
Nation Building: The View from the Pointy End of the Spear

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Of course nation building should be an integral part of US foreign policy. Modern Western political thought is fairly straightforward here. Economic growth, assuming that the rewards are distributed in a reasonable fashion, leads to political stability. In turn, nations which exhibit political stability more often than not also align themselves with Western (and/or US) positions on the world scene. This general line of reasoning is insensitive to political orientation (liberal and conservative) and, as a consequence, we should have little or no difficulty agreeing that nation building, with its intentions of economic growth and political progress culminating in a representative democracy, should be an integral part of US foreign policy.

However, that is not the point. It is no more useful to say that nation building is a worthwhile way to solve the problems of the developing world than it is to suggest that the solution to poverty is widespread wealth. Of course the solution to poverty is widespread wealth; the issue is how to accomplish it. The same is true with nation building. We cannot be content with trivial declarations; we have to deal with concrete questions and issues of implementation. Which nations are to be built? Who will build them? What model will be used? And—most importantly for this article—which instruments of national power are most suitable for the task?

Clearly, we cannot build *every* nation which needs to be built—our

resources are limited. However, the question ranges well beyond the classic case of finite resources in the face of infinite demands. We have to face the fact that not all nations *can* be “built;” some nations probably should not exist in the first place, having been created from artificial constructs at the end of various colonial periods. We also have to face the fact that we do not yet have a mold for the casting of nations; our record with nation building is rather miserable.

Our point in this article is to look at the problem from “the pointy end of the spear”—the military. It is the military forces that will be thrust into the task of nation building. As with Panama, Grenada, Haiti, Somalia, Lebanon, Bosnia, and even Vietnam, it is the military that will be asked to step in and accomplish a preliminary peacemaking or peace-keeping role, from which a nation held in check can be “built.” Through its civil affairs units, it is the military that will remain long after the media’s storm troopers have departed and the public’s attention has been diverted elsewhere.

It is our military who will stay on to train the new nation’s military, consolidate civilian control, and establish a separate, new police force to attend to domestic security. It is our military, through its civil engineering units, who will stay on and build the infrastructure necessary for economic growth. It is our military, as “the pointy end of the spear,” who will dwell in the guts and bowels of the problem and it is this perspective that we shall assume here. And, we will tell you right now that the mission stinks. It is a dirty, awful, ugly mission which, if it must be done at all, should be done by someone else.

We, meaning the military, probably should not be doing nation building—except in our own national interests.

The memory of Vietnam is too fresh in the minds of the military. To senior military leadership the phrase “no more Vietnams” means never again being placed on the battlefield without fairly clear objectives and a reasonably well understood “way out.” It means never again going into a situation where there is no solid base of public support and a widespread understanding of why the military is being asked to perform the mission. It means never again being hung out to dry, abandoned on the battlefield by political leaders who lost their mettle after a taste of failure—a failure which they only sampled while soldiers drowned in the flood of discontent. Nation building, for all of its good intentions, smacks of Vietnam in the worst way. We need to think long and hard before we launch our troops down this path again and recall that we did not build our military to walk this path in the first place.

Our military exists to defend the United States against “threats” which have traditionally been defined in terms of US national interests. This is a classical approach to foreign policy. It produces a military whose focus is on overseas enemies rather than on domestic unrest. In a Realist’s world, nations are the principal actors on the world scene, having both the right and the obligation to control events internal to their borders. Therefore, under this principle, Realist arguments for military intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries cite a rather narrow range of goals: self-defense, response to territorial aggression, sheer conquest, commercial advantage over rivals, and assuring the repayment of debts.

However, Globalist arguments in favor of expanding the role of the military to include this task of nation building usually begin by refuting the concept of national interests as dated and irrelevant. These arguments in favor of nation building then weave in some version of a New World Order, which has replaced the tenets of Realism as a basis for international relations and foreign policy—hence, codifying a new Globalist orientation which replaces national interests. In a New World Order, it is argued that few, if any, events are truly “internal” and that few, if any, nations can really control internal events. In this New World Order the primacy of nations is irrelevant, existing only as a temporary skeleton on which to hang the flesh of World Government and a Globalist orientation.

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Examples of these new global issues include the effects of industrial pollution (including destruction of the natural environment), the general condition of humans (especially those who suffer violations of their human rights), and the absence of economic or political progress (for instance, historically impoverished regions in civil wars). A Globalist view of this so-called New World Order establishes not only a right, but a moral or ethical obligation for active interventionism. Under the earlier Realist paradigm such intervention, if it was considered at all, would only have been contemplated under the rubric of national interests. Under the Globalist view, intervention can be justified on the basis of need, capability, or even a sense of obligation.

With this approach, the problems of nations quickly become the problems of the world, crying out for international solutions. Lack of

economic progress, and corresponding political unrest in any single country eventually will erupt and becomes an issue which demands world resolution. Rather than waiting for these disasters to occur, we should pursue a preventive policy of nation building, seeking economic development and stabilization which will permit better allocation of the world's scarce resources. As the richest nation in the world, and the world's sole remaining superpower, we have an obligation to undertake this role of nation building and it is our military forces which will be reformed and honed to that mission.

This Globalist view of the world, and our role in it, is arrogant, representing an extreme position along three axes. First, it is extreme in its naiveté that we in the West, or in particular in the US, should assume such a role. It is like seeing Andrew Lloyd Webber versions of *Manifest Destiny* and *White Man's Burden*, where the angels sing choruses of Righteousness while developing world musicians and dancers respond to our orchestration, all in front of the crypt of national sovereignty. Who are we to say that we should write the words, the music, or even the story-line for human progress? It is a large risk, which has always tempted disaster, to base foreign policy exclusively on ethical-moral foundations.

America has done well, and we certainly have every right to be proud of ourselves and even to dance on the Berlin Wall after the Cold War; that's fine, and well earned. But the country which returns the likes of Marion Barry to the mayoralty of its capital city, allows a banking crisis of a magnitude which exceeds the gross domestic product of 85 percent of the world's nations, and has a violent crime rate which surpasses almost every other nation, has no right to *dictate* or otherwise forcibly impose its political, economic, or social structure on anyone. Having done well, we should advertise our wares. We should probably share our intellectual accomplishments and material gains to help others make progress. But we should always remember that all nations are entitled, even compelled, to protect their physical borders, political structures, and cultural identities against the encroachment of others.

Second, these Globalists free themselves of the responsibility of priority setting. They forget that we cannot intervene and nation build in each and every place where we see a crisis of the human condition, industrial aggression against the environment, or civil wars which ravage the common people. Without the ability to solve all of these problems, we must choose which ones will get our attention. Since there must be choice, one has to ask: what is the basis of choice? Which nation, among the many nations in economic and political chaos, will be stabilized and then rebuilt?

If we let it be known that we will answer all requests for interven-

tion, then we shall surely be overwhelmed by such requests. "The mice will roar." Nor can the basis of choice be "need" because those with the greatest need are, more often than not, those who use resources least efficiently. Nations in the greatest "need" are, all too often, those who have handicapped themselves by their own systems of government. In these cases, "aid" only perpetuates a government which enslaves or otherwise mistreats its own citizens. Where internal differences have not yet been settled, aid can prolong a conflict.

Finally, one might better appreciate the failure of "aid" as a tool of development if one considers its opposite—embargo, or absolute denial of "aid" of any form. Here, if nation building generates success, then its opposite, embargo, should generate failure. Such is clearly not the case. Quite often, deprivation of aid in the form of an embargo often makes political despots even more powerful by giving them additional leverage—the power of rationing even scarcer resources. Perhaps even worse is what happened in South Africa, where an embargo was levied to facilitate the demise of apartheid, yet it so weakened that country that the Mandela government now has few fiscal resources with which to rebuild. Thus, the embargo may become a self-fulfilling prophesy for those who predicted that a black government would fail.¹ Unfortunately the extreme difficulties and potential failure are a result of the policies which the international community took to bring its existence about in the first place.

Nation building, or aid in nearly any form, may work best in an environment of benign neglect. Indeed, some of the best cases of economic growth and political stability have occurred in those areas where they have been left to their own devices. Consider Chile. Perhaps the best thing that ever happened to the nation of Chile was the Kennedy amendment, which forbade US government "assistance." To the chagrin of many American liberals, Chile was left on its own but developed quickly according to its own systems and beliefs—now it is the economic powerhouse of South America. Cuba, North Korea, Iraq, and Israel have all endured similar or even harsher embargoes yet they have been remarkably slow to alter the main goals of their foreign and domestic policy.

Thus aid as a tool of progress fails fundamental tests of logic at both ends of the spectrum (full application and embargo) and may well work best when it is not applied at all (benign neglect).

There are also nations or regions of the world where the concept of nation building is wholly irrelevant—in spite of their horribly impoverished conditions. Consider Bangladesh. Bangladeshis make the news only when the Ganges floods or nature strikes from the clouds. They "need" everything but can do little with what is given except multiply

their numbers who, in turn, need even more aid. While we may well have to carry these “basket case” nations, we should not expect them to blossom into self-sustaining entities. If we are to “aid” these cases, we should admit that it is simply alms to the poor—with no expectations of growth, stability, or progress.

The ultimate basis of nation building must be *long-term* national interests. If the government is going to expend the nation’s resources for a long period of time, then the taxpayers have a right to expect some benefits. Unless they are willing to be charitable in the grand sense (which we doubt), these benefits need to be weighed against their prospective costs. As crass as it may seem, and as much as we might wish it were not true, it is simply the only remaining policy choice—we do it because it makes sense in our own national interests—a concept which is still alive and well, in spite of academic pundits who would have killed it long ago. As long as the world is divided into nations, and those nations operate according to Realist principles, national interests and national power will (and should) shape foreign policy far more than some sort of ethical or moral vision which favors nation building as an end in and of itself.

Our military does have some history of nation building. But it is not necessarily pretty.

Practically every nation has, in one way or another, used its military for nation building. Beginning with our colonial experience, and certainly carrying forward to the closing of the frontier in the 1890s, the American military, and in particular the US Cavalry, built major parts of our nation. America’s Land Grant Colleges, the ROTC programs which were compulsory for male students, and later VA educational benefits, built a national base of literacy and social mobility in the United States which was probably not attainable otherwise. Even in modern times the Army’s Corps of Engineers builds dams and bridges across Middle America and responds to natural disasters on a regular basis.

The first American experience with military involvement in nation building began with the arrival of Columbus and did not end until late in the 19th century with the Indian Wars. Although quite unavoidable, given the European expansion throughout North America, these wars have left a bitter legacy for both the victorious US Army and the defeated Indians. One might think that the pain and suffering of these wars would somehow affect current American thinking on the wisdom of military involvement in nation building, but such is not the case. At best, these wars are remembered as travesties in integrity as the American Government successively made and broke treaties with the Indian Nations. At

worst, the Indian Wars are remembered as White Genocide against the Native Americans.

Rarely, if ever, are they treated as the insoluble dilemma that they were—a protracted conflict, as near to domestic terrorism as America has ever seen, in which dead settlers and soldiers outnumbered the dead Indians—and as a political nightmare which troubled several generations of American policy makers almost as much it bedeviled the US Army of the time.

Perhaps the greatest Indian fighter of them all was Nelson A. Miles, who urged his fellow citizens in 1879 to abolish US Army rule over the Indians—the nation building project of its day—and use non-military institutions to bind the country together;

...after nearly four hundred years of conflict between the European and American races for supremacy on this continent, a conflict in which war and peace have alternated almost as frequently as the seasons, we still have presented the question, 'What shall be done with the Indian?'... The real issue in the question which is now before the American people is whether we shall ever begin again the vacillating and expensive policy that has marred our fair name as a nation and a Christian people, or devise some way of still improving the practical and judicious system by which we can govern a quarter of a million of our population...and put an end forever to these interminable and expensive Indian wars.²

Miles' specific proposal was for the President to transfer responsibility from the War Department to the Interior Department for any tribe so "civilized and peaceable" as to no longer require military control.³ Departmental names have changed over the intervening century, but Miles' plea could have applied just as poignantly to a host of other cases of nation building which have confronted this nation.

The other great case of US military involvement in building our own nation was post-Civil War Reconstruction. Under the Military Reconstruction Act of 1867, the eleven defeated Confederate States came under martial law. Five military districts were created, each commanded by an army general, to rule the South until Black suffrage was guaranteed. Congress also directed that all orders from the Secretary of War and the President must pass through the General of the Armies, who could not be replaced without the consent of the Senate. Thus the Congress both weakened the President's power as Commander in Chief and deprived the South of many traditional restraints upon rule by the army.⁴

The Army paid a heavy price for its role in rebuilding the shattered nation. Over half of the military manpower went towards securing unpopular state governments, defending federal authorities, and enforcing the new voting laws. Such onerous duties were devastating for morale, discipline, and professionalism. Worse, a wave of anti-military

sentiment swept the country. Under President Grant, Congress cut the Army from forty-five to twenty-five infantry regiments, and regular officers counted themselves lucky to confront the Native Americans on the frontier instead of protecting the Blacks in the former Confederacy.⁵ Throughout the emerging West as well as the defeated South, military commanders constantly clashed with civilian authorities due to their intertwining roles, missions, and chains of command. Such endless bickering within the government inflicted one additional casualty upon the military: a national inability to formulate a consistent strategic policy until at least the turn of the century.⁶

The first step toward correcting the confusion over military and civilian functions came in 1878 with the passage of the first Posse Comitatus Act. Not only did it reflect the legacy of both the Reconstruction and the Indian Wars, it also has major implications for the military role in nation building down to the present day. In general, Congress declared that the militia, not the army, was responsible for executing laws, suppressing insurrection, and quelling riots. More specifically, the act provided:

...it shall not be lawful to employ any part of the Army of the United States as a *posse comitatus* or otherwise under the pretext or for the purpose of executing the laws, except in such cases and under such circumstances as such employment of said force may be expressly authorized by act of Congress... .⁷

America's seizure of the Philippines in 1898 gave the US Army its first experience with nation building beyond our borders. An occupation that lasted some fifty years proved no less bitter than the Indian Wars and Reconstruction, as defeating the Spaniards proved to be far easier, quicker, and cheaper than subduing the Filipino nationalists. Again and again, the Army promised victory but then discovered that resistance was far from over. By 1902, some fifty thousand US troops were assigned to the country, encountering the same pattern of atrocity and counter-atrocity as in every protracted war.

The Army Chief of Staff at this time was none other than Nelson A. Miles, and he examined the military role in the Philippines with the same logic that he had previously applied to the Indians. In a display of political incorrectness that angered both the Roosevelt Administration and the War Department, he forbade the torturing of prisoners, urged for the release of exiled Filipino statesmen, and advocated an end to the military administration of the country:

...in my judgment the sooner we allow them to establish a government that would be for their benefit as well as ours, both in close diplomatic and commercial interests, the sooner we will have the glory of having established the first republic in the Orient.⁸

Again and again, the US Army and Marine Corps were ordered first to occupy and then to pacify specific countries, especially in the Caribbean, Central America, and the Pacific Rim. With few exceptions, these adventures achieved little long term benefit, lasting longer than expected, costing more

than planned, corroding military professionalism, and convincing many foreigners that the United States was no more than just another colonial or imperialist power.

Perhaps the most dramatic successes in foreign nation building are the cases of Germany and Japan. Although, as even the most casual observer must be willing to admit, their circumstances were vastly different than any case which presents itself today. Both Germany and Japan submitted to unconditional surrender. War criminals were tried and hung. World opinion allowed, even dictated, a wholesale restructuring of the political foundation by drafting and implementing new constitutions while under the temporary control of victorious military governments. Foreign military troops were stationed in both countries for many years following the War. Perhaps of greatest importance, both of these countries were formerly very well developed nations, with mature political and robust physical infrastructures. As such, Germany and Japan were actually re-built rather than built. Today's calls for nation building involve countries with drastically weaker circumstances and permit no such firm mandate for intervention and change.

Three other cases of Cold War nation building deserve mention: the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Republic of China (ROC, i.e. Taiwan), and Iran. All were extensive, costly programs, which the US undertook with the enthusiastic support of the host governments. The ROK and Taiwan both managed to build dynamic market economies and moved steadily towards democracy. Even so, the very existence of these superb new nations has posed painful dilemmas for Washington. The Cold War is over, but US foreign policy is still held hostage by Korean tensions along the 38th Parallel and Chinese disputes over the future of Taiwan. As for Iran, it must rank with Vietnam as one of the greatest object lessons in why not to nation build. Our efforts to democratize the Shah's government, reform land ownership, and liberate the women—as well as develop the economy and modernize the Iranian armed forces—met with spectacular success for a time but ultimately exacerbated the country's social tensions. Instead of a moderate, pro-Western nation, the Mullahs built a brutal theocracy which has spawned bloody conspiracies in a host

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of countries and worked feverishly to frustrate the Middle East peace process.

Other nations have a better record of nation building than the United States.

Having berated America's attempts to perform both domestic and foreign nation building, it is interesting to note that other nations, in modern times, have generated more successful records. Much can be learned by reflecting upon the behavior of two countries which are just as democratic as the United States and perhaps a bit more civilized: Canada and the United Kingdom. The British stand second to none in the ratio of their armed forces that they assign to humanitarian efforts around the world, yet their presence in Northern Ireland may have delayed, rather than fostered, nation building in that unhappy place.

The Canadians deserve special attention, not only for their practical support for virtually every peacekeeping effort but also for their academic insights. More than any other single journal, Toronto's *Peacekeeping & International Relations* provides a powerful and thoughtful forum for exchanging current information about the military's role in peace operations and nation building. In restrained but caustic words, its editors have periodically accused the United States of excessive readiness to use military force in support of good causes. Consider, for example, their assessment of the Bosnian situation:

The USA representatives appear to hold the view that simply because bombing had been approved by the UN Security Council, it ought automatically to be approved, no matter what the situation on the ground or the opinions of those civilian and military personnel best qualified to assess the overall circumstances.⁹

While this criticism of America's approach may hit the mark, it will not alter the fact that America approaches these problems as the sole remaining superpower (hence, it expects to "dictate" policy in many regards) and that America's presence, even if benign, is a lightning rod for groups opposing intervention by outside forces. Crudely put, it is not "fun" to shoot Canadians or Swiss, but it seems to be great sport for the terrorists of this world to target Americans. Sometimes, for reasons which defy logic, the simple presence of Americans (military or civilians) inflames a situation—even when their purpose is to provide aid, comfort, and assistance.

Nor are we culturally attuned to the mission of nation building. The American Body Politic is not a patient master. Seldom, if ever, have we exhibited the sort of long term, low threshold, consistent effort it

would likely take to build a nation from the ground up. Seldom, if ever, do we exhibit the temperament to learn another nation's or region's culture (especially a small, under developed nation), so that we can be sensitive to its needs rather than our own requirements.

We are not organized, in the military, to take a cultural approach. Our service members have been hired for their technical skills. We hire engineers, not cultural anthropologists or sociologists. We train combat crew members, not farmers and teachers. And "...we don't Mirandize, we vaporize."¹⁰ The American military—the instrument under consideration for this task of nation building—is designed to destroy nations so they can be rebuilt by others, and not the other way around.

Nor is the American national security apparatus attuned to the task of nation building. Nation building, taken in its literal sense, would imply that we might build one nation at a time. Nothing could be less useful in terms of policy implementation. A regional approach, building one nation and its neighbors simultaneously, is the only approach that could even remotely hope to succeed. Problems which might be addressed by nation building cross boundaries; they are not often limited to political boundaries. Unfortunately, the only entity which has regional authority and the right orientation to orchestrate such a project is the military Commander in Chief (or CinC) Structure (e.g. Southern Command for South America). The Ambassador structure is clearly inadequate—each Ambassador has influence only within a single nation, not across borders. Even the State Department's regional bureaus are inadequate—they focus on the Washington environment, not regional development. One has to doubt, seriously, if nation building would ever be turned over to a military CinC or even whether the military CinC would be staffed and equipped to perform the task.

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In sum, the American military, and perhaps the American national security apparatus at large, is not suited for this task of nation building. Where we have tried we have failed, in both domestic and foreign situations. In the post-Cold War period the situation is made worse by the lightning rod aspect of American presence. Even if we were asked to perform this task, we are scarcely organized to do it, nor do we have the personnel or the training. It is morally and ethically wrong to send American troops into a situation which is doomed to failure—as Somalia was—and military members have every right and obligation to object to

such missions on these grounds.

The policy options.

If one takes the opening premise as correct, that is, that nations should be built and that US foreign policy must see to it that they are built in a certain fashion, and one also accepts the theme of this article that the active duty forces should not do the building, then what are the policy options for the US?

Fortunately, there is some evidence that US policy makers are learning from these criticisms. The shining light is the possibility of using the militia rather than the active forces for nation building. Here the Maryland National Guard has undertaken a small, cheap, and highly effective program to work with Estonia. Since October 1993, four and five-member teams from Maryland have advised the Estonians on how to set up border patrols, deal with nuclear accidents, and fight organized crime. Estonians have also visited Maryland to learn the American approach to military police, emergency response, medical systems, and political institutions. The project is headed by Lt. Col. James Adkins, who has a clear understanding of the wisest way to build nations: "The key thing is that we don't want to Americanize them—we show them and let them do what they want to do."¹¹

This approach has many advantages. Not only is it wholly voluntary, from the perspective of the gaining nation, it involves citizen soldiers who are inherently less threatening to both Estonian public opinion and their Russian neighbors (who harbor deep suspicions about NATO intentions toward the former Baltic republics of the Soviet Union). From the American perspective, such a National Guard initiative is perfectly controllable by State Department and DOD authorities, but it constitutes a far smaller commitment or intrusion by the US Government than would a regular unit. So, at least one policy option would be to allow the militia to perform this task rather than the active duty forces.

A second option would be to "contract" for the services of such nations as Sweden or Canada. These nations have a strong, and well deserved reputation for fairness and cultural sensitivity, and they do not generate the lightning rod effect as does the US. These nations have well established schools and training facilities where they send their soldiers for "cultural training"—sometimes for as much as six months before they are deployed into a region. Such training is specifically designed to take away their "soldier" or "warrior" orientation and adopt a completely different mentality. These nations could serve as guideposts and focal points for nation building policies and practices. America could send

volunteers, or detail its soldiers, and even provide financing. But America should not be in the lead.

A third option would be benign neglect. Our Globalist colleagues will not accept this option easily, but it is real nonetheless. Underpinning this option would be a belief that most national or cultural under-development might better be called mal-development. Nations, or cultures, left alone to develop but linked to the world community through free trade, will make their own best choices. Some nations or cultures will fail, but they will learn from those experiences. This practical exercise in decision making may be destructive during the short term, but it is far better in the long run than any “learning” which could be superimposed by outside forces. To leave them alone, but to leave our own door open, may well be the best policy. No matter what, benign neglect should not be given a short shrift and summarily dismissed. It is a serious policy option.

The conclusion: A wise man does not walk into a thunderstorm carrying a lightning rod.

We should not be deceived by our own rhetoric or blinded by our successes. Nation building, especially nation building by military forces, is intervention by another name. Nation building from some perspectives inevitably means nation destroying, as the Native Americans and the Old South discovered. Certain ethnic groups, social strata, and religious factions may build their nations with America’s military help, but others will lose what little they have. At least some of them will blame America for their sorrows and swell the ranks of our enemies. Unless it is clearly in our national interests, and a firm, broad, base of public support can be built for the action, then nation building is probably best left alone.

Whichever policy option is selected, it should not thrust the spear of American armed forces into the belly of other cultures. We need to get our policy makers off of the ether and down to earth—where *we the people* are. Our policy makers should not send spear carriers where they would not go themselves, or where they tuned in, turned on, dropped out, and then cried out when we went before. Ⓜ

Notes

The views expressed in this article are the views of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Naval War College, the US Navy, or the Department of Defense.

¹ South Africa also justified its apparent decision to develop nuclear weapons in response to this embargo. According to the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* (vol. 50, No. 4, July/August 1994), South Africa constructed seven fairly large, dirty, nuclear weapons at a cost of less than \$1 Billion. Embargoes generate strange and unpredictable responses—usually to the detriment of those invoking the embargo, and nearly always counter to any reasonable policy objectives.

² Nelson A. Miles, *Serving the Republic: Memoirs of the Civil and Military Life of Nelson A. Miles, Lieutenant-General, United States Army* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1911), 196-197.

³ Miles, 206

⁴ David Lindsey, *Americans in Conflict: The Civil War and Reconstruction* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1974), 166, and Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., *The Civilian and the Military: A History of the American Antimilitarist Tradition* (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, 1972), 109-111.

⁵ S.L.A. Marshall, *Crimsoned Prairie: The Indian Wars* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1972), 93-94, and Robert Wooster, *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1965-1903* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 13-14.

⁶ Russell Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1967), 187-188.

⁷ For a recent and authoritative review, see Office of the Assistant Attorney General, *Memorandum for General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, National Security Council, Re: Extraterritorial Effect of the Posse Comitatus Act*, (November 3, 1989), 4-6. We are indebted for this citation to Commander Alicia M. Nemec, JAGC, USN, "The Viability of Posse Comitatus in Defining Future Missions for the Military," Unpublished Paper, October 20, 1994.

⁸ Miles, 307-308. See also Norman F. Tolman, *The Search for General Miles* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1968), 237-245.

⁹ "From the Editor," *Peacekeeping and International Relations*, Vol. 23, No. 3, May/June 1994, 1.

¹⁰ A phrase often used by Dr. Larry Korb, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics and now Director of Public Policy Studies at the Brookings Institute, with respect to using military forces for police duties and the Miranda decision.

¹¹ Robert A. Erlandson, "Maryland Guard helping to rebuild Estonia," *Baltimore Sun*, October 19, 1994: A13.