

Brown Undergraduate Journal of Middle East Studies

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Volume 1
Issue 2

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

At the time of writing, much of the Middle East—and the world more broadly—is witnessing another moment of uncertainty and struggle. In the Middle East, Lebanon, Iran, and Iraq are experiencing moments of popular protest against entrenched corruption and other state practices. In Sudan, uprisings beginning in 2018 ultimately led to a revolution and a new government in 2019. In South Asia, mass protests have erupted after Prime Minister Narendra

Modi declared a new citizenship law excluding many of the country's Muslims, while Kashmir is in its fifth month of a curfew and communications blackout imposed by the Indian government. In East Asia, hundreds of thousands—if not millions—of Uyghur Muslims and other ethnic minorities continue to be detained in internment camps in China, while protests in Hong Kong continue. In South America, people in Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Peru have been protesting corruption and state policies that have led to economic insecurity. Meanwhile, in the United States, tens of thousands of asylum seekers are detained by US Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Patrol in squalid conditions, and the US is posturing towards an escalation in armed conflict with Iran—a devastating possibility for the millions of residents of the region who would be impacted by an outbreak of violence.

The 2010s were, for many of our editorial team, a time of questioning, grief, intellectual curiosity, solidarity, and hope. The Arab Uprisings in 2011 and the ensuing refugee crisis catapulting the Middle East and its people to the forefront of our minds and the social and political movements, waves of repression, and upheavals set the stage for the developments that many of us would come to study in our time at Brown. The varied and far-reaching impacts of the past decade have shaped both how we think and learn about the region and its people, which is reflected both in the pieces the Journal has published, as well as our overarching editorial philosophy.

On the cusp of the 2020s, we face many more unknowns. In addition to the conflicts mentioned above, youth-led movements addressing the impending climate crisis have gained momentum worldwide and biometric data collection and surveillance pose new challenges as societies, governments, and corporations struggle to balance profit, security, and ethical dilemmas. As a journal and as students we hope to continue to address these topics and more as they relate to the Middle East, both in this volume and in forthcoming issues. To do so, we reaffirm the need for historical analysis as a method for understanding and addressing contemporary phenomena. In addition to critical analyses, we hope our journal will celebrate the strengths, perspectives, cultures, and work of a wide variety of peoples in the region, as well as those of our contributors, collaborators, and editorial team. To achieve this, we wish to reiterate a number of choices and reasonings that stem from the question of what it means to produce content about the Middle East, originally put forth in our inaugural issue:

On "the Middle East"

We welcome an expansive definition, interpretation, and problematization of this term. For example, if an author has written "Southwest Asia" instead of "Middle East," we will respect and welcome this choice. Additionally, because the Middle East is a contested and amorphous geographical conception, we welcome submissions that might not fit into our current borderized understandings of the Middle East, but are related.

On style and language

We adhere to the Chicago Manual of Style and the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* style and transliteration guides. However, we take an expansive interpretation into account: style guides can reinforce hierarchical academic norms that have historically excluded marginalized communities through rigid conceptions of acceptable academic language. As such, we will use them as a guide but will deviate from them when we feel it is necessary. In addition to our English-language abstracts for our academic content and some of our creative content, we seek to provide a supplemental abstract translated to the language(s) of relevance to the piece when possible, given the skill-sets of our editorial team. Furthermore, we welcome submissions from languages other than English, for both academic and/or creative writing.

On anti-oppression and inclusivity

It is important for any publication to be conscientious of its role in knowledge production, especially one that deals with a region that has been historically viewed through the lenses of imperialism and orientalism. We are committed to elevating the voices of people from marginalized communities and across multiple intersections of oppressed identity, especially from those with connections to the region. In this same vein, we reject content that explicitly or implicitly perpetuates racism, sexism, homophobia, transphobia, xenophobia, ableism, classism, antisemitism, Islamophobia, discrimination on the grounds of religion, imperialism, colonialism, and/or

other systems of oppression, bearing in mind that this is not a comprehensive list. We acknowledge that this journal benefits from privileges enabling its publication, such as being based in the United States and at an institution like Brown, as well as the privilege of studying the Middle East from outside of the region. As such, we commit to critical self-reflection and reevaluation of our impact. We would like to thank *The College Hill Independent* and *bluestockings magazine* for modeling such commitment, and from whom we took inspiration for these statements.

On discussion and academic growth

We welcome discussion, feedback, and constructive responses to our previous publications, subject to similar editing standards as with our other content. Letters to the editor may be sent to bujmes@brown.edu.

As we look towards our second volume, we are excited to announce that we will be expanding our editorial capacity beyond Providence and are now accepting submissions from individuals regardless of institutional affiliation. During this editorial cycle, we have grown our organization, pushed through the ups and downs of a student publication, celebrated incredible student work, and have built a collaborative and supportive team that uplifts one another both in and outside of our editorial process. We look forward to growing our publication to include and amplify a wider variety of voices, and sharing these conversations with our

audience. As we move towards this vision, we are excited to present Volume 1 Number 2 of the *Brown Undergraduate Journal of Middle East Studies*.

The BUJMES editorial team



Mission Statement

The Brown Undergraduate Journal of Middle East Studies (BUJMES) is the first journal at Brown University whose focus is on the Middle East and North Africa. It is an undergraduate-operated journal featuring work from Brown-and RISD-affiliated individuals, covering a wide array of disciplines ranging from arts and literature to politics and culture. BUJMES aims to expand understanding of the Middle East and raise awareness of contemporary topics and discourse in and about the region.

We are committed to elevating voices of people from marginalized communities and across multiple intersections of oppressed identity, especially from those with connections to the region. In this same vein, we reject content that explicitly or implicitly perpetuates racism, sexism, homophobia, transphobia, xenophobia, ableism, classism, antisemitism, Islamophobia, discrimination on the grounds of religion, imperialism, colonialism, and/or other systems of oppression, bearing in mind that this is not a comprehensive list. We acknowledge that this journal benefits from privileges enabling its publication, such as being based in the United States and at an institution like Brown, as well as the privilege of studying the Middle East from outside of the region. As such, we commit to critical self-reflection and reevaluation of our impact.

Acknowledgments

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

WHERE THE FIRST AND SECOND CIRCLE OVERLAP:

An Exploration of Gamal Nasser's Navigation of Egypt's Middle Eastern and African Identity

Oluwatomisin (Tomi) Onabanjo

Edited by
Luqmaan Bokhary, Ryan Saadeh

Can we possibly ignore the fact that there is an African continent which 'Fate' decreed us to be a part of?[1] These are the words of the famous Egyptian leader, General Gamal Abdel Nasser. Although the inclusion of Egypt within Africa seems to be geographically self-evident, the nation's historical relationship with the remainder of the continent is in fact quite complex. From being a site along the Oriental slave trade to its prominent position in Afrocentric thought, Egypt has long had to contend with its bifurcated identity as both a Middle Eastern and African country. Yet, no Egyptian leader has so determinedly attempted to unite the two "circles" that characterize Egyptian national identity than Nasser.[2] However, the question arises: was Nasser's devotion to merging pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism an act of anti-colonial solidarity or an expedient ploy to

1 Gamal Abdel Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution. Introduced by Dorothy Thompson* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs, 1955), 86.

2 Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation*, 85.

increase his own prestige as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)?[3]

It is important to first briefly outline Egypt's historical association with other African nations, particularly sub-Saharan African nations. Through this contextualization, one begins to understand the significance of Nasser's decision to embrace the African component of Egypt's national identity. Located at the northeastern tip of Africa, Egypt is rightfully referred to as "the crossroads between the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and Sub-Saharan Africa."[4] Egypt's political history spans centuries, as it hosted notable African empires such as the Pharaonic Egyptians and the Kingdom of Kush. Such renowned civilizations have become focal points for radical African scholars in the reclamation of African history from the obliviating forces of slavery and colonialism.[5] Yet, regardless of these deep historical connections to an African heritage, Egypt is predominantly considered a Middle Eastern country.[5] When examining the "historical and socio-cultural heritage and links, Egypt is largely an Arab-Islamic state... So much so that taking Egypt from any of these two entities today will mean an amputated Islamic or Arab world."[6] Thus, Egypt—alongside other North African countries like Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and Libya—is frequently excluded from historical discourse concerning Africa, not simply because of its

3 The Non-Aligned Movement, or NAM, is an international organization that was formally established in 1961. Prior to its official creation, the NAM was a term used to describe the international movement of Asian, African, and South American nations that refused to align with either the United States and NATO ('First World') or the Soviet Bloc ('Second World') during the Cold War. It was primarily dedicated to supporting international struggles against the forces of racism, colonialism, and imperialism that affected the constitutive countries. For a comprehensive account of the NAM, refer to Guy Arnolds, *The A to Z of the Non-Aligned Movement and Third World* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2010).

4 I.K. Souare, "Egypt's evolving role in Africa: A Sub-Saharan perspective," Paper presented at the Institute of Diplomatic Studies, Cairo, April 7, 2008.

5 Delores P. Aldridge and Carlene Young, *Out of the Revolution: The Development of Africana Studies* (Lanham: Lexington, 2003), 29.

6 Souare, "Egypt's evolving role in Africa: A Sub-Saharan perspective."

northern geography. The dominant influence of Middle Eastern culture has resulted in Egypt developing a markedly different national identity than the remainder of the African continent. This schism between Egypt and sub-Saharan Africa was subsequently exacerbated by Arab people's historical involvement in the slave trade of black Africans.

Accused by the Kenyan scholar, Ali Mazrui, of participating in "second-degree slavery," Egypt was a major site of the Oriental slave trade as the country provided many captured black/sub-Saharan Africans to European slavers.[7] Thus, many sub-Saharan African people associated—and still associate—Arabs with willfully participating in crippling the overall development of the African continent.[8] This is so much so that when prominent academics call "for a pro-Arab, pan-Africanism that includes North Africa, and demands reparations from the West but not from the Arab world … [such] typology outrages many black nationalists, who see [such scholars] as apologists for Oriental slavery."[9] In addition, this tenuous historical relationship has resulted in many Arab people—and consequently, many Egyptians—developing racist attitudes towards sub-Saharan Africans. This tension has thus cultivated a tendency for Egyptians to consciously reject their status as Africans.[10] However, the onset of European colonialism in the 19th century would initiate a gradual shift in mentality. With Britain's occupation of Egypt in 1882, and the 1899 creation of a joint Egyptian-British protectorate over Sudan, Egypt's national identity would become inextricably tied to its sub-Saharan neighbor. The people of both territories would soon be united in their shared detestation for British colonial rule. Therefore,

7 Souare, "Egypt's evolving role in Africa: A Sub-Saharan perspective."

8 Hishaam D. Aidi, "Slavery, Genocide and the Politics of Outrage: Understanding the New Racial Olympics," *Middle East Report* 234, (Spring 2005): 44.

9 Aidi, "Slavery, Genocide and the Politics of Outrage," 44.

10 Valentina Primo, "The Reality of Racism in Egypt," *Cairo Scene*, August 5, 2015.

this mutual anti-colonial sentiment would form the initial foundations of a revived Egyptian connection to sub-Saharan Africa.

It is this common goal of removing colonial interference which Nasser would masterfully utilize to alter Egypt's conception of itself as an African nation. Effectively coming to power in 1954, Nasser immediately went about shedding the typical Egyptian antipathy directed towards sub-Saharan Africa. Nasser rather chose to proudly accept Egypt's unique position at the crux of two illustrious regions. Best encapsulated in a speech delivered to the Organization for Solidarity for the People of Africa and Asia (OSPAA), Nasser pridefully stated, "the Arab-Egyptian people are almost themselves a bridge between the two great continents. In our contemporary time, brothers, the Asian-African friendship is not only a historical and civilized link, but [a means to] demand the liberation of humanity from all the injustices of colonialism and exploitation."[11] Nasser's decision to embrace the Middle East and Africa's shared heritage of colonial exploitation therefore represented a momentous departure from the standard Egyptian opinion regarding Africa. For Nasser, "[the Egyptian people] cannot, under any circumstance … remain aloof from the terrible and sanguinary conflict going on there [sub-Saharan Africa] … We cannot do so for an important and obvious reason: we are *in* Africa."[12] Nasser thus presented Egypt's position on the African continent as nothing to be ashamed of and rather something to be celebrated. Through this willful acceptance and promotion of Egypt's African identity, Nasser's historical stature must be appropriately reconsidered. Not only was he a significant figure in the creation of a pan-Arab identity, he also aided in the reconciliation of a traditionally tenuous relationship between the Middle East and Africa.

11 Gamal Abdel Nasser, "The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser at an Event Held by the Organization for Solidarity for the People of Africa and Asia (OSPAA)" (speech, October 26, 1966), *http://www.nasser.org*.

12 Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation,* 109.

What is particularly laudable about Nasser's attempt at joining Egypt's Arab and African heritage are the steps he took to achieve this goal.[13] For example, Nasser ensured that the educational system reflected Egypt's African roots. As described by Tamim Kashgari:

> Educational curriculums were changed, additional courses added in universities and textbooks were rewritten all to create a sentiment within Egypt of unity with Africa. The more popular political wave of Pan-Arabism was also manipulated in order to generate excitement for Pan-Africanism… All of these efforts that were undertaken by Egypt clearly demonstrate that it [was] committed to creating a bond between itself and Africa.[14]

Education is often considered the most dependable means of transforming the fundamental perceptions and opinions of the populace. Thus, Nasser's decision to emphasize Egypt's African heritage via this change in curriculum reveals a steadfast dedication to altering how the Egyptian people framed themselves. Furthermore, Nasser reaffirmed Egypt's connection to the African continent not only through his influential role in establishing the Organization for African Unity in 1963, but also through Egypt's encouragement of liberation struggles across the continent.[15] This is best reflected in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Nasser proclaimed, "we have to comply with our duties towards the Congo and Africa. The more independent countries there are, the more secure we are in our freedom."[16] The Egyptian leader would promptly go about providing technical and material support to the revolutionary movements within the Congo, again solidifying his commitment to the

13 Tamim K. Kashgari, "The African Dimension of Egyptian Foreign Policy," *Inquiries Journal* 3, no. 9 (2011).

14 Kashgari, "The African Dimension of Egyptian Foreign Policy."

15 Kashgari, "The African Dimension of Egyptian Foreign Policy."

16 Kashgari, "The African Dimension of Egyptian Foreign Policy."

grander African fight against colonialism and imperialism. Therefore, Nasser must be appreciated not only as a proponent of pan-Arabism, but also as a willing adherent to pan-Africanism. The combination of these two identities draws out an attempt by Nasser to truly link the shared struggles of the Middle East and Africa. As both regions were tragically affected by colonialism, it was in their common interest to unite against the imperialist West. For Nasser, Egypt was to be the logical vanguard of this anti-colonialist movement due to the nation's position in both the Middle East and Africa.

The positive effect of Nasser's insertion of Egypt into the African sphere is further reflected in the statements and opinions of various African and African-American contemporaries. Gamal Nkrumah, son of the legendary Kwame Nkrumah, provides a useful example of the appreciative African response to Nasser's commitment to the sub-Saharan independence movements. Nkrumah conveys that "few Arab leaders of Nasser's stature were involved as intimately as he was in the struggle to liberate Africa from colonial rule. It was this dedication to the cause of African liberation that endeared him to like-minded African leaders."[17] Based on the historical relationship between Egypt and the remainder of sub-Saharan Africa, Nasser's offering of substantial support was quite startling. As Egypt was traditionally detached from the plight of the remainder of the continent, there was an immense sense of gratitude for a leader like Nasser "who was just as proud of his African heritage as of his Arab identity."[18] However, it is extremely important to consider the positionality of Gamal Nkrumah when reading such statements. Gamal Nkrumah is in fact named after General Nasser due to Kwame

Nkrumah's storied friendship with the Egyptian leader. Furthermore, Nasser would "[rescue the Nkrumah] family from possible perdition in the aftermath of the bloody 24 February 1966 coup that overthrew [Kwame

17 Gamal Nkrumah, "Nasser through African Eyes," *Al-Ahram Weekly,* May 8, 2017.

18 Nkrumah, "Nasser through African Eyes."

Nkrumah]" by sheltering them in Cairo.[19] Thus, there is understandably a significant degree of partiality in Gamal Nkrumah's statements regarding the former Egyptian leader. However, Gamal Nkrumah still fittingly conveys the sense of gratitude felt by many African leaders and people for Nasser's refusal to shun the African continent in favor of solely upholding Egypt's Middle Eastern identity. Nasser's commendable adoption of a pan-African mentality would be so pronounced that it would also affect African-American civil rights activists and their own efforts to combat racism and segregation. This is best encapsulated in the sentiments of Malcolm X. Travelling to Egypt in 1964, Malcolm X would be impressed not only by the level of social intermingling between races, but also Nasser's attempts at striking unity between the Middle East and Africa via the two regions' common struggles. As put by Edward E. Curtis IV:

> In so doing, [Malcolm X] identified Egypt's Nasser as a model of anti-colonial, Afro-Asian Islamic leadership, and he was not the only African American leader to do so. Fellow Harlemite street orator Carlos Cooks called Nasser a "unique and rare personality," both "African and Arabic." Nasser became a hero to some African Americans, especially black Muslims in New York, in the wake of the 1956 take-over of the Suez Canal by Israeli, British, and French armed forces. Although it was U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower who demanded the withdrawal of these troops, people of color around the world saw Nasser as a victor and as [a] potential leader of the global struggle against colonialism.[20]

Nasser's decision to integrate Egypt's two identities thus represented a willingness to fight colonialism on two fronts and would draw immense adulation worldwide. To the extent that those who once might have rebuffed Egypt's attempt at framing itself as African—black nationalists

19 Nkrumah, "Nasser through African Eyes."

20 Edward E. Curtis IV, "My Heart Is in Cairo: Malcolm X, the Arab Cold War, and the Making of Islamic Liberation Ethics," *Journal of American History* 102, no. 3 (2015): 779.

who still chafed from the legacy of Oriental slavery and Arab racism—would come to accept Nasser as an admirable leader in the anti-colonialist movement.

However, a critical question that arises is the underlying reason for Nasser's decision to align Egypt's Middle Eastern and African identities. Some scholars ascribe to Nasser "an ambivalent chord between a recapitulation of European colonial discourse about Africa and a more radical view of Africa as a source of enlightenment for Egypt."[21] It is this notion of a "recapitulation of European colonial discourse" that casts skepticism on the altruistic portrayal of Nasser as the liberator of both the Middle East and Africa.[22] There is evidence that Nasser was primarily using Africa to exploit sentiments of "pan-pigmentalization"[23] and solidify his global stature within the Third World (and thus become the *de facto* leader of the Non-Aligned Movement). A 1964 CIA special memorandum to President Lyndon B. Johnson highlights Nasser's potentially self-aggrandizing interests in the fate of sub-Saharan Africa. The CIA document claims that, "Nasser recognized that he carried comparatively little weight with his conferees at [the Addis Ababa Conference] and that he set about expanding and strengthening his African relationships."[24] This memo does not attribute Nasser's interests in Africa to any moral obligation to the continent, but rather as an avenue to develop his own international status. Therefore, Nasser's political remarks concerning Egypt's intertwined pan-African and pan-Arab identity possibly veiled his true intentions. There is the potential that Nasser regarded "his African policies as a means not only to gain prestige for him on the continent,

21 Shaden M. Tageldin, "The Place of Africa, in Theory: Pan-Africanism, Postcolonialism, Beyond," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 27, no. 3 (2014): 310-311.

22 Tageldin, "The Place of Africa," 310-311.

23 Darryl Thomas, *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2001), 37.

24 The Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates, *Nasser's Policy and Prospects in Black Africa*, January 6, 1964, 1.

but also to embrace his role on the world scene, particularly among the non-aligned states."[25] Yet, similar to Gamal Nkrumah's honorific account of Nasser, this CIA memorandum must also be critiqued for its partiality. To the Western powers, Nasser was often considered the "Hitler of the Nile" for his unwillingness to bend to their imperialist desires.[26] Thus, a CIA memo designed to discredit Nasser's global influence within both the Middle East and Africa is understandable. Yet, it still presents the idea that Nasser may have utilized realpolitik tactics concerning Egypt's affairs in Africa: Rather than a true devotion to pan-Africanism, Nasser self-servingly perceived sub-Saharan Africa as a region which could be used for both his and Egypt's international aims. This notion of a self-interested Nasser is compounded by various instances where he uttered defamatory remarks about sub-Saharan Africa. Nasser referred to Egypt's obligation to "never in any circumstances relinquish our responsibility and civilization to the remotest depths of the jungle."[27] In addition, he also references Africa as the "Dark Continent."[28] While Shaden Tageldin argues that this term, "Dark Continent," is a result of mistranslation, this excerpt still evokes a sense of inflated Egyptian superiority.[29] Similar to the *mission civilisatrice* of the Western powers, Nasser seems to convey a duty in which Egypt *must* aid sub-Saharan African in their development as they cannot accomplish this task by themselves. As put by Tageldin, "charging Egypt with the 'responsibility' to foster enlightenment in Africa, Nasser's rhetoric ultimately re-consigns the rest of the continent to darkness."[30] The notion of a noble Nasser, uniting Egypt's Middle Eastern and African identity for the sake of anti-colonial solidarity, must be critiqued.

25 The Central Intelligence Agency, *Nasser's Policy and Prospects in Black Africa*, 1.

26 "An Affair to Remember," *The Economist*, July 29, 2006.

27 Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation,*110.

28 Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation.*

29 Tageldin, "The Place of Africa," 313-314.

30 Tageldin, "The Place of Africa," 313.

Nasser's willingness to utilize Africa—or in this case, black Africans—for the sake of his and Egyptian prestige is further illustrated in his treatment of the Nubian people.

The construction of the Aswan High Dam is often considered one of Nasser's most notable achievements. It not only represented Nasser's decision to showcase Egypt's industrial capabilities, it also instigated the chain of events that would result in Nasser's victory in the Suez Crisis and his positioning as the foremost leader of the Middle Eastern world. However, what is often neglected from the historical record is the immense effect the Dam had upon the Nubian communities who were displaced by its construction. Nasser's decision to sacrifice the wellbeing of the Nubian people reflects a potential lack of regard for the black/sub-Saharan African population of Egyptian society. Located primarily in what is southern Egypt and Northern Sudan, the Nubians are the ethnic group most commonly associated with Egypt's sub-Saharan African heritage. As articulated by Hussein Fahim, "Nubians constitute an ethnic group of nearly 120,000 people ... Skin color and language serve to differentiate Nubians from other ethnic groups in Egypt. Because of their primarily Negroid rather than Caucasoid ancestry, Nubians are darker skinned than the average Egyptian."[31] It is rather telling that the construction of the Aswan High Dam so significantly superseded the wellbeing of thousands of Nubians. As Hassan Dafalla states, "when Egypt decided to build the High Dam at Aswan, the world's attention was attracted by the wonderful scheme, its design, its scale, its costs and its benefits to Egypt; but its evil aspects for Nubia passed unnoticed."[32] While Dafalla is also an example of a partial observer—having "lived with [a Nubian displaced community] for six years"—the decision to sacrifice the livelihood of the Nubian people for the betterment of the country

31 Hussein M. Fahim, *Egyptian Nubians* (N.p.: University of Utah, 1983), 10.

32 Hassan Dafalla, *The Nubian Exodus* (Uppsala: C. Hurst in Association with the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1975), xvii.

still suggests a willingness on the part of Nasser to strategically disregard the concerns of Egypt's most distinctly sub-Saharan African population.[33] Elucidated by Fahim, "the Nubians have always felt that the two Aswan dams drastically upset their traditional life and placed them, against their will, in an unfamiliar and uncertain existence … Nubians—especially those whose lands were inundated—perceived themselves as victims of the dam."[34] Admittedly, the Nasser government did substantially invest in the relocation and compensation of the Nubian people.[35] As described by Fahim, "in 1960, both Egypt's president [Nasser] and vice-president visited Nubia to show further official and national concern for the Nubians."[36] However, this trip can also be considered an empty gesture as "there was no direct Nubian participation in the government's formulation of plans."[36] Therefore, the implication is that the Nubian people were dispossessed of their agency in regards to the construction of the Aswan High Dam. This thereby indicates Nasser's preparedness to overlook the inputs and desires of the portion of the Egyptian population that most strongly identified with its African heritage. Captured by Maja Janmyr, "President Nasser dealt the final blow to the country's Nubian community when he, in the 1950s, initiated the Aswan High Dam project, which led to the near total flooding of settled Nubia."[37] Janmyr further discusses the immense effect which this displacement had on the Nubian people

> Ever since their displacement, Nubians as a collective have been continuously marginalized politically, socially and economically. The Egyptian state has blatantly denied the existence of any indigenous people or ethnic minority groups in the country, preferring to emphasize the homogeneity

33 Fahim, *Egyptian Nubians,* xvii.

34 Fahim, *Egyptian Nubians,* 31.

35 Fahim, *Egyptian Nubians,* 36.

36 Fahim, *Egyptian Nubians,* 36.

37 Maja Janmyr, "Human Rights and Nubian Mobilisation in Egypt: Towards Recognition of Indigeneity," *Third World Quarterly* 38, no. 3 (2016): 718.

> of Egyptian society. While Egypt's nationalism aimed at being anti-imperialist, anti-racist, and revolutionary, it has been argued that this nationalism also reinforced historical and racial structures of oppression, where prejudice against Nubians has been long prevalent.[38]

The displacement of the Nubian people can be argued as a necessary decision when considering the massive economic gains that would come from the Aswan High Dam. However, the knowing cost of the Dam to the Nubian people reflects a readiness on the part of Nasser to forfeit the livelihood of Egypt's most identifiably African population for the sake of his international standing. Thus, Janmyr highlights Nasser's potential usage of sub-Saharan Africa and its people as simply a means to an end. This counters the narrative of Nasser as a leader who chose to integrate Egypt's African and Middle Eastern identities due to altruistic intent.

Nasser's decision to wholly embrace Egypt's African identity resulted in significant international admiration as he diminished traditional antagonism between Egypt and sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, Nasser's provision of both material and political support to various African nations and their liberation struggles resulted in his social preeminence within both regions. However, the idea that Nasser promoted pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism out of a genuine desire to foment worldwide anti-colonialist efforts should be critically examined. Through analyzing CIA documents, excerpts of his texts, as well as the fate of the Nubian community in Egypt, Nasser's embrace of an African identity can also be interpreted as a self-serving ploy to increase both his and Egypt's international stature. The validity of this Machiavellian notion is consolidated by the fleeting nature of Egypt's acceptance of its African heritage. For example, poor racial relations between Egyptians and sub-Saharan Africans significantly characterizes contemporary Egyptian society. Thus, Nasser is undoubtedly a major figure in both Middle Eastern, as well as

38 Janmyr, "Human Rights and Nubian Mobilisation in Egypt," 718.

African history. Yet, the debate still remains as to whether this legacy is born out of altruistic sincerity or political ambition.

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

THE FRENCH MEDICAL MISSION IN MOROCCO

& the Ideological Impact of Émile Mauchamp, 1901-1907

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In 1954, *Maroc Médical* published *Lyautey et le Médecin*, a collection of letters by French doctors in a solemn "homage of gratitude" to Hubert Lyautey for his incorporation of medicine in "the creation of modern Morocco."[1] The collection paints a moving, humanitarian portrait of the first Resident-General of the Moroccan Protectorate. "Doctors will draw stimulus and new dynamism from continuing [in Morocco] the action of pioneers who had the pride to collaborate in the work of such a Chief, the work which honors Morocco more than ever today," the preface exalts.[2]

Indeed, in pursuit of his mission to spread French culture like an "oil stain" across Morocco, so as to "peacefully" consolidate power, Lyautey engineered the military-style deployment of "médecins-militaires" and the rapid construction of hospitals and dispensaries across the Protectorate.

1 Charles-Auguste-Félix de Beaupoil et al., *Lyautey et le médecin* Casablanca: Maroc Medical, 1954), 6.

2 Saint-Aulaire, *Lyautey et le médecin*, 9.

[3] Lyautey carried out this project with an associationist strategy, a new colonial theory coined by French sociologist and ethnographer René Meunier.[4] Associationism drew upon psychology and biomedicine to create an oversimplified, Orientalizing conception of Moroccan identity that ignored regional and individual differences, assuming that colonial subjects were incapable of becoming "civilized" and therefore should exist separately from Europeans.[5] In using associationism to govern the Protectorate, Lyautey rejected the Jacobin theory of assimilationism upon which the French government had previously based its colonial strategy, seeking to rejuvenate a system he felt "republican dogmatism" had hindered.[6] Whereas associationism erased pre-colonial identities by otherizing colonial subjects, assimilationism had claimed colonial territories as inherently French and attempted to assimilate subjects into French culture. Assimilationism gave rise to the "mission civilisatrice," or French civilizing mission, and predicated itself upon the idea that colonial subjects were capable of "reformation" so as to become eventually equal to Europeans.

As Ellen Amster has argued, associationism manifested in the work of soldier-doctors who created the Arab as a "physiological racial type," often through blatant misrepresentation of data.[7] Such a development is evident

3 Spencer D. Segalla, *Moroccan Soul: French Education, Colonial Ethnology, and Muslim Resistance*, 1912-1956 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 14; Jim Paul, "Medicine and Imperialism in Morocco," *Middle East Research and Information Project*, Inc., no. 60 (Sep. 1977): 4.

4 Hamid Irbouh, *Art in the Service of Colonialism: French Art Education in Morocco 1912-1956*, 2nd ed. (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2012), 77.

5 Segalla, *Moroccan Soul: French Education, Colonial Ethnology, and Muslim Resistance, 1912-1956,* 125.

6 Segalla, Moroccan Soul, 9; 20.

7 Ellen Amster, "The Syphilitic Arab?: A Search for Civilization in Disease Etiology, Native Prostitution, and French Colonial Medicine," in *French Mediterraneans: Transnational and Imperial Histories*, ed. Patricia M.E. Lorcin and Todd Shepard (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2016), 320.

in the research Lyautey's recruits undertook after the establishment of the Protectorate. For example, Drs. Georges Lacapère and Émile-Joseph Speder discussed the distinct "evolution" of disease and human biology in Morocco as a result of the Arab-Muslim "mentality."[8] In harnessing the scientific method (inaccurately) to "prove" biological differences between Arabs and Europeans, these doctors claimed that Arab inferiority was irreversible, thus providing a strong rebuke to assimilationism.

Of course, Lyautey by no means invented the French medical endeavor. Rather, he was capitalizing upon the existing diplomatic and grassroots influence of French doctors that had begun in the 16th century—far before the advent of associationism—when the Sultan first requested European biomedical techniques presented to his court.[9] In particular, Lyautey operated upon a blueprint which doctor-diplomats created in the service of the French foreign ministry. Over the course of his 1878-1901 mission, Dr. Fernand Linarès pioneered this role as the first doctor to come to Morocco formally on behalf of the French military and its "peaceful penetration" strategy, in fact inspiring Germany, Spain, and Great Britain to begin their own medical diplomacy programs. Following Linarès' tenure, the French mission manifested most systematically from 1901-1907, with the formalization of the Service du Santé. [10]

There is very little secondary literature on the French medical mission in Morocco, and almost none on the period 1901-1907. The existing scholarship skims over this phase in the Service du Santé's history by conflating it with the mission's development under Lyautey, who arrived in Morocco in 1905. This linkage assumes that the transition from associationism to

8 Georges Lacapère, *La Syphilis Arabe* (Paris: Doin, 1923), 1.; Dr. L. Lepinay and Dr. Émile-Joseph Speder, preface to *Pratiques des Harems Marocains: Sorcellerie, Médecine, Beauté*, by Aline R. de Lens (Paris: P. Geuthner, 1925), viii

9 Ellen Amster, *Medicine and the Saints: Medicine, Islam, and the Colonial Encounter in Morocco*, 1877-1956 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2013), 108.

10 Dr. Maxime Rousselle, *Médecins, chirurgiens, & apothicaires français au Maroc: 1577-1907* (Morocco: self-pub., 1996), 194.

assimilationism coincided with the decline of the Makhzen (the Moroccan government) following the death of Sultan Moulay Hassan in 1894. The most compelling evidence to suggest a shift had already occurred by this time is the historical record of Dr. Émile Mauchamp, whom the secondary literature often discusses in tandem with doctors in Morocco post-1912. Mauchamp, who served in Morocco from 1905-1907, was a virulent racist whose posthumous work *La Sorcellerie au Maroc* ("Sorcery in Morocco") adopts an unmistakably associationist tone. He is by far the most well-known (and most-cited) doctor of the pre-Protectorate era, as in 1907 a crowd of local residents beat him to death outside his clinic in Marrakesh.[11] Mauchamp's assassination prompted an international outcry and gave Lyautey an excuse to take the first French military action against Morocco, beginning in the Protectorate. [12]

In this paper, I seek to counter the disproportionate attention Mauchamp has received and instead highlight the work of other doctors in Morocco during 1901-1907, for there is a striking inconsistency between Lyauteyist (and Mauchampian) rhetoric and the mainstream discourse of pre-Protectorate French doctors in 1901-1907.[13] This paper will consider when and how this discursive rupture actually occurred. This examination is relevant in answering broader questions about the complicated legacy of French colonialism, especially regarding the longevity of its narrative as "humanitarian" or "civilizing," which draws upon assimilationist rhetoric. Despite the shift to associationism (and the existence of medical diplomacy in the first place), history has often

11 Jonathan Katz, *Murder in Marrakesh: Émile Mauchamp and the French Colonial Adventure* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 1.

12 Katz, *Murder in Marrakesh*, 2

13 Daniel Rivet, "Hygiénisme colonial et médicalisation de la société marocaine au temps du protectorat français: 1912-1956," in *Santé, médecine, et société dans le monde arabe, ed. Elisabeth Longuenesse* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1995), 112.

remembered the medical mission in Morocco as an example of French humanitarianism or "solidarisme" with indigenous Moroccans. [14]

In addressing these issues, I analyze primary sources from colonial actors and draw conclusions on their perspectives and scholarship. I include colonial descriptions of indigenous peoples in my analysis to evaluate the doctors' biases and intentions; rigorous discussion of Moroccan perspectives is beyond the scope of this paper. I will begin with a brief historical background, followed by a closer analysis focusing on the French doctors' reports, in order to demonstrate that from 1901-1907, they approached their work through a more assimilationist lens, following the example of Fernand Linarès. Like doctors during the Protectorate, their objective was increasing French imperial control. In concerning themselves mainly with hygiene and infectious diseases, such as cholera and smallpox, they racialized Moroccans psychologically rather than physiologically, so as to otherize them without contending that they were biologically and therefore irrevocably inferior to Europeans (as associationism argued). By adopting a grassroots approach, attempting to integrate themselves into local populations, and offering their services for free, these doctors wove a false narrative of consent and benefaction and maintained a facade of assimilationism. I then identify Émile Mauchamp as departing from his colleagues in both his practice and scholarship. His death and ensuing martyrdom galvanized Europe and provided a key opportunity to transition towards associationism and "Islam-as-pathology."[15] Meanwhile, the presentation of his work as representative of the Service du Santé's supposed republicanism maintained a laïque (secular) and humanitarian face of the French mission civilisatrice.

14 Marie-Claire Micouleau-Sicault, *Les médecins français au Maroc (1912-1956): combats en urgence,* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2000), 11; 33; Amster, *Medicine and the Saints,* 10-11.

15 Amster, "The Syphilitic Arab," 321.

Historical Overview

Prior to the Protectorate in Morocco, the French colonial strategy in North Africa centered around assimilationism. There were both practical and ideological reasons for this approach. First, it was necessary to simplify the task of direct rule over such a large empire. The French hoped that in replacing North Africa's diverse array of tribal, ethnic, and religious identities with a standard French colonial culture, they could prevent rebellion.[16] While assimilationism did draw a distinction between French versus colonized populations, it did so not biologically or anthropologically, a typical tactic of indirectly-ruled empires, but rather by condemning the "moral and physical degradation" of Arab culture due to Islam.[17] Therefore, it left open the possibility for evolution once French governance reformed and secularized existing social structures. In its purest form, assimilation theory was "forced," stipulating that France annex colonies outright, claim them as singularly French, and institute an all-encompassing *mission civilisatrice*.[18] In practice, of course, the French colonial government enforced strong socio-economic barriers between French settlers and indigenous peoples in occupied territories, and the promise of eventual "equality" was clearly a farce.[19] However, in professing to support the idea that all colonial subjects were capable of adopting French culture and values, assimilationism still allowed the French imperialist project to portray itself as "race-blind" and *laïque,* inspired by the Declaration of the Rights of Man itself.[20]

16 Moshe Gershovich, *French Military Rule in Morocco: Colonialism and its Consequences,* (New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 19.

17 Charles Richard, *De l'esprit de la législation musulmane,* (1849), quoted in Amster, "The Syphilitic Arab," 320.

18 Gershovich, *French Military Rule in Morocco,* 26.

19 Gershovich, *French Military Rule in Morocco,* 25.

20 Gershovich, *French Military Rule in Morocco,* 20.

By the time Fernand Linarès arrived in Morocco as part of a French military mission in 1878, the validity of assimilationist theory as a vector for control seemed in doubt. In the Caribbean, the first attempts at forced assimilation had appeared successful, but as Moshe Gershovich argues, it had been an easier task since repatriated former slaves had already been robbed of "homogenous pre-colonial traditions" which could have formed a basis of resistance.[21] More recently, however, Thomas Bugeaud, the governor-general of Algeria from 1840-1848, had attempted to replicate the process in the Caribbean and failed spectacularly: His regime ended with the 1848 Revolution—or what the French called the rise of "Muslim fanaticism." Meanwhile, increasing dissent among the indigenous, European-educated elite in India against British rule sparked fear among the French of using education as a tool of assimilation. [22]

Indeed, by the mid-19th century, disgruntled doctors in Algeria had begun to question the merits of assimilationism, some beginning research that would inspire the later work of doctors during the Protectorate era. Dr. Émile-Louis Bertherand, stationed in Algeria at a *bureau-arabe* (an "Arab office," a French colonial administrative and intelligence-gathering center) from 1848-1853 supplied "evidence" against assimilationism.[23] He discussed the "physiological expressions of Arab temperament," such as the "overdevelopment of the abdomen to the detriment of the brain" and "engorged" sexual organs which heightened the risk of "venereal excess, syphilis, hemorrhoid, and tumefaction of the legs."[24] These qualities are more associated with associationist rhetoric because they rendered the Arab physically and irrevocably inferior to the European; they undermined assimilationism by claiming that a civilizing mission was scientifically futile.

21 Gershovich, *French Military Rule in Morocco,* 21.

22 Gershovich, *French Military Rule in Morocco,* 22; 26.

23 Amster, "The Syphilitic Arab," 324.

24 Amster, "The Syphilitic Arab," 324.

Nonetheless, Morocco presented a daunting challenge that did not permit an abandonment of assimilationism altogether. On the one hand, there were certainly reasons that the theory would require modification if implemented there. Islam, as Bugeaud learned in Algeria in 1848, had the potential to serve as a potent unifying force against French encroachment.[25] Consequently, France was wary of outwardly attempting to undermine Muslim leadership or practice, as the secular principles of assimilationism dictated. Governmentally, too, Morocco was strong, making it still more difficult to replace the existing structures with French hegemony. The Sultan from 1873-1894, Moulay Hassan I, had proven himself adept at playing European powers off of one another. He had also made concerted efforts, such as the 1893 trip on which Linarès accompanied him, to raise a call for national unity in the face of the imperialist threat.[26] Even if France or another European power were able to weaken him or the Makhzen, under the so-called "Sharifian empire" local chieftains retained strong governmental authority and were thus capable of rising up in the central government's place. [27]

On the other hand, competition for influence in Morocco with Germany, Great Britain, and Spain had created intense pressure for France to live up to the republican (and assimilationist) ideals by which it professed to run its empire. France's enormous abuses in Algeria after 1848, and its questionable adherence to the Franco-Moroccan Treaty of 1845, had incited backlash by other European states, who accused France of "trafficking in Protection."[28] In 1880, the United States intervened and

25 Gershovich, *French Military Rule in Morocco*, 21.

26 Amina Aouchar, *Le Voyage du Sultan Moulay Hassan de 29 Juin au 23 Décembre 1893*, (Morocco: Senso Unico Editions, 2003), 237.

27 William A. Hoisington, *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 22.

28 Frederick V. Parsons, "The 'Morocco Question' in 1884: An Early Crisis." *The English Historical Review* 77, no. 305 (Oct. 1962): 660; Frederick V. Parsons, *The Origins of the Morocco Question, 1880-1900,* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1976), 22.

assembled the Conference of Madrid, which produced a treaty affirming the sovereignty of Morocco under the Sultanate and the equal rights of all European states to trade there.[29] These events created a bind for Plenipotentiary Minister of Tangier Laurent-Charles Féraud; while the lessons of Algeria made it clear that France could not continue its strategy of forced assimilation, there had never been stronger international pressure to prove the validity of the mission civilisatrice. Féraud concluded that France must employ increased "discretion" in their dealings with Morocco: Rather than show force, France had to demonstrate that Moroccans themselves desired their help.[30] In accordance with Féraud's recommendations, the French government devised a new approach to Morocco of "peaceful penetration."[31] It modeled this policy after the test run it had established in Tunisia, which developed a revised assimilationist theory whereby the colonial power maintained the "appearance of a Muslim sovereign as the head of state," rather than complete annexation, in order to prevent either rebellion or international outcry. [32]

Medical diplomacy made up the core of this plan of modified assimilationism, for it provided the perfect narrative of secularism, humanitarianism, and longstanding Moroccan cooperation. European doctors had come to Morocco and presented to the Sultan's court since the 17th century. Therefore, there was a continuous record of "civilizing" through medicine since the end of the Renaissance, the period that colonial actors widely identified as the moment the Arab world ceased to be the intellectual superior of the Christian West and fell to Muslim "decadence."[33] This history, along with Sultan Hassan's apparent openness to European

29 Right of Protection in Morocco, July 30, 1880, 246 U.S.T.S. 71.

30 Parsons, "The Morocco Question," 308-309.

31 Alexander Johnston, "Peaceful Penetration," *Journal of the Royal African Society* 4, no. 14 (Jan. 1905), 190.

32 Gershovich, *French Military Rule in Morocco*, 23.

33 Ernest Renan, "L'Islamisme et la Science" (speech, Conférence de l'Islamisme et la Science, la Sorbonne, Paris, France, 1883).

doctors, created a precedent for doctors to infiltrate Morocco openly, to an extent that the terms of the Madrid Conference had otherwise prohibited. [34]

Although all the major European powers in Morocco used medical diplomacy, France had a particular claim to ownership over the practice that allowed them to assert their dominance over the region. The primary reason for this advantage was that they had been the first to think of the strategy: Linarès was the first European doctor to insert himself formally into the Sultanate as an advisor and friend to both Sultan Hassan and royal chamberlain Sadar al-Adham.[35] Although others, such as Dr. Egbert Verdun from Great Britain, followed suit, none were as successful in gaining the trust of the Sultan, as Linarès already had his ear and could therefore undermine other colonial powers without infringing upon any international agreements.[36] His colleagues, including Féraud and French Ministers in Tangier at the time of his mission, widely credit him with "neutralizing the rival powers" in order to pave the way for peaceful penetration in Morocco. [37]

While France took the opportunity to capitalize upon their strategic advantage following the death of Sultan Hassan in 1894, they did not divert from modified assimilationism altogether. The Makhzen weakened dramatically without their late ruler, so that by the turn of the century Europeans generally viewed Morocco less as a challenge to the imperial agenda than as a "ramshackle state."[38] In concurrence with this change, French medical penetration increased in both pace and efficiency, through the counsel of Doctor Sylvain Foubert, who arrived

34 Aouchar, *Le Voyage*, 237.

35 Paul, "Medicine and Imperialism," 4.

36 Paul, "Medicine and Imperialism."

37 Count of Saint-Aulaire, qtd. in Paul, "Medicine and Imperialism," 4.

38 Hoisington, *Lyautey,* 22.

in Oujda in 1901 to take over Linarès' dispensary.[39] It may be tempting to designate this period as the turning point from which the French Protectorate became inevitable and doctors became emboldened enough to begin leaving assimilationist rhetoric behind. However, the success of the French medical mission was far from assured. [40]

At that point, French influence was still lacking in the rural and mountain regions, and was mainly confined to the urban areas in which the Service du Santé had established dispensaries.[41] Other nations had also found ways of establishing solid footholds through means other than currying favor with the Makhzen, posing challenges that France had yet to overcome. Spain, for example, had established a bacteriological practice through its Sanitary Council and Hygiene Commission of Tangier, helping delay the establishment of a Pasteur Institute in Morocco until 1913. [42]

Most important, France could not afford to divert from its assimilationist message because it had not yet convinced the international community of its merit, specifically Western Europe and the United States. Reflecting this continued skepticism, in 1905 *The North American Review* published a report on "Conditions in Morocco," in which author Philip Bayard wrote bitingly: "The French have discovered that, among all Europeans, the Moors find them the most agreeable…in his heart of hearts, the Moor finds that the most agreeable are those who remain in Europe…The fact is that the French are incapable of making a pacific penetration in any part of the world."[43] That Bayard, an American, took notice of France's misdeeds is significant, as the Madrid Conference of

39 Rousselle, *Médecins,* 189.

40 Susan Gilson Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 140.

41 Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco,* 139.

42 Francisco Javier Martínez-Antonio, "Double Trouble: French colonialism in Morocco and the early history of the Pasteur Institutes of Tangier and Casablanca (1895-1932)," *Dynamis* 36, no. 2 (2016): 317.

43 Francis Philip Bayard, "Conditions in Morocco," *The North American Review* 180, no. 579 (Feb. 1905): 283.

1880 had established the United States as a neutral facilitator in the case of Morocco. Therefore, American dissent had not only more credibility than that of a European power (as the US was not competing for control in Morocco), but also diplomatic weight.

"Mainstream" Approach & Scholarship

France's colonial history, particularly in Algeria, and the diplomatic circumstances surrounding the Moroccan question had encouraged innovation upon the original, blatantly coercive brand of assimilationism on which the Empire had relied. The continued relevance of political factors, like international pressure to show benevolence to Morocco, meant that doctors in the Service du Santé had no reason to change their tactics. In this section, I focus on reports and research that these doctors compiled in order to demonstrate that they had indeed not transitioned to associationism. Their work does not reflect an institutional embrace of the physiological study of Arab inferiority, which dominated the medical mission during the Protectorate.[44] Rather, these doctors more closely followed the precedent Linarès had set based in assimilationism. Indeed, it had been his example, and his 1901 retirement, that had inspired the deployment of the medical missionary corps in the first place in order to continue to "gather local intelligence and win native confidence."[45] This assimilationist model was tripartite: It involved manufacturing a narrative of indigenous consent by portraying certain voices as representative of all the people, following a grassroots approach that incorporated local customs, and focusing on infectious diseases in order to create the image of a "diseased" Arab who could be cured through stricter governance and laïcité.

44 Amster, *Medicine and the Saints*, 5.

45 Amster, *Medicine and the Saints*, 87.

The French colonial administration used Linarès as proof of Moroccan desire for and consent to French aid, following the false assimilationist idea that a colonized population welcomes its occupation. Members of the French administration, like Minister to Tangier Henri de la Martinière, extolled Linarès in 1899 for the integrity and tact which had supposedly given him "great moral authority" amongst the Moroccan people.[46] However, Martinière provided this supposed goodwill by citing favor Linarès won from members of the Moroccan indigenous elite, who cannot be considered representative of the general public. He first established his notoriety by vaccinating an important family in Bargach, and then cemented the trust of the Makhzen by curing the Sultan of typhoid fever in 1889.[47] His account of his trip to Tafilalet with the Sultan demonstrates that he was able to go anywhere with his Moroccan co-travelers, allowing him to come in close contact with the Arab population. Colonel Epaulard exaggerates this dynamic as a quasi-romance in the introductory biography, dubbing him an "Arabophile," observing that everyone he encountered in Fez asked about "*Toubib* Linarès," and marveling that he was able to tear himself from the "indigenous ambiance" enough to remember his duties to France.[48] However, Linarès was travelling as a member of the Sultan's cohort; it is more likely that the Moroccans he met were honoring the Sultan's authority than embracing Linarès as an individual.

Doctors in the Service du Santé built upon this romanticized account of Moroccan welcome, thus maintaining the assimilationist veneer of indigenous consent. They noted the impression their predecessors had made in general, hyperbolic terms, depicting Moroccans as blindly grateful for biomedical techniques that they could not possibly

46 Dr. Maximilien Antoine Cyprien Henri Poisson de la Martinière, *Souvenirs du Maroc,* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie., 1919), qtd. in Rousselle, *Médecins,* 145.

47 Rousselle, *Médecins,* 139.

48 Dr. François-Fernand Linarès, *Voyage au Tafilalet avec S.M. Sultan Moulay Hassan en 1893,* (Rabat: Bulletin de l'Institut d'Hygiène du Maroc, 1932), 2.

understand: one remarked that "everywhere European doctors are seen as sorcerers," while another observed that "Moroccans viewed European science as a universal panacea."[49] Despite the waning power of the Makhzen after 1900, the Service's administration continued to stress the importance of fostering relationships with the elite. The Service solicited a nomination from Linarès to succeed his role as doctor-diplomat within the Makhzen and personal doctor to the Sultan.[50] Linarès chose Dr. Théodore Zumbiehl, who even took a note from his predecessor and accompanied the Sultan on horseback from Fez to Marrakesh.[51]

(Figure 1) Portrait of Fernand Linarès

Dr. Félix-Paul Jaffary's accounts demonstrate the intentional public relations tactics the Service undertook in order to advertise supposed consent towards the mission to the rest of Europe. In November 1903,

49 Ahmed Idrissi Alami, *Mutual Othering: Islam, Modernity and Politics of Cross-Cultural Encounters in Pre-Colonial Moroccan and European Travel Writing,* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2013), 114-115.

50 Rousselle, *Médecins,* 145-146.

51 Rousselle, *Médecins,* 146.

Zumbiehl quit and Jaffary replaced him.[52] Jaffary, like Zumbiehl before him, expressed a sense of purposelessness in his job, reflecting the Sultanate's decline in prestige in Morocco.[53] Nonetheless, the chief of the medical mission insisted that relations with the Sultan were "obligatory," no matter how "mundane."[54] It was critical, he insinuated, for the sole reason that it made for great advertising: he required Jaffary to report all communications with the Sultan to Gabriel Veyre, a photographer and correspondent stationed in Casablanca for the French magazine L'Illustration. The purpose of these reports was less to demonstrate the virtuosity of his position in the Sultanate than simply to advertise just how much more "intimate" Jaffary (and the French government) was with Morocco than any other colonial rival—in a manner that would garner the most public attention possible in Europe. Jaffary filled his testimonies with scintillating details and humorous asides about life in the Sultan's court, such as in one particularly provocative report, where he quipped, "I was called yesterday to insert suppositories into two of His Majesty's black mistresses. One can't do better than peaceful penetration!"[55] In fact, Veyre used Jaffary's reports to publish a book entitled "*Dans l'Intimité du Sultan*," (roughly, "In the private life of the Sultan") in 1905, an imperial-era version of a celebrity tell-all.[56]

Whether or not Moroccans truly welcomed the French medical presence, Linarès made clear his pains to blend into the local culture. This effort to assimilate demonstrates the modified assimilationist theory the French colonial administration crystallized in Tunisia by demonstrating a willingness to respect local culture and authority while still working oneself into the power structure. Without access to indigenous Moroccan

52 Rousselle, *Médecins,* 148.

53 Rousselle, *Médecins,* 147.

54 Rousselle, *Médecins,* 150.

55 Dr. Félix-Paul Jaffary, qtd. in Rousselle, *Médecins,* 149.

56 Rousselle, *Médecins,* 150.

testimony, one cannot determine the extent to which these efforts at assimilation were meaningful, but Linarès certainly took care to convey them in the reports he published for a European audience. In his portrait on the inside cover of *Voyage au Tafilalet*, he wears the traditional robe of a Moroccan soldier over his French military tunic and rather than keeping his beard and moustache trimmed in the French military style he has allowed them to grow out.[57] He also incorporated Arabic into his own vocabulary: even his French colleagues addressed him as *Toubib* Linarès, a familiar word for "doctor" in Arabic dialect, and in his 1878 report on the cholera epidemic in Morocco, he referenced the disease by its Arabic term *Bou Glib*. [58]

It is important to remember that, ultimately, Linarès and his colleagues were not trying to make friends in Morocco, but rather to promote French strategic interests. Linarès' *Voyage au Tafilalet* was not a scientific report, but essentially a travelogue; he wrote it not for the medical community, but for a more general European audience. There is a reason that in this sort of user-friendly document, Linarès and his colleagues emphasized his partial assimilation into Moroccan culture (despite the fact that most Europeans believed Moroccan culture to be inferior to their own). The local knowledge that *Voyage au Tafilalet* cites does not necessarily indicate a significant amount of time spent ingratiating oneself with the native people, nor does it prove that genuine trust existed between Linarès and his patients. *Toubib*, the name by which Arabic-speakers would have addressed doctors, and *Bou Glib*, the name of one of the most rampant epidemics of the time, were words with which a doctor working in Morocco would have become familiar. It is hard to imagine, moreover, that a white European man wearing his robe over a military dress uniform would not have looked strange in the eyes of a

57 Portrait in Linarès, *Voyage au Tafilalet*, Linarès, inside cover. See fig. 1.

58 Linarès, *Voyage au Tafilalet*, 2.; Dr. François-Fernand Linarès, *Une épidémie de choléra au Maroc en 1878,* (Paris: G. Masson, 1879), 8.

native Moroccan observer. To the average 19th-century European seeing this image at home, however, Linarès probably looked downright exotic. These performative efforts by both Linarès and his colleagues prove less convincingly their adoption of Moroccan customs than a conscious effort to impress their Western audience, advertising to their competitors, as Veyre would do later, that they had set down meaningful and amicable roots in the region, thus promoting the assimilationist agenda.

After successfully reactivating Linarès' dispensary in Oujda in 1901, Dr. Sylvain Foubert formalized his predecessor's grassroots approach by making it an official expectation of all the dispensaries active from 1901-1907.[59] In doing so, he continued the revised assimilationist strategy developed in Tunisia. Acting on the orders of the Plenipotentiary Minister of Tangier, M. Eugene Regnault, to ensure that "our doctors" could "accomplish their mission" in an effective and standard manner, Foubert travelled to dispensaries all across Morocco.[60] He produced evaluations which rewarded doctors most integrated into their host communities and accommodating of their patients. Doctors received high ratings for speaking Arabic with their positions; those who were unable, like a Dr. Merle working in Casablanca, also garnered praise if they had hired an Arabic interpreter to compensate.[61]

Foubert also valued doctors who gained the "sympathies" of the local population through other good "moral and professional qualities."[62] These positive traits could entail efforts to bridge cultural gaps. For instance, in Mogador, which had a large "Israelite" population, Dr. Félix de Campredon hired "Jewish interpreters" to inform him on issues like Jewish modesty practices or kosher standards for oral medication.[63] An important piece

59 Rousselle, *Médecins,* 185.

60 Dr. M. Eugene Regnault, qtd. in Rousselle, *Médecins,* 191.

61 Dr. Sylvain Foubert, *Instructions relatives au Service des dispensaires français au Maroc* (Paris: Foreign Affairs, Morocco, New Series 407, June 1907), qtd. in Rousselle, *Médecins,* 194; 221.

62 Rousselle, *Médecins,* 251.

63 Rousselle, *Médecins,* 264.

of morality and professionalism, however, also involved offering free treatment. Foubert explains the importance of this practice—both to encouraging widespread attendance and placing the medical mission in a republican context—in his critique of a Dr. Sartre stationed in Larache, who had been selling medicine and charging for appointments. Foubert protested that Sartre "forgets that the French government, in creating these dispensaries, wants to penetrate by the practice of good and charity, not simply…by the profit of a few privileged people."[64]

In June 1907, again at Regnault's request, Foubert published "Instructions for the Service of French Dispensaries in Morocco," a document which echoed the assimilationist idea that his mission was capable of reforming the indigenous population and that the French doctors blended in seamlessly. He drew upon his reports in order to exhibit doctors' cultural sensitivity as evidence that French dispensaries were destined to insure medical aid "in the most liberal spirit," and "without any distinction of [patient] background or [expectation of] glory."[65] He characterized the French medical missionary as a servant to humanity and a "powerful agent" for the "benefaction of France."[66] The most important service that Foubert considered the doctors to have accomplished was to have "gained the confidence of the population to overcome the "religious moors and sentiments" which had hitherto "frozen" both Muslim and Jewish populations into "deplorable hygienic conditions."[67] Hence, one may see that Foubert did not support the grassroots methods initiated by Linarès due to genuine tolerance of the local traditions, but rather as a practical means to "cure" Moroccans of their harmful adherence to religion through biomedicine.

64 Rousselle, *Médecins,* 204.

65 Rousselle, *Médecins,* 191.

66 Rousselle, *Médecins,* 191.

67 Rousselle, *Médecins,* 264

This notion supports the assimilationist discourse of the contagious, unhygienic Arab who is capable of mental restoration through the mission civilisatrice. It does not contend that Islam or Judaism have affected Arab people physically, but rather that religion espouses values which lead to bad habits and therefore a poor quality of life. This attitude towards religion has roots in the French Revolution, when France declared itself a secular state and all religions, including Christianity, a corrupting force. Therefore, Foubert could have contended that he was not prejudiced, but rather was treating the Moroccans with the same values his own country's constitution asked that he follow. Moreover, it implies that the Arabs he treated were capable of treatment, reformation, and eventual adaptation to European society.

Linarès' recommendations for managing the contagion integrated policies that would have advanced the French assimilationist project if implemented. He advocated establishing lazarettos to isolate populations infected with cholera (and by extension, inhibited Moroccan mobility), particularly along the Western border shared with Algeria, where there was strong resistance against forced assimilation.[68] As Foubert would echo later, Linarès also demonstrated his "race-blindness" and adherence to laïcité by criticizing Jewish "wretchedness" in equally derisive terms as towards the Muslim population: "The first case of invasive cholera presented itself in the Mellah (the Jewish quarter), where the Jewish population is, so to speak, in the midst of all possible conditions of insalubrity."[69]This comment not only proves Linarès' antipathy towards religiosity but also subtly attacks the British Protestant medical missionaries who had centered their efforts on Jewish communities and whom Linarès would continue to undermine.[70]

68 Rousselle, *Médecins,* 25.

69 Rousselle, *Médecins*, 7.

70 Rousselle, Médecins, 139.

Following Linarès' assimilationist line of scholarship, doctors in the Service du Santé set about realizing his courses of treatment for infectious diseases such as cholera, diphtheria, and typhoid fever.[71] As Linarès had envisioned, the programs they instituted offered treatment options which enforced imperial control, but nonetheless assumed that Arabs, like Europeans, would respond to the same physical treatment, and were suffering from mental, not physical, effects of Islam and Judaism. Most notably, around the turn of the century, doctors gave new purpose to the "Council of Hygiene," which France had established in 1840 in cooperation with the Sultan.[72] In 1894, they hired Dr. Soulié, a bacteriologist, in order to implement a more organized and regulated system by which to disseminate Pastorian vaccines, thus providing the greater governmental oversight which Linarès had advocated.

It was through this Council that the number of dispensaries in urban areas increased so rapidly between 1901 and 1907, mainly serving to offer vaccines and inoculating serums. Foubert, for instance, had attracted the notice of Minister Regnault only after he provided approximately 250 of these vaccinations in Oujda in less than two years.[73] This injection of Pastorian medicine into the French medical mission followed the egalitarian ideology espoused in Émile Durkheim's 1895 *sociologie*, which supported assimilationism through medicine by asserting the universality of human physiology and arguing that as a result, all people could be understood and reformed through Western science. [74]

71 Anne Marie Moulin. "Les instituts Pasteurs de la Méditerranée arabe: une religion scientifiques en pays d'Islam," in *Santé, médecine, et société dans le monde arabe*, ed. Elisabeth Longuenesse (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1995), 148.

72 Rousselle, *Médecins*, 163.

73 Rousselle, *Médecins*, 188.

74 Amster, *Medicine and the Saints*, 9.

Émile Mauchamp: Rupture & Impact

As I have argued in the previous section, doctors mimicked Linarès and adhered more to assimilationism than associationism. Dr. Émile Mauchamp, however, rebuffed his authorities. Instead, he voiced his sympathies towards associationism openly, to the consternation of both



(Figure 2) Émile Mauchamp in Marrakesh.

his French colleagues and his Moroccan patients. The Service du Santé only embraced him in death, recognizing the political opportunity he presented, but in doing so, implied that he had adhered to their ideology and strategy. In doing so, they blurred the line between the revised assimilation developed in Tunisia and implemented in Morocco until 1907, and the associationist regime Lyautey would impose following Mauchamp's murder. With Moroccans having committed the first act of

violence, Lyautey was now free to invade without contradicting France's policy of peaceful penetration (at least in the eyes of the West).

Dr. Émile Mauchamp embodied a stark departure from the policies of the medical missionary project. The reproach which he garnered from his colleagues upon his 1905 arrival bears witness to this difference. He had a reputation for being headstrong and unaware of "popular susceptibilities," which his colleagues saw as a potential threat to the entire French mission.[75] One doctor serving in Algeria, Mohamed Ben Larbey, even took it upon himself to write a letter beseeching the Service du Santé not to hire Mauchamp. He writes: "He is known as a mediocre doctor, having neither professional worth nor moral prestige…his presence in Morocco could bring prejudice to French prestige. He has bad diplomacy and sets people sharing his religion against French government officers."[76]

Mauchamp's conduct at his dispensary in Marrakesh realized Larbey's warning. Rather than follow the guidelines Foubert had developed of cultural sensitivity, he declared stubbornly, "I am here… as a French doctor, to make France known and loved."[77] One need only look at how he chose to portray himself: a photograph of him in Marrakesh could not be in starker contrast to the portrait of Linarès in *Voyage au Tafilalet.* He perches on top of a meticulously groomed horse, in a suit, brimmed hat, and well-kempt moustaches, glaring as he rides straight through a crowd of Moroccans.[78] In his practice, he refused to accommodate Muslims' concerns of scarring caused by a needle-injected vaccination. In contrast, other doctors were well aware of this disconnect, and had taken institutional steps to counteract it. They had compensated with serums, and even partnered with the Union of French women, who held "vaccination

75 Rousselle, *Médecins,* 281.

76 Dr. Mohamed Ben Larbey, July 1907, qtd. in Rousselle, *Médecins,* 283.

77 Emile Mauchamp, qtd. in Amster, *Medicine and the Saints,* 98.

78 Photograph, "Le Docteur Mauchamp à Marrakesh," in Dr. Émile Mauchamp, *La sorcellerie au Maroc: oeuvre posthume,* ed. Jules Bois (Paris: Dorbon-Ainé., 1911). See fig. 2.

séances" with Arab women during Ramadan when vaccinations were not administered in observance of the holiday.[79] Mauchamp's refusal to show similar consideration incited the rumor that he was "administering poison" through the needle, the final blow which motivated the plan for his assassination.[80]

Nonetheless, the hysteria surrounding Mauchamp's death and the longstanding portrayal of the medical mission in Morocco allowed him to be remembered historically as another humanitarian servant who had lived by the tenets of assimilationism. This false narrative distorted the defining ideals of the Service du Santé, with Mauchamp, the most well-publicized doctor of the entire mission, and his associationist rhetoric presented as representative of the entire 1901-1907 mission. For example, Mauchamp's posthumous work, *La Sorcellerie au Maroc,* denied the conventional notion that medicine could reform Moroccans and suggested openly that Arab peoples were physiologically distinct from Europeans. "It is difficult to idealize garbage…as soon as one enters in the conceptions of Moroccan physiology and psychology…one must reconcile oneself to manipulating the naturalism of…latrines," he writes in the introduction.[81] He stresses the concept of Muslim fanaticism that doctors had risen in Algeria but that had been discouraged in Morocco, and refutes the idea that there is any chance of saving the lost souls he describes, lamenting: "Pious Muslims…envelop their soul with a soft and subtle shroud of a tranquil lullaby…from where they depart…for a violent convulsion of fanaticism."[82]

Jules Bois, the editor of *Sorcellerie,* had no background in or authority on the French medical missionary project. Nonetheless, he alone pieced

79 Rousselle, 280; Parsons, *The Origins of the Morocco Question, 1880-1900*, 148.

80 Anonymous, quoted in Amster, *Medicine and the Saints,* 1.

81 Dr. Émile Mauchamp, *La sorcellerie au Maroc: oeuvre posthume*, trans. Amster, *Medicine and the Saints,* 8

82 Mauchamp, *La sorcellerie au Maroc*, 71.

together Mauchamp's scattered notes to complete the book (Mauchamp had only completed the introduction in publishable form before he died) and contributed his own lengthy preface. In contradiction to Mauchamp's clear declaration of associationism, Bois painted him in a similar light as Foubert had portrayed medical missionaries by claiming him as the quintessential French, republican doctor. He began the text with a letter solicited from Mauchamp's grief-stricken father, setting the tone with an appeal to pathos. His father recalled:

> I opened this packet, which a quantity of writing and some photographs, all ragged and horribly defiled with blood and mud…the notes…he had intended to publish. Knowing his heart of a Frenchman, his ardent love of truth, science, and humanity, I imagine that, under the dagger…he was asking that his work…not die.[83]

This description fits with the valorized image by which France had depicted its colonial doctors for years. Add to that the poignancy of paternal anguish, and it would have been very difficult to question Mauchamp's character.

Meanwhile, France strengthened this falsehood and circulated obituaries around the globe that confirmed Mauchamp's innocence. These texts applied Mauchamp's innocence to the entire French mission in Morocco, claiming that their desire to protect a "country overtaken by anarchy" had left them with no other choice but to resort to military action rather than continuing peaceful penetration.[84] This public relations campaign was extremely effective. "He was extremely popular, and his murder appears to have been due to a misapprehension on the part of the natives," the British Medical Journal reported. That a British publication was praising Mauchamp, a doctor-diplomat sent to Morocco specifically to elevate

83 Pierre Mauchamp, preface to *La Sorcellerie au Maroc* by Émile Mauchamp, 1.

84 Jacques Nauroy, "Les pharmaciens militaires français au Maroc," *Revue d'histoire de la pharmacie* 50, no. 173-174 (1962): 315.

French imperial claims over those of Great Britain, indicates the level of international sympathy Mauchamp's death accrued.[85] Colonial savagery was a potent unifying force, for imperial powers feared it equally, and understood that if revolution could succeed against their European competitor, it could inspire protest in their own colonial territories.

The obituary explains that the "angry crowd" had gathered because "[Mauchamp] had put a pole, bearing a flag, on the top of his house…to serve as a landmark in some…work that is being carried out by the French scientific mission…The Moors thought this was part of an apparatus of wireless telegraphy…that would lead somehow to increased taxation."[86]Whereas before Mauchamp's death other states had ridiculed France's justifications of their mission in Morocco as "scientific," this account demonstrates international acceptance of that narrative. This obituary stands in great contrast to Bayard's denigration of French motives just two years prior in *The North American Review*.[87] It also highlights Moroccan ignorance by claiming that a gross misunderstanding of technology had sparked their outrage, supporting the notion that they needed European help to modernize. This account is untruthful and reductive. First, the rumor about the needles Mauchamp used, not a pole on his roof, had incited the riot. Second, even though this rumor spurred action, it was not the only factor; Mauchamp's assassination was not a spontaneous event. Rather, it was an act of protest against the growing injustices—the crumbling economy and Makhzen, the threat of imperial takeover, and now a disrespectful, petulant French doctor—under which Moroccans were suffering.[88]

85 "Dr. Pierre Benoit Émile Mauchamp Obituary," *The British Medical Journal* 1, no. 2413 (Mar. 30, 1907): 785.

86 Dr. Pierre Benoit, " Émile Mauchamp Obituary," *The British Medical Journal*, 785.

87 Bayard, "Conditions in Morocco," 283.

88 Amster, "The Many Deaths of Dr. Emile Mauchamp: Medicine, Technology, and Popular Politics in Pre-Protectorate Morocco, 1877-1912," 409.

Conclusion

As Ellen Amster argues, the murder of Émile Mauchamp in 1907 was no coincidence, but rather a political statement against an individual who confirmed the suspicions Moroccans held about the French medical institutions' ulterior imperialist motives.[89] Mauchamp departed radically, both in approach and scholarship, from other doctors in the Service du Santé, who had striven to mask their true intents with humanitarianism and assimilationism. But the effect of this assassination and the events which followed did more than merely provide the political excuse for Lyautey to take military action. Rather, the misrepresentation of Mauchamp's work and beliefs following his death allowed the rupture he presented in the mainstream discourse of medical missionaries to be overlooked. His singular prominence as a medical missionary from the period 1901-1907, despite a lack of critical examination of his legacy, allowed for version of history that suggests, in hindsight, that the French doctors in Morocco from 1901-1907 had always conformed closely to Lyauteyism. Such a narrative underestimates the calculated approach of this mission of "peaceful penetration," in itself ensuring that its quest for absolution of the French imperialist mission in Morocco was successful.

89 Amster, "The Many Deaths of Dr. Emile Mauchamp," 423.

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

AIRBRUSHED OUT OF HISTORY

Remembering and Commemorating Mohammed Mossadeq in Iran

Isabel Guarnieri

Edited by
Melis Gökalp, Ryan Saadeh

Mohammed Mossadeq occupies a space in the Iranian national psyche that can only be likened to the reverence reserved for the 20th century's most iconic post-colonial figures, such as Mahatma Gandhi or Nelson Mandela. To many, his name represents the values of democracy, integrity, and the rule of law, which he pushed for during his short tenure as Iran's Premier from July 1952 to August 1953.[1] This esteem is only enhanced by the issue that defined his career and ultimately, doomed him—the nationalization of Iranian oil. Mossadeq's sudden toppling in the 1953 CIA-backed coup is a major turning point in Iranian political history that deeply rattled society, leaving historians to wonder how the course of Iran's history would be different if the secular democrat had fulfilled his political career. Since 1953, both the Shah and eventual Islamic government have worked hard to directly suppress and diminish Mossadeq's memory and legacy, as his values directly contradict with those enforced by both regimes. This has prompted some to depict Mossadeq as being "airbrushed out of history."[2]

1 Fariba Amini, telephone interview by the author, October 20, 2018.

2 Ervand Abrahamian, *The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of the Modern U.S-Iranian Relations* (n.p.: New Press, 2013), 216.

Yet, in limited periods of freedom, reform, and countermovement that emerge every now and again in Iran, Mossadeq's name and image reemerge.[3] Despite state efforts to expunge his name, it still carries a deep symbolic weight. Through an examination of various points of change in Iranian politics, namely immediately after the 1953 coup, the "6 Months of Freedom" after the 1979 Revolution, and moments of reform and anti-government countermovement from the past two decades, I will examine Mossadeq's enduring societal resonance in the face of state-sponsored erasure.



Mohammed Mossadeq.

The Man: Mohammed Mossadeq

A large part of Mossadeq's iconography is his distinct appearance and theatrical personality. Mossadeq has several signature characteristics: he is bald and stick-thin with a bent nose, large lips and dramatic, arched

3 Nader Hashemi, telephone interview by the author, October 22, 2018.

eyebrows.[4] He was famous for his bold political stunts and exaggerated mannerisms, often fainting, howling, or weeping in public. Moreover, his passion and fury was always palpable, manifesting most often in fiery speeches or renouncements which resounded with the Iranian populace. This strategy, a combination of theatrics and political savvy, helped him achieve immense goals throughout his career that reduced the influence of foreign powers in Iran and brought Iran closer to a secular democracy.[5]

Mossadeq was born in 1882 to an upper-class Qajar family in Tehran and, after receiving a European education, occupied a variety of ministry positions in Iran's bureaucracy starting in 1919. Mossadeq opposed the shah, Reza Shah Pahlavi, throughout the 1920s and 30s, and returned to the political sphere after his abdication, when Reza Shah's son Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi assumed the throne. Throughout his political career, Mossadeq pushed for restrictions on the Shah's powers, as he viewed the monarchy as the primary obstacle to liberal democracy in Iran. [6]

However, his election to the 14th and 16th Majles, the Iranian parliament, clarified the two major issues that would define his political career: consolidating a constitutional monarchy and nationalizing Iran's oil.[7] One essential aspect of an equitable constitutional monarchy is ensuring that there are free and fair elections. After the 16th Majles that were "conducted so dishonestly that even the British were shocked," Mossadeq stormed the palace and demanded the elections be annulled, another example of his use of spectacle to achieve political goals.[8] When Mossadeq was installed with full powers for six months after the July Uprising of 1952, he used his authority to undertake grand reforms which strengthened the separation of powers, promoted pro-rural land reform, and retired

4 Abrahamian, *The Coup*, 76.

5 Christopher De Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia* (n.p.: HarperCollins, 2012), 2.

6 Michael Axworthy, *Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic* (n.p.: Oxford University Press, 2013), 58.

7 Abrahamian, *The Coup*, 48.

8 De Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 137

elderly corrupt leaders, along with other measures that brought Iran closer to becoming a constitutional democracy.[9] Overall, Mossadeq's role as a staunch protector of the rule of law cast him as a secular democratic hero, as well as distinguished him from the repressive post-1953 Shah and the Islamic government.

However, Mossadeq's most important symbolic achievement was the nationalization of Iran's oil from the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which "was for Iran what national independence was for many former colonies."[10] To Mossadeq, regaining control over Iran's oil was a moral issue rooted in overcoming imperial exploitation. After a massive national oil strike on April 25, 1951, Mossadeq navigated the bill to nationalize Iran's oil through the Oil Committee, and it was signed into law by the Shah on May 1st. Mossadeq's popularity swelled in the wake of the oil nationalization, with a US Embassy analysis characterizing his national reputation akin to that of a "demigod."[11] In response, Britain tried desperately to regain control of the oil through international legal battles. Nevertheless, a powerful speech by Mossadeq at the United Nations and a favorable decision from the World Court in The Hague that stated it did not have jurisdiction over the case seemed to indicate that Iranian oil was secure in the hands of its people.[12] Mossadeq had achieved the unthinkable, and in the face of imperial powers, seemed invincible.

Overall, Mossadeq's character and actions while in office solidified his legacy as a figure that was fiercely dedicated to democracy, rule of law, and Iranian autonomy. While this portrayal does not fully capture the complexities and contradictions of Mossadeq's political career, it serves to portray how the man could exist as a symbol, especially one who could be perceived as threatening to the autocratic regimes that followed.

9 Abrahamian, *The Coup*, 142.

10 Abrahamian, *The Coup*, 79.

11 Abrahamian, *The Coup*, 76.

12 Abrahamian, *The Coup*, 111.

Fading into the Background: Mossadeq Post 1953-Coup

The 1953 Coup that brought Mossadeq's tenure as Prime Minister to a sudden end was a jolt to society, even before it was explicitly known that the CIA and Britain orchestrated it.[13] In many ways, Iranians understood Mossadeq's fall in the context of martyrdom that is rooted in Iran's Shi'i identity—reminiscent of when Imam Husayn was slain facing the Ummayid Caliph's army in 680 AD.[14] This characterization enhances Mossadeq's iconography, painting him as someone who was denied reaching his full potential and died for their values, on par with the great Shi'a religious figures.

After the coup, the Shah made concerted efforts to completely remove Mossadeq from public life and quell his supporters and allies. In a matter of months, Mossadeq fell from being a central figure in Iranian political life to a non-person, living the last years of his life under house arrest at his estate in Ahmadabad until his death in March of 1967.

First, Mossadeq had to be removed from the public eye. On October 1, 1953, the Shah charged Mossadeq with treason and a riveting trial began that was the subject of national fascination. Local and foreign newspapers commented on every aspect of the hearing, and the courtroom was filled with photographers who splattered Mossadeq's iconic face on the front page of every newspaper.[15] Iranians were transfixed by the trial, and Mossadeq used his infamous theatrics to his advantage, with powerful lines such as: "I am Dr. Mossadeq and it behooves me to point out what is anti-constitutional."[16] The central argument revolved around whether the Shah had the right to remove his Prime Minister without the authorization of the Majles. In the end, Mossadeq was charged with treason and

13 De Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 255.

14 De Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 255; The year 680 AD refers to the Gregorian Calendar year, which corresponds with the year 61 AH of the Islamic Calendar.

15 De Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 258.

16 De Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 259.

sentenced to three years in solitary imprisonment, which he immediately appealed. His next trial began on April 8, 1954 in a military court. Few spectators were allowed to enter and the prosecutor dictated reports of the trial to journalists, limiting the degree to which Mossadeq's defense could proliferate in the Shah's increasingly autocratic regime.[17] The verdict was upheld and Mossadeq served three years in solitary confinement—now considered a form of torture—in a prison in central Tehran.

In the months after the coup, Mohammad Reza Shah became increasingly paranoid and obsessed with protecting his position, which required eliminating any and all voices of dissent.[18] Immediately after the coup, all opposition newspapers were closed, thousands of members of opposition and nationalist parties were arrested, the Majles elections were rigged, political dissenters were thrown in jail, and Mossadeq sympathizers were cleared out of the government and military.[19] The secret state police, the SAVAK, allowed the Shah to rule by fear; with an estimated 5,000 operatives and three million informants, the SAVAK was in charge of censoring all media, jailing, beating, and torturing political prisoners, and essentially surveilled every Iranian for signs of dissidence. [20]Finally, in 1975, the Shah reinforced his autocratic rule by abolishing the two party state system and instituting Rastakhiz, a one-party state apparatus. Emerging from the Mossadeq era that championed democracy, freedom, and the rule of law as the values a state should strive towards, this new repressive state was a shock.

Scholars argue that the Shah's efforts to eliminate all signs of Mossadeq from Iranian society stemmed from his own feelings of deep insecurity in regards to Mossadeq's resonance with the Iranian populace.[21] The Shah

17 De Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 261.

18 Axworthy, *Revolutionary Iran*, 58.

19 Axworthy, *Revolutionary Iran,* 58.

20 Ervand Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran* (n.p.: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 126.

21 Abrahamian, *The Coup,* 216.

had cultivated immense distance between himself and his people—traveling only by helicopter and watching parades from the comforts of a bullet-proof glass box.[22] After the coup, uttering Mossadeq's name in the Shah's presence was forbidden, and the SAVAK's intrusion into all aspects of life dissuaded Iranians from referencing him in public life as well.[23] At the same time, the Shah himself remained obsessed with Mossadeq. To illustrate, the diary of the Shah's trusted confidant Asadollah Alam displays that, twenty years after the coup, Mossadeq's memory still enraged the Shah. In 1973, Alam describes how the Shah said:

> The worst years of my reign, indeed of my entire life, came when Mossadeq was prime minister. That bastard was out for blood and every morning I awoke with the sensation that today might be my last on the throne. Every night I went to bed having been subjected to unspeakable insults in the press.[24]

The Shah's visceral language in this quote demonstrates the negative emotional weight of Mossadeq's memory. Moreover, it serves to paint the Shah as utterly obsessed with protecting his position, which characterized the remaining years of his authoritative and violent reign. While the Shah viewed any respected personality as a potential political rival, the resentment he harbored towards Mossadeq specifically is potent in this passage. [25]

Other than the elimination of Mossadeq's political allies from positions of power, the Shah also made efforts to diminish Mossadeq's impression in cultural memory by constructing false historical narratives. A crucial aspect of this was reframing the coup that toppled Mossadeq, as many

22 Axworthy, *Revolutionary Iran*, 85.

23 Abrahamian, *The Coup*, 216.

24 Asadollah Alam, *The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court, 1969-1977* (n.p.: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 318.

25 Alam, *The Shah and I*, 9.

Iranians were suspicious of Western intervention. Instead of a military coup orchestrated by the United States and Britain, it was described as a popular uprising under the name "The Shah-People Revolt."[26] To commemorate, a heroic statue of the Shah was unveiled on the coup's first anniversary.[27] The Shah also tried to claim credit for the nationalization of Iran's oil. In reality, after Mossadeq was removed from politics, the Shah essentially denationalized the oil industry in 1954 through a 50/50 profit-sharing agreement with a consortium of Western oil companies.[28]This erasure of Mossadeq's accomplishments and prohibition of his name was the Shah's attempt to retell recent history, as if to pretend that he had never existed. Even Mossadeq's picture in children's exercise books was pasted over with an image of the Shah. However, if you lifted the book to the light, Mossadeq's outline remained visible.[29]

The Shah's strategy was ineffective at effacing Mossadeq's name and achievements. In fact, merely speaking his name was transformed into a powerful, rebellious act. In 1962, the Shah allowed Mossadeq's party, the National Front, to emerge from their illegal state and hold a rally. There was only one condition: every speaker would only be permitted to say Mossadeq's name once. One hundred thousand people attended the event, letting out a roaring applause every time a speaker spoke Mossadeq's name. The National Front was never allowed to have another rally during the Shah's reign.[30] Nevertheless, this event demonstrates that the people of Iran had not forgotten about Mossadeq despite the attempts to erase him.

After serving his time in prison, Mossadeq was released on house arrest at his estate in Ahmadabad, where he was placed under constant

26 Abrahamian, *The Coup*, 221.

27 De Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 255.

28 Abrahamian, *The Coup*, 207.

29 De Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 267.

30 Stephen Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror* (n.p.: Wiley, 2008), 195.

guard and his contact with the outside world was extremely limited. In an interview with a French journalist, the Shah claimed that this isolation was for Mossadeq's own protection, as he would be "lynched" by the people if he returned home to Tehran.[31] This was another attempt by the Shah to reframe history, just as he had with the renaming of the Coup. In reality, hundreds of letters from supporters were smuggled into Mossadeq's estate, each one of which he answered diligently. When his wife Zahra would go grocery shopping, people would approach her and request signed photographs of him.[32] In the brutal police state the Shah had cultivated, remnants of Mossadeq and reminders of his survival were still treasured.

Mossadeq died quietly on March 5, 1967. In his will, he requested to be buried in the graveyard with the martyrs who had fallen in the 1952 uprising against Qavam, but the Shah denied this request. Instead, Mossadeq was lowered into the floor of his dining room at his estate in Ahmadabad, next to a mantelpiece with a picture of Gandhi.[33] Since his death, his grave and the estate have carried the sanctity of a shrine.

The "Six Months of Freedom" Post-1979 Revolution

In the immediate aftermath of the 1979 Revolution, there was immense hope for a new dawn in Iranian politics, free from tyranny and the catering to Western demands that had dominated Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's reign. With this hope and fervor for a new chapter came an outpouring of support and interest in the figure of Mohammed Mossadeq. The relationship between the end of the revolution and the reemergence of Mossadeq's name and image occurred for several reasons: the provisional post-revolutionary government was dominated by Mossadeghists who promoted his legacy, there was a general aura of excitement for the

31 De Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 266.

32 De Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia,* 267.

33 Abrahamian, *The Coup*, 212.

democratic ideals that Mossadeq represented, and finally, the revolution marked the toppling of the Shah who had returned to power in the aftermath of Mossadeq's sudden descent.

However, Mossadeq's name and image did not remain in the public sphere for long. As Ayatollah Khomeini consolidated his power and the hardliner Islamic government took shape, Mossadeq's image and memory were yet again repressed, as his values were deemed inconsistent with those of the regime.

The liberal democrats that made up the provisional post-revolutionary government played an instrumental role in reviving Mossadeq's name in public discourse. These men were part of Mossadeq's National Front party and the Freedom Movement of Iran, a religious party that advocates for democracy and human rights.[34] Mehdi Bazargan, the first Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic, served as the first director of the National Iranian Oil Company during Mossadeq's administration. Karim Sanjabi, the foreign minister of the provisional government, served as Mossadeq's Minister of Education.[35] With these two Mossadeq allies in critical positions of power, a period now referred to as the "Six Months of Freedom" was ushered in, which was characterized by an outpouring of political and journalistic freedoms, as well as small commemorative acts that publicly acknowledged Mossadeq's legacy.[36] The capital's main boulevard which stretches from northern to southern Tehran was renamed from "Pahlavi Avenue" to "Mossadeq Street."[37] Moreover, stamps and bills were issued bearing his face, and there were calls for a center of Mossadeq Studies and for his estate in Ahmadabad to be converted into a museum.[38] These gestures allowed his legacy to be recognized publicly

34 Hashemi, telephone interview by the author.

35 De Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 276.

36 Axworthy, *Revolutionary Iran*, 143.

37 Amini, telephone interview by the author.

38 De Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 277.

in a way that was endorsed by the state, which stood in sharp contrast to the way the shah so harshly repressed his memory.

Six weeks after the Shah left in February 1979, the first opportunity for a collective memorial of Mossadeq emerged in honor of the 12th anniversary of his death. The event was held at Mossadeq's estate of exile in Ahmadabad, about 100 kilometers from Tehran. The memorial was an exciting event, and everyone was eager to offer their services; national bus operators announced they would provide transportation and fast food outlets offered to provide meals. On March 5, Mossadeq's family had prepared for about 20 to 30,000 people to make the pilgrimage to Ahmadabad. Rather, hundreds of thousands showed up, travelling by bus, car, truck, motorbike, and on foot.[39] The centerpiece of the memorial was a series of speeches by Mossadeq's former cabinet members advocating for principles of democracy and the rule of law. Now that we've had a revolution, they said, we must stick to our values and maintain this atmosphere of free speech and expression.[40] The massive crowds stretched beyond the estate and into the surrounding fields, with everyone craning their necks to hear the speeches in the garden. As De Belliague writes, "Thus, at last, he was remembered."[41] On the 12th anniversary of his death, Mossadeq's estate of exile was transformed into one of remembrance of his life and values, allowing the public to finally grieve and collectively celebrate the man and his movement.

The Islamic Republic and the Repression of Mossadeq's Memory

The "Six Months of Freedom" in Iran ended when Khomeini was able to consolidate power, remove the Mossadeghists from the government, and establish the distinctly Islamic ideology of the Republic. A major turning point that allowed him to secure authoritative power was the 1979 Hostage

39 De Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 277.

40 Amini, telephone interview by the author.

41 De Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 278.

Crisis. The Hostage Crisis occurred in the midst of a power struggle over the character of Iran's new constitution, namely whether it should be based solely on Islam or more secular or left-leaning. When Khomeini and other members of the government supported the students that held 52 US embassy personnel hostage, Prime Minister Bazargan, a staunch Mossadeq supporter, resigned in protest. This worked to Khomeini's advantage, as he was able to frame the remaining moderate politicians that denounced the students' actions as allies of the West, creating a clear binary of supporters and enemies of the Islamic Republic's goals. The referendum for a new, distinctly Islamic constitution on December 3rd was voted in by a landslide.[42] Yet again, Iran's political landscape was shifting and in this new era there was no room for Mossadeq or secularism.

In comparison with the Shah, it appears that Mossadeq's strong anti-imperialism would endear him slightly to the new Islamic leadership that was so opposed to Western influence. However, Mossadeq had one unforgivable fault: he was not religious. It is rumored that Khomeini said that Mossadeq was not even a Muslim.[43] In his time as Premier, Mossadeq was very public with his secular leanings, which made him lose favor with the ulama (the body of Muslim scholars) of the time. Although he customarily abstained from alcohol and pork, he did not pray frequently or fast during Ramadan. Moreover, his irreligiosity was sometimes perceived as mocking, such as when he would publicly sip water during Ramadan in parliamentary speeches.[44] Therefore, Mossadeq's selective adherence to Islam made him an unpopular character for the Islamic Government, as his values countered the basis of their government. Mossadeq could not serve as a role model or a central character in the history of the Islamic Republic.

42 Axworthy, *Revolutionary Iran*, 170.

43 Hashemi, telephone interview by the author.

44 De Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 92.

In order to diminish Mossadeq's emotional foothold in cultural memory, the new regime set about undoing the commemorative acts put in place by the provisional government during the "Six Months of Freedom." The central avenue that was named after Mossadeq was renamed again to the "Master Of Time" in reference to the 12th Imam.[45] By the end of 1979, strict new regulations were placed on freedom of speech—many newspapers were closed down and many more leftists and nationalists were thrown in prison. Articles and books were published that slandered Mossadeq's name and accomplishments, spreading rumors that Mossadeq had been an agent of the British and other falsehoods.[46] In addition, similarly to the Shah, the Islamic Government framed oil nationalization as a success of Ayatollah Kashani, the cleric most active in politics during Mossadeq's time as premier and one of his key allies. In 1951, Kashani issued a fatwa, a nonbinding legal opinion issued by an Islamic legal scholar, in favor of the nationalization of Iran's oil, which helped propel a massive propaganda project that culminated in Mossadeq's great success.[47] Using similar strategies to those of the Shah after the coup, the Islamic government went about diminishing Mossadeq's legacy by dismantling public dedications and reimagining history in a way that recognized leaders whose values align with their own.

This transition from celebrating Mossadeq's memory to diminishing and even smearing it illustrates the contradictions of the 1979 Revolution and the ways in which this moment of perceived liberation could be transformed into one with similarly repressive tendencies. Moreover, it serves to illustrate how in the aftermath of the Revolution, multiple groups were trying to assert their vision for a new Iranian society. In the

45 The Daily Star, "Tehran Renames Street after Former Premier Mossadegh," *The Daily Star,* last modified March 13, 2018, accessed December 9, 2018, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2018/Mar-13/441377-tehran-renames-street-after-former-premier-mossadegh.ashx.

46 De Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 278.

47 De Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 151.

eyes of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic government that consolidated power, this new Iran had no place for secular or democratic values—or the man who represents them.

Mossadeq in Reform and Countermovement Post-1979

Since the 1979 Revolution, Iran has had two Supreme Leaders and seven Presidents. The political leanings of these leaders play an important role in how (and if) Mossadeq is commemorated publicly. When reformist candidates and governments emerge, there is a general loosening of restrictions and a stronger official recognition of Mossadeq's role in Iran's history. Additionally, in times of anti-government countermovement, Mossadeq's image has been mobilized to symbolize the values he championed, such as the rule of law and Iranian sovereignty, but also to recall moments of external interference in Iran's electoral processes. Mossadeq's name and legacy have been used strategically to assert both hope and resistance.

One such period of reform was President Khatami's presidential term, which lasted from 1997 to 2005. Khatami ran on a platform of increased civil society, freedom of expression, the expansion of women's rights, political pluralism, and rule of law. His candidacy and proposed reforms were hugely exciting to the Iranian public, increasing voter turnout from 50 to 80% and winning 70% of the electorate, even though he was a relatively unknown figure.[48] During his term, the number of daily newspapers increased from 5 to 26, and the amount of books in circulation increased to 23,300—a dramatic contrast to the 3,800 books in print in 1986.[49] This rapid growth in publications and rise in civic engagement attest to the period's increased debate and intellectual freedom. De Belliague describes this moment as "the thaw, when the restrictions were relaxed and it was

48 Abrahamian, *A History*, 186.

49 Abrahamian, *A History*, 191.

possible to love [Mossadeq] again."[50] Although the more devout Guardian Council reversed many of these reforms and President Khatami failed to deliver on many of his promises, it was still a moment of immense excitement and possibility, moments which tend to coincide with a revival of Mossadeq's name in the public consciousness.

Nader Hashemi, an Associate Professor at the University of Denver, was in Iran in the spring of 1999, and witnessed a celebration of Mossadeq's legacy in the Khatami era. The springtime corresponds with the anniversary of the nationalization of Iranian oi, and that year there was a massive public gathering held at Mossadeq's former estate in Ahmdabad. The centerpiece of the event, organized by the decimated National Front, Freedom Movement of Iran party, and various student organizations, was a series of speeches by various politicians celebrating Mossadeq's contributions to democracy.[51] Replicating the giant commemoration of the 12th anniversary of Mossadeq's death in 1979, the event indicates how his spot of exile continues to be seen as a symbolic gathering place. Unfortunately, according to Hashemi, attempts at commemorative events at the estate have since been met with state interference and police crackdowns. In addition, Iranian journalist Fariba Amini indicated that people need to seek permission on an individual basis to visit the estate, and that is has fallen into severe disrepair.[52] While commemorations held at the estate may have been limited, this 1999 memorial event emphasizes how the reemergence of democratic values in Iran in times of reform comes with a simultaneous remobilization of Mossadeq's memory.

The limited occurrence of countermovements in Iran since the 1979 Revolution have also provided opportunities for the resurgence of Mossadeq's image as a way to evoke his values for secular, democratic reform. The most salient representation of this phenomenon is the Green

50 De Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 278

51 Hashemi, telephone interview by the author.

52 Amini, telephone interview by the author.

Movement Protests of 2009 that were ignited over alleged election fraud in Iran's 2009 Presidential Election, in which the incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was declared to have won over the reformist candidate Hossein Mousavi. One image from the protests is particularly striking: In it, a protestor is holding up a sign with a picture of Mossadeq against one of Mousavi, with the phrase "We won't let history repeat itself" inscribed above, in reference to the 1953 coup. The juxtaposition of the two men with the text display that this election was perceived as another instance in which fair democratic processes in Iran were obstructed. Moreover, it signals the desire for an Iranian democracy free from Western intervention, which has left an enormous mark on Iranian's collective psyche.[53] Here, the mobilization of Mossadeq in a protest context signals the push for Iran to reestablish democracy on its own terms, and to recall the suspicious ways in which its leaders have been brought to or fallen from power in the past. These two examples illustrate how Mossadeq's image and legacy are utilized in different contexts, but always with the goal of recalling an era of democratic freedom or questioning the legitimacy of Iran's political apparatus. Under Mossadeq, attempts were made to put checks on top leaders' powers, limit Western influence, and encourage free and fair elections. Whenever Mossadeq's image resurges, it is with the intention of evoking these values, as well as to assert the need for transparent and equitable leadership.

Recent Developments in Mossadeq's Memorialization (2013 -)

Despite Mossadeq's imprint on modern Iranian culture and political consciousness, primary and secondary school curricula skim over his achievements and legacy. The Cultural Revolutionary Council, which runs the main textbook manufacturing company, is composed of religious

53 Stephen Kinzer, "A Specter is Haunting Iran -- the Specter of Mossadeq" in *The People Reloaded: The Green Movement and the Struggle for Iran's Future*, ed. Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (Brooklyn, N.Y: Melville House Publishers, 2010), 26-27.

hardliners who do not want to promote Mossadeq's impact on history.[54] Consequently, many Iranian youth are unaware of Mossadeq and his accomplishments beyond a knowledge of the oil nationalization, ensuring that his legacy is remembered has thus fallen to artists and reformist politicians, who have bypassed the strict religious leaders in order to pay tribute to a national symbol of democracy and anti-imperialism.[55] In the past few years, there have been small public commemorations of Mossadeq's legacy by artists, such as Iranian playwright Asghar Khalili and the Tehran City Council, which have occurred in the context of the moderate Hassan Rouhani's presidency (2013-present). Although their scale and success have varied, the attempts mark the importance of political memory and the symbolic impact Mossadeq still carries in different spheres of Iranian society.

Khalil found a way to bypass state censorship and educate Iranians about Mossadeq through a play about the 1953 Coup, which ran with enormous success in Tehran in the second half of 2016. Khalili states that one of his reasons for writing the play, entitled "Dr. Mossadeq's Nightly Reports" was to "make [Mossadeq] more popular and better-known, and not just superficially."[56] His play received positive reviews and significant media attention, with Ayatollah Khamenei's liberal cleric brother even urging people to go see it.[57] Since all theatrical works have to be reviewed by the Iranian government due to strict censorship laws, this play's approval indicates that there is a certain degree of openness to representations of Mossadeq's legacy in Rouhani's administration. The play's popularity demonstrates the wide interest in Mossadeq, and perhaps even an ache

54 Hamed Tavakoli, interview by the author, November 28, 2018.

55 Amini, telephone interview by the author.

56 Jonathan Steele, "Iran's Theatre Scene and the Rehabilitation of Mossadeq," *Middle East Eye*, last modified August 25, 2016, accessed December 9, 2018, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/irans-theatre-scene-and-rehabilitation-mossadeq-1888695977.

57 Steele, "Iran's Theatre," *Middle East Eye*.

for more portrayals of his life, while also demonstrating how figures can diffuse historical knowledge through unconventional artistic channels.

In March of 2018, a minor step was made to publicly commemorate Mossadeq: the Tehran City Council voted to rename a small street in his honor. The Tehran City Council is made up of newly elected reformists, who have been pushing for a street in Mossadeq's name despite pushback from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). If the hardliners were still in charge of the City Council, Tavakoli says that "they would not have even named a telephone booth after Mossadeq."[58] However, despite the potential symbolism of this renaming, it was not a major news story or source of celebration in Iran. Tavakoli claims that this is because of the renamed street's insignificance, as it is just a side street with no government building or foreign embassy.[59] This small nod to Mossadeq's legacy indicates how reformist groups can affect cultural memory when put in positions of power, albeit at varying scales. Moreover, it signifies that the question of how and if it is possible to publicly remember Mossadeq is still being reinterpreted years after he was toppled from the international stage.

Conclusion: Why Do We Remember Mohammed Mossadeq?

Mossadeq himself said to the Shah, "Good days and bad days go past, what stays is a good name or a bad name."[60] Even though Mossadeq's name has been suppressed by all forms of the Iranian government since 1953, it always finds a way to resurface depending on the political constituencies in power. In moments of freedom, reform and countermovement—Mossadeq's memory reemerges in a way that is usually celebratory, sometimes hopeful, and often nostalgic for the values of fairness, transparent

58 Tavakoli, interview by the author.

59 Tavakoli, interview by the author.

60 De Bellaigue, *Patriot of Persia*, 278.

democratic processes and Iranian sovereignty that he pushed for during his short political career.

The Iranian scholars and writers I spoke to often weaved their discovery of Mossadeq into their own intellectual coming of age story, discovering him through books and familial oral histories. They view him as someone who embodied the best values, intentions, and hopes for his country, as well as a leader who fought for political independence in the face of Western imperialism and never compromised on their principles. They empathize with him as a loner and a victim of great injustice. They celebrate his commitment to fairness, aversion to cruelty, and singular allegiance to the people of Iran as traits that distinguish him from leaders to follow. He is a once in a century kind of political figure—and his reclamation of Iran's greatest resource will always cement his legacy among the great post-colonial heroes. It is impossible to fully airbrush Mossadeq out of the 20th century.

Moreover, to erase someone from the pages of history creates an emptiness that begs to be occupied. The Shah and the hardliner Islamic Government that consolidated power tried to fill that void by retelling a history that people lived through and viscerally remembered. It did not work. Whenever they could, such as in the "6 Months of Freedom," periods of reform, or the 2009 Green Movement, politicians and ordinary Iranians have tried to occupy these spaces through the purposeful mobilization of Mossadeq's memory. By restricting and suppressing Mossadeq's legacy, evoking his name and image in any capacity has almost become an act of resistance in itself. Calling forth his values of democracy, rule of law, and nationalism are a slap in the face to the authoritative regimes and other systems of power that have tried to suppress them.

The small side street that was named after Mossadeq in March 2018 is a way to keep his name in societal discourse, but the preservation of his memory is not conditional on any public structure or commemoration. The Iranian journalist Hamed Tavakoli put it best when he said to me:

"His legacy is not necessarily dependent on names; his legacy is carved on our political destiny. We need to have his name on our map, even on the smallest streets."[61]

Mohammed Mossadeq is a man and a movement—an embodiment of resistance, integrity, and democracy, and a central figure in his nation's modern history. As long as Iranians continue to question their government, uncover their history, and examine their place in the world, Mossadeq's words, actions and achievements will shine through. And in that vein, he can never be forgotten.

61 Hamed Tavakoli, e-mail interview by the author, December 7, 2018.

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

OPERATION CAST LEAD

The Israeli Campaign against International Humanitarian Law in Gaza

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The term legal entrepreneurialism was coined by the author Michael Bryers in his book, *War Law: Understanding International Law and Armed Conflict*, which applied the legal principles of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* to analyse the violations of international law perpetrated by American military forces in the context of the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in the years 2001 and 2003, respectively.[1] George Bisharat, a legal scholar of the conflict in Palestine, adopted this term to develop a theory of "Israeli legal entrepreneurialism" that applies specifically to Israeli military conduct in Palestine. Legal entrepreneurialism in Israel, as Bisharat explains, is "the institutionalized, persistent and internally coherent" campaign to systematically and deliberately alter the regime of international humanitarian law (IHL), and to perpetuate a system of

1 Michael Byers, *War Law: Understanding International Law and Armed Conflict,* First Trade Paper edition (New York, NY: Grove Press, 2007). *Jus ad bellum* refers to the conditions under which a country is permitted to exercise its right to wage war under international law, while *jus in bello* refers to the rules that govern military conduct during warfare that constitutes international humanitarian law (IHL). See International Committee of the Red Cross, "Jus in bello - Jus ad bellum," https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/ihl-other-legal-regmies/jus-in-bello-jus-ad-bellum.

injustice that is grounded on the alternate norms of legality developed and furthered by Israel.[2]

This essay first identifies the standard framework of legal entrepreneurialism that Israel began to develop after the Six Day War to justify repression of Palestinian human rights using humanitarian law. The paper then examines the application of this framework to the political context of Israeli military conduct after the Second Intifada, specifically to the case of the Operation Cast Lead—the 22-day war waged by Israel on Gaza between December 2008 and 2009. It argues that during Operation Cast Lead, Israel employed legal entrepreneurialism to justify violations of the core humanitarian intentions of IHL using the language of the *existing* law, as well as interpreted the humanitarian intention of the law to justify violations of the law. Both forms of legal entrepreneurialism that Israel has used since the beginning of the Second Intifada are part of a concerted and deliberate campaign to transform customary IHL and and redefine it in terms that further Israeli political interests.

Legal Entrepreneurialism During Operation Cast Lead

Terrorism

Terrorism has been pushed as the overarching argument that justifies all forms of violence employed by Israel in Gaza ever since the start of the Second Intifada, an argument that the international community has

2 George E. Bisharat, "Violence's Law : Israel's Campaign to Transform International Legal Norms," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 42, no. 3 (2013): 68, https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2013.42.3.68. The International Committee of the Red Cross defines international humanitarian law as "a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare. International humanitarian law is also known as the law of war or the law of armed conflict." See: https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf.

been especially receptive of in the post-9/11 period.[3] During Operation Cast Lead, Israel walked the same path of argumentation- pleading for impunity for many doctrinal violations of IHL by the Israeli Defense Forces, claiming that it had a right to self-defense because it was under a constant threat of terror from Hamas, the militant Islamic Palestinian resistance group that runs the government in Gaza. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), among others, have repeatedly denounced Hamas as a terrorist organisation that is a threat to the existence of the state of Israel and to Jewish identity.[4] Thus, self-defense against terrorism and anti-Semitism is used as the umbrella argument for all uses of state violence against Hamas. Invoking the widely supported statist rhetoric of self-defense against radical Islamic terrorism, Israel is able to garner international support for even the most disengenous violations of international law it perpetrates in the name of restraining Hamas. International sympathy for Israel's purported duress made it easier to push forward a campaign of legal entrepreneurialism that would empower it to use violence as it pleased in the name of combating terrorism.

Like most other groups that are designated terrorist organisations, Hamas is considered to be a non-state actor (NSA) by Israel. NSAs can

3 Bisharat, "Violence's Law," 73-74. *"The condition that made this campaign (of molding international law on targeted killings) possible, moreover, has been the so-called "War on Terror" declared by the United States, and adhered to by some other Western states, following the attacks of 11 September 2001, on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the later U.S.-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan."* (Bisharat, 74). *See also*: Yoav Feldman and Uri Blau, "Consent and Advise," Ha'Aretz, 29 January 2009, quoting Daniel Reisner, former head of the International Law Division of the Military Judge Advocate General of the Israeli Defense Forces, on the impact of the "War on Terror" on Israel's legal entrepreneurialism.

4 AIPAC, "Mounting Threats to Israel: Hamas" (The American Israel Public Affairs Committee, June 8, 2017), https://www.aipac.org/learn/resources/fact-sheets/mounting-threats/view?pubpath=PolicyPolitics/Fact%20Sheets/Mounting%20Threats; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Responding to Hamas Attacks from Gaza - Issues of Proportionality," December 2008, https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/state/law/pages/responding%20to%20 hamas%20attacks%20from%20gaza%20-%20issues%20of%20proportionality%20-%20 march%202008.aspx.

defy all the standard rules of IHL that govern state military conduct in warfare. They hide within civilian populations, their attacks do not discriminate between civilians and combatants, and they are not bound by the clauses of the Geneva Conventions meant to dictate behavior of conventional actors.[5] This leads to conditions of "asymmetric warfare." The conventional legal argument on such entities goes as follows: "Requiring states to one-sidedly adhere to traditional laws of war while terrorists flout them is unreasonable."[6]

It is imperative to point out that although this reasoning—often used by Israeli legal scholars while defending cases of the IDF's disproportionate response to Hamas attacks—may be consistent with the letter of IHL, it is not so in practice. German jurist Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg claims that in an "asymmetric war", it is a state's responsibility to incentivize an NSA to comply with IHL.[7] If an NSA doesn't comply, he goes on to say, "despite the potential political implications, the application of military force in accordance with the laws of armed conflict (a synonym for IHL) is the first way to respond to the threats posed by asymmetric warfare."[8] Heintschel von Heinegg's argument is premised on a simple assumption: minimization of violence—the premise of IHL—is a state interest. This theory does not explain why Israel actively seeks out gaps in the applicability of IHL to justify usage of disproportionate force, instead of trying to bring Hamas into the regime of the limited usage of force, under IHL. Again, while Israel's violent military conduct against an NSA-like Hamas may not be in violation of the letter of the law, it also does not coincide with the intent of IHL, which is to minimize violence by limiting usage of force.

5 Bisharat, "Violence's Law," 74.

6 Bisharat, "Violence's Law," 74.

7 Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, "Asymmetric Warfare: How to Respond?," *International Law Studies* Vol. 87 (2011), 478.

8 Heintschel von Heinegg, "Asymmetric Warfare," 478.

Israel has used the "asymmetric warfare" argument to reclassify the legal model it formerly (unilaterally) applied to Gaza, from one where it exercised rights of law enforcement as the territory's administrative power to one where it is engaged in an "armed conflict" against a territory that supposedly poses a perpetual threat of terror to Israel. This model allows for the use of excessive violence in the name of self-defense, although there are still some limits set by IHL.[9] According to Amnesty International,

> under normal circumstances, the occupying power is bound by law enforcement standards derived from human rights law when maintaining order in occupied territory. For example, these would require the occupying power to arrest, rather than kill, members of armed groups suspected of carrying out attacks, and to use the minimum amount of force necessary in countering any security threat. [10]

But Israel has already done the work to disassociate itself from the law of occupation, primarily claiming that the West Bank and Gaza are not "occupied" territories at all, but are "administered" and/or "disputed" territories, which is the official title that Israel has conferred upon the OPT.[11] The umbrella argument of counter-terrorism that they can use as a result helps Israel further justify why its actions in Gaza both prior to and during Operation Cast Lead were governed by laws applicable to armed combat (IHL) rather than the laws of occupation. The Israeli Supreme Court, for instance, has argued that Israel has been in a state of armed conflict with Palestinian terrorist organizations, including Hamas, since the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000.[12]

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9 Bisharat, "Violence's Law," 75.

10 Bisharat, "Violence's Law," 75; Amnesty International, "The Conflict in Gaza: A Briefing on Applicable Law, Investigations and Accountability," January 19, 2009, 6.

11 The term Occupied Palestinian Territories is used in this essay as it is the internationally acknowledged status of Gaza and the West Bank.

12 Mara'abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel, para. 1.

The international community, especially the United States and its allies, have also been more supportive of Israel's arguments in favor of disproportionate response to terrorism after the 9/11 terror attacks.

One particular legal grey area is the use of targeted killings at times of armed conflict.[13] Although customary international law does not endorse targeted killings as a permissible form of force due to the principle of proportionality, many states have persisted in using it. Prior to the Second Intifada, Israel consistently denied using this tactic, but their actions during the Second Intifada rendered denial implausible, pushing them towards developing a legal justification.[14] In September 2000, the US President Bill Clinton set up the Mitchell Committee to investigate the causes of the Second Intifada. It was apparent that American legal opinion disfavored targeted killings and considered them incompatible with IHL. After 9/11, however, the US itself began using targeted killings in Iraq and Afghanistan during the War on Terror. This altered US opinion on the permissibility of the practice of targeted killings, and American legal scholars did not seem to be at all unfavorably disposed towards Israel's practice of using targeted killings against Hamas in Gaza as they had been only a year prior.[15] As Daniel Reisner, the IDF's former International Law Division (ILD) head, said: "When we started to define the confrontation with the Palestinians as an armed confrontation, it was a dramatic switch…It took four months and four planes to change the opinion of the United States, and had it not been for those four planes I am not sure we would have been able to develop the thesis of the war

13 There is no internationally recognised definition of targeted killings. The Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston, published by the Human Rights Council of the UN defines it as the following: *"A targeted killing is the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their agents acting under colour of law, or by an organized armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator."*

14 Bisharat, "Violence's Law," 76.

15 Bisharat, "Violence's Law," 76; *See also*: The "Mitchell Report" of the Sharm al-Shaykh Fact-Finding Committee, 20 May 2001.

against terrorism on the present scale."[16] The world perception on Israeli aggression in Gaza changed after September 9/11. By the time of the Gaza War of 2008, even neutral observers like Amnesty International began to frame the situation as an "armed conflict" and not an occupation, deeming IHL of armed combat, not the laws of occupation, applicable to the IDF's actions against Gazans. [17]

Thus, Israel successfully used the doctrine of terrorism to justify its usage of excessive violence in Gaza after the Second Intifada. This, coupled with the international community's tacit approval of the application of laws of armed conflict (IHL) instead of the laws of occupation as the governing rules for the IDF's conduct in Gaza, helped to bring seemingly illegal Israeli activities within the realm of international law. Israeli legal entrepreneurialism served to justify Israeli actions through legal language, but it subsequently pushed customary IHL applicable to the situation in Gaza further away from its humanitarian intent.

Indistinction between Civilians and Combatants

One of the principal accusations faced by the IDF during Operation Cast Lead was that it failed to distinguish between civilians and combatants. Rule 1 of Chapter 1 of the Customary IHL Database, which has been codified by the International Committee of the Red Cross by drawing elements from the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, states: "The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against

16 Yotam Feldman and Uri Blau, "Consent and Advise," *Haaretz*, January 29, 2009, https://www.haaretz.com/1.5069101.

17 Bisharat "Violence's Law," 76; Amnesty International stated, "if a situation arises in which fighting inside the occupied territory reaches the requisite scale and intensity, then international humanitarian law rules governing humane conduct in warfare apply." (Amnesty International, "The Conflict in Gaza," 7).

combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians."[18] The independent and international UN Fact Finding Mission headed by Judge Richard Goldstone published the Goldstone Report in 2009, that listed the international obligations that Israel had violated during Operation Cast Lead. This report explicitly stated that

> Israeli armed forces [constituted] grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention in respect of wilful killings and wilfully causing great suffering to protected persons and, as such, give rise to individual criminal responsibility. It also finds that the direct targeting and arbitrary killing of Palestinian civilians is a violation of the right to life.[19]

The Israeli insistence on dealing with all *employees* of the Hamas government as *terrorists* (and thus combatants) renders it impossible for Israel to distinguish between civilians and combatants as necessitated by the norms of IHL.[20] To counter this situation, Israeli legal practice aims to systematically redefine the legal norms. First, Israel pushes the standard terror argument by reemphasizing that Hamas is a terrorist organisation. This is significant because Hamas is not branded a terrorist organisation by the United Nations, and only a handful of states, including Japan, Egypt, Jordan, the US, Canada, and the European Union, consider it to be so. On the other hand, a number of states use the normative principle of self-determination, enshrined within the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, customary human rights law, to define their perspective on Hamas. In international legal literature, Hamas is treated

18 International Committee of the Red Cross, "Customary IHL - Rule 1. The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants," ICRC IHL Database, accessed January 2, 2020, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter1_rule1.

19 "Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories: Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict" (United Nations General Assembly, September 25, 2009), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/SpecialSessions/Session9/Pages/FactFindingMission.aspx, 20.

20 Bisharat, "Violence's Law," 76.

as a non-state actor that is obliged to adhere to IHL like state actors.[21] But on the other hand, Hamas also fits the definition of an NSA that engages in "asymmetric warfare" using tactics that do not correspond with standard rules of international combat. All of these contradictory identities makes Israel's unilateral conferment of the designation of a terrorist organisation upon Hamas, and its subsequent expectation that the international community will unanimously approve of this appear, somewhat unrealistic.[22] Yet Israel does so by using the absence of a standard internationally accepted definition of terrorism to its advantage. Legal entrepreneurialism is used by Israel to assert its own political interest—creating and promoting a definition of terrorism that fits the description of Hamas.[23]

Having established Hamas as a terrorist organisation, Israel then attempts to claim that all civilians employed by the Hamas are also terrorists. As Israeli military spokesman Captain Benjamin Rutland told the BBC in an interview on civilian casualties during Operation Cast Lead in January 2009: "Our definition is that anyone who is involved with terrorism within Hamas is a valid target. This ranges from the strictly military institutions and includes the political institutions that provide the logistical funding and human resources for the terrorist arm."[24]

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21 Bisharat, "Violence's Law," 83.

22 Bisharat, "Violence's Law," 83. Many states and international actors treat Hamas's military wing, Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades as a terrorist organisation and condemns its acts of violence as acts of terrorism, despite not officially designating Hamas an a terrorist organisation.

23 Many states do not consider resistance to foreign military occupation to be terrorism. For example, Article 2(a) of the Organization of Islamic Conference Convention to Combat Terrorism (1999–1420H) stipulates: *"Peoples struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination in accordance with the principles of international law shall not be considered a terrorist crime." See also*: Statehood and Palestine for the Purposes of Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute, Errol Mendes.

24 Heather Sharp, "Gaza Conflict: Who Is a Civilian?," January 5, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7811386.stm.

There were a number of instances during Operation Cast Lead when the IDF killed "civilians" in direct violation of the distinction principle of IHL, justifying their conduct in the terms of the above legal argument. An investigation by *The Guardian* brought to light multiple incidents where medics and ambulance drivers were targeted when they tried to tend to the wounded. According to the World Health Organisation, more than half of Gaza's 27 hospitals and 44 clinics were damaged by Israeli bombs.[25] *The Guardian* also gathered testimony on missile attacks by Israeli drones against clearly distinguishable civilian targets. In one case, a family of six was killed when a missile hit the courtyard of their house.[26] Secretaries, court clerks, housing officials, judges and all other members of the Hamas-run Gaza government were "legitimate targets for liquidation."[27] The most notable of all these incidents, however, was the Israeli attack on the graduation ceremony of a police academy in Gaza City on December 27, 2008. Dozens of young people, who were indisputably civilians under international law, were gunned to death by IDF forces. The ILD had ruled the attack permissible under IHL, giving the IDF the go ahead it desired. The ILD explained this decision later using the same "employee of Hamas" argument. By choosing to enrol in a law enforcement academy that would undertake activities on behalf of Hamas, these innocent students had "incriminated" themselves, claimed the ILD. As a member of the ILD said to *Ha'aretz*, "this was a very large group of people who at that moment were ostensibly civilians and the next day would become legitimate military targets."[28] The IDF murdered 248

25 Clancy Chassay, "Under Attack: How Medics Died Trying to Help Gaza's Casualties," *The Guardian*, March 23, 2009, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/23/gaza-war-crimes-medics.

26 Clancy Chassay and Julian Borger, "Gaza War Crimes Investigation: Guardian Uncovers Evidence of Alleged Israeli War Crimes in Gaza," *The Guardian*, March 24, 2009, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/23/israel-gaza-war-crimes-guardian.

27 Bisharat, "Violence's Law," 76.

28 Feldman and Blau, "Consent and Advise."

non-combatant civilian police in the Gaza War, justifying each incident in terms of terrorism. The Goldstone Report ruled that: "The Mission finds that there is insufficient information to conclude that the Gaza police as a whole had been 'incorporated' into the armed forces of the Gaza authorities. Accordingly, the policemen killed cannot be considered to have been combatants by virtue of their membership in the police."[29]

Israel connected each of these violent incidents that caused civilian casualties in Gaza to Hamas' disregard of IHL in general, and the principle of distinction in particular, which requires distinguishment between combatants and civilians. The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that Palestinian combatants "routinely mingle with civilians in order to cover their movements."[30] Further, "members of the Palestinian armed groups were not always dressed in a way that distinguished them from civilians." [31]The Goldstone Report acknowledged the factual truth of these claims, but countered the argument on the grounds that Palestinian combatants did not mingle with civilians to shield themselves from attack. When combatants use civilian populations to render a particular territory immune to the enemy, international norms of armed conduct are violated. The mere "mingling" of civilians and combatants does not violate the Geneva Convention unless the "mingling" serves a military intent.[32] Thus, clarified the Goldstone Report, Israel's justification of treating Hamas employees as combatants was incompatible with the intent of IHL.

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29 "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 110.

30 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Operation in Gaza-Factual and Legal Aspects," July 29, 2009, https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/operation_in_gaza-factual_and_legal_aspects.aspx, para 186.

31 "The Operation in Gaza-Factual and Legal Aspects," para 186.

32 "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 121-123. This claim is further countered by this finding: *"It has also been reported that specialist Israeli troops operated in Gaza during the military operations in civilian attire to liaise with informants and as francs-tireurs"* (Jane's Sentinel Services, Country Risk Assessments).

Furthermore, Israel violated a core principle of customary human rights law—the "right to life" enshrined within the ICCPR—that supplements the aforementioned intent of customary IHL. As the Goldstone Report stated in the case of Israel's airstrikes against the police academy: "There has been a violation of the inherent right to life of those members of the police killed in the attacks of 27 December 2007 who were not members of armed groups by depriving them arbitrarily of their life in violation of Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."[33] As this is a vaguely defined norm that falls outside the realm of IHL, the ILD did not attempt to justify IDF's violation of the ICCPR.

Politicizing Human Shields

The term human shield is used "with respect to civilians or other protected persons, whose presence or movement is aimed or used to render military targets immune from military operations."[34] It can also be used with reference to civilians who are taken to military objectives in order to shield those objectives from attacks.[35] During Operation Cast Lead, Israel came under fire for using human shields, as well as for designating all civilians who could not evacuate from IDF targets once they had been warned as "voluntary human shields" of Hamas and thus legitimate targets for the IDF.

Usage of human shields is prohibited under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention, as well as the Statute of the International Criminal Court all of which constitute customary IHL. Article 51(7) of the Additional Protocol I specifically states:

33 "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 111.

34 Vera Rusinova, "Human Shields," in *Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law*, May 2011, https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e2111.

35 International Committee of the Red Cross, "Customary IHL - Rule 97. Human Shields," ICRC IHL Database, accessed January 2, 2020, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule97.

> The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.[36]

Usage of human shields also violates a principle of customary human rights law, in addition to IHL, as is highlighted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC): "International human rights law does not prohibit the use of human shields as such, but this practice would constitute, among other things, a violation of the non-derogable right not to be arbitrarily deprived of the right to life."[37] The UN Human Rights Committee points out that it is not only the responsibility of the state to not kill, but also to protect life—a principle which is violated by the usage of human shields. What is important is that both IHL and human rights law assert unequivocally that the usage of human shields are incompatible with the humanitarian mission of international law.

Israeli practice of using human shields during Operation Cast Lead is a less defensible action than the aforementioned practice of designating individuals "voluntary human shields." There have been at least four incidents reported during Operation Cast Lead during which the IDF coerced Palestinian civilians at gunpoint to take part in house searches during the military operations—blindfolded, handcuffed, and forced to enter ahead of Israeli soldiers—in houses which Palestinian combatants were suspected of hiding. One particularly gruesome account was

36 International Committee of the Red Cross, "Additional Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions, 1977 - 51 - Protection of the Civilian Population," June 8, 1977, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=4BEBD9920AE0AEAEC12563CD0051DC9E.

37 ICRC, "Customary IHL - Rule 97. Human Shields."

presented by three teenage brothers in the al-Attar family. They describe how they were taken from home at gunpoint and made to kneel in front of Israeli tanks to deter Hamas fighters from firing, and were sent by Israeli soldiers into Palestinian houses to clear them.[38] Despite clear orders from the Israeli High Court against usage of human shields and public assurances from the IDF that it would comply with this order, the practice was continued.[39] Accusations of employing human shields were also levelled against the Golani Brigade—the IDF unit responsible for executing a military operation by the name of "Israeli Plan" in the northeast of the Gaza Strip at some key Hamas resistance points.[40] The Goldstone report was explicit:

> ...this practice amounts to the use of Palestinian civilians as human shields and is therefore prohibited by international humanitarian law. It puts the right to life of the civilians at risk in an arbitrary and unlawful manner and constitutes cruel and inhuman treatment. The use of human shields also is a war crime. The Palestinian men used as human shields were questioned under threat of death or injury to extract information about Hamas, Palestinian combatants and tunnels. This constitutes a further violation of international humanitarian law. [41]

The 164 page report that was published by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs in response to the Goldstone Report, titled "The Operation in Gaza-Factual and Legal Aspects," does not defend this outright violation of IHL.

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38 Chassay and Borger, "Gaza War Crimes Investigation."

39 "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 22.

40 "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 89.

41 "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 23, 77. The Goldstone Report also highlighted that war crimes comprise *"...crimes relating to the use of prohibited methods and means of warfare (including directing an attack against civilians or civilian objects, launching an attack directed against legitimate targets if such attack causes excessive incidental civilian casualties or damage to the environment, improper use of the protective emblems, the use of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, use of human shields and acts of terror."*

The concept of voluntary human shields is easier to subject to Israeli legal maneuvering. Israel designated Palestinian civilians who failed to evacuate a building or an area after the IDF had provided warnings of an impending bombardment a "voluntary human shield" of Hamas.[42] As an Israeli military lawyer said in 2009, "people who go into a house despite a warning do not have to be taken into account in terms of injury to civilians…From the legal point of view, I do not have to show consideration for them."[43] Another lower-ranked Israeli soldier said, "…we were told to break into a house…Go upstairs and shoot every person we see…The upper echelons said this was allowed because anyone remaining in this area, inside Gaza City, is incriminated, a terrorist, who did not escape."[44] Thus, Israel perpetuated a legal concoction that these "voluntary human shields" were combatants and not civilians. IDF personnel, therefore, did not have any IHL obligations towards them.[45] On 29 February, 2009, Mr. Fathi Hammad of the Palestinian Legislative Council called upon Palestinian people to act as human shields, which only helped Israel to bolster its argument that civilians who did not evacuate after being warned were not the IDF's moral responsibility, as they were complicit in Hamas' "war".[46]

The Goldstone Report made several arguments that questioned the above Israeli defense. First, not every Palestinian civilian who did not evacuate a "warned" building had a military or political motivation to

42 Bisharat, "Violence's Law," 77.

43 Rony Brauman and Régis Meyran, *Humanitarian Wars?: Lies and Brainwashing* (Hurst, 2019), 106.

44 "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 129.

45 Bisharat, "Violence's Law"; "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 77.

46 Fati Hammad, a Hamas leader said *"the Palestinian people has developed its [methods] of death seeking. For the Palestinian people, death became an industry, at which women excel and so do all people on this land: the elderly excel, the mujahideen excel and the children excel. Accordingly, [Hamas] created a human shield of women, children, the elderly and the mujahideen, against the Zionist bombing machine"* (Goldstone, 120, Hamas' Youtube Channel).

support Hamas. The Mission led by Goldstone found upon investigation that many people had chosen to stay despite warnings

> because they had experienced previous incursions and, based on past experience, did not think they would be at risk as long as they remained indoors or because they had no safe place to go. In addition, some witnesses stated that they had chosen to stay because they wished to watch over their homes and property. The Mission did not find any evidence of civilians being forced to remain in their houses by Palestinian armed groups.[47]

Further, the Mission also had no reason to believe that people's decision to not evacuate building were spurred by the Hamas leader's statement.[48] On several occasions, for instance, people were overwhelmed by the sense that they had "nowhere to go."[49] They were often asked to evacuate and go to the city centres but the events of the preceding weeks made this action appear dangerous.[50] Besides, there were attacks in the "safe" city centres even after evacuees had been sent there. After the IDF attacks on the al-Maqdamah mosque and the mortar attack outside of a UN shelter, the director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), John Ging, commented: "There is nowhere safe in Gaza. Everyone here is terrorized and traumatized."[51] In some cases, people reported that IDF soldiers manhandled escaping civilians, which may have deterred other civilians from fleeing.[52] In other cases, people were too frail or disabled to move.[53] Thus, according to the Mission's investigations, the ILD's claim that all civilians who chose

47 "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 119-122.
48 "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 120.
49 "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 128.
50 "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 128.
51 "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 129.
52 "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 133.
53 "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 129.

to stay behind were complicit in Hamas's terrorism was baseless. As Bisharat points out, "in the limited space of the Gaza Strip, from which exit is barred by Israel itself, the 'voluntary human shield policy' functioned to transform warned areas into virtual free-fire zones for Israeli troops."[54] The "voluntary human shield" policy was nothing more than a legal justification for IDF's mass civilian murders.

Under customary IHL, it is the responsibility of states to ensure that "in the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects."[55] The Geneva Convention also states that "effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit."[56]

During Operation Cast Lead, the IDF used three kinds of warning tactics in accordance with IHL: (i) Telephone/text message: Phone calls with recorded messages were played. In total some 165,000 telephone calls were made throughout the military operations;[57] (ii) Leaflets dropped from aircrafts over Palestinian neighborhoods that did not have access to telephones. In total some 2,500,000 leaflets were dropped;[58] (iii) "Knocking on the Roof": The IDF developed a practice of dropping light explosives on rooftops. Israeli gunners would first fire at a building's corner and then strike at the more vulnerable points after a few moments.[59] These warnings gave credence to the legal arguments that allowed the

54 Bisharat, "Violence's Law," 111.

55 ICRC Database, Ch IV of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, Article 57 (1).

56 ICRC Database, Ch IV of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, Article 57 (2) (c).

57 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "PM Olmert Press Briefing on IDF Operation in the Gaza Strip," December 27, 2008, https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2008/Pages/PM_Olmert_press_briefing_IDF_operation_Gaza_Strip_27-Dec-2008.aspx.

58 "PM Olmert Press Briefing on IDF Operation in the Gaza Strip."

59 Bisharat, "Violence's Law," 10; "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 125.

ILD to state that they had no moral obligation to protect Palestinian civilians who had not heeded their warnings. This was another classic case of legal entrepreneurialism.

However, in many instances, these warnings were found to be inadequate. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated in a press conference on December 2008, that "preparations for its military operations were 'extensive and thorough'."[60] The Goldstone Mission argues that if the IDF had the ability to prepare militarily, they also had the ability to issue more thorough warnings, especially given their monopoly over Gaza's telephone networks and airspace.[61] Further, phone calls to inform inhabitants that the building they were in would be destroyed within minutes did not suffice the adequacy requirements of warnings to civilians.[62] It clearly placed military advantage over human life even when the strategic achievements of such an act were not significant.

Additionally, the "roof-knocking" policy was found to be "a dangerous practice and in essence [constituted] a form of attack rather than a warning."[63] Civilians could not be put under the duress of having to guess whether a bombing was a warning or an attack. The uncertainty was exacerbated by certain incidents in which a "warning" had led to serious damage.[64] The Mission concluded that the IDF had failed in its responsibility of warning civilian populations before inflicting damage.

60 "PM Olmert Press Briefing on IDF Operation in the Gaza Strip."

61 "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 127-8.

62 Weizman, "Short Cuts," 2.

63 "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 132.

64 Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 126. The Mission also saw in the Sawafeary house that a missile had penetrated the rear of the house on the wall near the ceiling, gone through an internal wall and exited through the wall at the front of the house near the windows. At the time (around 10 p.m. on 3 January 2009) there were several family members in the house, who happened to be lying down. The Mission cannot say what size of weapon was used on this occasion, although it was sufficiently powerful to penetrate three walls, or whether it was intended as a warning (Goldstone Report, 126).

The Israeli legal inference that those civilians who didn't heed warnings were "voluntary human [shields]" of the Hamas was considered "wholly unwarranted." The Mission found that "the fact that a warning was issued does not, however, relieve a commander or his subordinates from taking all other feasible measures to distinguish between civilians and combatants."[65] The voluntary human shield tactic was therefore a concerted effort by Israeli legal entrepreneurs to relieve the IDF of the obligations of IHL. As Eyal Weizman, an Israeli intellectual points out, "to communicate a warning can indeed save a life. But the strategy is also aimed at changing the legal designation of anyone who is killed."[66] The Israeli objective in concocting this policy was intended to justify the deaths of civilians whom Israel treated as collateral damage while pursuing its military and political interests.

Thus, this legal entrepreneurial campaign used international law to alter the legal status of a Palestinian casualty killed by the IDF from that of a civilian and a non-combatant to a "voluntary human shield" of Hamas.[67] Israel's obligation to the central intent of IHL—the protection of those "not partaking in hostilities during wartime"—was waived by Israeli lawyers by redefining Palestinian citizens in Gaza in a manner that justified the massive numbers of civilian casualties.[68]

The Dahiya Doctrine of Disproportionality

During the Israeli War in Lebanon in 2006, Israel razed the Dahiya Quarter of Beirut—the part of the city that housed Hezbollah offices—to the ground. The principle behind this policy of total destruction when

65 "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 130.

66 Eyal Weizman, "Short Cuts · LRB 06 December 2012," London Review of Books, December 6, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n23/eyal-weizman/short-cuts, 2.

67 Weizman, "Short Cuts," 2.

68 International Committee of the Red Cross, "What Is International Humanitarian Law?," Legal factsheet, ICRC, October 13, 2014, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/what-international-humanitarian-law.

dealing with enemies is what constitutes the base of the Israeli "Dahiya Doctrine." Major General Gadi Eizenkot, who had been in a leadership position of a unit of the IDF during the Lebanon War, revealed this policy during Operation Cast Lead in 2008. He said in an interview:

> What happened in the Dahiya quarter of Beirut in 2006 will happen in every village from which Israel is fired on…We will apply disproportionate force on it and cause great damage and destruction there. From our standpoint, these are not civilian villages, they are military bases…This is not a recommendation. This is a plan. And it has been approved. [69]

The Dahiya Doctrine is synonymous with Israeli arguments of favoring disproportionality in armed conflict. Thus, as the renowned Palestinian scholar, Rashid Khalidi, points out, this "is actually less of a strategic doctrine than it is an explicit outline of collective punishment and probable war crimes."[70]

Proportionality is one of the most significant norms of IHL. Outlined in Additional Protocol I, the principle of proportionality prohibits launching attacks "which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."[71] Israel accepts as customary international law that the excessive use of force, weighed in relation to "the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated" can constitute actionable offence.[72] However, during Operation Cast Lead, the UN Fact Finding Mission found a number of incidents that violated the principle of proportionality that Israel was obligated to uphold. The mortar shelling of

69 Rashid I. Khalidi, "From the Editor : The Dahiya Doctrine, Proportionality, and War Crimes," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 44, no. 1 (2014): 5, https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2014.44.1.5.

70 Khalidi, "The Dahiya Doctrine," 3.

71 "The Operation in Gaza," para. 120.

72 "Operation in Gaza," para. 120; See also: Statute of the ICC.

the al-Fakhura junction in Jabaliyah next to an UNRWA school, which was sheltering 1,368 people at the time, was one such incident. Not only did the IDF decide to use mortar shells, a weapon that would maximise civilian casualties, but the IDF also chose to not warn civilians about the attack, despite having a full fifty minutes to do so. This was undisputedly a deliberate action and one that violated IHL in terms of proportionality because there was no military advantage to using mortars over another type of weapon.[73] The Mission concluded that the bombing "cannot meet the test of what a reasonable commander would have determined to be an acceptable loss of civilian life for the military advantage sought. The Mission thus considers the attack to have been indiscriminate, in violation of international law, and to have violated the right to life of the Palestinian civilians killed in these incidents."[74] Other instances of this violation include the bombing of the graduation ceremony at the police academy at Gaza City in December 2007, as well as the attacks on other police headquarters across Gaza which "constituted disproportionate attacks in violation of customary international humanitarian law."[75] Israel violated the proportionality principle again in its usage of white phosphorous, a prohibited weapon, in an attack on a civilian hospital. [76]

Under international law, some exceptional precedents have been set, where militaries face a very serious dilemma; killing some civilians may lead to huge strategic successes that can lead to minimization of loss in the long run. However, this was not applicable to any of the incidents in which Israel was accused of using disproportionate force during Operation Cast Lead. As the Goldstone Report summarised, the assessment of proportionality was made very difficult because the words and deeds of the IDF and the Israeli government "...were premised on a

73 "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 158-159.

74 "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 20.

75 "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 111.

76 "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 146.

deliberate policy of disproportionate force aimed not at the enemy but at the 'supporting infrastructure.'"[77] In practice, this appears to have meant the civilian population. This conclusion is not inconsistent with the statement made by Major General Eizenkot, who believed that the Dahiya Doctrine was justifiable. Just like the Goldstone Report indicates, Israeli policy suggested that it had a right to use excessive force to destroy the enemy, including force directed at Palestinian civilians, whom Israel viewed as Hamas affiliates and therefore legitimate targets.

Israeli legal entrepreneurialism doesn't try to explain why the IDF's actions are often disproportionate. Instead, it rationalizes disproportionality using the political context in which it is taking place. The report by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), justifying the Gaza War of 2008, argues at length that there are circumstances under IHL in which military actions that result in loss of civilian life is not unlawful. These include attacks that are directed against military objectives that comply with the principles of discrimination and proportionality, but nonetheless kill civilians. They include killing those persons who, though not members of an armed group, participate directly in hostilities. Israel justifies its actions in terms of this exception.[78] Further, the primary objective of the Dahiya Doctrine is "future deterrence." As Gabi Saron, of Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies, said, "such a response aims at inflicting damage and meting out punishment to an extent that will demand long and expensive reconstruction processes."[79] The purpose of disproportionality is to pressure the civilian population to repudiate Hamas.[80] While this is not an argument propounded by Israel legal scholars, it nevertheless highlights the political motivation behind

77 "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," 406.

78 "The Operation in Gaza," 89-141.

79 Bisharat, "Violence's Law," 78; *See also*: Saboni, "Disproportionate Force: Israel's Concept of Response in Light of the Second Lebanon War," *INSS Insight,* no. 74 (2 October 2008).

80 Bisharat, "Violence's Law," 78.

Israel's violation of international law. This argument also emphasizes that Israeli conduct under the Dahiya Doctrine ultimately aims to alter international opinion on the disproportionate use of force in the interest of self-defense.

Conclusion

Israel launched a legal campaign *against* the humanitarian norms of international law on armed conflict in 1967, after it occupied the Palestinian territories in West Bank and Gaza. Since the Second Intifada, in the global aftermath of 9/11, this campaign has experienced unstinted success. This campaign, now known as legal entrepreneurialism, is a sustained effort by the state of Israel to justify the IDF's violations of customary IHL that is binding upon all member states of the United Nations in occupied Palestine.

Legal entrepreneurialism is a cogent and systematized policy initiative that Israel has carefully constructed over a length of time to expand the extent and degree of violence that is permissible for its military to exercise during a state of armed conflict. Israel has done this by repeatedly undermining and re-interpreting the humanitarian norms of warfare enshrined in IHL that attempt to reduce non-combatant casualties. Furthermore, ever since the beginning of the campaign, Israel's legal entrepreneurialism has played the part of a "defensive offensive." Ostensibly, this legal campaign serves as the armour that shields IDF members from criminal accountability for the violations of IHL they have perpetrated in occupied Palestine.

The less discernible but more pervasive impact of the campaign is its distortive impact upon IHL. Through institutionalized state practice that has gone unchecked for decades, Israel has set a precedent in the practice of customary IHL that actively encourages other states to undertake similar acts of violence in the future, where they, too, can fulfil their military interests unhindered by legal humanitarian obligations. In other

words, through its structured and calculated process of transforming the law, Israel has monopolized and weaponized IHL, transforming it into a legal arm that states can use to inflict violence on non-combatants. Thus even as Israel unilaterally turns IHL away from its explicit objective of protecting civilians during warfare, it continues to be lauded as a state that practices restraint in military conduct and upholds the norms of IHL. In actuality though, the IHL that Israel follows is the IHL that Israel has created for itself, that does not fetter vested Israeli political interests in Palestine.

Given the unrestrained support Israel receives from the international community, especially in contrast with the negative world perception of Hamas, Israeli legal entrepreneurialism appears to be a burgeoning campaign with optimistic prospects. As Israel violates more norms of international law and the international community silently consents, international law that protects the human rights of the Palestinian people fighting Israel's protracted military violence seemingly plummets towards insignificance.

But, what, it must be asked, compels Israel to pour resources into this expensive campaign to transform the law? Why can't a state as powerful as Israel flout the existing law, even without the fear of retribution? What necessitates Israel's unwarranted self-justifications for its military excesses? Is IHL's role in Palestine truly superfluous if Israel persists in its practice of legal entrepreneurialism? These questions suggest that Israel's campaign against IHL is only an extension of its campaign against the Palestinian people, that the restoration of the principles of customary IHL will go hand in hand with the realisation of justice for Palestinian victims of Israeli military oppression, and that as long as Israel engages in legal entrepreneurialism the dream of a global order that serves humanitarian interests over state interests will stay alive.

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REVIVIN

TRADITI

NG

Alla Alsahli

This look reflects upon historical native Palestinian clothing from the 1920s and 30s. The emphasis is on the women themselves as they harvest, farm, and use their hands to make and produce quality objects and staple foods such as woven baskets, olives, and wheat in and on the land of Palestine. Even when they were hard at work, Palestinian women wore intricate and beautiful garments, and their clothes remained true to who they were and are, and true to their traditions. In this project, I wanted to convey the essence of her effortlessness and freedom by balancing a lighter weight fabric that moves freely with the heavier wool jacket. The materials chosen are much different than what was used in historical 1920s Palestine, in an attempt to create variations from the past and to experiment using different materials.

ON

إحـــــيـــــاء الـــتـــقـــالـــيـــد

يستعرض هذا العمل الأزياء الفلسطينية الفلكلورية في فترة العشرينات والثلاثينات من القرن الماضي. تم التركيز في هذا العمل على النساء الفلسطينيات العاملات في الزراعة، والحصاد، و في إعداد سلال القش، وتحضير الأغذية الرئيسية كالزيتون والقمح. على الرغم من طبيعة العمل القاسية، كانت النساء الفلسطينيات تحافظن على ارتداء ملابس جميلة و محاكة بعناية لتعكس انتمائهن وهويتهن. أردت في هذا المشروع أن أحاكي جهد وحرية المرأة الفلسطينية من خلال الموالفة بين نسيج خفيف الوزن يسمح بحرية الحركة وسترة الصوف التي تكون أثقل وزنا. استخدمت في هذا العمل مواد تختلف عن تلك المستخدمة في عشرينات القرن الماضي وذلك في محاولة مني لأحقق شيء من الاختلاف مع الماضي ولتجربة مواد جديدة.

About the Artist

Alla Alsahli is a senior at the Rhode Island School of Design (RISD) majoring in Apparel Design. Her work can be found at alla-studio.myportfolio.com and on Instagram at @alla_alsahli.

SELF

PORTRA

Lena Al-Kaisy

When creating my work, I always take my identity into consideration. And being a Palestinian is an inseparable part of my identity; thus, the following image is a glimpse of my design final. The prompt was to create a mask/self portrait using embroidery techniques. For this assignment I really wanted to create a mask that would be alluding to the gas masks worn by Palestinians. My mask doesn't function as an insulator of gas chemicals, but rather as one that serves to empower its wearer. I was intrigued by this idea of creating a uniform or military inspired collection.

Here's my first attempt, however, please take into consideration that this project does not aim to demean the suffering nor the negative associations and reality of the Palestinians behind these gas masks, rather it's my aim to draw attention to it through apparel work. Ideally, this mask would be worn by women, making them look powerful and fierce. The war field is often considered a space for masculinity, however, since Palestinian women are as involved as men in this fight, I wanted to create a piece that sheds light on that. My prayer goes to all the Palestinians out there. You teach us how to cope with suffering each day, how to love our lands and country, and how to fight for our basic human rights of living under OUR homes safely and on OUR land.

About the Artist

Lena Al-Kaisy is a junior at the Rhode Island School of Design. During the fall term of her sophomore year, her major was Apparel Design; however, she transferred majors and is currently majoring in Graphic Design. Her work can be found at www.behance.net/lenakaisy and on Instagam @therealkaisyy.





صـــــــــــورة ذاتـــــيـــــة

الصورة التالية هي لمحة عن التصميم النهائي لمشروع فني يقوم على حياكة قناع أو صورة ذاتية باستخدام تقنيات التطريز. حين انكب على عملي أضع هويتي نصب عيني، وكوني فلسطينية هو جزء مهم من شخصيتي، لذا قمت بتطريز قناع يحاكي أقنعة الغاز التي يرتديها الفلسطينيون. هذا القناع لا يحمي من الغازات السامة بقدر ما يبث القوة في مرتديه. خامرتني رغبة جامحة في تصميم مجموعة أزياء مستوحاة من الأطقم الموحدة أو البزات العسكرية.