

Between National Division and Rapacious Individualism

Ukraine before and after the Orange Revolution

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Since 1991, Ukraine has experienced dynamic political competition with the growth of a relatively powerful parliament and four turnovers in leadership. Such political contestation has been rooted in the divisions between eastern and western Ukraine, as well as the failure of executives to build single cohesive political parties. The geographic divisions facilitated opposition mobilization, even in the absence of a robust civil society, while undermining centrally directed electoral and media manipulation. Simultaneously, executives have built governing coalitions characterized by a highly atomized and disorganized "rapacious individualism" that promoted elite defection. National divisions and rapacious individualism contributed to the downfall of President Leonid Kravchuk in 1994, Leonid Kuchma in 2004, and two prime ministers and their parties after the Orange Revolution.

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An examination of the sources of competition suggests a reform dilemma in Ukraine: divided nationality and rapacious individualism have not only undermined efforts to concentrate political power but have also thwarted reform and effective governance. The centralization of power that would be required for successful reform is also likely to promote greater authoritarianism.

BARRIERS TO DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE

There are many reasons why Ukrainian leaders should have been able to consolidate autocratic rule after the cold war. Prior to 1991, Ukraine had no history of democracy, and as Marc Howard has argued, the legacy of communism fundamentally weakened civil society by decreasing interpersonal trust and by concentrating resources in state hands.¹

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As a result, even after the Orange Revolution, there have been very few well-organized, large-scale, stable societal groups to hold Ukrainian power-holders accountable.² Further, the legacy of state control combined with a weak rule of law has made it relatively easy for incumbents to monopolize control over economic resources. Thus, as in Russia and other post-Soviet countries, leaders have been able to easily accumulate vast patronage resources through insider privatization and simultaneously use state agencies such as the tax authorities to go after dissenters and businesses that fund opposition.³ Ukraine has a weak rule of law. As Oleksandr Sushko and Olena Prystayko note, "Law enforcement bodies and police selectively respect fundamental political, civil, and human rights, and equality before the law remains doubtful. . . . Generally, the judiciary is considered one of the most corrupt bodies of the state."⁴ Finally, in stark contrast to nearby Romania or Bulgaria, Ukraine has not benefited from the strong stimulus of potential EU membership to ensure that elites behave democratically. As a result, external costs for non-democratic behaviour are relatively limited.

All of this means that leaders in Ukraine face remarkably few constraints on anti-democratic behavior. Indeed, Ukrainian politicians have consistently demonstrated a willingness to abuse democratic norms. Ukraine's first president, Leonid Kravchuk (1991–1994), regularly harassed opposition media and tried (but failed) to shut down the legislature in early 1994 in an effort to delay presidential elections.⁵ Kravchuk's successor Leonid Kuchma (1994–2004) was more openly autocratic—engaging in widespread vote fraud, violent harassment of opponents, and comprehensive media censorship.⁶ Since the Orange Revolution, politics has continued to resemble a kind of large-scale "king of the hill" game in which each side uses every legal and extra-legal

Indeed, Ukrainian politicians have consistently demonstrated a willingness to abuse democratic norms. means at its disposal to stay on top.⁷ Thus, then-prime minister Viktor Yanukovich in early 2007 ignored rules of imperative mandate that forbade deputies from changing parties by buying off significant numbers of opposition parliamentarians in an effort to increase his majority. President Viktor Yushchenko responded by shutting down parliament on dubious constitutional grounds and then fired three judges from the constitutional court in order to prevent it from ruling against his decision.⁸

Even in the absence of strong preconditions for democracy, Ukrainian politics remained dynamic and competitive throughout the post-Soviet period. Over the last 16 years, the country has witnessed four governmental turnovers—in 1994, 2004, 2006, and 2007.⁹ And, more than most other post-Soviet countries, Ukraine's parliament has retained significant powers that increased significantly in 2006 and again in 2007.¹⁰ By 2005, Ukraine had become a democracy. The media no longer face problems of censorship and provide a wide range of views to the public.¹¹ Finally, elections in 2006

and 2007 were devoid of the extensive manipulation and harassment of opposition that characterized contests under Kuchma.

SOURCES OF AUTHORITARIAN FAILURE: NATIONAL DIVISION AND RAPACIOUS INDIVIDUALISM

Divisions over national identity and rapacious individualism have created key obstacles to authoritarianism throughout post-Soviet Ukrainian history. As I initially argued in 2002, conflicts over national identity have “undermined efforts by any single group to monopolize political control.”¹² Ukraine is one among several cases where divisions over national and ethnic identity have provided the basis for dynamic, disorderly, and often very dysfunctional political competition. For example, Bangladesh, which witnessed two turnovers between 1991 and 2006, has a dynamic two-party system based on the split between the pro-Pakistani/Muslim “Bangladeshi” identity and the pro-Indian ethnic “Bengali” identity. Similarly, in Albania, where incumbents have fallen three times since 1992, divisions between Ghegs in the north and the Tosks in the south have motivated relatively equal competition between the Socialists and the Democratic Party.¹³

Ukraine is divided between a predominantly Ukrainian-speaking and pro-European west that was historically part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and a highly industrialized and historically Russian east. Such division has promoted competition in several important ways. First, the divide provides a key mobilizational resource for each side when it is out of power. Opposition is not simply rooted in disagreements over particular policies but is instead tied to perceived threats to group identity and way of life. As a result, anti-government leaders are able to generate the sustained personal sacrifice necessary for successful mobilization—even without a strong civil society. Salient national identity can replace organized civil society as a mechanism to mobilize protest. The opposition’s ability to build “a movement around strong ties of collective identity, whether inherited or constructed, does much of the work that would normally fall to organization.”¹⁴

Next, divisions over national identity make it much more difficult for autocrats representing one side to manipulate media and elections in the other. Emotive appeals that bring citizens onto the streets are also likely to convince regional or other state officials to disobey central state orders—making it more difficult for incumbents to manipulate elections or impose force in parts of the country where the alternative national identity is salient. Thus, in 1994, eastern state officials in Ukraine defected from President Kravchuk, who was perceived as anti-Russian; in 2004, some western Ukrainian officials resisted central efforts to manipulate the vote in response to President Kuchma’s pro-Russian stance. Finally, a large section of the population is less susceptible to media manipulation. For example, extensive media manipulation and censorship by

Kuchma in the run-up to the 2004 election had very little impact in western Ukraine, which tended to view the pro-government candidate as part of an effort by Russia to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty and European identity.¹⁵

Simultaneously, authoritarian consolidation in Ukraine has been undermined by weak elite organization or "rapacious individualism."¹⁶ While much of the literature has focused on the democratizing impact of political parties,¹⁷ strong ruling parties are also key to authoritarian stability.¹⁸ In particular, institutionalized parties lengthen time horizons and prevent elite defection. With established ruling parties, short-term losers in internal leadership battles will be less likely to defect to the opposition. In the absence of such organizations, even small personal slights may translate into major political breaks.

Ukraine emerged from the Soviet Union in 1991 with the old Communist elite still very much in control—beginning with Leonid Kravchuk, who was a former head of party ideology. But the destruction of the Communist Party in 1991 deprived the leaders of any organized base of support. Initially, leaders did nothing to build party bases, and instead relied on personal appeals, divide and rule, and coalitions of parties to stay in power.¹⁹ While such tactics were useful for undermining the strength of competitors, the weakness of ruling parties has significantly increased the possibility of elite defection. Thus, the main threats to leaders in Ukraine have most often come from among the executive's own allies and appointees. Leonid Kravchuk was defeated by his own prime minister, Leonid Kuchma, in 1994. Similarly, Kuchma faced serious threats from prime ministers Evgenii Marchuk and Pavlo Lazarenko before being overthrown by Viktor Yushchenko, whom Kuchma chose to head the government in late 1999. Finally, Yushchenko's most serious threat in the next presidential elections is likely to come from Yulia Tymoshenko, an ally during the Orange Revolution whom Yushchenko picked as prime minister in early 2005 and again in late 2007.

NATIONAL DIVISION AND RAPACIOUS INDIVIDUALISM UNDER KRAVCHUK AND KUCHMA

National divisions between east and west, as well as weak ruling party structures, promoted a high degree of political contestation in Ukraine through the early 2000s. Leonid Kravchuk faced particularly serious challenges from pro-Russian mobilization and elite defection in the early 1990s. In 1991, Kravchuk became president in part by tapping into a surge of anti-Soviet and anti-Communist sentiment that followed the failed 1991 Soviet coup. Kravchuk deserted the Communist Party and led Ukraine to independence. While initially popular, such moves led to his undoing. The economic crisis that followed in 1992 and 1993 was blamed on Ukraine's break from the Soviet Union, and Kravchuk faced mobilized opposition from key constituencies in the east.

Backed by regional leaders, coal miners in the eastern region of Donetsk struck for higher wages, greater regional autonomy, and early presidential and parliamentary elections in the spring of 1993.²⁰ By contrast, populations in western Ukraine continued to support Ukrainian independence and did not oppose Kravchuk—despite suffering the same economic crisis.

Simultaneously, Kravchuk's abandonment of the Communist Party and lack of access to any political organization further weakened his presidency. As a result, Kravchuk emerged as a remarkably weak president despite a solid victory of 60 percent in the December 1991 elections, majority support in the legislature in 1990 and 1991, and the presence of his ally as head of parliament. Those around him in key positions—the prime minister, leader of parliament, and heads of security and police—did not function as a cohesive political unit despite their common backgrounds in the Communist *nomenklatura*.

The lack of any organization tying the government together resulted in serious elite defections. Then-prime minister Leonid Kuchma broke from Kravchuk to run for president in 1994 on a pro-Russian platform. Many of Kravchuk's own appointees in eastern Ukraine actively worked for the Kuchma campaign. As a result, Kuchma defeated Kravchuk and became president.²¹

Kuchma proved more adept than Kravchuk in putting together a ruling coalition. Initially drawing on his networks as head of the Soviet Union's largest missile factory in Dnipropetrovsk, he built a team over the late 1990s and 2000s of competing small parties headed by oligarchs who had received patronage resources from the president. Kuchma, like Yeltsin in the mid-1990s, essentially outsourced political organization to these oligarchs, who helped bring out the vote and orchestrate media policy on Kuchma's behalf. Kuchma was also able to draw on support from western Ukraine by reversing his pro-Russian stance and supporting greater separation from Russia. Such efforts helped Kuchma to force his version of the constitution through parliament in 1996 and win re-election in 1999.

But national divisions and Kuchma's loose base of competing oligarchs made him vulnerable to crisis and ultimately led to his regime's downfall in 2004. His reliance on a decentralized group of parties for support both encouraged defections and led him to select a highly problematic successor to run in the 2004 presidential election. A central dilemma for Kuchma was that the competing oligarchs who backed him were extremely opportunistic and lacked any solid organizational or ideological ties to the president. This meant that allies were likely to defect from Kuchma if they perceived his position to be weak. At the same time, the wide distribution of patronage in the form of cheap privatization, access to monopoly rents, and government "loans" gave one-time allies the resources to fund an opposition campaign. Finally, high government officials could

gain name recognition and popularity through access to state-controlled media that could later provide the basis for a serious opposition challenge.²²

The combination of weak elite loyalty and broad distribution of resources made Kuchma extremely vulnerable to any crisis or sign of weakness that might convince allies to carry their resources to the other side. The release of tapes in late 2000 by presidential security guard Mykola Melnychenko provided this crisis. The tapes revealed extensive evidence of corruption and possible involvement in the murder of journalist Georgiy

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Gongadze. While Kuchma survived an initial series of demonstrations in 2001 aimed at his overthrow, the release of the tapes set in motion key defections

that ultimately led to the regime's collapse in 2004. In early 2001 Yulia Tymoshenko, who had been loyal to Kuchma since the late 1990s, took her party, Fatherland, into open opposition. Most importantly, Viktor Yushchenko, Kuchma's prime minister from 1999 to 2001 who had once declared Kuchma to be a "father figure," gradually moved into opposition in 2001 and 2002 after being fired by Kuchma. Together with other former Kuchma supporters such as Petro Poroshenko, Yushchenko created the Our Ukraine party that handily beat Kuchma's For a United Ukraine party in the 2002 parliamentary elections. Virtually the entire leadership of the Orange Coalition that defeated Kuchma's chosen successor in 2004 had been close allies of Kuchma just two to three years previous.²³ Thus, before anything else, the Orange Revolution was the outgrowth of Kuchma's organizational failure to keep his own allies in line.²⁴

Former ties to Kuchma and state resources gave the opposition enormous advantages. Despite the general weakness of civil society, its leaders were all well-known and supported by many wealthy businesspeople. Given the opportunism of Kuchma's coalition, many oligarchic allies apparently gave to the Yushchenko campaign for fear that they would be left out in the cold in the event of Kuchma's downfall.²⁵ Thus, one Yushchenko campaign coordinator bragged in the run-up to the election that "I don't know of a financial group in Ukraine, or even in Russia, which doesn't [support Yushchenko]. Yushchenko has no problem with money."²⁶

Kuchma's reliance on a loose coalition of competing oligarchic patronage networks also may have forced the president to select Viktor Yanukovich, a convicted criminal, as his successor rather than other, seemingly more electable candidates, such as then-head of parliament Volodymyr Lytvyn or Serhiy Tyhypko, the highly competent and smooth head of the national bank. The problem for Kuchma appears to have been that Yanukovich, despite his obvious deficiencies as a national candidate (including both his criminal record and clear allegiance to a single regional patronage network) had by far the best organization in the Kuchma coalition. As governor of the large eastern

industrial region of Donetsk in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Yanukovich subdued a powerful Communist Party and warring business clans and built a strong Party of Regions that was able to both mobilize and steal votes with remarkable efficiency as demonstrated in the 2002 parliamentary elections. Lytvyn and Tyhypko, despite their greater national appeal, lacked access to this Donetsk organization. There is evidence that if Tyhypko had been chosen as successor, Yanukovich would have run for president anyway thus hopelessly splitting the ruling coalition. Thus, the decentralization of Kuchma's coalition combined with the power of the Donetsk group may have given the President no choice but to select Yanukovich.

Next, the opposition benefited from the divide in Ukrainian identity that allowed them to mobilize large numbers of highly committed activists from western Ukraine following stolen elections in late November 2004. Kuchma's international isolation following the release of the tapes forced him into a close alliance with Putin's Russia in 2001. Viktor Yanukovich, Kuchma's chosen successor, in turn sought to draw on pro-Russian sentiment to win the election. This strategy had worked in 1994 when Kuchma ran successfully against Kravchuk on a pro-Russian platform. But in the intervening ten years, support for Ukrainian independence had increased significantly due in large part to improved economic conditions.²⁷ Thus, in 2004, as opposed to 1994, most Ukrainians—even the many who were not ardent nationalists—were not put off by candidate ties to Ukrainian nationalism.

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Pro-Ukrainian nationalists were the backbone of the Orange Revolution, which involved millions of protestors in late 2004.²⁸ In response to Yanukovich's open embrace of Russia during the elections, the opposition was able to mobilize nationalists even in the absence of any explicitly nationalist demands. Protestors came overwhelmingly from western Ukraine, and survey evidence suggests that a pro-Ukrainian identity was a key factor bringing people onto the streets.²⁹ In stark contrast to their counterparts in Moscow or Minsk, liberals in Kyiv could count on strong regional support against a regime that was perceived by many as anti-Ukrainian. Ukrainian nationalists provided the opposition with its most ardent and committed activists, who were willing to withstand almost three weeks of sub-freezing temperatures on the streets of the capital. As a result, Yushchenko was able to successfully overthrow the Kuchma regime. Ukraine became a democracy in 2005 with the cessation of serious media censorship and any significant electoral manipulation.

NATIONAL DIVISION AND RAPACIOUS INDIVIDUALISM AFTER THE ORANGE REVOLUTION

The democratic success of the Orange Revolution is in many ways a surprise. Despite democratic rhetoric, there were many good reasons to suspect that the new regime

would quickly revert to non-democratic rule. Again and again in the post-cold war era, the fall of autocrats at the hands of self-proclaimed democrats has led to new forms of authoritarianism rather than democracy. The “democratic” victories of Levon Ter Petrosian in Armenia in 1990–1991, Zviad Gamsakhurdia in Georgia in 1991, Frederick Chiluba in Zambia in 1991, Sali Berisha in Albania in 1992, Aliaksandr Lukashenka in Belarus in 1994, Mikheil Saakashvili in Georgia in 2003, and Kurmanbek Bakiyev

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in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 resulted in regimes that to varying degrees engaged in significant suppression of independent media, harassment of opposition, and electoral manipulation.³⁰ We might have expected the same fate for “democratization” in Ukraine in 2004. Thus, the fact that all of the main leaders of the Orange Revolution had recently been close associates of Kuchma might have suggested a quick return to Kuchma-era practices.

An important source of democratic success in Ukraine lies in the person of Yushchenko, who has chosen not to utilize many of the older institutional mechanisms of autocratic rule that remain available.³¹ Simultaneously, divisions between east and west, as well as elite disorganization, have continued to promote political competition since 2005. First, during the Orange Revolution regional divisions led to a political settlement that has made it harder for the president to concentrate power. Because he lacked support in large parts of eastern Ukraine, Yushchenko was unable to impose a unilateral solution to the crisis in late 2004 despite having millions of protestors backing him up. Yushchenko was forced to agree to changes in the constitution that weakened the presidency in exchange for a rerun of the fraudulent 21 November ballot. As a result of a constitutional agreement of mid-December 2004, the legislature became responsible for selecting the prime minister and approving most cabinet members nominated by the prime minister.³² Further, divisions in the country allowed Viktor Yanukovich to survive the Orange Revolution. Even after he had been deprived of key state resources and humiliated by extensive coverage of his criminal record and direct involvement in electoral fraud, Yanukovich remained a powerful force—winning a very respectable 44 percent to Yushchenko’s 52 percent in December 2004.³³ In 2006, Yanukovich’s Party of Regions won 32 percent of the vote and obtained 41 percent of parliamentary seats. In 2007, the party won 34 percent of the vote and 39 percent of the seats in parliament. The Party of Regions has remained the single largest party in Ukraine.

Such strength has been almost entirely grounded in stable regional support. Thus, in the 2006 parliamentary elections, the Party of Regions gained between 45 percent and 75 percent of the vote in eastern and southern provinces as opposed to 2 percent to 8 percent in western provinces.³⁴ The regionalization of Ukraine means that almost regardless of what happens, Yanukovich or a successor will remain an important check

on any executive with a power base in western Ukraine.

In addition, the degree of party organization has also shaped the evolution of post-Orange Revolution Ukrainian politics. While Yanukovich has been able to centralize his support in more or less one party, Yushchenko has been forced to rely on two movements ("Block Tymoshenko" and "Our Ukraine—Self Defense Bloc") consisting of around 13 separate parties.³⁵ Most significantly, the Yushchenko–Tymoshenko alliance that facilitated the Orange Revolution has been racked by severe tensions driven mostly by conflicting political ambitions. Thus, Tymoshenko has widely been seen as Yushchenko's primary competitor in the upcoming 2010 Presidential elections. Such tensions have significantly hampered efforts to consolidate power. "The Orange Revolution alliance quarrelled so much, it didn't have the sort of inner dynamism to create a government of its own."³⁶ In September 2005, Tymoshenko's first stint as prime minister ended amid mutual charges of corruption. Following the March 2006 elections, parties from the Orange coalition took about three months to negotiate an agreement to make Tymoshenko prime minister—only to have that agreement fall apart at the last minute due to the defection of Oleksandr Moroz, the chairman of the Socialist Party. Yanukovich in turn was able to take advantage of these divisions and become prime minister himself. The result was a situation in which the prime minister and president were from different parties and in constant conflict. The president, despite his rather extensive formal power, was relegated to the "opposition." Mutual hostility between Tymoshenko and Yushchenko further weakened Yushchenko in the winter of 2007 when Tymoshenko supported Yanukovich in overriding a Yushchenko veto of the "Law on the Cabinet of Ministers" that weakened presidential powers.³⁷ Finally, divisions and distrust within the Orange camp came very close to derailing the election of Tymoshenko as prime minister in late 2007.³⁸

CONCLUSION: THE REFORM DILEMMA IN UKRAINE

In Ukraine, the relative weakness of civil society and the rule of law and the absence of consistently strong international democratizing pressures have left few constraints on autocratic behavior. Indeed, both Kravchuk and Kuchma demonstrated a willingness to use extra-legal and undemocratic measures to stay in office and concentrate power. Even the much more democratic Viktor Yushchenko readily thwarted the constitution and pressured judges who sought to block his efforts to shut down the legislature in 2007.

In this context, ruling party weakness and divisions in national identity have been a critical factor constraining the ability of leaders to monopolize authoritarian control. But of course, these same factors directly undermine governance and the abil-

ity of governments to carry out economic reforms. The kind of failed authoritarianism found throughout much of post-Soviet Ukrainian history has kept Ukraine dynamically competitive but has also resulted in near constant political stalemate. Regional divisions have arguably weakened state capacity to collect taxes and provide many basic social goods.³⁹ The negative effects of such divisions and stalemate have been especially evident recently. For example, relations between President Yushchenko and Yanukovich while he was prime minister from 2006 to 2007 were characterized by a "permanent fight for power between presidential and governmental branches of the executive."⁴⁰ Such divisions became particularly dangerous in late May 2007 when government forces loyal to Yushchenko came close to open confrontation with Interior Ministry troops loyal to Yanukovich. Such tensions have continued to infect Ukrainian politics following Tymoshenko's re-election as prime minister in late 2007. Conflict between the two has undermined efforts to aggressively pursue corruption cases. As noted in the newspaper *Zerkalo Nedeli* in late 2007, "fortunately, groundless political repressions are no longer an element of public policy. Unfortunately, deserved punishments are not, either."⁴¹ Such problems have led many to argue for the centralization of power and increased efforts to prosecute corruption. Thus, numerous supporters of Yushchenko opposed the December 2004 constitutional reforms while observers have recently criticized Yushchenko for not pursuing corruption cases more aggressively.⁴²

262 However, the argument presented here suggests that Ukraine may face a reform dilemma. Centralization of power and more active use of the state to prosecute corruption may be necessary for reform. Yet, in the context of a weak rule of law in which virtually all leaders use the state for partisan ends, such measures are likely to destroy democracy. In the absence of a strong and independent court system, what is to prevent a politician from using an anti-corruption drive to target political enemies as Kuchma did so often during his tenure? The failed authoritarianism rooted in national divisions and weak parties that Ukraine has witnessed over the last 16 years may undermine reform. But it also provides an important obstacle to authoritarianism. Ukraine may never become an Estonia; but it also is unlikely to turn into a Belarus or Russia. 

NOTES

1. Marc Howard, *The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

2. Paul D'Anieri, "Explaining the Success and Failure of Post-Communist Revolutions," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39, no. 3 (2006): 331–350.

3. Chrystia Freeland, *Sale of the Century: Russia's Wild Ride from Communism to Capitalism* (New York: Crown Business, 2000); Lucan Way, "Rapacious Individualism and Political Competition in Ukraine," *Communist and Post Communist Studies* 38, no. 2 (2005): 191–205.

4. Oleksandr Sushko and Olena Prystayko, "Ukraine," *Nations In Transit* (Freedom House New York, 2006).

5. See Lucan Way "The Sources and Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism in Ukraine" *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 20, no. 1 (March 2004): 143–161.

6. Vakhtang Kipiani, *Vlada T'my i Temnykiv* (Kyiv: Prosvita, 2005); Keith Darden, "The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal State Institution," *Politics and Society* 36, no. 1 (2008): 35–59.

7. This metaphor was suggested by Steven Levitsky, personal communication.

8. Earlier in 2005, the legislature had refused to select its share of judges in order to block a quorum for the constitutional court. Leaders in the legislature feared that the constitutional court might block changes in the constitution in late 2004 that strengthened parliamentary powers.

9. This refers to Kravchuk's loss to Kuchma in 1994 and the Kuchma regime's loss to Yushchenko in 2004. I also score Yanukovich's accession to prime minister in 2006 and Tymoshenko's accession as PM in 2007 as turnovers. While the same president (Yushchenko) has remained in power since 2005, the prime minister arguably became the most important governmental figure after constitutional changes took effect in 2006. In addition both of the latter turnovers represented a clear change in partisan composition of the government.

10. Teyana Nikolaenko, "Як Тимошенко зробила Ющенка ніким, або І поки смерть не розлучить нас." *Ukraynska Pravda*, 12 January 2007.

11. Marta Dyczok, "Was Kuchma's Censorship Effective? Mass Media in Ukraine before 2004?" *Europe-Asia Studies* 58, no. 2 (March 2006): 215–238.

12. Lucan Way, "Pluralism by Default: The Challenges of Authoritarian State Building in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine," *Studies in Public Policy Working Paper #375* (University of Strathclyde, 2002), 37

13. Similarly, differences of ethnic identity were the basis for opposition mobilization in Kenya by Kuyus in 2002 and in opposition to Kuyus in 2007–2008. This case demonstrates just how dangerous such divisions can become.

14. Sidney Tarrow, "Beyond Globalization: Why creating transnational social movements is so hard, and when it is most likely to happen," *Global Solidarity Dialogue*, <http://www.antenna.nl/~waterman/tarrow.html> (April 19, 2001).

15. Marta Dyczok, "Was Kuchma's Censorship Effective? Mass Media in Ukraine before 2004," *Europe-Asia Studies* 58, no.2 (2006): 215d–238.

16. Lucan Way, "Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Political Competition in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine," *World Politics* 57 (January 2005); Lucan Way, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution: Kuchma's Failed Authoritarianism," *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 2 (April 2005); Lucan Way, "Rapacious Individualism and Political Competition in Ukraine" *Communist and Post Communist Studies* 38, no. 2 (2005): 191–205.

17. Michael McFaul, *Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).

18. Barbara Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization after Twenty Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 115–144.

19. For example, Leonid Kuchma remarked in the run-up to the 1994 election "[T]his is good that not a single political party supported me during the elections, as I am going to serve people and not the party." Quoted in Andrey A. Meleshevich, *Party Systems in Post-Soviet Countries: A Comparative Study of Political Institutionalization in the Baltic States, Russia, and Ukraine* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 151.

20. Andrew Wilson, "The Growing Challenge to Kiev from the Donbas," RFE/RL Research Report, 20 August 1993, 286; Paul Kubicek, *Unbroken Ties: The State, Interest Associations, and Corporatism in Post-Soviet Ukraine* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000): 77–78

21. Lucan Way, "Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Political Competition in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine," *World Politics* 57 (January 2005).

22. Way, "Pluralism by Default."

23. At least two-thirds of the Committee of National Salvation that was created to respond to the fraudulent elections in 2004 were former Kuchma allies—including almost all of the most prominent leaders of this group.

24. Lucan Way, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution: Kuchma's Failed Authoritarianism." *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 2 (April 2005).

25. Ibid.

26. *Ukraynska Pravda*, 7 March 2004

27. Lucan Way, "Identity and Autocracy: Belarus and Ukraine in Comparative Perspective," in *Civil Society in Ukraine*, eds. D. Arel and P. D'Anieri (Woodrow Wilson, forthcoming).

28. The results of a nationally representative survey conducted about three weeks after the second round, suggests that about 13 percent of individuals above the age of 17 took part in pro-Yushchenko demonstrations—a figure that translates into roughly four to five million Ukrainian adults. The nationally representative survey was conducted 10 to 17 December 2004. It had 2,044 respondents and included the question "Did you participate in demonstrations since the second round of elections?" Of these, 77 percent said that they voted for Yushchenko. To separate out those who demonstrated for Yushchenko, I included in the dependent variable only those who said they demonstrated and who said that they voted for Yushchenko (on the assumption that those demonstrators who voted for Yushchenko also demonstrated for him). Nearly 14 percent (279) of those interviewed reported that they both voted for Yushchenko and participated in demonstrations since the fraudulent second round. I am extremely grateful to Vladimir Paniotto for giving me access to this data.

29. Controlling for a range of standard demographic variables (age, urban residence, education, as well as belief that the elections were fraudulent), Ukrainian identity (as measured by Ukrainian language proficiency and residence in Galician western Ukraine) was an important predictor of attendance at a pro-Yushchenko rally.

30. Before he was elected in 1994, Aliaksandr Lukashenka was widely considered an outsider and a member of the democratic opposition in the early 1990s (he was at one point a member of the Belarusian National Front) and even authored an ironically prescient article warning of the emergence of a new "Belarusian variant of dictatorship" in 1991 (*Narodnaia hazeta* (Minsk) 25 May 1991: 1, 3).

31. Dyczok, "Was Kuchma's Censorship Effective?" notes that the failure of the Yushchenko administration to make significant changes in the structure of media—such as changes in libel laws or introduction of public broadcasting—make it relatively easy for a new government to reintroduce Kuchma-style government censorship.

32. Thus, the prime minister is responsible for appointing all major ministers (with the approval of parliament) except for the ministers of defense and foreign affairs, whom the parliament must approve. The president also retains the right to nominate and initiate the dismissal of the head of the SBU, National Bank, Central Election Committee and the Prosecutor General. In addition, the president continues to appoint regional heads.

33. This result was in stark contrast to Mikheil Saakashvili's victory in Georgia of 96 percent following the collapse of the Shevardnadze regime in 2003.

34. Data from Central Election commission website: <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/vnd2006/w6p001.html>.

35. Serhvi Rakhmanin, "Tri Sumnykh Povisti," *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*, 15 December 2007.

36. Brian Whitmore, "Ukraine: Did West Pull Up Stakes Too Soon?" *RFE/RL Reports*, April 12, 2007.

37. Teyana Nikolaenko, "Як Тимошенко зробила Ющенка ніким, або І поки смерть не розлучить нас," *Ukraynska Pravda*, 12 January 2007.

38. Mustafa Nayem and Sergei Leshchenko, "Tri Konverta, Tri Tosta I 'Zolotaia Ruchka.' Dlia Iulii Tymoshenko," *Ukraynska Pravda*, 19 December 2007.

39. Paul D'Anieri, "The Impact of Domestic Divisions on Ukrainian Foreign Policy: Ukraine as a 'Weak State,'" *State and Institution Building in Ukraine*, eds. Robert Kravchuk, Taras Kuzio, and Paul D'Anieri (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).

40. Oleksandr Sushko and Olena Prystayko, "Ukraine," in *Nations in Transit* (Freedom House, 2007), 738.

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