

Myths of Anti-Americanism

The Case of Latin America

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LATIN AMERICA MAY JUSTLY BE called the wise old man of anti-Americanism. After two centuries of relations with the United States, the countries south of the Rio Grande have gained much knowledge about the contradictions of living next to a superpower that protects while occupying, invests as it exploits, and professes friendship as it makes enemies. More and more Latin Americans see themselves as cursed—"so far from God and so near to the United States," General Porfirio Díaz is said to have bemoaned about his own Mexico. Yet, Latin Americans have also grown to appreciate much about the United States, as the growth of migration to *el norte* and the spread of U.S. popular culture in Latin America demonstrate. The maturing of this "love/hate" relationship between the United States and Latin America has exposed several myths about anti-Americanism, which must become the targets of demythologization

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The history of anti-Americanism in Latin America defies reduction. *Antiyanquismo* has evolved as a complex response to the growth and interconnectedness of the U.S. presence in Latin America. Every strand of U.S. power—military, political, economic, and cultural—has grown upward and outward since the nineteenth century, and anti-Americanism evolved out of the blending of these strands. Rightly or wrongly, the more the United States made its presence as an industrial juggernaut, military overlord, and cultural omnivore known, the more Latin Americans came to see—or imagine—links between these roles, and the more they rejected them. Latin America's journalists, novelists, and artists, for instance, increasingly spoke out against the corrupting influences of the north and represented the United States in images of greed and racism. A full century ago, for instance, Uruguay's José Enrique Rodó likened the United States to the character Caliban in *The Tempest*, the quintessence of self-indulgence and mate-

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rialism. Decades later, Guatemala's Juan José Arévalo spoke of the U.S. "shark" relentlessly circling the Latin American "sardines" and mercilessly gobbling them up. Novelist Carlos Luis Fallas immortalized the overbearing and not so gentle "mothering" of Costa Rica by the United Fruit Company in *Mamita Yunai*.¹ Meanwhile, Latin America's political leaders decried the growing impoverishment of their economies at the hands of U.S. corporations, the undermining of their regimes by the State Department, or the weakening of their security by the CIA and the Pentagon. Its ordinary workers and peasants resented U.S. military intervention from the Mexican-American War of the 1840s to the present imbroglio in Colombia.

A historical understanding of Latin Americans' resentment toward the United States is glaringly absent in the words and actions of U.S. policymakers, media pundits, and citizens. As a result, U.S. citizens on both the left and right have conceptualized anti-Americanism as a series of myths. These myths are distortions of reality that must be overturned, examined, and questioned in order to move to a more mature understanding of anti-Americanism in Latin America.

MYTH #1: ANTI-AMERICANISM IS ANTIQUATED

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One myth states that anti-Americanism is out of date. The myth associates anti-americanism with the nationalism of the mid-twentieth century, when, after World War II, the cry of "Yankee Go Home" took root in France and Germany. It also goes so far as to consider anti-Americanism as a relic of the Cold War, when Soviet, Chinese, North Vietnamese, and Cuban Communist cadres and other propagandists recycled reams of hackneyed Marxist jargon about "Yankee capitalists" and sent it out to any tiny militant group in the developing world that could put together a newspaper or stir up a union meeting. Even in the Latin America of the 1960s, which many scholars may associate with the birth of anti-Americanism, U.S. officials who faced growing opposition to their presence often dismissed that opposition as "latent" hostility feeding off memories of the "gunboat diplomacy" of the early-century occupations in the Caribbean area. Every generation of U.S. observers has wanted to see anti-Americanism as belonging to the past.

This first myth is easy to debunk. The reality is that anti-Americanism is stronger today than ever before. Latin Americans, despite deep sympathy for the victims of 11 September, showed little support for the war on terrorism: Mexican and Chilean representatives at the United Nations refused to support the Iraq war, and 79 percent of Brazilians opposed even a military attack against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan immediately after 11 September.² Other discontents, moreover, have persisted: Puerto Ricans in Vieques have insisted on ejecting the U.S. Navy from their territory, Brazil

led poor nations in walking out of U.S.-led trade talks in Cancún, Mexico, and Bolivians recently forced their president to step down in a protest against selling natural gas to the United States and Mexico.

Polling provides another indication of the recent growth of anti-Americanism. Since the 1940s, the United Nations and other organizations have conducted world wide opinion polls about the image of the United States around the world. These surveys, done when the United States was still a young superpower, revealed not a widespread resistance to its influence, but instead, surprisingly generous attitudes toward Yankees. The polls indicated that only a small minority opposed U.S. policies, while the overwhelming majority agreed both with the values of the United States and with letting the United States spread those values.³ The U.S. government, mostly through the United States Information Agency (USIA), did its own polling during the Cold War. It found similar results: rarely was a majority in any country hostile to the United States. In fact, those who had "bad" or "very bad" opinions of the United States often amounted to single-digit totals. Polls showed that respondents around the world, then as now, had common sense: they consistently distinguished between criticisms of specific policies and those of the United States as a whole.⁴

Every generation of U.S. observers has wanted to see anti-Americanism as belonging to the past.

In polls taken in Latin America during the Cold War, U.S. officials were reassured that media fears of widespread anti-American hostility were misplaced. The polls indicated that, in general, Latin Americans wanted more economic security, cherished their culture, loved their country, and when it came to the East-West struggle they were firmly on the side of the United States and expressed a fondness for political and social freedom. There, too, "bad" and "very bad" opinions of the United States were rare, and were mostly confined to urban, militant groups of students or workers.⁵ In a 1955 survey of four Latin American countries, for example, only 3 to 11 percent of respondents answered that the United States was *not* a "really good friend and neighbor." And in another survey from the early 1960s, only 2 percent of Central American urban dwellers mentioned "resisting foreign influence" as a priority.⁶

How things have changed. Recently, similar polls taken around the world have indicated, for the first time, a majority of negative opinions of the United States among both opinion leaders and cross-sections of societies. In Latin America, the numbers are unprecedented: only 64 percent favorable in Mexico, 52 percent in Brazil, and as low as 34 percent in Argentina.⁷ These numbers are far from the 80 to 90 percent approval ratings of the Cold War.

The reasons for the sudden change in attitude toward the United States should

fascinate all who are interested in anti-Americanism and should especially prompt historical questions about the conditions that may support or hinder feelings of anti-Americanism. Are U.S. policies now different from what they were in 1989? 1945? 1898? What has changed and what has stayed the same? Is the revolution in mass communication responsible? Has the relentless selling of the "good life" by advertisers seeped deeply into the consciousness of the world and set it up for disappointment and resentment? Or has mass communication simply given anti-U.S. groups a bigger megaphone? Do the personalities of certain presidents or other policymakers have an impact on the approval of U.S. actions? Is anti-Americanism a *result* of democracy rather than a lack of it? These questions may begin to illuminate the pertinent issues of anti-Americanism: its main grievances, surely, as well as its leading voices, its methods of communication, its political intents, and, last but certainly not least, U.S. reactions to it.

MYTH #2: ANTI-AMERICANISM IS IRRATIONAL

A basic assumption of this second myth is that the emotion of hostility toward the United States is just that, an emotion. Anti-Americanism, it argues, is an intellectual short cut that blames the United States for the evils of the world. By defining anti-U.S. "sentiment" as pathology, this myth denies it the legitimacy that any concept needs in the supposed rational world of geopolitics. The myth of irrationality also reinforces the perception of anti-Americanism as a totalizing prejudice fit for the dustbin of history as are racism, sexism, or anti-Semitism.⁸

The basis of this myth is easy to understand. When asked to describe anti-Americanism, most people (including myself) would use emotions. In 2002, one thoughtful editor asked, "What do we think of when we think of America?" and he suggested not political or cultural concepts but emotions: "Fear, resentment, envy, anger, wonder, hope?" He forgot the most oft-mentioned emotion: hatred. "Why do they hate us?" has become the question *du jour*, itself infused with fear and urgency. It may convey a sincere desire to understand the roots of hostility, but it is a loaded question. President Bush himself asked it right after 11 September, 2001, and, not surprisingly, he had difficulty answering the question intelligently.⁹

Throughout twentieth century U.S. commentary on Latin America, the word "hate" surfaced frequently. When Panamanians rioted against U.S. power in 1959 and again in 1964, periodicals on the homeland mostly focused on the simple emotion of hate: "A Nation that Hates Gringos," "Why Do They *Hate* Us?" and "Panama: Why They Hate Us" were notable headlines.¹⁰ In Latin America, especially, U.S. officials consistently associated anti-Americanism with the perceived natural emotionality of "Latins."

Similarly, in 1959, when the Eisenhower administration ran up against the most effective anti-U.S. speechmaker in Latin American history, Fidel Castro, the language around the White House was that Castro was not just a bit hot-headed or manipulating the emotions of crowds, but literally certifiable. He had "gone haywire," was "un-reasoning," and had "a broad streak of irrationality on the Hitler pattern." President Eisenhower himself called him a "madman."¹¹ Because it was defined as pathological, anti-Americanism could therefore not be balanced out by pro-Americanism. Thus, when many Latin Americans showed great admiration of the United States alongside those who protested, U.S. officials labeled this not ambivalence, but "schizophrenia."¹²

The myth of irrationality clearly places too much stock in the emotions of anti-Americanism. If anti-Americanism is immediately identifiable with emotional language such as "resentment" and "hate," it is because emotions stem from frustration, from the lack of solutions to the overwhelming inequalities in the world. The great majority of those hostile to U.S. power are expressing unprecedented desperation in their desire to prevent or reverse the erosion of their wealth, their traditions, and their arable land. These are all problems that they trace back to U.S.-led globalization, and that link is very serious. Emotions, in other words, *are* rational responses. Let us consider Castro again: today we know that the man who outlasted Eisenhower and—so far—eight other presidents is not insane. Rather, he is brilliantly Machiavellian in using anti-Americanism to cement the loyalty of Cubans, which allowed him to approach the Soviet Union, whom he had chosen as his subsidizing protector, from a position of power.¹³

MYTH #3: ANTI-AMERICANISM IS RATIONAL

This myth declares that *all* protests are a reasonable response to the unreasonable situation of U.S. hegemony in the world. At the core of this myth, held mostly by leftist critics of U.S. power, is the desire for a reassuring compartmentalization of anti-Americanisms. Believers of this myth want each criticism to stand on its own as a distinct, crisp denunciation of economic, political, military, or cultural U.S. abuses. Some of these myth-holders even refuse to use the word "anti-Americanism" at all, claiming it is too large an analytical category to describe any reality. This myth is also understandable: everyone, after all, wants to be seen as a rational person and almost all (again, including myself) claim to be opposed to specific policies of the United States without advocating a total rejection.

The reality, however, is that many, in a display of irrationality, conflate the various forms of U.S. power and imagine, without bothering to gather evidence, that they are tied together. As a result, those who see all U.S. power abroad as malevolent grow conspiratorial in their thoughts, easily manipulated in their strategies, and desperate in



photo courtesy of Yaya Camara Johnson

Anti-war protesters in Brazil demonstrate that anti-American sentiments and anti-war feelings are far from antiquated. (15 February, 2003)

their tactics. As one student once declared in a class discussion about U.S. investments in Latin America, while shaking her head and literally closing her eyes, "*I don't care what anyone says. [U.S. corporations] planned to impoverish Latin America from the very beginning, and no one will convince me otherwise.*" More seriously, some Latin Americans have thus rejected certain reforms that they would have otherwise favored had they not been Yankee. Cubans serving jury duty under the post-1898 U.S. occupation, to take just one example, consistently returned verdicts of innocence, not because they actually found defendants innocent, but because they judged the duty itself to be an imposition of U.S. imperialism.¹⁴

The experience of Panamanians in 1964, touched upon briefly above, is an instance in which such facile, irrational conflation was at

once understandable but dangerous. By that year, hundreds of thousands of Panamanians had been living for decades literally a stone's throw away from U.S. colonialism. The target of their hatred was the Canal Zone, a ten-mile-wide strip of land that hugged Panama's cities and surrounded the Panama Canal, which was run and secured by the U.S. government (although worked mostly by West Indians and Panamanians). The many U.S. citizens in the Zone, called "Zonians," held all the desirable, racially-segregated jobs in this well-tended tropical paradise. In the eyes of watchful Panamanians, they embodied U.S. empire in all its greed, racism, and paternalism. Since all aspects of U.S. power were rolled into one, how could Panamanians not think that whatever else was "American" was only more of the same? In January 1965, in four days of rioting, Panamanians lashed back not only at U.S. policemen and U.S. soldiers but also at ordinary U.S. citizens, many of whom lived outside the Canal Zone. All foreigners became targets, and many made sure to set themselves off from U.S. citizens by pre-

tending they could not speak English. Rioters also trashed businesses for looking "Yankee," such as the Panamanian-owned Good Neighbor bar.¹⁵ Attacking innocent U.S. civilians may have felt justifiable, but it was no less irrational.

MYTH #4: ANTI-AMERICANISM IS CAUSED BY ELITES

This fourth myth, held most notably by U.S. officials, holds that very little anti-American sentiment resides in the hearts of people outside elite circles. Myth holders argue that people who are not among the elite share the same basic aspirations as U.S. citizens. Among these are decent living standards, equality of opportunity, and political freedom. In 1928, a State Department economist working in Nicaragua struck this theme: "In its contact with backward peoples," he wrote to the Secretary of State, "the United States stands for roads, schools, public health facilities and those other material improvements which are reflected in security, wealth, literacy, health and progress." Decades later, during a massive U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic, adviser Adolf Berle reiterated these ideas as he recommended what U.S. propaganda campaigns should emphasize. Berle wrote to President Lyndon Johnson that what was "needed" was the "insistent repetition of a few simple ideas, of which the 'Yankee' is a symbol: better houses, more food, better jobs, a chance for the children; unlimited opportunity. No more killing—and so forth. The Santo Domingo little people want these things."¹⁶

The myth that "backward peoples" or "little people" want exactly what U.S. citizens want is not necessarily wrong. It is certainly powerful because it speaks to the belief in the universality of U.S. values. As one U.S. commentator wondered in 1953, "We feel that anyone in his right mind ought to like us, or at least understand us . . . After all, aren't we the most 'normal' people in the world?"¹⁷ It follows from this logic that those who cause anti-Americanism are the hypocritical, "abnormal" elites: despite also sharing "our" values, these elites engage in "externalization," foisting blame for purely internal problems onto the shoulders of an external culprit such as the United States.¹⁸

In U.S.-Latin American relations, at least, some evidence does support the claim of hypocrisy and opportunism. Elites often mismanaged their governments and as a result "whipped up" sentiment against the United States to deflect criticism away from themselves, as U.S. observers were fond of saying. The most commonly cited example is no doubt Fidel Castro's long record of blaming the United States for most of Cuba's ills. In 1999 and 2000, during the Elián González crisis—which the Clinton administration handled with cool, legalistic aplomb—Castro again used anti-U.S. sentiment during mass demonstrations to criticize not just the delay in returning Elián to his father in Cuba but also a panoply of U.S. policies toward Cuba.¹⁹ As those who visit

Cuba and talk to ordinary Cubans are aware, however, many Cubans privately are becoming weary of this blame game.

But have elites *created* this sentiment? Something must be present in order to be “whipped up.” Evidence suggests that the most pro-United States of Latin American leaders were, on the contrary, the wealthiest and least democratic: dictators Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua, Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, and Augusto Pinochet of Chile were all “good neighbors” of the United States. Most Latin American political leaders who used anti-Americanism in symbolism, speeches, or legislation were usually *following* public opinion rather than trampling it. Elites were desperate to keep up with popular sentiment, and, if they got lucky, to run ahead of it. In this sense, being anti-American meant being a democrat, if also a demagogue.

The Panama Riots of forty years ago again provide a good example, this time of a leader joining an anti-American protest rather than creating it. High school students began the fighting in a schoolyard. When the scuffle turned into a full-blown riot, university students joined. Soon, older militant groups led masses in the streets. Radio commentators screamed for payback, while others called for total revolution. All demanded apologies from Washington. Within hours, the president of Panama, Roberto Chiari, worried that he was losing control and realized that he needed to set the terms of this protest. His strategy was to get ahead of it: he broke relations with the U.S. government—the first time any Latin American country had done so. He demanded not just an apology but a complete rewrite of the treaty that gave control of the Panama Canal to the United States. Having outdone Panama’s militants, he invited them to the presidential palace to show his unity with their patriotic cause, and took the opportunity to speak on their behalf. It was a brilliant takeover of anti-Americanism—one that carried great risks, but one that eventually led to the devolution of the Panama Canal into Panamanian hands in 1999.

MYTH #5: ANTI-AMERICANISM IS AN IMAGE PROBLEM

Phrased in this way, this myth seems terribly naïve to many. But it represents the belief held by the great bulk of U.S. policymakers and observers of U.S. world affairs, which is that the United States is fundamentally a force for democracy and prosperity around the world and that any disagreements between it and other countries can be resolved to the satisfaction of both. This myth grows out of the deep roots of the U.S. self-image as a Wilsonian “innocent abroad” on the world stage, and maintains that there is a false dichotomy between U.S. and foreign interests. According to the optimists and patriots who wholly buy into this myth, anti-Americanism is the result of false perceptions and misinformation.

The solution to this supposed blurring of the U.S. image, therefore, is to sharpen

the image. One of the leading tasks of the State Department in the last decades has been to push for a public relations approach to counter anti-Americanism. "Clearing up" or "improving" the image of the United States abroad has not meant changing U.S. behavior, but rather changing the perception of that behavior. To do so, public diplomacy has long borrowed from advertising techniques and rationales. In the 1950s, the language of Dale Carnegie, the famous author of *How to Win Friends and Influence People*, infused discussions of anti-Americanism. Fighting hostile public opinion meant winning a popularity contest. In this vein, the *Saturday Evening Post* characterized "America's reputation abroad" as "our overseas box office." And *Newsweek* warned that Soviet propaganda was "big business" and that "the U.S. must have its own public-relations office."²⁰

This language has not disappeared—far from it. After 11 September, Secretary of State Colin Powell defended the appointment of a Madison Avenue executive to redesign his public diplomacy by saying, "There is nothing wrong with getting somebody who knows how to sell something. We are selling a product. We need someone who can re-brand American foreign policy, re-brand diplomacy."²¹

There are several problems with the "re-branding" approach. First, it may make things worse because many abroad will see the contradictions between U.S. words and actions. As the venerable *New York Times* journalist James Reston observed long ago, "The gap between our public pronouncements of equality [with other nations] and our private demands for authority equal to our power leaves us open to charges of hypocrisy."²²

Second, this approach prevents U.S. officials from being receptive to arguments about the basic incompatibility of U.S. and foreign economies or U.S. and foreign political systems. Seeing anti-Americanism as a mere image problem reinforces the widely held neoliberal assumption that what is good for the United States is good for the rest of the world. This simplification frees officials from the responsibility of doing anything to change the painful realities that give rise to negative images in the first place.

The third problem and perhaps the most disturbing are the patriotic consequences this myth engenders. The image of the United States, as presented in discussion of anti-Americanism, presumes a commonality of interests not only between U.S. citizens and foreigners, but between U.S. citizens themselves. "Do they like us?" or "Why do they hate us?" both presume that there is an "us" to like or hate. This reinforces the tendency to view Americans as monolithic. How about considering that the "United States" does not in fact stand for anything at all? Might that not be such a bad thing? After all, many within the United States increasingly do not consider themselves part of "us," partly because that "us" insists on being so narrowly defined. As the authors of the recent book *Why Do People Hate America?* propose, "we have to interrogate the question rather than be bamboozled into ready-made, easy answers."²³

Patriotism creates a vicious circle when it is the response to anti-Americanism:

power projected abroad as representative of the good of one nation sparks a rejection of that power as a representative of the evil of that same nation, which leads to self-defensive patriotism backed by ever more power.

Latin America offers yet another example for this fifth and final myth. To counter the anti-American hostility that spread out from the ripples of the Cuban Revolution in the 1960s, the strategy in Washington, where officials were ready to conjure up images of pathology, was to cure what CIA Director Allen Dulles called "Castro-itis" with a good old-fashioned dose of salesmanship. The highly image-conscious John F. Kennedy, for instance, actively championed a more prominent role for the USIA, which included a huge boost in anti-Castro propaganda to Latin America. He multiplied the aid budget and renamed it the Alliance for Progress, and he and wife Jackie—she a Spanish speaker and both being Catholics—made frequent, highly successful goodwill visits to Latin America. On the one hand, Kennedy's strategy worked well enough: a survey of seven Latin American nations found that, "in all seven countries the overwhelming majority of those aware of the Alliance, [sic] also approve of it, with opposition to the program averaging 1 percent in all seven countries and indifference averaging about 3 percent."²⁴

On the other hand, after 1959 the U.S. government admitted to almost *no* wrongdoing in Latin America. As Castro erased U.S. influence from Cuba by taking over U.S.-owned farms, alarm bells sounded in Havana and Washington. Expropriation was theft, U.S. landowners argued (not without some reason), and the State Department agreed. But it was more than that. Expropriation was typically irrational "Yankee-hating" because U.S. landowners had been good to Cuba. U.S. officials repeatedly argued this line to Cuban officials, who shook their heads in disbelief. Not once did U.S. policymakers express doubts about the benefits of U.S. foreign investment to Cubans. Not once did they suggest that owners who valued their land four or five times higher than their taxable amount were greedy. And not once did they concede that maybe, just maybe, U.S. investment had been exploitative. The dialogue of the deaf that surrounded the Cuban Revolution was another reminder of the long-standing U.S. reluctance to plumb the depths of anti-U.S. discontent.

HOPE AMID HOSTILITY

In a way, this reluctance, this innocence, is disarming and gives reason for hope. The U.S. response to anti-Americanism, for all its arrogance, stems from an optimism that seems to seek goodwill among nations. But U.S. citizens must realize that Latin Americans and others around the world share a different hope: that one day U.S. citizens will lose their innocence. The post-11 September era in U.S. foreign relations is still not

clearly defined, but the myths of anti-Americanism will arguably play a central role in its definition. Exposing the myths will help de-politicize ideas about anti-Americanism. Latin America's anti-Americanism defies easy stereotypes, and its long history invites deeper study into its multiple sources and into responses by the United States. ❧

NOTES

1. Rodó, *Ariel* trans. Margaret Sayers Peden (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988; orig. 1900); Arévalo, *The Shark and the Sardines*, trans. June Cobb and Raúl Osegueda (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1961); Fallas, *Mamita Yunai: el infierno de las bananeras* (Havana: Editorial de Arte y Literatura, 1975; orig. 1941). For more discussions of literary images, see Carlos Rama, *La imagen de los Estados Unidos en la América Latina: De Simón Bolívar a Allende* (Mexico: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1975); Carlos Rangel, *The Latin Americans: Their Love-Hate Relationship with the United States* trans. by Ivan Kats (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977); John Reid, *Spanish American Images of the United States, 1790-1960* (Gainesville: The University Presses of Florida, 1977); F. Toscano and James Hiestler, *Anti-Yankee Feelings in Latin America: An Anthology of Latin American Writings from Colonial to Modern Times in their Historical Perspective* (Washington, D.C.: UPA, 1982); and Gustavo San Román, ed., *This America We Dream Of: Rodó and Ariel One Hundred Years On* (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 2001).

2. "Maioria dos brasileiros quer justiça, sem guerra," Datafolha poll published on 21 September 2001, available at www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/datafolha/po/guerra_eua_092001.shtml.

3. William Buchanan, "As Others See Us," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 295 (September 1954). The United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organization conducted such a poll in Australia, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, and the United States. For similar results in later polls, see "In the Mirror," *Time*, 21 April 1952; and Andrew Henry Ziegler, Jr., "The West European Public and the Atlantic Alliance (NATO)" (Ph.D. diss., University of Florida, 1987).

4. For a summary of these USIA polls, see Leo Crespi, draft, "The Extent of Anti-Americanism Abroad In the Wake of Iranian Developments," 4 December 1979, box 19, folder Office of Research, Research Reports, 1964-82, Record Group 306, U.S. National Archives.

5. See, for instance, Mexican and Brazilian responses in International Public Opinion Research, "Latin American Barometer Survey Dec 1955-Jan 1956," folder ZP5502 Multi-Country (Area) Project Files, 1952-63, Latin America, 1953-57, box 4, Record Group 306, U.S. National Archives; various USIA reports in box 5, Special Staff File Series, NSC Staff Papers, 1953-1961, White House Office, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; and "Anti-US Student Sentiment in Latin America," folder P-4 No. 5 Area Background - ARA '63, box 205, Country Files 1955-1964, Planning and Development, Bureau of Cultural Affairs, Record Group 59, U.S. National Archives.

6. International Research Associates, Inc., "Survey of Political Attitudes in Six Latin-American Cities," June 1955, folder ZP5501 Multi Latin American, March 1955 Radio Listening (LA1), box 4, Record Group 306, U.S. National Archives; United States Information Agency, "A Review of USIA Research," 4 March 1963, folder USIA Review of Research, box 91, Departments & Agencies, President's Office Files, Papers of President Kennedy, John F. Kennedy Library.

7. "America Admired, Yet Its New Vulnerability Seen As Good Thing, Say Opinion Leaders," 19 December 2001; "What the World Thinks in 2002," 4 December 2002; and "War With Iraq Further Divides Global Publics," 3 June 2003, all at www.people-press.org.

8. See, for instance, Stephen Haseler, *The Varieties of Anti-Americanism, Reflex and Response* (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1985), especially the introduction by Midge Decter.

9. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," 20 September 2001, *Weekly compilation of Presidential Documents*, 24 September 2001, 37 (Washington, D.C.: GPO), 1347-1351.

10. "A Nation That Hates Gringos," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 13 January 1964; Martin, "Why Do They

Hate Us? "Saturday Evening Post, 23 April 1960; Trevor Armbrister, "Panama: Why They Hate Us," *Saturday Evening Post*, 7 March 1964.

11. Congressman Adam Clayton Powell cited in memorandum of conversation, 12 March 1959, *Foreign Relations of the United States* 1958-1960, 6: 425; U.S. embassy in Havana's political attaché Daniel Braddock, draft attached to memorandum to Ambassador Philip Bonsal, 12 September 1959, folder Cuba 1959, box 16, lot 61D248, Subject Files Relating to Regional Economic Affairs, 1951-1961, Record Group 59, U.S. National Archives; NSC meeting, folder 429th Meeting of NSC December 16, 1959, box 12, NSC Series, Eisenhower Papers as President, 1953-1961, Dwight Eisenhower Library.

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13. Edward González argued this convincingly in "Castro's Revolution, Cuban Communist Appeals, and the Soviet Response," *World Politics* 21 (October 1968): 39-68.

14. Thomas F. O'Brien, *The Revolutionary Mission: American Enterprise in Latin America, 1900-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 208.

15. "Je Suis Français' Saves American," *New York Herald Tribune*, 13 January 1964; "Riot Incidents as Reported by Radio and TV Broadcasts from the Republic of Panama, January 9-10, 1964," box 15, Declassified General Correspondence, 1945-1979, Internal Security Office, Record Group 185, U.S. National Archives; "Lack of RP Action Caused Riots, US Alleges to Jurists," *The Panama American*, 21 March 1964.

16. William W. Cumberland to secretary of state, 10 March 1928, cited in O'Brien, *The Revolutionary Mission*, 47; Berle memorandum to Johnson, 3 June 1965, folder ND 19/CO 62 6/3/65-6/10/65, box 202, National Defense, Subject File, White House Central Files, Lyndon Johnson Library.

17. Editorial, "Leaning About 'Anti-Americanism,'" *America*, 26 December 1953.

18. On this concept, see Robert Snyder, "Explaining the Iranian Revolution's Hostility toward the United States," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 17 (spring 1994): 19-31.

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20. "'Liberal' Horror Stories about U.S.A. Aren't Helping Our Reputation Abroad," *Saturday Evening Post*, 16 January 1954; "Fighting Anti-Americanism Abroad," *Newsweek*, 30 April 1956.

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