
An Illiberal Hegemon or an Understanding Partner? Japanese Views of the United States in the Post-Cold War Era

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Many Japanese today find no compelling reason why they should expect the United States to continue providing for Japan's security as generously as it did in the past, nor do they see any convincing evidence that the U.S.-Japan alliance can guarantee the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region as their government would like to have them believe. Current Japanese views of the United States are inextricably linked to their agonizing search for a credible and legitimate place in the post—Cold War world. Their perspectives are also influenced by their expectations regarding the United States's role in the development—which many Japanese find desirable if not entirely possible—of an Asia-Pacific community occupying a common civilizational space, anchored on a stable system of political relations, and connected by growing webs of economic interdependence.

Japan's view of the United States in the postwar era has evolved through several phases.¹ In the immediate postwar years, Japan was a vanquished nation whose economic reconstruction and political reintegration into the world were at the mercy of the United States. With the onset of the Cold War in Asia, the overwhelmingly powerful United States brought the totally vulnerable Japan into its strategic fold by concluding a mutual security treaty in 1951 which committed the United States to protecting Japan with no reciprocal role for Japan. In 1960, the two countries replaced the one-sided treaty with a new one which committed Japan to upgrading its own defense capabilities and assisting the United States in

defending Japan and ensuring the security of the Far East. During the third phase, roughly from the end of the 1960s to the end of the 1970s, Japan slowly awakened to the role of a “junior partner,” acknowledging the U.S.-Japan relationship as an “alliance” and proceeding with defense buildup. In the 1980s, Japan entered its fourth phase as a full-fledged member of the “Western alliance” against the Soviet Union and responded favorably, if grudgingly, to the U.S. call for expanded burden-sharing.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s thrust Japan into its current phase. Japan is in need of a strategic rationale for its alliance with the United States that can survive the disappearance of the Soviet threat and deal with the emerging security issues in the Asia-Pacific region, including the growing Chinese power and independence-minded Taiwan, the disintegrating Russia and its desperate efforts to sell arms for hard currency or for debt payment, and the lingering stalemate on the Korean peninsula with a dangerously isolated North Korea.

The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty System

At the core of the Japanese view of the United States today is their understanding of what they call *ampo taisei* (the U.S.-Japan security treaty system), the bilateral alliance based legally on the mutual security treaty and buttressed by domestic and bilateral political institutions, serving the interests of the two largest capitalist economies of the world.² The system was born from the U.S.’s Cold War strategy in East Asia and the Pacific as an instrument of the American containment policy against the Soviet Union and international communism. At the height of the Cold War and throughout the periods of East-West detente, the alliance survived all ideologically inspired challenges from the left and the right and overcame economically motivated criticisms from both sides of the Pacific. So long as the alliance’s Cold War rationale was powerful enough and its tangible and intangible benefits compelling enough, the system could and did withstand a myriad of challenges, including the American criticism of Japanese “free-riding” and Japanese charges of hegemonic dominance by the United States.

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the very strategic rationale of the bilateral alliance has disappeared and this raised and continues to raise serious questions about the viability of the alliance, not to mention the costs and benefits of maintaining the security treaty to the respective countries. Moreover, the Gulf War, the first regional conflict in the post-Cold War era directly affecting the interests of both the United States and Japan, forced the two countries to try to find a common understanding of the relevance of the bilateral alliance to post-Cold War security challenges.

Washington’s response to these challenges has been to redefine the strategic

purpose of the security treaty and to demand larger operational roles and logistic responsibilities on the part of Japan, not only for its own defense but, more importantly, for the region's security as well.³ Tokyo's response has been to accept Washington's demands. In 1996, Washington and Tokyo reaffirmed their bilateral alliance and declared its centrality to the national interests of the two countries and to the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. They have given substance to the declaration by adopting a new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation in 1997 to replace its 1978 predecessor. The new document obligates Japan to step up cooperation with the United States in defense planning during peace time and in operational functions during regional contingencies that may threaten Japan's security. The Japanese government has introduced a bill that would enable it to carry out its operational and logistical responsibilities under the new defense guidelines.

Globalists, Regionalists, and Nationalists⁴

The end of the Cold War has not fundamentally altered the power relationship between the United States and Japan with respect to the bilateral security treaty system.⁵ However, there are voices of discontent in Japan which come from competing perspectives. A complex mix of globalist perspectives, regionalist sentiments, and nationalist impulses informs the Japanese debate on their relations with the United States. This is generating competing and conflicting views of Japan and of the United States.⁶

Many globalists believe that Japan must play a much more visible and substantial global role but that it should continue to pursue the pacifist foreign policy it has followed since its defeat in the Second World War. Most of them believe that Japan should maintain its alliance with the United States but continue to eschew the projection of its military power beyond its borders.⁷ Some globalists part company by claiming as virtually inevitable the termination of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, if not immediately then over some period of adjustment.⁸ These two globalist schools of thought agree that Japan should maintain its self-imposed denial of the right to collective security. In essence, they advocate a global division of labor between the United States, Japan, and Europe, with Japan limiting its international security role to economic development assistance and non-combatant functions in UN peacekeeping. Their argument is based on two premises: that economic development in the developing world and in the transitional economies will lead to domestic and international political stability and that international economic interdependence will enhance prospects for global peace. They share the regionalist view noted below that the Asia-Pacific countries must advance multilateral economic integration as a foundation of regional peace and stability. They want to see the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

(APEC) forum move beyond the dialogue phase it is now in and develop clearly defined, if not legally binding, principles governing trade, investment, and other economic transactions among the member countries. They also demand that these principles be consistent with the rules of the global trade system under the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Other globalists believe that such a division of labor, especially between the United States and Japan, would be politically untenable in view of the growing isolationist sentiment in the United States. They also do not believe that it would be desirable for Japan to disavow its responsibility for global peace and security. They assert that it is time for Japan to end its self-imposed ban on participation in collective security and become a "normal state."⁹ In their view, a normalized Ja-

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pan would be able to play an active role in UN peacekeeping operations, including front-line operations, and also develop a more reciprocal relationship with the United States in the bilateral alliance.¹⁰

This view is founded on the realist premise that all great powers inevitably assume po-

litical roles commensurate with their economic power and that they require and eventually acquire well-developed military capabilities to exercise effective political influence in the anarchic world order. In the regional context, these globalists assume that a new balance of power is emerging in the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific region and that Japan, whether by itself or, more realistically, in concert with the United States, should deter the emergence of an unfriendly regional hegemon such as China. Although they do not necessarily see rivalry with China as an inevitable outcome of the end of the Cold War, they do see it as a distinct possibility. Other realists are less inclined to invest in the UN and other global institutions and advocate a balance-of-power or "bandwagoning" cooperation with the only remaining superpower, the United States.¹¹

Regionalists are critical of what they see as their government's uncritical dependence on the alliance with the United States and are hopeful that the growing economic interdependence in the Asia-Pacific region will facilitate more friendly relations among the countries of the region, particularly between Japan and China. In their view, political reconciliation and economic interdependence with China and other Asian countries, not enhanced defense cooperation with the United States, will ensure Japan's peace and prosperity. From their perspective, Washington's aggressive human rights policy toward China and its demand for accelerated liberalization of Asian markets are both self-centered and even counterproductive. While they may not necessarily agree that there is an Asian model of political and economic development, they object to Washington's sanctions policy as part of its democratization and market-opening policies. In this view, they have something

in common with regionalists in other Asian countries, such as Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad. However, they do not support an "Asians-only" regional framework, such as the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) proposed by the Malaysian Prime Minister. Instead, they want the APEC process to succeed in advancing the cause of regional economic cooperation, although they would like the process to move slowly and the decisions to be made on the basis of consensus. In the security realm, Japanese regionalists do not see any viable alternative to the U.S.-Japan alliance, at least in the foreseeable future, but they do recognize the need to develop a multilateral security framework to supplement the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance. They advocate, therefore, the development of regional institutions for confidence-building and economic cooperation.¹²

Nationalist themes also appear in the domestic debate over Japan's role in the world. These themes do not coalesce into any coherent system of thought or policy prescriptions that depart radically from the government's current policy. Instead, they typically appear as impulsive reactions to international criticism of Japan and its policies. Nationalist sentiments find their expressions in the prickly debate on defense burden-sharing with the United States, the protracted legislative initiatives to authorize Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping operations, and the discussion on how to respond to Chinese and Korean criticisms of Japan's militarist-imperialist past. Nationalist impulses also push the debate on domestic market opening, financial deregulation, and international environmental policy.

Japanese nationalist sensitivities have been aroused by Washington's persistent demand, beginning in the 1970s, for a larger Japanese burden for their own national defense. On the one hand, it is unlikely that without U.S. prodding Japan would have built up its defense capabilities to the current level, over \$50 billion and the third largest in the world, after the United States and Russia. Today, Japan has more major naval vessels than the U.S. Seventh Fleet, all of which are technologically more advanced than their neighbors'.¹³ However, Japanese nationalists are visibly critical of the U.S.-Japan agreement on the joint development of FSX fighter aircraft, which they believe was an unfair deal.¹⁴ Also, they resent the increasing demands from Washington for Japanese support as a host nation to maintain a U.S. military presence in Japan.¹⁵

One nationalist has persistently argued that Japan should reject the U.S. pressure on the nation to change its ways and advocates an independent, autonomous path toward the status of great world power that Japan deserves.¹⁶ He proposes that Japan should threaten to scrap the U.S.-Japan security treaty if Washington continues to pressure Tokyo to change its successful industrial policy and open its already competitive domestic market to U.S. products to reduce the burgeoning bilateral trade imbalance when, in his opinion, the United States is to blame for much of the trade gap. Although the termination of the security treaty

would be too radical a move for most Japanese to endorse, they share the nationalist's resentment against *gaiatsu*, external pressure.

Washington's inability to reduce its public debt, the U.S. industry's failure to develop a long-term strategy for global competition, and American consumers' failure to save rather than spend have long been targets of ridicule and attack by Japanese nationalists, regionalists, and globalists alike. The growing anti-American sentiment among the Japanese is captured by the concept of *kenbei*, literally the "dislike of America."¹⁷ Japanese criticisms of U.S. economic policy have subsided in recent years as the Japanese find themselves unable to escape the suffocating effects of their government's failure to manage their post-bubble economy. Their targets of criticism are now their own corrupt politicians, inept bureaucrats, and business leaders who, in their view, have caused the "hollowing out" of Japanese economy. However, the nationalist sentiments that were visible in the pre-bubble domestic debate are certain to resurface once the Japanese put their own house in order. Moreover, nationalist sentiments are echoing in the growing exchange of views among Asian intellectuals. An example of this is the publication of *The Asia That Can Say 'No'*, in which Shintaro Ishihara and Malaysia Prime Minister Mahathir discuss how Asia should forge a common strategy against what they see as a misguided and misinformed attack on the cultural values and indigenous institutions of Asian countries.¹⁸

Declining U.S. Hegemony

Although globalist, regionalist, and nationalist perspectives and impulses inform the domestic debate and push it into competing and contradictory directions, they share one thing in common: they are all based on the premise that the United States is no longer the global hegemon that it once was. They agree that the management of world affairs today and in the future requires the sharing of power and responsibilities among the great powers, including Japan, Europe, and the United States. They differ, however, over where Japan's priorities should be—whether Japan should concentrate on global partnerships with the United States and Europe, invest in reconciliation and accommodation with their Asian neighbors, or focus on the search for a unique Japanese identity in the post-Cold War era. As I have argued elsewhere,¹⁹ the outcome of this debate is likely to be a mixture of these competing perspectives, the balance between them depending on the issues the nation is faced with at any given moment. However, how the Japanese will frame their major issues, particularly important foreign policy issues, will be informed first and foremost by their view of Japan's relations with the United States.

Of particular importance at this moment is the lasting effect of the shifting balance of economic power between the United States and Japan, which began to

appear as early as in the late 1960s. By the mid-1970s, when the United States withdrew from Vietnam, most Japanese intellectuals had come to accept the premise that the United States was no longer the hegemon, benevolent or otherwise, that it once was and that the world was entering a post-hegemonic era.²⁰ This view has not changed even after the U.S. "victory" over its ideological-strategic rival, the Soviet Union. The economics-dominant conception of the world that the Japanese have long held since their postwar reconstruction continues to be an important source of their contemporary understanding of national power and international relations.

There are unsettling doubts among the Japanese, particularly among those of globalist and regionalist persuasions, about the viability of a post-Cold War world order dependent on what they see as a declining hegemon determined but unable to lead the world. They point to the Clinton Administration's inability to secure congressional approval of U.S. financial contributions to the UN budget and Washington's failure to lead the international debate on UN reforms, including the question of Japan's permanent seat on the Security Council. The Japanese are particularly disturbed by the visible division among the current permanent members of the Security Council over the United Nations's role in settling regional conflicts and preventing the proliferation of missiles and nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The Japanese government stood by the United States during the crisis over Saddam Hussein's defiance of the UN resolutions demanding access to military sites for UN inspection teams. The public was deeply troubled by the U.S. threat to launch a military strike against the recalcitrant Iraqi government, but also was not confident that the Russian and French diplomatic efforts would succeed in breaking the deadlock. Foremost among Japanese concerns was the very real possibility that if the United States carried out its attack on Baghdad, Japan would come under pressure to support the U.S. policy in a much more visible and costly way than during the Gulf War. Still fresh in their memory was the humiliation they had suffered from the stinging international criticism of Tokyo's "checkbook diplomacy" in the 1991 crisis. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, Tokyo managed to pass legislation authorizing the dispatch of Japanese Self-Defense Force personnel to UN peacekeeping and disaster relief missions and actually sent forces to Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, El Salvador, Zaire, and Kenya. Tokyo would have found itself in a serious dilemma, however, if the United States had carried out a military strike against Iraq despite the objections of Russia, France, or China and with no solid international coalition. This would have exposed the vulnerability of the United Nations to big power disagreements at the same time that Tokyo was trying to convince the Japanese public of the importance of supporting the peacekeeping function of the world organization.

As unsettling as the prospects for a leaderless post-Cold War world may be, the Japanese are resigned to the fact that they have no choice but to rely on U.S.

leadership where it does exist. This is illustrated by Tokyo's support for and participation in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) established as a result of the successful U.S. effort to suspend North Korea's nuclear weapons development. Although there was some resentment against the almost "matter-of-course" manner in which Washington called on Japan to provide a major financial contribution to the new organization, the Japanese appreciated the fact that the US-DPRK Agreed Framework brought the nuclear crisis to an end, although an uneasy one. Tokyo's support for the extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) also illustrates Japan's willingness to cooperate with the United States on global security issues. However, Tokyo no longer hesitates to part company with Washington on issues about which it feels very strongly. Tokyo, therefore, defied Washington's pressure and decided to join the international ban on anti-personnel landmines. During the Cold War such an action

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would have had a very disturbing impact on U.S.-Japan relations, especially in view of the fact that one of the main reasons why the United States

has not signed the landmine treaty is that it would compromise U.S. military options against a North Korean invasion of South Korea, a possibility that some Japanese do not rule out.

Conclusion

The official policy of the Japanese government is an amalgam of the contending perspectives outlined above. Tokyo is determined to continue anchoring its security policy on the bilateral alliance with Washington while at the same time exploring possible modes of multilateral security cooperation, not to replace but to supplement the U.S.-Japan alliance. While reaffirming the bilateral alliance with the United States and further expanding its contribution to the effective functioning of the alliance, Japan has also begun to take some initiatives to develop security dialogue and defense cooperation with its neighboring countries.²¹ Tokyo was instrumental in the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Tokyo has also shown increasing interest in expanding security consultations with South Korea, developing defense cooperation with Russia, and initiating defense dialogue with China. The Japanese government is also supportive of the track-two diplomacy for exploring various confidence-building measures.

Should Washington and Tokyo fail to maintain the U.S.-Japan Security

Treaty System or to develop a multilateral security framework to either supplement or replace the bilateral alliance, there would remain only unsettling options for Tokyo. They are: (1) accommodation with Beijing to neutralize China's possible hostility, (2) a strategic partnership with Moscow to counter China's growing power, (3) a concert of power among the United States, Japan, China, and Russia, and (4) defense buildup and independent security policy.

Accommodation with China would likely reduce Japan's already dubious influence in China over such issues as human rights, defense buildup, arms export, and even territorial demands on its neighbors, possibly compromising Japan's own claims to the Senkaku (Tiaoyu) island. Also, it would increase Japan's financial burden to support China's economic development, which would further strengthen China's national power and weaken Tokyo's leverage over Beijing. More importantly, Japanese-Chinese accommodation of this magnitude might seriously undermine Japan's relations with the United States, politically and economically.

A strategic partnership with Moscow that could balance China's growing power would require a full settlement of the Russo-Japanese dispute over the Northern Territories (southern Kuriles), which is not an assured prospect despite the visibly improving relationship between Moscow and Tokyo since 1997. Even if the two countries were able to find a mutually acceptable solution to the territorial dispute, a full-fledged strategic partnership between Tokyo and Moscow would likely entail a substantial burden on Japan: massive economic aid to the struggling Russian economy and equally substantial Japanese investment in the fledgling markets, a risk that most Japanese businesses would like to avoid.

A concert of great powers, involving the United States, Japan, China, and Russia, would require an unprecedented convergence of future visions among these powers.²² Given Japan's historic aversion to a balance-of-power-based political order in Asia, it would be surprising if Tokyo chose this option.

Finally, Japan's military aggrandizement would be equally problematic. It is true that Japan has developed substantial military capabilities through direct arms purchases from the United States, defense technology cooperation with the United States, and a research and development program of its own. The experience the Japanese defense industry has thus gained is varied and advanced enough to provide Tokyo with some powerful indigenously developed military hardware. However, such an independent move on the part of Japan would almost certainly mean the end of Japanese access to American weapons technology. Japan would have to finance its military buildup entirely on its own. This would tempt Japan to develop nuclear capabilities, but such a prospect would surely frighten its neighbors into a coalition against Japan. Tokyo's decision to abandon its three non-nuclear principles and to develop nuclear weapons would polarize and destabilize Japan, where pacifism and anti-nuclear sentiments run deep.

Clearly, Tokyo's best alternative is to continue its alliance with the United

States and, where the bilateral cooperation is inadequate in meeting post-Cold War regional security requirements, to develop bilateral and multilateral security dialogue and consultations with the other countries of the region. This, indeed, is the alternative Tokyo has decided to pursue as the twenty-first century approaches.

What should Washington do to keep its alliance with Tokyo intact and to use it as an anchor, if not as the only anchor, of U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region in the next century? Washington should encourage Japan to engage other Asian powers in the development of bilateral defense cooperation and multilateral security dialogue and consultations. It should discourage the formation of an alliance or a coalition, bilateral or multilateral, that could threaten others in the region. Washington should find a politically sustainable formula for a division of labor in securing the region's peace and stability. It should encourage Tokyo to do what it does best—to continue its soft approach to the region's peace and stability, through its economic assistance to developing and transition economies and by limiting its military capabilities to those necessary for strictly defensive purposes. It should not try to impose an anachronistic image of a "normal state" upon the unwilling ally to the detriment of long-cultivated bilateral trust. Above all, Washington should eschew unilateralism and promote closer consultations with Tokyo, bilaterally and in multilateral forums.

Washington should apply the same tenets to its economic policy toward Tokyo. It should encourage Tokyo to proceed with the deregulation of industry and liberalization of financial and consumer markets and to demonstrate its commitment to the liberal international economic order. Internationally, Washington should cooperate with Tokyo in advancing the liberal world economy and open regional economies through closer policy coordination in the WTO and APEC, simultaneously pursuing the same principles through NAFTA and encouraging the EU to follow suit. Washington should demonstrate to Tokyo through both words and action that it is no longer a global hegemon, neither benevolent nor self-serving, but a constructive, understanding partner. This will go a long way toward alleviating any false misgivings about a declining hegemon lashing out at a junior partner. 

Notes

1. For a review of the evolution of Japan's perception of the US power through the 1980s, see Tsuneo Akaha, "Japan's Security Policy after U.S. Hegemony," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 18, no. 3 (Winter 1989): 435–454.

2. For recent Japanese analyses, see *Kokusaiseiji* (International politics), 115 (May 1997). The entire issue is devoted to "The US-Japan Security: Continuity and Change."

3. For the most articulate justification of the US policy, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Case for Deep Engagement" *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 1995): 96–101.

4. The distinctions outlined below are not meant to represent internally consistent and mutually exclusive systems of thought but rather to indicate various orientations in thinking and argumentation found in the ongoing debate on Japan's place in the world. For a further exploration of the globalist, regionalist, and nationalist perspectives in Japan, see Tsuneo Akaha, "Three Faces of Japan: Nationalist, Regionalist, Globalist Futures," to be published in Japanese in Kenichiro Hirano, ed., *Japan, Asia, and the World in the 21st Century*, Tokyo: Kokusai Shobo (forthcoming spring 1998).

5. Yoshihisa Hara, "Josetsu: Nichibei Ampo Taisei Jizoku to Henyo" (Introduction: The Japan-US security treaty system-continuity and change),

6. See note 4 above.

7. The description of Japan as a "pacifist nation" is found in virtually every Japanese work on the nation's contemporary international policy. For discussions of Japan as a "civilian power," see Hanns W. Maull, "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers," *Foreign Affairs*, 69, no. 5 (Winter 1990-91); Yoichi Funabashi, "Japan and the New World Order," *Foreign Affairs*, 70, no. 5 (Winter 1991/92): 65; Yoichi Funabashi, *Nihon no Taigaikoso: Reisengo no Bijon wo Kaku* ("A Vision for Japan's External Policy: Fashioning a Post-Cold War Vision"), (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993): 159-206.

8. See for example, Shigeto Tsuru, *Nichibei Ampo Kaisho he no Michi* ("A Pathway to the Dissolution of the US-Japan Security Alliance"), (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996).

9. For the "normal state" thesis, see Ichiro Ozawa, *Blueprint for a New Japan: Rethinking of a Nation*, (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994); Hisahiko Okazaki, "Rekishhi no Kyokun: Koku saikankei no Shiten" ("The Lesson of History: A Perspective on International Relations"), in Okazaki, *Kokusaijosei Handan: Rekishi no Kyokun, Senryaku no Tetsugaku* ("Judging the International Situation: the Lesson of History, Strategic Philosophy"), (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo, 1996): 275-317.

10. For advocacy of Japanese participation in collective security, see Hisahiko Okazaki, "Japan Should Awake to Right to Collective Self-Defense," *Daily Yomiuri*, (July 4, 1994), Masamori Sase, "'Shudanteki Jieiken' Kaishaku no Kai" ("The Association to Interpret 'the Right to Collective Defense'"), *Voice*, no. 223 (July 1996): 128-149, and Seizaburo Sato, "Clarifying the Right of Collective Self-Defense," *Asia-Pacific Review*, 3 (Fall-Winter 1996): 91-105.

11. For the concept of "bandwagoning," see Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1987); Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging International Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 44-79. For a recent Japanese analysis of the US-Japan alliance dynamic from the balance-of-power, bandwagoning, and other theoretical perspectives, see Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, "Nichibei Domei no Kokusaiseijiron: Riarizumu, Riberaru Seidoron, Konsutorakutivizumu" ("International Relations Theories of the US-Japan Alliance: Views from Realism, Liberal-institutionalism, and Constructivism"), *Kokusaiseiji*, 115 (May 1997): 161-179.

12. Kazuo Ogura, "Japan's Asia Policy, Past and Future," *Japan Review of International Affairs*, 10, no. 1 (Winter 1996).

13. Robert S. Ross, *Managing a Changing Relationship: China's Japan Policy in the 1990s* (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1996): 5. The Japanese Self-Defense Force has more submarines, escort ships, and mine warfare units than the United States has in the region. Their inventory of destroyer-type surface ships is nearly triple the number that the US Seventh Fleet has and their roster of PC-3C antisubmarine-warfare aircraft is four times larger. (Michael Mandelbaum, *The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1995: 120.)

14. Tsuneo Akaha, "Japan's Security Policy after US Hegemony," 448-449.

15. See for example, Takahiko Soejima, *Zokkoku Nipponron* ("Japan, a Tributary State"), (To-

kyo: Satsukishobo, 1997).

16. Shintaro Ishihara and Akio Morita, *"No" to Ieru Nippon* ("The Japan That Can Say 'No'"), (Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1989).

17. American culture remains very popular in Japan despite the state- and business-level frictions between the two countries. The resentment against the United States is directed at Washington and the so-called revisionists who blame Japan for the ills of US economy. The examples of what the Japanese consider "revisionist understandings of Japan" include James Fallows, *More Like Us: Making America Great Again* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989); Chalmers Johnson, *Japan: Who Governs?: The Rise of the Developmental State* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995); Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., *Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead*, (New York: Basic Books); and Karel van Wolferen, *The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989).

18. Shintaro Ishihara and Mahathir bin Mohamad, *"No" to Ieru Ajia* ("The Asia That Can Say 'No'"), Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1994.

19. Akaha, "Three Faces of Japan."

20. Akaha, "Japan's Security Policy after US Hegemony."

21. This is the policy direction advocated by the so-called Higuchi Report on Japanese defense policy in the post-Cold War era. Prime Minister's Advisory Commission on Defense Issues, "The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the Twenty-first Century" (Tokyo, August 12, 1994). The report appeared to place greater emphasis on multilateral regional security than on the bilateral alliance with the United States, and this prompted Washington to intensify its effort to secure Tokyo's unequivocal commitment to their bilateral alliance.

22. For an examination of the complex and uncertain mix of economic power and security interests, see Susan L. Shirk and Christopher P. Twomey, eds., *Power and Prosperity: Economics and Security Linkages in Asia-Pacific* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996).