
American Foreign Policy at the Millennium: The Case for a New Multilateralism

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I still can vividly recall sitting in a paneled room at the International Studies Association annual meeting in Washington in April of 1986, attending a session featuring two American diplomats engaging two Soviet diplomats in a speculative discussion about “The Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations”—this at a time when Mikhail Gorbachev had just come to power in the Kremlin, when Ronald Reagan was continuing to characterize the USSR as the “evil empire,” and when his own secretary of defense was quoted as saying tensions were such that “we are no longer in the postwar era but the prewar era.” One of the Russian diplomats started his comments by uttering what he took to be an old Romanian proverb, that it is always hard to predict anything, especially the future. Indeed, who in that room, or for that matter any room anywhere at that moment, can claim to have remotely predicted that within a half-decade or so the world would witness the end of the Cold War and the end of the Soviet Union itself, with hardly a shot being fired?¹ It is fair to say that most people—scholars, practitioners, and laymen alike—shared Zbigniew Brzezinski’s 1986 view that “the American-Soviet conflict is not some temporary aberration but a historical rivalry that will long endure.”²

Despite our recent failure at predicting even five-year trends, long-term forecasting is becoming a growth industry the closer we get to the *fin de siècle*, as observers seek to prophesy whether the American Century will continue into the twenty-first century, whether it will give way to the Pacific Century, or whether it

will be replaced by a “post–international politics” century altogether.³ Among prognosticators, one can find optimistic as well as pessimistic readings of the human condition generally and the American condition in particular. The optimists include the likes of Charles Maynes, who has decried “the new pessimism;”⁴ Julian Simon, who posits “no limit in sight,” environmental or otherwise, for America and the rest of the planet;⁵ Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, whose *The Real World Order* envisions the current “zone of peace” inhabited by the U.S. and other Northern states eventually extending into and replacing the current “zone of turmoil” inhabited by much of the South;⁶ Alan Goodman, whose *A Brief History of the Future* heralds the twenty-first century as an era that “will encompass the longest period of peace, democracy, and economic development in history;”⁷ John Mueller, who foresees “the obsolescence of major war,”⁸ and James Lee Ray, who sees “the end of international war” altogether;⁹ and, of course, Francis Fukuyama, who by 1989 had already proclaimed that “the end of history” had occurred with the final triumph of western liberal democracy and free-market capitalism over all other competitors.¹⁰ The pessimists include John Mearsheimer, who, a year after Fukuyama’s pronouncement, was already lamenting “why we will soon miss the Cold War;”¹¹ Samuel Huntington, who has hypothesized about the “clash of civilizations” pitting “the West vs. the rest” as the successor to the East-West axis of conflict;¹² Robert Kaplan, who writes of “the coming anarchy” stemming from ecological and other catastrophes, citing contemporary Rwanda as a metaphor for how both the South and the North will evolve;¹³ Paul Kennedy, who, at times writing in a doomsdayish tone reserved usually for biologists, finds us wholly unprepared for the twenty-first century;¹⁴ and Robert Heilbroner, who continues to find “the human prospect,” “looked at again for the 1990s,” rather dim, given what he sees as a persistent “what has posterity ever done for me?” attitude held by publics everywhere¹⁵ (in contrast to the ancient invocation supposedly offered by leaders of the Iroquois Confederacy prior to every council meeting, that “in our every deliberation we must consider the impact of our decisions on the next seven generations”).¹⁶

Rather than engaging in such cosmic, millennial thinking exercises, the author has taken on a more modest, but amply challenging, task here. The purpose of this essay is to attempt to delineate the main features of the contemporary international system currently, in 1998, and then to analyze their near-term implications for American foreign policy, with a view particularly to examining whether the system is hospitable or inhospitable to the kind of global multilateralism the U.S. helped to give birth to in this century. I have written elsewhere:

There is the caveat that global international organization has become too large and unwieldy to be subjected to either serious scientific inquiry or social engineering. It is true that the world does not revolve around governments making

“great global choices among grand alternatives.” Policymakers, John Ruggie notes, “do not get to choose on the future of the state system; they confront choices on exchange rates,...terrorist attacks on airport lobbies and embassy compounds, and garbage that floats down a river or is transported through the air. If change comes it will be the product of micro practices. Hence, if we want to understand change or help to shape it, it is to these micro practices that we should look.” That begs the question, was the creation of the United Nations in 1945 a micro practice? If so, are there other such practices to which we should look?¹⁷

Before examining the parameters of the contemporary international system and whether further global institution-building is *feasible* or not, we need to remind ourselves about why it remains *desirable* from an American perspective. In the interest of space, the argument can be made succinctly in terms of a simple, rational cost-benefit analysis. On the cost side of the equation, the most obvious point to make is that the U.S. annual assessed contribution to the United Nations (UN) regular budget is on the order of \$300 million (less than one-quarter the price of a single airplane such as the B-2), hardly a budget-buster; indeed, the UN yearly regular budget is less than the budget of the New York City police department, and totals only about .00005 percent of the U.S. GNP, amounting to \$0.88 out of each American's pocket.¹⁸ If one factors in U.S. annual peacekeeping assessments, another approximately \$1 billion is added (given the rising cost of peacekeeping in the 1990s), while a few million dollars more annually go to extrabudgetary payments, voluntary contributions, and support for the specialized agencies. All told, the United Nations system as a whole (not including the World Bank and IMF) spends an estimated \$10 billion annually; with a bureaucracy smaller in size than the state of Wyoming and the city of Stockholm, it would seem the fears harbored by Buchananites in the American political system that the UN is a sprawling world government-in-waiting which could threaten U.S. sovereignty are rather exaggerated. As for other “costs” to the U.S., it is argued by some that “small states tend to treat [international organizations] as vehicles for their self-assertion”¹⁹ and that the UN in particular has been looked to by weak states to legitimize agendas which are antithetical to great-power interests and which in the absence of global sounding boards would otherwise get no hearing whatsoever.²⁰ There is little evidence, however, that small states have succeeded in implementing such agendas in the face of major-power opposition; one need only point to the failure of the New International Economic Order, New World Information Order, and related debates in the 1970s in the UN General Assembly, where Third World militancy fell on deaf ears and was subsequently replaced by less developed countries (LDCs) becoming eager suitors of western foreign investment in the rush to American-led globalization and Internet use. There would seem no other potential costs worth mentioning.

Given the relatively small costs incurred by the U.S. in global institution-building, one does not need to demonstrate huge benefits to justify a policy of promoting global multilateralism. Suffice it to say, the U.S. has the most at stake in the creation and maintenance of a stable world order based on some at least semi-observed rules of the game (international treaties, norms, or general principles), being the preeminent home country and host country of multinational corporations, the state with the largest number of citizens (diplomats and non-diplomats) traveling abroad, and the state with the most far-flung global transactions and interests generally. Some universal or near-universal institutional apparatus is needed to facilitate the production and operation of broad-based international regimes, unless the U.S. would prefer the inefficiency of negotiating and implementing bilateral regimes piecemeal with 190 different national actors.²¹ At a minimum, the U.S. seems well served by most of the global public unions entrusted with “functional” concerns; witness, for example, the 7 billion pieces of mail which cross national boundaries each year and the 700 billion passenger-

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UN achievements in “higher politics” issue-areas are more debatable. It is hard to dispute Winston Churchill’s dictum that “jaw-jaw is better than war-war,” but it is also hard to measure with quantitative data how much the UN has contributed to peace. At least one study has found that the UN had a fairly successful overall record between 1945 and 1975, when the organization became involved in more than half of all international crises and was effective at crisis abatement in one-third of those cases, with effectiveness increasing as the situation became more serious and more violent;²³ citing the 1973 Yom Kippur War particularly, which at one point put both Washington and Moscow on nuclear alert, one prominent realist and UN skeptic acknowledged that the organization “proved to be...the most effective way by which the settlement could be achieved.”²⁴ While the next decade saw the UN practically moribund in the security area, the end of the Cold War resulted in more peacekeeping missions being authorized between 1989 and 1993 than in the entire previous history of the organization, with numerous additional missions added as the 1990s progressed. The recent record has been mixed, with failures probably outnumbering successes, although, lest UN critics gloat, few cases have been as disastrous as the 1983 American intervention in Lebanon, when 240 U.S. Marines were killed by a terrorist bomb

while they were deployed in lieu of a UN peacekeeping force rejected by the Reagan administration (in contrast with the highly successful US-led multinational force which removed Iraq from Kuwait during the 1990-91 Gulf War, aided by the political cover and coalition-building advantages provided by the UN).

On balance, then, there seem few if any reasons on the surface for the U.S. to oppose global institution-building as a foreign policy goal, and many reasons for Washington to be sympathetic. This conclusion seems to fly in the face of the current U.S. posture toward the UN, which ranges from hostile to indifferent, symbolized by the \$1 billion in arrearages owed by the U.S. as the foremost dues delinquent in the world body. The author will return to the U.S.-UN relationship below, but first let us examine the larger context in which this relationship must be understood.

Systemic Constraints and Opportunities Surrounding Global Institution-Building

If the New World Order proclaimed by George Bush has not yet materialized, a new world order has nonetheless begun to take shape. The exact shape of this international system remains uncertain since it is a work in progress, subject to numerous "micro practices." But at least one thing is clear—the neat, tidy bipolar era following World War II which featured two superpowers engaged in a grand geopolitical struggle, presiding over two relatively cohesive blocs separated by a "third world," is gone; trends in the direction of a more complicated system which were already partially discernible toward the later stages of the Cold War are becoming more pronounced and accelerated. This complexity is marked by at least four key properties: (1) a growing diffusion and ambiguity of power, with the term "superpower" in question and the term "power" itself increasingly problematic; (2) a growing fluidity of alignments, with the old East-West and North-South axes of conflicts giving way to West-West, South-South, and assorted other faultlines; (3) an ever-expanding agenda of newly salient issues facing national governments, with economic, environmental, and other concerns competing for attention with traditional military-security issues and, like the latter, enmeshing states in ever more intricate patterns of interdependence; and (4) a growing importance of multinational corporations, NGOs, and other nonstate actors, which are increasingly competing with states in shaping outcomes in world politics.

Perhaps the central question of our time is whether—based on the first two trends (the breakup of the postwar power and bloc structure)—we are witnessing merely the *déjà vu* transformation of the international system from bipolarity back to the more normal, pre-1945 historical pattern of full-blown multipolarity, or whether—based on the other two trends (the new agenda of issues and the new set of actors)—we are on the brink of a much more fundamental,

epic transformation, namely the unraveling of the very fabric of the state system itself that has been the primary framework for human political organization for the past several centuries at least as far back as the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Let us consider these four trends one by one.

The Growing Diffusion and Ambiguity of Power

By the 1970s, one could already see superpower slippage and the increasingly problematical nature of the exercise of power, reflected in the oil crisis of 1973—demonstrating the threat potential posed by a group of less developed countries, some of which were tiny “statelets” and all of which were devoid of the assets traditionally associated with international influence, bent on bringing the industrialized world to a standstill—sandwiched between the failure of the “the greatest power on earth” to defeat “a band of night-riders in black pajamas,”²⁵ and the Soviets’ own Vietnam-style failure in Afghanistan. While some observers refer to the U.S. in the 1990s as the lone superpower left in a “unipolar” world,²⁶ it would seem more accurate to say we are living in a post-hegemonic, “post-superpower age” where at times the U.S. has behaved more like a “subpower,” due to lack of usable resources or resolve or both.”²⁷ Although some analysts see the U.S. as capable of dealing with threats to international order through its own unilateral action, others argue, more cogently, that Washington cannot afford except on rare occasions to be the lone global policeman and must settle for the role of “sheriff of the posse.”²⁸

In the post-Cold War era, there are at least five “power centers,” to use Henry Kissinger’s terminology: (1) the United States, whose much-noted “decline” of the 1980s has stabilized somewhat, now accounting for over 25 percent of world GNP and one-third of world military spending, making it an, if not the, “indispensable nation”²⁹; (2) Japan, second-ranked in GNP despite recent economic woes; (3) the European Union, led by Germany, Britain, and France, moving toward a single market larger than the U.S.; (4) China, representing one-fifth of humanity and experiencing the highest economic growth rates of any state in the past decade; and (5) the Russian Federation, still the largest piece of real estate on the planet, blessed with vast natural resources, and, with the U.S., accounting for 95 percent of the global stockpile of 35,000 nuclear weapons.³⁰ To this pantheon can be added the so-called “middle powers,” such as India, Brazil, Nigeria, Canada, Australia, and the Nordic countries.³¹

The construction of a meaningful pecking order in international relations has become a trickier exercise than in the past, however, as those states with sizable military arsenals which can be projected well beyond their borders (traditionally labeled “great powers”) now find it far more awkward to employ those resources against lesser actors and almost impossible to employ them against each other; we are not there yet, but as Libya and other relatively small “rogue” states

close in on acquiring ABC arsenals (particularly biological and chemical weapons, the “poor man’s” weapons of mass destruction), the international system may become a “unit veto” system of the kind that was only fantasized about in the 1950s.³² One cannot discount the continuing importance of military power, as seen in the success of the U.S.-led coalition during the 1991 Gulf War; Kenneth Waltz argues for the primacy of military power even in the post-Cold War era, noting that “no state lacking in military ability to compete with other great powers has ever been ranked among them.”³³ Still, the contemporary era may mark the acceleration of a process underway for some time, namely the eclipse of military potential as the main source of control in the international system. At the same time that such resources as oil and investment capital have become part of the currency of power, traditional military resources have become somewhat devalued. Even Kissinger has commented that “the issues susceptible to solution by military action are in decline” and that military power “is less and less relevant to most foreseeable international crises.”³⁴ The old saw attributed to Frederick the Great, that diplomacy is only as effective as the number of guns backing it up, has always been open to debate, and all the more so today. Resources are less fungible than previously, power more issue-specific. At times “soft power” (“the projection of a set of norms and their embrace by leaders in other nations”) may trump hard power.³⁵ The kind of “polyarchy” that Robert Dahl years ago associated with the governance of New Haven seems an apt characterization of the contemporary international system.³⁶

If one must be careful not to exaggerate the power of the U.S. or any other single actor today, one should also not lose sight of the degree of stratification which persists in the international system. The system *is* stratified, even if stratification does not lend itself to predicting winners and losers quite so easily as in the past. Just six states (the U.S., Russia, France, Germany, the UK, and China) account for 75 percent of all military spending worldwide, down somewhat from their 85 percent share in 1960, but still constituting a large concentration of fire-power; if one adds Japan, which has recently joined the ranks of top spenders, seven states claim more than three-quarters of global arms expenditures. The U.S., Russia and China together account for one-third of all military manpower on the globe. Regarding economic resources, the eleven largest countries in GNP terms (the G-7 states plus Russia, China, India, and Brazil) account for 70 percent of the planetary product, comparing favorably with the power distribution in the immediate postwar period.³⁷ As for soft power, even if Asian, Islamic and other states may be resisting Western values, an American cultural onslaught seems nonetheless to be pressing forward, with CNN in over 140 countries (being challenged by MTV), Coca-Cola in over 160 (consumed some 600 million times daily), McDonalds in over 100, the worldwide web in almost as many (and the most likely of all American innovations to become universal), and English fast expand-

ing its reach as the dominant language of commercial and scientific communication. In short, notwithstanding the fragmentation of power, there would still appear to be, at least on paper, the makings of a “concert”—a “small n” coalition of states—capable of moving the international system and forging a degree of world order through a judicious blend of carrots and sticks *if* they were so disposed.

The Growing Fluidity of Alignments

John Mearsheimer, waxing nostalgic, has said that the Cold War gave a kind of “order to the anarchy of international relations.”³⁸ Clarity yes, order maybe. Abba Eban seems more on the mark: “The Cold War, with all its perils, expressed a certain bleak stability: alignments, fidelities, and rivalries were sharply defined.”³⁹ Clarity itself became more muddled as the Cold War system progressed; tight bipolarity had given way to loose bipolarity by the 1960s, and the latter had been superceded by “bimultipolarity” by the 1970s.⁴⁰ Still, to the very end, indeed well into the 1990s, the main categories which international law texts as well as most other international relations treatises comfortably fell back on in conceptualizing world affairs were “Western,” “Marxist,” and “Third World” perspectives. These trichotomous, polarizing tendencies of the Cold War have now been replaced by a far more complex set of relationships, with many sources of conflict and cross-cutting cleavages to be found in the post-Cold War world. The contemporary international system may be messier than its predecessor, but would seem a tad less Armageddon-prone.

It is possible that the East-West conflict could be revived in some form if communism as a belief system is resuscitated by the failure of capitalism to deliver the goods in societies undergoing neoliberal transitions, but for now Marxist-Leninism has been overtaken by “Market-Leninism.”⁴¹ Any East-West axis of conflict that might reemerge is more likely to be motivated by a Russo-Sino reaction to NATO expansion and other perceived U.S. ambitions than by rival ideologies. Just as the East-West conflict has disappeared as East bloc states have moved ideologically toward the West, the North-South conflict also shows signs of possibly losing its defining character despite the persistence of the rich-poor gap. Parts of the Third World have been seeking to revive the NIEO debate of the 1970s in the 1990s, this time couching demands for aid and technology transfer in the language of sustainable development and environmentalism. However, given the growing diversity within the developing world, Southern solidarity likely will be increasingly difficult to maintain as some of the more industrialized members gravitate toward the North. When 108 members of the Non-Aligned Movement met in 1992 in Bandung, they had to search hard for a rationale for their continued existence, just as the eighth UN Conference on Trade and Development held in Cartagena around the same time “witnessed the end of the formal role of the alliance that created the NIEO and the Group of 77.”⁴² The staying power of

NAM and UNCTAD in the 1990s is testimony to the role of inertia in human relations. As for the North, increasing economic competition between technologically advanced states threatens to make West-West conflict almost as volatile an arena as East-West conflict had been. Instead of East-West and North-South, there is the First World and the “Two-Thirds World”—the collection of former communist states and third-world, fourth-world, middle-income LDCs, NICs and next NICs trying to join the global elite.

If the East-West and North-South conflicts were “the two dominant struggles of our time” in the last half of the twentieth century, what then are replacing them as the central global dramas? What new descriptive categories in the post-Cold War era might replace the vernacular of first, second, and third worlds and other such terminology that dominated discourse during the Cold War? Will the critical divisions occur in the form of competing civilizational entities built around culture as posited by Huntington, or emergent continental blocs (NAFTA, the EU, and the Pacific Rim) built around economic relationships, or some other permutations? In any event, it does seem premature to declare either “the end of history” or “the end of geography.”⁴³ Based on recent cases such as Yugoslavia and Rwanda, there is evidence that a series of relatively isolated conflicts will increasingly define world politics and that these localized and regionalized conflicts may be hard to fit into any larger global, systemwide *Weltanschauung*. Perhaps, “unalignment” is the order of the day.⁴⁴ Yet global issues such as nuclear proliferation and the globalization of the international economy will not go away, and the very absence of polarized friction in the contemporary system can provide the grease to mobilize a coalition in support of global institution-building in a manner that was not as possible previously—again, though, only if the will to lead is present.

An Expanding Agenda of Issues

Closely related to power and alignment trends, although potentially far more revolutionary in impact, is the increased blurring of the line between high and low politics. In the contemporary international system, “national security” has taken on newer meaning, no longer equated almost exclusively with military issues. Although it may remain the overriding goal of nation-states, *security* has been broadened to include economic, ecological, and other *welfare* dimensions that have gained rising visibility on the agendas of governments. This trend is rooted in long-term historical processes: mass democracy and the public appetite for improved material well-being led to the growth of the welfare state earlier in this century, while technology over time internationalized these concerns. It was already apparent by the 1970s, as Stanley Hoffmann noted, that we were witnessing “the move from a world dominated by a single chessboard—the strategic-diplomatic one (which eclipsed or controlled all others)—to a world dispersed

into a variety of chessboards.”⁴⁵ Such “complex interdependence”⁴⁶ was interrupted briefly during the realpolitik revival of the 1980s, only to be resumed at a more accelerated pace in the 1990s, freed from Cold War constraints. That all of us this has become a cliché does not make it any less real a phenomenon.

There is some disagreement over whether welfare issues have now achieved primacy over military issues, considering that finance ministers are now getting the kinds of front-page newspaper headlines once reserved for defense ministers and foreign ministers. Playing on Clausewitz, economics is being called “the continuation of war by other means,”⁴⁷ particularly among highly developed societies, which may intensify their economic competition but, presumably, are unlikely to wage shooting wars against each other given the destructiveness of armed combat in the nuclear age. That system transformation occurred in 1989 without major war as the engine of change was unprecedented in the life of the Westphalian state system, defying all realist theory and raising the question of whether there had been a change not just in the system but *of* the system. Not without irony, the period since 1945 has been characterized as “the long peace,” i.e., the longest continuous stretch of time since 1648 in which there has not been a single recorded instance of direct “great power” exchange of actual hostilities. Indeed, during most years of the 1990s, there has been virtually no inter-state war occurring anywhere on the planet, great or small.⁴⁸

Of course, civil wars have proliferated. The Yugoslav conflict is a reminder that war in its most savage form can still occur even among people living in relatively highly developed societies, with life expectancy and literacy rates comparable to the U.S. The Yugoslav case also shows how convulsions in international economic relations can contribute to escalation of tensions, possibly culminating in violence. There is reason to believe that not only will the world continue to be faced with wars such as Bosnia—“teacup wars”⁴⁹ in which major actors are only peripherally involved—but one also cannot rule out larger wars between great powers themselves. Classic “security dilemmas” and territorial disputes persist, reflected in China’s pressing of claims to the Spratlys and Taiwan, along with the machinations between Russia, Iran and others over control of the Caspian Sea oil routes. Although such disputes are less likely to eventuate in war today than in the past, they remain a source of concern, as do less conventional security issues, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and the spread of epidemics.⁵⁰ If Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter (dealing with peaceful settlement of disputes and collective security) are anachronisms today, it is not because war is a relic but rather there is a need to adapt those parts of the Charter, along with other passages as well, to changed conditions.

The Growing Set of Actors

The UN Charter presumed a world of states as the basis for human organization.

One of the major developments in the postwar era was, in fact, the tremendous proliferation of new states mainly as a function of the decolonialization process, with the UN membership more than tripling by the time the Cold War had ended and adding another two dozen states in the 1990s. However, the founders did not envision that many of these states would be of the cookie-cutter variety—microstates smaller in size than not only a typical American state but a typical American city and, in some cases, a typical American town. What was envisioned even less was the proliferation of *nonstate* actors and their growing importance if not autonomy in world politics, including subnational actors (e.g., the overseas trade missions maintained by virtually every state in the U.S.)⁵¹ as well as transnational actors (e.g., the now more than 300 IGOs, 10,000 NGOs, and 35,000 multinational corporations).⁵² Relating to the aforementioned “chessboard” imagery, world politics can be seen as a series of issue-areas in which outcomes are determined by a congeries of forces, including both state and nonstate actors.

For example, one cannot fully understand the dynamics of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro (the “Earth Summit”) unless one takes into account, in addition to the interplay between Northern and Southern governments, the variety of nonstate actors involved: the secretariats of the UN, World Bank, and other IGOs, scientific research bodies (“epistemic communities”) and global environmental advocacy groups, MNCs, and a host of other players. Although state-centric analysts would contend that IGOs are little more than fragile collections of states that tend to be dominated from a few national capitals, and that NGOs are no match for the power of governments, the point is not that nonstate actors played the decisive role in the conference, only that they were a not insignificant part of the equation that produced several new environmental agreements.⁵³ To the extent that economic issues are in ascendancy relative to military security issues, we are likely to see greater play of subnational and transnational actors—private bankers, currency traders, corporate executives, WTO bureaucrats, and the like—whose behavior is not adequately accounted for by state-centric models that are based on states as unitary, rational actors pursuing their national interests. “Two-level games” are being supplemented with “three-level games.”⁵⁴ There is already evidence to suggest that, with the end of the Cold War, it is harder for an American president to manipulate national security symbolism (as “the leader of the free world”) and for national leaders in general to mobilize their nation in support of broad national policies, whether foreign or domestic.⁵⁵ The U.S., in particular, seems to be suffering again from its “weak state” syndrome—the anti-statist impulse historically dominant in the American political culture, overcome usually only when there is a major external threat or national crisis of some sort requiring an energetic government response—although many polities seem to be experiencing this condition.

Some have associated the nonstate actor phenomenon with what they perceive as the decline of the nation-state as an institution. There is some disagreement among those who envision the demise of the nation-state as to whether the primary threat to its viability comes from *integrative* tendencies (i.e., the transnational links, perhaps best represented by cyberspace, which are causing mounting “loss of control” and erosion of sovereignty) or *disintegrative* tendencies (i.e., the proliferation of so many small marginally self-sustaining polities, fueled especially by the surge of ethnic conflicts and separatist movements), or both.⁵⁶ Depending on the analyst, we are witnessing the emergence of either a “global village” or the exact opposite, “a new feudalism.” Brussels would seem a perfect metaphor for our time, caught between centripetal and centrifugal forces, at once the seat of the European Union and the capital of a state in quasi-breakup.⁵⁷ Everything is up for grabs in “global governance,” including not only what level of government (ranging from subnational to supranational) is optimal but also how much government (as opposed to civil society) is optimal. Notable here is the recent observer status granted the International Red Cross by the UN General Assembly, an unprecedented measure far more potentially revolutionary than the consultative status granted NGOs by ECOSOC. (Only territorially defined entities—would-be states, such as the Vatican and the PLO—have enjoyed such status previously.) As Susan Strange has said, “state authority has leaked away, upwards, sideways, and downwards.”⁵⁸

However, if the nation-state is withering away, someone has forgotten to tell the leaders, and for that matter the publics, in Washington and elsewhere. Even if nuclear weapons make national boundaries as dysfunctional for defense as gunpowder did the walled cities of yore, there remains almost everywhere a generalized commitment to the national security state; likewise, even if economic elites have outgrown the nation-state as former captains of commerce outgrew feudalism, and notwithstanding pronouncements about how the “the era of big government is over” in the face of growing cynicism toward government and a growing movement toward privatization, there remains almost everywhere a continued heavy reliance on the welfare state. Judging by the non-shrinking size of national budgets and national egos, statism and nationalism may well be more vibrant than ever, while never more at risk.⁵⁹ The nation-state may possibly have peaked as a political form in the twentieth century, but it is rather premature to sound its death knell.

I said at the outset I would attempt to resist millennial thinking. Regarding the “central question” I raised earlier about the long-term future of the Westphalian state system, there would seem no amount of scientific analysis that could answer that question. Just as it took observers some 200 years to recognize in retrospect the significance of 1648 as ushering in a new age—the term “international relations,” after all, was not invented until Jeremy Bentham was credited

with it in the early eighteenth century—one must leave it to historians many decades hence to determine whether 1989 was or was not a Westphalian moment. The owl of Minerva always rises at night. For now, suffice it to say that we are inhabiting a schizophrenic world, or what James Rosenau has called a “bifurcated” system characterized by an uneasy coexistence of state-centric and multi-centric actor politics.⁶⁰ The bedrock concepts that have guided the study and practice of international relations for centuries—sovereignty, national interests, citizenship, and so forth—continue to exert a powerful hold on us, even as they seem often at odds with everyday events. While we wait for a new paradigm, we can consider what all this means for near-term U.S. foreign policy, and especially the prospects for a new multilateralism.

The Prospects for a New Multilateralism

One can see there are numerous systemic constraints as well as opportunities surrounding global institution-building at present. The need for global institution-building is arguably greater today than ever before—to cope with nuclear proliferation, greenhouse warming, economic interdependence, and assorted other planetary concerns—at precisely the same moment when central guidance mechanisms are less feasible in some respects than in previous eras due to the recent structural changes in the international system. It could be argued that, if comprehensive, global approaches to world order such as the League of Nations and UN have failed or worked only marginally in the past, they are *a fortiori* even less likely to succeed today, given the proliferation of states as well as nonstate actors clamoring to be at the global bargaining table, the equally unwieldy proliferation of items on the agenda (ranging from CO₂ emission reductions to intellectual property rights enforcement) that tax the financial and technical capacities of even the most well-heeled and well-intentioned states and greatly complicate reaching and implementing transparent international agreements of wide scope, the absence of any one or two powers capable themselves of moving the system, and the absence of any visible, palpable systemwide crisis equivalent to World War I or II that can serve as a catalyst for the next stage of global organization. Hence, the best we can do, some say, is subglobal multilateralism or minilateralism.

However, we forget how close the world has come, with the Law of the Sea Treaty, to producing a single set of rules governing virtually every human activity (fishing, navigation, mining, etc.) on 70 percent of the earth's surface. Further progress in global institution-building would not seem out of reach. By global institution-building, I do not mean global government but what many have called global governance and what Barry Buzan felicitously has referred to as a more “mature anarchy.”⁶¹ As Inis Claude has said, “The international organization movement . . . can be interpreted as an attempt to perpetuate the multistate

system by making its continued operation tolerable; it is not so much a scheme for creating world government as for making world government unnecessary.”⁶² As the UN goes, so goes the state system in which the major states continue to have the largest stake. Lynn Miller puts it most plainly when he says, after all, “it is *their* system” for the most part.⁶³ Even though the stakes have become diffused, along with power capabilities, there would appear enough at stake, and enough power concentration remaining in the system, for some subset of states, through an enlightened concert of great powers approach to world order, to provide the collective good represented by international institution-building. The U.S., not as a hegemon but as a veto state, is clearly critical to any significant, workable UN institutional reform.

What might be the shape of a bargain struck in a two-level game the U.S. plays over UN reform that could satisfy both, say, Jesse Helms and India or China and the larger membership?

- First, the U.S. must be prepared to pay the \$1.3 billion it owes the UN in arrearages. For the U.S. this is closer to chump change than it is an act of great national sacrifice, and it is a *sine qua non* for the U.S. positioning itself to have leverage over the institutional reform process. Hard cash is one price to pay for continuing to exercise soft power.

- Second, in the war/peace area, emphasize the UN Charter’s provisions pertaining to Chapter VI (peaceful settlement) or Chapter VI 1/2 (peacekeeping) rather than Chapter VII (collective security). As noble as collective security is as a concept, it invites charges of hypocrisy and double standards, since the permanent members of the Security Council are unlikely ever to be the targets of UN action. Besides, most hostilities today are intrastate rather than interstate; and in either case, pre-conflict peace maintenance (preventive deployment), mid-conflict peacemaking and peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding—as articulated in Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 *Agenda for Peace* proposal—figure to be less heat-generating and more doable than branding and punishing “aggressors.” In all these situations, and in the rare instance where collective security might be appropriate, it would be better for both the U.S. and the international community if Washington limited its contribution to money and technical support rather than manpower, since this would defuse the hot-button issue of American troops serving under a foreign commander. Also, play down “humanitarian intervention” insofar as it is perceived as posing an Article 2(7) threat to the integrity of lesser states in an international system where the one value that continues to command universal acceptance among governments is national sovereignty, eroded or not.

- Third, in the economic, social and humanitarian area, focus on a few achievable goals rather than staging a never-ending “road show” of social summits, city summits, and other global extravaganzas which cannot be adequately staffed by most states and which produce mostly inflated rhetoric and empty

gestures, only adding to the cynicism surrounding the organization. In particular, an enhancement of its disaster relief capabilities would seem to attract a broad consensus among the UN membership and provide a strong *raison d'être* for the organization. It might be helpful to revisit the *Successor Generation* study funded in the mid-1980s by the Ford Foundation, which was a victim of poor timing, with its Cold War assumptions overtaken by the events that immediately followed its publication. The study contained many useful ideas for restructuring the UN—not only the General Assembly but especially the Economic and Social Council and the Advisory Committee on Coordination that links the specialized agencies to the UNO—to deal with “low politics” concerns, which are likely to be more manageable than “high politics” matters, even if these issues today constitute more of a continuum than a dichotomy.

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• Fourth, continue to insist on administrative reform and greater efficiencies in the UN Secretariat, along the lines Secretary-General Annan is attempting to foster, with the major organizational donors entitled to play a special role in the budgetary process, not necessarily as final arbiters but at least as gatekeepers, as a *quid pro quo* for their largesse. Make better use of NGOs to help implement international regimes and monitor compliance, as has been happening to an extent in the areas of human rights, environmental protection, and delivery of development assistance.

Finally, it may be possible to put off the single most contentious issue for awhile longer, but the moment of decision cannot be avoided indefinitely on the future expansion of the Security Council. The current composition of the Council is the most glaring anachronism left over from the post-World War II era. The world, and Europe, would not seem quite ready for an IGO—the European Union—and Japan to take over the seats occupied by the U.K. and France. Nothing attests more to the continued relevance of the state-centric paradigm and the vitality of nationalism than the debate over the future of the Security Council. A “prominent solution” to this part of the UN game might consist of adding Japan and Germany (the #2 and #3 financiers of the organization) as permanent members; allocation of a permanent seat each to Latin America, Asia, and Africa, with the regional caucus group in each case asked to make the selection; and the addition of two nonpermanent seats from the developing world rotating biennially. A Security Council of 22 members, with each permanent member having a more circumscribed veto power carefully limited to core organizational issues (to be defined in the reform process), would seem the maximum size compatible with operability; although paralysis might still be a concern, there is something to be

said for the organization not acting without the significant backing of major players in both the developed and developing world. Insofar as the expanded Security Council would likely represent over a majority of the world's people, as well as planetary product, military firepower, and UN budget contributions, the plan could claim to satisfy both realist and idealist desiderata. The closer that international governance arrangements come to reflecting an intersubjective image of fairness and reasonableness, the more workable they are likely to be.

These ideas are not radical. They are microsteps in the ongoing project of global institution-building. Henry Kissinger has noted that the major challenge facing the United States in the post-Cold War era is to carve out a role for itself in a world which "for the first time in her history . . . she cannot dominate, but from which she also cannot simply withdraw."⁶⁴ That is, the U.S. must adapt to a new multilateralism, at a time when conditions are not wholly ripe. It is the very pacific nature of the Cold War transformation, as well as the absence of any obvious singular enemy facing the United States today (Saddam Hussein aside), that has contributed to the current mass apathy among Americans toward world affairs. That has made it difficult for Washington to mobilize public interest in and support for United Nations reform or other dimensions of foreign policy, which lack saliency on the public policy agenda. Whether the new world order trumpeted at the outset of the 1990s ever materializes will depend in no small measure on the capacity of the U.S. to provide leadership. This in turn will depend on an American public willing to reengage itself in world affairs as a nation and not just as a set of economic, ethnic, and other enclaves. A return to normalcy will not do. If one might be permitted a closing millennial thought, it is worthwhile quoting Abba Eban, who, after savaging the UN through much of a recent essay, concludes that "the idea of an international organization playing an assertive role in the pacification of this turbulent world may have to bide its time, but it will never disappear from view. History and the future are on its side."⁶⁵ 

Notes

1. On the failure of international relations theory to anticipate and account for the end of the Cold War, see John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," *International Security*, 17 (Winter 1992-1993): 5-58; and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., "How Did the Cold War Die: Principles for an Autopsy," *Mershon International Studies Review*, 38 (April 1994): 11-41.
2. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Game Plan: A Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the US-Soviet Contest* (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986), xiii.
3. The term "post-international politics," referring to the transformation of the Westphalian state system into a completely new set of relationships not predicated upon the nation-state as the preeminent actor, was coined by James Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990): 6.
4. Charles Maynes, "The New Pessimism," *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1995): 33-49.
5. Julian Simon, *The Ultimate Resource* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).
6. Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Real World Order*, revised ed. (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1996).
7. Allan E. Goodman, *A Brief History of the Future* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).
8. John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
9. James Lee Ray, "The Abolition of Slavery and the End of International War," *International Organization*, 43 (Summer 1989): 406-439.
10. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, 16 (Summer 1989): 3-16.
11. John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," *The Atlantic Monthly* (August 1990): 35-50; and "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security*, 15 (Summer 1990): 5-56.
12. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (Summer 1993): 22-49; and *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
13. Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic Monthly* (February 1994): 44-52; and *The Ends of the Earth* (New York: Random House, 1996).
14. Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Random House, 1993).
15. Robert Heilbroner, *An Inquiry Into the Human Prospect*, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991).
16. Cited on the eve of the 1992 Earth Summit, by Maurice Strong, Secretary-General of the conference. Statement to Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the UN Conference on Environment and Development, 2 April 1991, 13.
17. J. Martin Rochester, *Waiting for the Millennium: The United Nations and the Future of World Order* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1993), 246. The Ruggie quote is from John G. Ruggie, "International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time, and Method," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989): 32.
18. Robert W. Gregg, *About Face? The United States and the United Nations* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 50.
19. Inis Claude, "The Record of International Organizations in the Twentieth Century," *Tamkang Chair Lecture Series*, No. 64, Tamkang University, Taiwan (mimeo), 53; also see Claude, "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations," *International Organization*, 20 (Summer 1966): 367-379.

20. Stephen D. Krasner, *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1985).

21. Although the vast majority of the some 8,000 international agreements the U.S. is a party to are bilateral, there are approximately 1,000 which are multilateral, including many major regimes.

22. The international regimes governing transportation and communications generally have been favorable to the United States. See Mark W. Zacher and Brent A. Sutton, *Governing Global Networks* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

23. Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Michael Brecher, "International Crises 1945-1975: The UN Dimension," *International Studies Quarterly*, 28 (March 1984): 45-67; also see Ernst B. Haas, *Why We Still Need the United Nations: The Collective Management of International Conflict, 1945-1984*, Policy Papers in International Affairs, No. 26 (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, 1986).

24. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, 69 (10 December 1973): 708.

25. "I still believe he [President Lyndon Johnson] found it viscerally inconceivable that what Walt Rostow [one of Johnson's chief national security advisors] kept telling him was 'the greatest power in the world' could not dispose of a collection of night-riders in black pajamas." Quoted from Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The Quagmire Papers," *New York Review of Books*, 16 December 1971, 41.

26. On the U.S. as the lone superpower in the post-Cold War era, see Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs*, 70, no. 1 (1991): 23-33; remarks of U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, "The United States as a Superpower," *Defense Issues*, 5 (7 May 1990): 5-8; and Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, *The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America's Purpose* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993). Susan Strange, writing in 1995, noted that "five years of post-Cold War 'order' have only confirmed what I have always believed: there is only one superpower, the U.S." "ISA as a Microcosm," *International Studies Quarterly*, 39 (September 1995): 293. Earl Ravenal, in a lecture at the University of Missouri-St. Louis on 17 November 1995, stated that "the U.S. is the only country on earth whose foreign policy choices are still determinative of the shape of the international system."

27. A fundamental assumption of Robert Keohane's *After Hegemony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) is that it is highly unlikely any single state will emerge in the foreseeable future as a hegemon. The term "post-superpower age" is from Jonathan Clarke and James Clad, *After the Crusade: American Foreign Policy for the Post-Superpower Age* (New York: Madison Books, 1995); also see Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," *International Security*, 17 (Spring 1993): 5-51; the "subpower" term is from William Safire, "Clinton Flinched from Bosnia Duty," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 16 July 1995, C3.

28. Joseph S. Nye, "Conflicts After the Cold War," *Washington Quarterly* (Winter 1996), 2. Nye acknowledges that the U.S. in many respects remains a superpower in a privileged position, but feels Washington will need to act through building coalitions rather than alone if it is to exercise power successfully.

29. In 1998, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright justified the possible need for Washington to take military action against Iraq, despite lukewarm support from the international community, as arising out of the fact the U.S. was "the indispensable nation." Remarks at Ohio State University, 18 February 1998.

30. Henry Kissinger, in *American Foreign Policy*, 3rd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977), 416, alluded to the emergence of multiple power centers before the "decline of hegemony" literature started appearing in the 1980s; Kissinger most recently has added India as a sixth power center, suggesting "we are now living in a world composed of six or seven major global players."

Kissinger, "We Are Living in An Age of Transition," *Daedalus*, 124 (Summer 1995): 102.

31. See Richard A. Higgott and Andrew F. Cooper, "Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building," *International Organization*, 44 (Autumn 1990): 589-632.

32. The "unit veto" system, in which each state had nuclear weapons, was one of the models delineated by Morton Kaplan in *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: John Wiley, 1957).

33. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, 18 (Fall 1993): 54.

34. Kissinger, "We Live in An Age of Transition," *op.cit.*, 102. Theodore Moran, in "An Economic Agenda for Neorealists," *International Security*, 18 (Fall 1993): 211, states that economic power is "probably the most important source of power, and in a world in which military conflict between major states is unlikely, economic power will be increasingly important in determining the primacy or subordination of states." Also see Richard N. Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

35. "Soft power" is discussed in Joseph S. Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990); the quote is from G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," *International Organization*, 44 (Summer 1990): 284.

36. Robert Dahl, *Who Governs: Democracy and Power in An American City* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). Seyom Brown borrows the term and applies it to the international system, referring to the diffusion of power among both state and nonstate actors in *New Forces, Old Forces, and the Future of World Politics*, post-Cold War ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 1995). On the continued search for #1 status, see the articles by Robert Jervis, "International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?" and Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," in *International Security*, 17 (Spring 1993).

37. These data are discussed in Rochester, *Waiting for the Millennium*, *op.cit.*, 57-68.

38. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," *op.cit.*: 35.

39. Abba Eban, "The UN Idea Revisited," *Foreign Affairs*, 74 (September/October 1995): 50.

40. Richard N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 10 (September 1966): 314-327.

41. Nicholas Kristof, "China Sees 'Market-Leninism' As Way to Future," *New York Times*, 6 September 1993.

42. Craig N. Murphy, "The United Nations' Capacity to Promote Sustainable Development: The Lesson of A Year That Eludes All Facile Judgment," in Albert Legault et al., *The State of the United Nations: 1992* (Providence, R.I.: Academic Council on the UN System, 1993), 63. Also, see Gerald Dirks et al., *The State of the United Nations: 1993* (Providence, R.I.: Academic Council on the UN System, 1993); Mark T. Berger, "The End of the 'Third World?'," *Third World Quarterly*, 15 (June 1994), 257-275; and the special issue of *Third World Quarterly* entitled "The South in the New World (Dis) Order," 15 (March 1994).

43. See note 10, and Richard O'Brien, *Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography* (London: Pinter, 1992).

44. Earl C. Ravenal, "The Regionalization of Power: General Unalignment in the Future International System," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., 14 April 1990.

45. Stanley Hoffmann, "Choices," *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1973), 5.

46. Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), Chapter 2.

47. The quote is from Daniel Bell in the Fall 1990 issue of *Dissent*, cited in Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," *op.cit.*, 81.

48. Mark W. Zacher, "The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for Global Order and Governance," in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., *Governance Without Government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). According to one analysis, "at the end of 1997, the world had fewer active conflicts than at any time since World War II." *The Defense Monitor*, XXVII, no. 1 (1998): 1.

49. Leslie Gelb, "Teacup Wars," *Foreign Affairs* (November 1995). Also see Peter Rodman, "Points of Order," *National Review*, 1 May 1995: 37.

50 See Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995).

51. On subnational actors, see for example John Barkdull, "Globalization and Texas," paper delivered at annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, 20 March 1998.

52. Depending on the criteria used, the number of IGOs may exceed 1,000, and the number of NGOs may exceed 28,000. See Harold K. Jacobson et al., "National Entanglements in International Governmental Organizations," *American Political Science Review*, 80 (March 1986), 141-159; and the Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 32.

53. On the special importance of NGOs at Rio, see Jessica Matthews, "Power Shift," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February, 1997): 50-66.

54. Robert Putnam has noted "the politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two-level game [one pitched at the international level and the other at the domestic level, aimed at constituencies back home]." Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization*, 42 (Summer 1988): 434. Maria Cowles has shown that in some cases, such as European Union negotiations, there is a complicated three-level game operating, involving not only subnational and state actors but also transnational actors at the supranational level. Maria Cowles, *The Politics of Big Business in the European Community*, Ph.D. dissertation, The American University, 1994.

55. For example, when the G-7 leaders arrive at their annual economic summits these days, they no longer enjoy quite the aura of statesmanship which surrounded them during the Cold War era. The growing public distrust of and alienation from national governments, found not only in the U.S. but throughout Western Europe, and already evident by the 1980s, has only become more pronounced in the 1990s. On this phenomenon, and its relationship to the end of the Cold War, see Joseph S. Nye, "In Government We Don't Trust," *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1997): 99-111. It is unlikely that an article such as Aaron Wildavsky's "The Two Presidencies," *Transaction*, 4 (December 1966): 7-14, predicated on the special power the U.S. president enjoys in the foreign policy realm relative to the domestic policy arena, would be written in today's climate.

56. On these "powerful tensions, profound contradictions, and perplexing paradoxes," see James N. Rosenau, "Governance in the Twenty-First Century," *Global Governance*, 1 (Winter 1995): 13. Also see Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, UN Doc. A/47/277 and S/24111, 17 June 1992, 3; and Benjamin Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York: Times Books, 1995).

57. On the increasingly messy geopolitics of Europe, see John Newhouse, "Europe's Rising Regionalism," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 1997): 67-84. In the wake of the European Union movement toward a common currency, Jeffrey Frieden has stated that "economic policy is no longer made at the national level in Europe." Statement made at a seminar given at the University of Missouri-St. Louis on 26 March 1998.

58. Susan Strange, "The Defective State," *Daedalus*, 124 (Spring 1994): 56-57; also see Vincent Cable, "The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power," in the same volume.

59. Stephen D. Krasner and Janice Thomson have noted that there has never been any "golden

age of state control” and that in some respects national sovereignty has been increased of late. See “Global Transactions and the Consolidation of Sovereignty,” in Czempiel and Rosenau, *Global Changes*, *op. cit.*, 195-219. The future of the nation-state was the focus of the 1998 program of the annual meeting of the International Studies Association in Minneapolis, March 17-21; the conference theme, marking the 350th anniversary of the Peace of Westphalia, was “The Westphalian System in Global and Historical Perspective.”

60. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics*, *op.cit.*

61. Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 97.

62. Claude, “The Record of International Organizations in the Twentieth Century,” *op.cit.*: 4-5.

63. Lynn H. Miller, *Global Order*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 29.

64. Henry A. Kissinger, “Clinton in the World,” *Newsweek*, 1 February 1993: 45.

65. Eban, “The UN Idea Revisited,” *op cit.*, 55.