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SECRET

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 7 STATE 000000/1

CFR REPORT, INFORM CONSULS, CINC/SHAPE/MAC FOR POLADS ONLY

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CFR TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. PA - AMERICANS RATE THE U.S. AND 25 OTHER COUNTRIES
2. INR - SOUTHEAST ASIAN REACTIONS TO THE MILITARY COUP
IN THAILAND
3. EUR - PORTUGUESE SOCIALISTS PASS LOCAL ELECTION TEST
4. ACDA - MBFR NEGOTIATIONS
5. AF - BOTSWANA SECURITY PROBLEMS
6. AF - CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC BECOMES CENTRAL AFRICAN
EMPIRE
7. EB - IMPACT ON THE PRICE OF OIL OF OPEC'S TWO-TIER
PRICING DECISION
8. NEA - ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER RESIGNS
9. NEA - INITIAL VIEW OF EGYPTIAN-SYRIAN ANNOUNCEMENT

ACTION
POL-2

INFO
AMB
DCM
ECON-2
CONS
USIS
ADMIN
DAO
SC/1
AID
FAS
LEGAT
CHRON
RCS
POUGH
RIO
SAO
REC
BEL
SAL
PA

10. ARA - MANLEY WINS BY A LANDSLIDE IN JAMAICA
11. IO - 31ST UNGA CLOSES
12. S/S-O - SEASONS GREETINGS

1. PA - AMERICANS RATE THE U.S. AND 25 OTHER COUNTRIES
(UNCLASSIFIED)

DURING THIS SEASON OF GOODWILL, THE GALLUP POLL HAS RELEASED A TALLY OF HOW MUCH GOODWILL THE AMERICAN PUBLIC FEELS TOWARD 25 OTHER COUNTRIES AS WELL AS THE U.S.

AMONG FOREIGN COUNTRIES, CANADA WAS VIEWED MOST FAVORABLY, SLIGHTLY AHEAD OF SWITZERLAND. CUBA WAS VIEWED LEAST FAVORABLY, BEHIND COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION.

RESPONDENTS WERE ASKED TO RATE COUNTRIES EITHER POSITIVELY (FROM PLUS 5 DOWN TO PLUS 1) OR NEGATIVELY (FROM MINUS 1 DOWN TO MINUS 5). THE U.S. CAME OUT ON TOP OF THE LIST, WITH A TOTAL POSITIVE RATING OF 96.

THE U.S. HAS RISEN IN SELF-ESTEEM SINCE THIS QUESTION WAS LAST ASKED, IN 1973. THAT YEAR, THE TOTAL APPROVAL WAS 94 PERCENT, WITH 74 PERCENT PUTTING THE U.S. IN THE TOP TWO CATEGORIES. THIS YEAR, 85 PERCENT PLACED THE U.S. IN THE TWO TOP CATEGORIES.

THE OVERALL TOTAL WHO RANKED EACH FOREIGN COUNTRY AT ANY POINT ON THE POSITIVE SCALE WAS AS FOLLOWS:

75 PERCENT AND OVER: CANADA (91), SWITZERLAND (88), ENGLAND (87), AUSTRALIA (85), HOLLAND (85), SWEDEN (77), WEST GERMANY (77), JAPAN (75).

50-74 PERCENT: FRANCE (74), MEXICO (74), PHILIPPINES (74), ITALY (68), BRAZIL (66), ISRAEL (65), ARGENTINA (60), POLAND (60), INDIA (56), TAIWAN (55), SOUTH AFRICA (54), CHILE (51).

LESS THAN 50 PERCENT: EGYPT (49), IRAN (48), RUSSIA (21), COMMUNIST CHINA (20), CUBA (15).

RUSSIA REACHED ITS HIGH IN 1973, 45 PERCENT. ITS RATING THIS YEAR HAS MORE THAN HALVED, BUT IS STILL FAR ABOVE THE 1 PERCENT FAVORABLE RATING IT RECEIVED FROM AMERICANS IN 1953, WHEN THIS QUESTION WAS INITIATED.

CUBA, THOUGH LEAST FAVORED OF THE 25 COUNTRIES, IS WELL ABOVE THE RATING IT RECEIVED THE ONLY OTHER TIME IT APPEARED IN THIS SERIES, 1967, WHEN IT RECEIVED A FAVORABLE RATING OF 6 PERCENT.

COMMUNIST CHINA IS ALSO UP FROM ITS INITIAL TALLY, 5 PERCENT IN 1967.

2. INR - SOUTHEAST ASIAN REACTIONS TO THE MILITARY COUP IN THAILAND (CONFIDENTIAL/GDS)

IN REACTION TO THE THAI MILITARY COUP IN OCTOBER,

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REPORT, INFORM CONSULS, CINC/SHAPE/MAC FOR POLADS ONLY

COOPERATION IN THE ASSEMBLY TO FORCE LEGISLATIVE ACTION AT THE RAPID PACE EARNES AND THE OPERATIONAL MILITARY WILL DEMAND.

4. ACDA--MBFR NEGOTIATIONS (SECRET)

ON DECEMBER 16, 1976, THE WESTERN DELEGATION AT THE VIENNA MBFR NEGOTIATIONS TABLED UPDATED DATA ON NATO MILITARY MANPOWER IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE WEST INDICATED THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD 731,000 GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA. THE WEST CONTENDS THAT THE EAST HAS MORE THAN 925,000 MEN IN THE AREA OF NEGOTIATIONS; HOWEVER, THE EAST CLAIMS THAT IT MAINTAINS ONLY 805,000 GROUND FORCES. IN THE NEXT ROUND OF THE TALKS, BEGINNING IN THE FIRST WEEK OF FEBRUARY, BOTH SIDES WILL BEGIN A DISCUSSION OF THE "COUNTING RULES" THEY USED IN ARRIVING AT THEIR FIGURES IN AN ATTEMPT TO CLARIFY THE REASONS BEHIND THE DISCREPANCY IN THE DATA. THIS DISCUSSION COULD BE SIGNIFICANT IN INDICATING WHETHER THE EAST IS LIKELY TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS.

THE WEST IS SEEKING APPROXIMATE PARITY IN THE FORM OF A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING ON MILITARY MANPOWER, TO BE REACHED THROUGH MUTUAL REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING, ON THE EASTERN SIDE, REDUCTION OF AN INTEGRAL SOVIET TANK ARMY. BECAUSE THE EAST HAS A GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ADVANTAGE OF OVER 150,000 IN THE AREA, THE WEST CONTENDS THAT ASYMMETRICAL MANPOWER REDUCTIONS, WITH THE EAST WITHDRAWING APPROXIMATELY THREE TIMES AS MANY MEN AS THE WEST, ARE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE PARITY. THE EAST CLAIMS AN ESSENTIAL BALANCE OF FORCE ALREADY EXISTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THUS PROPOSES EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS FOR BOTH SIDES.

THE WEST HAD TABLED DATA ON BOTH EASTERN AND WESTERN TROOP STRENGTH WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN IN DECEMBER 1973. AFTER INTENSIVE WESTERN PRODDING, THE EAST ON JUNE 10, 1976, TABLED DATA ON ITS FORCES, BUT THESE DATA SHOWED ONLY A SMALL DISPARITY WHEN COMPARED WITH THE WEST'S 1973 FIGURES.

THE WEST HAD INTENDED TO TABLE UPDATED DATA ON ITS TROOP STRENGTH IN JUNE AND ENGAGE THE EAST IN A DISCUSSION OF COUNTING RULES. BUT THIS COURSE WAS BLOCKED BY FRANCE WHICH OBJECTED TO BOTH THE INCLUSION OF FRG-BASED FRENCH TROOPS (ABOUT 60,000 MEN) IN THE WESTERN DATA AND TO THEIR INCLUSION IN THE OPERATION OF THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING. THE FRENCH DO NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND HAVE MAINTAINED THAT THEIR FORCES SHOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY AN MBFR AGREEMENT.

AFTER EXTENSIVE ALLIED DISCUSSION, IT WAS FINALLY AGREED TO TABLE REVISED WESTERN DATA EXCLUDING THE FRENCH FORCES. THE WESTERN MBFR PARTICIPANTS HAVE STATED THAT THEIR POSITION ON THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING REMAINS UNCHANGED BUT THEY HAVE "AGREED TO DISAGREE" WITH THE FRENCH ON THIS.

5. AF - BOTSWANA SECURITY PROBLEMS (CONFIDENTIAL)

RECENT INCURSIONS BY RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES INTO BOTSWANA ARE FORCING MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BOTSWANA (GOB) TO CONSIDER CREATING A CREDIBLE DEFENSE FORCE FOR THEIR COUNTRY. THE CREATION OF A LARGER AND BETTER ARMED DEFENSE FORCE IN BOTSWANA WILL DIVERT ITS LIMITED HUMAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES FROM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WHILE NOT NECESSARILY CREATING A CREDIBLE DETERRENT TO AGGRESSION FROM ITS MINORITY-RULED NEIGHBORS. DUE TO ITS DOMESTIC FISCAL AUSTERITY PROGRAMS, THE GOB IS LOOKING FOR FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE ABROAD, PREFERABLY FROM ITS WESTERN FRIENDS.

BOTSWANA'S ONLY SECURITY FORCE IS A 400-MAN, POORLY ARMED, POLICE MOBILE UNIT. THE GOB IS NOW PURCHASING 400 AUTOMATIC RIFLES FROM A BRITISH FIRM IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE CAPABILITY OF THIS SMALL PARA-MILITARY FORCE. EVEN WITH NEW WEAPONS THE PRESENT FORCE WOULD HAVE TO TRIPLE IN SIZE, ACCORDING TO AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT, IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A REASONABLE DEGREE OF SECURITY TO BOTSWANA'S

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ZENS LIVING NEAR THE RHODESIAN BORDER.

INT ARTICLES IN BOTH THE RHODESIAN AND BOTSWANAN PRESS
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF "OPERATION TANGENT" BY
RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES ALONG THE RHODESIAN/BOTSWANAN

C R E T SECTION 2 OF 7 STATE 000000/2

REPORT, INFORM CONSULS, CINC/SHAPE/MAC FOR POLADS ONLY

VIETNAM AND LAOS HAVE VOCIFEROUSLY PROCLAIMED THEIR
APPROVAL;

CAMBODIA, WHILE PUBLICLY SILENT, HAS SHOWN PRIVATE
CERN; AND

THAILAND'S FELLOW ASEAN STATES--INDONESIA, MALAYSIA,
PHILIPPINES, AND SINGAPORE--GENERALLY HAVE WEL-
ED THE CHANGE AS PRESAGING MORE STABILITY AND
ONGER MEASURES AGAINST COMMUNIST INSURGENTS. SOME
ICIALS OF ASEAN MEMBER STATES, HOWEVER, FEAR THAT
AUSE OF THE ANTI-COMMUNIST POLICY OF THE NEW THAI
VERNMENT, THE INDOCHINESE COUNTRIES MAY BE MORE
LINED TO EMBARK ON AN AGGRESSIVE POLICY--UN THE
NG RUN, ENDANGERING THAILAND AND UNDERMINING THE
ABILITY OF ASEAN.

E THAI MILITARY GOVERNMENT ITSELF, DESPITE ITS RIGHT-
RD DOMESTIC COLORATION, SEEMS TO BE CONTINUING THE MAJOR
REIGN POLICIES OF THE CIVILIANS IT OUSTED FROM POWER,
CLUDING EFFORTS TO BE CONCILIATORY TOWARD THAILAND'S
MMUNIST NEIGHBORS. A HARDER THAI POLICY APPEARS LIKELY,
WEVER, SHOULD THE LEVEL OF VERBAL HOSTILITY CONTINUE AND
OULD SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL MATERIAL ASSISTANCE BE SUP-
IED TO THAILAND'S INSURGENTS.

IME MINISTER THANIN'S CURRENT ROUND OF VISITS TO THE
EAN MEMBER STATES--HIS FIRST TRIP OUTSIDE THAILAND SINCE
SSUMING OFFICE--GIVES THESE COUNTRIES FIRSTHAND KNOWLEDGE
THE NEW THAI LEADERSHIP AND SOME REASSURANCE ON
GIONAL COOPERATION.

. EUR - PORTUGUESE SOCIALISTS PASS LOCAL ELECTION TEST
CONFIDENTIAL)

RIME MINISTER MARIO SOARES' SOCIALISTS WEATHERED WHAT
ANY WERE CALLING A REFERENDUM ON THEIR MANAGEMENT OF THE
OUR-MONTH OLD PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT BY WINNING A CLEAR
LURALITY OF THE POPULAR VOTE IN LOCAL AND MUNICIPAL
LECTIONS DECEMBER 12. UNOFFICIAL COMPLETE RETURNS FOR
HE MUNICIPAL CHAMBERS AND THEIR PRESIDENTS SHOW THE
OLLOWING:

- THE SOCIALISTS GOT 33.24 PERCENT OF THE VOTE COMPARED
WITH 34.87 PERCENT IN ELECTIONS TO THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY LAST APRIL;
- THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS GOT 24.27 PERCENT (24.38 IN APRIL);
- THE CENTER DEMOCRATS 16.61 (16.00 IN APRIL);
- THE PEOPLES UNITED ELECTORAL FRONT (FEPU) INCLUDING THE
COMMUNISTS 17.69 (COMPARED WITH 14.35 FOR THE COMMU-D
NISTS IN APRIL);
- THE ULTRA-LEFT COALITION GDUP 2.51 AND OTHER LEFTIST
PARTIES 1.11 (COMPARED WITH 4.63 FOR THE FAR-LEFT IN
APRIL).

THE OUTCOME CONFIRMED, MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE, THE RELA-
TIVE STABILITY OF PORTUGUESE VOTING PATTERNS WITHIN PARA-
METERS OF A FEW PERCENTAGE POINTS. WITHIN THESE LIMITS
THE COMMUNISTS ADVANCED, MOSTLY AT THE EXPENSE OF THE
LEFTISTS. THE SOCIALISTS ENTERED THE CAMPAIGN
LOSSES THAN THOSE THEY INCURRED, HOWEVER, AND
FOR HIS PARTY AND MINORITY GOVERN-
ES WERE COUNTED.

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ACTERS COMMUNIT
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ING WOR
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THE LOCAL ELECTIONS WERE THE FINAL STAGE OF THE INSTALLATION OF PORTUGAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL-DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM. WITH THE ESTABLISHED POLITICAL BALANCE CONFIRMED, PRESIDENT EANES INTENDS TO PUSH SOARES HARD ON RAPID IMPLEMENTATION OF TOUGH MEASURES TO STRAIGHTEN OUT THE ECONOMY. SOARES CLEARLY INTENDS TO PROCEED WITH THE AUSTERITY PROGRAM BUT HE WILL DRAW UNCEASING CNIRE FROM THE LEFT AND FACE NEEDLING BY THE IMPATIENT DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION PARTIES ON HIS RIGHT AS THE PROGRAM UNFOLDS. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER HE WILL BE ABLE TO EVOKE SUFFICIENT SOCIALIST-SOCIAL DEMO-

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 7 STATE 000000/4

CFR REPORT, INFORM CONSULS, CINC/SHAPE/MAC FOR POLADS ONLY

BORDER. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS "HOT PURSUIT" POLICY IS DEMONSTRATED BY THE DECEMBER 11 KIDNAPPING OF THREE BATSWANA, AND THE DECEMBER 18 HOUR-LONG ATTACK ON THE REFUGEE CAMP AND POLICE MOBILE UNIT CAMP IN FRANCISTOWN. THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION IS UNDERScoreD BY VICE-PRESIDENT MASIRE'S DECEMBER 17 STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT ANNOUNCING PRESIDENT KHAMA'S DECISION TO APPEAL TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL FOR ASSISTANCE AGAINST RHODESIAN AGGRESSION. THE COUNCIL IS CONSIDERING DISCUSSION OF THE BOTSWANA APPEAL DURING THE WEEK OF DECEMBER 27, BUT MAY POSTPONE DISCUSSION UNTIL JANUARY.

6. AF - CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC BECOMES CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

THE LONG-RUMORED PROCLAMATION OF AN EMPIRE, WITH PRESIDENT BOKASSA AS EMPEROR, OCCURRED ON DECEMBER 4 UNDER A NEW CONSTITUTION WHIC; PROVIDES ALSO FOR THE REVIVAL OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. IN A DIPLOMATIC NOTE TO THE USG, THE NEW GOVERNMENT WAS DESCRIBED AS A "PARLIAMENTARY MONARCHY--FOUNDED ON A SINGLE PARTY."

THE NEW EMPIRE WAS ANNOUNCED AT THE CLOSING SESSION OF THE MONTH-LONG MESAN PARTY CONGRESS (MOVEMENT FOR THE SOCIAL EVOLUTION OF BLACK AFRICA) IN THE PRESENCE OF ZAIRIAN PRESIDENT MOBUTU AND THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS. THE ANNOUNCEMENT PUT AN END TO THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED LAST SEPTEMBER AND REPRESENTS, IN THE OPINION OF OUR EMBASSY, A FORMALIZATION OF THE DE FACTO INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION. FORMER PRESIDENT BOKASSA IS NOW OFFICIALLY EMPEROR BOKASSA I.

THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT INTEND TO TAKE ANY SPECIAL NOTICE OF THE NEW FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND WILL ADDRESS IT AND THE CHIEF OF STATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NEW FORMS AND TITLES.

7. EB: IMPACT ON THE PRICE OF OIL OF OPEC'S TWO-TIER PRICING DECISION (CONFIDENTIAL)

THE OPEC PRICE DECISION CREATED A TWO-TIER PRICING SYSTEM. ELEVEN COUNTRIES DECIDED TO RAISE OIL PRICES BY 10 PERCENT AS OF JANUARY 1 AND ANOTHER FIVE PERCENT ON JULY 1. SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UAE DECIDED TO RAISE THEIR PRICE BY ONLY FIVE PERCENT ON JANUARY 1 AND SAID THIS PRICE WOULD BE MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT 1977.

THE SAG MAY HAVE INTENDED TO SHOW GOOD WILL TOWARD THE NEW ADMINISTRATION AND ENCOURAGE THE PRESIDENT-ELECT TO TACKLE THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM EARLY. THE SAG MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN CONCERNED AT THE FRAGILITY OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF EUROPE AND THE US, A POINT WE STRESSED QUITE STRONGLY IN OUR REPRESENTATIONS TO OPEC MEMBERS.

AT THIS POINT, IT IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT HOW LONG THE TWO-TIER PRICING SYSTEM WILL BE MAINTAINED OR THE PRICE THAT MIGHT EVOLVE.

SECRET

THE ABILITY OF THE ELEVEN COUNTRIES TO MAINTAIN A MARKET PRICE ABOVE THAT OF THE SAUDIS AND UAE WILL DEPEND BASICALLY ON (1) THE SIZE OF THE MARKET LEFT TO THEM AFTER THE CHEAPER SAUDI-UAE OIL HAS BEEN SOLD; AND (2) THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE ELEVEN BEGIN COMPETING AMONG THEMSELVES TO MAINTAIN REVENUE LEVELS IN THE FACE OF A DECLINE IN THE VOLUME OF THEIR SALES.

THE OUTCOME WILL TURN ON THE FOLLOWING FACTORS:

(1) TOTAL DEMAND FOR OPEC OIL: FORECASTS FOR THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1977 VARY WIDELY FROM NO FALLOFF TO A CONSIDERABLE DECLINE BECAUSE OF RECENT HEAVY ANTICIPATORY BUYING.

(2) LEVEL OF SAUDI/UAE PRODUCTION: IF THE SAG AGREES, ARAMCO COULD BEGIN PROCESSING AN ADDITIONAL 1 MMED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AND ANOTHER 1 MMED WITHIN 6/12 MONTHS. THE UAE HAS AN 0.3 MMED SURPLUS THAT WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE.

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 7 STATE 000000/5

CFR REPORT, INFORM CONSULS, CINC/SHAPE/MAC FOR POLADS ONLY

- - - (3) BUYER CONSTRAINTS: COMPANIES LIFTING FROM THE ELEVEN UNDER CONCESSIONAL OR CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS WILL NOT WISH TO JEOPARDIZE LONG TERM LIFTING RIGHTS FOR A SHORT TERM PRICE BREAK. THEY WILL SHIFT THEIR PURCHASES AT THE MARGIN ONLY, BUT THIS SHIFT SHOULD BRING SOME PRESSURE ON THE ELEVEN TO MEET THE PRICE OF THE COMPETITION.

8. NEA: ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER RESIGNS (CONFIDENTIAL)

- - -

PRIME MINISTER RABIN'S DECEMBER 19 DISMISSAL FROM HIS COALITION CABINET OF THE THREE MINISTERS FROM THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY (NRP), THUS EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVING HIMSELF OF A WORKING MAJORITY, LED IN RAPID-FIRE ORDER TO A CALL BY THE OPPOSITION LIKUD PARTY FOR A NO-CONFIDENCE VOTE, AND A PREEMPTIVE RESIGNATION BY RABIN AND HIS GOVERNMENT. THE PROXIMATE REASON FOR RABIN'S SACKING OF THE NRP MINISTERS WAS THE ABSTENTION BY TWO OF THEM SEVERAL DAYS EARLIER ON A NO-CONFIDENCE MOTION OVER DESECRATION OF THE SABBATH BY THE ARRIVAL OF ISRAEL'S FIRST BATCH OF F-15S FROM THE UNITED STATES. THE MORE COMPELLING REASONS WERE, HOWEVER, POLITICAL. RABIN'S MOVE SEEMS CALCULATED TO DEAL WITH:

-- THE CHALLENGE WITHIN HIS OWN PARTY FROM DEFENSE MINISTER SHIMON PERES. THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE GENERAL ELECTIONS MEANS THAT THE DECISION REGARDING THE LABOR PARTY WILL HAVE TO BE SPED UP, REDUCING PERES' MOMENTUM.

-- THE RAPIDLY GROWING STRENGTH OF THE NEW OPPOSITION PARTIES HEADED BY YIGAL YADIN AND ARIK SHARON, WHICH HAD ALREADY PICKED UP NEARLY 15 PERCENT OF THE ELECTORATE IN A RECENT OPINION POLL.

-- THE IMPACT OF THE PEACE PROCESS ON HIS ELECTION PROSPECTS. ALTHOUGH RABIN HAS SUGGESTED HE PLANS TO RUN ON A PEACE PLATFORM, HE PROBABLY FELT THAT AN EARLY ELECTION WOULD ENABLE HIM TO BENEFIT FROM PUBLICITY REGARDING MOVES TOWARD PEACE BEFORE ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN TO ENCOUNTER THE INEVITABLE DIFFICULTIES.

SECRET

THE NEW ELECTION DATE HAS NOT YET BEEN SCHEDULED BUT IS WIDELY EXPECTED TO BE HELD IN MAY. FOR THE PRESENT, THE RABIN GOVERNMENT WILL REMAIN IN PLACE AS A CARETAKER. IN THE MEANTIME, PRESIDENT KATZIR WILL CONSULT WITH PARTY HEADS TO DETERMINE IF ANY CAN FORM A NEW GOVERNMENT. IN THE PROBABLE EVENT THAT NONE CAN BE FORMED, THE KNESSET WILL DISSOLVE ITSELF AND AN ELECTION DATE WILL BE SET. A SLIM PROSPECT EXISTS, HOWEVER, THAT LIKUD AND THE NRP, TOGETHER WITH SEVERAL SMALLER CENTER AND RIGHTIST PARTIES, COULD PUT TOGETHER AN ALTERNATIVE COALITION AND BLOCK THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE ELECTION.

ELECTIONS IN MAY AND THE SUBSEQUENT GOVERNMENT-FORMATION PROCESS WILL PROBABLY SOMEWHAT DELAY FULL-SCALE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT RABIN COULD NOT HAVE ADVANCED THE PROCESS SIGNIFICANTLY BEFORE THE ELECTIONS ON THE EARLIER TIMETABLE. FROM THIS STANDPOINT,

THE EARLIER DATE FOR THE ELECTIONS COULD BE VIEWED AS A PLUS FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. WHETHER IT WOULD PROVE TO BE IN FACT WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER THE DOVES IN THE KNESSET WOULD BE STRENGTHENED AND NOT WEAKENED BY THE ELECTION OUTCOME. GIVEN THE BAD ECONOMIC AND LABOR-UNREST TREND IN ISRAEL AND THE MOUNTING PERES CHALLENGE TO RABIN, IT MAY WELL BE THAT AN EARLIER ELECTION WOULD BE MORE FAVORABLE TO THE DOVES THAN A LATER ONE. BUT IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THE ELECTIONS, WHENEVER THEY MAY BE HELD IN 1977, WILL PRODUCE A MORE HAWKISH KNESSET THAN THE PRESENT ONE.

9. NEA-INITIAL VIEW OF EGYPTIAN-SYRIAN ANNOUNCEMENT (SECRET

AT THE CONCLUSION OF ASAD'S VISIT TO CAIRO ON DECEMBER 21, SYRIA AND EGYPT ISSUED A DECLARATION ESTABLISHING A

SECRET SECTION 6 OF 7 STATE 000000/6

CFR REPORT, INFORM CONSULS, CINC/SHAPE/MAC FOR POLADS ONLY

"UNIFIED POLITICAL COMMAND" HEADED BY SADAT AND ASAD. THE DECLARATION IS NOT CLEAR ABOUT THE PURPOSE OF THE COMMAND, STATING THAT IT WOULD LAY DOWN THE BASES "FOR STRENGTHENING AND DEVELOPING THE UNITY (SIC) RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES". IN ISSUING IT, HOWEVER, FOREIGN MINISTER FAHMY IS QUOTED BY THE PRESS AS HAVING SAID THAT THE PURPOSE WOULD BE TO STUDY WAYS OF UNITING THE EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN STATES. THIS ANNOUNCEMENT BRINGS TO MIND THE LATE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (1958-61), BUT THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES: SYRIA IS NOT NOW THE SUPPLICANT, AS IT WAS IN 1958; ASAD HAS A STRONG INDEPENDENT POSITION AND SADAT'S ROLE IS PATENTLY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF NASSER. THERE IS NOW, ALSO, THE SAUDI ELEMENT, AND WE ASSUME THAT THIS NEW ANNOUNCEMENT HAS SAUDI ARABIA'S BLESSING.

SADAT AND ASAD NO DOUBT HAVE FELT SOME COMPULSION TO PRODUCE A CONCRETE MANIFESTATION OF DEEPENING SYRIAN-EGYPTIAN COOPERATION TO PUT TO REST ANY LINGERING SUSPICION THAT THE RAPPROCHEMENT AT THE RIYADH SUMMIT MERELY PAPERED OVER THE RIVALRIES THAT WERE SO EVIDENT DURING THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR. FURTHERMORE, THE SIMPLE, EMOTIONAL ATTACHMENT TO THE IDEAL OF ARAB UNITY, WHICH WAS BADLY DAMAGED IN THE RECRIMINATIONS FOLLOWING SINAI II, SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED. THERE IS ALSO THE OBVIOUS ALLURE OF MAKING A CONSPICUOUS GESTURE OF HARMONY IN THE ARAB WORLD AS SADAT AND ASAD CONSIDER TOGETHER THEIR STRATEGY IN THE NEXT ROUND OF THE PEACE PROCESS.

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WITH THE DECLARATION PROVIDING FOR JOINT COMMITTEES AND STUDIES, WE WOULD NOT EXPECT ANY EARLY MOVES TOWARD ORGANIC UNITY BETWEEN THE EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN GOVERNMENTS.

10.

ARA - MANLEY WINS BY A LANDSLIDE IN JAMAICA (CONFIDENTIAL)

ELECTION RETURNS ARE NOT COMPLETE, BUT PRIME MINISTER MANLEY'S PARTY CLEARLY WON A LANDSLIDE VICTORY ON DECEMBER 15. THE PNP ALREADY HAS CAPTURED 46 OF THE 60 SEATS IN PARLIAMENT AND 3 MORE MAY BE ADDED WHEN RETURNS ARE FINAL. ALTHOUGH THE PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY, THE RULING PARTY'S PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULAR VOTE INCREASED ONLY .1 OVER 1972. REGARDLESS, MANLEY HAS THE MANDATE HE SOUGHT.

DESPITE HIS IMPRESSIVE SHOWING IN THE ELECTION, MANLEY'S BASIC ECONOMIC PROBLEMS REMAIN. THE ALREADY CRIPPLED TOURIST INDUSTRY WAS DAMAGED FURTHER BY CAMPAIGN VIOLENCE. THESE HARD ECONOMIC REALITIES COULD PERSUADE HIM TO FOLLOW A MORE RATIONAL COURSE:

- IMPLEMENTING IMF RECOMMENDED AUSTERITY MEASURES;
- IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., IN HOPES OF RECEIVING ASSISTANCE.

EARLY EVIDENCE OF A MORE MODERATE APPROACH IS FOUND IN MANLEY'S BRIEF SPEECH AT HIS SWEARING-IN CEREMONY. HIS REMARKS:

- CHARACTERIZED OPEC'S PRICE INCREASE AS "A GRAVE BLOW TO THE POOR OF THE WORLD";
- EXPRESSED CONCERN FOR THE LACK OF BUSINESS CONFIDENCE;
- CALLED FOR HARD WORK AND DISCIPLINE TO REDUCE VIOLENCE AND ACHIEVE ECONOMIC RECOVERY/

10 - 31ST UNGA CLOSING (CONFIDENTIAL)

THE 31ST UNGA WAS SOBER AND BUSINESSLIKE IN COMPARISON TO RECENT GA'S. THE ABSENCE OF CONTENTIOUS KOREA AND PUERTO RICO ISSUES--THANKS IN LARGE PART TO POSTS' EFFECTIVE WORK IN CAPITALS--HELPED PRODUCE THIS RESULT. THERE WAS, HOWEVER, STILL SOME EXCESSIVE RHETORIC AND POSTURING IN THIS SESSION. RELATIONS OF BOTH DEVELOPED COUNTRY AND THIRD WORLD DELEGATIONS WITH US DELEGATION AND GENERAL TONE OF SESSION SHOWED THAT US LEADERSHIP IS SOUGHT AND EXPECTED.

MANY NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC ISSUES DEALT WITH BY UNGA WILL

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S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 7 STATE 000000/7

CFR REPORT, INFORM CONSULS, CINC/SHAPE/MAC FOR POLADS ONLY

BE SUBSTANTIVELY NEGOTIATED IN THE CIEC, UNCTAD, AND OTHER FORUMS IN COMING YEAR. US OPPOSED CIEC AND NIEO RESOLUTIONS WHICH WERE ONE-SIDEDLY CRITICAL IN THEIR EFFORT TO BRING PRESSURE ON DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TO IMPLEMENT THE NIEO AND THE UNGA SEVENTH SESSION. US ALSO OPPOSED DEBT AND TRANSFER OF REAL RESOURCES RESOLUTIONS WHICH SOUGHT TO SPECIFY SOLUTIONS IN ADVANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN CIEC AND ELSEWHERE. WE JOINED CONSENSUS RESOLUTION ON UNCTAD IV, BUT RESERVED ON A NUMBER OF ITS PROVISIONS, ESPECIALLY ON DEBT AND COMMODITIES. WE INTERPRETED CONSENSUS RESOLUTION ON WORLD BANK REPLENISHMENT AS REFERRING ONLY TO SELECTIVE CAPITAL INCREASES NOW IN PROCESS WHILE G-77 SAW RESOLUTION AS CALLING FOR GENERAL CAPITAL INCREASE. OUR EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT SECRETARY'S OFFER OF US AS SITE FOR UN CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT SUCCESSFULLY RESULTED IN RESOLUTION GIVING SITE SELECTION TO 32ND GA AFTER CONSIDERATION BY A PREPARATORY CONFERENCE IN INTERVENING YEAR.

POLITICAL ISSUES WERE DOMINATED BY THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND DISARMAMENT. RESOLUTION STRONGLY DEPRECATING US MILITARY BASES ON GUAM PASSED BY A SUBSTANTIAL MAJORITY, WHICH WAS REDUCED FROM LAST YEAR BY INCREASED OPPOSITION RESULTING FROM VIGOROUS LOBBYING. OF EIGHT RESOLUTIONS ON NAMIBIA (US: ONE OPPOSITION, FIVE ABSTENTIONS, TWO CONSENSUS), THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ONE ENDORSED SWAPO AS ONLY TRUE NAMIBIAN REPRESENTATIVE, IMPLYING IT IS ONLY NAMIBIAN GROUP QUALIFIED TO NEGOTIATE WITH SOUTH AFRICA. ON RHODESIA, CONSENSUS RESOLUTION EXPRESSED HOPE FOR GENEVA CONFERENCE; AND RESOLUTION ON SANCTIONS ABSTAINED ON BY US CONDEMNED USG FOR BYRD AMENDMENT IMPORTS. APARTHEID ISSUES, ASSIGNED THIS YEAR TO PLENARY INSTEAD OF SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE, PRODUCED 11 RESOLUTIONS. AMONG OTHERS, US OPPOSED RESOLUTIONS ON ISRAEL-SOUTH AFRICA COLLUSION, ENDORSING ARMED

STRUGGLE TO LIBERATE SOUTH AFRICA, AND CALLING ON THE SC TO IMPOSE A MANDATORY EMBARGO ON SOUTH AFRICA. US STRATEGY ON MIDDLE EAST ISSUES WAS TO AVOID UNBALANCED EFFORT TO PRESCRIBE MODALITIES AND CONTENT OF MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATING PROCESS. WE THEREFORE OPPOSED RESOLUTIONS ATTEMPTING TO IMPOSE TIMETABLE FOR GENEVA CONFERENCE. GA DID NOT REVIVE ZIONISM/RACISM ISSUE. HOWEVER, USG CONTINUED POLICY OF NOT PARTICIPATING IN DECADE TO COMBAT RACISM DEBATES AND RESOLUTIONS UNTIL LINK BETWEEN DECADE AND ZIONISM/RACISM RESOLUTION IS BROKEN BY AN EXPLICIT UNGA ACTION. MOST SIGNIFICANT DISARMAMENT RESOLUTIONS OPENED FOR SIGNATURE ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION CONVENTION (SPONSORED BY US, FINLAND, USSR) AND BY CONSENSUS CALLED FOR A SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT IN 1978.

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IN SUM, 31ST GA SET WORLD COMMUNITY A FORMIDABLE AGENDA FOR 1977. CARRY-OVER OF RELATIVE PRAGMATISM AND REALISM OF 31ST GA TO 32ND WILL DEPEND LARGELY ON SUCCESS WE AND OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS IN 1977 ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, MIDDLE EAST, AND NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES. TO KEEP PRESSURE UP ON LATTER, LDCS ARE HOLDING OPEN POSSIBILITY OF RESUMED UNGA IN MAY OR JUNE AFTER DELAYED CIEC MINISTERIAL. RE-ELECTION OF UNSYG WALDHIEM SHOULD STRENGTHEN HIS, AND UN'S, ROLE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

12. S/S-O - SEASONS GREETINGS (UNCLASSIFIED)

BEST WISHES FOR THE HOLIDAYS AND THE COMING YEAR FROM THE CFR CONTRIBUTORS, COORDINATORS, EDITOR AND BOARD. KEEPING WITH TRADITION, THERE WILL BE NO CFR PUBLISHED ON DECEMBER 29.

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