

A Constructive Conflict Approach to World Struggles

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ALTHOUGH INTERNATIONAL WARS INVOLVING LARGE armies have become rare, civil wars persist and deadly attacks by nongovernmental organizations have increased, both within and across national borders.¹ The violent conflicts that include major transnational actors often have an impact on several countries and attract armed intervention, sometimes from several countries. This article examines conflicts of this type, as well as inter-state wars, focusing on both the actual and potential contributions of a constructive conflict approach to reducing the incidence and severity of these diverse kinds of world struggles.

The constructive conflict approach, applied here to large-scale conflicts, synthesizes the fields of peace studies and conflict resolution as they have evolved and converged since the end of World War II.² The fields of peace studies and of peace research have envisioned the possibilities of avoiding wars and achieving peaceful and just relations within and among countries. Historically, the field of conflict resolution has focused more on adversaries negotiating settlements, often with the assistance of mediation. An encompassing conflict transformation approach recognizes that conflicts are necessary, and not always bad. It entails a change in the relationship between adversaries greatly reducing severely injurious conduct. The constructive conflict approach emphasizes noncoercive and

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coercive ways to wage conflicts as they escalate and de-escalate. It recognizes that each conflict is socially constructed, dynamic, and interrelated with many others. Finally, it presumes that conflicts are more likely to be broadly beneficial when an adversary considers the concerns of its antagonists while waging a struggle against them.

The horrors of World War II, unlike those of World War I, did not arouse the same pacifist sentiments and resolutions to avoid future wars. However, the victorious nations of World War II generally felt that the war was necessary and the means used to defeat the enemies were justified.³ This reliance on military force, which quickly became apparent with the emergence of the Cold War, entailed maintaining large military forces and developing nuclear weapons systems, intervening covertly and overtly in proxy wars, and engaging in deadly wars in Korea and Vietnam.

Nevertheless, constructive ways of conducting inter-societal and intra-societal conflicts have also been discovered, devised, analyzed, and applied. The first section of this article explores how empirically grounded analyses of such alternatives have greatly increased over the last 70 years. In the second section, examples of constructively conducted policies applied to major conflicts are discussed. This article concludes with observations about ways in which large-scale conflicts can regularly be conducted and transformed more constructively.

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IDEAS AND PRACTICES OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICT APPROACH

The constructive conflict perspective, similar to the fields of peace studies and conflict resolution, is a body of concepts, research findings, and systematized propositions that are linked to applied tactics and strategies. While some actors consciously adopt the constructive conflict approach or some of its elements when they engage in conflicts, others do not think of themselves as doing so, but apply or create such strategies and tactics nonetheless. Interestingly, those studying and developing the method often incorporate the ideas and practices that these unwitting actors utilize. Thus, these actors often contribute to the development of the constructive conflict approach.

Whether the conduct related to contentious relations is regarded as constructive or destructive, it is not readily measured. Contentious relations vary along several dimensions, among different adversaries, and over differing time periods; I use the term in a relative sense, in which it describes relations as compared to alternative kinds of conduct and in light of contemporaneous international law standards and human rights norms. From the perspective

of the constructive conflict approach, large-scale conflicts are often waged in highly detrimental ways and frequently become self-destructive. Such conflicts too often incur countless human deaths and immense costs that result in the creation of conditions for future destructive conflicts.

BASIC IDEAS OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICT APPROACH

The basic premise of the constructive conflict perspective is that social conflicts are inherent in human life and are often necessary in order to extend social welfare, freedom, and autonomy. While this assumption is widely recognized by scholars in the field, the belief that major conflicts can be waged without terrible destructiveness is not. The latter may only be achieved by the acknowledgment of seven crucial realities that are fundamental to the constructive conflict approach.

First, although conflicts are sometimes characterized as necessarily involving violence or otherwise hurting adversaries, it is useful not to define conflicts as necessarily requiring violence or other forms of harsh coercion.⁴ Rather, conflict is better defined as a relationship between persons or groups in which one or more parties manifest the belief that they have incompatible goals, such that achieving each side's objective is hampered by the other side.⁵ A conflict emerges as one party tries to induce the other to change its conduct, thus enabling it to achieve its goals either partially or fully.

Three kinds of inducements in various combinations are usually used in every conflict. Certainly, many forms of nonviolent and violent coercion are often threatened and actually employed, particularly as a conflict escalates. Nonviolent coercion may take the form of cutting off funds to the opponent or withdrawing previously accorded authority. Two other kinds of noncoercive inducements are also commonly applied in conflicts: persuasion and benefits. When a conflict first emerges, persuasive inducements are commonly presented. These are arguments intended to assert the justice of the demands being made, sometimes claiming that they are consistent with the values and interests of the antagonist. During the course of a conflict, benefits or concessions that appear to be important to the adversary may be offered in trade for concessions from the other side.

The second crucial reality is that conflicts are socially constructed; each side declares which issues are in dispute and who the adversaries are. Members of opposing sides tend to quarrel about the correctness and reality of each other's social constructions. Misperceptions can exacerbate conflicts and contribute to their destructiveness. On the other hand, the socially-constructed character

of conflicts makes them susceptible to reframing or redefinition, which then results in their constructive transformation. The transformation of the Cold War, discussed later, illustrates the underappreciated importance of constructive strategies based on this and other empirical realities.

Third, adversarial parties in a large-scale conflict are not unitary actors; rather, they are heterogeneous in significant ways. There are inevitable differences in concerns and interests between and among each side's leaders, sub-elites, rank and file members, and marginal groups. Their varying responses to oppo-

The rise of a new enemy tends to lower the significance of an old enemy. nents' actions open up avenues for changing the trajectory of a conflict. The changing posi-

tions and their relative influence in shaping conflict behavior among the diverse members of each side can also lead to shifts in the way conflicts are conducted. This was discernable in U.S. policy toward Iraq between President George W. Bush's first and second administrations, with changes in the cabinet and the reduction in the magnitude of the goals sought.⁶

The fourth empirical proposition is that each conflict is not a closed, isolated system but is instead open to external influences and is interconnected with many other conflicts. Each struggle is linked to past conflicts and embedded in larger ones. Each adversary has its own separate set of antagonists in addition to the animosity that they already have toward each other. A shift in the salience of any of these other conflicts affects the prominence of the conflict they share. Thus, the rise of a new enemy tends to lower the significance of an old enemy. For example, the intensifying struggle between the Soviet Union and Communist China in 1969 contributed to the de-escalation of contention between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as between the United States and Communist China in the early 1970s.⁷

The empirical propositions previously noted produce the fifth reality: no conflict is entirely static; rather, conflicts are dynamic. The destructiveness or constructiveness of struggles may increase or become more entrenched due to the actions of new leaders or new social movements. Conflict transformation generally results from the convergence of the actions of many actors in a new direction.

The sixth reality is that external intervention, particularly of a mediating nature, can contribute to the constructive waging and settling of a conflict. Intermediaries provide a variety of services that help constrain and even stop destructive conflict escalation; open channels of communication between adversaries; overcome contentions and construct mutually acceptable agreements;

and sustain understandings that have been reached. A wide variety of persons and groups may perform each of these kinds of functions.

Finally, if one side takes into account its adversary's concerns and interests while advancing its own, it can often contribute to achieving more constructive results for itself and for its adversary as well, at least to some degree. Such consideration reduces the risk of misunderstandings and the need to resort to unnecessarily provocative actions. It can help an actor gain support from segments of the opposition and from outsiders who might intervene in the conflict. Demonstrating such considerations can provide a beneficial context for efforts aimed at influencing an adversary to agree, at least in some measure, to the pursued goals.

BASIC STRATEGIES AT DIFFERENT CONFLICT STAGES

A great variety of strategies pertaining to the field of conflict resolution have been proposed and employed.⁸ Some of them originated from and are used by officials and non-officials who are engaged in waging and transforming conflicts constructively, but who do not self-identify as working in the conflict resolution field. I will briefly identify several strategies as they relate to different conflict stages.

Since conflict escalation efforts too often fail or are counterproductive, attention needs to be given to ways in which struggles can be constructively intensified. One kind of strategy with a long history has recently become more widely recognized, analyzed, and practiced; this entails the recourse to various kinds of nonviolent action, usually mixed with persuasive efforts. For example, this was the case in ousting the authoritarian rulers of Serbia in 2000 and of Tunisia in 2010 to 2011. Empirical research and careful analyses have shown how and why nonviolent actions that are disciplined and appropriate for the circumstances are effective.⁹ The greater success rate for nonviolent actions compared to violent ones is attributable to their persuasiveness to the antagonist and to their reduction of the provocativeness that recourse to violence would entail.

The power of noncoercive inducements is also gaining more recognition in the context of the constructive conflict approach. The power and influence that countries and other entities derive from being attractive and exemplifying positive attributes have gained recognition through the work relating to soft power.¹⁰ In addition, offering benefits to achieve desired but contentious goals is a long-standing strategy. However, research indicates its limitations if the proffered benefit is experienced as offering a payoff in exchange for giving up

sacred values.¹¹ To yield on sacred matters for what might be regarded as a bribe would be considered dishonorable, and the offer would be seen as insulting. On the other hand, showing signs of respect to an adversary is likely to be seen as a benefit in itself.

Persuasive efforts are often components of conflicts and have been central in instilling fundamental changes, such as reducing inequalities in the United States for minorities and women and transforming the Cold War. How claims are phrased affects their acceptance by opponents, as illustrated by the rapid change in views toward gay men, who are no longer seen as men engaging in sordid, casual sex, but as persons of the same gender establishing a loving relationship in marriage.

Settling conflict through negotiation has been a central process in the conflict resolution field.¹² This includes strategies for getting adversaries to the negotiating table and methods to maximize the efficient capture of mutual gains. Negotiations are often greatly assisted by mediation services. Such services are frequently provided by recognized mediators working directly with the negotiator teams. They vary greatly in the extent to which they simply enhance communication between the negotiating sides, present and structure options, or add resources that help implement and sustain agreements. In addition to such mediators, certain members of the negotiation teams acting as quasi-mediators provide mediation services informally. Various other channels can complement the main negotiation channel, as is done in non-official Track-Two diplomacy.¹³ An important example of the workings of Track-Two diplomacy began in 1957 in Pugwash, Canada.¹⁴ Russians and Americans associated with nuclear weapons development met informally for many years and exchanged ideas that were useful in official arms control negotiations. More recently, Track-Two meetings preceded the U.S.–Iranian official negotiations.¹⁵

Finally, workers in the field of conflict resolution are becoming increasingly involved in peacebuilding. Peacebuilding goes beyond merely settling a conflict and extends to recovering from situations of great oppression or mass killings and to building enduring, mutually acceptable social relationships. This often includes significant progress in reconciliation to varying degrees through four major kinds of processes. One process is providing security for people who were harmed or endangered by oppression and discrimination. A second process is furthering justice so that those who suffered receive some degree of recompense and those responsible for gross human rights violations are tried. Third, the truth, as seen by different sides, is revealed and acknowledged. Finally, respect for people on different sides is fostered, which may include apologies and ex-

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pressions of forgiveness for past harms. Recovery includes both attitudinal and structural changes, as they are interdependent. This may be seen in the profound French-German reconciliation after World War II and generations of enmity. Reconciliation is often a very long, uneven process, as in the case of black-white relations in the United States.

MAJOR CONFLICTS CONSTRUCTIVELY WAGED

Terribly destructive, highly violent conflicts attract wide attention, but much less thought is given to tensions or crises that do not result in extreme violence or deadly conflict escalations. Much can be learned about how to avoid, mitigate, or stop destructive conflicts by examining those with constructive trajectories. I will briefly note three different cases in which a variety of constructive strategies were employed.

ENDING THE SOUTH AFRICAN APARTHEID

It was widely believed that the oppressive apartheid system in South Africa could not be ended without great violence. However, the violence was contained by various constructive strategies.¹⁶ When the resistance to the apartheid regime began as a nonviolent effort by the African National Congress (ANC), it was subjected to violent suppression. Nelson Mandela and other ANC leaders declared that they would have to resort to armed struggle, for which they were imprisoned.¹⁷ Mandela made it clear, however, that the armed struggle would not entail terrorist acts or guerilla warfare but rather sabotage. The goal was to negotiate a conflict transformation. The ANC was not of a racist nature and stressed shared values and love of South Africa. Nonviolent strikes and other forms of resistance persisted. The Afrikaner-led government shifted for many overlapping reasons: internal resistance and external isolation, loss of belief that apartheid was morally correct, conviction that time was not on their side, and a growing belief that an acceptable deal could be reached with the ANC.

Negotiations finally began soon after Mandela was released from prison in 1990. When the negotiations initially failed and groups opposing them resorted to violence, the ANC and government leaders cooperated to overcome

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the spoiler actions. Civil society organizations also took crucial measures to counter the spoiler attempts by establishing the National Peace Accord, which operated at diverse societal levels.¹⁸ Negotiations were then renewed and successfully conducted through multiple channels, including intensive private meetings.¹⁹ Inclusivity in the peacebuilding stage was gained by establishing power-sharing agreements. With widespread celebration, Mandela was elected president of South Africa in 1994.

CONCLUDING PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

A constructive conflict approach prescribes preventive actions before destructive escalation begins. An example of this is U.S. President Jimmy Carter's initiation of stalled negotiations regarding the status of the Panama Canal.²⁰ In a 1903 treaty, Panama had granted a 10-mile-wide strip across its territory to the United States, within which it could build a canal that it would operate in perpetuity. The Panamanians believed that the treaty was foisted upon them and they deeply resented it. Following violent riots in 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson opened negotiations with the Panamanian government about the future of the Canal. Not until June 1967 were new treaties agreed upon, but they were not submitted for ratification given the Senate's opposition. Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford also pursued negotiations, but did not complete them. The prevailing sentiment was that, as President Ronald Reagan put it, the Canal belonged to the United States and "we intend to keep it."²¹

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During his election campaign, Carter learned about the history of the dispute and concluded that an eventual agreement should acknowledge Panamanian sovereignty and end U.S. control of the Canal. He expected strong Congressional resistance, but quickly opened negotiations with the Panamanian government. U.S. military leaders, who argued that the Canal's security would be best achieved if it were operated with the cooperation of a friendly Panamanian government, buttressed the need for a new agreement. The negotiations were consistent with conflict resolution methods, focusing on underlying interests instead of fixed positions. Two treaties were signed in February 1977. One treaty returned most of the Canal Zone territory to the Panamanians who would join the Americans in its operation until the end of the century, at which point they would control the Canal exclusively. The other treaty established the U.S. right to defend the Canal from external threats that might interfere with neutral service to ships of all nations.²² Carter appreciated the value of these treaties for U.S. standing in Latin America and the world generally, but he also knew that there

would be domestic resistance to “giving up the Panama Canal.”²³ To overcome the opposition of conservative senators, Carter mobilized former and current Republican and Democratic officials who knew that ratifying the treaties was crucial. To help overcome the concerns of opponents, he arranged for many senators to travel to Panama in order to better understand the significance of the Canal’s history for the Panamanians and the vulnerabilities of the Canal system. The diplomatic and political efforts ultimately succeeded, resulting in the ratification of the treaties. The treaties have been successful in securing the operations of the Canal and have helped avoid destructive expansions of later conflicts between the United States and Panama. Nevertheless, this achievement receives little public notice in the United States.

ENDING OF COLD WAR

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Historically, the U.S. government has characterized the Cold War as a conflict between the “free world” and the Communist bloc, directed by the Soviet Union. The Soviet government has generally framed the Cold War as a struggle between the socialist camp and capitalist imperialism. At times, it seemed as if massive nuclear warfare would erupt between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Although this never happened, many proxy wars were fought and U.S. involvement in wars in Korea and Vietnam were components of the Cold War. In addition, however, many constructive strategies contributed to transforming and finally bringing the Cold War to an end, aided by popular nonviolent social movements in Eastern Europe.

By the late 1960s, U.S. and Soviet governmental leaders recognized that the two sides were not unitary camps, and that they had some shared concerns, such as the burdens of military expenditures and China’s ambitions. National interests overrode ideological solidarity in the relations among the Soviet Union, China, and North Vietnam. Moreover, in 1969 the Social Democratic Party, led by Willy Brandt, won federal elections in West Germany and introduced a new policy in relations with East Germany and the governments of Eastern Europe. The new West German policy meant engagement and reconciliation with Eastern Europe and acceptance of the border changes that had moved Russia and Poland westward and divided Germany.

President Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, saw the advantages of playing the Soviet Union and China against each other. As a staunch anti-communist, Nixon was confident he could open relations with China without arousing domestic resistance. Given West Germany’s new policy

toward the East, he could also be more accepting of the realities of Eastern Europe. An active period of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union ensued. Détente in the early 1970s resulted in routinizing arms control agreements and cultivating cultural, educational, and economic relations between the two countries. Russian academics and political figures gained experience with Western freedom and the pleasures of consumerism.

The limitations and stagnation of the Soviet system became more evident to the Soviet elites. The costs of maintaining an empire and of military expenditures became increasingly burdensome, particularly during President Reagan's first administration. After selecting a series of old and short-lived rulers, the Communist Party leadership took another path and turned to a younger and more creative leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. He believed that reducing the military confrontation with the United States and opening up the Soviet Union to new thinking could yield economic revitalization. U.S. domestic resistance to Reagan's anti-Soviet rhetoric and actions helped make that option seem plausible. A specific path to reduce the level of military confrontation was provided by the ideas of non-provocative defense, which were developed by Western European peace research scholars.²⁴ They analyzed how adopting military defense strategies that would not be viewed as aggression could enhance security. This went beyond agreeing on confidence-building measures, such as procedures for mutual monitoring of adherence to past settlements. It involved restructuring military forces so that they clearly served defensive purposes. Peace researchers, West German Social Democratic Party officials, and other Western Europeans conveyed this reasoning to Soviet leaders, and Gorbachev and his associates adopted and implemented the ideas.²⁵

Finally, the people living in Soviet-dominated countries in Eastern Europe brought the Communist Party's rule to an end.²⁶ With the exception of some violence in Romania, this occurred by popular, nonviolent actions. Such social movement conduct brought about the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, marking the end of the Cold War. Subsequently, nonviolent actions contributed to the end of Communist rule in the Soviet Union and to its dissolution.²⁷

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Greater applications of a constructive conflict approach to the conduct of large-scale conflicts could avoid the destructiveness of international and domestic wars. The challenge arises in the realm of conventional thinking about social conflicts and also in the realm of institutionalized structures that rely on relatively

destructive strategies. However, trends in global developments and energetic actions by many people are helping to overcome these challenges.²⁸

The potential of the constructive conflict approach is currently far from being fully realized. This is particularly true with regard to large-scale global conflicts, such as U.S. counterterrorism efforts and U.S.–Russia relations.²⁹ Developing and recognizing constructive options are steps toward undertaking them.

Fortunately, the field of conflict resolution is well-established in the United States, Europe, and in some countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. There are numerous graduate degree programs and centers advancing research and providing training regarding the constructive waging of conflicts. Scholar-practitioners engage in mediation, training, and evaluation of ongoing practices in countries beset by conflicts. There are also many nongovernmental and governmental organizations that apply conflict resolution methods to various kinds of conflicts. Currently, much work is devoted to peacebuilding after mass violence or oppression, including mitigating turmoil that resulted from international intervention.

Non-military means of conducting international affairs are relatively underdeveloped and under-resourced.

In order to realize the potentialities of the constructive conflict approach, its basic ideas and various strategies must be more effectively communicated to policymakers and laypersons. Both formal and informal educational avenues must provide clearer and more robust information about constructive alternatives to traditional—and often counterproductive—ways of waging conflict. Further research is needed to better understand the constructive and destructive consequences of different conflict engagement strategies.

Major national and international centers and think tanks need to develop forward-looking, long-term policies for diverse actors to engage constructively in different stages of large-scale conflict transformations. The International Crises Group combines analyses based on well-grounded, detailed information with precise policy recommendations for each of the primary actors in major crises around the world. Similar capacities need to be created for emerging conflicts, in order to prepare for likely future crises, to transform intractable conflicts, and to help with peacebuilding after mass violence or oppressive rule has ended.

Ongoing information about effective applications of the constructive conflict approach in many parts of the world must be made widely available. For example, the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC) provides

information about nonviolent practices by preparing videos and publications and making them available on television and the Internet, as well as to schools and universities. Several other nongovernmental organizations provide basic information about the methods of negotiation and mediation through publications, videos, and websites.

Institutional changes are also needed. U.S. foreign policy—and that of many other states—is overmilitarized. Non-military means of conducting international affairs are relatively underdeveloped and under-resourced. Therefore, when contentious action on behalf of a state appears necessary, recourse tends to gravitate toward military forces. For example, U.S. military expenditures are sustained not only by external military threats, but also by domestic interests that sometimes produce counterproductive policies and hamper funding of alternative diplomatic activities.³⁰

Transnational institutions, including the United Nations and its associated agencies, need much greater development. For example, establishing a standing UN peacekeeping force would enable its operations to be undertaken in a more timely fashion, thereby increasing its effectiveness. Reliance on more narrow military alliances is problematic. The U.S. government's emphasis on the U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), not only during the Cold War but also particularly after the end of the Cold War, has often proved counterproductive.³¹ The current conflict involving Ukraine is an example.³² The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has been instrumental in averting destructive conflicts and advancing human rights in Eastern Europe. The United States should have relied more on the OSCE, rather than NATO, and that would be a constructive alternative going forward.

In conclusion, the evidence about the transformations of the Cold War, the conflict over the Panama Canal, and the fight to end apartheid—together with the other evidence noted in this article—should demonstrate that constructive conflict strategies can help prevent, limit, or transform destructively-waged conflicts. Applications of the constructive conflict approach in large-scale conflicts usually involve a wide variety of actors. No action by any single person or country can ensure that large-scale conflicts are conducted constructively. Many different actors operating appropriately, often in complementary ways, are needed to be effective. Therefore, each actor's constructive efforts contribute to increasing the likelihood that conflicts will be conducted more constructively. Indeed, every person, organization, or government can act to raise those chances. 

NOTES

1. The ideas discussed in this article are more fully developed in: Louis Kriesberg, *Realizing Peace: A Constructive Conflict Approach* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). In *Realizing Peace*, the ideas presented in this article are further developed and applied to examine many U.S. engagements in foreign conflicts since the beginning of the Cold War and how they might have been approached more constructively.

2. Ibid.

3. George Kennan set forth a policy of containment to meet Soviet challenges, published as: George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* 15, no. 2 (July 1947): 566–82. However, the policy was actually highly militarized. See: Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union and the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007).

4. This narrow definition is presented in: Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York: The Free Press, 1956).

5. Louis Kriesberg and Bruce W. Dayton, *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution*, 4th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012).

6. The shift away from the neoconservative approach was indicated by changes such as the departure of Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense and his replacement by Robert M. Gates.

7. William Bundy, *A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998); Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little Brown, 1979).

8. These strategies are examined in several handbooks. See: Peter T. Coleman, Morton Deutsch, and Eric C. Marcus, *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, 3rd ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2014); Dennis J. D. Sandole et al., *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2009); Martina Fischer, Joachim Giessmann, and Beatrix Schmelzle, *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation* (Farmington Hills, MI: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2011); Jacob Bercovitch, Viktor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, eds., *Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution* (London: Sage Publications, 2009).

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13. John W. McDonald, "Further Explorations in Track Two Diplomacy," *Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts*, ed. Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J. Thorson (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991); Esra Çuhadar and Bruce W. Dayton, "Oslo and Its Aftermath: Lessons Learned from Track Two Diplomacy," *Negotiation Journal* 28, no. 2 (2012).

14. Michael J. Pentz and Gillian Slovo, "The Political Significance of Pugwash," *Knowledge and Power in a Global Society*, ed. William M. Evan (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1981); Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).

15. Trita Parsi, *A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama's Diplomacy with Iran* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 31–42.

16. I. William Zartman, "Negotiation and the South African Conflict," *SAIS Review* 11, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 1991); Hendrik W. van der Merwe, *Peacemaking in South Africa: A Life in Conflict Resolution* (Cape Town, South Africa: Tafelberg, 2000).

17. Nelson Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom* (Boston: Little Brown, 1994); Hermann Giliomee, *Surren-*

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der without Defeat: Afrikaners and the South African 'Miracle' (Braamfontein, South Africa: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1997); van der Merwe, *Peacemaking in South Africa*.

18. Peter Gastrow, *Bargaining for Peace* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1995).

19. Timothy D. Sisk, *International Mediation in Civil Wars: Bargaining with Bullets* (London: Taylor & Francis, 2010).

20. Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982); J. Michael Hogan, *The Panama Canal in American Politics: Domestic Advocacy and the Evolution of Policy* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1986).

21. Rachel Maddow, *Drift: The Unmooring of American Military Power* (New York: Crown, 2012), 30.

22. Ibid.; Carter, *Keeping Faith*; Hogan, *The Panama Canal in American Politics*.

23. Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 163–4.

24. Jorgen Dragsdahl, "How Peace Research Has Reshaped the European Arms Dialogue," *Annual Review of Peace Activism*, 1989 (Boston: Winston Foundation for World Peace, 1989).

25. Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War*, 187–9.

26. Louis Kriesberg, Bronislaw Misztal, and Janusz Mucha, *Social Movements as a Factor of Change in the Contemporary World*, vol. 10 in *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change* (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1988).

27. David Remnick, *Lenin's Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire* (New York: Random House, 1993).

28. Kriesberg, *Realizing Peace*, 282–315.

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30. Andrew J. Bacevich, *Washington Rules: America's Path to Permanent War* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010).

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