Is Africa Rising?

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Africa is said to be rising, turning a definitive page in its history. African per capita growth figures are relatively high and have now been sustained for a decade or so, constructed on the back of high commodity prices. Analyses thus far have had strong evangelical undertones, suggesting that Africa has turned a corner and that its emergence is imminent. Barely a week passes without a new article, official report, or conference eulogizing the continent and its growth figures. Africa has been called a "rising star" and a global power that "will rule the 21st century."[1] Previous, less positive studies on Africa's political economy are dismissed as "Afro-pessimism," to be swept away by "the Ultimate Frontier Market."[2] It is clear that a flip-flop in attitudes regarding the continent has occurred. With minimal critical consideration, the narrative has swung from a portrayal of Africa as a basket case to Africa now being the future. Growth in GDP and opportunities for investors are the new intonations in a crude construction of Africa that has shifted almost overnight.

In the context of stagnating or slowly growing Western economies, Africa's growth does look comparatively healthy—setting aside for a moment the flattening-out of over fifty variable countries into one entity known as Africa. However, the current process "deepens and intensifies Africa's inveterate and deleterious terms of (mal)integration within the global political economy—terms which continue to be characterized by external dominance and socially damaging and

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extraverted forms of accumulation."[3] While the situation depends on national context, most African countries remain typified by an over-dependence on the export of raw materials while importing finished products due to the legacies of colonialism.[4] There is little added value for African producers.

This reality is glossed over by the "Africa rising" mantra, which focuses on growth. Here it is helpful to note Timothy Shaw's separation of structural and superficial features of Africa's economies. The superficial features can be identified in the GDP figures, industry, prices, debt levels, and exchange value. The structural features are less obvious but more critical, chief among them being Africa's place in the international division of labor.[5] There is no evidence thus far that Africa's structural profile is improving, which should alert us to the dangers of being dazzled by numbers. African economies remain integrated in the global economy in ways that are generally unfavorable to the continent and ensure structural dependence.

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Africa Rising

It is popularly said that Africa's time has come and that the continent is embarking on a radically different and better stage in its history. GDP growth has been the central focus of such commentaries, and talk of "the hopeless continent," as *The Economist* called Africa in 2000, has been dropped in favor of names such as "a hopeful continent."[6] The mood swing over Africa is linked to increasing global demand for the continent's resources, primarily driven by the rise of China as a major global economic actor.[7] The Africa rising mantra, which prefers to present endogenous factors as causal factors, fails to account for the role of China and other emerging economies. Yet as Patrick Bond notes:

> Ongoing resource extraction by Western firms was joined, and in some cases overtaken, by China [and others]….Still, Africa's subordinate position did not change, and aside from greater amounts of overseas development aid flowing into fewer than 15 "fragile states", the North–South flows were not to Africans' advantage. One would not know this from reading reports by the elite multilateral institutions in 2011, which celebrated the continent's national economies as among the world's leading cases of post-meltdown economic recovery.[8]

The popular flip-flop regarding the continent marks a change from the familiar media images of flyblown children that had previously dominated the discussion of Africa. While a change from these old, reductionist narratives is necessary, the new narrative has veered almost entirely in the opposite direction, with little critical reflection. Yet in doing so, the Africa rising discourse neglects a fundamental context: "only for nine of the forty three [sub-Saharan (SSA)] countries were growth rates during 1980–2008 high enough to double per capita income in less than thirty years, and only sixteen in less than one hundred years."[9] Africa must grow at least 7 percent per year for the next 20 to 30 years if any serious reduction of continental poverty is to be realized. However, growth induced by a rise in commodity prices, new discoveries of natural resources, or an increase in sources of foreign capital is not sustainable growth, as will be indicated below.[10]

The GDP growth that we have seen is overwhelmingly characterized by the deployment and inflow of capital-intensive investment for the extraction and exportation of natural resources. There is a conspicuous lack of value added on the African side, and there are few indications that higher rates of inflow of capital investment are stimulating African employment. The fundamental reason behind this is that the growth "rests heavily on the engagements of foreign governments and corporations with African elites."[11] Most African governments are neopatrimonial in nature—that is, African leaders have relied on effected control and patronage by capturing power over the economy, rather than through the state in the form of a functioning administration.[12] In such regimes sustainable and broad-based development is not on the agenda of those in power and is unlikely to occur.[13] In fact, since 1990 Africa has experienced a relative shift in the composition of employment toward sectors that create too few high-productivity jobs.[14]

This of course is not to write off the recent growth as devoid of any value at all. Retail sectors are growing, with revenue increasing by around 4 percent per year, and there is growing investment in infrastructure.[15] Given that there is a correlation between infrastructure and export diversification, and that the current composition of exports from Africa is compounded by the continent's poor trade infrastructure, improvement in infrastructure has per se a helpful effect on African growth and trade capacity.[16] Africa's debts have fallen, partly thanks to the efforts of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), although we should note that "in spite of the HIPC initiative, only half of SSA countries have witnessed a temporary reduction of their annual debt service."[17] In social sectors, performance is uneven but increases in overall years of schooling have been reported, while health outcomes—particularly life expectancy at birth—have generally improved. These changes are all obviously to be welcomed.

However, there remains a desperate need to convert natural resources and high commodity prices into structural change, which is defined as "an increase in the share of industry or services in the economy, or as the diversification and sophistication of exports…or as the shift of workers from sectors with low labor productivity to those with high labor productivity."[18] This need is not being met. Instead, some African countries are in danger of seeing the historical process of underdevelopment further entrenched. The surge in commodity prices contributed greatly to a general increase in GDP per capita. However, that surge has not necessarily provided African countries with a sustained platform for development. It is important to remember, as Douglas Dowd noted, that "growth is a quantitative process, involving principally the extension of an already established structure of production, whereas development suggests qualitative changes, the creation of new economic and non-economic structure."[19] Pertinent to the notion of a rising Africa are the words of economist Samir Amin:

> Emergence is not measured by a rising rate of GDP growth (or exports)…nor the fact that the society in question has obtained a higher level of GDP per capita, as defined by the World Bank, aid institutions controlled by Western powers, and conventional economists. Emergence involves much more: a sustained growth in industrial production in the state [or region] in question and a strengthening of the capacity of these industries to be competitive on a global scale.[20]

This insight is mostly absent in the dominant narratives of Africa's rise.

A New Africa?

As previously noted, until recently Africa was depicted as the hopeless continent, a spatial entity supposedly in "the limbo of the international system, existing only at the outer limits of the planet which we inhabit."[21] Much of this analysis centered on the poor governance seen in most African countries. However, as part of the Africa rising narrative, such concerns have been quietly shelved. We are now told confidently that "the Africa-pessimists have got it wrong" as "the engines of development are still going strong. Democratic governance, political participation and economic management look set to improve further."[22]

Some proponents of the Africa rising trope have argued that improved governance and modes of doing business have facilitated the upsurge in African countries' GDP. For example, some argue that a "hospitable climate for business" has been spurred by institutional change and political and economic reform across the continent.[23] As part of these dynamics, there are claims that huge improvements in governance across Africa have occurred. Emblematically, Yvonne Mhango of Renaissance Capital claimed that "governments [in Africa] have got policy spectacularly right and created the low-debt, low-inflation, much-improved macro conditions that have enabled growth to take off."[24] It is not just asset managers spinning this story; recently, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, President of Liberia, stated, "In ten years [a] rapidly transforming Africa will move into the industrial age."[25] However, less exuberant analysis notes that the years when SSA's growth figures surpassed 1996 levels (2004 to 2008) can in fact be demonstrably linked to the period when emerging economies began to hugely demand commodities. In the energy realm, concern over predicted declines in petroleum reserves, apprehensions over the so-called Peak Oil scenario, instability in the Middle East, and oil price speculation placed further upward pressure on prices, peaking in 2008. This reality is qualitatively different from the picture of a rising Africa whose policies have driven growth. Official reports from international organizations have at times bolstered this latter interpretation, postulating that Africa's perceived economic resurgence hinges on the ability of the continent to recover from the global crisis relatively quicker than other areas of the world.[26] These praises neglect the reality that Africa's growth over the last ten years has occurred within the context of overall global growth. In this regard, Africa's growth has only been about 1 percent higher than the world average—commendable, but not fantastic and certainly a shallow foundation for the Africa rising theory.[27]

Troublingly, there is little evidence that the quality of governance in African countries overall is improving. The composite Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) had a continental average of 47 out of 100 in 2000, and by 2013 it had increased to 51.6 out of 100—hardly seismic.[28] In fact, less than half (43 percent) of Africa's population resides in countries that have shown overall governance improvement since 2010.[29] Furthermore, the World Bank's own governance indicators for sub-Saharan Africa refute any notion of an improved governance environment over the period associated with Africa's improvement. The figures used, from the Estimate of Government Effectiveness, capture the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service (and the degree of its independence from political pressures), the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies (see Appendix 1).

Unlike the discourse outside the continent, within Africa there is growing skepticism about any notional improvements in macroeconomic frameworks or progress in the continent's governance. An Afrobarometer survey released October 2013 revealed "a wide gap in perceptions between ordinary Africans and the global economic community," where 53 percent of Africans "rate the current condition of their national economy as 'fairly' or 'very bad'" and only 31 percent think that "the condition of their national economies has improved in the past year," in comparison to 38 percent who claim conditions have declined. Notably, when it came to their own elites, "Africans give their governments failing marks for economic management," with 56 percent claiming their leaders are performing at a level that is "fair" or "very badly." Likewise, 69 percent do not believe their governments are improving the living standards of the poor, 71 percent do not feel that the governments are creating enough jobs, and 76 percent disapprove of their leaders' performance in narrowing income gaps.[30] Clearly, popular opinion in Africa is not convergent with the Africa rising narrative so enthusiastically adopted by African government officials.

The Natural Resource Corner

Commodity dependence is typically measured by the share of export earnings of the top single commodity (or top three export commodities) in GDP, total merchandise exports, and total agriculture exports. The percentage of people occupied in commodity production or the share in government revenue accruing from commodities are also important measurements.[31] From 1995 to 2009 trends in the share of primary commodities in total exports, which coincide with increasing Africa rising claims, demonstrate "that despite a contraction between 1995 and 2000 the share of primary commodities in total exports rose rapidly between 2000 and 2009."[32] This development had particular implications for the African continent: the United Nations Development Programme noted in a 2011 report that "the share of primary commodities in exports increased across all regions of the developing world [...] Africa—the region most dependent on primary commodity exports throughout the period—became even more commodity-dependent (the share of primary commodity exports was 72 per cent in 1995 and rose to 81 per cent by 2009)."[33]

Put another way, "dependence on external markets, as measured by the export-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio … doubled from 26 per cent in 1995 to 51 per cent in 2007."[34] This super cycle was largely—though not exclusively—driven by growth and industrial demand within the emerging economies. Economic relationships with the BRICS nations, particularly China, and rising commodity prices were the main drivers behind the recent economic improvements in SSA, adding nearly 2.5 percentage points to the growth of the typical African economy by the mid-2000s.[35]

A diversification index can be calculated using the United Nations Conference on Trade and Declarations (UNCTAD) Secretariat calculations. The index, which ranges from 0 to 1, shows the extent of the differences between the structure of trade of a country or country group and the world mean. In other words, the index shows whether countries or groups of countries are more or less diversified than the world average. The figures demonstrate that Africa continues to be much less diversified than the rest of the world.[36] Indeed, exports from Africa have become even more concentrated, with an increase in the aggregate concentration ratio from 0.35 in 2000 to 0.48 in 2008.[37]

The numbers indicate that Africa has more or less remained undiversified in its exports, remaining dependent on primary commodities, despite commentators' claims that the continent is on the rise. In some respects, what we are seeing is history repeating itself, with commodity booms being initially heralded by some commentators as positive for Africa. Note that in 1974, in the wake of the then-latest commodity boom, a popular assertion was that "trade prospects for the developing world [were] considerably better in 1973 than they were in 1951 or even in 1960."[38] Yet the following three decades saw widespread economic collapse and much of the continent plunging into instability, debt, and perpetual crises. Half of the countries in Africa derive over 80 percent of their merchandise export income from commodities. As a whole, the latest available figures (2009 to 2010) reveal that Africa's export profile in terms of commodities is composed of fuels (69 percent), minerals, ores, metals (16 percent), and agricultural products (7 percent).[39] The total share of fuels and mining products in Africa's total merchandise exports increased from 48.4 percent in 2003 to 70.6 percent in 2008, but dropped down to 64 percent in 2011. Resource-based commodities form the bulk of African exports.

This has led to an increase in income for some African countries or their elites. However, it is important to note that a price boom "runs the risk of locking developing-country commodity exporters into what Edward Leamer called the 'raw-material corner,' with little scope for industrial progress or skills advancement."[40] Leamer's corner came from his illustration of both relative factor endowments and relative factor intensities with three factors and any number of goods. Given that Africa's factor endowments are concentrated in commodities and its export profile and sector concentration are as well, the raw material corner has been the continent's broad fate and most African countries have failed to diversify trade into manufactured products.[41] The result has been structural disarticulation between production and consumption, in which "What is produced is not consumed and what is consumed is not produced."[42]

Growth for Growth's Sake

There are few current signs of social transformation in Africa and, in fact, there have been signs of deindustrialization. The growth and governance models being pursued in most of Africa are based on facilitating market-based actors' profit-making and capital accumulation but generally ignoring conditions that enhance production. Social questions are entirely dismissed.

The existing growth model is based on a simplistic increase of national GDP.[43] GDP growth is routinely used as the major benchmark against which success is considered. As previously discussed, GDP growth has been used to argue that Africa has turned a corner and that "the Next Asia Is Africa."[44] This fixation on GDP stems from developments within the discipline of economics, where GDP is now seen by mainstream economists and their institutions as the supreme indicator of economic well-being, replacing Gross National Product (GNP). This is not some mere shift in accounting methodology but has intense political implications:

> Traditional GNP referred to all goods and services produced by the resident of a given country, regardless of whether the "income" was generated within or outside its borders. This meant that, for instance, the earnings of multinational corporations were attributed to the country where the firm was owned and where the profits would eventually return. With the introduction of the gross "domestic" product, this calculation changed completely. GDP is indeed territorially defined, which means that the income generated by foreign companies is "formally" attributed to the country where it is generated, even though the profits may very well not remain there. This conceptual evolution…was by and large responsible for the economic boom of many developing nations. Yet, it is obvious that the gains it revealed were more apparent than real.[45]

Given the capital-intensive nature of such investment in the resource sectors of Africa by foreign corporations, it is easy to imagine the distortionary effect of reporting Africa's growth based on GDP rather than GNP. Yet it is precisely the GDP figures that constitute the Africa rising narrative.

Furthermore, little consideration is paid to the long-term implications of how these growth rates have been accomplished. Mineral resource extraction is non-renewable, and in the current milieu of dependent relations, Africa's wealth is being taken out of the continent at an exponential rate by an ever-diversifying array of actors. All the while, this is being celebrated as Africa's gain. In fact, "the continent is actually losing a net 6% of the gross national income each year, thanks to the Resource Curse writ large."[46] "GDP calculates such exports as a solely positive process—a credit—without a corresponding debit on the books of a country's natural capital," despite the fact that there is an actual "decline in 'natural capital' that occurs because the minerals and petroleum are non-renewable and lost forever."[47]

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The World Bank itself recommended in 2006 that subtracting the value of non-renewable resources through extraction gave a superior indicator of actual gains made through trade. This was termed "genuine saving" (GS) and is a measure of net investment in produced natural and human capital:

> Genuine saving provides a much broader indicator of sustainability by valuing changes in natural resources, environmental quality, and human capital, in addition to the traditional measure of changes in produced assets. Negative genuine saving rates imply that total wealth is in decline.[48]

This has massive implications for the Africa rising narrative, given that the majority of this "rising" has been built on non-renewable extraction and that resource-rich countries are historically the poorest genuine savers.[49] In fact, "with the exception of Algeria and Guinea, for whom GS was just above zero for the period 1970–2001, every country with an average share of fuel and mineral exports in total exports of over 60 percent had negative GS."[50]

GDP does not include deductions for the depreciation of fabricated assets or for the depletion and degradation of natural resources. Thus, a country can have very high growth rates, calculated using GDP indicators, while also embarking on unsustainable exploitation of its finite resources. The idea of GS traces its roots back to the work of economists such as Robert Solow and John Hartwick, who sought to model a development path where social welfare did not deteriorate in economies based on the exploitation of non-renewable resources.[51] GS, or adjusted net savings, thus measures the true rate of savings in an economy after taking into account investment in human capital, the decline in asset values through the extraction of natural resources, and damage caused by pollution. Persistently low or negative GS is an indicator that a country's trajectory is unsustainable, while negative adjusted net saving rates (ANS) demonstrate that the total wealth of a country is in decline.

Below is a representation of both GDP growth rates (the indicator used to celebrate Africa rising) and the adjusted net saving rates, including particulate emission damage. The year 2000 is the start date, for comparison with the latest available data from 2012. Of interest is the comparison and contrast between the two different indicators. The difference between the 2000 and 2012 figures using the GS statistics equally shows the sustainability or lack thereof of African countries' current paths. All figures are from the World Bank.

Table 1: GDP Growth Rate (%) vs. Adjusted Net Saving Rates

Country Name	GDP 2000	ANS 2000	GDP Growth 2012	ANS 2012 unless indicated
Algeria	2.2	-	3.3	28.2
Angola	3.0	-39.5	6.8	-25.2
Benin	4.9	6.8	5.4	-5.2 (2011)
Botswana	2.0	34.4	4.2	33.2
Burkina Faso	1.8	0.7	9.5	8.5 (2010)
Burundi	-0.9	-21.5	4.0	-13.7
Cameroon	4.2	-4.4	4.6	-1.6
Cape Verde	14.3	-	2.5	-
CAR*	-2.5	-	6.9	-4.59
Chad	-0.7	-	8.9	-49.89 (2008)
Comoros	1.9	-	3.0	7.04
Congo, DR	-4.3	-20.1	7.2	-29.9 (2007)
Congo, Rep.	-2.6	-43.4	3.8	-56.1 (2007)
Cote d'Ivoire	-3.7	4.8	9.5	-3.4 (2008)
Egypt	5.4	7.8	2.2	0.0
Eq. Guinea	12.5	-	2.5	-38.45 (2008)
Eritrea	-3.1	3.1	7.0	-
Ethiopia	6.1	-4.5	8.7	6.1
Gabon	-1.9	0.1	5.6	-2.2 (2005)

Gambia	5.5	-	5.3	0.9
Ghana	3.7	-0.2	7.9	2.7
Guinea	2.5	-5.2	3.9	-42.8 (2011)
Guinea-Bissau	3.6	-	-6.7	-22.4 (2010)
Kenya	0.6	5.6	4.6	4.7
Lesotho	5.1	-	4.0	11.5
Liberia	25.7	-	10.2	-6.0 (2011)
Madagascar	4.8	-2.0	3.1	-2.5 (2005)
Malawi	1.6	-5.5	1.9	-2.7 (2011)
Mali	3.2	4.8	-0.4	-10.8 (2010)
Mauritius	9.0	17.1	3.2	4.5
Morocco	1.6	16.7	4.2	14.7
Mozambique	1.1	1.4	7.4	0.4
Namibia	3.5	21.7	5.0	12.0 (2011)
Niger	-1.4	-5.3	10.8	10.0 (2010)
Nigeria	5.3	-3.2	6.7	-10.2 (2011)
Rwanda	8.3	-7.9	8.0	-3.7
Senegal	3.2	3.5	3.5	15.9 (2011)
Sierra Leone	6.7	-21.3	15.2	-22.7 (2010)
South Africa	4.2	5.3	2.5	-0.9
Sudan	6.3	3.3	-10.1	-6.7
Swaziland	1.8	5.2	-1.5	1.4 (2011)
Tanzania	4.9	2.1	6.9	8.7
Togo	-0.8	-11.7	5.6	-21.3 (2010)
Tunisia	4.7	6.7	3.6	-3.2
Uganda	3.1	-6.2	3.4	-11.2
Zambia	3.5	-11.7	7.2	1.8
Zimbabwe	-3.1	-	4.4	-

Note: Djibouti, Libya, Mauritania, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, and Somalia omitted due to insufficient data.
*Central African Republic

Standard GDP measurements miss the the negative dynamics shown in this table, despite the fact that genuine savings rates that are "persistently negative" lead to declining wellbeing.[52] Furthermore, inequality remains a significant issue. The Africa Progress Panel observed in a 2013 report that "inequality has been reinforced during this boom, with evidence that economic disparities in resource-rich countries are rising alongside GDP growth," noting the "profound implications for poverty reduction."[53]

Conclusion

Not only has the current model of growth promotion commonly found throughout Africa been unsuccessful so far in generating sustainable developmental outcomes, it has also made things worse regarding issues such as financial equality, the environment, and Africa's dependent status within the global political economy. Even the Africa Progress Panel, which is invariably Pollyannaish in its assessment of Africa, admits that:

> After a decade of buoyant growth, almost half of Africans still live on less than $1.25 a day. Wealth disparities are increasingly visible. The current pattern of trickle-down growth is leaving too many people in poverty, too many children hungry and too many young people without jobs. Governments are failing to convert the rising tide of wealth into opportunities for their most marginalised citizens. Unequal access to health, education, water and sanitation is reinforcing wider inequalities. Smallholder agriculture has not been part of the growth surge, leaving rural populations trapped in poverty and vulnerability.[54]

These problems have gone hand in hand with a lack of serious structural change in the continent's economies; indeed, they are linked. The share of Africa in global manufacturing value added (MVA) actually fell from 1.2 percent in 2000 to 1.1 percent in 2008, and there has been no substantial change in the region's share of global manufacturing exports in recent years, i.e., the years when the upsurge in Africa has been most pronounced. In 2000, manufacturing made up 12.8 percent of GDP in Africa, but by 2008 it accounted for only 10.5 percent. It is apparent that with the exception of eastern Africa, manufacturing is in decline across the continent. Here it is important to note that even within the manufacturing sector, resource-based manufacturing accounted for about 49 percent of total MVA in Africa (see: Appendix, Table 3).

Manufacturing underdevelopment in Africa is also apparent at the global level. Manufacturing exports represent a low percentage of total African exports and, more importantly, the share has declined over the years. As has been noted, almost half of manufacturing that does take place is linked to the continent's resources. However, it is in low-technology manufacturing where labor-intensive, job-creating opportunities are found. A look at the figures where data is available reveals that this sector of manufacturing is relatively small, perhaps very small, as the key contributor to the MVA in Africa.[55] In fact, "fewer than 10% of African workers are currently in manufacturing of any kind and only about 1% in modern companies with advanced technology."[56]

In short, the much vaunted recent economic growth in Africa, upon which the Africa rising narrative is predicated, is based on trade in resources, not production. Such growth is problematic given that, according to Geoffrey Kay, "production is the key to accumulation since the profits of all capital, even merchant capital that operates exclusively in the sphere of circulation, originate in the sphere of production."[57] The economic advantages of current trade accrue to the accumulation centers outside of Africa (GDP rather than GNP is a useful measurement to hide such realities). The result is that Africa continues to be reified as a source of cheap raw materials, exported to feed external economies and/or processed up the value chain into finished products. Since the surpluses that might lend themselves to investment in industry are not offered, peripheral regions of the world such as Africa appear condemned to remaining producers of raw materials.[58] This has been a habitual problem for Africa, given that building up capabilities in manufacturing and industrialization, as well as improving the productivity of agriculture, are the levers to wealth creation, with suitable pro-poor policies aimed at equitable and sustainable development at the heart of long-term poverty reduction.

Currently, areas where value might be added and production relatively enhanced are either stagnant or in decline. Instead, mining extraction alone represented 73 percent of Africa's export growth between 1995 and 2008:

> Africa's current pattern of growth is that it has been accompanied by de-industrialization as evidenced by the fact that the share of manufacturing in Africa's gross domestic product (GDP) fell from 15 per cent in 1990 to 10 per cent in 2008…The declining share of manufacturing in Africa's output is of concern because historically manufacturing has been the main engine of high, rapid and sustained economic growth.[59]

Africa has become even more commodity-dependent during the period now anointed as "Africa rising." The uncomfortable truth is that recurring growth in Africa is based on strong external demand, and further, "the end of growth periods has ended with a combination of predatory rent-seeking and depressed external markets."[60]

Economic development is typically defined as "sustainable economic growth accompanied by significant structural change in production patterns and generalized improvement in living standards."[61] Relationships based on extraction have not historically worked as catalysts for this outcome. Unless an economy is engaged in activities that deliver increasing returns over time, as is found in manufacturing production, then the economy is not developing—it is just growing. The problem is that mainstream economists argue that economies must integrate into the global economy using their notional comparative advantages. If this means focusing on primary commodity extraction, then so be it. In this reading, the simple existence of upward GDP growth and flourishing trade volumes, not the quality thereof, are seen as evidence of success. This is the point on which the discourse about Africa rising is based. But growth per se and trade in commodities specifically do not mean development. The vast majority of Africa's countries that are said to be on the rise are still locked into primary commodity sectors and show very little progress toward engaging in value-added industrial production.

The story of Africa rising is just that: a story. In this tale, where growth for growth's sake is cast as a manifestation of development and progress, the agenda of industrialization and moving Africa up the global production chain has been abandoned. Instead, analysis has been hypnotized by growth rates, often channeled through poor reporting desperate to compensate for previous—and equally poor—overly negative reporting.

It is true that growth in non-minerals sectors has been recorded, driven largely by agricultural sectors, but in most African countries these are mainly subsistence-based, with low levels of productivity and basic, if not primitive, technologies. Minimal scaling-up and commercialization characterizes these sectors with little value added. The service sector in parts of Africa has also grown, particularly in the much-vaunted telecommunications area, as well as wholesale and retail trade, but these do not provide sufficient wage employment. It continues to be the case that 596.4 million Africans (69.9 percent of the population of sub-Saharan Africa) still lives on less than $2 a day.[62] A "rise" based on an unsustainable intensification of resource extraction through diversifying partners, with no serious long-term development policies in place to reap what benefits may accrue—while over half a billion Africans live in abject poverty—raises the key question: rising for whom?

APPENDIX

TABLE 2: GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS FROM 2000 TO 2012

COUNTRY NAME	2000	2012	GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS WORSENED BETWEEN 2000 TO 2012?
Angola	-1.46	-1.02	
Benin	-0.27	-0.53	✓
Botswana	0.51	0.44	
Burkina Faso	-0.62	-0.63	✓
Burundi	-1.44	-1.33	
Cameroon	-0.67	-0.90	✓
Cape Verde	0.30	0.09	
Central African Republic	-1.38	-1.46	✓
Chad	-0.76	-1.49	✓
Comoros	-1.25	-1.54	✓
Congo, Dem. Rep.	-1.96	-1.66	
Congo, Rep.	-1.32	-1.20	
Cote d'Ivoire	-0.88	-1.11	✓
Equatorial Guinea	-1.52	-1.65	✓
Eritrea	-1.01	-1.51	✓
Ethiopia	-0.91	-0.44	
Gabon	-0.63	-0.78	✓
Gambia	-0.49	-0.51	✓
Ghana	0.02	-0.07	✓
Guinea	-0.83	-1.27	✓
Guinea-Bissau	-1.06	-1.24	✓
Kenya	-0.54	-0.55	✓
Lesotho	-0.17	-0.38	✓
Liberia	-1.84	-1.18	
Madagascar	-0.64	-1.08	✓
Malawi	-0.37	-0.49	✓

Mali	-0.87	-0.99	✓
Mauritania	-0.18	-0.91	✓
Mauritius	0.45	0.93	✓
Mozambique	-0.43	-0.64	✓
Namibia	0.17	0.12	
Niger	-1.08	-0.70	
Nigeria	-0.96	-0.99	✓
Rwanda	-0.65	-0.06	
São Tomé and Príncipe	-0.51	-0.72	✓
Senegal	-0.12	-0.46	✓
Seychelles	-0.03	0.37	
Sierra Leone	-1.46	-1.21	
Somalia	-2.28	-2.22	
South Africa	0.69	0.33	
South Sudan	-	-1.59	
Sudan	-1.19	-1.46	✓
Swaziland	-0.71	-0.57	
Tanzania	-0.42	-0.69	✓
Togo	-1.24	-1.32	✓
Uganda	-0.38	-0.57	✓
Zambia	-0.86	-0.50	
Zimbabwe	-0.78	-1.21	✓

Source: Data from World Bank database, Worldwide Governance Indicators.

Table 3: Contribution of Mining and Manufacturing to GDP

Country name	% share of GDP	1970	1980	1990	2000	2005	2008
Africa*	Manufacturing	6.3	11.9	15.3	12.8	11.6	10.5
	Mining	4.8	19.3	15.2	18.4	23.0	25.8
Eastern Africa	Manufacturing	1.7	4.9	13.4	10.4	10.3	9.7
	Mining	0.8	1.5	3.3	3.1	3.6	3.7

Middle Africa	Manufacturing	10.3	11.8	11.2	8.2	7.3	6.4
	Mining	19.1	21.2	18.9	39.3	47.9	50.5
Northern Africa	Manufacturing	13.6	9.7	13.4	12.8	11.3	10.7
	Mining	15.7	33.0	17.2	19.5	28.2	29.8
Southern Africa	Manufacturing	22.0	20.9	22.9	18.4	17.9	18.2
	Mining	12.0	24.0	14.3	11.7	11.2	13.1
Western Africa	Manufacturing	13.3	16.8	13.1	7.8	6.0	5.0
	Mining	7.7	21.3	18.8	29.3	27.7	29.6

*African developing economies

Source: *Economic Development in Africa Report 2011* (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2011), 15.

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