
Arms Transfers, Military Intervention, and the Taiwan Mission

A. JAMES GREGOR

Professor of Political Science
University of California at Berkeley

Any effort to make a general and compelling case either for or against international arms sales, or for or against unilateral or multilateral military intervention in external crises, constitutes, at its very best, an exercise in futility. The decision to undertake arms sales or intervene in foreign crises inevitably involves normative choice, which is necessarily case-specific, not general, in reference.

Like all efforts to address essentially normative issues, the arguments for or against arms sales or intervention typically involve holding one or more general moral assumptions as “unproblematic,” together with some set of specific descriptive and probability statements as true.¹ The presumed truth of moral “axioms” and the confirmation of specific factual claims provide the cognitive grounds for policy recommendations.

Thus, a rationale for international traffic in arms might rest on some relatively simple normative assumptions: e.g., “nation-states” have a “right” to exist, and consequently, enjoy the “entailed right” to protect themselves.² It could be argued that the arms trade enhances the survivability of nation-states in at least two ways: by providing requisite arms for non-industrialized nation states that must defend themselves in a world in which the threat of armed aggression will continue for the foreseeable future, and by satisfying some of the special survival needs, other than simple defense, of the industrial powers. The arguments are rarely more sophisticated.

It is argued, for example, that industrialized nations undertake arms sales and transfers either to secure a measure of influence over the policies of the recipi-

ent country and thereby help shape regional outcomes, or in order to reduce the per unit costs involved in the production of sophisticated weapon systems. An argument might be made that while the concern with influencing regional policy may be important, for vendor nations, the export of arms is essential to their security in very special fashion.

For industrialized nations, arms exports reduce the costs of research, development, and special production requirements involved in military supply by distributing all such expenses over the larger number of units produced. Foreign sales allow for longer production runs and thus reduce per unit costs. Moreover, production for export sales offsets the discontinuities that result from restricting sales exclusively to the domestic market. In order to provide continuous employ-

ment for the skilled workers necessary for the production of advanced weapons and weapons platforms, production lines must be kept in operation. To provide for ongoing production, defense industries require an external market.³

It is argued that, in a very real sense, foreign markets have be-

come critical to the maintenance of the major defense industries of developed nations. If industrialized nations are to have modern armed forces at less than disabling cost, export sales have become all but indispensable.

The economic argument for the sale of arms on the international market is sufficiently persuasive to assure broad public and political support. As a consequence, it is probable that the industrialized and partially industrialized nations—the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and China—will continue to traffic in arms regardless of the immediate moral arguments marshaled against it.⁴

The contemporary evidence indicates that even less extensively developed economies like Brazil, where some of the arguments concerning the necessity of international arms sales do not hold, have found the trade seductively lucrative. It seems reasonably clear that arms sales will continue for the foreseeable future.

In the future, under one or another set of circumstances, it is conceivable that the rate and kind of arms transferred internationally might be controlled by negotiation or sanction, but it is hard to imagine an international system in which all weapon sales will be proscribed. However, though arms exports seem set to continue, specific justifications for these sales will remain necessary.

Very often, the moral grounds for the sale of arms are presumed, and the arguments for specific arms sales turn on facts in dispute. Does the sale of arms, in any specific instance, really enhance the security of the recipient or not? Does the sale increase the specific potential for violence in a region or in the entire

**Like all moral arguments,
the rationale for intervening
begins with a list of precepts
that tell us very little until
they are operationalized.**

international community? What are the diplomatic consequences of such a sale? What might the domestic political implications be? In effect, even without engaging the normative grounds for international arms sales, the argument can easily become enormously complicated, time consuming, and result in little more than a kind of persuasiveness that we have learned to identify with complex normative discourse. Each instance of the sale of arms requires its own rationale.

It seems likely that the reason arms sales (although often spoken of as “an extremely dangerous phenomenon”) generate “so little international debate,” is because most analysts accept that modern military industry would not be sustainable without them.⁵ Equally important, it would seem, is the fact that it is very difficult to trace any specific consequence or set of consequences directly to any given sale.⁶

Because of the informality of social science, the fragmentary nature of the data available, and the indeterminate number of variables that together determine outcomes, generalizations used to support or resist any specific international sale of arms are intrinsically suspect.⁷ Unlike arguments in natural science, in which all participants share some fundamental principles governing truth conditions, normative arguments in social science are always implicitly fugitive.

While such generic considerations apply to arguments concerning both arms sales and intervention, the fact is that arms sales do not inspire the same sense of normative urgency as do proposals of direct military intervention in the affairs of other states. Intervention, not the trade in conventional arms, is almost always at the center of non-academic foreign policy debates.⁸

The Logic of Intervention

Arms sales are so common a feature of international life that there are few occasions for sustained or intense public review. Arms sales are very often dealt with as though they were noncontroversial, standard economic features of U.S. relations with much of the rest of the world. Intervention, on the other hand, is almost always seen as requiring special scrutiny. The arguments for U.S. military intervention overseas, no matter how frequent those interventions might be, are almost always carefully scrutinized.⁹

As distinct from arms sales, interventions are usually controversial. For one thing, unlike the sale of arms, they carry with them the risk of American casualties.¹⁰ They are seen as involving serious and immediate risk, and often it appears less than clear how military interventions serve the national interest.¹¹ As a consequence, there is a general tendency to recommend that U.S. armed intervention in foreign crises be limited to those instances that serve, in some restrictive sense or another, “vital national interests.”¹² The most common form such recommendations assume is that U.S. interventions be undertaken only in those “cases in which there is a direct and substantial threat to national security or American vital interests.”¹³

Unhappily, such prescriptions are not particularly useful unless “direct,” “substantial,” “threat,” “national security,”¹⁴ and “vital interests” are operationally defined with some precision—a task not likely to be accomplished in the abstract. Prescriptions become binding when they are understood to apply to real instances in the empirical world.

In attempting to deal with these issues in the most recent past, the best that we have been afforded as a guide to policy by those responsible for armed intervention is a list of “dangers and opportunities” that seem to provide the occasion for the overseas defense of “national security and vital interests.” Thus, in October 1993, then Secretary of Defense Les Aspen provided an account of how the armed forces of the United States in the “new era” were to be employed in the nation’s interests. They were to protect the “lives and personal safety of Americans, both at home and abroad; maintain the political freedom and independence of the United States with its values, institutions, and territory intact,” as well as “provide for the well-being and prosperity of the nation and its people.”¹⁵

To accomplish that would require the United States to maintain the security arrangements put together during the Cold War, deter any possible aggressors, and control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction while remaining “engaged” internationally. Part of that engagement involved not only efforts to influence international “trade policy” and suppress transnational drug traffic, but also the fostering “of democratic values and institutions” throughout the world. Moreover, the armed forces of the United States were to be charged with “conducting smaller-scale intervention operations, such as peace enforcement, peace-keeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief to further U.S. interests and objectives.”¹⁶ In effect, by 1993, “threats to national security and American vital interests” had dilated to include almost anything that might somehow influence the “well-being and prosperity of the nation and its people.”

It is not immediately evident how a mission of intervention by the U.S. military anywhere might influence trade policy, control the flow of drugs, foster democracy and democratic institutions, or enhance the nation’s well-being and prosperity. Like all moral arguments, the rationale for intervention begins with a list of precepts that, in and of themselves, tell us very little until they are operationalized. This involves an analysis of the imminence and salience of the threats to be addressed by the mission as well as a whole host of other determinants: viable alternatives, the measure of popular and political support enjoyed by the operation, the potential risks, the degree of support expected from allies, the resources available, how mission success is to be registered, and what the mission’s exit strategy might be.¹⁷

Successful interventions have generally satisfied the bulk of the criteria. The intervention in the Persian Gulf is among the most recent. Those that have failed—or whose results have been at best “provisional, fragile, and reversible”—have satisfied very few of the criteria.¹⁸ The failed Somali mission is among the most recent examples of the latter. It remains uncertain what governed the deci-

sions to undertake the failed interventions or how such interventions were understood to further American interests.

In all of this there has been one recent intervention that has received little public commentary, but which serves as an illustrative example of U.S. policy and the logic that seems to govern it: the Clinton administration's massive show of force off the Taiwan Strait in the late winter of 1996.¹⁹

Until that time, most of the interventions during Clinton's tenure had been associated with the administration's assertive multilateralism²⁰—either as a function of UN or NATO “peace-enforcing” or “peace-keeping” responsibilities.²¹ The deployment of the large deck carrier battle groups off the Taiwan Strait, on the other hand, was embarked upon unilaterally, as a response to the provocative live-fire exercises undertaken by combatants from the armed forces of the People's Republic of China, which were perceived as threatening the political integrity of Taiwan and the safety of its people.

Intervention in the Taiwan Strait

The intervention on Taiwan's behalf in March 1996 was but one instance in a half century of U.S. military interventions in the affairs of mainland and island China. What renders it distinctive is the fact that it was almost totally unanticipated.

Only six months prior to the mission, Clinton administration officials had publicly committed themselves to an accommodating policy of “engagement” with Beijing. From an initial refusal in 1992 to “coddle” the “tyrants in Beijing,” through qualified granting of Most Favored Nation trading status for China in 1993,²² to the “deep engagement” in 1995,²³ the Clinton administration seemed to have moved into a foreign policy position that would have precluded the 1996 armed intervention in the Taiwan Strait.

Nonetheless, in March 1996 the U.S. armed forces were placed in harm's way in order to deter the Chinese military from further jeopardizing the security of Taiwan. It is instructive to reflect on the reasons that may have governed the decision to intervene.

What seems evident is that any such undertaking could expect to receive broad-gauged support from Americans in general, and Congress in particular. For decades, political polls and an entire series of congressional resolutions had signaled the American public's general support of Taiwan. The administration did not have to fear either public or congressional resistance to the undertaking.

For more than half a century, the United States has supported the Republic of China, first as the successor regime to the Qing dynasty on the mainland and then as an anti-Communist regime on Taiwan and associated territories.²⁴ The reasons for the support varied over time, but the support itself has been virtually continuous from the mid-1930s to the present.

On the Chinese mainland, the Republic of China was an ally of the United States in the war against Japan, and when the Nationalist government retreated

from the mainland to Taiwan after its defeat by Mao Zedong's forces, it continued to support the United States during the Korean War and throughout the Cold War. Even after its "de-recognition" by the Carter administration in 1979, popular and congressional support prompted the passage of domestic legislation, the Taiwan Relations Act, calculated to defend the security and independence of "the people of Taiwan."²⁵

Since that time, irrespective of the rapprochement with the Chinese authorities in Beijing, the United States has continued to maintain intensive economic and substantial military relations with the Chinese authorities in Taipei. In the recent past, the United States has permitted both governmental and commercial arms sales to Taiwan in an effort to maintain a credible military balance in the Taiwan Strait.²⁶

Why the United States should remain concerned with the survival and integrity of Taiwan seems to turn on several considerations. Taiwan is one of those East Asian nations that has made the difficult transition from authoritarianism to

As a consequence of increasing budget allocations, China's armed forces have become increasingly well-equipped to engage opponents on the sea or in the air.

representative democracy.²⁷ It is also our eighth largest trading partner. Like the Republic of Korea, the Republic of the Philippines, and Japan, Taiwan is part of a constellation of democratic states that provides the United States with support in an international community not always hospitable to American political preferences. Taiwan is

also a major component in that configuration of East Asian economies with which the United States now exchanges over \$400 billion annually, and that provide markets for almost \$193 billion in American goods and services—activity that creates direct employment for more than 3.8 million Americans.²⁸ Taiwan, like many of the East Asian economies, offers the United States high-quality, low-cost commodities that help to sustain the American standard of living.

For all that, it is unlikely that the decision to intervene was motivated by a specific concern for the immediate well-being of Taiwan or immediate economic interests. More substantial issues were involved.

The island of Taiwan occupies a critical place in the arc of islands on the West Pacific rim that stretches from Sakhalin in the North to Indonesia in the South. It is within the waters bordered by mainland and insular Asia that some of the world's heaviest ship traffic makes transit. Over half the world's merchant vessels sail through the chokepoints of the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok, passing the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, to make their way through the Taiwan Strait and bring critical industrial resources to Taiwan, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.²⁹

The flow of resources to these countries is critical to their survival.³⁰ Any disruption of seaborne traffic through the region would work significant hardship on their economies. Should any power gain control over that free flow of resources, the consequences could be very serious, not only for the democratic polities and market-governed economies of East Asia, but for the United States as well.

Virtually since its founding in 1949, the People's Republic of China has claimed sovereignty over all the islets, sandbars, lagoons, and cays of the South and East China seas. In June 1980, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing issued a document entitled *China's Sovereignty Over the Xisha (Paracel) and Nansha (Spratly) Archipelagoes is Indisputable*. The claims were reissued in April and December 1987, and again in February 1988. In February 1992, under the direct sponsorship of Premier Li Peng, the National People's Congress of mainland China passed domestic legislation identifying the South and East China seas as "territorial waters." In principle, that legislation laid the foundation not only for exclusive economic claims to any underwater subsoil resources to be found in those seas, but also the right to control surface and air passage through the region.

Since 1974, Beijing has acted on its claims by seizing island territories in the South China Sea, beginning with an amphibious invasion of the Paracel Islands in that year. Since then, mainland China has deployed troops on several maritime territories in the area, including the Yongshu and Huayang reefs. In 1988, Beijing deployed elements of its military to four islands and reefs in the Spratlys, and in March of that year, armed conflict erupted between the People's Liberation Army Navy of mainland China and naval elements of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in the archipelago's Chigua Reef area.³¹

In 1995, it was discovered that Beijing had deployed forces to Mischief reef, claimed by the Philippines. The authorities in Manila notified Washington, pursuant to the security treaty between the two countries. Washington refused to countenance the notion that the United States was obliged to defend the disputed offshore islands. It was reasonably clear that the United States was ill-disposed, at that time, to engage Beijing on the issue.

In all of this, analysts have seen a pattern emerge. Not only has Beijing taken every opportunity to seize contested territories in waters that are critical to the economic well-being and security of major U.S. allies in East Asia, it has also undertaken to purchase major weapons platforms from Russia that significantly bolster the power projection capabilities of its armed forces, enhancing their ability to deal with real and potential opponents in the South and East China seas. As a consequence of increasing budget allocations, the armed forces of the People's Republic of China have become increasingly well-equipped to engage opponents on the sea or in the air.³² This has "heightened regional anxiety" in the South China Sea.³³

What seems to be of concern is that Beijing is "actively pursuing command of the regional waters" in the South and East China seas³⁴ as part of "China's rapid

military expansion and America's even more rapid contraction," a process calculated to significantly alter the balance of power in Asia.³⁵ What is at stake in the long-term are U.S. economic and political interests. What appears to be at stake in the short-term is U.S. credibility as a security partner.³⁶ Failure to deal with increasing mainland Chinese assertiveness along the island chain that reaches through the South China Sea to Taiwan is likely to confirm what appears to be a prevailing Asian perception that the United States has neither the will nor the capacity to cope with the region's problems.

Intervention in the defense of Taiwan's security and political integrity seems to have been undertaken as a response to an entire clutch of problems in East

The decision to intervene in Taiwan clearly communicated to Beijing and to our allies in East Asia that the United States remained a power to be reckoned with in the region.

Asia. Washington intervened in defense of what it held to be valid national interests. Infinitely more credible than intervention in Somalia or Haiti, the action, it was clear, would have popular and congressional support. Alternative opportunities had been allowed to pass. To engage Beijing over Vietnamese claims did not recommend itself.

Armed intervention in the service of the Philippines was not much more attractive. Moving in the defense of Taiwan was distinctly preferable, and would achieve the same result: clearly communicating to Beijing, and to our allies in East Asia, that the United States remained a power to be reckoned with in the West Pacific and that it would not tolerate mainland Chinese aggression. Intervention in the Taiwan Strait was understood as a threat of the use of force in order to deter an aggression that might ultimately challenge the most fundamental interests of all the nations of the Pacific rim.³⁷

The deployment of two large deck carriers—probably armed with more fire power than the entire armed forces of the People's Republic—was a convincing demonstration of the seriousness of purpose on the part of the United States. The Clinton administration's military advisors surely conveyed the belief that there was very little real risk in the exercise. The probability that Beijing would choose to engage the United States in armed conflict at that juncture was as close to zero as one could calculate.

The United States had every reason to believe that the action would receive the tacit support of all its allies in the region. There was no problem with executing a suitable exit strategy from the intervention, no ground forces were off-loaded, the action was rapid, and the mission specific. The aircraft carriers simply sailed away.

More difficult to determine is how one might calculate the success of the action. That can only be determined, in part, by time. But so many factors will

influence the relationship between the People's Republic of China and the United States, it will be difficult to isolate the intervention's specific impact.

Conclusions

It is clear that there are "no immutable and universally applicable rules for decisions about interventions."³⁸ The decision to employ, or threaten to employ, force in the resolution of international disagreements invariably involves the most intense moral deliberation. Each instance must rest on its own merits. What is more important than arms sales and intervention, per se, is the fact that in the United States, intervention is usually undertaken largely without public deliberation. The fact that the president can undertake intervention, for all intents and purposes, without consulting either the people or Congress, is ill-advised, and probably perilous. Anyone who has ever dealt with the decision to employ violence, or the threat of violence, in the resolution of disagreements, recognizes the role played in the deliberations by moral judgment—and moral judgments inextricably involve public exchange. The greater the responsible public's involvement in the deliberation, the more defensible the outcome.

While it is evident that some interventions require rapid decisions that do not allow for extended or inclusive deliberations, it seems clear that the more successful ones have engaged public participation. Ideally, any decision to embark upon a military intervention must be made not only with reluctance and the utmost gravity, but with the fullest democratic participation of all. 

Endnotes

¹ Normative arguments logically require a moral foundation in terms of assumptions about "self-evident" values (e.g., "killing is bad," "pleasure is preferable to pain," "there is a fundamental right to protect oneself," and precepts of that order). No specific moral principle is necessary, but without a principle or some set of such principles, a normative argument cannot proceed. Sometimes normative arguments are about the fundamental moral "axioms," and sometimes they are about the factual premises employed to make the axioms applicable in any given case. See A. James Gregor, *An Introduction to Metapolitics: A Brief Inquiry into the Conceptual Language of Political Science* (New York: Free Press, 1971) Chapter 9.

² This is not to suggest that one cannot argue that "nation states" have no such "right," and that it would be "better" that they did not exist at all. But that would be an argument for an "alternative future," and does not address itself to the present state of the international community.

³ See Frank Barnaby and Ronald Huiskens, *Arms Uncontrolled* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975) 35–36.

⁴ This is not to suggest that arguments against arms sales may not prevail in the future, near or remote. It is simply to report on prevailing circumstances.

⁵ Barnaby and Huiskens, *op. cit.*, 35.

⁶ While critics will often argue that the availability of arms fosters their use, countercritics will equally often point to the fact that the vast arsenals of nuclear weapons that characterized the

Cold War protagonists, if anything, rendered a major war inconceivable.

⁷ Thus Nicholson argues that empirical generalizations be rigorously tested. See Michael Nicholson, "Security in the 1990s and Beyond," in Michael Clarke (ed.), *New Perspectives on Security* (New York: Brassy's, 1993) 105–106.

⁸ For emphasis, see: Roger W. Barnett, *The Sinews of National Military Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Strategic Institute, January 1994) 4–5.

⁹ See Richard Haas, *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World* (Washington: D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 1994); Richard Grimmett, *Instances of Use of U.S. Armed Forces Abroad, 1789–1995* (Report 96-119F, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 6 February 1996).

¹⁰ See Harry G. Summers, Jr., *The New World Strategy: A Military Policy for America's Future* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995) 170.

¹¹ See John Hillen, "American Military Intervention: A User's Guide," *Backgrounder* (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 2 May 1996) particularly page 1.

¹² This was the explicit position assumed by the then-Secretary of Defense, Caspar R. Weinberger, in "The Uses of Military Power," *Department of Defense News Release 609-84*, 28 November 1984. It followed closely on the heels of the loss of 241 Marines in the suicide bombing attack in Beirut in 1983. A comprehensive review of the exchanges that followed Weinberger's account of the criteria for intervention is provided in Stephen Daggett and Nina Serafino, *The Use of Force: Key Contemporary Documents* (Report Nr. 94-805F, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 17 October 1994).

After the nation had recuperated from the shock of the losses in Beirut, the Bush administration argued for more liberal criteria for intervention. President Bush maintained that "although the flourishing of democracy in America did not require a completely democratic world, it could not long survive in one largely totalitarian," suggesting that it was in U.S. vital interests to foster and support, conceivably through direct intervention, the establishment of political democracy in non-democratic circumstances. The subsequent intervention in Haiti by the Clinton administration would presumably represent such an intervention. See George Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States, 1990–1991* (Washington, D. C.: Brassey's, 1990) 4.

Critics, of course, have objected to such reasoning. In fact, there have been those who have maintained that the entry of the United States into the Second World War did not really serve "vital national interests." See Colin S. Gray, *The Geopolitics of Superpower* (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1988) Chapter 12.

¹³ Barbara Conry, "The Futility of U.S. Intervention in Regional Conflicts," *Policy Analysis*, no. 209 (19 May 1994) 18.

¹⁴ See Nicholson, *op. cit.* 107–110, for a discussion concerning the concept of "security."

¹⁵ Les Aspin, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, October 1993) 2-3.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁷ See Summers, *op. cit.*, particularly parts 3 and 4; John M. Collins, "Military Intervention: A Checklist of Key Considerations," *Parameters* 25, no. 4 (Winter 1995/1996) 53–58; Mark M. Lowenthal and Robert L. Goldich, *Use of Force by the United States: Case Studies. 1950–1991* (Report Nr. 92-757, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 14 October 1992); Stanley R. Sloan, *The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War World: Toward Self-Deterrence?* (Report Nr. 94-581S, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Report, 20 July 1994).

¹⁸ Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 1 (January/February 1996) 21. Mandelbaum had served as an advisor in the Clinton administration.

¹⁹ See A. James Gregor, "China, the United States, and Security Policy in East Asia," *Parameters* 26, no. 2 (Summer 1996) 92–101.

²⁰ See the discussion in Mark T. Clark, "The Future of Clinton's Foreign and Defense Policy:

Multilateral Security," *Comparative Strategy* 13, no. 2 (April/June 1994) 181–195; Ben Maynigo, "The Korean Peninsula and East Asian Collective Security," *Global Affairs* 8, no. 3 (Summer 1993) 87–96; Hillen, *op. cit.*, 7; Summers, *op. cit.*, 181–182.

²¹ In December 1994, the U.S. Army's doctrinal manual, *Peace Operations*, cited the U.S. operations in Somalia in 1992–93 as an instance of "peace enforcement." See Summers, *op. cit.*, 158. "Peace-keeping," as distinct from "peace enforcement," refers to maintaining peace after the cessation of conflict. "Peace enforcement" involves the effort to end an enduring conflict. Also see Michael H. Hoffman, "War, Peace, and Interventional Armed Conflict: Solving the Peace Enforcer's Paradox," *Parameters* 25, no. 4 (Winter 1995/1996) 41–52.

²² In an Executive Order issued on May 28, 1993 President Clinton had stipulated that China had to improve its human rights record to qualify for a renewal of MFN in 1994.

²³ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Case for Deep Engagement," *Foreign Affairs*, (July/August 1995) 90–114.

²⁴ See the discussions in John C. Kuan, *A Review of U.S.–R.O.C. Relations 1949–1978* (Taipei: Asia and World Institute, July 1980); Hung-mao Tien (ed.), *Mainland China, Taiwan and U.S. Policy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1983); Hungdah Chiu (ed.), *China and the Taiwan Issue* (New York: Praeger, 1979); Jerome Alan Cohen, Edward Friedman, Harold C. Hinton, and Allen S. Whiting, *Taiwan and American Policy: The Dilemma in U.S.–China Relations* (New York: Praeger, 1971).

²⁵ See the accounts in Edwin K. Snyder, A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, *The Taiwan Relations Act and the Defense of the Republic of China* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1980); Robert L. Downen, *Of Grave Concern: U.S.–Taiwan Relations on the Threshold of the 1980s* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1981); Martin L. Lasater, *The Security of Taiwan: Unraveling the Dilemma* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1982).

²⁶ The Bush administration allowed the sale of high performance F–16 air-superiority fighters to Taiwan in the effort to offset the advantages provided the armed forces of the People's Republic of China by Beijing's purchase of Russian Su–27s. In 1994, the Clinton administration approved export applications for U.S. companies to sell Taiwan, among other assets, advanced military electronics for frigates Taiwan is purchasing from France. "Agreement Reached on Taiwan Arms Sale," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 27 April 1994: A10.

²⁷ See John F. Copper, *The Taiwan Political Miracle: Essays on Political Development, Elections and Foreign Relations* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1997).

²⁸ John T. Dori and Richard D. Fisher, Jr., *U.S. and Asia Statistical Handbook 1996* (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1996) See *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, February 1995) 2.

²⁹ See John H. Noer and David Gregory, *Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1996); John H. Noer, "Southeast Asian Chokepoints: Keeping Sea Lines of Communication Open," *Strategic Forum*, no. 98 (December 1996).

³⁰ See the discussion in Tadashi Tajiri, "Korea in Japan's Arc of Crisis," *Global Affairs* 8, no. 3 (Summer 1993) 77–86; Osamu Namatame, "Crisis in China and the Security of East Asia," *Global Affairs* 4, no. 4 (Fall 1989) 87–105; Byung Kyu Kang, "Korea and Sea Lane Security," *Global Affairs* 4, no. 3 (Summer 1989) 148–162.

³¹ See the account provided in Ai Hongren, *Zongqong Haijun Toushi—Maixiang Yuanyangde Tiaozhan (An Inside Look into the Chinese Communist Navy—Advancing Toward the Blue Water Challenge)*, translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 16 July 1990.

³² Henry J. Kenny, "The South China Sea: A Dangerous Ground," *Naval War College Review* 49, no. 3, sequence 355 (Summer 1996) 100–101.

³³ Robert Karniol, "Chinese Actions Heighten Regional Anxiety," *Jane's Defence '96: The World in Conflict* (London: Jane's, 1996) 55.

³⁴ Ulysses O. Zalamea, "Eagles and Dragons at Sea: The Inevitable Strategic Collision between the

United States and China," *Naval War College Review* 49, no. 4, sequence 356 (Autumn 1996) 71.

³⁵ George Melloan, "China's Balance of Power Politics in Asia," *The Wall Street Journal*, 20 January 1997.

³⁶ See Lawrence T. DiRita, "Innocents Abroad: How the World Views Clinton's Foreign Policy," *F.Y.I.* (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 10 June 1994).

³⁷ See, for example, the account in Yossef Bodansky, "PRC Revives Military Threat to Taiwan as a Prelude to Wider Expansion," *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy* (July/August 1995) 6–11.

³⁸ Collins, *op. cit.*, 53.