

ORIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 2-1 DOM Ref

FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R 1	REP	AF
ARA 10	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
E	P	IO 5
L	FBO	AID 9
AGR 2	COM 3	FRB 4
INT	LAB	TAR 2
TR 4	XMB	AIR 10
ARMY 10	CIA 20	NAVY 7
OSD 48	USIA 11	NSA 3
DBI 5		

A-531

CONFIDENTIAL

NO.

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO : Amconsul SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS

FROM : Amembassy SANTO DOMINGO

SUBJECT : Joint Weeka No. 15 (April 7 - April 14)

REF :

POLITICAL

1. President Reports to Nation on Eve of Departure for Summit
2. Amiana Tió Orders Police to Respect Human Rights
3. Nivar Seijas and Tejeda Alvarez Transferred
4. Judiciary - San Isidro Clash Prompts Attorney General Resignation Threat
5. Balaguer Speaks on Labor

MILITARY

6. Military Staff and Command Changes Announced

ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

7. Ground-breaking for Thermo-Electric Plant
8. President asks Public Administration Reform

PSYCHOLOGICAL

9. Presidents' Meeting at Punta del Este Blankets Front Pages
10. OCLAE-inspired Strike Sharpens Differences Between Student Groups

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: See last page:avb

Clearances:

POL:JWWilson

Contents and Classification Approved by:

DCM:FJDevine

1967 APR 17 AM 8 53

COPYFLO-PBR

Action Assigned to
Action Taken

Date of Action

Action Office Symbol

Date of Officer
Directions to R/RINM COMMUNICATIONS
CENTER

1967 APR 18 AM 9 07

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVEDRECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APR 17 7 20 AM 1967RS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH

DATE: April 16, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Santo Domingo A-531

2

POLITICAL1. President Reports to Nation on Eve of Departure for Summit

A. Culminating his pre-Summit efforts to defuse any potentially explosive element present in the new and more fluid politico-military situation arising out of the Imbert assassination attempt and ensuing developments (Santo Domingo 3115), President BALAGUER delivered a calm, conciliatory, forceful and optimistic speech to the nation on April 10 (Santo Domingo 3136, 3137, 3138), a few hours before his departure for Punta del Este. He made no reference to recent developments, but rather addressed himself to mollifying the specific apprehensions of various sectors (labor -- Item 5, sugar-workers, landowners, etc.) whose unhappiness with actions and real or alleged intentions of the government is, the President charged, being exploited by troublemakers for partisan purposes. He also held out the promise of corrective measures responsive to specific political and press criticisms of certain administrative practices or failures (Item 8); painted an optimistic picture of the nation's progress towards economic recovery; and, once again, hit hard at contraband and continued corruption in the judiciary and other areas of administration.

B. Turning to his then impending departure, the President rebuked the professional pessimists who objected to his leaving on the grounds that some disaster might strike in his absence, and declared that the national situation "has never been firmer, nor more promising, nor more stable." Stating that the Armed Forces presented a "monolithic front" against conspiracy and subversion, and that--above all--the popular will of the Dominican people presented "an impenetrable bulwark to impatience and ambition," the President affirmed that the national atmosphere is not propitious for new golpista adventures. Although he was leaving the city full of false rumors, whose origin he explained, the President said that under the circumstances his best course was to take refuge in the secure knowledge that the nation supports him and that he has no enemies either on the right or left who enjoy popular backing. He can thus leave the country with a tranquil mind and serene confidence, he concluded, and invited the nation to rally around Vice President LORA, who temporarily assumed Presidential powers. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

C. Comment: Editorial reaction to the President's speech was favorable and intermixed with best wishes to the President for success at the Summit Conference. Caribe was particularly glowing in its comments, praising the Chief Executive for covering all themes of national interest while, by tone and content, encouraging a climate of confidence, dissipating rumors, and ensuring that the nation's

CONFIDENTIAL

unity of purpose is monolithic. As on previous occasions, the President appeared to have achieved a significant tranquilizing effect, which seemed reflected during the week in a heightened popular capacity to absorb continued rumors and isolated incidents without undue anxiety. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Amiama Tió Orders Police to Respect Human Rights

A. Secretary of Police and Interior Luis AMIAMA Tió instructed Police Chief SOTO Echavarria on April 9 to ensure that the behavior of all members of the National Police henceforth be in strict accord with the Constitution and the law and, in particular, that police observe faithfully the human rights which protect all citizens (Santo Domingo 3116). The order, which was published in the local press the following day, stated that Amiama must be informed immediately of any police act that might represent a violation of a citizen's guarantees or that could otherwise affect the good relations and confidence that should characterize the police's relationship with the citizenry. To make certain that all members of the police understand and observe this code, the order stated, Soto Echavarria was instructed to reproduce it for transmission as a circular to all police units throughout the country.

B. On the same day that Amiama issued the order, twenty-seven members of the PRD were arrested while conducting an indoors business meeting in a Santo Domingo neighborhood (Santo Domingo 3117). Those arrested were detained for several hours and then freed, reportedly after the interventions of Amiama and Attorney General Manuel GARCIA Lizardo. PRD Secretary General José Francisco PEÑA Gomez protested the arrests the following day, describing them as one more proof of the veracity of PRD charges regarding police persecution and the existence of widespread fear and insecurity which made impossible the exercise of human rights. As a consequence of many similar incidents around the country, Peña Gomez said, the PRD had been forced into a militant opposition posture which did not permit the acceptance of government invitations to dialogue (Weeka 8). Peña Gomez also acknowledged Amiama's and Garcia Lizardo's efforts to free those arrested, and he went on to congratulate Garcia Lizardo publicly for other "responsible" actions.

C. There was no evidence that Amiama, Soto Echavarria, or Peña Gomez regarded the arrest as a violation of Amiama's April 9 order, though it clearly was the type of police action to which the order was addressed. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

D. Comment: Although Amiama's order was important and meaningful in and by itself, its most immediate significance was its responsiveness to the PRD request of April 5 for a public pronouncement concerning the measures Amiama would take to impede or prevent repeated violation of human rights (Weeka 14). As this request was contained in a letter

CONFIDENTIAL

Santo Domingo A-531

4

ostensibly from Peña Gomez to Amiama, but reportedly drafted between the two, it was regarded as setting the stage for Amiama to force a showdown with Balaguer over the general issue of "Trujillismo" but specifically over the position and influence of Ney TEJEDA and perhaps, Neit NIVAR Seijas. Balaguer's removal and reassignment of those two (Item 3) presumably satisfied Amiama, at least for the time being, persuading him to respond to the PRD request indirectly and in a manner that would neither challenge nor threaten the President. Still and all, since the order lends public credence to the PRD's charges of police persecution, which have been the hard rock of the PRD campaign on the "Trujillismo" issue, it may well be interpreted, at least in some circles of the government, as a sign that Amiama definitely has lined up with the PRD. This interpretation was further encouraged at week's end, when a group of PRD Congressmen made a well-publicized visit to Amiama to request investigation of an alleged beating by a soldier in Oviedo of PRD Deputy Americo PEREZ Mercedes. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. Nivar Seijas and Tejeda Alvarez Transferred

A. On April 7 and 8, President Balaguer made a number of changes in the armed forces including the long-rumored transfer of his Chief Military Aide, Col. Neit Rafael NIVAR Seijas, and the transfer of former Police Chief Luis Ney TEJEDA Alvarez to the Air Force (Santo Domingo 3105). Nivar, who took command of the Army's MAP-supported First Brigade, was replaced by Lt. Col. Francisco MEDINA Sanchez, former commander of the Base Defense Group at the Santiago Air Force Base. Tejeda, who lost his temporary rank of brigadier general--which he had been allowed to keep after his March 28 ouster as Police Chief (Week 13)--and his essentially honorary jobs as Police Inspector General and adviser to the President, replaced Medina Sanchez at Santiago with the rank of colonel. (UNCLASSIFIED)

B. Comment: Nivar's transfer to the First Brigade, which is the Army's best unit, had been in the wind for several weeks. As confirmed to the Ambassador by President Balaguer, the successive moves of Tejeda have been made to satisfy Interior Secretary Luis Amiama Tió, who has thrice threatened to resign to force the President to remove Tejeda from any position in which he could, in Amiama's view, interfere with his investigation of the Imbert shooting. By returning Tejeda to his permanent rank and moving him out of the police, out of the Palace, and out of the Capital, the President has gone to unusual lengths to satisfy the highly sensitive Amiama. However, it is as yet unclear whether Amiama's actions stem only from a desire to remove any obstruction to his investigation of the Imbert shooting or whether he has more sweeping political motives--especially in view of his increasingly close relationship to the PRD (Item 2).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Santo Domingo A-531

5

C. The transfer of Nivar, which should further mollify Amiana, has the virtue of placing a no-nonsense officer of the President's complete confidence in de facto control of the Capital during the President's stay in Punta del Este. It, as well as a number of minor changes, were largely responsive to Balaguer's desire to set his military house in order before leaving the country. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. Judiciary - San Isidro Clash Prompts Attorney General Resignation Threat

A. In a case which may become a test of civilian judicial power over the armed forces, Attorney General Manuel Garcia Lizardo, supported by various other judicial officials, has threatened to resign if a former Air Force corporal accused of homicide is not turned over to civil judicial authorities (Santo Domingo 3135). The corporal, Angel Maria TAPIA Tapia, had been accused of killing a child and injuring four others by throwing a grenade against their house on February 12, 1966. Reportedly discharged by the Air Force, Tapia was apparently imprisoned a year later at La Victoria (a civil penitentiary) and then almost immediately removed to San Isidro, through the intervention of Air Force Chief of Staff ALVAREZ Albizu. And, when Tapia finally appeared in court on April 7, he was carrying a revolver and represented by an Air Force lawyer, who took him back to San Isidro, after refusing to surrender Tapia to the court on the grounds that he was under "superior orders" not to do so.

B. Faced with this situation, Attorney General Garcia Lizardo stated that he would resign if judicial authority did not take precedence over the military and was quickly supported by press editorials. Armed Forces Secretary PEREZ y Pérez told the press on April 9 that he had ordered an investigation of the incident, but that he thought Tapia should be sent to La Victoria. (He did not, however, indicate that he had ordered Tapia's release to civil authorities.) Alvarez Albizu, meanwhile, refused comment, while Garcia Lizardo expressed confidence that Tapia would be sent to La Victoria. However, at week's end, Tapia was still at San Isidro. (UNCLASSIFIED)

C. Comment: This is the second recent case (the other being the arrest of an Air Force Sergeant--Week 13) in which civilian authorities have attempted to exercise power over the previously sacrosanct San Isidro Air Base. There is some indication that, having lost the previous case, the San Isidro chiefs are now attempting to make a stand to defend what they consider their prerogatives. In light of Pérez y Pérez' statement that Tapia should be turned over to civil authorities, the role of Alvarez Albizu in refusing to release him also raises the possibility of a direct confrontation between the Armed Forces Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

and the Air Force Chief of Staff unless Alvarez gives way. However the possibility of a compromise was indicated by the Air Force Chief's private statement to the Air Attaché that he did not object to presenting Tapia for trial on a fixed date but only to turning him over to languish in La Victoria indefinitely awaiting trial. (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. Balaguer Speaks on Labor

A. President Balaguer devoted an important part of his eve-of-departure speech (Item 1) to a defense of his administration's labor policies (Santo Domingo 3136). He stated that the most encouraging of many signs evidencing the country's progress toward democracy was a new awareness among workers that their traditional exploiters have been not only bad employers but also bad trade union leaders. He castigated the practice during recent years of using trade unions as vehicles for indoctrinating workers, whether with communist ideology or the views of a political party, and cited the recent Santo Domingo portworkers (POASI) elections (in which administration-backed candidates won union offices) as proof that workers are turning away from political trade unionism. (UNCLASSIFIED)

B. Public reaction to the President's labor remarks has been sparse (Santo Domingo 3161). Only CASC (Social Christian Labor Confederation) issued a press notice half-heartedly alleging that the speech contained "contradictory and confusing points." CONATRAL leaders praised the speech highly, but the communists and the PRD labor leaders--targets of the President's references to political interference in POASI and other trade unions--did not comment publicly. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

MILITARY

6. Military Staff and Command Changes Announced

A. In addition to the transfers of Army Colonel Nivar Seijas and Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Medina Sanchez (Item 3), President Balaguer announced the following changes in senior military command and staff billets: Lt. Col. Humberto TRIFILIO from G-3, Army, to the Staff and Faculty of the recently inaugurated (April 1, 1967) Army Officers School; Colonel Feliz DE LA MOTA from Liaison Officer, US MAAG, to Commanding Officer, Artillery Group, replacing Lt. Col. Salvador ESCARRAMAN Mejia, who becomes Army G-3. Colonel Eliseo PEREZ Sanchez, formerly Commander, Transportation Battalion, becomes Commander, 3rd Battalion, 1st Brigade, located at San Cristobal. Major Elio Narciso BAUTISTA, Army G-2, was appointed to be Public Relations Officer of the Armed Forces. He, in turn, was replaced by Lt. Col. Usino Osvaldo GUZMAN Liriano, who transferred from the National Police on April 3rd, after 14 years of police service. (UNCLASSIFIED)

CONFIDENTIAL

Santo Domingo A-531

7

B. Comment: With the exception of the long-rumored "promotion" of Neit Nivar Seijas to command the 1st Brigade, the other staff and command changes announced do not appear significant to the attachés. However, it is interesting to note that Colonel Pérez Sanchez is senior to Colonel Nivar Seijas, though the latter commands the former's unit. (CONFIDENTIAL)

ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

7. Ground-breaking for Thermo-Electric Plant

In a brief ceremony on April 8, ground was broken for a 54,000 kilowatt capacity thermo-electric generating plant in Haina, about 15 kilometers west of Santo Domingo. The plant, which is being financed by an \$8,859,000 EX-IM Bank loan to the Dominican Electric Corporation (CDE), is expected to be operational by the end of 1968. \$1.5 million of the loan will be used to install a transmission line to Puerto Plata which will tie the new plant in with the national grid. A second and identical plant, Haina No. 2, is also part of the expansion plans for the system developed by CDE's U.S. consulting firm, Ebasco Services, and should be started in the near future. Electrical demand, which now approaches the system's full capacity (ca.130,000 kw.) during peak hours, is estimated to be growing at 12-13% annually. (UNCLASSIFIED)

8. President Asks Public Administration Reform

In his April 10 televised report to the nation (Item 1) President Balaguer promised to increase efforts to improve the Public Administration and stated that the time had come to consider the establishment of a civil service system, although lack of adequate human resources and established democratic traditions would necessarily postpone implementation for several years. He suggested that the Congress give serious consideration to administrative reforms and to several proposals which have already been presented to them in this area. He also reiterated the need for better job discipline, for strict adherence to official hours by all employees, and for the elimination of private business transactions during government working hours. (UNCLASSIFIED)

PSYCHOLOGICAL

9. Presidents' Meeting at Punta del Este Blankets Front Pages

A. Wire service reports, articles by Dominican correspondents, and photographs from the Summit Conference dominated the front-pages of the morning press during the past week. The afternoon La Hoja and

CONFIDENTIAL

El Nacional afforded lesser but still significant coverage. Attention, of course, focused on the activities of President Balaguer and the Dominican delegation. Prior to the President's departure, editorials favorable to his attendance and wishing him well appeared in all dailies except leftist-nationalist El Nacional, which remained opposed (Week 14).

B. Remarks attributed to Balaguer by the wire-services to the effect that he had thanked President Johnson for the "intervention" caused a brief stir, and prompted angry protests from the PRD and the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo (UASD) Council (Santo Domingo 3147, 3160, 3163). However, when the Dominican President denied the reported statements the following day, attention shifted again to the DR's major concerns: a guaranteed 600,000 ton (or more) sugar quota and financing for the Tavera and Valdesia dams. (UNCLASSIFIED)

10. OCAE-inspired Strike Sharpens Differences between Student Groups

A. Communist university and secondary student groups, in response to the bidding of the Havana-based OCLAE, called a three day student strike for April 12, 13 and 14 (Santo Domingo 3133). The UER and Fragua (MPD, 14th of June, and PCD secondary and university students) together announced the strike in an April 11 press conference held on the campus of the Autonomous University (UASD) while the Juventud Comunista (PCRD university and secondary students), although responding to the same stimulus, independently announced its support of and participation in the strike. BRUC and the JRC (Social Christian university and secondary students) immediately called for students to ignore the strike call as being contrary to their own interests, at the same time making clear their own criticism of the Summit Conference. FUSD (PRD university students) belatedly announced on April 13 that it had endorsed a symbolic suspension of classes for a few hours but felt that students, particularly first year university students, should return to class on April 14 to take scheduled exams.


B. A fracas between Social Christian and communist students on April 11 led the acting UASD rector to suspend classes for April 12, making the strike appear to be more effective than it really was (Santo Domingo 3148). University classes were resumed the following day, however, and Rector CASTAÑOS Espaillat, who had hurried back from the United States to try to prevent further problems at the UASD, announced that classes would be held as usual on the 14th. At the time of this writing, however, it is uncertain whether the UASD will hold the first year exams on April 14 in defiance of the striking student groups.

CONFIDENTIAL

Santo Domingo 4-11-68

C. At the secondary school level, the strike was effective the first day but by the second day affected only one intermediate and two secondary schools (Santo Domingo 3163). Other than the burning of a few tires and several clashes between Social Christian and communist student groups, there were few disturbances of the type normally produced during student strikes. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

D. Comment: More than anything else the strike served to sharpen differences between Social Christian and communist students, particularly at the UASD where BRUC has now demanded that university authorities take disciplinary action against Fragua and Juventud Comunista members responsible for the fracas of April 11 and for other outbreaks of violence on the campus. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)


CRIMMINS

Contributors: JYoule, AArenales, LKilday, THubbard, EWoltman, LtColdHecht, GMalovany, BDarling

COPIES POUCHED TO:

Amembassy Caracas
Amembassy Rio de Janeiro
Amembassy Port-au-Prince
Amembassy San Salvador
Amembassy Managua
Amembassy San José
Amconsul Santiago de los Caballeros
CGFMFLANT
CG 72nd Bomb Wing
Cdr NavBas Guan
CONCARIBSEAFRON (3)
USCINSCO (7)
CONCLANTFLT
CINCLANT

CONFIDENTIAL