
European Security: The End of Territorial Defense

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Traditional security thinking dominated the Cold War. Increasing military capabilities was the primary strategy adopted to achieve security. In the post-1989 world, but especially in the post-11 September world, a broader and more complex security concept has emerged. After fascism and communism disappeared as threats in 1989 and until 2001, no single overwhelming security threat existed. Mass invasion and total war ceased to be threats to the East or the West; wars between systems and states were no longer prime security risks. The changes in the post-Cold War world have been dramatically demonstrated by post-11 September developments. Security after 11 September is a qualitatively new phenomena and calls for unconventional responses.¹ New and different fields of security in various compositions emerged, such as the roots and consequences of the new terrorism; the transformed role of the military; the merger of internal and external security; failed states and terrorism; weapons of mass destruction and proliferation; terrorism and arms control; and transatlantic relations post-11 September. This article examines the impact of the developments before and after 11 September on both NATO and European security and in particular on the concept of collective and territorial defense.

The battles of the twenty-first century will almost certainly be fought without large standing armies, air forces, or navies to defend countries and their territories. Massive force will be less essential than light and flexible units capable of rapid, decisive, and sustained deployment abroad.² The U.S. war in Afghanistan

highlighted the shift in the way modern wars are being fought, with sophisticated arms technologies beyond tanks and heavy artillery becoming dominant. Coercive, peace-support, and humanitarian operations are likely to be a principal task of armed forces for the next generation. Coalitions of the willing and able will replace concepts of traditional alliances with their solemn declarations and promises of mutual defense.

European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)

At Petersberg, Germany in June 1992, the 10 states of the Western European Union (WEU) defined the “Petersberg Tasks” as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making. The Petersberg Tasks were subsequently included in the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in June 1997 and effective from 1 May 1999: “(T)he Union can avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions of the EU on the tasks referred to ...” The Treaty did not merge the WEU and the European Union (EU). Such a merger would have transformed the EU into an organization of territorial defense in the form of a military alliance.

The common European Headline Goal for deployable military capabilities was adopted at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999. This was based on a British and French proposal that called for a European Rapid Reaction Force of up to 60,000 troops—capable of deployment within 60 days and sustainable

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for one year under its own command—by 2003. This force is to have the necessary equipment, such as command and control, air and sea transport, intelligence availability, and logistic and combat support. EU-led crisis-management operations encompass all military missions, with the exception of collective defense. “With the exception of territories

inside the European Union, such missions are possible whenever and wherever politically decided.”³ The EU has specifically limited its security aims to peacekeeping, rising at most to peace-enforcement with combat troops, if necessary. No mutual security guarantee is written into the European treaty, nor can one be obtained in the near future. In any event, a force capability for such a defense will not be available anytime soon. NATO Secretary General George Robertson is very clear on this issue:

There is, and will be, no single European army. There will be no standing European force. National armed forces will remain just that: national forces, under the command of national governments. Any decision to deploy national forces, on any mission, will

remain exclusively the decision of the state concerned: for national, UN, or NATO operations. What is being created is a fourth option: EU-led operations, where NATO as a whole is not engaged. It will add another tool to our toolbox of crisis management. A win-win situation for Europe, for NATO, and for the transatlantic relationship we all value so highly.⁴

At the Laeken Summit in December 2001, the EU officially declared its 60,000-strong Rapid Reaction Force “capable of conducting crisis-management operations.”⁵ The “Laeken Declaration” explicitly asked whether the Petersberg tasks should be updated and include the fight against terrorism.⁶ The heads of state and government reiterated that there is no intention to create a “European Army.”⁷

The European Union has agreed in principle to take over command of the multinational force deployed in Macedonia from NATO in the second half of 2003 as part of its new regional strategy for the Balkans. The Macedonia operation will be the first full-fledged joint military action under the command of European officers. NATO sources have expressed concerns that it makes no sense for the EU to take over the operation, since all of the Alliance’s planning, logistics, and command and control structures are already in place. For this reason, the mission was put off for six months in November 2002. The Macedonia operation could, however, remain under NATO auspices to provide access to U.S. satellite intelligence and NATO backup forces in a crisis. Yet the European force will have a very close relationship with NATO that will entail access to its assets on a case-by-case basis.

European Shortcomings

After the end of the East-West conflict, European military deficiencies became increasingly visible. One important reason for this lies in the legacy of the Cold War.⁸ During this period, European armies prepared for a confrontation with the major threat from the East in a collective effort to defend their territories. For most Western European countries, this required the development of heavy armies built around armor, artillery, and short-range air superiority fighters. The conflicts and challenges since the end of the military bipolarity do not require massive, heavy European armies, ill suited for transport and projection to distant places. Rather, they require rapid reaction forces with flexible structure and light weapons, deployable over great distances, equipped with modern communication assets to coordinate their actions, surveillance, and reconnaissance facilities.

In November 1999, the WEU identified in their recommendations for “Strengthening European Capabilities for Crisis Management” a number of gaps and deficiencies in European defense capabilities. These deficiencies were in

the areas of information and intelligence gathering and management; crisis situation analysis; and preparation, planning, political control, and strategic direction of crisis management operations.⁹ Francois Heisbourg proposed a long list of remedies that the Europeans should adopt, including professional armed forces, satellite surveillance, military electronics, heavy airlift, precision-guided weapons, and more versatile aircraft.¹⁰

On 20 November 2000, the Member States took part in a Capabilities Commitment Conference where they announced their specific national commitments that corresponded to the military capability goals set by the Helsinki European Council. They stressed that they do not have the intention to create a single European army or a standing European military force.

In October 2001 the Council of the European Union submitted a paper that suggested procedures for a coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management structure. It established the aim of a Crisis Management Concept (CMC). In the case where the CMC envisages an EU military role, the CMC provides the appropriate framework, including political-military objectives for subsequent crisis response military strategic planning.¹¹

At the Capabilities Improvement Conference on 19 November 2001, the Member States agreed on a European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) that would incorporate all the efforts, investments, developments, and coordination measures executed or planned at both national and multinational level necessary for the EU's activities.¹²

The creation of a European security system is expensive, yet most of the Western European countries have decreased their defense budget substantially in recent years. The annual expenditure per soldier for new military investment and research and development is approximately 100,000 euro. The European Headline Goal calls for a European Rapid Reaction Force of up to 60,000 troops.¹³ To be deployable within 60 days and sustainable for one year, however, about three times that number of troops has to be prepared. The costs per year for the European force would amount to approximately 20 billion euro. It can be assumed that it will take six years to build a capable force. Based on the current defense budgets, it is very unlikely that the EU would achieve the Headline Goal by 2003, as projected. The cost of equipping 200,000 troops over a period of six years would cost close to 120 billion euro. This price depends on how much equipment required for the "high end" Petersberg tasks will be acquired.

Brussels will not be able to catch up with Washington, however. President Bush increased the fiscal 2003 defense budget by almost \$50 billion over that of 2002, to \$390 billion. By contrast, in 2002, the European NATO members spent \$140 billion on defense and the members of the European Union spent \$117 billion. There will not be a significant increase in these figures in 2003.

Clearly, the European Union does not cover collective defense. But what about NATO? Important members of both EU and NATO have always underlined that there is no reason for the EU to develop collective defense efforts because such efforts remain within NATO. Formally, this is correct. But if the EU is right not to incorporate collective defense in its security and defense policy, why should NATO keep it?

NATO's Transformation

NATO was founded as a collective defense organization, a common security umbrella that promised equal protection for an indivisible grouping of states, including the United States. This promise was enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, claiming that war against one is a war against all, requiring a collective response.¹⁴ During the Cold War, the emphasis on the mutual assistance commitment overshadowed virtually all other commitments.¹⁵ After the end of the Cold War, NATO took on new tasks, including crisis management, peacekeeping, humanitarian action, and peace-enforcement. The NATO-led operations in Bosnia and in Kosovo are cases in point.

The end of the Cold War diminished the importance of both collective defense and NATO's nuclear deterrent. Simultaneously, the definition of the NATO area lost relevance. NATO started to focus on the new areas, as it could no longer focus on the single mission of collective defense. NATO's new challenges lie beyond its territory in international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the disruption of Persian Gulf oil supplies, and instability along its southern and eastern flanks. Since these new challenges do not represent a direct threat to NATO territory, the real issue for NATO's future is not territorial defense but rather its structural transformation into a crisis management alliance. Many of NATO's capabilities, however, are still configured to defend against a major attack in Central Europe, not to quickly move and support limited forces, trained and equipped to perform specific crisis management or peacekeeping operations.¹⁶

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The Washington Summit in 1999 set the course for further transformation. It stopped halfway, however. The summit, on the one hand, emphasized NATO's commitment to territorial and collective defense. On the other hand, however, it stressed NATO's ability to undertake new missions, including contributing to effective conflict prevention and actively engaging in crisis management and response operations. The summit recognized that Alliance security interests could

be affected by risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage, organized crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept acknowledges that terrorism should be dealt with under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, not under Article 5.¹⁷ A second, related contradiction was whether NATO should have a global reach. The summit did not want to create artificial borders for its operations, yet it did not pledge to become a global organization.

The terror attack of 11 September gave NATO the opportunity to bridge the gap between collective defense and crisis management. For the first time, NATO invoked Article 5 of its charter to declare the attacks on Washington and New York as attacks on the 19-member alliance, directed from abroad. By applying collective defense on a (strictly speaking) non-Article 5 situation, the division between traditionalists and modernizers within NATO could be temporarily resolved. NATO had a price to pay, however. The United States did not need NATO in the war in Afghanistan, for the Alliance's cumbersome decision making procedures made it an obstacle. Therefore, NATO's contribution to the first battle in the war against the terrorism was marginal. The United States consequently decided to act through its Central Command, bypassing Brussels and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).¹⁸

NATO Secretary General George Robertson recognized that the Alliance has made considerable progress in adapting their forces and procedures to a multitude of challenges after 11 September.¹⁹ NATO had to adjust its capabilities in order to be able to deal with terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, on top of the requirements peacekeeping and crisis management already imposed. The Secretary General stressed that NATO has to transform itself further and leave behind the ballast of the Cold War, saying "the Alliance needs capabilities for the future, not for the past." This includes "more wide-bodied aircraft and fewer heavy tanks," more precision-guided weapons, deployable logistic support troops, ground-surveillance systems, and protection against chemical and biological weapons.²⁰ The Alliance's Summit of Heads of State and Government in Prague in November 2002 set the definitive course in this direction for NATO's transformation. It approved the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) "to improve and develop new military capabilities if individual allies for modern warfare."²¹

If NATO incorporated America's new strategy of pre-emption, Article 5 would also formally be dead. There cannot be a mutual assistance clause if no partner of the treaty has been attacked beforehand. Is it unlikely that NATO would accept the doctrine of pre-emption? Probably, but there is a historical precedent. In the 1960s, NATO adopted the U.S. doctrine of "flexible response" that replaced the strategy of massive retaliation; "flexible response" includes the possible use of nuclear weapons to meet a conventional attack. The NATO

Rapid Response Force that was accepted at the Prague meeting could easily become an instrument for pre-emption.

NATO Goes Global

The events of 11 September could also resolve the issue of whether NATO should become an organization with global reach. Not only has Article 5 has been transformed since 11 September, but NATO's role has also been transformed and is becoming increasingly global in scope. If this happens, Article 6 of the Washington Treaty—which defines the territorial limits of NATO operation—will become increasingly obsolete. Already, NATO's operations on the Balkans were “out of area.” This again has an impact on the interpretation of Article 5. Article 6 prescribes the area where, according to Article 5, an attack against a member state would be seen as an attack against all. For the purposes of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the parties in Europe or North America. Together with Article 6, Article 5 would be entirely transformed.

A declaration of NATO's Foreign Ministers in May 2002 said “[t]o carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives.”²² The phrase “wherever [forces] are needed” implies that NATO will become a global organization. In November 2002, the NATO Secretary General said about the upcoming Prague Summit that “it will mark the beginning of a new, bigger, outward-looking Euro-Atlantic community, a community that is able and willing to engage wherever our security interests demand it.”²³ And he added: “The out-of-area debate has been resolved once and for all.”²⁴

Experts connect NATO's global reach to its survival. “11 September made clear that the political will to exercise a global role is imperative ... Global challenges require global security and thus a global NATO.”²⁵ Therefore, NATO should transform into a global alliance. Europe then would be an equal partner with the United States in a balanced alliance able to meet new challenges anytime, anywhere. Strobe Talbott predicts that NATO's name “North Atlantic” will increasingly seem inadequate as the geographic designation expands:

NATO may someday be in a position to advance the interests of members and partners alike by leading coalitions on missions in virtually any region of the world where the defense of international peace demands.²⁶

Not all support this development of NATO, however. Some traditionalists in Europe were reluctant to invoke Article 5 in Afghanistan in September 2001—they felt that Alliance troops exist to defend *Europe*. In the

United States, many conservatives think NATO is an obstacle in the war on terror—its scope should be limited to Europe. Neither of these groups wants NATO to act “out of area.”²⁷ Although the Alliance has decided that the main threats it faces are global, there are no plans to alter the NATO treaty with an expanded definition of mutual defense commitments and self-defense (i.e. Article 5) in order not to lose the support of the traditionalists.

In the post-Cold War and post-11 September era, NATO’s traditional role as a collective defense organization is coming to an end. NATO—together with its Partnership for Peace (PfP)—is becoming more and more a military “toolbox” of allied forces. It will be a pool of armed forces with similar operational doctrines that could fit into alliances of the willing led by the United States—or perhaps by the European Union, in regional crises. For Alan L. Isenberg, NATO can be revitalized by becoming “a forum for debating foreign policy preferences ...”²⁸ NATO is changing from an alliance to a menu from which the United States draws ad hoc coalition partners. NATO is being transformed from a defensive war-fighting organization into a force-providing and coalition-facilitating organization.²⁹

EU-NATO: Duplication or Division of Labor?

The question of how independent the Europeans should be in terms of security was raised at the NATO Summit in Washington 1999. The Summit Communiqué acknowledged the resolve of the EU to have “the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military force where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.” Europeans (EU Member States and other allies) should strengthen their defense capabilities—especially for new missions—and avoid unnecessary duplication. The Washington Summit launched Defense

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Capabilities Initiative (DCI) to improve defense capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations of alliance missions.³⁰ This includes non-Article 5 crisis response operations, with a special focus on the interoperability among Alliance forces, and where applicable, also between Alliance and Partner forces. According to the document, a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) should be developed within NATO. This can be seen as attempt to avoid duplication of missions and equipment with the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) of the EU.

Duplication and overlap of NATO and ESDP would be ineffective and expensive. If ESDI cannot be achieved within NATO, and the ESDP gains

self-confidence and develops autonomously, a certain division of labor and role specialization could avoid duplication. One example of potential duplication is the European Union's plan to launch "Galileo," a network of 30 satellites that might duplicate the American military-run Global Positioning System (GPS).

The war in Afghanistan revealed a huge and increasing gap between the military capabilities of the main NATO member (the United States) and the Members States of the EU. It is very unlikely that the Europeans will be able to copy American capabilities. Europeans are more suited for peacekeeping, humanitarian action, and disaster relief than the rapid deployment of larger forces over long distances for war fighting. NATO Secretary General Robertson stopped short of proposing a division of labor. He suggested that Europeans should engage in "minor European security problems" and Europeans should handle "small-scale crisis;" NATO would be for the bigger jobs. Robertson further says:

Building European military capabilities has to be matched with building the institutional role—distinct from, but closely linked to NATO—in order to create a European option for handling small-scale crises. That is why ESDI is focused on the so-called "Petersberg tasks."³¹

Fighting terrorism is not only, or even primarily, a military battle; Europe's contribution can be broader than that. Europe possesses a specific culture of security, based on conflict prevention, political management, and sensitivity to the economic and social roots of violence. For example, deploying an international police force in crisis situations—as the EU is about to do in Bosnia-Herzegovina—or preventing the collapse of civil or judicial authority may be vital in avoiding the need for subsequent military action.

There could be cooperation between the EU and NATO in certain areas, however. Joint and combined force development and planning could be created, entailing common training programs.³² A joint NATO-EU command structure³³ could be created to deal exclusively with crisis management operations.³⁴ It would provide the infrastructure and experience indispensable for these new missions. The command could be headed by an American or a European, depending on the type of operation. Common training programs should not remain restricted to these narrow areas, however. It would have to be expanded to incorporate common defense planning, procedures, and strategic concepts. Consultation and cooperation would cover key areas such as the elaboration of headline goals, generic crisis management, and military advance planning for specific scenarios. The processes of the EU, ECAP, and NATO's PCC should increasingly coincide over time. To some observers, the creation of a common European intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and command, control,

communications, and computing (C⁴) capability could provide the basis of such a solution.³⁵

Once a crisis has been recognized and each organization (NATO and the EU) begins to monitor it, the two organizations would share intelligence and situation assessments and inform each other of their internal deliberations via intensified consultation mechanisms. If it were decided that the EU, and not NATO as a whole, would engage in an operation, the EU could either make use of NATO assets and capabilities or mount an operation without recourse to NATO assets.³⁶ Both cooperation and duplication can only happen in the field of non-Article 5 crisis management, because the EU will not develop Article 5 capabilities and the importance of NATO's collective defense is no longer a priority.

Conclusions

Many of today's most serious threats are global in scale. The traditional military force is far from adequate to confront these new challenges (e.g. regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism). Crisis management is the paradigm that forms the cornerstone of a new system of international security. Europe's security organizations—NATO, the EU—must move beyond their traditional security understanding. They must adapt to take on new challenges. By far the greatest proportion of the operational efforts of both NATO and the EU has already shifted away from collective defense toward this type of crisis management. And increasingly, there must be cooperation and division of labor to find responses to these common challenges in order to solve them.

The EU launched its 60,000-strong Rapid Reaction Force in 2001; it is supposed to be operational this year. But the force is struggling amid budget restrictions and is affected by post-11 September events, the war in Afghanistan, and the situation with Iraq. The more the United States commits to the war on terror somewhere in the world, for example, the further it will reduce its commitments in the Balkans. The Europeans will then have to increase their share of the burden of the Balkan missions.

In principle, European force should be capable to participate in all Petersberg or crisis response operations. Europeans also should share the burden and the risks with the Americans. In practice, however, Europeans should concentrate on the lower level of crisis response operations such as peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The EU might include collective defense in a future constitution, however, to emphasize its federal identity.

Since the end of the East-West conflict, NATO has undergone a significant transformative process. This process was accelerated by the terror

attacks of 11 September. Founded as a collective defense organization at the onset of the Cold War, NATO has revised its strategic concept to respond to the broader spectrum of the threats. The invocation of its Article 5 security commitment for a war that took place outside of NATO territory changed the meaning of this article, in addition to the meaning of Article 6, which prescribes this area. Considering NATO's enlargement and NATO's small military role in Afghanistan, the Alliance seemed likely to lose military significance in the international arena. NATO is at

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risk of becoming totally irrelevant in a world in which terrorism has become the principal strategic threat. So it has to surrender the notion of the "old NATO," a collective security organization designed to protect Western Europe against Soviet invasion.

For NATO, however, a new array of future operations and options exist. NATO can create flexible military assets (a "toolbox") suitable for use by varying coalitions, which it can employ when taking on crisis management tasks itself but also to lend to the EU. If NATO remains a traditional alliance of collective defense, as enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, it is likely to deteriorate or die. In the area of crisis management, there is the danger of duplication of NATO and EU capabilities and missions. A division of labor and role specialization could prevent such duplication, as could cooperation in certain areas, such as a common command structure for crisis management. Article 5 collective defense operations do not matter in this regard, since they are not part of the EU's defining treaties. 

Notes

1. Adam Daniel Rotfeld, "Introduction: Global security after 11 September 2001," International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford New York, 2002): 1-26.

2. Chris Donnelly, "Shaping soldiers for the 21st century," *NATO Review*, Vol. 48, No. 2, (Summer/Autumn 2000): 28-31.

3. General Rainer Schuwirth, "Hitting the Helsinki Headline Goal," *NATO Review*, Autumn 2002.

4. General George Robertson, Speech by NATO Secretary, at the presentation of the Chesney Gold Medal to Baroness Thatcher, Royal United Services Institute, London, 1 March 2001.

5. At Laeken, the EU failed to agree on an accord on NATO support because of Greece's objections over the relationship the force will have with NATO.

6. "The Laeken Declaration," *Financial Times*, 15 December 2001.

7. There is one distant possibility that the EU might pick up collective defense again. The ongoing EU Convention has been charged to produce a draft constitution. If the EU moves towards a federal "United States of Europe," the constitution might incorporate a collective defense clause, in which all Member States would consider an attack on one state an attack on all Member States. This commitment has less to do with defense against a threat than with the creation of a European identity.

8. James Appathurai, "Closing the capabilities gap," *NATO Review*, Autumn 2002, electronic version.

9. Western European Union (WEU) recommendations for "Strengthening European Capabilities for Crisis Management" of November 1999.

10. Francois Heisbourg, "L'Europe de la defense dans l'Alliance atlantique," *Politique Etrangere*, No. 2, Summer 1999.

11. Council of the European Union, Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management, October 2001.

12. Statement On Improving European Military Capabilities (issued by the European Union's General Affairs Council with the participation of the Ministers for Defense of the European Union), Brussels: European Union, issued 19 November 2001.

13. A RAND study estimates capital costs for the ESDP force at between \$24 billion and \$56 billion for 60,000 troops over a period between 6 and 8 years. Charles Wolf, Jr./Benjamin Zycher, *Military Prospects, Economic Constraints, and the Rapid Reaction Force*, Washington 2001.

14. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty states: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."

15. John Barrett, "NATO Reform: Alliance Policy and Cooperative Security," in: Ingo Peters (ed.), *New Security Challenges: The Adaptation of International Institutions, Reforming the UN, NATO, EU, and CSCE Since 1989*, New York, 1996: 123-152, here 130.

16. Dieter Mahncke, "The Role of the USA in Europe: Successful Past But Uncertain Future?" *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 4, Issue 3 (Autumn 1999): 353-370, here 364-365.

17. The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. (23-24 April 1999).

18. Interviews with NATO and U.S. officials and experts.

19. Lord Robertson; NATO Secretary General, Keynote Address at the Conference on "The UN, the EU, NATO, and Other Regional Actors: Partners In Peace?" Paris, 11 October 2002.

20. NATO Secretary General, Lord, Robertson, "Investing in Security," *NATO Review* (Autumn 2002), electronic version.

21. Prague Summit Declaration, issued by the Heads of State and Government, 24 November 2002, para. 4c.

22. Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting Of The North Atlantic Council Held In Reykjavik, on 14 May 2002.

23. Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, The Summit Ahead: Accession, Transformation, Capabilities, Speech at the "Welt am Sonntag Forum," Berlin, 4 November 2002.

24. Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, "Europe's Transformation," speech at the Conference of the Aspen Institute, Berlin and the NATO Host Committee for Prague, 20 November 2002.

25. Bronislaw Geremek, Jacques Lanxades, Peter Mandelson, Margarita Mathiopoulos, and Klaus Naumann, A global future for a balanced NATO, *International Herald Tribune*, 6 June 2002.

26. Strobe Talbott, "From Prague to Baghdad: NATO at Risk," *Foreign Affairs* (November 2002), electronic expansion.

27. See also "Europe and America," *Economist*, 30 May 2002.

28. Alan L. Isenberg, "Last Chance: A Roadmap for NATO Revitalization," *Orbis* (Fall 2002): 641-659 (659).

29. Philip H. Gordon, "Reforging the Atlantic Alliance," *National Interest* (Fall 2002).

30. Defense Capabilities Initiative, 25 April 1999.

31. George Robertson of Port Ellen, Secretary General of NATO, "Trans-Atlantic Relations - Overcoming New Challenges," The American Enterprise Institute Washington, D.C. 7 March 2001.

32. A first common major crisis management exercise, CMX/CRISEX 2000, took place in February 2000. This joint WEU/ NATO exercise was based on a Petersberg mission scenario (peace support mission) leading to a WEU-led operation making use of NATO assets and capabilities. A common exercise between NATO and the EU is planned for 2003. In 2002 NATO conducted such an exercise on the basis of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept. The CJTF is a capability by which NATO forces, together with the forces of non-NATO nations, deploy in response to a crisis beyond NATO's borders. The EU officially was not involved but non-NATO states participated in the non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operation (CSR) part. See: Exercise Previews Future European Peacekeeping, *Defense News*, 14 February 2000; NATO Exercise Press Release, Exercise "Strong Resolve," 12 February 2002.

33. I developed this idea in 1998: "European Security, NATO, and the Transatlantic Link: Crisis Management," *European Security* 7, No. 3 (Autumn 1998): 1-15. I published it in various versions later on - e.g. Europe's New Security Challenges, Heinz Gärtner/Adrian Hyde-Price/Erich Reiter (ed.), (Lynne Rinner: Boulder/London) 2001: 125-148.

34. Philip H. Gordon suggests a new Force Projection Command for NATO that would be specifically responsible for planning out-of-area operations. Philip H. Gordon, E-Journal: U.S. State Department, NATO in the 21 Century - The Road Ahead (March 2002).

35. Rainer Schuwirth, General, "Hitting the Helsinki Headline Goal," *NATO Review*, (Autumn 2002).

36. So far a clear arrangement for the use of NATO assets by the EU has been blocked by NATO members Turkey and Greece, which are afraid that the EU would use NATO assets against their interests.