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# Russian Policy toward Conventional Arms Transfers after the Cold War

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There is no consensus concerning the appropriate role of conventional arms transfers in international security. Strong norms and/or legal prohibitions exist against the transfer of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. These prohibitions apply both to complete weapons and to dual-use goods and technologies if it is known that they are to be employed in developing or manufacturing weapons of mass destruction. By contrast, there is a widespread conviction among governments that conventional armed forces are the most important instrument through which they can pursue their right to self-defense. Since a relatively small number of states maintain arms industries on any major scale, there is a significant international market for arms. Moreover, as domestic arms markets and traditional export markets—notably those within alliances—have been shrinking, the probability of building strong norms and prohibitions is low in the short term.

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were the dominant suppliers of conventional arms. After the political, economic, and strategic convulsion that the Soviet Union underwent in 1989, the international arms trade was fundamentally changed. One of the two main pillars of international arms supply was removed, and the newly independent state of Russia faced a very different international environment in which to re-evaluate its approach to arms transfers.

It is widely agreed that during the Cold War, the Soviet Union used arms transfers and military assistance as a politico-military instrument, though Soviet

leadership was not indifferent to commercial- or defense industry-related benefits gained from arms sales. Moreover, the Soviet Union had export control systems designed to ensure that the direction of military assistance and arms transfers conformed to a policy determined by the government. After the end of the Cold War, both the direction of Moscow's policy and the instruments needed to implement it had to be reconsidered.

This paper describes one aspect of Russian arms transfer behavior—arms transfers to countries around the southern periphery of Russia—and tries to use the evidence presented to reach conclusions about the nature of the post-Cold War arms trade. Recent analyses of Russian arms transfers have tended to focus on the economic and industrial motives for sales. These are undoubtedly very strong. However, this paper is an attempt to test whether there are other elements in play which are shaping Russian policy and, if so, what they are.

### **Arms Transfers in the Former Soviet Space**

Several of these ideas and arguments can be tested using the case of military assistance and arms transfers in the geographical space that comprised the former Soviet Union.<sup>1</sup>

Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States were the dominant suppliers of arms and military assistance. The two superpowers supplied arms both to other states, often those grouped into alliances led by one or the other superpower, and to non-state actors. During the final period of the Soviet Union's history, President Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze made significant revisions to Soviet foreign policy that had a direct impact on arms exports. Relations with developing countries that had been important arms recipients, such as Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea, and Syria, were downgraded. At the same time, other bilateral relationships which had been tense or hostile for much of the period 1945–89—between China and Iran, for example—improved and took on a new importance.

In 1992, a new dimension appeared when the Soviet Union was replaced by a series of independent states whose political relations with one another were often hostile. Russia, in particular, had few friends among the newly independent states. At that time, it was feared that a pattern of escalating conflict would emerge. In fact, the pattern has been mixed. In Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Russia itself (in the Republic of Chechnya) the most pessimistic predictions turned out to be true. Elsewhere, for example in the three Baltic Republics and Ukraine, post-Soviet development has been more peaceful than could have been predicted.

Leaving aside their political relations, the financial and industrial bases of these new countries continued to be linked through the use of the ruble as a common currency, the state socialist planning procedures that had guided economic decisions, and interdependency for materials and semi-finished manufac-

tured products. In the strictly military sphere, the rapid disintegration of first the military structure provided by the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and then the Soviet Union's unified armed forces, meant that the future disposition of a vast inventory of conventional arms suddenly became difficult to predict. The allegiance of very large numbers of trained military personnel became an open question. Under these conditions, the role of arms transfers and military assistance, as well as the practical possibilities for implementing policies, were bound to change. Several questions arise: What are the factors driving arms transfers in the former Soviet Union and around its periphery? Is there evidence that arms transfers are still being used as an instrumental means to achieve political objectives by Russia? If so, then how are arms transfers used?

The most common explanations of arms export behavior by Russia and the newly independent states are economic, and there is no doubt that such factors weigh very heavily. While there is some disagreement over exactly how much hard currency Russia earns from arms sales, there is consensus among analysts inside and outside Russia

that sales are rising from the low of 1991–92.<sup>2</sup> It is also widely believed that an increasing proportion of Russian arms exports are linked to currency payment rather than barter. Earnings from exports are seen as very important by both manufactur-

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ers and the Ministry of Finance, which is trying to construct a new system of public finances. The Ministry of Defense shares this view of export earnings, given that it still uses the United States as the benchmark for its force planning in spite of the evidence that Russia lacks the technology, economic strength, and political consensus that would provide the foundation for such a policy.

In spite of these economic imperatives, there is also evidence that Russian arms transfers continue to have a politico-military as well as an economic and industrial dimension. This may be particularly true of arms transfers to Iran and to the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Looking at Russia's policies toward Iran, several issues stand out. First, Russia and Iran both wish to exploit oil and natural gas supplies under and around the Caspian Sea. Moscow and Tehran have a common interest in preventing U.S., Western European, and Japanese oil companies from reaching independent agreements with two newly independent states—Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan—that are “sandwiched” between Russia and Iran. There is a risk that independent agreements might be concluded on terms that were disadvantageous to Russia and Iran, both of which want to participate in exploiting these reserves.<sup>3</sup> Second, Russia and Iran share similar views on the ongoing conflicts in Azerbaijan, Arme-

nia, and Georgia. Third, both Russia and Iran have had strained relations with the United States.

Russia and Iran both have a range of instruments through which to pursue their interests in these matters. Russia has regular opportunities for dialogue with newly independent states through meetings of the CIS and OSCE. There is a large community of ethnic Russians living in most newly independent states, though this is both a potential source of influence and a potential flashpoint. Russia still has a direct military presence in many of these states through bilateral agreements or multilateral accords within the framework of the CIS.<sup>4</sup> In addition, these states often depend on Russia for raw materials, manufactured goods, credit, and technical assistance which they cannot easily obtain elsewhere. Iran has common ties of language and religion with the non-Russian people living in the Central Asian states.

Under these conditions, Russia and Iran have the option of using either "carrots" or "sticks" in pursuing their objectives. They also have the option of pursuing these objectives alone or together. However, the common interests of Russia and Iran tend to be negative rather than positive, blocking unwelcome developments by other powers. In addition, each harbors lingering suspicions about the long-term ambitions of the other. It seems unlikely that they will ever be strategic partners. Indeed, several commentators have observed recently that Iran needs Russia far more than Russia needs Iran.<sup>5</sup>

The instruments that Russia has to pursue its policies toward Central Asia seem fairly powerful. Iran, by contrast, only claims rather loose arrangements, such as local religious organizations. These elements have proven difficult for Tehran to control completely, as evidenced by its efforts in Lebanon. Iran also has a limited capacity to influence developments in the Persian Gulf, where the United States and its allies enjoy an overwhelming preponderance of power. Given that the Arab states on the Arabian peninsula are supported by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, through a web of bilateral agreements and a continued local military presence as well as through arms transfers and military assistance, changing the regional balance would require a significant commitment of resources.

In 1989–90, the former Soviet Union and Iran opened a conventional arms transfer relationship which might, it was then thought, have become a significant factor shaping the regional power balance.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, the fact that Iran has acquired some complex weapon platforms, such as the MiG-29 fighter, the Su-24 fighter-bomber, conventional submarines, and some advanced air defense systems, means that Russia and Iran will continue to have some military-technical cooperation for an extended period—perhaps up to twenty-five years. However, the years 1989–91 proved to be the high point of this arms transfer relationship.<sup>7</sup> Internal problems in Iran—related to budgetary problems as well as Tehran's difficulty absorbing new military technology into its armed forces—placed constraints on the volume of sales.<sup>8</sup>

After the 1990–91 Gulf War and the defeat of Iraq, there was a brief moment when the issue of conventional arms transfer control became prominent on the major powers' agenda. In 1991 a series of meetings of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council raised the issue of conventional arms transfers with a particular focus on the Middle East. At that time, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which still favored an effort to develop a strategic partnership with the West and the United States in particular, proposed a mechanism for market sharing and political coordination among the major arms suppliers. This mechanism, it was argued, would give suppliers a powerful tool with which to impose stability in inter-state relations among Persian Gulf states. It is an open question whether this proposal had the complete support of the Soviet government or whether it was an initiative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<sup>9</sup> In any event, the United States showed no interest in pursuing the proposal. At this point, the level of Soviet arms exports might have been expected to increase if the Soviet Union intended to play a major role in shaping the security environment in the Persian Gulf. If Iran had proved to be a very lucrative market, the pressures for this approach would have been even greater. However, it appears that no new Russo-Iranian arms agreements were signed after this point. Subsequently, an informal agreement has been achieved between the United States and Russia: No new conventional arms agreements will be made with Iran.<sup>10</sup> Under these conditions, even the United States has come to accept that Iran has and will continue to have limited conventional military capabilities.<sup>11</sup>

In the geographical space which separates Russia and Iran, Russia has pursued an active arms transfer policy toward Armenia, Georgia, and Turkmenistan in particular.<sup>12</sup> This policy has included different elements at different times. When the arsenals of Soviet weapons were divided between the newly independent successor states, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and to a lesser extent, Turkmenistan, inherited large equipment inventories. As conflicts in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia rapidly escalated in the early 1990s, ownership, control, and physical custody of these arsenals was somewhat confused. This became the main factor contributing to the high level of militarization within the newly independent states. There have been many confirmed reports of raids on military installations and storage sites during which weapons and equipment were seized.<sup>13</sup> Nevertheless, there are also credible reports of Russian arms transfers to both government forces and non-government forces in Georgia. While the supporting evidence is not sufficiently detailed and documented to be beyond question, it has been argued that Russian authorities permitted arms transfers to both the forces loyal to former President Gamsakhurdia and to armed factions within Georgia supporting the cause of separate statehood for Abkhazia and Ossetia. Russia was also an important arms supplier to Armenia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Recently, there have been reports that Russian arms transfers to Armenia continued after 1994, when a cease-fire was declared in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

If it is true that Russian arms were transferred to factions in Georgia and to the government of Armenia after 1994, it need not mean that these transfers were politically motivated. It is possible that they occurred without the knowledge and consent of central authorities. Transfers may have been made by manufacturing enterprises that failed to apply for the required export authority or by units of the armed forces which sold equipment from inventory. Either of these forms of transfer would be illegal. It is also possible that transfers were made with the authority of the Russian Ministry of Defense. For a relatively short period, the agency Voentech, which reported directly to then Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev, was authorized to dispose of surplus equipment and stores. These transfers would have occurred according to a logic dictated by the needs of the Ministry of Defense rather than reflecting broader government policy, but it is not clear that they were illegal.<sup>14</sup>

### **Arms Transfers to the Southern Periphery**

While the balance in decision-making between politico-military factors and economic and industrial factors has changed, with politico-military factors becoming relatively less important, the information presented in this paper suggests that Russia would like to continue to use arms transfers as an instrument of its foreign and security policy. The transfer of arms to countries like Armenia, Georgia, and Turkmenistan brought little if any financial benefit to Russia. From the literature on the arms trade it is possible to identify several broad politico-military objectives of suppliers in framing their arms transfer policies.

Perhaps the most important politico-military characteristic of military assistance and arms transfers is to enable the recipient to perform tasks in which the supplier has a strong interest. Usually this is defense against external aggression in conditions where it is impossible for states to eliminate the threat of the use of force from their relations. Since the major arms suppliers are also the permanent members of the UN Security Council, they have a strong interest in conflict prevention. If states are unable to prevent conflict, it is the UN Security Council that will be charged with managing the subsequent problems and, given the finite resources of the UN "P5," prevention is better than administering a cure. The major powers also attempt to create and maintain an international status quo that favors their own perception of the common good: Arms transfers have played a role in this process.

Defense via credible conventional deterrence is usually agreed to be better than alternative forms of deterrence. Military assistance and arms transfers are sometimes argued to have played a role in allowing states such as Israel and Pakistan to avoid crossing the threshold to overt nuclear weapon state status.<sup>15</sup>

A second line of argument is that military assistance and arms transfers can provide a supplier with influence or leverage over the policies of a recipient. This influence or leverage can occur at different levels. Some authors suggest that re-

cipients of military assistance and arms transfers consciously or unconsciously develop patterns of thought and behavior which they would not otherwise develop as a result of their cooperation with the supplier. This, so the argument goes, need not translate into any specific influence or leverage in a given concrete situation, but can nevertheless benefit the supplier if recipients reach “better” decisions as a consequence of their learned patterns of thought and behavior.<sup>16</sup> Others argue that suppliers can gain direct influence or leverage through military assistance and arms transfers. For example, complex systems may be needed to perform a particular function that is important to the recipient, who may not be able to perform the range of tasks required to operate and maintain the equipment successfully. Under these conditions, the supplier can threaten to deny assistance if a recipient fails to behave in ways that the supplier considers appropriate.<sup>17</sup>

A third line of argument is that states may use arms transfers in a coercive way. The influence and leverage argument assumes that the supplier and recipient have good, or at least normal, relations. In fact, one of the main criticisms of this approach is that influence and leverage are not available because the supplier and recipient are important to one another, and therefore the threats are not credible in the eyes of the recipient.<sup>18</sup> Using arms transfers as an instrument of coercion implies an antagonistic relationship between governments. It would mean supplying arms to a foreign actor, not necessarily a government, with the deliberate intention of creating or raising the threat to a third party who would be the actual target of the policy.<sup>19</sup> In an extreme case, the supplier government may be indifferent to the specific needs and perspectives of the arms recipient and only concerned with the impact on the intended target of the transfer.

A plausible argument can be made that Russia has an interest in transfers of all three kinds. For example, by making arms transfers both to the central authorities in Georgia and to armed factions, the Russian government could remind Georgia that there were costs and benefits attached to decisions such as whether and how fully to participate in the Commonwealth of Independent States—an issue about which Georgia was ambivalent—and whether or not to support the Ukrainian position on issues such as ownership of the Black Sea fleet and access to port facilities. Similarly, arms transfers to Armenia could remind the government of Azerbaijan that there were costs and benefits attached to issues such as CIS participation, Caspian Sea oil concessions, and close alignment with Turkey.

The manner in which policy is being conducted suggests that Russian leaders have not abandoned the aspiration to play a major role in international relations in favor of a more limited and more inward-looking approach, at least not around the periphery of Russia. However, while the Russian government may wish to use arms transfers in this way, the evidence also suggests that they have a limited capacity to do so.

In the period after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian central government could not control developments in the post-Soviet space effectively.

In arms transfer policy, Russia was not able to create a decision-making system which could ensure that the conventional arms flow followed a pattern which met the national interest as defined by the government. The failure to produce a unified decision structure probably means that different agencies of the Russian government have been able to pursue different policies almost in isolation from one another. As of 1997, there is still no evidence that a unified decision-making system has been established in Russia. The absence of border controls, especially in regions where there were armed conflicts, and the wide dispersion of equipment inventories would have undermined the implementation of policies if they had been formulated.

Moreover, the approaches to arms transfer policy described above are not only applicable to inter-state or government-to-government relations. It is not universally agreed that governments and state agencies are the only legitimate possessors of conventional arms. There is no strong international norm against arms transfers to non-state actors. If anything, the recent tendency has reconfirmed that under some conditions there are legitimate reasons for transferring conventional arms to non-state actors.

In May 1996, the United Nations Disarmament Commission agreed by consensus on a document entitled "Guidelines for International Arms Transfers," which included a catalogue of principles that may govern such transfers.<sup>20</sup> No hierarchy was imposed on the catalogue, and some of the principles listed could be expected to lead to contradictory policy responses when translated into decisions by governments. Among these principles was "the right of self-determination of all peoples," taking into account "the particular situation of peoples under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation." The document confirmed "the right of peoples to take legitimate action in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to realize their inalienable right of self-determination." At the same time, the catalogue of principles affirmed "the sovereign equality of [UN] members," the principle of "non-interference in the internal affairs of states," and also, "the obligation of [UN] members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State."<sup>21</sup> The UN Guidelines take no position on a central issue in post-Cold War international security: the relationship between self-determination and state sovereignty. As a result, these "guidelines" fail to provide any guidance on many issues of importance, but rather leave governments with complete flexibility in decision-making.

During the Cold War, the formulations noted above regarding self-determination and anti-colonialism were used by the superpowers to justify arms transfers and military assistance to sub-national groups at war with their own governments. Both the United States (in Angola and Afghanistan) and the Soviet Union (in El Salvador and South Africa) frequently used arms transfers and military assistance in this way. However, it can be argued that the superpowers were in fact using arms transfers coercively to hurt each other or their proxies, rather than out

of general concern over principle or even because some issue of importance was at stake in the local conflict.<sup>22</sup>

After the end of the Cold War, the incentives to use arms transfers in this way might have been expected to diminish. However, in the area of arms transfers there is little evidence that Russia is fully committed to constructing a system of rules that would eliminate its power to act on a case-by-case basis.<sup>23</sup> A decision that state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states are absolute principles would be inconsistent with decisions to transfer arms to sub-state groups at war with their governments. At the same time, a decision that self-determination is a principle that should be more highly weighted would create difficulties for Russia in managing relations between the constituent parts of its own federation, especially in ethnically defined administrative units such as Chechnya and Tatarstan. It may be that no hierarchy of principles can be constructed. The specific correlation of political forces prevailing at any given time may be decisive in shaping policy.

Arms transfers may play an “enabling” role, contributing to stable conventional deterrence by enhancing defensive capabilities and shaping regional force balances. During the Cold War, it was common for the United States and the Soviet Union to be on different sides in disputes between countries. Now, with the new approach to foreign policy adopted in the Soviet Union and maintained by Russia, this pattern of arms transfer behavior might also be expected to change. As noted above, some analysts, including some Russians, have argued that Russian arms transfer policy toward Iran is evidence of an effort to create new power configurations to balance the overwhelming superiority of the Western states. The evidence presented above suggests that this would be, at best, a premature conclusion. In fact, it would appear that as of yet, no Russian policy been formed on this issue.

The post–Cold War international system has not crystallized into competing or antagonistic symmetrical blocs.<sup>24</sup> Some commentators say that “not yet” would be a more accurate characterization.<sup>25</sup> Other analysts believe that the post–Cold War international system will be characterized by a highly unequal distribution of power between states, with one state, the United States, holding a predominant position.<sup>26</sup> Under these conditions, competition will continue, but it will be conducted outside the framework of intergovernmental relations.<sup>27</sup> The best known argument in this vein is Samuel Huntington’s suggestion that fault-lines between civilizations (as he defines them) do not correlate with state boundaries. As a logical extension, agents which are not governments may see them-

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selves as acting in the legitimate interests of a civilization. Their actions, which might include the use of force, could be supported by states sharing a common identity.

A third line of argument is that international relations may be characterized more by cooperation than by confrontation. Within this general argument there are some variants. One is that states will submit a growing number of problems and tasks to international organizations rather than seeking to resolve them unilaterally or through ad hoc coalitions with other states.<sup>28</sup> A second variant is that cooperation will rest on the emergence of an agreed body of principles, rules, and norms which will reflect the self-interest of a security community's members, and thus will not need to be implemented through any formal institution or organization.<sup>29</sup>

Though evidence suggests that Russian policy in this area is not fully formed, a tentative conclusion might be that Moscow would like to participate in a cooperative system but is too weak to impose its views on others.

In recent years, Russia has proposed cooperative means of addressing security threats in the post-Cold War world. The suggestion of a managed approach to arms transfers to the Persian Gulf is one example. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was disappointed at the response to the proposal, though it is unclear how deeply anchored the suggestions were in other influential domestic power structures. Russia has also participated in multilateral forums in a progressively more constructive manner. The recently formed Wassenaar Arrangement, which addresses conventional arms transfer-related issues, is an example of this initiative.

The root causes of the challenges to Russia's security lie in the upheaval caused by the political, economic, and social revolution underway in the post-Soviet geographical space. Most of these challenges can only be met locally. However, it is likely that a patchwork will emerge in which different multilateral processes—some formal and some informal—acquire new tasks and new powers in an ad hoc way, depending on which approach seems best able to solve the particular problem at hand. Russian attitudes toward multilateral processes in the area of conventional arms transfers suggest that this form of diplomacy might be effective in achieving specific objectives if combined with bilateral engagement, and if some account is taken of Russian needs and interests. 

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> The following section is based on the findings of three SIPRI books which consider different aspects of post-Soviet security. These books are I. Anthony, ed. *Russia and the Arms Trade*; Vladimir Baranovsky, ed. *Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) and Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, *Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

<sup>2</sup> However, there is disagreement about whether the current levels of growth will continue and

whether Russia has good sales prospects over the longer term.

<sup>3</sup> Turkey, though geographically more removed, is also relevant in this equation, first because of its close links with Azerbaijan and second, because Russia has developed an arms transfer relationship with Turkey in spite of the latter's membership in NATO.

<sup>4</sup> D. Trenin, "Russia," *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*, SIPRI Research Report no. 12, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

<sup>5</sup> P. Goble, "Russia, Tehran and Berlin," *RFE/RL Newswire* 1, no. 11 (April 15); L. Fuller, "New Geopolitical Alliances on Russia's Southern Rim," *RFE/RL Newswire* 1, no. 12 (April 16, 1997).

<sup>6</sup> Some analysts continue to argue that Russia and Iran are likely to develop closer ties, largely in an effort to balance the power of the United States. For example, S. T. Hunter, "Closer ties for Russia and Iran", *Transition* (December 1995): 42–45.

<sup>7</sup> According to SIPRI estimates, in the two years 1990–91 the Soviet Union provided 75 percent of the major weapons delivered to Iran under agreements signed in 1988–89, that is, after the end of the Iraq–Iran War but before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Prior to 1990, the Soviet Union had supplied only a handful of weapons to Iran. During the decade of the 1980s, Iraq was among the most important Soviet arms clients.

<sup>8</sup> E. Arnett ed. *Military Capacity and the Risk of War: China, India, Pakistan and Iran*, SIPRI (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

<sup>9</sup> I. Anthony and V. Baranovsky, "National Security Policy Making in Post-Soviet Russia," paper presented to the Common Security Forum, Stockholm, September 10–11, 1996.

<sup>10</sup> Discussed in I. Anthony, S. Eckstein, and J.P. Zanders, "Multilateral Military-Related Export Controls," *SIPRI Yearbook 1997*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

<sup>11</sup> It is likely that Russia and Iran will cooperate on specific issues on an ad hoc basis. The most important of these issues is the trade in nuclear technology and materials which, at least for the moment, is seen as important by the Ministry of Atomic Energy in Russia, which is a powerful political actor. Russia argues that Iran, which is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has accepted IAEA safeguards on its nuclear facilities, is not a nuclear weapons proliferation risk. The United States does not share this view.

<sup>12</sup> This section is based on A. Sergounin, "Military-technical cooperation between the CIS member states," *Russia and the Arms Trade* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

<sup>13</sup> A recent discussion is contained in D. Darchiashvili, "Russian–Georgian Military Relations," *Georgia Profile* 1, no. 7–8 (July/August 1996): 11–18.

<sup>14</sup> After the publication of documents describing the transfers of arms to Armenia after 1994, statements from the Russian government have been carefully worded. The office of the President is distanced from the transactions, while the Ministry of Defense is consistently named as their point of origin. It has been disclosed that no payments were made to Russian state agencies in connection with the transfers. The possibility that individuals were paid remains open.

<sup>15</sup> L. A. Dunn, "Some reflections on the 'Dove's Dilemma'," *Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the Chain* (University of Wisconsin Press, 1971); T. Taylor, "Conventional Arms: The drives to export," *The Defense Trade: Demand, Supply and Control* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994).

<sup>16</sup> J. A. Cope, "International Military Education and Training: An Assessment," *McNair Paper no. 44* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, October 1995).

<sup>17</sup> G. Kemp, "Arms Transfers and the 'Back-end' Problem in Developing Countries," *Arms Transfers in the Modern World* (Praeger 1979).

<sup>18</sup> For example, it has been argued for the U.S.–Israel relationship that leverage does not exist because Israel does not believe that the United States would either leave it "in the lurch" in a crisis or push Israel into declaring itself to be in possession of nuclear weapons. T. Wheelock, "Arms for Israel: The Limits of Leverage," *International Security* 3, no. 2, (Fall 1978). At the same time, U.S. policy during the 1973 Arab–Israeli War can be argued to demonstrate that the United States will

use leverage even with close allies if the stakes are considered to be high enough. In that case, arms transfer policy was used to underline to Israel that the annihilation of the Egyptian 3rd Army would not be accepted.

<sup>19</sup> There are also historical cases in which states have transferred arms to enemies in an effort to exert influence. U.S. arms transfers to Iran during the 1980s are an example of this approach.

<sup>20</sup> Guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991, UN Document A/CN.10/1996/CRP.3/3 May 1996.

<sup>21</sup> Guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991, UN Document A/CN.10/1996/CRP.3/3 May 1996.

<sup>22</sup> U.S. support for opposition forces in Afghanistan is perhaps the clearest example in that two former Directors of Central Intelligence have said that this was their objective. Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996): 348–50 and William Casey in R. Woodward, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–87* (London: Simon & Schuster, 1987): 385.

<sup>23</sup> It should be added that analysis of the arms transfer policies of other major suppliers would probably lead to the same finding. For this reason, the newly formed multilateral regime known as the Wassenaar Arrangement was unable to develop stronger rules and norms.

<sup>24</sup> No effort is made here to make a comprehensive summary of theories about the possible characteristics of the post–Cold War international order. References are only to theories which are relevant to the argument being advanced in this article.

<sup>25</sup> C. Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why new great powers will arise,” *International Security* 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993). Similarly, a theme in some discussions of European security is that new blocs will inevitably form after new members join the NATO alliance. At different times, other commentators have identified countries like China, the European Union (or even a resurgent Germany), India and Japan to emerge in the future as power centers whose relationship with the United States will almost certainly be antagonistic as a consequence of the inherent nature of the international system.

<sup>26</sup> Power in this formulation means the ability of one actor, usually but not always a government, to influence the behavior of others, who may or may not be governments. S. P. Huntington, “Why International Primacy Matters,” *International Security* 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993).

<sup>27</sup> S. P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993).

<sup>28</sup> For example, an interview with Ambassador Olara Otunnu, Director of the International Peace Academy, in “Security after the Cold War: Emerging Perspectives,” *The Boston Review* 18, no. 3–4 (June–August, 1993). This type of argument was more common in the period 1992–93 than it has subsequently become.

<sup>29</sup> E. A. Kolodziej, “US-Russian Regional Cooperation: Redefining Mutual Expectations,” *Cooperative Security: Reducing Third World Wars* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995).