
The European Common Foreign and Security Policy: Projecting Our Shared Values

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A catastrophe is defined as the loss of stability in a dynamic system. This notion, which originated in physics, can be used to describe the state of international relations since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The internal dynamic of the system may cause reversion to equilibrium, or at least stability, but in the aftermath of a significant event—in this case, the disappearance of one of the blocs in a bipolar structure—a period of chaos usually follows. These are the times in which we are living, times of transformation from a world that is no more to one that has not yet come into being, times of uncertainty and of hope.

We have called this situation “globalization.” But this term does not provide us with a general theory to give unity and consistency to processes and phenomena that are already changing our world and affecting our daily lives. One thing is clear: the defining characteristic of this new model of international relations is the interdependency of all regions and countries worldwide. Distances have disappeared, and we now have access to opportunities—and are vulnerable to threats—from every corner of the Earth.

The dangers and threats of this newly configured world are obvious, and they were brutally demonstrated by the attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. Terrorists take advantage of the freedom in Western societies, of the new possibilities offered by information technology, and of the growing global freedom of movement. The international community must unite to combat the scourge of terrorism; it is a global threat that we have to face

together. But this new model of international relations also gives us cause for hope, since the visibility of our interdependence reinforces the conviction that peace, security, freedom, and prosperity are not self-contained. These ideals cannot exist independently of each other.

Our greatest challenge in the twenty-first century will be the structuring of international relations in democratic terms. It has been said that democracy is the new shape of *realpolitik*, for it is the only system that can, in the long term, safeguard the stability of our values. The time for the rule of law in international relations has come. The United Nations is the seat of the political and normative legitimacy of the international community and the powerhouse of these values. Its contribution to the design and application of a new covenant for international relations is essential, for it is the organization that can impose, by force if necessary, the decisions made by the community of states. Spain is ready and willing to take part in this process that will shape our future, as shown by our election to a non-permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council for the 2003-2004 period.

Spain, however, does not take isolated action in the international arena. A critical mass is needed if we want to contribute effectively to the stability and security of our world and to the promotion of values such as freedom, democracy,

and human rights. Thus, the European Union (EU) Member States act together through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Within the framework of this policy, the defense and security dimension is becoming a central feature,

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enabling the EU to react jointly and effectively against the new threats as well as to manage crisis situations. Such missions must be carried out in coordination with NATO. The strategic partnership between both organizations is, and will continue to be, the key to the defense and promotion of our shared values.

These issues will be the focus of this article. But the CFSP cannot be described without mentioning two processes that are now taking place within the framework of the EU and that will shape its future: the Convention on the Future of Europe and EU enlargement.

The Union At A Turning Point

The European Union is an ongoing project, a living organism that reacts to day-to-day questions and to middle and long-term challenges in the international agenda. At the same time, it must continuously reinvent itself.

Internally, reflection is focused on the work of the Convention for the Future of Europe, which is laying the foundations for the adoption of a text that could be defined as the "Constitution of the EU." This document, whose final design has yet to be decided, could have the same structure and contents as a traditional constitution, with a declaration of rights and a set of basic rules concerning the roles and functions of the main institutions. This text will enable European citizens to clearly understand what the EU is, how it works, and what it can do for them. It will also reinforce an already existing sense of belonging.

Externally, and in relation to its close neighborhood, enlargement is the central drive of EU activity. Its importance derives from the influence enlargement will have on the future shape of the Union, as well as from the principle that it implements. After 2004, when enlargement will become effective, the number of EU Member States will grow from 15 to 25, and the population will increase from 375 million to 480 million. This will entail serious institutional adaptations to the Union's decision-making processes, as well as an enormous effort of solidarity, especially considering that the average per capita income of the 10 new Member States is only 39 percent of that of the now-existing Union.

Enlargement is the practical application of the outward projection of the EU as a community of democracy, solidarity, freedom, and prosperity. We believe that these values can only undergo stable development if the neighboring countries are incorporated and become part of the process. The incorporation of the 10 new Member States, however, will not be the end of the enlargement process. Bulgaria and Romania—as well as Turkey, with its own peculiarities—are slated to become members of the EU, thus reinforcing the Mediterranean component of the Union.

The case of Turkey has a particular relevance, for it brings into question the concept of Europe that we want to achieve. Europe is not only a geographical space, but also one based on values such as democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, and separation between religion and politics. These values and ideas do not derive from a particular religion or culture, but from a shared vision of law and citizenship. Turkey, with an overwhelming Muslim majority, is a living example of the universality of these values, and our recognition of this fact will define our notion of Europe as well as our approach to other cultures and civilizations.

At this point, I should like to make a brief reference to the Union's relations with the Mediterranean region. At the Strait of Gibraltar, only 14 kilometers separate the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea. This short distance constitutes the border between two regions with huge political, economic, and social differences; the northern region (Europe) boasts an average per capita income of approximately \$20,000, whereas the same figure for the southern region (Africa) is only about \$1,500. This is a difference that can only be

compared to that existing between North and South Korea. The Union cannot turn its back to this situation. It must compose and implement active and consistent policies to promote development on the southern shore of the Mediterranean.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy

At times in the recent history of the CFSP, we have had to choose between the “C” and the “P:” if consensus enabled us to reach a *Common* decision, the result could hardly be considered a real and effective *Policy*, but if we wanted a real *Policy*, it could not be *Common*. External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten has even said that the CFSP could be compared to a misconstrued sentence, with too many adjectives but no verb. It is true that too often our policy has been judgmental and opinionated, but not executive.

We are aware of these limitations. But as the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset once said, a man’s greatest treasure is his own mistakes. Diagnosing our shortcomings is a necessary step towards solving them, and we are working hard to achieve a more efficient, more consistent, and more visible common foreign policy. In any case, those who say that the CFSP’s attitude is merely reactive, or even passive, tend to forget that it is a great achievement to coordinate and jointly implement the foreign policies of 15 (soon to be 25) Member States, who operate by consensus. They also tend to forget that, notwithstanding all the difficulties, the CFSP is progressing, slowly but surely.

To achieve a more efficient foreign policy, we must be able to design harmonization systems that place emphasis on shared values and interests, so that each Member State may feel CFSP is its own foreign policy, in a sort of joint ownership of its decisions and actions. The phasing out of consensus and its replacement by qualified majorities will play an essential role in this context.

But first, the Union must more efficiently manage the tools that are already available. The existing system of presidencies must give way to more flexible devices, consistent with the growing complexity of international relations in a more open and globalized world. The roles of the External Relations Commissioner and the High Representative for CFSP should also be reviewed. In all these changes, the institutional balance will have to be preserved.

The CFSP in the Middle East: A Case Study

The Middle East has been one of the main sources of concern for the CFSP. The painful situation there not only threatens stability in the Mediterranean, the southern frontier of the EU and an area of meeting and shared responsibilities, but it also questions the values upon which the EU aims to build its global role.

The point of departure for EU action is the conviction that no military solution to the conflict is possible or acceptable. We have been working along four main axes. First, we have been working to define a common set of ideas and principles. This is an example of what has pejoratively been called "Declarative Diplomacy," but it constitutes the necessary basis for all discussions on the subject. This political framework contemplates the creation of a democratic, independent, and viable Palestinian state, ending the occupation of 1967. It also guarantees the right of Israel to live within secure borders, which has also been guaranteed by the international community and, in particular, by the Arab countries.

Second, we have multiplied our efforts to control the escalation of violence, not least through the presence on the ground of the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, and of the EU Special Envoy, Miguel Moratinos. The third line of action has been the establishment of the Quartet, consisting of the EU, the United States, Russia, and the United Nations. It is now the most active and far-reaching diplomatic tool working for peace in the area. Last but not least, a "road map" has been formulated as a practical and politically feasible guide to achieve the goals of the negotiations, including the creation of a Palestinian state by the year 2005.

At a time in which the area is shaken by terrorist attacks and in which anger and hatred are still powerful engines, Europeans will continue to devote a large amount of effort in search of a final negotiated solution for this land of unfulfilled dreams.

The European Security and Defense Policy

The European dimension of defense will be key to implementing the CFSP. If we want to be a relevant actor on the international stage, capable of assuming our responsibilities, promoting our values, and defending our interests, we must provide ourselves with the means.

In order to achieve this, the EU is gradually developing the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as an integral part of the CFSP. During the first half of 2002, the Spanish Presidency of the EU set itself a pragmatic yet truly ambitious goal: instead of launching new initiatives, it undertook to fully develop the Union's military and civilian capabilities for crisis management in order to demonstrate the Union's operational capacity. The basic ESDP structures and concepts had already been developed in previous years, and a catalogue of available military capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations had been established. The European Council had declared the new structures operational in December 2001. Our task was to make sure that they really worked, and that

they did so for the full range of crisis management missions as defined by the EU Treaty (the so-called “Petersberg operations”).

The urgency of this task was underlined by the growing consensus on the need for the EU to undertake its first crisis-management operations as soon as possible, in order to assume its share of the burden and responsibility for the security of Europe, as well as to ensure the credibility of the ESDP. During the Spanish Presidency, the EU decided to undertake a police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) as a follow-up to the present United Nations police operation. The EUPM commenced in January 2003. Furthermore, in March 2002, the European Council of Barcelona expressed the EU’s readiness to take over from NATO the military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Future Prospects for ESDP

The development of ESDP has reached a crucial moment. There is a sense of urgency for it to prove its worth in military action, which was difficult as long as the “Berlin Plus” issue (access to NATO’s collective assets and capabilities for EU-led operations) remained unresolved. Meanwhile, perceptions of the international security situation have profoundly changed, NATO is transforming itself and attention seems to be shifting from “Petersberg”-type crisis management to the worldwide fight against new threats, including terrorism.

Spain is convinced that an effective ESDP is feasible and more necessary than ever, in spite of—or rather because of—this challenging situation. ESDP instruments are of key importance for the relevance, effectiveness, and coherence of EU action abroad. As the common foreign policy of the Union continues to develop, its security and defense dimensions will unavoidably grow with it. This is the rationale behind the French-British St. Malo initiative, which paved the way for the ESDP in 1998.

Efforts to make the ESDP fully operational were stepped up following 11 September, as part of the Union’s overall response to terrorism. Furthermore, on the initiative of the Spanish Presidency, the Seville European Council in June 2002 stressed the need to increase the contribution by the CFSP, including the ESDP, to the fight against terrorism. The Seville Council also agreed on measures such as strengthening arrangements for sharing intelligence, determining military capabilities required to protect forces deployed in EU-led crisis management operations against terrorist attacks, and exploring how military or civilian capabilities could be used to help protect civilian populations against such attacks.

The debates of the Convention on the Future of Europe concerning the defense aspects of EU treaty reform also point in the direction of a reinforcement

of the ESDP. True to its intended role as a channel for European public opinion, the Convention reflects in its proceedings the public demand for effective action at the EU level against common security threats. Undoubtedly, the Petersberg missions will continue to play the main role. But European public opinion would be unable to understand a failure on the part of the ESDP to address the dangers that they feel are the most threatening, such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

The EU-NATO Relationship

From the beginning, the development of the ESDP has been based on two very clear principles: it should complement NATO, and it must preserve and reinforce the transatlantic link. Spain remains fully committed to cooperation between NATO and the European Union that avoids undesirable competition and unnecessary duplication of efforts. We believe that this partnership is of key importance for the continuing effectiveness of both organizations in crisis management, as experience in the Balkans has shown.

EU-led operations will take place in close consultation with NATO in crisis situations where the Alliance as a whole is not involved. The EU military operation will then have the added value of being part of the overall crisis management action by the Union, including political and economic instruments, but it will not try to create new military command structures and operational planning capabilities, duplicating those already available in NATO. Since most EU members are also NATO members (and those who are not participate in NATO's Partnership for Peace), it makes military sense to resort to the Alliance in order to obtain the assets and capabilities needed for complex operations. It also makes political sense, because such cooperation is the best way to guarantee full transparency and coordination.

It is for this very reason that we regretted the long delay in the finalization of the "Berlin Plus" agreements. It harmed not just the ESDP, but also NATO itself, by preventing the ESDP from being developed in the most effective way and in a manner that fully complements the Alliance. Therefore, I welcome the agreement on "Berlin plus" finally reached between the EU and NATO in December 2002 following the European Council of Copenhagen and look forward to its full and speedy implementation.

NATO's Prague Summit

The summit meeting of the Atlantic Alliance on 21-22 November in Prague demonstrated the good health of the transatlantic link. NATO's enlargement and transformation, together with the reinforcement of its European pillar

through the ESDP, are aimed at strengthening the common effort by the allies on both sides of the Atlantic to meet the security challenges of the twenty-first century.

The results of the summit show the continued relevance of NATO in the new security environment. At the same time, we are determined to preserve the essence of the Alliance. NATO must remain the guarantee of security to its members and the embodiment of the transatlantic link. These two elements have made NATO the most successful collective defense organization ever. Today, NATO must address the growing threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Terrorism is the greatest and most direct threat faced by our societies. Our values, our democratic system, and the rule of law are the main objects of this aggression; they are also our most solid defense. In this context, decisions were adopted in Prague with a view to adapting and equipping the Alliance to act effectively against this threat, wherever and whenever it might be necessary.

Spain is willing to contribute to the common effort to provide NATO with the military capabilities needed for the Alliance's new missions. We have responded positively to the detailed requests contained in the Prague Capabilities

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Commitment. We have also committed ourselves to support the new NATO Response Force and are ready to provide national assets and capabilities aimed at achieving operational readiness as soon as possible. Spain is also a major contributor to the force structure and has made a major national effort to provide two of the new Headquarters for the High Readiness Forces of the Alliance (one for Land Forces and the other for Maritime Forces), as well as

our share of the Eurocorps Headquarters, which is also available for NATO. We expect to continue to play a role in NATO's command and force structures that is commensurate with our contribution to the Alliance.

The Prague Summit reiterated the value of the strategic partnership between NATO and the European Union. Both are not just compatible but are indeed necessary partners in the security and defense field. Of course, this requires a major European effort to develop the necessary military capabilities, both within NATO and through the EU's Headline Goal, which are mutually reinforcing processes. At Prague, we once more reaffirmed that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean, and this was

implemented through the decision to substantially upgrade the Mediterranean Dialogue conducted by NATO as an integral part of the Alliance's cooperative approach to security.

NATO's Prague decisions present a picture of an Alliance that is ready to take action beyond its traditional task of collective defense and its more recent responsibilities for crisis management. But its essence remains the same. Like the EU, NATO is based on common values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. It is, above all else, a community of values—an Alliance of values. The defense assets at NATO's disposal are meant not just for safeguarding the security of the Atlantic allies, but also for defending these values. In the same way, NATO's commitment to collective defense applies not only to a stretch of territory but also to the values and freedom that we hold so dear. That is why Spain—both in NATO and in the EU—must defend these values not only on our own territory, but wherever they are threatened.

Conclusion

The CFSP—and the ESDP as an integral part of it—is one of the greatest challenges facing the European Union in the years to come. The political and technical obstacles to reaching agreements on this issue between 15 Member States, which will soon increase to 25 or more, are daunting. But the experience of European integration shows us that apparently impossible objectives, such as achieving a single market or a common currency, become feasible when political will is present in a decisive way.

The traditional solution to most of Europe's problems—now more than ever—has been "More Europe." Through the process of enlargement, the Union is implementing a far-reaching decision to project an area of freedom, democracy, and prosperity in its immediate surroundings. The CFSP is the instrument for applying this same approach on a global scale. In the new environment following 11 September, the projection of these values is the most ambitious international goal, and at the same time, it is the only efficient tool for shaping a world we can all share.

The European Union and the United States share the joint endeavor to achieve these goals. In the twentieth century, through two World Wars and one Cold War, the transatlantic link remained the guarantee of a common sense of purpose. The threats and the challenges have changed, but our will to work together for a better world has not. 