

Remembering the Persian War Differently

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CURRICULUM VITAE

David Yates was born the last of three boys on September 8, 1978 to Ron and Jeannie Yates in a small town in northeast Tennessee called Greeneville. His family did not remain there long and soon moved about sixty miles north to Bristol, Virginia. He spent the rest of his adolescent life in Bristol where his interest in ancient history was inspired by his older brothers.

He matriculated to the University of Virginia in 1997. There he became an Echols Scholar and ultimately majored in History and Classics. His senior thesis on the mentality of Greek hoplites won the Richard Heath Dabney Prize for Outstanding Thesis in European History. In 2001 he went on to pursue a Master's in Classics at the University of Colorado at Boulder where he was awarded the George Norlin Graduate Fellowship. In 2003 David entered the Ph.D. program in Classics at Brown University. He was awarded upon entry a Joukowsky Presidential Fellowship. In 2005 he became the first student to join Brown's new program of study in Ancient History. Between the University of Colorado and Brown University David had the opportunity to teach numerous Greek and Latin courses and to assist in the teaching of Greek and Roman History. He also accepted a summer position teaching Ancient History as an Instructor at the University of Rhode Island, Providence Campus.

David has published three articles and given numerous talks at both his home universities and peer-reviewed conferences. His first article, “The Archaic Treaties between the Spartans and their Allies”, appeared in *Classical Quarterly* (2005). The second, “*FGrHist* 328 (Philochorus) F 181”, a joint publication with Prof. Charles Fornara that considered the proper interpretation and placement of a fragment attributed to the historian and polymath Philochorus, appeared in *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* (2007). A piece on the role of Cato the Younger in Julius Caesar’s *Bellum Civile* is set to appear in *Classical World* (forthcoming).

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My interest in the memory of the Persian War began in the spring of 2005 when I took a seminar on that topic offered by Prof. Deborah Boedeker. My seminar paper examined the memory of the Persian War in fifth-century Plataea. Its aim was very much the same as the present dissertation, to consider the commemorative tradition of the Persian War outside of Athens. This small study of Plataea demonstrated that Athens and its Boeotian neighbor – despite their proximity, extremely close political alliance, and almost identical wartime experience – had very different notions about how the Persian War should be remembered. The paper was well received. Soon after the seminar I met with Prof. Boedeker to discuss the possibility of pursuing this topic as a dissertation. My initial inquiry into the Greek memories of the Persian War outside Athens led to deeper questions: How significant were the memorial differences between states? Why did dissimilarities over the same event emerge between allies? How did these dissimilar memories interact with each other? Was there ever a unified ‘Greek’ memory of the war? The present work attempts to answer these critical questions.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction: Collective Memories of the Persian War Past.....	1
Chapter 1: Shaping the Conflict(s).....	36
Chapter 2: Localizing the Past.....	67
Chapter 3: The Panhellenic Memorial Community.....	118
Chapter 4: Competition between Memorial Communities.....	164
Chapter 5: Inventing a Greek Memory.....	230
Conclusion: Greek Memorial Culture.....	274
Map: Delphi.....	284
Abbreviations.....	287
Bibliography.....	289

INTRODUCTION: COLLECTIVE MEMORIES OF THE PERSIAN WAR PAST

In 340/39 the orator Aeschines was elected representative to the Amphictyony from Athens. Even for the fourth century the political situation was exceptionally uncertain. Athens was at war with Philip II of Macedon, but for now hostilities were limited to the north where Athens with the help of Persia and several Greek allies was doing remarkably well. Philip had penetrated into central Greece some six years earlier to support the Thebans and Locrians in the Third Sacred War against Phocis, but now Philip had no excuse and his relations with his former allies were not such that he felt confident to return uninvited. Yet Thebes was certainly no friend to Athens. In spite of their earlier cooperation against Sparta, relations had cooled considerably since the battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C. Indeed, Athens had been a supporter of Phocis in the Sacred War. When Aeschines arrived at the meeting of the Amphictyony, the situation was explosive, and the match that set it off was a dispute over how the Persian War ought to be remembered.

A little over 30 years before Aeschines was sent to the Amphictyony, the Temple of Apollo at Delphi, long ago built by the Alcmeonid clan of Athens, had been destroyed by an earthquake. Efforts to rebuild the structure were proceeding slowly, but by 340/39 progress was sufficient for the Athenians to have a number of golden shields, spoils of the Persian War, placed on the metopes of the new temple. Aeschines provides the

dedicatory inscription: “The Athenians, from the Medes and Thebans when they were fighting against the Greeks” (3.116).¹ Given the current hostility between Athens and Thebes the shields proclaimed a particularly divisive recollection of the war. The Thebans were infuriated and had their allies, the Amphissians, propose a fifty-talent fine on the Athenians in the Amphictyonic Council for dedicating the shields prior to the consecration of the temple and inscribing them as they did. Aeschines responded by attacking the impiety of the Amphissians with such ferocity that the ire of the council was actually turned against them to the extent that a sacred war was declared. This new sacred war gave Philip the excuse to enter central Greece that he had so longed for. Athens gathered what allies it could (Thebes included) and marched to defeat at Chaeronea.

At the core of the dispute over the shields stood two different notions of the Persian War conceived by each party to suit local traditions and present needs. Thebes preferred to forget or severely reinterpret her submission to Xerxes in the wake of Thermopylae. The Athenians traditionally focused on their glorious struggle against the Eastern other, but at this point chose to go out of their way to vilify the Thebans, doubtless because of their present enmity. The dispute between these two conceptions plays out on the panhellenic stage (that is, before the Amphictyony), but is not a dispute between a panhellenic notion of the past and an Athenian or Theban one. Rather Athens and Thebes are at the center of the altercation.

Above all this episode underscores the fierce competition and high stakes involved in the recollection of the Persian War. Roughly a century and a half after the

¹ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπὸ Μήδων καὶ Θηβαίων, ὅτε πάναντία τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἐμάχοντο. All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

Persian invasions the political map of Greece had changed radically. Sparta was a shadow of its former self. The Peloponnese was a hive of fractious states and shifting alliances. A weakened Thebes and Athens fought to maintain position as each passing decade seemed to give rise to another magnate from the north or west who threatened to disturb the status quo. When the Amphietyon met in 340/39 Philip was poised to do what no previous threat had managed, and yet even then the distant memory of the Persian War was thought important enough to upset the delicate balance.

My study of Persian War memory will demonstrate that the commemorative trends apparent in the above episode are no anomaly, but in fact typical of the Greek recollection of that war throughout the classical period (from Xerxes' invasion in 480 to the battle of Chaeroneia in 338 B.C.). I argue (1) that the Greeks recalled the Persian War as members of their respective polities, not collectively as Greeks, (2) that these various and often contradictory memories of the war competed with each other fiercely on the larger panhellenic stage, and (3) that it was not until the rise of Philip and Alexander that a truly 'Greek' memory of the war emerged. Simply put, trends toward localization and fierce competition speak to a fractured memorial culture in which there was not one memory of the past, but several. Such a conclusion not only has implications for the study of Greek memory in general, but also touches on larger questions of Greek identity. Before demonstrating my case, it is important that I place these propositions into context. To start, I note how my thesis complements recent work on Persian War memory. I then outline how I intend to use memory theory in the present study with a particular focus on the methodological considerations required for its application to ancient Greece. Finally, I conclude by setting out briefly how I intend to organize my arguments.

The fact that the individual Greek states of the classical period had different conceptions of the Persian War and that those conceptions were often in competition for recognition is not a new idea, nor is it particularly controversial. Competition is generally acknowledged (see below, pp. 5-7), but remains underexplored. Two trends in the study of Persian War memory have done much to direct scholarly attention away from this aspect of Greek memorial culture: the categorization of commemorations by battle and a general overemphasis on Athens. Both artificially restrict the body of evidence considered and consequently yield at best an incomplete picture of how the Persian War was recalled. A recent study by Michael Jung (2006) has attempted to counterbalance these trends, and while he makes an excellent start, I hope to continue that effort by examining in greater detail the manifold differences and subtle contestations that I believe most characterized the classical memories of the Persian War.

The categorization and interpretation of commemorations by battle are widespread trends in the study of Persian War memory. Flashar, whose 1996 article was the first to mount a full-scale effort to apply memory theory to the Persian War, focused exclusively on Marathon. He was followed in this by Hölkeskamp in 2001 and Gehrke in 2003 and 2007. Marathon was joined by Thermopylae when in 2006 Albertz published a study of the literary tradition of that particular battle from classical times to the present. Plataea was added by Jung also in 2006. Of these studies only Jung's, whose work examines the various recollections of Marathon as well as Plataea, undertakes a significant comparative analysis of the memorial tradition of more than one battle. But even here the perspective is limited. Obviously, the absence of sustained work on

Artemisium, Salamis, and Mycale (to say nothing of more ‘peripheral’ battles like Lade, Eurymedon, or Cyprian Salamis) leaves a serious gap. Yet a study of all the battles or even several studies of each individually would not ameliorate the situation. Not all Persian War monuments can be tied specifically to one battle or another, and commemorations of the war in general are not unknown.² Moreover, the monuments and narratives surrounding any one battle (even a battle as apparently separable as Marathon) can only be completely understood in relation to the others. Rather, what is needed is a study of the war, however it may be defined (see below, chapter 2), in its totality.

The tendency among scholars to categorize commemorations by battle also places undue emphasis on Athens. Three important articles and more than half of Jung’s substantial book have been devoted to the memory of Marathon and thus to Athens. To this we can add Loraux (1981), Hall (1989), Castriota (1992), and Harrison (2000), each of whom devotes significant attention to the presentation of Athenian identity as well as the uses to which the Persian War was put in support of it. We need not be surprised by this fact since it can be multiplied in numerous other fields of study. Athens supplies a substantial body of evidence, most of which has been treated with greater scholarly attention than testimony from other states. Far from surprising, Athenocentrism is understandable and in many cases necessary. But this is not the case here. A wealth of information relating to the commemoration of the Persian War can be found in numerous states outside Athens. If we do not avail ourselves of these sources, a distorted perspective on the Greek commemorative response to the war necessarily emerges.

² The columns of the Stoa Persike in Sparta, for example, bore images of Artemisia and Mardonius and thus evoked both Salamis and Plataea (Paus. 3.11.3). The Megarian epigram (‘Simonides’ 16 Page) has a similarly broad outlook.

Despite trends that direct attention away from diversity and contestation, both receive significant attention from Jung (2006), whose inclusion of the battle of Plataea allows him to examine the interaction between panhellenic commemorations and those of the individual states. In this he is largely followed by Hans Beck who in a forthcoming article looks specifically at the role of the young in the great celebrations of the battle of Plataea both at Plataea and elsewhere. Competition in memory-making has also been touched upon with greater or lesser attention by West (1970), Mikalson (2003), Marincola (2007), Vannicelli (2007) and Sider in a forthcoming commentary to Simonides.

Jung's treatment of these issues remains by far the most detailed to date, and I make extensive use of his findings below. The scope and focus of our projects, however, differ significantly. As noted above, Jung restricts himself to two battles. This is understandable since he sets out to cover the cultural response to those battles from the classical period to the end of antiquity. He argues that the process of memory-making is best understood in a diachronic analysis that takes into account the *longue durée*. Changes over long stretches of time certainly provide an invaluable perspective from which to examine cultural memory, but there is also much to be gained from a more detailed investigation of a single period. By offering a temporally more restricted, but topically more inclusive study, I hope to complement Jung's expansive treatment. The classical period suggests itself as a natural unit of study. With the rise of Philip and Alexander the Great the open competition of the free Greek states undergoes a significant transformation. Perceptions of the Persian War past remain diverse and are still contested down to the imperial period, but the presence of Macedon and the other Hellenistic

successor states (and later Rome) introduces enough of a change in the balance of power to consider the later period of commemoration a separate entity. I therefore end my detailed analysis with the death of Alexander, although some thoughts on later recollections are provided in the last chapter.

Restricting my focus to the classical period will also permit me to consider a more diverse body of material than can Jung, who examines contestation in that same period largely through the lens of the great panhellenic commemorations such as the Serpent Column, Simonides' Plataea Elegy, and the various cults associated with the town of Plataea (2006: 225-97). Although these same memorials will also feature prominently below, a consideration of the many state dedications reveals several important aspects of commemoration otherwise lost.³ From this broader range of evidence I offer a conclusion about the relationship between panhellenic and state memories that differs substantially from Jung's. While Jung holds that a panhellenic memory of the Persian War remained dominant in Greece until the bitter infighting of the Peloponnesian War tore it apart (2006: 297), I argue that a truly panhellenic memory of the war failed to develop in the classical period and that in fact the various states dominated the commemoration of that event until the rise of Philip and Alexander.

A second area in which I hope to contribute to the study of Persian War memory is a reflective use of memory theory, especially focusing on those problems that emerge from its application to the ancient world. With the recent quickening of interest in Greek

³ Since the underlying question of the present study is how memories of the same event in different states evolved and interacted, most of our attention will be directed to those recollections of the Persian War employed at the state and interstate levels. Memories held by groups within the state (such as social classes, tribes, villages, or individuals) will be addressed here only to the extent that they shed light on the relationship between the memories of different states.

social memory, it is important to begin addressing some of these critical questions. The treatment of the theory and methodology of memory has been quite uneven in the scholarship. Of course, much depends on the intentions of the study in question. For example, although Mikalson (2003) and Albertz (2006) touch on several matters of concern for a reconstruction of Persian War memory, neither has set out to treat memory per se. To these can be added some earlier works on identity and reception (see, for example, Loraux 1981, Harrison 2000, and Hall 2002). Nevertheless there is a discernable reluctance to treat memory theory even where such a discussion would be fruitful. Neither the introduction to a recent volume edited by Bridges, Hall, and Rhodes (2007) on the cultural response to the Persian War up to the present nor the chapter dealing with the impact of the Persian War on classical Greece (Rhodes 2007) notes any theorist of memory. Explicit talk of memory theory is much more common in German scholarship on the Persian War. Flashar (1996) begins his piece on Marathon by setting out a number of propositions about cultural memory, most influenced by the works of Jan Assmann. So too does Hölkeskamp's 2001 study of the memory of that same battle draw on Assmann's notion of *das kulturelle Gedächtnis*. Gehrke (2007) cites such luminaries of memory and identity studies as Pierre Nora, Eric Hobsbawm, and Benedict Anderson. Below I build on these initial forays by advancing a more detailed treatment of the extensive scholarship on memory theory.

Theory is, of course, a double-edged sword. Memory theory was developed within, and is generally used for the analysis of, modern and post-modern societies. Applying such notions to the ancient world can mislead as easily as clarify if terms and concepts are not reviewed critically. It might be helpful to consider this problem with a

case in point. Jung's study is a natural choice. His work is one of the most recent (2006), tackles the issue of theory directly, and is already quite well received (see Gehrke: 2007 and Beck: forthcoming). He places his work squarely on the theoretical shoulders of Pierre Nora (1996), who coined the concept of *lieu de mémoire*. Yet Jung hardly addresses the fact that for Nora a *lieu de mémoire* can only exist in the post-modern context.⁴ It appears when an acceleration of history and a professionalization of historiography strain the relationship between a group and its tradition / memory, converting an earlier (and unfortunately quite loosely defined) *milieu de mémoire* into a *lieu de mémoire* (see below, pp. 25-7). As a result, Jung's use of *lieu de mémoire* necessarily diverges from Nora's usage since those factors that change a *milieu* into a *lieu* are necessarily absent from the ancient world. This problem leaves Jung's contribution hard to integrate into a larger theoretical model and thus reduces its value for cross-cultural / comparative studies within or beyond the ancient world.

Applying memory theory to the ancient world is thus a tricky affair. Special questions, generally left untreated by the theorist, emerge: What is the relationship between history and memory before the professionalization of the former? Can Nora's *lieu de mémoire* be used productively without the post-modern acceleration of history, or without it does the term simply devolve into a mere site of memory, encompassing almost anything worth recalling? – an imprecision Nora explicitly rejects (1996: 15). Of perhaps more concern, how can advances made in studies that take for granted the ubiquity of the nation-state be applied to an age in which the very concept is alien?

⁴ Jung (2006: 17n.14) notes that Nora argues that the modern period is marked by caesuras and breaks that lead to an altered view of the past, which in turn makes it necessary to enshrine memory at certain symbolic places, but he does not link this modern (or rather post modern) phenomenon to the definition of *lieu de mémoire*.

While I do not intend the dissertation to serve as a defense of one or another solution to these problems, I do treat issues of theory and methodology more directly both presently in the introduction and throughout the work. What emerges, I hope, will be useful for future applications of memory theory to the Greek world through the example of the Persian War.

Prior scholarship on Persian War memory has made many valuable contributions. Establishing that for the Greeks cultural memory was intentional and malleable (Gehrke: 2001), as Halbwachs (1992 [=1925] and 1980 [=1950]) and Hobsbawm (1983) argue for the modern period, is a critical step in applying memory theory more broadly to the ancient world. There has also been an increasing attention to non-literary sources and their primacy over literary texts for the creation and maintenance of memory in any society, particularly those with a rudimentary literary culture (Hölkeskamp: 2001 and Beck: forthcoming). Even the focus on Marathon and Athens has yielded some important findings about how memory was crafted and manipulated within a state. More recently Mikalson (2003) and Boedeker (2007) have drawn attention to the wide variety of possible responses to the Persian War by considering the diversity of gods thanked and the cults established. Finally, Jung (2006) and Beck (forthcoming) have posed critical questions about the ways in which the memory of a single event (or string of events) was formed in the politically fragmented, but culturally connected and always competitive Greek states of the classical period. I hope to build on such work by offering a more inclusive look at the evidence (even if over a limited period of time) and incorporating a more thorough and critical look at the possible uses of memory theory as a tool for understanding Greek commemorative practice.

Now I set out a few basic propositions on the notoriously unsteady ground of memory theory. Indeed, a decade ago Kerwin Klein could proclaim that “the appearances of the word (memory) are so numerous, and its apparent meanings so legion, that it would take the work of a lifetime to begin to disentangle them” (2000: 129). With the stream of memory studies flowing unabated from then to now, the prospects of providing a full synthesis of the state of scholarship are even more daunting today. Since the present work takes memory theory as a point of departure and not an end in itself, I provide only that material which I believe most clarifies the workings of collective memory in ancient Greece. This will not take the form of a diachronic history of scholarship on memory, nor will I attempt to construct my own theory of memory (as do Fentress and Wickham 1992, Assmann 1992, and Winter and Sivan 1999), which would be well beyond the scope of this project. Rather, I offer a few observations about collective memory that will serve to clarify my own use of existing memory theory in the present work. I consider below the definition of collective memory, the relationships between power and memory, the nature of memorial communities, memory as narrative, the transmission of memory, historiography as an expression of memory, continuity and change in collective memory, and finally the impact of collective memory on collective identity.

The Definition of Collective Memory: In the early 20th century Maurice Halbwachs employed the term collective memory as a way to understand the impact of society on the recollections of the individual. He argued that there was a social aspect to all memory (1992 [=1925] and 1980 [=1950]; see also Assmann 1992: 34-48, Fentress and Wickham

1992: 1-40, and Winter and Sivan 1999). When we recall the past and attempt to give that past meaning in the present we rely on the terms, images, and values of the groups to which we belong. These necessary concomitants of memory do not and cannot properly belong to the individual alone. Rather, he or she shares them in common with larger or smaller groups. Thus the memories of a family, village, coworkers in an office, members of the same profession, or citizens of the same state will overlap to the extent that we may say that a collective memory exists among them. The individual will likely belong to several collectives at once and will therefore draw on different social frames of memory depending on what is recalled.

Despite broad agreement about what collective memory is, a serious objection has emerged over the implications of Halbwachs' precise terminology. Halbwachs is frequently accused of speaking as if a collective memory exists independently of the individuals that compose the collective (Assmann 1992: 36, Fentress and Wickham 1992: ix, and Winter and Sivan 1999: 9; see also Alcock 2002: 15). The implication of such a notion would be at once implausible and disquieting. The simple fact is that collectives do not remember. Only an individual may recall or forget something about the past. To assert the contrary strikes many as a way to return to such happily abandoned notions as the spirit or nature of a race or nation. In fact, Halbwachs himself was fully aware that individuals do the remembering (1980 [=1950]: 48; see also Hutton 1988: 314); he adds only that they do so within a social context, a point which his critics also concede. Furthermore, Halbwachs' insistence that individuals recall the past within numerous frames of memory militates against any notion that one of those collectives (such as the nation) could fully or even adequately define the individuals that constitute it (1992

[=1925]: 52-3 and 1980 [=1950]: 77; see also Alcock 2002: 15). Still, it is important to underscore here some important conclusions that Halbwachs himself did not emphasize. Collectives and collective memories have no existence beyond the members who compose them and do their remembering. Collectives as well as their perceived identities and memories are social constructs (see also Gillis 1994: 3), constructs that nevertheless impact the remembering done by the individual members.

Because of Halbwachs' failure to draw sufficient attention to the role of the individual in recollection, there are those who have proposed new terms to replace collective memory. Fentress and Wickham, for example, propose social memory (1992: ix). Winter and Sivan settle on collective remembrance (1999: 9). Ultimately, I feel such terminological overdetermination is as much a hindrance as a help. It is not that social memory or collective remembrance is proposed as something different from collective memory. Rather, both are intended to replace that term, which under the propositions set out by Fentress, Wickham, Winter, and Sivan cannot exist. Yet I feel this is neologism for the sake of neologism. Collective memory remains an acceptable term so long as it is understood that only the individual can remember and that collective memories are products of the individual members as much as individual memories are in a sense products of the many larger collectives to which a given person will likely belong. The real danger lies not in the term preferred, but in attributing to collective memories the psychological properties appropriate to the individual alone, such as amnesia or trauma, which would implicitly reify collective memory as a thing independent of the individual memories that compose it (Klein 2000: 135). Ultimately, any of the terms used to designate collective memory would work equally well so long as the above caveats are

understood. For the simple sake of avoiding the senseless repetition of a single *terminus technicus*, I use collective, social and cultural memory, recollection, and commemoration throughout the work with no meaningful distinction intended.

The Relationship between Power and Memory: The influence of power upon how we remember the past is undeniable and frequently seconded (see, for example, Gillis 1994: 4, Hutton 1988: 314, and Le Goff 1992: 54; see also Alcock 2002: 17-18). But what do we mean when we say that memory responds to power? The most obvious way to conceive of this relationship is to say that those in power will frequently manipulate memories about the past to their own advantage. While there is certainly truth in the old adage that “history is written by the winners”, this observation is too sweeping to be of much use. How do powerful groups or individuals influence collective memory and what are the limits of that influence? Roger Bastide (1978; see also Winter and Sivan 1999: 27-9) offers a productive way to think about the problem that foregrounds the individual. Collective memory, he argues, is a system of exchange. An individual contributes his or her own memories from which a collective memory is formed. Such an exchange of memories between individuals will not be equal. The memories of some will count for more as opposed to others. Knowledge, wealth, prestige, and position can give to the memories of a select group a social prominence denied to the recollections of the other members within a community (see also Alcock 2002: 18). In this way the memories of the individuals within a given collective are subject to the preponderant influence of a few among their number.

Bastide approaches a notion of power from the perspective of memory that is more thoroughly fleshed out by Michel Foucault from the perspective of knowledge generally. Foucault argues that power is not a point or possession that can be held or monopolized; it is rather the name given to a complex network of unequal relationships running through a society (1978: 93). Between any two or more individuals there exist unequal relationships of power, which allows the one to act upon the possible actions of the other (1978: 94, 2000b: 120, and 2000c: 340-2). The totality of these seemingly insignificant relationships within a given community are termed *infrapower*, or by analogy to anatomy, *capillaries of power*. These capillaries run through every corner of a society. Thus, power is not held, nor can it be removed (2000c: 343). Rather, power is woven into every interaction, every discourse, and every subject of knowledge – memory included (1978: 94 and 2000a: 32). Without relationships of power – the capacity of some to influence with persuasion or violence the actions of others – there is no society. Power is not, therefore, imposed from the top down, but interpenetrates the whole from the bottom up (Foucault 1978: 92-3 and 2000c: 343). In short, power is everywhere and is all-encompassing.

Both Bastide and Foucault suggest that within any given memorial community collective memory will respond to power, but their delicate formulations of the relationship between the two also sets distinct limits on the influence of powerful individuals or groups. Ultimately power is not the exclusive preserve of those we generally term powerful. It is distributed much more broadly throughout the exchange network within which a collective memory exists. Even at the zenith of their power, such groups as the archaic oligarchs and such prominent individuals as Themistocles and, as

we shall see below (chapter 5), even Alexander the Great maintained only imperfect control over the various capillaries and thus imperfect control over broad perceptions of the past (see also Dietler 1998, Winter and Sivan 1999, and Lebow 2006). To be effective elite memories have to be accepted by the numerous, historically insignificant, shareholders of power situated throughout the community. Memory responds to power, yes; but it is the power of the many that exerts more influence in the long run (Foucault 1978: 97-8).

The Nature of Memorial Communities: The term ‘memorial community’ is borrowed from Peter Burke (1989: 107), who uses it to designate communities holding conflicting interpretations of the past within a given society, but not the society itself. For our purposes I do not wish to use the term so restrictively. I use it not to designate a type of collective, but rather all collectives that share memories of the past. In this broader sense communities of memory are quite literally everywhere humans interact. They can be as small as a nuclear family, but as large as massive nation-states (Halbwachs 1980 [=1950]: 77). They are in fact so ubiquitous that it is easy to take their influence for granted, but not all memorial communities have an equal impact on how the past is recalled. Before we consider the interplay of memories in the classical Greek world, it is necessary to consider in more detail what constitutes a memorial community and how its potential impact can be gauged.

Following Bastide (1978; see also Wachtel 1986: 214-17 and Winter and Sivan 1999: 27-9), we can visualize a memorial community as a series of dots, representing individuals, connected by lines of exchange. Where lines of exchange form an

interconnected cluster there is likely to be a community of memory between those individuals. The denser the lines, the more cohesive the group and the greater the impact its collection of overlapping memories will have on each individual member. Holding a collective memory is, of course, a two-way street. The individual contributes his or her own memory, but at the same time must be subject to the pressure created by the overlapping memories of the collective (see also Assmann 1992: 130-31). The impact of a community's overlapping memories on the individual (what I term its 'reciprocal pressure') is the critical factor to consider when assessing the relative influence of the various communities to which any given person will likely belong. If an individual imagines him or herself as belonging to a community that exerts no reciprocal pressure on the beliefs and memories of its members, that community has no cohesive force. It would go too far to say that such a community does not exist since all memorial communities are essentially constructs, but its influence on the memories of its members would be slight.

When lines of exchange emerge from real interactions, the community in question can be called face-to-face. Such communities have severe spatial limitations, particularly in the ancient world. Even if men from different villages met at regional centers, the number of people who could attend with sufficient regularity to form lines of interaction that could compete with the sheer density of those formed locally would remain small. Because I focus predominantly on larger communities, memories formed and maintained exclusively within face-to-face communities will not play a significant role in the present study.

The communities that will consume most of our attention are those formed not from actual interaction, but rather from perceived interaction. In such cases individuals, despite the fact that they do not know each other personally, come to believe that they belong to a larger group nonetheless. We can call such a community, following Benedict Anderson (1991: 1-7), an ‘imagined community’. The means by which a collection of face-to-face communities could be assembled into a single imagined community in the ancient period is touched upon by Josh Ober’s recent book, *Democracy and Knowledge* (2008, esp. 144-51). There, he explores the formation of a single, effective Athenian state in part through the institution of polis-wide rituals, monuments, and festivals that together multiplied lines of exchange running between the various face-to-face communities.⁵ Imagined communities, despite their rather whimsical name, are vastly more complex and unstable than face-to-face communities (see Assmann 1992: 144-51). They require the greatest effort from the ‘center’ in order to exert reciprocal pressure and thus maintain cohesion. It is in fact little wonder that one of the principal aims of the earliest kingdoms of the ancient Near East was maintaining such a sense of cohesion within their vast territories (Assmann 1992: 145).

For neither Anderson working with the modern nation-state nor Ober considering the organization of the polis is the relative influence of concentric imagined communities of much concern. Since our focus falls on the interaction of state memories on the larger panhellenic stage, the question of whether the imagined community of Greeks exerted any significant reciprocal pressure on the memories of the Persian War held by individual

⁵ The extent to which terms like state or city-state are applicable to the Greek polis is much debated (for discussion and bibliography, see Hansen 1998), but I believe such terms can still be productively used to designate the polis as a politically oriented memorial community exerting a reciprocal pressure on its members that is mutually exclusive vis-à-vis other poleis.

Greeks is a critical one. Recalling the past in similar ways requires constant interaction or dense lines of exchange (Halbwachs 1980 [=1950]: 32 and Connerton 1989: 20). The distribution of power in the Greek world (or, in more Foucauldian terms, its 'regime of power relationships') greatly predisposed individuals to form lines of exchange within the boundaries of their respective poleis. Since the seventh century various towns in central and southern Greece had spent vast resources developing rituals, cults, festivals, traditions, and memories that tied face-to-face communities scattered across sizeable tracts of land together within a single imagined community (de Polignac 1995). By the time of the Persian War these poleis were well established and (as we shall see below) exhausted vast resources in an attempt to claim the recent victory over Persia. To what extent the imagined community of Greeks was capable of recalling the Persian War independently of the various participating and non-participating states will occupy a significant part of the present study (see below, chapter 3).

Memory as Narrative: Individual memory develops by virtue of a communicative process (Assmann 1992: 36-7 and Fentress and Wickham 1992: 47; see also Connerton 1989: 70 and Zerubavel 1994). To be remembered, facts must become images and arranged as a story (Fentress and Wickham 1992: 73). It is only as a story, as narrative, that memory can be transmitted from one person to another, from one generation to another. Alan Megill (2007: 66), writing on contemporary historiography, provides a useful working definition of a narrative: an account in which a chronology can be discerned and a beginning, middle, and end can at least be projected from what is provided. Despite the freedom such a definition permits, a narrative can never be large enough or detailed

enough to tell the whole story of the past. Hayden White (1978) has argued that the past is manifestly too complex for that. Like a map, a story of the past becomes comprehensible only by leaving certain details out. The process by which information is judged worthy of inclusion or exclusion is never innocent. Some details are omitted, others subordinated, while still others are emphasized or cast as turning points. In this way a string of facts is made meaningful to those telling the story. In just the same way, however, others can take the same events and construct an almost wholly different story. Our study of Persian War narratives in Greece provides many examples of this phenomenon (see below, chapter 1).

Connected with the concept of narrative is the rather more ambiguous term master narrative. Master narratives seem to stand in some relationship of mastery to regular narratives, but the nature of that mastery is not always spelled out (on this problem generally, see Klein 1995). At one end of the spectrum master narratives represent stories of the past told by groups seeking to master other groups (Klein 1995: 297) whose stories about the past can be dubbed counter narratives, a concept borrowed from Foucault (1977: 139-64; see also Zerubavel 1994: 10 and Alcock 2002: 17). At the other end of the spectrum master narratives are understood as super narratives (Zerubavel 1994, Jarausch and Geyer 2003: 5 and Megill 2007: 167); that is, large narratives composed of manifold smaller narratives and thus holding a position of mastery over its component parts. While some scholars favor one definition over the other, most make use of a combination of the two.

Both definitions of master narrative are quite useful for disentangling the various stories of the Persian War that appear in the classical period, but to be of use they must

first be disentangled from each other. I propose to term narratives through which the empowered of a given community attempt to impose their stories upon others ‘dominant narratives’, a term occasionally used in a non-technical sense by Zerubavel (1994: 10). Narratives that oppose them remain ‘counter narratives’. The term dominant narrative must be used with particular caution in the present study. The act of presenting a dominant narrative in an attempt to control the perceptions of others necessarily implies that both parties are members of the same memorial community. As such, dominant and counter narratives form a symbiosis. A counter narrative is always opposed to a more powerful / widely accepted dominant narrative. Their places may shift, but they are always defined one against the other. If two individuals lack sufficient contact with each other, however, it is inappropriate to say that one dominates the other with a given narrative. Indeed, such language implies a real or metaphorical center over which different narratives compete. Winners hold the center while losers are banished to the periphery. A narrative or set of narratives in Athens or Corinth can be said to dominate over others within those states, but it remains to be seen whether the narratives of an individual state or a larger panhellenic collective could be said to hold dominance throughout Greece (see below, chapter 3).

Stripped of any implication of mastery sought by social elites, the term ‘master narrative’ becomes the name for a narrative that exists in a particular type of relationship to other narratives irrespective of who is using it and why. Master narratives, to borrow some elements from Zerubavel (1994: 3-12) and Megill (2007: 167), are narratives that tell a story of a significant segment of the past and incorporates numerous smaller narratives. For the sake of clarity, I term smaller narratives ‘commemorative narratives’

(following Zerubavel) so as to distinguish them from the general term for all narratives.

According to this definition, the commemorative narrative of a monument, ritual, or holiday would evoke a larger story, a master narrative, into which the rather limited narrative related to the commemorative act in question fits. For example, the commemoration honoring the Spartans who fell at Thermopylae ('Simonides' 531) tells a very brief and fragmentary story, but at the same time this narrative is intended to evoke in the mind of the reader a much larger story about the entire battle and the Persian War in its totality. These larger, master narratives can act as dominant narratives or counter narratives. All that matters is that they encompass other, smaller narratives. Beyond this relative definition, however, there is no set size for a master narrative. They can fluctuate from the story of a battle to a war, to an epoch.

Narratives and master narratives are only part of a larger categorization of narratives about the past sketched briefly by Megill (2007: 167). Above master narratives sit 'grand narratives', which are stories about history in general. Here again I take grand narrative to refer to a type of narrative that could be used as a dominant or counter narrative. We could think of grand narratives as being to master narratives what master narratives are to commemorative narratives. Just as individual events evoke a larger story about the broader historical context in which they fit, so too do such large events as the Persian War or the reign of Pisistratus fit within a conception of history generally. Thus, the large collective tomb known as the Soros evokes the heroes at Marathon and the larger story surrounding that event without having to spell it out, but so too do Marathon and the Persian War in general evoke a much larger story in which that victory carries on the glorious tradition of the Amazonomachy – a fact not lost on the

Athenians who frequently made the connection themselves (see below, chapter 2, pp. 77-8).

Informing all narratives from the grand stories of history down to the narrowest commemoration is a final category of narrative, 'metanarrative'. Metanarratives (here again drawing on Megill 2007: 167) are less stories of the past than beliefs about how the world works, which in turn structure how someone within a society is likely to recollect the past. For example, the Greeks shared certain notions about the nature of the gods, which greatly predisposed them to think about the past in ways that would tend to diverge from those with a radically different conception of the divine. In the present study our focus will fall mostly on narratives and master narratives, since by definition grand narratives and metanarratives claim to say something that is true of all history and all things, not just the Persian War.

The great variety of narratives should warn us against imagining the relationship between dominant and counter narratives (or between the dominant narratives of different memorial communities) to be monolithic in nature. At the heart of such disputes are competing groups of individuals who can employ potentially different narratives as the occasion demands. For our purposes it is important to note that a given polis cannot be said to have a single story about the past with commemorative narratives fitting seamlessly within a master narrative which in turn sits perfectly within a static and fully crafted grand narrative. Collective memory is a term used to describe an immensely complex web of individual interaction. We must not expect uniformity even within an imagined community as solidly established as the polis. Rather those working to support a particular regime of power relationships will make use of several commemorative and

master narratives within a loose conception of history overall, which will itself tend to shift depending on what smaller narratives are used to give it voice.

The Transmission of Memory: How exactly collective memories are transmitted is a serious gap in Halbwachs' formulation (Connerton 1989: 38). As narrative, memory is transmitted over time and space through media of communication. These media can vary widely. Some are obvious, such as informal conversations, oral traditions, and later written texts. Yet these are not the only media that communicate. Rituals too have a narrative of their own and communicate something about the past they celebrate (Connerton 1989: 70). Monuments, even when they are not accompanied by inscriptions or representational images, can convey stories about the past to the viewer (Zerubavel 1994: 6). Landscapes too can be endowed with meaningful memories (Assmann 1992: 60-61; see also Alcock 2002, esp. 28-30).

The relative impact of these various media on individual and thus collective memory is debatable. Assmann (1992: 56-7 and 89-90) considers rituals and festivals the most important modes of transmitting cultural memory in early societies, but emphasizes the rising importance of those written texts that form a canon in literate societies throughout his work. Connerton (1989) and Winter and Sivan (1999) believe that ritual remains the key mode of disseminating collective memory even in highly complex literate societies. In this Connerton is surely right. Ritual is by nature repetitive and engages a much wider public more viscerally than does a written text however canonized, particularly in a society as barely literate as Greece. Yet it would be impossible to provide a sufficient account of the Greek recollections of the Persian War in the classical

period without recourse to less effective modes of commemoration (such as historiography, literary performances, and countless monuments that may or may not have been accompanied by repeated ritual performances). Even among these, however, some were certainly more effective than others. Those that take advantage of the elements that make ritual such an effective medium of memory (repetition, engagement, and broad appeal) will have more impact within a given society than those that do not. Each piece of evidence presents unique problems, and no hard and fast rule can be proffered here, but throughout the study we must account for the potential impact of a given expression of memory before assuming its influence on society at large.

Bound with the issue of the transmission of memory is the popular term *lieu de mémoire*. Above, I briefly noted my objection to Jung's use of Nora's signature term for the sites (geographical and otherwise) in which commemoration occurs. Let us now consider whether the term can be redefined so as to be useful for the ancient world. I stress again that it is not useful as Nora (1996) has formulated it. *Lieux de mémoire* are defined by a sense of incredulity toward them in the minds of those for whom they are supposed to have meaning. This last point is a key distinction since hostile groups or states are always incredulous to the commemorative claims of their rivals. Rather it must be for the members of a common memorial community that "pious undertakings" at *lieux de mémoire* "seem like exercises in nostalgia, sad and lifeless...rituals for a ritual-less society; fleeting incursions of the sacred into a disenchanted world" (Nora 1996: 6-7). Without the postmodern acceleration of history that creates this overwhelming sense of incredulity, *lieu de mémoire* loses all meaning as a *terminus technicus*. It is simply French for a site of memory and holds no meaning beyond what the English phrase

denotes. To salvage Nora's *lieu de mémoire* we must redefine how a sense of incredulity, still accompanied by lingering respect, might emerge toward a given site of memory before postmodern times.

Viewing the problem from the point of view of Foucauldian power relationships may shed some light. When a site of memory is fully integrated into an existing power structure, we can rightly call that site a *milieu de mémoire*, Nora's term for a site of memory before incredulity sets in (1996: 1). As power relationships evolve, a site remains current and meaningful if it too evolves. But if for one reason or another that site fails to adapt to present realities or if relationships of power change so radically that the site cannot be easily reinterpreted, it faces two possibilities. The site of memory in question, stripped of the power relationships that made it meaningful, may simply fall out of use and disappear. But if the site in question were monumentalized or canonized to an extent that it could not be ignored, that site could be said to exist within the altered relationships of power as a *lieu de mémoire* – an island of meaning commanding respect, but at the same time incredulity from a power structure in which it no longer fits. So defined, the transition between *milieu* and *lieu* would no longer be a modern phenomenon, but one that responds to certain conditions of power at any time. Nor would we expect such a transition to be immediate or total. In an extreme case we might imagine a Roman visitor to Athens during the High Empire looking upon the marks of the glorious Persian War past as *lieux de mémoire*, while at the same time an Athenian would likely see them as much more intimately related to his memory and sense of identity and thus as part of his *milieu de mémoire*. Within the classical period *lieux* are, in my opinion, much harder

to find, but after the rise of Philip and Alexander the Great I believe some sites could be productively termed *lieux de mémoire* at least for some contemporaries.

Historiography as an Expression of Collective Memory: The relationship between collective memory and historiography is much debated. Halbwachs argued that they work to opposite goals and according to different rules (1980 [=1950]: 50-87). There are some who still maintain this view (Assmann 1992: 42-4 and Nora 1996: 2),⁶ but Klein (2000: 128) has rightly noted that it is already commonplace to assert that history and memory are *not* opposites. As the observation implies, those in agreement are many (see, for example, Le Goff 1977: 129, Connerton 1989: 14, Fentress and Wickham 1992: 145, Zerubavel 1994: 4, and Wertsch 2002: 18-20). Conceding this point, there remains an important question: in what ways does history differ from memory, if at all? Burke (1989: 98-9) has argued that there is in fact very little difference between the two. Hayden White (1978: 49) observes that historians form their narratives within and under the influence of their respective societies. Arguments that history is simply another mode of expressing and transmitting collective memory seem to me, however, to go too far. It is certainly true that historians are subject to the influence of the memorial communities to which they belong. Moreover, much of their evidence (particularly in the case of ancient historiography) is likely derived from products of collective memory. Historiography can express collective memory in its content and form, but I maintain that it is not itself an unmediated product of collective memory. The self-conscious attempt by an individual

⁶ Nora seems, however, to have modern historiography in mind here since modern and pre-modern historiography appears as a "*milieu de mémoire par excellence*" (1996: 3).

to portray fact, however poorly executed or willfully distorted, shifts historiography away from the free expression of memory (Megill 2007: 18-26 and Wertsch 2002: 40-42).

The complex relationship between historiography and memory prompts a further question of methodology. Our richest sources of information about how the Greeks recalled the Persian War come from historiography or historical narratives in biographies, commentaries, philosophical treatises, and travel guides. In the classical period Herodotus holds center stage with some supporting evidence emerging from Thucydides and what little can be gleaned from those who seem to have made extensive use of Ephorus. In the imperial period Plutarch and Pausanias supply countless anecdotes and, more importantly, epigrams and descriptions of monuments that do not otherwise survive. How to use such information for collective memory presents some special problems.

For contemporary historiography there are two layers of evidence that must be distinguished. As an historian of the Persian War Herodotus records a wealth of information he gleaned from his own sources, who were likely drawing heavily on the collective memory of their memorial communities. Yet even when Herodotus (or Thucydides) attributes a given story or speech to the Corinthians or Athenians, it is important to keep in mind that the story has been reworked by the historian and is not a pure expression of collective memory (see also Fentress and Wickham 1992: 145). Nevertheless, such accounts offer several insights into contemporary viewpoints. At another level, Herodotus and Thucydides were themselves members of contemporary memorial communities and thus their histories as a whole may reflect trends beyond that of the individual (see White 1978: 49). Here again caution is needed since Herodotus and

(especially) Thucydides need not be in agreement with any great numbers of their contemporaries.

With regard to our later, secondary sources, like Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch, Pausanias, and Arrian we lose the capacity to read the works themselves as products influenced by collective memory. They were of course still written within memorial communities, but if Plutarch or Pausanias' overall conceptions of an event reflects anything, it is the perspective of memorial communities in the High Empire, not what the Greeks of the classical period believed. As we shall see below, these conceptions can differ quite radically, and we must not confuse one for the other. This does not mean that we should ignore these sources entirely. Plutarch and Pausanias frequently cite, allude to, and draw on classical sources. Moreover, our trust in their testimony is often justified by external evidence. That said, not everything that claims or appears to date from the classical period does. Persian War monuments standing in the imperial period need not date from the classical period, and traditions that Plutarch and his contemporaries thought were genuine may have been relatively recent inventions. Determining what in the later sources can and cannot be used as evidence for the memorial trends of the classical period will necessarily occupy much of our attention.

Continuity and Change in Collective Memory: Memories cannot literally be preserved in the mind; they must be reconstructed (Halbwachs 1992 [=1925]: 39, Wachtel 1986: 210, and Assmann 1992: 40; see also Wertsch 2002: 7). Thus the process of remembering and recollecting are not passive acts of retrieving stored information, but rather active processes whereby past perceptions are reworked within the context of the present

(Fentress and Wickham 1992: 40). Each new act of remembrance opens the possibility for the past to be recollected in a different way, one that better explains, accounts for, or befits present realities (Fentress and Wickham 1992: 88 and Zerubavel 1994: 5-6). This is not to say that collective memory is wholly at the mercy of present whims. Real experience and tradition can on occasion be remarkably influential (Schwartz 1982: 396, Lowenthal 1985: 326, Burke 1989: 104-105., Fentress and Wickham 1992: 130-31, and Dietler 1998: 85). Ultimately, present and past depend on each other for meaning (Halbwachs 1992 [=1925]: 86 and Connerton 1989: 3). As we shall see below, the tension between past notions and present needs can create an astounding array of commemorative permutations from a relatively short sequence of events (see below, chapter 2).

This same tension between conservative and innovative tendencies in collective memory also results in a constantly evolving vision of the past even in a relatively stable society. When the power relationships on which collective memories rely are greatly disturbed either because a memorial community undergoes a significant change or because a certain notion of the past is pulled from its original social context and imported into a new one, this constant evolution accelerates (Halbwachs 1992 [=1925]: 160 and Hutton 1988: 314). Those recollections that can be reinterpreted will tend to survive in an altered form that accords more with the new power relationships (Halbwachs 1992 [=1925]: 141 and Fentress and Wickham 1992: 72-3). Those that cannot, will fall into disuse or, according to my own reinterpretation of Nora, remain as *lieux de mémoire*. In their stead new traditions will be invented. ‘Invented traditions’, as defined by Eric Hobsbawm (1983), should not be mistaken for those changes to which notions of the past

are constantly subject. An invented tradition is not an adaptation of what was done before; it is the result of a break with preexisting tradition that then masquerades as continuity.

Despite the almost continuous warfare that engulfed Greece from the Persian War to the battle of Chaeronea, most states remained remarkably stable in terms of the basic relationships of power. Smaller or larger groups of elite males held sway over actually or nominally autonomous states that sought to expand their influence and check that of others. For states like Plataea, Melos, or Scione the period was marred by catastrophic change, but for most this pattern remained in place, obviating the need to replace existing and constantly evolving Persian War traditions with invented ones. It was not until Philip and Alexander the Great irreparably disturbed this system that we see real invented traditions and, in my opinion, *lieux de mémoire* emerge (see below, chapter 5).

The Impact of Collective Memory on Collective Identity: Over time the individuals within a memorial community project into the past a notion of themselves as a collective that transcends the individual (Halbwachs 1980 [=1950]: 85 and Assmann 1992: 140-41). It transcends not in fact, but in perception only. Like collective memories, collective identities are constructs and have no physical reality (Assmann 1992: 130-32 and Gillis 1994: 3). There is no better example than the choice by those eventually bound together by evolving political loyalties coalescing around the city of Athens to project into the past a sense that the citizen body had been there since the beginning and over that time had acted in a manner consistent with their present sense of identity (Loraux 1986: 148-50, 193-4, and 277-8).

Despite the clear connections between memory and identity, the latter is not a significant part of the present study. To speak to the larger sense of identity felt in Athens, Sparta, or indeed all Greece would require the examination of far more than just the recollections of the Persian War in the classical period. Rather, I approach the question of identity in a more indirect fashion. It is generally assumed that the Greeks collectively had an identity. Certainly they often spoke of it and since they could imagine such a thing, it follows that it did exist. A common language, common religion, and several common customs bound them undeniably together (see below, chapter 1, pp. 37-8). So far as the issue of identity is concerned, my purpose is not to reject the notion that the Greeks did belong to a common, imagined community, but to question the extent to which their membership in this larger collective influenced their recollections of the recent past. If, as I propose, it did not do so to any great degree, I do not take this to be a opening shot against the idea of a Greek identity, but rather an invitation to reconsider the nature of this massive, inter-state community in the absence of shared recollections of an event of the importance and caliber of the Persian War.

Now that we have considered the contributions I believe the present study will make and reviewed some preliminary observations about the nature of collective memory and its use in the context of the ancient world, I will finish by outlining briefly how the thesis will be organized. Given the mass of material related to the Persian War, the evidence cited is necessarily selective, but I believe sufficiently representative to prove that the Greeks did not recall the war as Greeks but rather as members of their respective polities; that their various state recollections of the war competed with each other fiercely

throughout the classical period; and that only with the advent of Philip and Alexander the Great did any single narrative of the war approach a position of dominance within the Greek world as a whole. The first two chapters address the issue of divided memories in the Greek world, the second two consider how those memories interacted on the panhellenic stage, and the final chapter examines the impact the rise of Macedon and Alexander's conquest of the East had on the memory of the Persian War.

Chapter One, "Shaping the Conflict(s)", examines the extent to which the Greeks remembered the Persian War differently. While it is generally recognized that Spartans, Athenians, Corinthians and others would each highlight their own contributions to the ultimate victory, it is less clear whether such disputes over detail and emphasis would have occurred within a shared concept of the war as a whole. To demonstrate the vast differences present in classical Greece, I review how the Greeks marked the temporal definition of the event we call the Persian War. A review of the available literary, rhetorical, and historiographical material shows that the temporal conception of the war could vary from a two year event encompassing merely the invasion of Xerxes to an eighty year struggle of which Xerxes' invasion was only a part.

The second chapter, "Localizing the Past", pursues a related, but more specific question: why did recollections of the war vary so much from state to state? The Greeks had defeated Xerxes in a broad alliance, but as the victorious allied armies disbanded each participating community arranged the Persian War past into a more suitable story. Four factors shaped this process: present political needs, wartime experience, preexisting social memory, and finally interactions with other memorial communities. Each of these factors predisposed those states that participated in the war to develop different

recollection of that shared event, each of which was regarded as perfectly true by its proponents.

Chapter Three, “The Panhellenic Memorial Community”, begins to address the question of how these various memories interacted with each other by asking the natural question prompted by chapters one and two: why did a panhellenic memory of the Persian War fail to develop in the classical period? Although the Greeks fought together as allies, evidence that they ever remembered the war collectively as Greeks is weak. Most examples are from later periods when larger political collectives were the rule rather than the exception. If we focus on contemporary and near-contemporary reports, it is clear that the alliance against Persia, the Hellenic League, was not sufficiently cohesive to generate and maintain a memory of its recent achievements against the sectional claims of the vastly better organized and funded states.

The fourth chapter, “Competition between Memorial Communities”, considers the agonistic memorial culture in classical Greece. Through poetry, rhetorical displays, and most particularly monumental buildings, city-states broadcasted their versions of the past to a larger panhellenic audience and in so doing often explicitly competed with contrary notions of the war. The stakes in these memorial contestations could be remarkably high. States accused of capitulating to Persia faced serious repercussions which might be averted if assertions that they participated on the winning side were accepted. Athens and Sparta fought over the lion’s share of the credit to advance their own claims to hegemony. The fragile and disunited political realities of the classical period precluded the emergence of a single, dominant narrative of the war. Contradictory versions competed endlessly with no firm winner or losers.

In fact, it was not until the emergence of Philip and Alexander the Great that a single version of the war approached dominance throughout Greece. The process by which this new memory of the Persian War emerged is instructive and will constitute the fifth chapter, “Inventing a Greek Memory”. Each participating state had a vested interest in telling a story that put itself at the center of the events. Such stories had little hope of gaining acceptance within other participating states. Philip and Alexander, whose Macedon had in fact fought for the Persians, invented a tradition of the Persian War designed to be so generic, so homogenous that it could appeal to all Greeks equally. While the great power that accrued to the Macedonian dynasts gave their new tradition a social prominence enjoyed by no other, its impact was felt slowly and unevenly. Even then its ultimate success owed less to Philip and Alexander’s personal power than to the substantial changes in the broader relationships of power they wrought, and it was as a result of those changes that their invented tradition came to dominate the memory of the Persian War in the larger Mediterranean world and beyond for centuries to come.

Finally, in the “Conclusion”, I draw together my findings and offer some closing thoughts on how an appreciation of the divisions and contestations rife within the Persian War tradition of the classical period contributes to the broader study of Greek memorial culture and identity.

CHAPTER 1: SHAPING THE CONFLICT(S)

The Greeks who joined together to repulse the threat of Xerxes' invasion disputed their precise roles in those momentous events for centuries to come. Claims to be the savior of Greece appear frequently, each implicitly contradicting the other. This much is generally recognized. But, when Athenians, Spartans, Megarians, Corinthians, Plataeans, and others gathered at the great panhellenic sites and disputed their respective roles, did these debates occur within a generally agreed upon narrative frame of the war, or did each party have an essentially different notion of the war as a whole? Said differently, were the differences between the various states' conceptions of the war a matter of detail against the backdrop of broad agreement, or did each state's claims fit only within a particular and more or less distinct story of the Persian War?

A consideration of memory as narrative offers some important guidelines for addressing this question (see above, Introduction, pp. 19-24). The most frequently noted differences between Greek accounts of the Persian War occur in commemorative narratives. Starr (1962: 328-30) long ago pointed out that Herodotus was aware that most would not appreciate his estimation of Athens' role in the ultimate victory. West (1970: 278-82) briefly reviews the surviving Persian War epigrams, finding that Corinth, Megara, Opuntian Locris, Tegea and of course Athens all claim to have saved Greece by their actions in one or another battle. Marincola (2007: 105-8) points out the numerous

surviving historical accounts that appear outside Herodotus, suggesting that they may derive from divergent memories of the war. Vannicelli (2007: 315-21) sees stratifications and variances of opinion within the text of Herodotus (see also Mikalson 2003). Finally, Jung (2006: 25) makes the tensions that emerged from competing state memories a major focus of his extensive study of the commemorations of the battles of Marathon and Plataea.

Viewed from the other end of the narrative spectrum, however, Persian War memory shows remarkable overlap. It is beyond doubt that the Greeks shared a common culture. Lines of exchange, however sparse, crisscrossed at sites like Delphi and Olympia where symbols and stories were displayed, communicated, and validated as mutually meaningful.¹ What we consider myth, but the Greeks considered their ancient history, also possessed some degree of uniformity, propagated in part by the panhellenic shrines themselves (Rosenberger 2001: 113-15), but also by canonical literary productions (Assmann 1992: 273-5). Indeed, Herodotus himself gives voice to this shared Greek culture, referring to it as “the Hellenic thing” (τὸ Ἑλληνικόν: 7.145.2 and more famously at 8.144.2). The common culture the Greeks shared had its most obvious impact on metanarratives. In his examination of the origin of the Greek conception of freedom Raaflaub (2004: 66-7) argues that “to those who lived through the Persian Wars, the freedom they were prepared to defend was elementary, a basic necessity for both polis and the individual.” This metanarrative – freedom as a necessary component of individual and civic life – began almost immediately to influence the way in which the Persian War was commemorated in numerous communities and by the 470s was near

¹ For the role of the great panhellenic sites in strengthening a sense of Greek identity, see Rosenberger 2001 for Delphi and Nielsen 2007b for Olympia.

universal (Raaflaub 2004: 58-65). A similar metanarrative can be seen in the antithesis between *hybris* and *sophrosyne*, which, Castriota (1992: 17-32) argues, appeared in numerous Athenian commemorations of the Persian War as well as in Aeschylus' *Persae* and Herodotus' *Histories*.

Between the incredibly diverse commemorative narratives and the broadly similar metanarratives stand the uncertain ground of the master and grand narratives, the multifaceted stories of longer periods of time and history in general (respectively) that constitute the frames through which commemorative narratives gain context. The question of grand narratives would take us too far beyond the purview of the present study, but an examination of the degree to which the master narratives addressing the Persian War differed from each other directly addresses our first hypothesis – that the Greeks recalled the Persian War as members of their respective polities, not collectively as Greeks – and moreover provides much needed context for a deeper analysis of the factors that caused the Greek memory of the war to fracture along state lines (Chapter 2) as well as the dynamics of memorial contestation at the panhellenic sanctuaries (Chapter 4).

Examining master narratives of the Persian War in the classical period is a difficult proposition. A full investigation of Persian War master narratives would entail an unruly amount of evidence touching on every aspect of that event. What would emerge would be diffuse and difficult to compare. Better and more manageable results emerge if we limit ourselves to a single aspect of the war that is touched upon by a wide variety of sources. I shall therefore present here a comparison of the various surviving periodizations of the Persian War. Periodization is a process whereby the nearly infinite

string of past events is organized into discrete periods (White 1978 and Zerubavel 1994: 8-9; see also Dewald 1997: 76). Within the larger story, these periods are characterized rather simply according to basic plot structures: was it a heroic period of growth, a period of decline, a chaotic transition phase? Some periods are determined to have particular relevance to the present and thus receive more attention. The Persian War was for the participants (and in fact many others) one such period. At a more basic level, periodization also entails setting temporal boundaries for a series of occurrences that can then be viewed as a single event. It is this rather rudimentary, but nevertheless telling and critical component of periodization that I will examine in this chapter. What we shall find is that the surviving evidence suggests a deep divide among the Greeks not only in matters of detail (that is, in commemorative narratives), but also about the basic temporal frame of the conflict and thus at the level of master narratives.

To approach the issue of periodization I rely predominantly on surviving historical accounts. This is not ideal. In a perfect world I would examine a wide range of dedications, celebrations, popular stories, and state-sponsored accounts of the war from a significant number of states. Commemorative narratives from a single memorial community, when placed together, would suggest one or more periodizations used to frame the master narratives of the war that were valid for that group. Arranged over time, this same body of evidence might also prompt some conclusions about changes to these narratives over time. In our case, however, only Athens with its wealth of sources comes close to providing the level of evidence needed to reconstruct master narratives with such detail. To examine the other states, we must turn to historiography. The connection between history and memory is, of course, a tricky one that has long exercised students of

cultural memory. My case for the use of historiography as a source for memory and the methods I will employ to that end are set out above (see Introduction, pp. 27-9). I underscore here only the added difficulty of localizing opinions expressed in historiography to any particular memorial community. Thucydides may be an Athenian and may be influenced by the collective memory of that community, but his history is far from an expression of Athenian collective memory, as he himself proudly insists (6.54.1). Any periodization of the Persian War that appears within historiography can only be tentatively attributed to a given state or community. Unfortunately, such uncertainties are in the nature of looking beyond Athens.

Recently, Jung (2006: 13) has examined the places of memory of the Persian War through the lens of a certain kind of periodization, one that begins with Marathon and ends with Plataea. In the case of Marathon Jung expresses some reservations. He argues that Marathon was not always thought of as the beginning of the war in Athens, although in the fourth century he sees a broad acceptance of its inclusion (2006: 146-65). He also notes that Marathon was likely not recognized as an integral part of the war outside Athens (2006: 165-9). Plataea is presumed to be a recognized endpoint without qualification. In the end both are seen as effective temporal points along which to structure an account of the memory of the Persian War. I argue that even the relatively basic question of the war's periodization failed to gain any significant consensus in the Greek world throughout the classical period. It was not just a question of Marathon; the range of opinion ran from a beginning in mythological times to an ending as late as the mid-fifth century and the Peace of Callias. There were not two or three options, but

rather several differently periodized and therefore differently understood master narratives of the war into which our surviving commemorative narratives could be fit.

I begin by quickly reviewing the sources for the view that the war began with Marathon and ended with Plataea. I shall then demonstrate that even in Athens, this periodization of the war was not the only one, nor could it be said to have reached a position of dominance at any time during the classical period, as Jung argues (2006: 153). I shall then explore the evidence for periodizations outside Athens in Herodotus, Thucydides, and Ephorus. For Herodotus and Thucydides this will involve not only the authors' own point of view, but those of their speakers as well. Tentative periodizations drawn from these three historians will be fleshed out, when possible, with supporting evidence from Hellanicus of Lesbos, Aeschylus, Pindar, Ctesias, and Diodorus Siculus.

The Marathon-to-Plataea periodization is, as Jung notes (2006: 13), most clearly and succinctly expressed by Plato in his *Laws*. His Athenian speaker corrects the Cretan interlocutor, who believes that Greece was saved by the battle of Salamis, saying:

But, my friend, both Megillus and I say rather that the land battle at Marathon was the beginning of deliverance for the Greeks and that the one at Plataea was its completion and that these battles made the Greeks better (707c1-5).²

The judgment of Plato in this context has traditionally been viewed as a largely partisan assertion about the events of the war, which of course it is (Hanson 1995: 328-9; see also Rowe 2007). Nevertheless, the periodization Plato uses here can be found elsewhere. Aristotle periodized the war in a roughly similar way. In his *Posterior Analytics* he

² ἡμεῖς δέ, ὦ φίλε, ἐγώ τε καὶ ὅδε, Μέγιλλος, φαμέν τὴν πεζὴν μάχην τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι γενομένην καὶ ἐν Πλαταιαῖς, τὴν μὲν ἄρξαι τῆς σωτηρίας τοῖς Ἕλλησι, τὴν δὲ τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι, καὶ τὰς μὲν βελτίους τοὺς Ἕλληνας ποιῆσαι.

actually adduces the Persian War to clarify his method of understanding causation (94a). Here, the Ionian Revolt is the cause and Marathon the beginning. In a more historical context Aristotle firmly dates the end of the Persian War to seventeen years before the reforms of Ephialtes in 462/1, which gives us 479/8 (*Ath. Pol.* 25.1) though it is less clear whether this is meant to include Mycale as well as Plataea. Both Demosthenes (18.208) and Aeschines (2.74-5), when they want to recount the great deeds of the Persian War, include the same four battles: Marathon, Artemisium, Salamis, and Plataea. A Persian War that begins with Marathon and ends with Plataea can also be found in Apollodorus' *Against Neaera* (94 and 96), which appears in the Demosthenic corpus as oration 59, and Lysias' *Funerary Oration* (2.21 and 46).

This periodization of the war was not, however, the only one to be found in Athens. There were in fact two major variants, besides that represented by Thucydides which will be treated in greater detail below (see pp. 52-60). The first is provided by Isocrates in his *Panegyricus* and the other by Plato in the *Menexenus*.³ Let us consider Isocrates first. The *Panegyricus* includes a substantial account of the Persian War, which is there defined as the conflict with Darius and Xerxes (71) and therefore as a single war that begins with Marathon (85-6).⁴ So far, Isocrates repeats the Marathon-to-Plataea periodization. The end of the war, however, is moved from Plataea back to Salamis. For Isocrates Salamis represents the final danger faced by the Greeks (92). After a substantial account of that battle (92-99) he skips directly to the Peloponnesian War (100). In so doing, he places particular emphasis on Athens' greatest military achievements, altering the picture generated by Plato in the *Laws*.

³ Pace Jung 2006: 153n.90 who adduces both in support of the same tradition as found in the *Laws*.

⁴ For more on Isocrates' depiction of the war in the *Panegyricus*, see chapter 5, pp. 231-34.

A more substantial variant appears in the *Menexenus*. There the war is concluded with a formal peace made between the Athenians and the Great King (241e-242a). The peace in question, of course, is the much debated Peace of Callias,⁵ which was most likely concluded soon after Cimon's final campaign to Cyprus in 449 (Diod. 12.4.4-6). So integral are the later campaigns against Persia in the *Menexenus* that, when the speaker ranks the accomplishments of the combatants, giving the *aristeia* to those at Marathon and second place to those at Artemisium and Salamis (240e-241a), he feels obliged to give honorable mention to those who served in such later engagements as Eurymedon, Cyprus, and Egypt (241d-e). Although the *Menexenus* is clearly a parody (Rowe 2007: 93-5), its periodization of the war seems to be part of a legitimate tradition. Several sources also suggest the use or at least knowledge of this periodization. In his *Against Leocrates* Lycurgus states:

Not content to erect a trophy at Salamis, they (i.e. the Athenians) made a treaty and crowned their victory by imposing boundaries on the barbarians designed to preserve the freedom of Greece and by preventing these men from transgressing them (73).⁶

Demosthenes too, who otherwise seems to follow the Marathon-to-Plataea tradition, makes mention of later punishments in connection with the defeat of Xerxes in his *Funerary Oration* (60.11).

Even among the Athenians it seems best to conclude that the dominant commemorative and master narratives of the Persian War did not rely on a single periodization of that war. Although Marathon was almost universally recognized as the

⁵ For discussion and bibliography on this issue, see Badian 1993: 1-72.

⁶ καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον τῆς νίκης, οὐ τὸ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι τρόπαιον ἀγαπήσαντες ἔστησαν, ἀλλ' ὅρους τοῖς βαρβάροις πῆξαντες τοὺς εἰς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος, καὶ τούτους κωλύσαντες ὑπερβαίνειν, συνθήκας ἐποίησαντο.

beginning (though see below, pp. 52-60 on Thucydides), the end was far more uncertain. Plataea was one option, but so too were Salamis the year before and the Peace of Callias three decades later. Nor does it appear that these narratives yielded to the view expressed in the *Laws* in the course of the fourth century. That Lycurgus, who wrote his *Against Leocrates* in 331 (see Worthington, Cooper, and Harris 2001: 159), could cite the variant that appears in the *Menexenus* suggests rather that they coexisted throughout the classical period. The periodization of the *Laws* was likely only one of several that served to support the regime of power relationships that dominated in Athens.

A far different view from anything found at Athens emerges in Herodotus. His periodization is surprisingly straightforward, although it is seldom recognized as such. In the prologue Herodotus gives his reasons for undertaking the publication of his research:

This is the exposition of the research of Herodotus of Halicarnassus so that the actions of men are not lost in time and the great and marvelous deeds displayed by both Greeks and barbarians are not without fame, especially the reason why they fought one another (τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι).⁷

The cause of the fighting between Greek and barbarian, as Herodotus goes on to tell us, is Croesus king of the Lydians (1.6.2; see also 1.92.1 and 1.130.3). He holds this distinction because he was the first of the barbarians to have “subjugated some of the Greeks to the payment of tribute” (τοῦς μὲν κατεστρέψατο Ἑλλήνων ἐς φόρου ἀπαγωγῇν). Earlier attacks on Greeks by barbarians – specifically that of the Cimmerians (1.6.3), but implicitly also those launched by the earlier kings of Lydia (1.14-22) – do not count because they did not result in subjugation (Wardman 1961: 136-

⁷ Ἡροδότου Ἀλικαρνησέος ἱστορίας ἀπόδεξις ἥδε, ὥς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα γένηται, μήτε ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωमाστά, τὰ μὲν Ἕλλησι, τὰ δὲ βαρβάροισι ἀποδεχθέντα, ἀκλεᾶ γένηται, τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι.

7, Hohti 1976: 42, and Hart 1982: 73). The war introduced by Herodotus is therefore no mere Persian War defined by one or two campaigns. It is a conceptually larger event, a unified Greco-barbarian War, beginning with Croesus in c. 560 and spanning some 80 years (Erbse 1956: 220-22, Immerwahr 1956: 251, and 1966: 18, Hohti 1976: 38-40, Gould 1989: 121, and Arieti 1995: 5). The cause of an event is, of course, not necessarily the same as its beginning, but arguments in favor of separating the two only persuade if the conditions that define the conflict, as set out by the narrator, are absent at the point it is caused, which is not the case here. A war between Greeks and barbarians is not set in motion by Croesus, only to come about later. Rather, it is because Croesus is the first person to bring about the conditions of the war – Greeks and barbarians fighting one another – that he is called its cause. Only bias in favor of more popular beginnings like Marathon or Xerxes' invasion impels us to separate Croesus as cause from the war Herodotus sets out in the introduction.

Herodotus' narrative of this extensive Greco-barbarian War is not seamless. Several breaks interrupt the progression of the story from its introduction with Croesus. Of these, two are particularly noteworthy since they could be taken as constituting new beginnings: the causes of the Ionian Revolt and the prelude to Xerxes' invasion. Although both divisions mark significant expansions of the conflict and thus major turning points, neither is presented as the beginning of a new or different war. Before narrating the debacle surrounding Aristagoras' attempt to subdue Naxos, Herodotus states that:

Serving as general, he (i.e. Otanes) accomplished these things, and afterward there was an abatement of evils for a

short time. They began again for the Ionians from Naxos and Miletus (5.28).⁸

The importance of this break has been noted, and rightly so (White 1969: 43, Evans 1982: 79, Walter 1993: 267, and Cawkwell 2005: 66-7). The implications of the Ionian Revolt were staggering. Soon after instigating the revolt, Aristagoras will convince the Athenians, who had recently “resolved to be openly hostile to the Persians” (σφι ἐδέδοκτο ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ τοῖσι Πέρσησι πολέμιους εἶναι: 5.96.2), to enter into direct hostility. They dispatch twenty ships to aid the Ionians. Herodotus called these twenty ships “the beginning of evils” (ἀρχὴ κακῶν) for the Greeks and the Persians (5.97.3).⁹ Moreover, Herodotus’ secondary narrators tend to think of the chain of events that prompted Xerxes’ invasion as beginning with the Ionian Revolt. Indeed, Xerxes (7.8β 2-3), Themistokles (8.22.2), and the Spartans (8.142.2) all seem to agree on this point, a telling, albeit suspicious, fact (see below, pp. 49-50). The weight placed on the Ionian Revolt by Herodotus and his speakers directs added emphasis to this pause in hostilities.

Yet none of these considerations suggest that a new war begins at this point. The opinion of Herodotus’ characters demonstrates at most that a Persian War beginning with the Ionian Revolt may have had currency, but says little about Herodotus’ view since the opinions of the secondary narrators, even if unanimous, need not reflect that of the primary narrator. The fact that the break in hostilities noted prior to the Ionian Revolt is called “an abatement of evils” (ἄνεσις κακῶν) seems to presuppose that what precedes and follows is part of a unity (Immerwahr 1966: 114n.110). Thus, Naxos, the subsequent

⁸ οὗτος μὲν νυν τοσαῦτα ἐξεργάσατο στρατηγήσας, μετὰ δὲ οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον ἄνεσις κακῶν ἦν, καὶ ἤρχετο τὸ δεύτερον ἐκ Νάξου τε καὶ Μιλήτου Ἰωσι γίνεσθαι κακά.

⁹ Cawkwell 2005: 66 rightly observes that Herodotus is here taking up the perspective of the mainland Greeks since according to Herodotus’ own admission the ‘evils’ for the Ionians had begun long ago and had just recently resumed.

Ionian Revolt, and Athens' lamentable participation in it is linked to the earlier misfortunes the Greeks suffered at the hands of Otanes and by extension Darius, Harpagus, Mazares, and even Croesus. Herodotus seems most eager to reinforce this connection when, in concluding his account of the Ionian Revolt, he notes "so for the third time the Ionians were enslaved – first by the Lydians, then twice in succession by the Persians" (6.32).¹⁰

The opening of Book 7 can also be cited as the beginning of what Herodotus believed to be the war proper, to which all else is mere prelude (Immerwahr 1966: 248, McCulloch 1982: 35, Evans 1993: 281 and Jung 2006: 252). The extensive reintroduction of the causes of Xerxes' invasion and the significantly slower pace for the final three books all point to a major transition, and of course it is. It introduces the dénouement of the whole work, Xerxes' grand invasion and its ultimate defeat, but it does not introduce a war distinct from that begun in Book 1. Herodotus wants to mark off the last three books as a separate unit, not a separate war. He is careful to link Xerxes' preparations to Marathon. Book 7 begins with Darius learning the results of the Marathon campaign (7.1.1). The war that Xerxes ultimately undertakes is the one planned by Darius in retaliation for this defeat (7.1.2; see also 7.8β 2-3).

Such an explicit connection between Darius' intention and Xerxes' execution was not the only tradition available to Herodotus. In Aeschylus' *Persae* Darius, evoked from the dead, speaks as if he had no part in the current undertaking. Once informed that destruction has befallen the Persians because of a campaign against Greece, Darius speaks of the whole attempt as a blunder: "by foot or by ship did wretched (Xerxes) make

¹⁰ οὕτω δὴ τὸ τρίτον Ἴωνες κατεδουλώθησαν, πρῶτον μὲν ὑπὸ Λυδῶν, δις δὲ ἐπεξῆς τότε ὑπὸ Περσέων.

this foolish attempt?” (πεζὸς ἢ ναύτης δὲ πείραν τήνδ’ ἐμώρανεν τάλας: 719). He criticizes his young son because “he does not remember my commands” (κοῦ μνημονεύει τὰς ἐμὰς ἐπιστολάς: 782-3), and advises the chorus never to campaign against Greece again (790-92). These are hardly the words of a man who had planned just such an expedition prior to his death (Hignett 1963: 90; see also Broadhead 1960: 197 and Garvie 2009: 306). Had Herodotus wanted to create a clear break after Marathon, he could have done so, but rather chooses a smoother transition that serves to bind the two campaigns. Within the larger scheme of events, Xerxes’ invasion remains an issue of a barbarian ruler attempting to subjugate the Greeks. The scope of the war has changed, but not its nature.

Historians and students of Herodotus alike can read points of rupture into any number of events or passages to define more strictly when Herodotus thought the Persian War began, but I believe such attempts impose on Herodotus a different conception of the war than the one he manifestly had. Herodotus is not trying to define the boundaries of a Persian War, which, if he had wished to do, he could easily have done. Rather, he chooses to treat a conceptually larger conflict, a Greco-barbarian War, begun by Croesus some eighty years before Xerxes’ invasion, which was undoubtedly its culmination to that point. That Herodotus presents what we might consider the Persian War proper within the framework of a larger war should not surprise. Famously, Herodotus opens his work by contrasting his own periodization of the war with an even larger one. This account is attributed to “learned Persians” (Περσέων...οἱ λόγιοι), but there can be little doubt that it is wholly Greek in content (How and Wells 1912: 53 and Haubold 2007: 49-50).¹¹ The

¹¹ Herodotus’ attribution of this patently Greek story to Persian sources has occasioned much debate. In his recent commentary on Book 1 Asheri rejects these sources as a pure narrative invention (Asheri, Lloyd, and

story places responsibility for the bad blood between the Greeks and barbarians on the Phoenicians, who in mythical times are said to have kidnapped Io, the daughter of Inachus, King of Argos (1.1). A series of counter-thefts is finally concluded by the Greek attack on Troy, which these ‘learned Persians’ argue was the decisive moment the bad blood turned to open warfare: “from this time on they have always considered Greece their enemy” (ἀπὸ τούτου αἰεὶ ἡγήσασθαι τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν σφίσι εἶναι πολέμιον: 1.4.4). Connections between the Trojan and Persian Wars were probably popular among the Greeks of the day (Momigliano 1966: 113-14, Evans 1982: 20, and Boedeker 1988). There are even indications that some early historians also emphasized the long past of the present conflict (Drews 1973: 88-9). The presence of the semi-legendary Sardanapalos in the second and final book of Hellanicus’ *Persica* (*FrGH* 687a F2) suggests a marked focus on the mythical prehistory of Persia and perhaps an equally long view of its conflict with Greece. The near eternal scope of the war proposed by Herodotus’ ‘learned Persians’ and perhaps others makes his own Greco-barbarian War seem temporally limited by comparison.

In addition to his own views Herodotus permits two of his Greek characters to touch on the origin of the hostilities that resulted in Xerxes’ invasion: Themistokles when he leaves messages for the Ionians in Xerxes’ fleet along the Euboean coast (8.22) and a Spartan embassy when they beseech the Athenians not to be persuaded by Mardonius’ offers of a separate peace (8.142). As noted above (see p. 46), both share a similar view of the war overall. Themistokles ends his message to the Ionians by reminding them of their shared heritage and that “from the beginning our hostility with the barbarian came

Corcella 2007: 74), but Haubold (2007) has recently argued that such Greek stories may indeed have been circulated by the Persians for propaganda purposes.

about because of you” (ὅτι ἀρχῆθεν ἡ ἔχθρη πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον ἀπ’ ὑμέων ἡμῖν γέγονε: 8.22.2). While the enmity Themistocles refers to could be that stretching back to Croesus, it is more likely that the Ionian revolt and Athenian aid given on that occasion is meant (Bowie 2007: 115). In a similar vein the Spartans remind the Athenians of their role in bringing about the war:

For you awoke this war, while we wanted nothing to do with it. From the beginning the conflict has been over your empire, and now it extends also to all Greece (8.142.2).¹²

Here again the present conflict begins with the Ionian Revolt (Bowie 2007: 233) when the Athenians first incite it even though the Spartans did not wish it.¹³ Herodotus’ patently anachronistic talk of “empire” (ἀρχή) also points to Ionia and the Ionian Revolt (Bowie 2007: 233). That both the Spartans and the Athenians, not to mention Xerxes (7.8β2-3), view the war with the same basic periodization is quite suspicious. It is possible that during the war there was greater agreement, but I find it much more likely that Herodotus has imposed a uniform view on his characters. As such, it is hard to attribute these views to the Athenians or Spartans themselves. Nevertheless, it strongly suggests that there was a genuine periodization of the Persian War that began with the Ionian Revolt.

At what point Herodotus believed the Greco-barbarian War ended is at first glance a simple matter. The work ends with the campaign year of 479 and the siege of Sestos (9.121), to which is appended an analeptic digression (9.122). There is a strong *prima facie* case for setting the ending of the war in that year, and that certainly seems to

¹² ἡγείρατε γὰρ τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον ὑμεῖς οὐδὲν ἡμέων βουλομένων, καὶ περὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας ἀρχῆς ὁ ἀγὼν ἐγένετο· νῦν δὲ φέρει καὶ ἐς πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

¹³ For Spartan reluctance at the time of the Ionian Revolt, see Hdt. 5.97.2.

be how Diodorus Siculus understood it (11.37.6). Yet Herodotus does not formally close the war in Book 9, the account simply concludes with an apt digression on Cyrus' decision not to resettle the Persians in conquered lands (9.122; see Dewald 1997 and Flower and Marincola 2002: 310-12). Herodotus was certainly aware that the war with Persia continued both in Europe and beyond (6.98.2, 7.7, and 7.106-7), and it is unclear whether he would have considered these actions too part of the war begun by Croesus in Book 1. Although any conclusion must be conjectural, I believe that the conditions under which the Greco-barbarian War opens provide the firmest basis for guessing its end. For Herodotus the war begins when Croesus compels the Greeks of Ionia to pay tribute. Before that time all the Greeks had been free (1.6.3). Perhaps with the campaign year of 479 the conditions were now present to return the Aegean world to its prior state. Of course, the dark irony of the *Histories* is that this return will be nothing more than another abatement of evils; Athens will soon pick up where Persia left off (see Dewald 1997: 69). But this important change of cast may have convinced Herodotus that the Greco-barbarian War begun almost eighty years before had now come to a definitive close.

It is difficult to say that anyone beyond Herodotus held this particular conception of the war. Certainly no one in his own narrative held this view, all of whom begin the war with the Ionian Revolt. But if some of Herodotus' fellow Greeks stand behind the 'learned Persians', we can feel confident that there was at least some broader support a periodization of the Persian War as a much longer conflict going back a century, or in some cases, centuries. Attributing such a view to any particular memorial community is equally difficult. An Ionian slant does run through Herodotus' periodization. The war

begins when Croesus first subdues the towns of the Asia Minor coast; the Ionian Revolt is the trigger for the first major widening of the conflict, which in turn ends when those same cities are in a position to be liberated (see also Walter 1993: 257). Even the opinion of the ‘learned Persians’ begins the war in Asia Minor with the Trojan War. It is tempting therefore to attribute Herodotus’ notion of a massive Greco-barbarian War in part to his own cultural background in Asia Minor and Ionia where his earliest conception of the war likely developed.¹⁴ In this connection, a dedication set up by the Samians for their participation in the battle of Lade is instructive (Hdt. 6.14.3). Although the Samians had by and large defected during the fight, the monument names those captains who remained loyal to the Ionian cause and was surely set up after the battle of Mycale (Mitchell 1975: 88). Such a late display of recognition suggests that the Samians were eager to show their courageous actions against the barbarians long before their enforced complicity in Xerxes’ invasion. At a minimum the master narrative that likely framed this monument implies a periodization in basic agreement with that expressed by Herodotus’ characters. Whether the monument was intended to evoke more distant events is impossible to say.

In stark contrast to Herodotus’ long war, Thucydides defines his Persian War in the narrowest possible way. In Book 1 Thucydides is quite mindful of the Persian War and mentions it several times. Together these references provide a reasonably clear picture of his periodization of the war. Let us begin with his notion of the war’s end, which can be reconstructed with greater ease. After the formation of the Delian League (1.96), in the so-called second preface to the Pentecontaetia (Gomme 1945: 363n.1), Thucydides states:

¹⁴ For the continuing influence of memories formed in childhood, see Halbwachs 1980 [=1950]: 55-63.

They (i.e. the Athenians) initially led autonomous allies who made decisions in common assemblies, and between this war (i.e. the Peloponnesian War) and the Persian War (μεταξὺ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ)¹⁵ they accomplished both in war and in the administration of policy the following against barbarians, against their own allies when they were in revolt, and any of the Peloponnesians involved in each case. I have written about these incidents and digressed from the narrative because this period was omitted by all those before me, who wrote either the history of Greece before the Persian War or the history of the Persian War itself (καὶ ἢ τὰ πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν Ἑλληνικά ξυνετίθεσαν ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ Μηδικά). Hellenicus touched on these matters in his Attic History, but he made mention of them quickly and imprecisely with regard to chronology. Moreover, my account contains an exposition of how Athenian rule was established (1.97).¹⁶

He defines the events described within the following digression as occurring between the Persian and the Peloponnesian Wars, which implies that before this point the narrative was still concerned in some way with the Persian War proper and that the institution of the Delian League in 478/7 sets off that period from the one that follows (i.e. the creation of the Athenian Empire).¹⁷ Thucydides (perhaps in basic agreement with Herodotus) saw

¹⁵ Thucydides consistently calls the Persian War the Medic War. He was not alone in this (see, for example, Arist. 1303a), and term does not seem to designate a distinct formulation of the war.

¹⁶ ἡγούμενοι δὲ αὐτονόμων τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ ἀπὸ κοινῶν ξυνόδων βουλευόντων τοσάδε ἐπῆλθον πολέμῳ τε καὶ διαχειρίσει πραγμάτων μεταξὺ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ, ὃ ἐγένετο πρὸς τε τὸν βάρβαρον αὐτοῖς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς σφετέρους ξυμμάχους νεωτερίζοντας καὶ Πελοποννησίων τοὺς αἰεὶ προστυγχάνοντας ἐν ἐκάστῳ. ἔγραψα δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ τὴν ἐκβολὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐποιησάμην διὰ τόδε, ὅτι τοῖς πρὸ ἐμοῦ ἅπασιν ἐκλίπες τοῦτο ἦν τὸ χωρίον καὶ ἢ τὰ πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν Ἑλληνικά ξυνετίθεσαν ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ Μηδικά· τούτων δὲ ὅσπερ καὶ ἤψατο ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ξυγγραφῇ Ἑλλάνικος, βραχέως τε καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ἐπεμνήσθη. ἀμα δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν ἔχει τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν οἴῳ τρόπῳ κατέστη.

¹⁷ In his summation of the Pentecontaetia Thucydides could be taken to imply an earlier date. There he states: “all these things that the Greeks did against one another and the barbarians, took place in the roughly fifty years between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning of the Peloponnesian War” (1.118.2). That he defines the upper limit of the digression as beginning with the withdrawal of Xerxes might seem to contradict his more explicit claim of 478/7. The confusion between these two alternate dates is best cleared up if we take the summation that appears in 1.118.2 to refer to the narrative digression alone and to imply nothing about his periodization of the war. Consequently, 1.118 refers back to 1.89, the first preface to the Pentecontaetia, where the digression begins with the summation of the event of 479 and thus picks up after 480 and the withdrawal of Xerxes.

the transition from Persian to Athenian domination in the Aegean as a sufficient break to conclude the Persian War. Herodotus concluded with the point at which Persian power in the Aegean had been crushed; Thucydides, with the point at which the Ionians and islanders bound their fate to Athens. Thucydides' subsequent discussion of historiography paints a similar picture. 478/7 is presumably the date at which the works of other historians (except Hellanicus) concluded, whose content can be described as covering the events before the Persian War or the Persian War itself. If Thucydides has accurately characterized the works of his predecessors, the institution of the Delian League seems to have been considered the end of the Persian War by other historians besides Herodotus as well.

The point at which Thucydides believed the Persian War began has been the subject of some debate. Thucydides touches on the beginning of the war on three occasions in his introduction: once in conjunction with the death of Darius to date the rise of naval power in the Greek world (1.14.2), again in a brief description of the happenings in Greece between the decline of tyranny in the mainland and the Peloponnesian War (1.18.1-2) and finally to contrast the small scale of the Persian War with that of the Peloponnesian War (1.23.1). That the first closely ties the beginning of the Persian War with the death of Darius seems very much to exclude the possibility of a long, Herodotean war. The inclusion of the Ionian Revolt too seems unlikely since it begins some fifteen years before Darius' death. Unfortunately, it does little to clarify the relationship between Xerxes' invasion and Marathon. Darius dies in 485 and so the inclusion or exclusion of Marathon implies the same degree of inaccuracy on Thucydides' part. In his second reference to the events of the Persian War, Marathon and

Xerxes' invasion are briefly mentioned. They are treated separately and the ten year pause between the two is noted, but neither fact definitively includes or excludes Marathon. Again, only the long prehistory of the war, which is not mentioned, can be safely rejected.

The third passage is more difficult, but also more telling. In order to argue that the Peloponnesian War was the greatest event yet seen in Greek history, Thucydides must first dispense with the event that had hitherto held that title, which he does with economy: "The Persian War was the most magnificent of past deeds, and yet it had a quick decision with two battles by land and two by sea" (1.23.1).¹⁸ There is some debate about which battles are meant here (Shilleto 1872: 29, Classen and Steup 1919: 80-81, Gomme 1945: 151, Marchant 1954: 170, Hornblower 1991a: 62, and Jung 2006: 153n.89). For the two land battles Plataea and either Marathon, Thermopylae, or Mycale have been suggested; for the two naval battles Salamis and either Artemisium or Mycale. We may safely exclude any earlier (Lade) or later (Eurymedon or Cyprian Salamis) battles based on our conclusions about Thucydides' periodization thus far. For our purposes we may also set aside the issue of the naval battles. If Thucydides believed the Persian War effectively ended in 478/7, then both Artemisium and Mycale were surely a part of it, regardless of which one was the more noteworthy. Whether the war began with Xerxes' invasion or Marathon, however, is of some importance. The balance of opinion is against Marathon, and in fact only Jung (2006: 153n.89) maintains that possibility. We cannot be certain, since the earlier references are of no help, but the exclusion of Marathon does fit much better with Thucydides' assertion that the Persian War "had a quick decision" (ταχέϊαν

¹⁸ τῶν δὲ πρότερον ἔργων μέγιστον ἐπράχθη τὸ Μηδικόν, καὶ τοῦτο ὅμως δυοῖν ναυμαχίαι καὶ πεζομαχίαι ταχέϊαν τὴν κρίσιν ἔσχεν.

τὴν κρίσιν ἔσχευ), which is said more appropriately of four battles that took place within two years, and not eleven.

Aside from his own view, Thucydides attributes views on the periodization of the war to three of his speakers, the Athenians, Mytilenians, and Corinthians. The Athenian view is by far the most striking. When in 432/1 the Spartans debated the matter of war with Athens, Thucydides tells us that a group of Athenian ambassadors, dispatched on some other business, addressed the assembly, in the course of which they refer to the Persian War (1.72). Their treatment of it diverges significantly from that of Thucydides himself. The Athenians start out by saying that they will not review the ancient myths, but will speak of the Persian War and subsequent events (1.73.2). The first historical event treated is Marathon (1.73.4). Although Jung (2006: 153n.89) cites this example as a case of parallelism between Marathon and Xerxes' invasion, it seems clear that Marathon, however briefly treated, is here portrayed as nothing less than a part of the Persian War, which of course comes as no surprise given the traditions in Athens discussed above. What is even more striking is that the Athenians refer to the war as ongoing when the Spartans abandoned it in 478/7: "for we did not take up this (empire) through violence, but rather because you did not wish to stand fast against what remained of the barbarian force" (1.75.2).¹⁹ Here Thucydides' Athenians seem to align most closely with the periodization of the Persian War found in the *Menexenus*, which does not conclude the war until the Peace of Callias in 449.

Thucydides' Mytilenians also make use of this more open view of the war's end, suggesting that it may have had some currency outside of Athens as well. At the

¹⁹ καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν τήνδε (scil. ἀρχὴν) ἐλάβομεν οὐ βιασάμενοι, ἀλλ' ὑμῶν μὲν οὐκ ἐθελησάντων παραμεῖναι πρὸς τὰ ὑπολοιπὰ τοῦ βαρβάρου.

beginning of Book 3 he reports that some Mytilenian ambassadors traveled to Olympia to convince the Spartans and their allies to support their planned revolt against the Athenians. To defend their membership in the Delian League, the Mytilenians refer to the events after the breakup of Xerxes' invasion: "there was first an alliance between us and the Athenians when you abandoned the Persian War, but they stood fast against what was left of the matter" (3.10.2).²⁰ Here too the Peloponnesians are figured as leaving a war that is in some sense still ongoing. Of course, the Mytilenian speakers have a purpose in this particular speech. They set out to explain their alliance with Athens and an ongoing war helps them to justify it. Yet this ulterior motive does not exclude the possibility that such a view was common among the Mytilenians. Rather, it is quite possible. Unlike most mainland Greeks the Mytilenians, along with the other Ionian states, particularly the powerful island states of Samos and Chios, continued to prosecute the war under the banner of Athens and were likely eager (at least for a time) to connect their current fight with the great events of the last generation.

In support of the argument that the long view of the war seen in *Menexenus* was in use among the Delian League allies, we might cautiously adduce Ctesias of Cnidus, whose account of Persian history is preserved in an epitome of that work produced by the nine-century Byzantine scholar Photius (*FGrH* 688 F14). Ctesias' infamous account of the Persian War is fraught with egregious error. The most remarkable is a derangement of chronology whereby the battle of Plataea occurs before that of Salamis (F14.28-30; see also Bigwood 1978: 30-31). Nevertheless, there are indications that he vaguely follows an open ended periodization of the war. After the Persian defeat at Salamis, Photius

²⁰ ἤμιν δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ξυμμαχία ἐγένετο πρῶτον ἀπολιπόντων μὲν ὑμῶν ἐκ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ πολέμου, παραμεινάντων δὲ ἐκείνων πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τῶν ἔργων.

notes the total number of Persians killed “in all the remaining battles” (ἐν δὲ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ἀπάσαις μάχαις: F14.30). It is tempting to see this as the total for the number killed in the other battles of Xerxes’ invasion. Yet, ταῖς λοιπαῖς ἀπάσαις μάχαις is a poor phrase for all the other battles. Rather, it should mean all those battles yet to be fought at the time of Salamis. In the Budé Lenfant (2004: 126) correctly renders it “dans tous les combats restants”, but notes only that the allusion is unclear (264n.526). I believe that Photius may have here abbreviated a proleptic digression in which Ctesias sketched the future course of the war with Persia at the point he concluded his account of the invasion of Xerxes. It is perhaps from this digression that Photius plucked out for more detailed treatment the incredible sack of Delphi executed by one of Xerxes’ eunuchs, Mataces, which is the event that actually closes Photius’ summary of Ctesias’ account of the Persian War (F14.31).

Ctesias’ overall viewpoint is notoriously hard to place. He claims to derive his information from Persian records (Diod. 2.32.4), but this is very unlikely. A basically Spartan bias has been suggested (Lenfant 2004: xcvi; see also Hignett 1963: 9); so too has an Athenian one (Momigliano 1969: 205), based on the fact that his emphasis falls on Salamis. His possible inclusion of later battles does not seriously challenge the latter conclusion since such a view of the war was known at Athens. It may, however, also suggest a genuinely Cnidian perspective similar to that held by Thucydides’ Mytilenians, which emphasized their continued participation in the war against the Medes.

A much smaller war emerges from the third Thucydidean speech in which the length of the Persian War is treated. At the same meeting that the Athenians so boldly express their vision of the Persian War, the Corinthians more casually date the rebuilding

of the walls of Athens with reference to the Persian War. While the Athenians (and the Mytilenians) suggest that hostilities were ongoing at the time the Spartans abandoned the conflict, the Corinthians point to a war that had concluded definitively by the winter of 479/8, saying to the Spartans that “you are to blame for these things since you first allowed them to fortify their city after the Persian War (μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά) and later to build the long walls” (1.69.1).²¹ It is striking that the Corinthians, and not the Athenians, come closest to Thucydides’ own periodization of the war. There is a case to be made that Thucydides’ narrow view of the war accorded with a broadly Peloponnesian outlook of the late fifth century (see below, chapter 4, pp. 188-9).²² That the Peloponnesians would have held such a view need not surprise. From their perspective a smaller war might have seemed quite natural since their involvement before and after Xerxes’ invasion was quite limited. This is not to say that such a view was unheard of in Athens. Isocrates uses it in his *Panathenaicus* (12.49 and 189-95), and Aeschylus too may have something close to it in mind when his Darius discusses the relationship between his own reign and that of his son Xerxes (see also Hölkeskamp 1999: 336-7). Yet it was certainly not the majority view in Athens and, I would hazard to guess, not among the dominant master narratives in use there. Indeed, Thucydides seems more than aware of this fact when he makes his Athenians present so different a periodization of the war (see also Raubitschek 1973: 39).

²¹ καὶ τῶνδε ὑμεῖς αἴτιοι, τό τε πρῶτον ἔασαντες αὐτοὺς τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ κρατῦναι καὶ ὕστερον τὰ μακρὰ στήσαι τείχη.

²² Thucydides can represent his Spartans as viewing the war as not quite finished when in 478 they decide not to send a replacement for Dorcis (1.95.7), but it is uncertain whether he would have characterized the opinion at Sparta the same way in 432/1.

It will be helpful to conclude our treatment of Thucydides with a brief summary of the various periodizations that appear there. As to the end of the war, Thucydides himself agrees basically with the implication of Herodotus, but their overall periodizations could not be more different. Herodotus' epic Greco-barbarian War is replaced by a much more modest conflict. Thucydides may have reflected on the tenuous thread that connected Herodotus' war and as a result decided to define it more narrowly as a critique of his predecessor. We must not, however, forget that Thucydides' periodization of the Persian War was a means to an end. He wished to demonstrate that the Peloponnesian War was a far greater event than the war with Persia. Such an argument is more persuasive if the latter is defined in the narrowest terms possible. Of Thucydides' speakers, the Corinthians come closest to his own view. His Athenians and Mytilenians, however, express views that seem to have been popular in Athens and perhaps among her allied / subject states.

However different the periodizations of the war set out by Thucydides and Herodotus or even their secondary narrators, they still placed emphasis on the same events; that is, the canonical battles of Xerxes' great invasion. If we turn to Ephorus, a wholly different conception of the war emerges (Marincola 2007: 112-13). In a scholiast's note to Pindar's first *Pythian Ode* we learn that Ephorus directed a great deal of attention to the Carthaginian attack on Sicily, which was turned back by Gelon, the tyrant of Syracuse, at the battle of Himera in 480 (*FGrH* 70 F186). Herodotus is, of course, aware of the Carthaginian invasion, but spends little time recounting it (7.153-67). For him the battle of Himera was ultimately irrelevant to his Greco-barbarian War. Gelon refused to help the Greeks and even sent an ambassador to Delphi with orders to

give earth and water to the Persians if they won (7.163-4). This is related as fact, while the excuse that a Carthaginian invasion hindered Gelon's attempt to give aid is presented as a mere story told by the Sicilians (7.165). Ephorus, however, reshaped Xerxes' invasion to give the Syracusans a starring role. This we can glean not only from the scholia, but also from the surviving account of Diodorus Siculus (11.1-2 and 20-26), whom we know made significant, though not exclusive, use of Ephorus (Green 2006: 35-6). In Diodorus the war is preceded by a Persian embassy sent to persuade the Carthaginians to attack Sicily and then join in an assault on the Peloponnese. Xerxes' invasion of mainland Greece is now seen as a much broader conflict, a two-pronged attack on the entire Greek-speaking world. Gelon is asked for help by the mainland Greeks, an offer he accepts at the urging of his brother Hieron. There is no doubt in Ephorus about the Syracusan tyrant's intentions. A large force is prepared to aid the mainland Greeks until word of the planned Carthaginian invasion compels him to face this threat instead. The resulting battle of Himera, far from a side-show or an excuse, is a glorious victory for the Greek cause. The Carthaginian plan to aid Xerxes is foiled. Not only is Sicily saved by this victory, but so too is all Greece. The scholiast summarizes Ephorus' assessment of Himera: "by fighting, Gelon freed not only the Sicilians, but also all Greece" (*FGrHist* 70 F186; see also Diod. 11.23).²³

That this conception of the war was known and utilized in Sicily we learn from Pindar. Our scholiast's comment, which supplies the fragment from Ephorus, was prompted by Pindar's own treatment of the victories at Himera and Cyme in his first

²³ ἱστορεῖ γὰρ Ἐφωρος τοιοῦτον...Γέλωνα...διαμαχησάμενον μὴ μόνον τοὺς Σικελιώτας ἐλευθερώσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ σύμπασαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα. Diodorus (11.23.2) appears to have restrained Ephorus' hyperbole by stating only that the victory at Himera raised the spirits of the mainland Greeks (Green 2006: 78n.96).

Pythian Ode, written in 470. The poem, dedicated to Hieron I, the then tyrant of Syracuse and the brother of Gelon, is not shy when comparing the accomplishments of the Syracusan tyrants to the victories against Xerxes. Pindar confidently states:

I shall earn
from Salamis the Athenians' gratitude
as my reward, and at Sparta I shall tell of the battle before
Cithaeron,
in which conflicts the curve-bowed Medes suffered defeat;
but by the well-watered banks of the Himeras I shall pay
to Deinomenes' sons the tribute of my hymn,
which they won through valor, when their enemies were
defeated (*Pyth.* 1.75-80; trans. Race modified).²⁴

The comparison with Salamis and Plataea serves two functions; it not only demonstrates the greatness of Himera since it is compared with the greatest battles in memory (Bowra 1964: 115 and Race 1986: 45), but it also inserts this battle fought against the Carthaginians in Sicily among the great events of Xerxes' invasion (Kirkwood 1982: 137). Such a comparison suggests that the narrative used by Ephorus was already being formulated in Sicily in the immediate aftermath of the battle.

We might go farther with Pindar and say that he is playing with an even more fluid conception of the war than Ephorus. For Diodorus, at least, and perhaps for Ephorus as well, the war against the grand Carthaginian-Persian coalition lasts two years and ends after the capture of Sestos in 479 (Diod. 11.37.6). It is therefore a chronologically narrow war, like the one proposed by Thucydides. Pindar, however,

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ἀρέομαι
παρ μὲν Σαλαμῖνος Ἀθαναίων χάριν
μισθόν, ἐν Σπάρτῃ δ' ἐρέω πρὸ Κιθαιρῶνος
μάχαν,
ταῖσι Μῆδειοι κάμον ἀγκυλότοξοι,
παρὰ δὲ τὰν εὐνδρον ἄκταν
ἡμέρα παίδεσσιν ὕμνον Δεινομένεος τελέσαις,
τὸν ἐδεξαντ' ἄμφ' ἀρετῇ, πολέμιων ἀνδρῶν
καμώντων.

80

seems more cavalier in his implications about the proper temporal boundaries of the war.

It should be noted that the line, which gives the above-cited scholiast his point of

departure, does not strictly refer to Himera, but Cyme (Race 1986: 45). It is this victory over the Etruscans in 474, which Pindar claims delivered Greece from grievous slavery:

I beseech you, son of Cronos, grant that the war cry
of the Phoenicians and Etruscans may remain quietly
at home, now that they have seen their aggression
bring woe to their fleet before Cyme,

such things did they suffer when overcome by the leader
of the Syracusans, who cast their youth
from their swiftly sailing ships into the sea
and delivered Hellas from grievous slavery (Pyth. 1.71-5;
trans. Race modified).²⁵

This obvious hyperbole makes the most sense if Cyme is meant to stand for Himera as well, and indeed we have every reason to suspect that it does. Pindar prays that the battle of Cyme has silenced the arrogance of both the Etruscans and Phoenicians (i.e. Carthaginians) even though the latter had no direct role in the battle (Diod 11.51).²⁶ After asserting that the ruler of the Syracusans had saved Greece, he moves on directly to comparing Salamis and Plataea to Himera (cited above), a jarring transition unless Cyme is here understood to have quieted a threat beginning with the Carthaginian invasion in 480. The close connection between the two battles and their mutual benefit for all Greece

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λίσσομαι νεῦσον, Κρονίων, ἡμερον
ὄφρα κατ' οἶκον ὁ Φοῖνιξ ὁ Τυρσα—
νῶν τ' ἀλαλατὸς ἔχη, ναυ—
σίστονον ὕβριν ἰδων τὰν πρὸ Κύμας,

οἱα Συρακοσίων ἀρχῶν δαμασθέντες πάθον,
ὠκυπόρων ἀπὸ ναῶν ὃ σφιν ἐν πόν—
τῳ βαλεθ' ἀλικίαν,
Ἑλλάδ' ἐξέλκων βαρείας δουλίας.

75

²⁶ Diodorus is here confirmed by the wording of the inscriptions Hieron had placed on three helmets dedicated for the victory of Cyme at Olympia (see *ML* 29, *SEG* 23.253, and 33.328). In none of the surviving helmets is any mention made of the Carthaginians. Rather, only the Etruscans are mentioned.

seems to insert even the battle of Cyme into the great events of the war against the barbarians (Burton 1962: 105-106).

Before concluding let me summarize the extant periodizations according to their possible state or region of origin. Within Athens there appear four possibilities. A slight majority of sources follow a Persian War that begins with Marathon and ends with Plataea, but closely behind is a war that, though beginning with Marathon, stretches long past Plataea down to the Peace of Callias in 449. The remaining two variants are more poorly attested. Only Isocrates preserves a version that begins with Marathon and ends with Salamis. Thucydides, Isocrates in a different speech, and perhaps Aeschylus present a war restricted to Xerxes' invasion. The findings from Athens do not permit a developmental model since each of the four variants is attested in the fourth century. Rather, it appears that these notions existed simultaneously throughout our period. This should not surprise since any given imagined community is composed of countless smaller memorial communities, whose relative relationships of power influence which narratives (from commemorative up) dominate within the larger collective (see above, Introduction, pp. 23-4).

Beyond Athens the evidence allows us to speak tentatively about three regions: the Peloponnese, Ionia, and Sicily. In the Peloponnese it appears that the Persian War meant Xerxes' invasion alone, which in fact accords quite well with their experience of the event. In Herodotus I have argued that we catch a glimpse of a broadly Ionian periodization, in which the long prehistory of the war was emphasized. There are also indications that some of the Ionian states also emphasized the continuing war against the Persians down to the Peace of Callias. There is no surviving attestation of a source that

combined the prehistory and continuance of the war into one enormous conflict, but there is no good reason to suppose that it was not done. In Sicily, however, their own particular battles and opponents were inserted within Xerxes' invasion of the mainland. Himera was certainly touted as an integral part of the war soon afterward, but so too was Cyme at least initially.

The surviving evidence for the Greek periodization of the Persian War suggests a confusing array of options. Although the picture presented above might at first glance suggest some regional uniformity outside Athens, this is almost certainly the result of the poor state of the evidence. If the situation in Athens was at all typical, several different periodizations likely had had currency in each polis, which in combination with other factors would have generated a stock of possible master narratives at the disposal of that community. Whether one or, as I believe more likely, a combination of several of these master narratives held a position of dominance within a state and what regimes of power they maintained are important questions, but answering them would take us too far afield from the present study. Suffice it to say that there seems to have been no consensus as to the periodization of the war either within a state or between states.

Our examination of periodization, a fairly common tool by which master narratives organize their component commemorative narratives, shows little agreement among the Greeks who claimed a share in the momentous events of Xerxes' invasion. There was not one dominant periodization of the war and almost certainly no one master narrative within which various states jostled for a place by contesting the details through a multitude of commemorative narratives. Rather, Greece seems to have abounded in

master narratives, each providing a possible frame for conflicting commemorative narratives. This is not to say that there were no points of agreement or that these narratives would have been mutually unintelligible to any significant degree. There were common elements. The realities of the war imposed some elementary similarities. For example, all surviving periodizations of the war give prominent place to the events of 480 and 479. Moreover, all master narratives could be said to draw on certain shared metanarratives. We might go even further and suggest that some basic agreements about the shared events of the distant past influenced perceptions of the Persian War through the grand narratives in which that particular event was placed. Yet, as we shall see in the next chapter, the political and social realities of classical Greece greatly disposed the Greeks to recall the war in different and often contradictory ways. Indeed, some of the very factors that may have prompted rudimentary similarities in surviving Persian War narratives also created significant fractures.

CHAPTER 2: LOCALIZING THE PAST

A narrative of even the recent past – be it historical, poetic, rhetorical, or monumental – will reflect choices made about which events within the nearly infinite web of past happenings merits note (see above, Introduction, pp. 19-20). In Chapter One I argue that Greeks of the classical period selected different constellations of events from which to generate their master narratives of the past. This chapter addresses a related question: why did the Greek who worked together to drive back the Persian invasion in 480 and 479 develop such different stories of that shared undertaking?

I believe a combination of four factors disposed the Greeks to commemorate different sets of Persian War events. The most well-known are the present interests of those doing the remembering. Equally important, but less discussed in scholarship, are a community's actual experiences of the events in question, the pre-existing social memory into which new memories must be fitted, and finally interactions with memories in other communities.¹ When individual members of different memorial communities share present interests, real experience, and pre-existing social memories, the recollections of a given event, despite some inevitable differences, will tend to converge to a substantial degree. When these factors differ, however, memories of that same event can diverge drastically and even develop polemic edges in response to alternate recollection. The

¹ For the bibliography on these individual factors, see below, pp. 69-70 for present interests, p. 81 for real experience, pp. 96-7 for pre-existing social memory, and p. 110 for interactions between memorial communities.

regime of power relationships that defined the classical period concentrated power on local centers (i.e. the polis) and denied it to potentially larger political entities. Numerous relatively small and densely connected imagined communities exerted immense and, for the most part, mutually exclusive reciprocal pressures on the individuals living within (above, Introduction, pp. 18-19; see also Finley 1954). As a result, shared notions of the distant past, wartime experience, and post-war agendas tended to extend no farther than the boundaries of the separate poleis. As a result, distinct memories were the rule from the beginning and subsequently became even more divided in reaction to each other.

To demonstrate the importance of these factors in the creation of memory and the lengths to which a difference in any one can drive apart recollections of the same event, I use four case studies. Each pairs the divergent recollections of a certain aspect of the war which exemplifies the impact of one of our four factors, in Athens and another state. Although Athenian memories are an essential part of this chapter, my focus will be on the examples from outside Athens. I begin with Plataea, where a particular emphasis on the role of medizers in the war, absent from Athens (and elsewhere), owes much to subsequent fears about a resurgent Thebes, a prominent medizer and Plataea's northern neighbor. I discuss the impact of wartime experience from the point of view of Megara, whose pride in the inviolability of the Megarid in the face of the Persian invasion would have been impossible in nearby Athens where the destruction of that city prompted the Athenians to celebrate the exact opposite. The dedication of the Corinthian women provides an excellent example of preexisting social memory's influence over new memories. Whereas in Athens the most prominent association between femininity and the Persian War was supplied by memories of the Amazons, in Corinth the special place

of Aphrodite as that city's protector goddess suggested a different connection in which a group of Corinthian wives were commemorated as instrumental to victory. Finally, I conclude with the role played by the awareness of alternative recollections. Since this factor is less a cause of memorial differentiation than a possible aggravating reaction to it, I return to the examples from Athens and Corinth used above to underscore some deepening differences resulting from a dialogue between the divergent memories of those two states. The division of this chapter into sections devoted to one factor should not be taken to mean that the different memories explored in each can (or should) be traced back to a single factor as its sole cause. Memory is never that discrete. Rather, these different recollections were responding to a complex mix of influences, one of which has been brought out in each case for the sake of explanation.

Maurice Halbwachs established the tenet that present circumstances shape our perceptions of the past (see 1992 [=1925]: 119, 172-3, and 189), and this basic precept has remained a cornerstone of memory studies ever since (Connerton 1989: 3, Hobsbawm 1983, and Fentress and Wickham 1992: 88, and Zerubavel 1994: 3-12; see also Gehrke 2001: 306). Simply put, the past is always used to justify the present since past events that are felt to have no relevance will be quickly forgotten (see above, Introduction, pp. 29-30). Only those recollections that advance the interests of a significant number of individuals within the collective will continue to be circulated in the exchange that forms a community's collective memory. Generally the influence of present interests on social memory is examined within the framework of a single community (as Gehrke 2001 does), but for our purposes we must consider its impact not

in one community, but rather within a network of politically distinct and often hostile polities, each of which had a unique set of internal and external political pressures that defined its perceived present interests. Even if we were to imagine that those states that fought against Xerxes had an identical notion of the war in 479 (which they did not),² present self-interest as interpreted by each community would have had an immediately centrifugal effect. Since the past is shaped by present interest and since present interest differed among the various Greek states, there would have been as many memories of the Persian War as there were politically distinct communities. A truly unique recollection of the Persian War as a civil war in the artistic program of the mid-fifth-century Temple of Athena Areia at Plataea provides an excellent opportunity to gauge the divisive impact of the present on the past in classical Greece.

Before we can consider that temple's presentation of the war, however, we must first clarify what influence, if any, Athens had over its decoration. With respect to the Temple of Athena Areia Castriota claims "that the Plataeans were only the ostensible patrons and that the Athenians were silent partners in the erection of a monument outside their borders" (1992: 65; so too Flower and Marincola 2002: 29). The basis for such an argument lies in the source of the funds used to construct the temple.³ Castriota concludes that the booty from the Athenian victory at Marathon provided a significant

² See below, pp. 81-96 and chapter 3.

³ Castriota (1992: 65) adds two supporting arguments: that one of the painters, Polygnotus, was known to have been very closely associated with Cimon and that the Plataeans' decision to dedicate wartime spoils to Athena was likely due to Athenian influence inasmuch as her cult is not attested in Plataea before the Persian War and plays no role in any extant narrative about that battle (see Gauer 1968: 98-9). Neither argument is sufficient to prove that the Athenians were calling the shots in the temple's construction. Polygnotus' possible association with the house of Cimon does not mean he was incapable of working for other states or reflecting their interests when paid to do so. Gauer may be correct to conclude that the choice of Athena ultimately goes back to Plataea's close ties with Athens, but such ties hardly prove that Athenian interests would have overshadowed those of the Plataeans in a temple within Plataean territory.

source, and thus that Athens was the ultimate patron of the decorations within, which as a result reflect the interests of Athens, not Plataea. Yet it is not at all clear if the spoils from Marathon were in fact used, or if they were, that the conclusion Castriota deduces from that fact is probable.

Our sources are split about the origin of funds for the temple. Pausanias claims it was Marathon (Paus. 9.4.1); Plutarch, Plataea (*Arist.* 20.1-3). Although scholars tend to follow Plutarch (Frazer 1898: 21, Gauer 1968: 98-9, and Flower and Marincola 2002: 28-9), Castriota (1992: 64) argues that the temple may have been funded from the spoils of both battles. Positing a connection to Marathon poses serious problems. We can be sure that work on the temple began after Xerxes' invasion (as Plutarch states) since any prior structure would have been in ruins after the Persian occupation (Hdt. 8.50.2).⁴ We must therefore posit an unnecessary and inexplicable delay at Plataea (but not at Athens).⁵ Castriota (1992: 64) recognizes the problem, but attempts to salvage the connection by suggesting that the Athenians provided the Plataeans with additional funds from the spoils of that battle in the 460s or 450s. This possibility cannot be wholly dismissed. Work on the Athena Areia temple continued until at least the 460s (Gauer 1968: 99 and Castriota 1992: 64), and at that very time the Athenians were building a number of Marathon monuments. The funds used on these late monuments were probably not derived from the actual spoils of the battle either (see below, chapter 4, pp. 203-204), but that does not exclude the possibility that the Athenians could not have disbursed monies

⁴ Siewert (1972: 103-104) advocates the possibility that a temple to Athena Areia was started before Xerxes' invasion, but destroyed and rebuilt with fund from Plataea afterward. Gauer (1968: 98-9), however, argues strongly and persuasively against the existence of any such temple before 479.

⁵ The Athenian treasury at Delphi was almost certainly constructed in the years immediately after Marathon (see below, chapter 4, p. 203).

to the Plataeans in the spirit of Marathonian pride all the same. Yet I feel this is an unlikely guess justified only by a desire to preserve the tenuous connection between the temple and Marathon. Plataea is by far the more likely source of funds. Even if some monies associated with Marathon were used, it is hard to conclude with Castriota that the temple must thereby have become a mouthpiece for Athenian propaganda. Surely the Temple of Athena Areia and its interior decoration represents a primarily, if not exclusively, Plataean commemorative narrative of the war.

As reflections of a particularly Plataean conception of the Persian War the two mythological scenes painted within the temple are quite telling. Pausanias states:

There are paintings in the temple: Odysseus after slaying the suitors by Polygnotus and the earlier expedition of Adrastus and the Argives against Thebes by Onasias (Paus. 9.4.2).⁶

To this brief description we can add a further detail about the scene of the Seven-against-Thebes, which Pausanias provides in another context. While arguing that Euryganeia was in fact the mother of Eteocles and Polyneices he notes that, “Onasias too painted Euryganeia bowed with grief at the fight between her sons” (Paus. 9.5.11).⁷ These few details permit an admittedly scanty reconstruction of the temple paintings. What little is said about the Odysseus scene can only be tentatively augmented by the narrative of the *Odyssey*. Odysseus is probably in his house, surrounded by the corpses of the suitors.

Athena, Telemachus, Eumaeus, and Philoetius may also have been in attendance. Indeed,

⁶ γραφαὶ δὲ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ναῷ Πολυγνώτου μὲν Ὀδυσσεὺς τοὺς μνηστήρας ἤδη κατεργασμένος, Ὀνασία δὲ Ἀδράστου καὶ Ἀργείων ἐπὶ Θήβας ἢ προτέρα στρατεία. Jeppesen's (1971) reading of the final clause – Ὀνασία δὲ ἀργούσῃ που κατὰ τὸ θεῖον ἐπὶ Θήβας ἢ προτέρα στρατεία – is many times less likely than that adopted by Jones' Loeb and Rocha-Pereira's Teubner and provided above.

⁷ καὶ Ὀνασίας Πλαταιᾶσιν ἔγραψε κατηφῇ τὴν Εὐρυγάνειαν ἐπὶ τῇ μάχῃ τῶν παίδων.

the fact that this is a temple to the warlike Athena makes her presence almost obligatory (Gauer 1968: 100). Pausanias' later reference to the Seven-against-Thebes suggests that the aspect of the "earlier expedition" there depicted is the battle for the seven gates itself, perhaps with Euryganeia on the city wall where Eteocles and Polyneices are fighting (Gauer 1968: 99-100). Castriota (1992: 65-76) has advanced a far more elaborate and detailed reconstruction of these compositions, most notably a dominant role for Theseus in the Seven-against-Thebes painting. While much of what is there proposed may be possible, it remains highly speculative and is motivated throughout by an insistence that the Plataean temple is nothing more than a shell for Athenian propaganda. By recognizing that the Temple of Athena Areia is, if anything, reflective of a Plataean memory of the war and by setting aside overly speculative reconstructions, which can just as easily confuse as clarify, I believe that we gain a glimpse of the war from a Plataean point of view.

While much can be said about the themes shared between these two compositions, one is immediately arresting. The conflict depicted in both paintings is in some sense civil. The suitors are by and large Odysseus' countrymen. The fight in the Seven-against-Thebes composition is at its heart a fight between brothers. Although we ultimately know very little about the full scale of these paintings, we have every reason to believe that this aspect was central to both. Odysseus is depicted not suffering outrage or in mid vengeance, but only after the grisly deed had been done amid the corpses of the suitors. The Seven-against-Thebes composition contains a mother "bowed with grief" (κατηφῆ) at the sight of her two ill-fated sons locked in combat. It is impossible to say that this element was particularly prominent within the painting since it is cited by

Pausanias only because it names the mother of Polyneices and Eteocles as Euryganeia.

But whatever else the painting contained, the mere presence of the fight between the two brothers and its discernable effect on their mother would have underscored the theme of civil strife implicit in the story.

There emerges from Plataea in a significant temple closely associated with the Persian War a vision of the war quite different from the one we find in Athens of the fifth century where there is a remarkable silence about the medizing Greeks. In Aeschylus' *Persae*, written about a decade before the decoration of the Temple of Athena Areia, the messenger expends 141 lines relating the noteworthy fatalities in the battle of Salamis (302-330), the numbers of ships involved (337-47), the naval battle itself (353-432), and the action on Psyttaleia (447-471), and yet for all that never mentions any medizing Greek states even though the Ionians made up a substantial part of the Persian fleet and most, at least as Herodotus tells us (8.85), fought with distinction in the battle.⁸ Equally notable in this regard is an Athenian dedication commemorating the battle at Artemisium. Although here too a substantial contingent of Ionians and islanders served under Xerxes (Hdt. 8.11 and 19), the Athenians specify their defeated foes as tribes from Asia and later as the Medes:

Once in these waters the sons of the Athenians
overpowered tribes of all types of men from the land of
Asia and deposited these tokens for Artemis the virgin after
the army of the Medes had been destroyed ('Simonides' 24
Page).⁹

⁸ Broadhead (1960: 44) and Garvie (2009: 63) make similar observations about Aeschylus' attempt to gloss over Ionian participation in the *parodos*.

⁹ παντοδαπῶν ἀνδρῶν γενεᾶς Ἀσίας ἀπὸ χώρας
παῖδες Ἀθηναίων τῷδ' ἐποτ' ἐν πελάγει
ναυμαχίᾳ δαμάσαντες, ἐπεὶ στρατὸς ὤλετο Μήδων
σήματα ταῦτ' ἔθεσαν παρθένῳ Ἀρτέμιδι.

In spite of broad participation by the Greeks in Xerxes' invasion the Athenians were reluctant to make mention of the fact.

By ignoring the medizing Greeks the Athenians appear to have been very much in line with broader trends that can be seen elsewhere. Despite the prominent part played by the Thebans and others in Herodotus' account of the battle of Plataea,¹⁰ the inscription Pausanias the regent had intended for the Serpent Column simply claimed the destruction of the army of the Medes as the occasion for the monument (see below, chapter 3, pp. 143-49). The dedication of the Corinthian women, which we shall treat in greater detail below (pp. 96-110), states that Aphrodite refused to hand over Corinth to the Medes. Plutarch records a Corinthian epitaph on Salamis in which those who died there are honored because they defeated the Phoenicians, Persians, and Medes:

O stranger, once we dwelt in the well-watered city of
Corinth, but now Salamis, the isle of Ajax, holds us. There
we captured Phoenician ships as well as Persians and
Medes and saved holy Greece ('Simonides' 11 Page).¹¹

The careful enumeration of oriental foes is particularly striking because it is a distinct possibility that the Corinthians were not ranged against these peoples in the battle itself.

Herodotus tells us that the Athenians held the left opposite the Phoenicians and that the

¹⁰ Herodotus mentions collaboration with the Persians frequently and on occasion with marked emphasis – for example, the majority of central Greeks before war (7.132), the Thebans at Thermopylae (7.205, 222, and 233), the Ionians at Salamis (8.85), and the Thebans again at Plataea (9.40 and 69). But, as always, it is hard to separate Herodotus the historian from Herodotus the member of contemporary memorial communities whose primary sources were themselves expressions of collective memory. To what extent Herodotus is reflecting an equally broad trend recalling and emphasizing medism or is rather offering a corrective to the more popular view must remain uncertain.

¹¹ ὦ ξεῖν', εὐνδρόν ποκ' ἐναίομες ἄστν Κορίνθου,
νῦν δ' ἄμ' Αἴαντος νᾶσος ἔχει Σαλαμῖς
ἐνθάδε Φοινίσσας νᾶας καὶ Πέρσας ἔλοντες
καὶ Μήδους ἱερὰν Ἑλλάδα ρυσάμεθα

For a defense of the final couplet see Boegehold (1965) and Page (1981: 202-203).

Spartans were on the right facing the Ionians (8.85). The position of the Corinthians is not specified, but given that the Athenians alone contributed about half the fleet,¹² it stands to reason that almost all the rest of the Greeks were arrayed on the right with the Spartans who in fact only furnished sixteen ships (8.43). If this reconstruction is correct, not only have the Corinthians ignored the part played by the medizers in the battle, but they may have tacitly repositioned themselves to face foes more suited to a story about foreign invasion. A Corinthian captain, Diodorus, is similarly silent about the Ionians when he dedicates arms taken from the battle at a temple of Leto ('Simonides' 13 Page). With such spotty fifth-century evidence, it is hard to say that the silence we see in Athens was typical, but it was certainly not an exclusively Athenian trend.

In a recent dissertation Bernd Steinbock (2005) argues for the prominence of Theban medism in Athenian social memory. He focuses on the orators of the fourth century, but does devote some attention to the recollection of Theban medism in the fifth. He cites three examples that demand refutation: the golden shields dedicated by the Athenians on the Temple of Apollo at Delphi, the Serpent Column again at Delphi, and the extended historical poems of Simonides on Artemisium, Salamis, and Plataea. The clearest case is that of the golden shields (2005: 104-105). Aeschines provides the dedicatory inscription: "The Athenians, from the Medes and Thebans when they were fighting against the Greeks" (3.116).¹³ But Aeschines, writing in the second half of the fourth century, is our earliest source and he says only that the shields were dedicated

¹² Herodotus' math in his description of the number of ships at Salamis is off (8.43-8). The Athenians contribute 180 ships, but by a calculation of the contingents Herodotus provides it is out of a total of 366, whereas according to his own total it is out of 378 (8.48). Aeschylus provides a total of 310 (*Pers.* 338-40).

¹³ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπὸ Μήδων καὶ Θηβαίων, ὅτε τὰναντία τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἐμάχοντο. See above, Introduction, pp. 1-3.

before the reconstruction of the Temple of Apollo was completed and thus presumably not long before he served as representative to the Amphictyony in 340/39. Nor does Aeschines make clear whether the Athenians were restoring shields that had been there since the time of the war or dedicating them now for the first time. He says simply that the shields were “dedicated” (ἀνέθεμεν), not rededicated. Since the Athenians could and did erect monuments long after the fact (note the ‘Marathon’ monuments above pp. 71-2), it is perhaps best to leave the shields aside as an example of fourth-century trends.

In Steinbock’s remaining examples an intended emphasis on medism is less certain. The Serpent Column fails to note the service of Thebes or other medizing states on behalf of the Hellenic League at Thermopylae and Artemisium (2005: 105-106). While this is an important observation which will be examined in detail below (see chapter 4, pp. 184-91), for our present purposes we need only note that the omission of the medizers is wholly consistent with the commemorative trend to ignore medism in the fifth century. Finally, Steinbock posits that Theban medism may have been mentioned in the lost portions of Simonides’ Plataea elegy or in his other expansive historical poems (2005: 106-107), but the absence of medizers in Aeschylus’ *Persae* should caution us against any such assumptions. While the medism of Thebes was a popular element of Athenian memory by the fourth century, the evidence is not there to conclude the same for the fifth.

The stark contrast between the Persian War as civil war and the tendency in Athens and elsewhere to avoid recognizing the extent of Greek support for Xerxes falls into sharper relief if we compare the artistic program of the Temple of Athena Areia to that deployed in two Athenians buildings constructed at roughly the same time, the Stoa

Poikile and the Parthenon.¹⁴ Like the Plataean temple both are connected to the Persian War. The Stoa boasted a famous painting of Marathon. The Parthenon was so closely associated with the Persian War that Demosthenes can later believe that it was in fact funded from the spoils (22.13). Between these two monuments four mythological parallels – the Amazonomachy and the sack of Troy from both and the Centauromachy and Gigantomachy from the Parthenon alone – hint at a conception of the Persian War as a victory over an alien foe. The Persian War is thus figured as a conflict between all that is Greek, or more properly Athenian, against all that is not. The losers represent the forces of chaos, lawlessness, and disorder (Castriota 1992: 17-19.; see also duBois 1982). Here the warrior women Amazons, the savage Centaurs, and the Giants, who attempt to overthrow the divine order, fit rather neatly. At first glance the Trojans may stand out, but, as Hall (1989: 11-12) has argued, the Trojans of the fifth century underwent a metamorphosis that turned the culturally indistinct foes of the *Iliad* into the orientalized ‘other’ of the tragic stage. As in Aeschylus and the Artemisium dedication, attention in the Stoa Poikile and the Parthenon falls on the barbarians, while the role of the medizers is ignored or at the very least subordinated.

The emergence of a memory of the Persian War as a civil war in Plataea was no doubt influenced by both real experience and preexisting social memory. In the battle of Plataea the Plataeans faced, not the Persians, but the medizing Greeks and so an emphasis on the medizers is fully in keeping with that city’s actual experience in the war (Lys. 2.46

¹⁴ Significant work on these monuments as recollections of the Persian War has been done by Castriota (1992), and I draw much on his analysis here. For more on the Stoa Poikile, see Castriota 1992: 76-89 and 127-30; for the Parthenon, see 134-83. I exclude the Theseion where Castriota (1992: 58-63) sees a reference to medism in the confrontation between Theseus and Minos, because the building cannot be firmly connected to the Persian War, and it is thus impossibly difficult to determine if all, any, or only some of the painting therein were intended to be understood in parallel with that war.

and Diod. 11.32.1-2). Moreover, Plataea's hostility with Thebes was longstanding (Hdt. 6.108) and surely held a cherished place in that community's social memory. Yet it is the role played by present interests that is of concern here, and Athens' wholly different vision of the war demonstrates well its particular impact in this case. Athens too had an abiding antipathy toward the Thebans whose defeat in 506 was commemorated on the Acropolis (Hdt. 5.77), rededicated in the mid-fifth century (see Fornara 1977: 44-5), and remained there well into the imperial period (Paus. 1.28.2). The Athenians also fought against the medizers alongside the Plataeans at the battle of Plataea (Hdt. 9.61; see also Lys. 2.46 and Diod. 11.32.1-2). Although both Athens and Plataea reserved a special hatred for the Thebans in their own social memories and had equal excuse to emphasize the role of the medizers because of their real experience in the war, present needs greatly predisposed the two states to develop markedly different versions of the events.

For Athens growing imperial ambitions quickly made mentioning the role played by the medizing Greeks impolitic. Within two years of the battle of Plataea Athens rose to hegemony over the Delian League whose stated purpose was to seek revenge against the Persians (Thuc. 1.96.1). The vast majority of this League's members were islanders and Ionians who had by and large fought under Xerxes during the war. Reminding the allies (particularly the strong and for now independent island states of Chios, Samos, and Lesbos) of specifics about their role at Artemisium and Salamis was certainly not in Athens' best interests. The Athenians had even less reason to draw attention to medism after 462/1 when they broke with their former Hellenic League allies and joined with Thessaly and Argos (1.102.4), both accused of collaboration during the Xerxes' invasion. After 447, of course, Thebes reemerged as a serious threat (1.113), and it is possibly as

early as this that the emphasis on that state's medism, which Steinbock (2005) observes in the fourth century, begins. Yet, as long as Athenian security relied on Argos and what allied states remained independent, past collaboration was best left in the past.

The situation in Plataea was very different. Plataea was one of only two Boeotian states (the other was Thespieae) to remain loyal to the Hellenic League (Hdt. 8.50.2). After the battle of Plataea the leading city in Boeotia, Thebes, was besieged, but not destroyed or punished beyond the arrest and execution of some of the most prominent proponents of medism (9.86-8). After the war the victorious allies departed for home leaving the medizing states of central Greece behind. The Plataeans, however, returned to a devastated land largely surrounded by hostile neighbors. For a time these states were politically isolated, but whatever security that fact offered began to unravel when Athens turned from her alliance with Sparta in 462/1. In 458/7 a Peloponnesian army marched to Doris, restored Thebes to a position of hegemony, and then defeated the Athenians in Boeotia at the battle of Tanagra (Thuc. 1.107-8.2). Athenian influence was quickly re-exerted after the Spartans departed (1.108.2-3), but Boeotia was now contested ground. I believe it is no coincidence that the paintings in the Temple of Athena Areia were likely commissioned at the very time (the 460s) that the old alliance against the Persians was beginning to fall apart. Unlike the Athenians, the Plataeans had no interest in unifying a grand coalition of medizing states against enemies at home and abroad. For the Plataeans the Persian War lived on in the fears a resurgent Thebes inspired, fears that caused the Plataeans to recall the role played by their neighbors more emphatically than is apparent in any other Greek state at the time.

The second factor that greatly predisposed the Greek memory of the Persian War to fracture along state lines was the fact that the real experience of the war could differ quite dramatically from one state to the next. In contrast to present interests the realities of a given past are seldom mentioned and occasionally ignored in discussions of social memory. Yet the role of real experience should not be underestimated. Schwartz (1982: 396) has argued that,

given the constraints of recorded history, the past cannot be literally constructed; it can only be selectively exploited. Moreover the basis of exploitation cannot be arbitrary. The events selected for commemoration must have some factual significance to begin with in order to qualify for this purpose.

Schwartz is speaking here of modern America, but even in the pre-modern world, where recorded history exerted far fewer constraints, the basic principle stands (Fentress and Wickham 1992: 130-31). A community's actual experience of an event in the recent past is likely to influence how that event is remembered (see Burke 1989: 104-105). Put differently, individuals within a memorial community are more likely to exchange what experiences they have, rather than invent something on the spot from nothing and substitute it for preexisting or developing notions of the past. Outside a radical break in existing power relationships, changes are generally more subtle and mindful of current perceptions (see above, Introduction, pp. 29-30). Real experience supplies the most natural store of places, characters, and episodes for commemoration. It can also suggest the basic plot structure into which the individual elements are placed. The Plataeans, for example, did not invent the medism of Thebes or their fight against that state in the battle line at Plataea; they selectively exploited a set of useful facts to create a valid, but not inevitable, narrative about the war as their present needs demanded.

The Greeks who joined together to resist the Persian invasion were divided into autonomous states. Participation in this or that battle was ultimately voluntary. As a result, few states experienced the same collection of those events which we call the Persian War. Only Athens and Plataea fought at Marathon (Hdt. 6.108.1). Of the battles of Xerxes' invasion, only Sparta and Corinth served in all five (Thermopylae, Artemisium, Salamis, Plataea, and Mycale). Several allies fought at either Thermopylae or Artemisium, but not both: Tegea, Orchomenos, Phlius, Thespieae, Mycenae, Mantinea, Thebes, and Phocis at Thermopylae (7.202-3) and Athens, Sicyon, Aegina, Megara, Epidauros, Troezen, Plataea, Ceos, Eretia, Chalcis, Styra and Lemnos¹⁵ at Artemisium (8.1). At Salamis Hermione, Melos, Tenos,¹⁶ Naxos, Leucas, Cythnos, Siphnos, Ambracia, Seriphos, and Croton join the fight for the first time (8.43-8), but by now the Plataeans had left the fleet (8.44) and the Locrians had medized (8.66). The battle of Plataea boasted the largest participation in the war with Tiryns, Potidaea, Anactorium, Lepreum, and Pale in Cephallenia serving now for the first time (9.28). Yet of those states that had served in at least one prior battle Thebes, Thespieae, Mantinea, Locris, Phocis, Ceos, Melos, Tenos, Naxos, Cythnos, Siphnos, Lemnos, Seriphos, and Croton did not contribute to the League army. Finally, although the exact participants in the battle of Mycale are not known, it is hard to imagine that all the allies who fought at Salamis also fought at Mycale if we can trust Herodotus' figure of 110 for the total number of League ships assembled for the campaign of 479 (8.131). On the other hand, a number of Ionian and island states (most notably Samos and Miletus) took this opportunity to revolt from

¹⁵ A Lemnian ship defected during the battle (Hdt. 8.11) and went on to serve at Salamis (8.82).

¹⁶ A Tenian ship defects on the eve of the battle (Hdt. 8.82).

Persian rule and aided the Greeks in the battle materially (Hdt. 9.99). Perhaps the most notable difference of experience in the Persian war occurred not on the battlefield, but on the home front. Xerxes' army penetrated as far west as Delphi (8.36-9) and as far south as Megara (9.14). States to the north and east of that line were forced to medize or faced the devastation of their territory to a degree unheard of in the Greek world, whereas those beyond the Persian advance escaped the war largely unscathed. It is from the disparate experiences on the home-front that our examples for this section are drawn.

From Megara we have two related memories about the impact of the Persian invasion on the Megarid. One appears in the *Theognidea* and likely dates from the period of Xerxes' invasion, the other appears in Pausanias and is first attested in the imperial period. Although separated by hundreds of years, both commemorations fit within the same master narrative – Megara protected by the direct intervention of a deity (Apollo or Artemis) closely associated with the city. This narrative draws much from the Megarians' actual experience inasmuch as they just barely escaped the devastation of their homeland. Yet among the Athenians, whose land and cities were ravaged as a result of two separate Persian invasions, such a memory would have been unthinkable. Rather, they developed a recollection befitting their own experience of the war.

The corpus of Theognis, a Megarian poet traditionally dated to the mid-sixth century,¹⁷ contains a poem that describes the fear of possible Persian invasion. Since the precise wording of the poem is of some concern, I cite it in full below the translation.

¹⁷ This date is supplied by the *Suda* (s.v. Theognis). West (1974: 70) deduces from the poems themselves a much earlier date in the late seventh century, but his conclusions have not found much support (see Gerber 1997: 123). Nagy (1985: 33-6) proposes a tempting conclusion that the historical Theognis is a myth, not unlike the lawgiver Lycurgus, and that the body of poetry that comes down under his name is simply a collection of traditional Megarian poetry.

Lord Phoebus, you fortified the acropolis as a favor to Alcahous, the son of Pelops. Keep now the arrogant army of the Medes away from this city, so that when spring comes the people may joyfully send illustrious hecatombs to you while they take pleasure in lyre and lovely abundance, in dancing the paeon and shouting around your altar. For in truth I for one am afraid when I see folly and destructive discord among the Greeks. But you, gracious Phoebus, protect this our city (773-82).

Φοῖβε ἄναξ, αὐτὸς μὲν ἐπύργωσας πόλιν ἄκρην,
 Ἄλκαθόωι Πέλοπος παιδὶ χαριζόμενος·
 αὐτὸς δὲ στρατὸν ὕβριστὴν Μήδων ἀπέρυκε 775
 τῆσδε πόλεως, ἵνα σοι λαοὶ ἐν εὐφροσύνῃ
 ἦρος ἐπερχομένου κλειτὰς πέμπωσ' ἐκατόμβας
 τερπόμενοι κιθάρῃ καὶ ἐρατῇ θαλίῃ
 παιάνων τε χοροῖς ἰαχῆισί τε σὸν περὶ βωμόν.
 ἦ γὰρ ἔγωγε δέδοικ' ἀφραδίην ἐσορῶν 780
 καὶ στάσιν Ἑλλήνων λαοφθόρον· ἀλλὰ σὺ Φοῖβε
 ἴλαος ἡμετέρεν τήνδε φύλασσε πόλιν.¹⁸

The date of this poem has been much discussed since it bears on the unity of the corpus of Theognis. If the invasion in question is that of Xerxes, it provides further evidence that Theognis was not the sole author of the poems in the corpus and thus that the Theognidea was a later (Hellenistic) compilation drawing on various authors.¹⁹ As a result, defenders of the Theognidea's unity have suggested that the poem refers to earlier fears about Persian interference. Burn (1960: 263; see also Hudson-Williams 1979 [=1910]: 9-10) has suggested that the poem conveys concerns over the initial fall of Ionia to the Persians in the 540s. Highbarger (1937; see also Legon 1981: 163-4) argues that an aged Theognis could have written this poem in response to the Persian attempt on Marathon in 490. Yet neither of the earlier occasions suits the poem as well as Xerxes'

¹⁸ Hudson-Williams (1979 [=1910]) and van Groningen (1966) end this poem at line 782. West (1971) includes the next six lines (783-8) with this poem, but notes line 782 as a possible alternate division. Since line 783-8 pick up a different theme and, in my view, disturb the balance of the poem, I follow Hudson-Williams and van Groningen.

¹⁹ For more on this thesis, see West 1974: 40-64, Nagy 1985, Gerber 1997: 118, and Bowie 1997: 62-6.

invasion (see van Groningen 1966: 300-302, West 1974: 65, Nagy 1985: 33, Figueira 1985: 122, and Gerber 1997: 122).²⁰ Twice the poet invokes Apollo to defend the city from the army of the Persians (775-6 and 781-2). The repetition of the poet's plea evinces a feeling of desperation unlikely when the Persians conquered Ionia (van Groningen 1966: 302 and West 1974: 65), a relatively distant region which had already been under foreign domination for some time. Had the campaign against Marathon stirred such emotion in Megara, we might well expect them to have sent a contingent along with the Spartans to aid the Athenians (Hdt. 6.120). Indeed, the Spartan expedition must have marched right by Megara on its way to Athens. As it is Megara did nothing, presumably considering resistance futile or the whole issue an Athenian problem (Legon 1981: 163). The year between the battles of Thermopylae and Plataea, when the Peloponnesian army had taken up positions at the Isthmus behind Megara and all central Greece was vulnerable, supplies a much more persuasive context (see below, pp. 88-9). Furthermore, the poet also makes specific reference to disunity among the Greeks (780-81). Here again, the circumstances of 480 and 479, when open disputes about whether to defend central Greece threatened to detach Athens from the league,²¹ fits the passage far better than the 540s or 490 when no serious attempt at broad cooperation was undertaken.

²⁰ One other poem in the Theognidea (757-64) makes reference to a Persian threat. While I agree with those who date this poem to the time of Xerxes' invasion as well (Nagy 1985: 33, Figueira 1985: 123, and Gerber 1997: 122), the internal evidence is too thin to be pressed (van Groningen 1966: 296).

²¹ During the debate before Salamis Herodotus tells us that Themistocles threatened that Athens would abandon the League if the fleet did not remain (8.62). Later the Spartans felt it necessary to send an embassy to rebut the offers of Mardonius designed to detach Athens from the League (8.141). After Athens had been captured a second time, Mardonius again offered a separate peace to the Athenians (9.4-5). Although the Athenians claimed to be resolved not to accept any such deal, they made a point of reminding the Spartans that it had been offered when they attempt to force them to take the League army north (9.7).

The poem provides a unique insight into the mood in Megara when the Persian threat was at its height, but what is of more interest for our purposes is that the Megarians continued to want to be reminded of this moment for generations to come. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that a poem by an unknown Megarian poet would have survived, much less have been included in the Theognidea if the poem was not quite popular in Megara throughout the classical period. Each passing generation found the commemorative narrative of the poem to be indicative of something they perceived to be true and telling about their Persian War past. Let us consider the poem itself in greater detail.

The poem begins by identifying Apollo as a past benefactor of the city and its founder: “Lord Phoebus, you fortified the acropolis as a favor to Alcatheus, the son of Pelops” (773-4). Although the Apollo whose temple was located atop the Alcathoan acropolis was Pythian Apollo (see Paus. 1.42.5 and Plut. *Ant.* 23.3), he is not here invoked as the panhellenic god of Delphi, but rather as an intimately Megarian one whose close association with the Megara’s founder was enshrined in the topography and architecture of the city (Paus. 1.42.2; see also van Groningen 1966: 299-301).²² The specific act of benefaction noted – the fortification of the acropolis – anticipates the larger theme of the poem, the defense of the city. Prior benefactions and present expectations are juxtaposed with a μέν...δέ clause that draws particular attention to Apollo as the agent of deliverance (αὐτός). The request the poet makes of Apollo neatly implies the threat. The army of the Medes is “arrogant” (ὕβριστήν), a suitable adjective for all things Persian, but in the context of holding that force back from the city it is especially evocative of the Persian policy of destroying the temples of those who resisted.

²² Highbarger (1937: 101-9) argues that the Apollo in question should be seen as Delian Apollo, but there is no evidence to suggest that Delian Apollo was particularly popular at Megara.

The Persian invasion is a threat to Megara's people and an affront to their divine patron and protector. Megarian concerns are narrowly targeted (van Groningen 1966: 300). It is not on Greece's behalf that Apollo is invoked, but on this city's alone: "Keep now the arrogant army of the Medes away from this city" (τῆσδε πόλεως: 775-6). The point is reiterated in even clearer language in the last lines of the poem: "But you, gracious Phoebus, protect this our city" (ἡμετέρην τήνδε... πόλιν: 781-2).

After the invocation and request the poet supplies a lengthy purpose clause, detailing the sacrifices and celebrations the god can expect if the city is spared destruction (776-9). The pleasant scene of future happiness is shattered by ἡ γὰρ which forces the reader back to the initial lines of the poem. It is recalled that the scene of feasting is contingent upon Apollo's acquiescence, that the same people (λαοί: 776) who intend to send hecatombs worthy of note are now on the verge of being undone by "destructive (literally, people-destroying) discord" (στάσιν... λαοφθόρον: 781). Emphatically the poet inserts his own observation: "I for one (ἐγὼ γέ) am afraid when I see folly (ἄφραδίην) and destructive discord (στάσιν... λαοφθόρον) among the Greeks" (780-81). Whatever defense human intervention was to provide is envisioned as inoperative, not because the Persians are unbeatable, but rather because of the mistakes of Megara's Greek allies. Two possible futures stand in the balance: the celebration described in the purpose clause and the ruinous defeat feared in the final lines. Yet the poet and his countrymen are powerless to sway the outcome through military or political means. Apollo alone can save them. The poem ends in ring composition with another invocation of Apollo to defend the city (781-2).

Megara's situation between Thermopylae and Plataea was indeed as grim as the poet suggests. Although it appears that the League army was to have met the Persians in Boeotia after Thermopylae, no such force materialized (Hdt. 8.40). Most of central Greece medized and those few who did not, suffered their homes to be destroyed as they fled before the Persian army (8.50). The Peloponnesians, now feverishly building a wall across the Isthmus, were of no use to Megara some miles north of that line of defense. Moreover, any battle fought along the wall would almost surely result in the utter destruction of Megara and the Megarid. As such, proposals that the fleet abandon Salamis posed as much threat to Megara as Athens (8.60 and 8.74). Despite the fact that the fleet did remain at Salamis, the full Persian army appears to have been headed for Megara before victory at sea stayed Xerxes' advance (8.70). Even after Salamis the threat remained very much alive. The Persian army under Mardonius retained effective control over central Greece. The army of the Hellenic League continued to work on the wall across the Isthmus (Hdt. 9.7.1). Like the Athenians, Plataeans, and Thespians, the Megarians still faced the possibility of a hasty evacuation of their territory if the League army could not be coaxed out of the Peloponnese. It is hardly surprising that we find the Megarians joining the Athenians and Plataeans on an embassy to Sparta to do just that (9.7.1) – probably the very folly and strife the poet has in mind. On the eve of the Plataea campaign, Mardonius did launch an attack on the Megarid, but withdrew before any significant damage was inflicted when reports that the League army was heading north sent the Persians back into Boeotia (9.14).

Herodotus provides the backbone of the historical sketch above, and for him Mardonius fails to take advantage of Megara's vulnerability because his plans were foiled

by the belated arrival of the League army. What the Megarians thought of their salvation is hard to say, but the continued popularity of the Theognidean poem suggests that a more miraculous story, one in which Apollo did in fact save his city, may have had currency. Megara was not the first city to fear the Persian approach, and the Megarians were certainly not the first people to entrust their city to their poliad deity. If there is any truth to the Themistocles Decree, the Athenians too gave their city to Athena to do as she willed (ML 23.4-6; see also Plut. *Them.* 10). But whereas Athena did not save the city and acropolis, Apollo had (apparently) opted to preserve his. Megara and the Megarid were spared almost any harm in spite of being totally exposed throughout most of 480/79. The distinction of being the first city whose prayers for salvation were answered was likely a point of pride.²³ The commemorative narrative of the poem itself is restricted to the dangers faced by the Megarians, but it may recall a master narrative in which these desperate prayers were answered, and Megara spared.

Pausanias shows that elements of this same master narrative remained alive in Megara of the second century A.D. There, what was implicitly credited to Apollo in the Theognidea is now explicitly attributed to Artemis. Within the city of Megara Pausanias notes a bronze statue of Artemis, called the savior, made by Strongylion and located in an ancient sanctuary (1.40.2-3). He appends an explanation – essentially the commemorative narrative surrounding the statue in his time – as to why Artemis was so named in Megara. A Persian cavalry detachment had overrun the Megarid and was attempting to rejoin Mardonius when by the will of Artemis they became lost in the hilly border with Boeotia during the night. Fearing the approach of enemy forces the cavalry

²³ Herodotus may hint at this possibility when he remarks that the Megarid was the furthest point of the Persian advance into Greece (9.14).

shot off some arrows in the night. A nearby rock groaned when struck, and the Persians, thinking it the groan of enemy troops, expended their supply of arrows in the night (1.40.2). When day broke a group of Megarians troops attacked and killed a large number of the Persians (1.40.3). On his way to Pagae, Pausanias describes the actual stone, obviously a point of interest to travelers at that time (1.44.4), and immediately thereafter notes that a bronze statue of Artemis the Savior, roughly identical to that in Megara, was a particular point of interest in Pagae. Although Pausanias does not explicitly say so, this statue was in all likelihood also erected to celebrate the defeat of the Persian cavalry.

The commemorative narrative Pausanias associates with the statue of Artemis, if genuine, appears to be of later vintage than the one I posit above in the case of the prayers to Apollo in the Theognidea. Of course, the fact that Artemis plays no role in the poem should cause no surprise since it was likely composed prior to the dramatic date of Artemis' intervention.²⁴ Yet Herodotus, who treats the Persian foray into Megara in Book 9, says nothing of divine intervention or even a battle. As arguments from silence go, Herodotus' is better than most. It is unlikely he knew the tale, and this was a man who knew most tales about the Persian War worth telling at the time. Nevertheless, the Artemis commemorative narrative probably gained currency in Megara soon thereafter. Pausanias identifies the sculptor of the bronze statue of Artemis the Savior in Megara as Strongylion, who is thought to have worked from the late fifth to the mid fourth centuries B.C (see *DNP* 11: 1055-6). With so few scraps of evidence we can only guess, but it seems that at some point after the Persian War the master narrative of divine salvation,

²⁴ *Contra* Highbarger 1937: 110 who argues that the absence of Artemis suggests the poem refers to the events of 490.

which had hitherto been evoked by the Apollo narrative, began to be associated with Artemis as well. She too was closely connected with Megara's founder and shared a temple with Apollo in the city (Paus. 1.41.3-6). During the fifth and fourth centuries these memories may have coexisted, but by the imperial period Pausanias seems unaware that Apollo played any role in the defense of Megara.

These two commemorative narratives of Megara's defense, though quite different as to detail, both fit within the same master narrative. The land of Megara, under threat, is saved by the intervention of a god closely associated with the city. Apollo is beseeched (and, I argue, remembered) as the only means of salvation for the city. Artemis intervenes more directly by leading a band of Persians to their doom. In both commemorative narratives human action is either secondary or irrelevant. The poet recognizes that human action has failed, while Artemis' ruse is at the heart of the Megarian victory in Pausanias. This basic master narrative of the Persian War continued to be exchanged in Megara from the end of the war to the second century A.D. at least and probably beyond. Megara was the farthest point of the Persian advance, it was the first city to resist Persia and be spared devastation without recourse to medism, and all this in spite of the fact that Megara had been left every bit as exposed to the Persian onslaught as Athens or Plataea. This particular experience had an undeniable impact on the formation of its memory of the Persian War for centuries to come.

Just across the Gulf of Salamis the wartime experience of Megara's neighbor, Athens, had been quite different. Whereas Megara was spared any significant devastation, Attica was overrun and Athens itself sacked twice (Hdt. 8.50 and 9.13). The memory of inviolability provided by the patron gods, so popular in Megara, was not a

story of the war that could reasonably be employed in Athens. When the Athenians returned to what was left of their city, it would have been inconceivable to tell a story of the war in which this fact did not play a prominent role. There are in fact reasons to think that the destruction of Athens was in many ways the most important master narrative within the Athenian recollection of the Persian War. Any visitor to ancient Athens, particularly in the decades immediately after the Persian War, would be struck by a significant number of temples left in ruins throughout the city and indeed all Attica (see Meiggs 1972: 506-507), each in its own way evoking this larger master narrative. The reluctance to rebuild temples is often connected with the Oath of Plataea (see, for example, Meiggs 1972: 504-506), which in part mandated that no temple destroyed by the Persians be rebuilt (Diod. 11.29.2; see also Lyc. *Leocr.* 81). The authenticity of such an agreement is rightly doubted (see Hignett 1963: 460-61, Siewert 1972: 102-106, and Robertson 1976: 20-21). For our purposes, however, the question of the Oath is irrelevant. If there was no oath we need to explain why the Athenians did not restore their temples. If there was an oath, we need to explain why the Athenians (one of a minority of allied states whose temples needed to be restored) would have agreed to such a policy or have continued to follow it afterward for over thirty years even as relations with most of their erstwhile allies deteriorated. The restoration of a temple within a state is a state matter. It needs a state explanation with or without recourse to an oath. I believe the decision not to restore temples makes most sense from a commemorative point of view. For thirty years, and in some cases longer, temples within Athens and throughout Attica were left charred and in ruins. Even in the imperial period Pausanias can point out two Athenian temples that showed the marks of Xerxes' invasion (10.35.2).

Like Berlin's Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gedächtnis-Kirche or Coventry's St. Michael's Cathedral, such memorials would have had immense power, drawing particular attention to the devastation wrought on Athens.²⁵

Nowhere was this message clearer than on the Acropolis. This was no accident. Besides being the sacred heart of the city, it was also the only location in Attica beyond Salamis in which a defense was mounted. Herodotus and our later sources hint at the difficulty the Athenians had leaving their city. Some (perhaps more than our sources indicate) were not convinced that the wooden walls of the oracle provided by Delphi referred to the fleet as Themistocles had argued (Hdt. 7.142-3). They rather believed the wooden walls referred to the Acropolis which was once protected by a wooden fence. A defense of the Acropolis was mounted in spite of the adoption of Themistocles' overall strategy (8.51; see also Plut. *Them.* 9-10, and *Cim.* 5). Cooler heads may have viewed it as a doomed undertaking, but that did not stop panic from breaking out within the allied fleet when word of its failure was reported (Hdt. 8.56). Athens had been left to Athena (ML 23.4-6; see also Plut. *Them.* 10), and in spite of assurances from Themistocles and others that the goddess had left the Acropolis (Hdt. 8.41; see also Plut. *Them.* 10), there may have been hope, now dashed, that Athena would yet save her city.

It was thus on the Acropolis that the Athenians placed the devastation of their city on center stage. The north wall prominently includes architectural members from the acropoline temples wrecked by the Persians. Meiggs (1972: 506) notes that this was not due to haste; "the careful arrangement of the blocks makes sense only as a memorial of the Persian destruction" (see also Dinsmoor 1932: 315, Ferrari 2002: 25, and Hurwit

²⁵ Ferrari (2002: 28) makes the same point in reference to the Temple of Athena Polias on the Acropolis.

1999: 142 and 158). More prominent still may have been the ruins of the Temple of Athena Polias. There is considerable debate about the uses to which the ruins of this temple were put after Xerxes' invasion. Some argue that it continue to serve as the state treasury until the fourth century (Dinsmoor 1932: 143-72 and 307-26), others that it stood well into the imperial period (Ferrari 2002: 11-35). Even if the old Temple of Athena Polias was not reused, neither was it obliterated by the Persian attack (Hurwit 1999: 144, 2004: 70, and 2005: 23-5). Herodotus can still use it as a point of reference to locate memorials on the Acropolis down to his time (5.77). Enough remained into the late fifth (or early fourth) century to catch fire (Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.1).²⁶ Before work on the Parthenon began in 447, this charred ruin would have been the most visible structure on the Athenian skyline.

There are strong indications that the commemorative narratives these burnt shrines communicated were felt to be a point of pride for those who had suffered Persian depredation. As Herodotus follows the progress of the Persian army into central Greece, he makes a point of noting the resistance of a community in almost the same breath as he does the devastation of their territory and the destruction of their temples. The resistance and devastation of Phocis (8.32-3), Athens (8.50.1), and the Boeotian towns of Thespieae and Plataea (8.50.2) are so described. Medism and escaping devastation are similarly linked in the case of Doris (8.31) and most of Boeotia (8.34). Even when Mardonius cuts down some trees in Theban territory before the battle of Plataea, Herodotus is at pains to remind the reader that this was not for any hostility on Mardonius' part, but merely out of strategic necessity (9.15). Herodotus' insistence that medizers were spared any

²⁶ For a discussion of the precise date, see Dinsmoor 1932: 143-72.

depredations suggests that the historian and perhaps others viewed signs of devastation wrought by the Persians as proof of loyalty to the Greek cause. This rationale appears to have remained alive and well long after the fifth century. When Pausanias discusses the Boeotian town of Haliartus, he makes a point of saying that it had been loyal to the Greek cause and had thus been destroyed by Xerxes (9.32.5; see also 10.35.2-3). There is, in fact, no indication that Haliartus remained loyal, and it seems clear that Pausanias is drawing on a later apologist for that town, who attempted to bolster his case by remarking that Haliartus had suffered destruction. The dual function of such ruins as memorials of loss and simultaneously proofs of loyalty to the better cause may provide further explanation for why such ruins were left in their post-war state in Athens and perhaps elsewhere without relying on the dubious Oath of Plataea.

Megara's pride in its inviolability and Athens' pride in precisely the opposite were critical elements of each state's recollection of the war that by and large responded to the actual wartime experience in those communities. This is not to say that they were not also shaped in such a way as to advance present interests. The loyalty the Athenians had shown to the cause and the great losses they had suffered as a result are central elements of the defense of empire provided by Thucydides' Athenian ambassadors in Book 1 (73-4). Yet neither the Athenians nor the Megarians were entirely free to invent whatever self-serving narrative of the past they wished. It is not that reality posed constraints per se; that is to conceive of the matter from our point of view rather than theirs. It is perhaps more accurate to say that it would not have occurred to the Athenians or the Megarians not to use (selectively) their actual experience to advance their present interests. Memory can, of course, be invented wholesale even within living memory, but

it is far more common and effective to bend the past rather than to break with it completely. Consequently, even before divergent present interest could create distinct memories, each state's more or less unique experience of the war made a uniform memory of that event in Greece highly unlikely.

Existing social memory influences the formation of new memories both before and after the events they recall take place. Every community that played a part in the Persian War did so with certain assumptions about the world that inevitably colored how that event was experienced (Burke 1989: 104 and Winter and Sivan 1999: 13). Before key battles individuals prayed to different communal gods, recalled festivals or symbols meaningful for their state or village, and thought of their present situation within an historical continuum specific to their state, village or family. After the battle, when the participants returned to their respective homes, these same factors would have continued to exert significant pressure on each community as it attempted to express its memory collectively through festivals, poetic competitions, dedications, or monumental architecture. Halbwachs argued that to be accepted new memories had to be integrated within a community's current assumptions about itself and its past (see 1992 [=1925]: 83, 86, and 160). Since the Greeks who fought in the Persian War were already members of distinct political units with equally distinct notions about the past, the process of grafting the experience of the Persian War onto existing social memory would have had a divisive effect. To demonstrate the impact of pre-existing social memory on new memories we shall consider the influence of contemporary conceptions about cult and myth on Persian War memory. Our focus will fall on Corinth where a peculiar connection between the

victory over Persia and the sexuality of the Corinthian women was forged in large measure because of the powerful part played by Aphrodite in that community's self-identity. In nearby Athens a different take on sexuality emerged, itself also influenced by a preexisting conception of the distant past.

Three surviving sources record a Persian War dedication to Aphrodite at Corinth, a Scholiast to Pindar (on *Ol.* 13.32b), Plutarch (*Mor.* 871a-b), and Athenaeus (13.573c-d). The dedication itself is lost, but each source preserves the content of its accompanying epigram. From these we can gain an insight into how Aphrodite's role within Corinth's identity, within its social memory, helped to shape the recollection of the Persian War in that community. First we must attempt to reach the original epigram, its context of dedication, and the master narrative this dedication was meant to evoke through our surviving sources. This presents considerable difficulties. Each of our three sources attests a different version of the epigram and provides a different story surrounding its original context. None is intrinsically more trustworthy than the other. None can claim autopsy and all have the epigram at second-hand. The Scholiast to Pindar cites Theopompus of Chios, the fourth-century historian, as his source. Athenaeus cites a late fourth- / early third-century B.C. commentator on Pindar, Chamaeleon of Heraclea, Timaeus of Tauromenium, a historian of Sicily roughly contemporary with Chamaeleon, and finally Theopompus. Plutarch cites no one, but seems to draw on the same constellation of sources as does the Scholiast and Athenaeus.

The influence of the 'primary' sources on our surviving sources is hard to gauge. The Scholiast to Pindar cites only Theopompus, and we have no reason to doubt that he accurately reports the version of the epigram and the discussion of its context that

appeared there (Page 1981: 207-208). Plutarch's story about the dedication bears strong resemblance to that in the Scholiast and may ultimately derive from Theopompus as well. Plutarch's version of the epigram is quite different and bears much greater similarity to the version in Athenaeus (Page 1981: 208; see also Budin 2008a: 338). Plutarch therefore seems to draw his information from a mixed tradition in which Theopompus played some part. Athenaeus' sources are the most difficult to disentangle in that he cites Theopompus and two other sources. Since both his story and his version of the epigram differ from that in the Scholiast, it is safe to say that his use of Theopompus was indirect. Page (1981: 208-209) argues that Athenaeus' only direct source in this matter was Chamaeleon and that it is Chamaeleon who cites Theopompus and Timaeus. He further posits that, since the version in Chamaeleon cannot be that of Theopompus, the origin of Chamaeleon's version is Timaeus. We should not press this reconstruction too far. In the case of Plutarch and Athenaeus, there is much to be said for Sider's observation (forthcoming) that these versions as they come down to us have been hopelessly cross-contaminated.²⁷

As a result of what should be a blessing (too many sources!), the reconstruction of the text of the epigram is extremely difficult. Although some intelligent choices can be made between one reading and another, several key words remain uncertain since their alternatives work every bit as well. It would take us too far afield to present a full analysis of the various textual issues. Page (1981: 207-10) makes a strong case that the text of the Scholiast is the most accurate. The Scholiast claims to draw on Theopompus,

²⁷ Sider's point is much larger and is meant to include all three of our sources. He does not, however, adequately defend his doubts as to the purity of the Scholiast's version. There is always a chance (perhaps even a good one) that our sources do not cite their sources directly or honestly, but beyond this blanket skepticism, there is no specific reason to doubt that the scholiast has reported what Theopompus wrote.

our earliest primary source for the epigram. His description of the context further suggests that Theopompus claimed to have seen the monument himself (Page 1981: 207). Moreover, the versions in Plutarch and Athenaeus use notably stronger language to describe what Aphrodite did not do, saying that “she did not devise to betray” (οὐ...ἐμήδετο / ἐμήσατο...προδόμεν) the city. The language in the Scholiast is much more subdued (οὐ...ἐβούλετο...δόμεναι), and Page (1981: 211) plausibly argues that a change to bolder language over time is much easier to explain than the reverse. Finally, only the Scholiast fails to associate the epigram with Simonides. Since attributions of this sort are more likely to be found in the Hellenistic period, Page (1981: 208-210) takes this to mean that the Scholiast is drawing on an earlier version of the epigram. I therefore use Page’s text. Here again I provide the Greek below the translation.

These women have stood praying inspired prayers to
Cyprius on behalf of the Greeks and their own close-fighting
citizens. For divine Aphrodite was not willing to give the
acropolis of the Greeks to the bow-bearing Medes
(‘Simonides’ 14 Page).

αἶδ' ὑπὲρ Ἑλλάνων τε καὶ ἀγχεμάχων πολιτῶν
ἔστασαν εὐχόμεναι Κύπριδι δαιμόνια·
οὐ γὰρ τοξοφόροις ἐβούλετο δῖ' Ἀφροδίτα
Μήδοις Ἑλλάνων ἀκρόπολιν δόμεναι.

For our purposes the identity of those honored for their prayers on behalf of the community is critical. We can say that the group is wholly female (αἶδ'), that the occasion was the threat of Persian military action, and that the addressee was Aphrodite. It is generally assumed that the Aphrodite beseeched is the armed Aphrodite whose cult on the Acrocorinth was revived under Roman rule (Paus. 2.5.1; see also Williams 1986: 15, Blomberg 1996: 82-4, and Sider: forthcoming).²⁸ This possibility is made more

²⁸ Strabo (8.6.20-1) also mentions the Temple of Aphrodite on the Acrocorinth.

likely by the mention of an acropolis in the fourth line. Different epithets could be attached to the armed Aphrodite, but Ourania is the most likely (Williams 1986 and Blomberg 1996: 93-5).²⁹ Beyond these generalities the sources supply two different answers as to the identity of those honored in the epigram. The Scholiast and Plutarch identify the women as the wives of the Corinthians who are beseeching Aphrodite to cast a lust (ἔρωσ) to fight the Persians on their husbands. Athenaeus says that it was a group of women containing as many prostitutes as possible. He does not specify the identity of those among the suppliants who were not prostitutes. Most scholars have sided with Athenaeus and in fact generally do him one better, concluding that the prostitutes in question were no mere assemblage of the city's hookers, but rather were sacred prostitutes dedicated to Aphrodite, the so-called hierodules (Page 1981: 209, Williams 1986, Brown 1991, Kurke 1996, Blomberg 1996: 82, and Sider: forthcoming).

Budin (2008a and 2008b) has recently launched a full-scale attack on the notion that sacred prostitution ever existed in the ancient Mediterranean (or Near East). The support for sacred prostitution in Corinth comes from Pindar fr. 122, an interpretation of that poem appearing in Atheneaus (13.573e-f) and attributed to Chamaeleon (Wehrli 1969: fr. 31), and Strabo (8.6.20 and 12.3.36), a geographer of the early imperial period. The epigram in honor of the Corinthian women is often cited as well, but the epigram itself provides no independent support, and, as Budin rightly notes, Athenaeus makes no mention of sacred prostitutes with respect to it (though he does immediately thereafter in

²⁹ Pindar refers to Aphrodite as Ourania in a poem touching on her worship in that city (fr. 122). Budin (2008b: 131) argues that the epithet Ourania was not in fact common in Corinth. While other epithets do appear in our sources, our knowledge of Aphrodite's epithets in Corinth is so poor that those used by Pindar should not be so quickly discarded as an anomaly.

reference to Pindar fr. 122). The implication from Athenaeus is that the prostitutes are simply gathered from town whenever needed.³⁰ She goes on to question whether any prostitutes, sacred or not, were involved in the prayer. Budin points out that Chamaeleon's reputation for accuracy is quite poor (2008a: 349-50 and 2008b: 151-2). Moreover, Chamaeleon mentions the epigram on the Corinthian women in his commentary on Pindar, and it is a fair assumption that he adduced the epigram to elucidate the sacred prostitution he believed was at the heart of fragment 122 (Budin 2008a: 348-9 and 2008b: 150-51). I leave aside Budin's analysis of Pindar fr. 122 (2008b: 112-40), but her observation that Chamaeleon's interpretation of it likely influenced his comments on the 'Simonides' epigram has merit. Chamaeleon has reason to read prostitutes into our epigram and may not have been above prevarication. Taken along with the fact that our best known source for the epigram, Theopompus, appears to have reported a different story, Budin's arguments suggest that at the very least scholars have hitherto been too cavalier in their willingness to accept that the women in the epigram were prostitutes, much less the sacred prostitutes of the later tradition.

Yet Budin herself goes too far when she tries to expel a sexual component from the epigram altogether. All three of our sources presume sexuality was an integral element of the prayer that our epigram commemorates. The Scholiast and Plutarch (following Theopompus?) state that the wives of the Corinthians beseeched Aphrodite to cast upon their husbands a lust (ἔρωϛ) for fighting the Persians. Like lust in English,

³⁰ "There is an ancient custom in Corinth, as also Chamaeleon of Heraclea says in his *On Pindar*: whenever the city prays about great matters to Aphrodite, as many prostitutes as possible are invited to the supplication (ὅταν ἡ πόλις εὐχῆται περὶ μεγάλων τῇ Ἀφροδίτῃ, συμπαραλαμβάνεσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἱκετεῖαν τὰς ἐταίρας ὡς πλείστας). They offer payers to the goddess and later are present at the sacrifice" (13.573c).

ἔρως need not always denote erotic love, but at the same time it cannot be sanitized of that connotation. Greek is not without words that mean courage, verve, or spirit, any of which could have been used to describe what the Corinthian wives wanted to instill in their husbands; lust means something more, something sexual. Athenaeus (following Chamaeleon and ultimately Timaeus?) states that prayers to Aphrodite on any major issue in Corinth were attended by as many prostitutes as possible. Here too, an explicitly sexual component is at play. Budin (2008a: 346-51 and 2008b: 148-52) dismisses Chamaeleon as having crassly invented this element of the story to support his interpretation of Pindar. For now we shall let her sweeping rejection of Chamaeleon stand and focus rather on the version attributed to Theopompus. Here too, Budin (2008a: 340-41 and 2008b: 145-6) believes that the element of the story dealing with ἔρως was invented. Theopompus, she argues, was confused as to why Aphrodite of all divinities was evoked in military matters and thus invented the connection to ἔρως to explain the anomaly. She assumes Theopompus did not know that Aphrodite was the poliad deity in Corinth and that to evoke her aid in Corinth was no more surprising than calling on Athena in Athens.³¹ Such an assumption short-changes Theopompus rather grievously. That Aphrodite was the acropoline deity in Corinth could not have escaped the attention of a historian who had in all likelihood seen the inscription in question within the Temple of Aphrodite on the Acrocorinth – and that in the fourth century when similar prayers to Aphrodite were probably still occurring. The Corinthians themselves actively advertised the centrality of their armed Aphrodite by placing her image on their coinage (see Blomberg 1996).

³¹ For the role of Aphrodite in Corinth, see Williams 1986: 17 and Blomberg 1996: 82-4.

Moreover, neither the Scholiast nor Plutarch supports Budin's argument that the identity of the addressee was what baffled them or their common source. If we read their remarks carefully it becomes clear that it is not the role of Aphrodite in the prayer that they find remarkable, but rather the fact that an all female group was assembled to perform the service. Plutarch introduces his discussion of this epigram with emphatic attention on the gender of the suppliants, referring to the addressee only obliquely: "alone among Greek women the Corinthian wives prayed that beautiful and divine prayer that the goddess cast a lust for fighting the barbarians on their husbands".³² The Scholiast imputes a roughly similar emphasis to Theopompus, saying, "Theopompus says that even their wives (καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας αὐτῶν) prayed to Aphrodite that a lust for fighting the Medes on behalf of Greece light upon their husbands".³³ Aphrodite is named, but the καί in front of τὰς γυναῖκας marks this fact as the one to which our attention is being drawn. We cannot be certain that the emphasis in the Scholiast and Plutarch is that of Theopompus, but there is a strong circumstantial case to be made for it. Budin's argument that Theopompus' version is the result of groundless rationalizing on his part cannot stand.

The text of the Scholiast and Plutarch do imply that Theopompus approached this epigram with an implicit question in mind: why did an all female group address the goddess? Far from a question emerging from ignorance, it is one fully justified by the text of the epigram (αἶδ'). Despite Corinth's active involvement in League campaigns by

³² μόναι τῶν Ἑλληνίδων αἱ Κορίνθιαι γυναῖκες εὐξάντο τὴν καλὴν ἐκείνην καὶ δαιμόνιον εὐχήν, ἔρωτα τοῖς ἀνδράσι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους μάχης ἐμβαλεῖν τὴν θεόν.

³³ Θεόπομπος δὲ φησι καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας αὐτῶν εὐξασθαι τῇ Ἀφροδίτῃ ἔρωτα ἐμπεσεῖν τοῖς ἀνδράσιν αὐτῶν μάχεσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τοῖς Μήδοις.

land and sea, at no point during the war would the city have been so bereft of men that an all female group was necessary. Even during the campaign season the old, the young, the hoplites left behind to guard the city, and the poor who were not needed as rowers would have remained. An all-male or mixed group of suppliants was certainly a possibility.

The fact that the group was composed only of females was a conscious choice and one that places gender in the forefront of the prayer and the subsequent dedication. The reason for this gender-conscious selection cannot be derived from the epigram.

Theopompus linked it to erotic sexuality. In this, Chamaeleon agrees. The composition of both groups stressed the erotic. Theopompus' group was made up of wives, not daughters, not mothers, not sisters. The women involved likely fit many, if not all, of these descriptions simultaneously, but they were selected as wives; that is, as a group whose status is nominally marked by an erotic sexual relationship with those on whom Aphrodite is asked to cast a lust for fighting. For Chamaeleon, the prayer is attended by another group of women, prostitutes, whose place within society is also defined by a particular connection to the erotic. The explanations of our sources could still be invented, as Budin claims, but in the case of Theopompus at least we have no good reason to think so. Theopompus was a generally well-informed historian who would have had easy access to a good, continuous tradition.

According to our best sources for the epigram the Corinthian wives beseeched Aphrodite to cast a lust for fighting into their husbands so as to secure victory in the war against the Persians. Sometime after the war the citizens of Corinth decided to commemorate this act in the center of the city in the Temple of Aphrodite on the Acrocorinth. The prominence of the dedication was sufficient to catch Theopompus' eye

over a hundred years later. The epigram, doubtless commissioned and approved by civic officials, provided the reason the act was deemed worthy of such an honor. It was Aphrodite's to give Corinth to the Persians, but she did not because of the prayers of women who had asked the goddess of erotic sexuality to give their husbands a lust for fighting the enemy. The erotic holds center stage in the monument's commemorative narrative and may have played a part in any number of Corinthian master narratives. We have every reason to suspect that the commemoration of this kind of request was entirely unique. Plutarch, who had surely seen more Persian War dedications (real and fake) in his lifetime than currently survive, says that only the Corinthian women offered a prayer on behalf of the Greeks at this time. Plutarch's assertion cannot be confirmed, but it does accord with the surviving monuments. His comment, if accepted, permits us to conclude that that not only was Corinth the only state to make the erotic such an essential element of success, but that they may also have been the only state to record any positive action undertaken by women in the defense of Greece at all.

The reason for the prominent place enjoyed by women and the erotic in Corinth's memory of the war must be sought in beliefs about the past and present connection between Aphrodite and the city. As Corinth's protector deity, armed Aphrodite was interwoven into the geography and iconography of that city. Put differently, Aphrodite Ourania was a prominent part of Corinth's pre-existing social memory. But despite her martial associations Aphrodite remained the goddess of love. As a result, sexuality, femininity, and warfare were uniquely linked in the civic identity of Corinth. When the threat of invasion and conquest loomed, it was only natural that the Corinthians would frame their prayers and the subsequent commemoration of them to accord with that

identity. Before the war the Corinthians were probably already making connections between future survival and their poliad deity (as did the Megarians), during the war the Corinthians women acted on these connections, and afterward the male citizens reinforced those connections by erecting a monument to the efficacy of their wives' prayers. Throughout, Corinthian conceptions about the war were shaped by a specifically Corinthian worldview.

Athens too developed its recollection of the Persian War under the influence of preexisting social memories that reserved a strikingly different place for sexuality, warfare, and femininity (Blok 1995: 138-9; see also Hall 2002: 178). In the late sixth century the myth of the Amazons took particular root in Athens. Although the Amazons represent a complex mix of positive and negative traits and although their early usage could vary (Stewart 1995 and Goldberg 1998), two salient attributes can be identified that would eventually come to define the image of the Amazon in Athens – transgressive femininity and alterity. The Amazons represent the power inherent in women who had transgressed social norms (Stewart 1995: 587-80). Amazons are young, fit, and attractive, and at the same time skilled warriors and dangerous foes. As such, they represent an existential threat to the status quo. At some level it could be argued that the Amazons reflect the fears of Greek males about their own women and thus represent an internal threat (Vidal-Naquet 1986: 5), but within the myth Amazons are quite early on depicted as the consummate 'other'.³⁴ Their home is variously located to the north or east, but they remain foreigners whose strange and exotic ways represent a threat from the borders of the known world.

³⁴ In the mid-sixth century the Amazons are depicted wearing hoplite armor and save for their gender are indistinguishable from their Greek adversaries (see Shapiro 1983: 106 and Blok 1995: 407-408).

Much work has been done tracing the evolution of the representation of Amazons in art and literature. It is agreed that in the second quarter of the fifth century the image of the Amazon began to shift from a northern to an eastern barbarian (Shapiro 1983; see also Blok 1995: 407-17 and Goldberg 1998: 91). At this same time the mythology surrounding the Amazons also began to change. Whereas once the story was dominated by Heracles and his attack on the Amazons, they were now more popularly represented as leading a massive attack on Attica (Boardman 1982; see also duBois 1982: 61-2 and Stewart 1995: 580-82). Both changes suggest that the alterity of the Amazons was being brought into parallel with that of the Persians. This realignment can be seen in popular media, but it also appeared on several state monument associated with the Persian War (see Castriota 1992). In the Stoa Poikile the Amazonomachy was depicted along with the battle of Marathon (Paus. 1.15). The fight with the Amazons also appeared on the Athenian Treasury at Delphi, which was built from the spoils of Marathon (Paus. 10.11.5). Finally and perhaps most prominently the Amazonomachy was represented both along the exterior of the Parthenon and within on the shield of Athena.³⁵

In prominent locations throughout the city and beyond the Athenians were drawing parallels between their fight against the Persians and an earlier fight against the Amazons. On the surface, the Amazons were suitable parallels because they were exotic foreigners (duBois 1982: 61 and Stewart 1998: 583-5). In this they joined the Centaurs, Giants, and Trojans, but implicitly these monuments also brought the Greek cause into alignment with masculinity and that of the barbarian invader with (unconstrained)

³⁵ For the connection between the Parthenon and the Persian War, see above, p. 78.

femininity. Aristophanes in his *Lysistrata* gives particular voice to this connection between out-of-control women, Amazons, and the Persian invaders.

If any man among us gives these women even the tiniest handhold, there's no limit to what their nimble hands will do. Why, they'll even be building frigates and launching naval attacks, cruising against us like Artemisia. And if they turn to horsemanship, you can scratch our cavalry: there's nothing like a woman when it comes to mounting and riding; even riding hard she won't slip off. Just look at the Amazons in Mikon's paintings, riding chargers in battle against men. Our duty is clear: grab each woman's neck and lock it in the wooden stocks! (671-81, trans. Henderson).³⁶

Aristophanes' speaker seamlessly blends internal and external threats. Athenian women, now in possession in the Acropolis and resisting by force any pressure to end the sex-strike, will, the chorus leader asserts, soon be imitating Queen Artemisia, who led a contingent of ships under Xerxes and fought at the battle of Salamis, or will mount horses on which they will be unbeatable. As proof of their skill on horseback, the chorus leader recalls the painting of the Amazons in the Stoa Poikile, which depicted the Amazons mounted attacking Athens' male defenders. Specific reference to the Stoa is no accident since this monument with its juxtaposition of the Amazonomachy and Marathon had long publicized the very connections Aristophanes' speaker is trying to make. But as Stewart (1998: 583-4) argues, such a correlation did not constitute a denigration of the Persians as

³⁶

εἰ γὰρ ἐνδώσει τις ἡμῶν ταῖσδε κἂν σμικρὰν λαβὴν,
οὐδὲν ἑλλείψουσιν αὐταὶ λιπαροῦς χειρουργίας,
ἀλλὰ καὶ ναῦς τεκτανοῦνται, κάπιχειρήσουσ' ἔτι
ναυμαχεῖν καὶ πλεῖν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ Ἀρτεμισία. 675
ἦν δ' ἐφ' ἵππικὴν τράπωνται, διαγράφω τοὺς ἵππεας·
ἵππικώτατον γάρ ἐστι χρήμα κἄποχον γυνή,
οὐκ ἂν ἀπολίσθοι τρέχοντος. τὰς Ἀμαζόνας σκόπει,
ᾗς Μίκων ἔγραψ' ἐφ' ἵππων μαχομένας τοῖς ἀνδράσιν.
ἀλλὰ τούτων χρὴν ἀπασῶν εἰς τετρημένον ξύλον 680
ἐγκαθαρμόσαι λαβόντας τουτονὶ τὸν αὐχένα.

cowardly women.³⁷ Rather, the point of comparison is excess. The Persians and the Amazons did not know or respect their natural (i.e. spatial or gender) boundaries, a deficit most typified, and ultimately punished, by their invasions of Attica.

The Corinthian wives called on Aphrodite, the goddess of erotic love and their city's defender, to inspire their husbands with a lust for fighting the Persians. The agent in this request was a goddess who broke all the rules governing gender relations – she was armed, erotic, non-monogamous, and alone capable of saving all Greece from defeat. In Athens the possibility that women might access these very attributes typified not the ingredients of a Greek victory, but rather the very threat that foreign invaders past and present posed to the established order. Athenian women found all around them reminders of this perceived truth. The vast differences between the commemorations of femininity in Athens and Corinth are even more striking when we consider that they probably mask broad similarities as to the actions of women in those communities during the war. Indeed, it is impossible to believe that the prayers of the Corinthian women were the only prayers conducted publicly by the women of Greece (for the typical role of women in such crises, see Graf 1984: 245-7). In Corinth the prominence of Aphrodite and the associations that prominence had already forged between women, sexuality, and warfare made the commemoration of this particular prayer a logical step for them. In Athens, however, no (known) commemorative use was made of the prayers of their women. In so doing, the Athenians were acting in accord with larger trends throughout Greece where the glory for the victory fell entirely to the citizen males of each state. Yet in Athens the

³⁷ Dubois (1982: 67) suggests very much the opposite when she argues that by analogy with the Amazons the barbarians were defined as “females garbed in armor, a grotesque, often seductive parody of an army”.

increasingly popular story of the Amazons suggested other commemorative uses for the connection between femininity and warfare.

Memories of the Persian War within individual communities developed under the influence of the present needs, past experience, and broadly held conception about the distant past. These memories did not, however, develop in isolation. In addition to the three factors discussed above, an awareness of different stories about the Persian War emerging in other communities often evoked veiled responses which could exacerbate differences between distinct collective recollections. The interaction between divergent memories held by politically independent states has not received much attention in memory studies in part because the individual nation state remains the most popular unit of conceptual measure (see above, Introduction, pp. 18-19). The theoretical and methodological ramifications of examining such interactions are treated below (see chapter 4). Our present concern is narrower – how such interactions contributed to the fracturing of Persian War memory along state lines in classical Greece. Because sharper differences emerging from an awareness of existing differences is less a factor in itself than a reaction to those factors, it will be most illuminating to look for polemic traces in those examples cited above. We can, I believe, see the reverberations of such disputes between Corinth and Athens.

The popular and officially sanctioned pairing of Amazons and Persians in Athens served to villainize unrestrained femininity and foreignness. No totemic figure so encapsulated both of those characteristics as did Corinth's Aphrodite Ourania. Aphrodite was the acme of transgressive femininity. She was unchaste, non-monogamous, powerful

and in Corinth armed and dangerous. No less was the Aphrodite of Corinth also associated with Eastern exoticism.³⁸ Nor is this fact a wholly modern calculation without purchase in the classical period. Herodotus (1.105) knew quite well that the worship of Aphrodite Ourania in Greece had a distinctly Eastern pedigree. I believe the poet of ‘Simonides’ 14 shows signs of being aware of the negative implications some of Corinthian Aphrodite’s attributes carried in other parts of Greece. Let us look again at the second couplet:

For divine Aphrodite was not willing to give the acropolis
of the Greeks to the bow-bearing Medes

οὐ γὰρ τοξοφόροιςιν ἐβούλετο δῖ' Ἀφροδίτα
Μήδοις Ἑλλάνων ἀκρόπολιν δόμεναι.

The curious formation of the final two lines of the epigram has been noted by scholars. The epigram does not say that Aphrodite saved the city, but rather that she did not wish to give it over. Another, in my opinion less likely, version of the poem goes even further and has Aphrodite not devise to betray the city (see above, p. 99). Kurke (1996: 65) has argued that we see here some ambivalence on the poet’s part about the power held by Aphrodite’s powerful suppliants (hierodules, in her opinion). According to Kurke, ‘Simonides’ thus expresses the same misgivings as Pindar when faced with mentioning these same sacred prostitutes (fr. 122). But the Persian War epigram was not

³⁸ For a discussion of the eastern origins and associations of armed Aphrodite, see Farnell 1977: 629-35, Graf 1984: 250-51, Williams 1986, and Blomberg 1996: 83-4. Budin (2008b: 132) attempts to deny any eastern associations to Aphrodite’s worship in Corinth which she believes is based primarily on the assumption that sacred prostitution was practiced there. Yet she herself later notes (2008b: 145; see also 2008a: 341) that the image of Aphrodite armed was most likely of eastern origin. The connection between the armed Aphrodite of Cythera and the East was known in Antiquity (Hdt, 1.105 and Paus. 3.23.1) as was a direct connection between the cult of Aphrodite on Cythera and that at Corinth (Alciphron 3.60). Thus, even without sacred prostitutes, there was at least one salient aspect to Aphrodite’s worship in Corinth that would have solidly connected her with the Orient. As such, Budin (2008b: 130-32) is too quick to insist that the eastern exoticism associated with Aphrodite in Pindar fr. 122 has nothing to do with the realities of Aphrodite’s cult in Corinth.

delivered for private enjoyment as was Pindar's fragment 122. It was attached to a state monument, erected in the Temple of Aphrodite Ourania, and intended to celebrate the actions of her suppliants (whoever they were). Ambivalence about the agents of salvation in such a monument would be unlikely.

Sider (forthcoming) too has rejected Kurke's ambivalence, but goes too far when he reduces the negative formulation to insignificance. Every negative implies an unstated positive with which the negative is in dialogue. To say that Aphrodite did not wish or resolve to hand over the acropolis of the Greeks is to suggest that somewhere someone envisions a contrary outcome in which Aphrodite does decide to do so. Only then is its refutation necessary. Such implicit positives need not exist in reality, but in this case we have reason to suspect that it did. As noted above transgressive femininity was a prominent image of the Eastern other in Athens. While there is no direct connection between Aphrodite and the Amazons, the attributes of Aphrodite at Corinth (Eastern, erotic, transgressive, and martial) do have some marked parallels with the Amazons of Athenian propaganda. Relations between Corinth and Athens were already becoming strained during the war (Hignett 1963: 411-12). It is possible that a growing anti-Athenian mood among the Corinthians was further aggravated by the fact that their patron goddess' attributes were being villainized in Athens. Such a mood may have inspired the poet to respond decisively by proclaiming that Aphrodite Ourania, thought in origin from the East and supplicated by a group of women to cast a lust for fighting on the men of Corinth, in no way (note that *οὐ* is in first position of the third line) intended to hand her city over.

The poet is not content to defend the reputation of Corinth's Aphrodite. That which Aphrodite does not wish to hand over is termed the acropolis of (the) Greeks (Ἑλλάνων ἀκρόπολιν). Page (1981: 211) and Sider (forthcoming), noting the impressive size of Corinth's acropolis, conclude that the phrase is meant to signify the Acrocorinth. While the poet surely intends the Acrocorinth to be understood here, the size of that outcropping is at best the poet's excuse for the phrase. Marincola (2007: 114) argues that the poet implicitly equates the fate of Corinth with that of all Greece and sees in this line a possible counter-claim to the prominence accorded to Athens and Sparta elsewhere. If Corinth was being portrayed as a tertiary player on the Serpent Column (ML 27) and on the list of allies at Olympia (Paus. 5.23) – or worse at Athens (Hdt. 8.94) – the Corinthians responded by placing themselves at the very heart of the defense of Greece. The poet goes still further. Mentioning that Aphrodite did not wish to give over the Corinthian acropolis brings to mind those acropoleis that did not withstand the Persian onslaught, acropoleis whose poliad deities did not save their temples from the invader, acropoleis not essential to the defense of Greece. Budin (2008a: 339) rightly suggests that a contrast with the wartime fate of Athens is intended.³⁹

The emphasis placed on the salvation of the city in Corinth (and Megara as well) was probably known at Athens. Just as the Corinthian epigram might be responding to memorial trends occurring in Athens (and perhaps elsewhere), so too might the Athenian memory of the fall of their city show an awareness of Corinthian memories celebrating the inviolability of their city. No single piece of Athenian memory better demonstrates this awareness than Aeschylus' *Persae*. There Aeschylus offers something of a response

³⁹ Budin's comments here are specifically geared toward the bolder reading of the epigram, but *pace* Budin the implication is the same, though more muted, in the version adopted by Page.

to such implicit criticisms as can be found in the Corinthian epigram. The Persian messenger explains that although the Greeks were outnumbered, the Persian force was undone by some god (337-46). He adds, “The gods saved the city of the goddess Pallas” (θεοὶ πόλιν σώιζουσι Παλλάδος θεᾶς: 347). The comment is unsolicited – the Queen has asked about the number of Greek ships (333-6) – and is in fact patently untrue. This counterfactual assertion is too much even for the patriotic Athenian audience, which can swallow much about Salamis and its aftermath that is not strictly accurate. The Queen replies: “is the city of Athens still not sacked?” (ἔτ’ ἄρ’ Ἀθηνῶν ἔστ’ ἀπόρθητος πόλις: 348). The messenger does not back down or in any way recognize this one silver lining in an otherwise dismal defeat. Rather, he retorts with a bold reinterpretation of what it is to sack a city – “For where there are men the wall remains secure” (ἄνδρῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἔρκος ἐστὶν ἀσφαλές: 349) – which permits his initial, blatantly false, assertion to stand (see Garvie 2009: 180-81). Afterward the Queen asks what was the beginning of the end for the grand Persian fleet (350-2) and thus picks up the basic line of inquiry interrupted by the messenger’s assertion that Athens had been saved. Aeschylus’ addition of this superfluous exchange shows, I believe, a desire on his part to reframe this particular episode of Athenian history. The fact that Athens had been sacked was not to be swept away, but he was determined to stage a reinterpretation of the past that spared the Athenians the negative implications of a sack and possibly the jeers of an increasingly hostile Corinth as well.

What the sack of Athens meant was, according to Herodotus, already a point of contention between Athens and Corinth even before the battle of Salamis. As

Themistocles made his desperate plea to convince Eurybiades and the allies to remain at Salamis, Herodotus tells us that:

After Themistocles spoke, the Corinthian Adeimantus was again complaining; he was ordering anyone without a homeland to be silent and preventing Eurybiades from putting the question to a vote at the insistence of a stateless person. For he bid Themistocles to add his opinion when he represented a state. He declared this to him because Athens had been captured and was occupied. Then Themistocles insulted that man and the Corinthians at length and in his speech pointed out that he and his countrymen had a city and land greater than theirs so long as they had two-hundred ships manned and ready. For, he said, none of the Greeks would drive them back if they attacked (8.61).⁴⁰

Adeimantus – like the Corinthian epigram, but more direct – attempts to put Athens in its place by recalling the fall of that city to the Persians. Themistocles responds with a more biting version of the same piece of sophistry used by Aeschylus – Athens remains unsacked so long as she possesses so strong a military force (here turned menacingly against the other Greeks). There are serious doubts about the veracity of this account (Hignett 1963: 204). Adeimantus’ position – that the Greeks should ignore the wishes of the Athenians who supplied at least half of the entire fleet – is so ridiculous on its face that this exchange must be an invention of either Herodotus or his Athenian sources, both of whom were capable of boundless antipathy toward the Corinthians. Even if the exchange has little historical value, it remains a witness to the commemorative tensions between Athens and Corinth. In fact, its dubious historicity gives it particular value in

⁴⁰ Ταῦτα λέγοντος Θεμιστοκλέος αὐτὶς ὁ Κορίνθιος Ἀδείμαντος ἐπέφερετο, σιγᾶν τε κελεύων τῷ μὴ ἔσθι πατρίς καὶ Εὐρυβιάδην οὐκ ἔων ἐπιψηφίζειν ἀπόλι ἀνδρί· πόλιν γὰρ τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα παρεχόμενον οὕτω ἐκέλευε γνώμας συμβάλλεσθαι. Ταῦτα δὲ οἱ προέφερε, ὅτι ἠλώκεσάν τε καὶ κατειχόντο αἱ Ἀθῆναι. Τότε δὴ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς κεινόν τε καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους πολλὰ τε καὶ κακὰ ἔλεγε, ἑωυτοῖσί τε ἐδήλου λόγῳ ὥς εἴη καὶ πόλις καὶ γῆ μέζων ἢ περ ἐκείνοισι ἔστ’ ἂν διηκόσαι νέες σφί ἔωσι πεπληρωμέναι· οὐδαμῶς γὰρ Ἑλλήνων αὐτοὺς ἐπιόντας ἀποκρούσεσθαι.

this respect. How to recall the sack of Athens was not merely an implication in one Corinthian epigram or the subject in a few lines in an Aeschylus play, rather the dispute was sufficiently influential and popular to be retrojected into the war itself and related by Herodotus as such.

Both Aeschylus and Herodotus' Themistocles attempted to change the terms by which the devastation of the homeland was to be remembered. Athens' insistence on leaving temples in ruins throughout the city can be seen as a similar attempt to redefine the conditions of victory and defeat. Xerxes had taken the city of Athens, but not the state. He had destroyed the temples, but like the olive tree atop the Acropolis (Hdt. 8.55), Athens grew back. The charred ruins of old Athens were a constant reminder of that ultimate victory, proof positive of Athenian loyalty to the Greek cause, and the surest argument in support of their subsequent claims to empire. If the Corinthians added a polemic edge to their stories of salvation, the Athenians may have responded by embracing the source of this implicit criticism and reinterpreting it as the jewel in their commemorative crown.

A multitude of different and often contradictory memories of the Persian War was the natural result of the deep, meaningful, and longstanding political divisions in the Greek world. Before the war participants from the various polities would have begun to frame the approaching threat in terms of their own recollections about the past. A single factual event was immediately fractured into as many experiences as there were bundles of past associations shared by some but not by others. Differences of perception based on pre-existing social memories were augmented by the realities of the war itself. Not all states

contributed equally to each battle. Moreover, the depredations of the invasion itself were not equally felt. Even before Mardonius was defeated at Plataea, different notions of the war were taking root. After the war diverse political interests distorted already distinct memories further, as each party framed its particular recollection of the war to suit present needs. Athens, Plataea, Megara, and Corinth: all had different post-war aspirations and thus needed different memories of the war to advance those goals. Finally, whenever the present interests of two states came to cross purposes, the contrary memories of the Persian War used to advance those interests could be sharpened in response to each other. There was, therefore, no moment when a single Persian War was remembered in the classical period. Existing political differences greatly predisposed the Greeks to think of the war differently from the start. These impediments to a panhellenic memory were not insurmountable, but a unified memory was never a natural or likely outcome. A common memory would have required a massive and consistent effort to maintain, and, as we shall see in the next chapter, the Greeks corporately lacked the machinery (and the will) to resource such an undertaking.

CHAPTER 3: THE PANHELLENIC MEMORIAL COMMUNITY

Whenever a group of individuals can be said to remember the past in a sufficiently similar (but never identical) way, they form a memorial community (see above, Introduction, pp. 16-19). A single individual will likely belong to numerous memorial communities that exert unequal reciprocal pressure on his or her recollection of any given past event. This chapter examines the relative influence of two imagined communities over the remembrance of the Persian War in the classical period: the polis, which was the common unit of political measure in the archaic and classical periods, and a larger panhellenic collective under whose nominal auspices the defense of Greece against Xerxes was conducted.

In Chapters One and Two I argue that those who joined in the defense of Greece against Xerxes did not use the same commemorative narratives of the war, nor did they frame such narratives within a common master narrative. There was not one story of the Persian War, but rather several. Put in terms of our two imagined communities, individuals in the classical period tended to remember the war with reference to memorial communities no larger than their particular polity, rather than as members of a massive, panhellenic collective. Given the general scholarly consensus that the period of the Persian War marked the emergence of a full-fledged sense of Hellenic ethnic identity (see Hall 2002: 175), the broader implications of chapters one and two must be investigated

further. Despite the fact that the Greeks were greatly predisposed to thinking in terms of the polis, did the various stories of the Persian War not also develop in tandem with a panhellenic version? What we shall find is that even in the years immediately after Xerxes' invasion was turned back the victorious Greeks failed to generate a common memory of the war capable of transcending the reciprocal pressures exerted by the various poleis.

It is important from the outset to frame carefully what is essentially a sweeping negative argument. I am not disputing the presence of an imagined community of Greeks which we can for lack of a better term call panhellenic (see above, chapter 1, pp. 37-8). I argue only that this nascent, pan-Greek, imagined community failed to develop a shared memory of the Persian War that went beyond the elementary cultural assumptions inspired by shared metanarratives (see above, Introduction, p. 23) and a few superficial generalities prompted by the event itself. Ultimately, the imagined community of Greeks, realized politically through the Hellenic League (the alliance formed in 481 B.C. to face the imminent threat of Xerxes' invasion), lacked the cohesion, rituals, and bureaucratic apparatus – in other words, the reciprocal pressure – to generate and sustain a binding memory of the war shared by all participants. The reciprocal pressure exerted by the various states was simply too strong. The city-state was a much more immediate presence in the daily lives of any possible member of the imagined community of Greeks (Finley 1956). This was in part a fact of propinquity, but the state was also vastly better financed and organized than the ramshackle Hellenic League or any other panhellenic organization for that matter. The disparity in prominence and power between these two

imagined communities was in fact so great that even those monuments which scholars generally take to be panhellenic fell ineluctably into the singularity of the city-state.

Panhellenism and the Persian War were, of course, much paired from the start. The monuments dedicated by the Greeks after Salamis and Plataea as well as Simonides' Plataea Elegy, each to a greater or lesser extent draw on concepts of panhellenism. These notions remain active throughout the fifth century and come to their most vivid expression in the fourth (see Flower 2000b). Yet not all expressions of panhellenism are equally panhellenic. Panhellenism as an expression of an imagined community constituting all, most, or even some of the Greeks is, in fact, incredibly hard to find. Panhellenism appears everywhere, but always from a certain point of view (Perlman 1976). Athens and numerous writers in its intellectual orbit draw attention to a larger Greek world, but always one in which Athens itself plays the starring role (see below, chapter 5, pp. 231-34). This was surely not the panhellenism to be found in Corinth or Sparta. At the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War the Spartans bid the Athenians to free the Greeks, a stirring panhellenic sentiment that Athens, for all its claimed panhellenism, was not prepared to concede (Thuc. 1.139.3). If surviving advocates of panhellenism tend to wax rhapsodic on the Persian War, we can be sure whatever sense of panhellenism there was in Argos or Thebes did not make use of this particular trope. References to the larger community of Greeks in our sources need not, and I believe should not, be taken as an active expression of a broader, suprapolis memorial community. Panhellenism was never just panhellenism, but rather always someone's panhellenism.

A more traditional view – one that recognizes a significant period of time in which there was an influential panhellenic memory of the war independent of participating poleis – has most recently been argued by Jung (2006: 225-97), who examines the memories surrounding the battle of Plataea with particular attention to the competing claims on the victory made by individual states on the one hand and by the panhellenic collectivity on the other. Jung argues that in the decades immediately after the Persian War there existed a pervasive tension between these two fields of commemoration, local and panhellenic. His focus falls on the panhellenic field which, he argues, emerged from the claims of the Hellenic League to represent the broader interests of the Greeks generally (295). These claims found voice through the sacrifice to Zeus Eleutherius carried out after the battle of Plataea and through the continued honors paid to the fallen of all participating poleis by the Plataeans afterward (270). Although this panhellenic field of memory did not survive the propaganda and infighting of the Peloponnesian War (297), it left a lasting impression on the memorial landscape. Such an interpretation concedes a great deal of influence to a generally accepted, panhellenic memory of the war.

Jung uses three basic arguments to support his case for a panhellenic memory of the Persian War: a strong and relatively long-lived Hellenic League (271-81), the presence of panhellenic rituals at Plataea that effectively created an interpretation of memory that transcended the polis (259-70), and finally the assertion that the allies collectively exerted strong influence over the expressions of memory found in the panhellenic monuments (241-57). Each will be addressed in turn. I will demonstrate that the Hellenic League was in fact too much of an ad hoc organization to have constructed a

strong expression of itself and its collective actions in the recent past, that the cult activities at Plataea represent almost from the beginning a Plataean memory, not a panhellenic one, and finally that the traces of panhellenism that do appear in the panhellenic monuments are not proof of an active expression of that concept by the collectivity of the allies. Rather, the agency of the allies in these monuments is highly mediated by Sparta. Any genuine memorial expression of the collective found there is thus similarly mediated by the interests of that polis. I shall then conclude by reviewing briefly the ongoing debate about the political context of Simonides' Plataea Elegy in light of the above conclusions.

After arguing for a panhellenic plane of memory from the surviving Plataea memorials, Jung (2006: 271) asks two apposite questions. The first is what organization could act as the bearer of this panhellenic memorial plane? His answer – the Hellenic League – prompts the second: did the League still exist and remain politically active after the defeat of Xerxes? The questions are critical. Behind a collective memory must stand a memorial community whose members are disposed to think, and continue to think, as a group (see above, Introduction, pp. 16-19). One time participation in an event is insufficient to generate a collective memory of that event. The point is so important for our present examination that extended citations from Maurice Halbwachs (1980 [=1950]: 32) and Paul Connerton (1989: 20) are in order. Halbwachs speaks more broadly of any shared experience seen from different memorial communities

Men who have been brought close together – for example, by shared task, mutual devotion, common ancestry, or artistic endeavor – may disperse afterwards into various groups. Each new group is too restricted to retain

everything that concerned the thoughts of the original party, literary coterie, or religious congregation. So each fastens onto one facet of its thought and remembers only part of its activities. Several pictures of that common past are thus generated, none being really accurate or coinciding with any other. Once they are separated, not one of them can reproduce the total content of the original thought. If two such groups come back into contact, what they lack in order to mutually encompass, understand, and confirm remembrances of that past common life is precisely the capacity to forget the barriers dividing them. A misunderstanding weighs upon them, much as upon two men who meet once again only to find, as is said, they no longer 'speak the same language'.

Connerton speaks more to our present point when he considers the modern European memory of World War I.

And yet – this is the remarkable thing – it is possible to imagine that the members of two quite different groups may participate in the same event, even so catastrophic and all-engulfing an event as a great war, but still these two groups may be to such a degree incommensurable that their subsequent memories of that event, the memories they pass on to their children, can scarcely be said to refer to the 'same' event.

In the absence of a memorial community capable to exerting substantial reciprocal pressure what was one experience becomes multiple memories. In light of this observation, we can sharpen Jung's question considerably, was the Hellenic League sufficiently cohesive and long-lasting to provide the participants a frame in which to think about the war as Greeks or allies, rather than Spartans, Athenians, Tegeans, Naxians, and so forth? Jung argues that it did.

Jung structures his analysis of the Hellenic League with reference to three different scholarly interpretations: 1) that the League was nothing more than a temporary expansion of the Peloponnesian League and thus had little existence beyond Spartan

leadership (Tronson 1991), 2) that the Hellenic League was in fact a new entity, but one that lost meaning soon after the immediate threat had passed (Brunt 1953/4), and 3) that the Hellenic League possessed a strong, institutionalized governing council that lasted well into the Peloponnesian war (Kienast 2003). He quickly rejects Tronson with arguments focused largely on his identification of the Hellenic League with the Peloponnesian League (2006: 274-6). Having established thereby that a separate Hellenic League existed, he turns to its duration. Jung (271-2 and 279-80.; see also Brunt 1953/4: 153) rejects the testimony of Plutarch, who claims that a formally constituted League centered on Plataea was instituted after the battle of Plataea (*Arist.* 21.1-2), but nevertheless concludes that the Hellenic League remained an effective political entity at least down to 462/1 when the Athenians withdrew from the alliance (Thuc. 1.102.4).

While I agree with Jung that the Greeks who banded together against the Persians entered into an organization essentially different from the existing Peloponnesian League (see also Brunt 1953/4: 141-3 and Kienast 2003: 45-6), I believe he dispenses with Tronson too hastily. Even if we insist that the Hellenic League was something new, there is much to commend Tronson's view that the organization formed to face the Persian threat was extremely weak and largely under the influence of Sparta. Moreover, I feel that Jung, following Kienast (2003: 51-64), has overemphasized the very slightest indications of the continued existence of the Hellenic League down to the mid-fifth century. I believe that the Hellenic League was a weak, ad hoc organization that effectively ceased to exist a few years after Xerxes' invasion. To defend this position I shall argue that, in spite of the brief ascendancy of a panhellenic governing body decisions within the Hellenic League were in large part made by Sparta or its

representatives. I then examine the evidence for the afterlife of the League, which is insufficient to demonstrate that it continued to wield any real power or influence (political or otherwise) after the immediate threat had passed.

The council of *probouloi*, the deliberative body of the Hellenic League, was an exceptionally short-lived entity.¹ We have firm attestation for meetings of the Greeks who opposed Persia in 481 and 480, and Herodotus attributes to them numerous important decisions. They exchange oaths, resolve disputes between members, dispatch spies and ambassadors (Hdt. 7.145), make strategic decisions (7.172-3 and 175), and vote to extract tithes from states that defect from the cause without compulsion (7.132.2). In spite of such notable undertakings the council that assembled at Corinth breaks up after land and sea forces are dispatched to Thermopylae and Artemisium. Herodotus states: “when they learned that the Persians were in Pieria, they were dismissed from the Isthmus and went on campaign, some of them on foot to Thermopylae, others by sea to Artemisium” (Hdt. 7.177).² Not only does the council break up, never to reassemble, but its members appear to go directly from there to campaign, which suggests that Herodotus at least did not make a clear distinction between those who met at Corinth and those who made up the two war councils (Macan 1908: 223-4). What particular influence was wielded by the Spartans within the council at Corinth is hard to say. Herodotus speaks of this group only as a collective, leaving its internal dynamics in question (see Tronson 1991: 103). It is, however, noteworthy that the *probouloi* did not dismiss themselves, but

¹ Kienast (2003: 49) argues that the official name of this body was the κοινὸν συνέδριον (τῶν Ἑλλήνων). The bases for this assumption are later usage and the witness of Diodorus (possibly drawing here directly on Ephorus); neither persuades. I use ‘council of *probouloi*’ as a shorthand drawing on the language used by Herodotus (7.172.1), but I in no way assert that it constituted a *terminus technicus*.

² ὥς δὲ ἐπύθοντο τὸν Πέρσῃν ἔόντα ἐν Πιερίῃ, διαλυθέντες ἐκ τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ ἐστρατεύοντο αὐτῶν οἱ μὲν εἰς Θερμοπύλας πεζῇ, ἄλλοι δὲ κατὰ θάλασσαν ἐπ’ Ἀρτεμίσιον.

“were dismissed” (διαλυθέντες), in Herodotus’ words, which may suggest Sparta already enjoyed presidency. A similar picture emerges if the embassies sent by the council of *probouloi* (see Hdt. 7.149.2-3 and 7.157-62) or the later war councils (see below, pp. 127-30) are any indication – as they should be (Kienast 2003: 48).

After the breakup of the council of *probouloi* in 480 there is no indication that any panhellenic group separate from the League armies and fleets played any further role in the defense of Greece (Brunt 1953/4: 140, Tronson 1991: 102 and Kienast 2003: 50). All decisions-making power appears to have devolved to the Spartan state and the war councils, over which the Spartan generals had presidency. The ability of the Spartan government to make decisions on behalf of the League is assumed in Herodotus’ account throughout. A Chian embassy, eager to persuade the Greeks to send the fleet into Ionian waters, goes to Sparta before bringing their request directly to King Leotychidas, who was then in command of the fleet (8.132). When there are serious concerns in the Peloponnese about the loyalty of the Athenians in the winter of 480/79, the Spartans dispatch an embassy to Athens. The League council plays no role, nor does Herodotus have his speakers refer to or otherwise acknowledge the existence of a body coordinating the actions of the allies (8.141). Later, when the Athenians, Plataeans, and Megarians demand a League campaign into central Greece, they go directly to Sparta, not Corinth. Their complaints are lodged with the Ephors, not the *probouloi* of the League or any other panhellenic body (9.6-7), and it is the Ephors who seem to have the final say on the actions of the League army (9.9-10). In this, Herodotus contradicts Diodorus, who asserts that the decision was made by the League congress at the Isthmus (11.29). Yet even Kienast (2003: 50-51) doubts the veracity of this account. Although the Greeks

preferred to make decisions together in council while the Persian threat was approaching, by late 480 and 479 there does not seem to have been a deliberative body for the Hellenic League. What decisions were made off the field were made at Sparta.

In addition to the Spartan government's direct influence on League policy from the summer of 480 on, command in the field and presidency over the war councils also belonged to the Spartan generals. Herodotus relates numerous occasions in which major strategic decisions are made by the supreme commander alone. Leonidas' vote to remain at Thermopylae seems to have been sufficient to outweigh the contrary opinion of the majority of those under his command (7.207).³ He alone orders a withdrawal of the bulk of the allies from Thermopylae (7.220; see also Brunt 1953/4: 141). Eurybiades' refusal appears to be enough to frustrate any thought of dismantling the bridges across the Hellespont (8.108.2-4). Later, Leotychidas unilaterally orders the fleet into the eastern Aegean and thereby substantially broadens the scope of the war on the strength of his own interpretation of an omen (9.91).

The authority of the Spartan generals was not unquestioned. The case of Eurybiades at Salamis is instructive since it is here that Herodotus gives us the most detail about the decision-making process within the war councils. Once the fleet arrives at Salamis, Eurybiades poses the question: where should the Greek fleet go now? (Hdt. 8.49.1). The debate is halted by word that Xerxes has reached Attica. Some prepare to leave immediately without waiting for a formal decision. Those that stay decide to depart for the Isthmus (8.56). What role Eurybiades has in the debate beyond posing the

³ Most of the states that contributed troops to the Thermopylae expedition were Peloponnesian (Hdt. 7.202), and Herodotus reports that they were *en masse* in favor of withdrawal, while only the Phocians and Locrians seem to have voted to stay.

question is unclear. When Mnesiphilus advises Themistocles to do more to keep the fleet at Salamis, Herodotus has him speak as though Themistocles needed to persuade Eurybiades alone: “but if there is some way, go and try to confound what has been decided (to see) whether you are somehow able to persuade Eurybiades to change his mind (ἦν κως δύνῃ ἀναγνώσαι Εὐρυβιάδην μεταβουλεύσθαι) so that he remain here” (8.57.2).⁴ Themistocles subsequently addresses Eurybiades before the council of allies as though the entire decision was effectively his: “it is now on you to save Greece” (ἐν σοὶ νῦν ἔστι σῶσαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα: 8.60a). Adeimantus the Corinthian rebuts, urging Eurybiades not to put Themistocles’ measure to a vote (8.61.1). Themistocles then threatens to pull Athenian support from the fleet if it leaves, whereupon Herodotus tells us that Eurybiades was persuaded to keep the fleet there. His decision effectively ends debate and apparently makes any vote unnecessary: “he opted for this opinion: that they remain there and fight by sea. So those skirmishing in words about Salamis were, after Eurybiades made his decision, preparing to fight a naval battle there” (Hdt. 8.63-4.1).⁵ Open complaints from the Peloponnesians soon prompt another debate. It is uncertain if this amounted to an attempt to overrule Eurybiades’ earlier decision or simply to persuade him to change his mind again. Eurybiades is certainly the subject of complaint (8.74.2), but even now he seems to have been open to yet another change of heart (Hdt. 8.79.4). Ultimately, this meeting is interrupted by news that Xerxes had cut off the intended escape route and so never reaches a decision.

⁴ ἀλλ’ εἴ τις ἔστι μηχανή, ἣτι καὶ πειρῶ διαχέαι τὰ βεβουλευμένα, ἦν κως δύνῃ ἀναγνώσαι Εὐρυβιάδην μεταβουλεύσθαι ὥστε αὐτοῦ μένειν.

⁵ ταύτην δὴ αἰρέεται τὴν γνώμην, αὐτοῦ μένοντας διαναυμαχέειν. οὕτω μὲν οἱ περὶ Σαλαμῖνα ἔπεισι ἀκροβολισάμενοι, ἐπεῖτε Εὐρυβιάδῃ ἔδοξε, αὐτοῦ παρεσκευάζοντο ὥς ναυμαχήσοντες.

The sequence related by Herodotus reveals a confusing mix of prerogatives in the war council. Eurybiades could put issues to discussion and resolve a matter by vote of the members. Yet this appears more an option than a requirement. So long as Eurybiades is himself undecided, as in the first and perhaps the third debates, the matter may be discussed and voted on, but if the supreme commander is persuaded, he can make a decision on his own authority. The Greeks remain free allies, and Eurybiades' decisions are not absolute. Some allies prepare to withdraw before the first meeting is adjourned (Hdt 8.56); Themistocles threatens to pull out altogether (8.62). Although it is tempting to follow Brunt (1953/4: 140-41) and conclude that the war councils resembled diplomatic congresses "in which it was hardly advisable for the commander-in-chief to stand on his rights and give orders", we must not lose sight of the great power wielded by the Spartan commander. If his position was delicate, so too was that of the allies who openly rejected his authority. The Peloponnesians can clamor for a third meeting, but it is not at all clear if they could realistically have returned to the Isthmus without Eurybiades. Sparta was simply too important.

The picture of the Hellenic League that emerges from Herodotus is of a weak organization largely held together by a shared threat and a mutual recognition of Sparta's right to command. The *probouloi* of the allies do meet in council in 481 and make decisions as a group, but that body lasts barely one year. In 480 the council is dissolved, and power seems to shift directly to Sparta and the war councils, which were dominated by their Spartan commanders. But could the League have reconstituted itself on a more firmly panhellenic basis after the threat of Xerxes' invasion had passed? Jung avoids the pitfalls associated with the institution of a firm League centered on the state of Plataea by

rejecting much of Plutarch's testimony in his *Aristeides* as a later retrojection (2006: 271-2 and 279), but he still maintains that the League remained a force down to 462/1 and did during that time reassemble to take united action, particularly against medizers (280). Jung is surely right to say that the League had an afterlife, if by afterlife we mean that it continued to take joint action against the Persians for one more year after Herodotus breaks off his narrative of events. He is also right to say that the League existed down to at least 462/1 since Thucydides states that it was at that time that the Athenians formally left the alliance against Persia (1.102.4). But the evidence for any significant action after the final joint campaign of the League in 478 is slight and late (Tronson 1991: 94-5).

Leaving aside the fanciful reconstruction of Plutarch in his *Aristeides*, we can say with certainty that the League outlasted the Persian invasion of Greece. In 478, the year after the famous battles of Plataea and Mycale, a significant joint campaign was organized. Pausanias the regent was sent out to command the League fleet and subsequently took most of Cyprus and drove the Persians out of Byzantium (Thuc. 1.94). It is perhaps in the same year that Leotychidas was sent to Thessaly to campaign against the medizers (Hdt. 6.72). Indeed, the campaign year of 478 seems to have worked much like those of 480 and 479: two Spartan commanders, one in charge of land operations within Greece and the other commanding the fleet. A perfect storm of Spartan mismanagement and Athenian ambition, however, put an end to this arrangement. Pausanias was recalled for violence against the allies, and his replacement, Dorcis, was rejected by the fleet (Thuc. 1.95). Sparta sent no more generals, the Peloponnesians withdrew support, and command fell to the Athenians. It was perhaps at roughly the same time that Leotychidas was accused of taking bribes in Thessaly (Hdt. 6.72). He too

was recalled. There are no further indications of any League operations by land or sea. The joint military campaigns against the Persians, which had most defined the League's activities since its inception, disappear a year after the Persian invasion force was defeated.⁶

Since the League was still very much active in 478, it should come as no surprise that Thucydides has his Themistocles refer to it when he gives a speech at Sparta about the alleged reconstruction of Athens' city walls in the winter between 479 and 478 (Thuc. 1.91.6-7). Kienast (2003: 52-3) suggests that Themistocles was speaking before a formal meeting of the Hellenic League, but the evidence does not support such a conclusion. Thucydides does state that the main impetus for Sparta's intervention came from the allies (1.90.1), but the request itself comes from Sparta. Themistocles then asks to be sent out as an ambassador to Sparta. Upon his arrival he delays a meeting with "the authorities" (τὰς ἀρχάς: 1.90.5), which most naturally refers to the officials of the Spartan government, not an otherwise unknown magistracy of the Hellenic League. Finally, once the wall is sufficiently completed and the other ambassadors arrive, Themistocles goes before the Spartans, not the allies, to present his case (1.91.4). Thucydides supplies no support for the view that this exchange between Athens and Sparta was also an occasion for a League meeting. This is not to say that the League had no part in the affair. As noted above, after the breakup of the council of *probouloi*,

⁶ Huxley (1967) has drawn attention to a passage in Vitruvius (1.1.5) which attests a League campaign against Caryae, a small town on the Lacedaimonian/Arcadian border, on charges of medism in the years after the war (Huxley prefers 479, but Vitruvius says only that it occurred after the liberation of Greece). Huxley sees in the operation the political self-interest of Sparta, but stands behind Vitruvius' assertion that the attack was executed at the command of the League. Medism may very well have been cited as an excuse; Sparta may very well have claimed to act on behalf of the League, but even if we follow Huxley and place the event within the period Sparta was still taking part in joint military operations with the other League members, it is frankly hard to imagine a League army assembling so close to Sparta to handle a matter fully within that state's capability (see also Wolski 1973: 14).

League matters that were not decided in the war councils were decided in Sparta by the Spartans. This incident appears to have been just such a case.

Let us concede that the Hellenic League remained an active and influential group down to 478. Did it continue to be so after the end of joint military operations? Jung argues that the League remained a considerable force in interstate politics, particularly as it related to medism. He claims that Pausanias was, and Themistocles was to be, brought before a court of the Hellenic League to face charges of medism (2006: 276-9; see also Kienast 2003: 54-64). The involvement of the Hellenic League in these events is doubtful at best. In the case of Pausanias Thucydides reports that once the regent had been recalled by the Spartans, other Greeks arrived in Sparta to bring charges against him (1.95.3; see also Diod. 11.44.6). While Badian (1993: 131) rightly assumes that these Greeks were probably official envoys, there is no indication that they were delegates to the Hellenic League or that a full meeting took place at this time as Kienast (2003: 57-8) argues. A subsequent trial held at Sparta finds Pausanias innocent of medism, although he was called to account for some private offenses (Thuc. 1.95.5). In this passage Thucydides does not say what court heard the case, but since the complaints are brought to Sparta and since the trial is held there, it stands to reason that any proceeding was conducted within the framework of the Spartan government. Moreover, in a later passage Thucydides states simply that Pausanias had been tried and acquitted by the Spartans after his first recall:

After Pausanias the Lacedaemonian had been summoned from his command on the Hellespont by the Spartiates, put on trial by them, and acquitted of wrongdoing; he was no longer dispatched on state business (1.128.3).⁷

⁷ ἔπειδὴ Πausανίας ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος τὸ πρῶτον μεταπεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ Σπαρτιατῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς Ἑλλησπόντῳ καὶ κριθεὶς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀπελύθη μὴ ἀδικεῖν, δημοσίᾳ μὲν οὐκέτι ἐξεπέμφθη.

Kienast (2003: 57), noting that non-citizens could not bring charges against citizens in Sparta, has argued that, since Pausanias was accused by the Greeks, the trial could not have been before a Spartan court. As a result, he is forced to explain away the above passage by stating that Thucydides has naively used a sloppy source that mistook a congress of the Hellenic League for a Spartan court. Some aspects of the excursus on Pausanias and Themistocles have been judged incredible, and recourse to an earlier literary source is one possible solution (Westlake 1977 and Hornblower 1991a: 213), but this does not provide a *carte blanche* to rewrite the basic meaning of the passage. That Pausanias was recalled by the Spartans is confirmed by a passage outside this excursus (Thuc. 1.95.3), and there is no reason to believe Thucydides or his source was mistaken about the further fact that the trial was also conducted by them. It is best to conclude that the trial was before a Spartan court and that allied complaints were, if necessary, mediated through their Spartan *proxenoi* or perhaps Pausanias' domestic enemies.

Themistocles' trial, on the other hand, is a more difficult matter to sort through. Diodorus explicitly states that at the insistence of the Spartans Themistocles' trial was to be before a panhellenic court since his crimes affected all Greece:

And they said that, since the wrongs done to Greece were a matter of common interest, it was necessary that the trial not be held privately among the Athenians, but rather before the common council of the Greeks” (11.55.4).⁸

Later, when Admetus attempted to harbor Themistocles, the Spartan envoys dispatched to arrest him threatened the Molossian king with military action by the full League army (Diod. 11.56.2). Plutarch similarly states that the trial was to be before the Greeks (*Them.*

⁸ καὶ δεῖν ἔφασαν, τῶν κοινῶν Ἑλλάδος ἀδικημάτων, εἶναι τὴν κρίσιν οὐκ ἰδίᾳ παρὰ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ συνεδρίου τῶν Ἑλλήνων.

23.6). The problem is that Thucydides makes no mention of such a trial. Spartan envoys do indeed come to Athens, bring charges, and demand punishment, but there is no hint that Themistocles is to be tried anywhere but Athens (1.135.2-3). Kienast (2003: 63) tries to extract some indication of League involvement from the fact that both Athenians and Spartans pursue Themistocles, but cooperation between Sparta and Themistocles' domestic enemies need not indicate the presence of a larger League mechanism at work. Indeed, in marked contrast to Diodorus' Admetus, who is threatened with a full League army, Thucydides' Corcyreans, who harbor Themistocles before Admetus, are afraid of alienating Athens and Sparta, not the whole Hellenic League (Thuc. 1.136.1). It is best to conclude that the notion of a standing or even ad hoc panhellenic court affiliated with the Hellenic League is an illusion of the fourth century retrojected into the fifth by Diodorus and Plutarch's sources. The Hellenic League did not act in the trials of Pausanias or Themistocles, and as such there is no evidence of the Hellenic League doing anything of note from 478 to 462/1 when the Athenians abandoned it.

To sum up, a panhellenic alliance was instituted in 481 to face the Persian threat and for a little over a year acted together through a council of *probouloi*. The council was, for whatever reason, dissolved in the summer of 480 never to be reassembled. Authority passed primarily to the Spartan commanders in the field, who nevertheless frequently consulted their war councils. What decisions were made outside the war councils, appear to have been made in Sparta. This was the condition for the remainder of 480, 479, and 478. At that point, four years after its institution, the Hellenic League ceased to function in any meaningful way. The reason is not hard to find. From its inception the Hellenic League had been premised on Spartan leadership. Even while

decisions were being made in the council of *probouloi*, Sparta probably already played a significant, if not preponderant, role. After the dissolution of the council, Spartan leadership was even more pronounced. When Sparta withdrew from command, the League built around it became little more than a name. The name, of course, lived on and maintained enough meaning for the Athenians to feel compelled leave it formally some sixteen years after it ceased to function. Yet I believe it is hasty to conclude that such a weak, ad hoc, and ultimately short-lived institution exerted so much reciprocal pressure that it could create and maintain its own memory of the past or give commemorative voice to a larger imagined community of the Greeks.

In spite of the weakness of the Hellenic League as a political entity, is it possible that customs or rituals instituted during its short life could have influenced the ways in which the Persian War was remembered to the extent that a separate panhellenic memory of those event could be said to have existed? The argument for this possibility rests solely with two rituals practiced at Plataea, both of which have broadly panhellenic associations: the cult of Zeus Eleutherius and the funerary honors paid to the fallen. Although later accounts describe a rich and elaborate ritual performance surrounding both activities, I believe that these details are later accretions (see also below, chapter 5, pp. 252-58). To understand the exact nature and impact of these two traditions in the years after the war, we must turn to Herodotus and Thucydides.

Our fullest treatment of the cult of Zeus Eleutherius at Plataea comes from Plutarch (*Arist.* 19.7-9). There we learn that the Hellenic League met annually on the anniversary of the battle of Plataea and that at that time sacrifices were made to Zeus

Eleutherius. Pausanias describes the altar, which he places just outside the town of Plataea near the tombs of the fallen (9.2.5). Inscribed on it was an epigram that at least one late source (*AP* 6.50) attributes to Simonides (see ‘Simonides’ 15 Page and *Plut. Mor.* 873b). Pausanias also adds that a festival, called the Eleutheria, was held at Plataea every four years (9.2.6). Both authors describe the cult as it was in their day, but also claim that these same rituals were performed from the beginning. A yearly meeting attended by the original allies, falling on the anniversary of the battle, marked by sacrifices to Zeus the Liberator, and punctuated by widely attended games every four years would certainly have made the performances surrounding the cult of Zeus Eleutherius a lightning rod for panhellenic memories of the war transcending those of the individual states.

Yet, as Jung rightly notes (2006: 267), the accounts of Pausanias and Plutarch cannot with any certainty be applied to the decades immediately after Xerxes’ invasion.⁹ For the classical period we must turn to Thucydides who also mentions a sacrifice to Zeus Eleutherius. He has his Plataeans remind king Archidamus:

For Pausanias the Lacedaemonian, the son of Cleombrotus, after he had freed Greece from the Medes along with the Greeks who were willing to share in the danger of the battle that was fought in our land, made sacrifices to Zeus the Liberator in the market of Plataea and calling all the allies together gave back to the Plataeans their land and city, (declaring) that they should live there with autonomy, that no one should ever attack them without just cause or for the purpose of enslaving them, and that if ever attempted, the allies present should defend them according to their ability (Thuc. 2.71.2).¹⁰

⁹ *Contra* Meiggs (1972: 507-508), who argues that the cult practices mentioned by Plutarch may have had a genuine core, and Raubitschek (1960), who defends the authenticity of Plutarch’s account in full.

¹⁰ Πανσαανίας γὰρ ὁ Κλεομβρότου Λακεδαιμόνιος ἐλευθερώσας τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀπὸ τῶν Μήδων μετὰ Ἑλλήνων τῶν ἐθελησάντων ξυνάρασθαι τὸν κίνδυνον τῆς μάχης ἣ παρ’ ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, θύσας ἐν τῇ Πλαταιῶν ἀγορᾷ ἱερὰ Διὶ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ συγκαλέσας πάντας τοὺς συμμάχους ἀπεδίδου Πλαταιεῦσι γῆν καὶ πόλιν τὴν σφετέραν ἔχοντας αὐτονόμους οἰκεῖν, στρατεῦσαι τε μηδένα ποτὲ ἀδίκως ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς μηδ’ ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀμύνειν τοὺς παρόντας συμμάχους κατὰ δύναμιν.

Thucydides gives no indication that we are dealing with an annual ritual. Rather, the sacrifice appears to have been a simple, single event and nothing like the elaborate performances of later years (Jung 2006: 270).¹¹ Nevertheless, Jung asserts that the one-time sacrifice of Pausanias to Zeus the Liberator on behalf of the other Greeks was able to create for all the participants a binding interpretation of the event as a panhellenic victory above that of the various poleis (2006: 270). There can be no doubt that standing before Pausanias as he made the sacrifice a sense of unity and common purpose was present among the assembled Greeks, but did that mood continue to have a life of its own for the various participants once they returned home? Did that one event exert enduring reciprocal pressure? As noted above, such moments of memorial singularity have to be maintained; otherwise they are likely to be incorporated into the memories of the various memorial communities involved (see above, pp. 122-3). The Plataeans certainly remembered the sacrifice of Pausanias and gave it particular importance within their memory of the war. The Spartans and others may have remembered the event as well, but there is no indication that its recollection created a binding interpretation, much less a community dedicated to that interpretation.

The annual honors paid by the Plataeans to those who fell in defense of Greece at Plataea has far better claim to be considered the basis of a panhellenic memory of the war existing beyond that of the individual poleis. Again, our most detailed account comes

¹¹ Raaflaub (2004: 103) rightly concludes that the later elaborations of the cult are quite out of place in the fifth century, but maintains that there was nevertheless an annual performance, perhaps celebrated in tandem with the annual funerary honors for the fallen. But if so, it is remarkable that Thucydides' Plataeans, when they directly address the question of the cult in the above passage, make no mention of an annual commemoration even though it would have advanced their case by underscoring the continuous nature of the tradition as well as the obligation inherent in that sacrifice.

from the imperial period where Plutarch provides a description of the ritual performances intended to honor the fallen (*Arist.* 21.3-6; see also *Mor.* 872f). Thucydides too attests the presence of funerary honors in the classical period (3.58). In this case, however, Jung believes that Plutarch's detailed description can be confirmed for the classical period by Thucydides' statements (2006: 262-3). Yet rituals change and can change quite drastically over even a short period of time (Hobsbawm 1983: 2; see also Connerton 1989: 48, Fentress and Wickham 1992: 200, and Gehrke 2001: 30). Over the roughly five-hundred years that separate Plutarch from Thucydides we would be wrong not to expect a fairly significant degree of development and indeed outright invention, which contemporaries honestly assume to be genuine, as indeed Plutarch himself does. Thucydides confirms a ritual, but cannot be taken as a classical source for the rituals mentioned by Plutarch.

As in the case of the cult to Zeus Eleutherius it is best to stick with Thucydides.¹²

He has his Plataeans sum up their actions for the fallen thus:

Look to the graves of your fathers. After they were killed by the Medes and buried in our land, we used to honor them every year at public expense with garments and the other customary items in addition to bringing the first fruits of all that our land produces season by season. We did this as friends from a friendly land, as allies for those who were once our comrades-in-arms (3.58.4).¹³

¹² If three mid-fifth century bronze vessels awarded by the Athenians to those who fell in battle could be connected with the Eleutheria Games described by Plutarch, they would constitute sure proof that there was much more going on at Plataea than Thucydides' Plataeans report (for the bibliography, see Boedeker 2001: 151-2), but for now the connection between these vessels and the games is far too tenuous to be pressed (Raaflaub 2004: 103).

¹³ ἀποβλέψατε γὰρ ἐς πατέρων τῶν ὑμετέρων θήκας, οὓς ἀποθανόντας ὑπὸ Μήδων καὶ ταφέντας ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐτιμῶμεν κατὰ ἔτος ἕκαστον δημοσίᾳ ἐσθήμασι τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις νομίμοις, ὅσα τε ἡ γῆ ἡμῶν ἀνεδίδου ὥραϊα, πάντων ἀπαρχὰς ἐπιφέροντες, εὖνοι μὲν ἐκ φιλίας χώρας, ξύμμαχοι δὲ ὁμαίχοις ποτὲ γενομένοις.

The Plataeans claim to honor the Spartan dead yearly at public expense with clothes, first fruits, and all the other customary rights. Reading Thucydides strictly, we would have to conclude that only the Spartan dead received these honors, which would necessarily exclude Athens – hardly a likely conclusion. It is better to assume that Thucydides' Plataeans have here tailored their remarks to suit their Spartan addressees and that in fact honors were paid to all those who fell on the Greek side (Boedeker 2001: 150n.14). Even without Plutarch's elaborations a yearly service to honor all the fallen would have made this ritual of central importance for the memory of the war at Plataea. There are also indications that it would have had meaning for the other participants as well (see Boedeker 2001: 150). Herodotus states that many of the tombs at Plataea were in fact empty, erected after the fact by those who did not participate in the fighting. The express purpose for building such tombs was to enhance a state's own image for future generations (9.85.3).

Despite the inclusiveness of the honors performed and broader interest in those honors, the funerary rituals performed at Plataea did not express a panhellenic memory independent of those expressed by the participating states. As Herodotus' account of disputed tombs already suggests, the battle site at Plataea did not convey a cohesive panhellenic narrative, but rather a cacophony of contrary assertions. What unity was supplied to the site and its individual tombs came from the annual ritual. But therein lays another problem. In the panhellenic celebrations held at Plataea in the Hellenistic period, the games and honors were managed by a council of Greeks from numerous states (see below, chapter 5, pp. 258-9). In the fifth century, as Thucydides tells us, the honors were administered by the Plataeans at their own expense. Given the tone of the Plataean

speeches, it is reasonable to assume that panhellenism was an important theme, but if so, that panhellenism was probably distorted by the reciprocal pressure of the Plataean state. Finally, it is not clear how significant the funerary ritual was outside Plataea. Herodotus and Thucydides give no indication that the honors paid to the dead were witnessed regularly by significant numbers of non-Plataeans. Such rituals require participation to transmit social memory effectively (Connerton 1989: 70; see also Winter and Sivan 1999: 15-16). Without regular, broad participation by the other allied states, the honors paid at Plataea would simply have been an anecdotal addition to ritual performances for the fallen carried out by each state in its own territory (for such rituals, see Jung 2006: 259-62).

This is not to say that the ritual for the fallen at Plataea was not in a meaningful sense still panhellenic. Those Greeks who erected tombs after the fact did want what came with the ability to claim to have left dead at Plataea. They wanted to co-opt as their own a panhellenic point of reference that would have meaning for the wider imagined community of Greeks. Panhellenism is present, but remains passive. Each tomb carried a commemorative narrative that did not necessary act in coordination with the others. Each may also have implicitly or explicitly touted panhellenism, but they likely did not together express a shared panhellenism on behalf of a larger community of Greeks. At best the funerary honors paid to the fallen by the Plataeans acted as a stage for various state-centered recollections. More like a three-ring circus than a coherent theatrical production, the Plataeans played impresario to a wide array of different commemorative assertions for their own advantage.

There is no denying that both the sacrifice of Pausanias and the honors for the fallen were strongly imbued with panhellenic themes. Unity and common purpose are in the forefront of the Plataean rendition of the Persian War as provided by Thucydides (2.71 and 3.53-9), and we have every reason to believe that the sacrifice and the annual ritual to the fallen were central to the Plataean conception of itself within the larger Greek world. Furthermore, we have every reason to believe that if the Plataeans did in fact make use of these precise examples in their addresses to Archidamus and the Spartan tribunal, they were citing events equally present in the Spartan social memory of the war. But Jung surely goes too far when he says that the sacrifice and ritual created “a panhellenic category of commemorative meaning that transcended that of the state” (Jung 2006: 270). The evidence is simply not there to suggest that these two acts were of such a kind to sustain a single, binding memory over multiple poleis for any length of time. It is more likely that there was not one memory of the sacrifice or the ongoing funerary honors, but rather several. Each civic memorial community incorporated those events in its own way. Doubtless Plataea was not the only community to associate them with panhellenism, but this was a panhellenism fully in the service of the state.

Even if, as I have argued, the Hellenic League ceased to be an effective organization quickly after Xerxes’ invasion and in that time established no performative rituals capable of introducing broad sectors of the population into a truly panhellenic memory of the war, there were nevertheless several monuments dedicated around the Greek world under the League’s auspices during its short existence. It is here that we come closest to a panhellenic memory of the war that continued to influence the ways in which the

Greeks thought about those past events. The impact of these monuments, which is undeniable, will be considered in detail below (chapter 4), but first it is important to consider the extent to which the panhellenic monuments expressed an independent panhellenic memory of the war that transcended that of the individual states, as is argued by Jung (2006: 255). Although these monuments were ordered by the allies together, I believe that there are strong indications that this collectivity had no hand in the actual execution of these commemorations. What little evidence we have suggests rather that, after the allies had designated the place and perhaps basic form of the monuments, the Spartans had complete authority over their construction and inscription. As a result, the panhellenic commemoration of the war conveyed by these monuments would have been mediated and positioned by the interests of a single polis, Sparta. This fact does not negate the presence of a panhellenic aspect in these monuments or the aspirations of the allies to stake a claim to the victory, merely the capacity of those allies collectively to produce panhellenic commemorative narratives (to say nothing of truly panhellenic master narratives) independent of the narratives they were simultaneously producing locally.

The Greeks who joined to repel Xerxes' invasion dedicated seven monuments on two occasions at five sites. After the battle of Salamis the Greeks dedicated three Phoenician triremes, one at the Isthmus, another at Sounion, and a third on Salamis (Hdt. 8.121.1). They also had a bronze statue of Apollo with the prow of a ship in his hand erected at Delphi (8.121.2). After the battle of Plataea the Greeks dedicated three statues at three of the major panhellenic sites: a golden tripod atop a bronze column made of three intertwined serpents at Delphi (Hdt. 9.81.1: see also Paus. 10.13.9), a bronze statue

of Zeus at Olympia (Hdt. 9.81.1; see also Paus. 5.23.1-3), and a bronze statue of Poseidon at the Isthmus (Hdt. 9.81.1). Herodotus' description of the process is simple and straightforward. The Greeks together set aside a portion for the gods and dedicated it. Pausanias paints a similar picture. The only monument about whose dedication we have more than Herodotus' brief description, is the tripod at Delphi. In this case we have two references from Thucydides (1.132.2-3 and 3.57.2), one from the Demosthenic corpus (59.96-8), and one from Plutarch (*Mor.* 873c-d). Moreover, the serpent column which originally held the tripod survives to this day in Istanbul where Constantine moved it in the fourth century A.D. (ML 27). From this monument we gain an impression of the process by which the other panhellenic monuments were dedicated that undercuts the simple picture that emerges in Herodotus and Pausanias.

There are three versions of the political debacle surrounding the inscription on the tripod at Delphi. The earliest is that of Thucydides, who describes these events toward the end of Book I as part of his digression on the fall of Pausanias. After Pausanias' second recall, the Spartans became very apprehensive of their regent. They began to reconsider his prior bad acts in a new light. Thucydides reserves the inscription Pausanias placed on the Delphi tripod for special comment:

They reviewed with suspicion his actions (to see) if he had departed in any way from established custom. Of particular note was the fact that he decided on his own authority to have this elegy inscribed on the tripod that the Greeks dedicated at Delphi as the first fruits from the Medes:

“Pausanias, leader of the Greeks, when he destroyed the army of the Medes, dedicated this monument to Phoebus”.

The Lacedaemonians erased the elegy from the tripod immediately and inscribed by name the cities that had

joined together to put down the barbarians and erected the dedication (Thuc. 1.132.2-3).¹⁴

Pausanias arrogates to himself the privilege of placing a self-serving inscription on the tripod dedicated by the Greeks. The Spartans respond by erasing the elegiac epigram and inscribing instead a list of the allied states. Meiggs and Lewis (1969: 60) doubt the couplet was ever actually inscribed on the monument, but they cite no supporting evidence and fail to address the fact that Thucydides' language here certainly suggests physical erasure (ἐξεκόλασαν... ἀπὸ τοῦ τρίποδος).

Some have argued that Sparta's actions here are undermotivated (Bonner and Smith 1943: 2 and Jung 2006: 247-8) and that in fact such dedications were common in Sparta (Jung 2006: 248n.76; see also Gauer 1968: 93). Neither is true. Let us consider the question of Spartan commemorative custom first. Jung and Gauer cite three commemorations in support of their claim: Pausanias' on the Hellespont (Hdt. 4.81.3; see also Athen. 12.536), the treasury of the Acanthians and Brasidas (Plut. *Lys.* 1.1), and the prominence of Lysander on the Aegispotami monument at Delphi (Paus. 10.9.7). None of these examples is satisfactory. The monument dedicated by Pausanias on the Hellespont was likely dedicated in the period of his disgrace and in any case was not a Spartan monument, but a private dedication. The treasury which sported the name of Brasidas so prominently was an Acanthian monument and besides constructed after the death and heroization of the Spartan general (Thuc. 5.11). The Aegispotami monument

¹⁴ τὰ τε ἄλλα αὐτοῦ ἀνεσκόπουν, εἴ τί που ἐξεδεδήτητο τῶν καθεστώτων νομίμων, καὶ ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸν τρίποδά ποτε τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς, ὃν ἀνέθεσαν οἱ Ἕλληνες ἀπὸ τῶν Μήδων ἀκροθίνιον, ἡξίωσεν ἐπιγράψασθαι αὐτὸς ἰδίᾳ τὸ ἐλεγεῖον τόδε·

Ἑλλήνων ἀρχηγὸς ἐπεὶ στρατὸν ὥλεσε Μήδων,
Παυσανίας Φοῖβω μνήμ' ἀνέθηκε τόδε.

τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐλεγεῖον οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐξεκόλασαν εὐθύς τότε ἀπὸ τοῦ τρίποδος τοῦτο καὶ ἐπέγραψαν ὀνομαστὶ τὰς πόλεις ὅσαι ξυγκαθελοῦσαι τὸν βάρβαρον ἔστησαν τὸ ἀνάθημα.

alone provides a parallel. Yet here we are dealing with a monument built some 80 years after the Serpent Column, likely constructed under the supervision of the Spartan general Lysander (a man no less ambitious and self-serving than Pausanias), and quite possibly designed with the Serpent Column itself in mind (see below, chapter 4, pp. 223-26). A more apposite example of contemporary Spartan memorial custom appears in an early classical dedication found at Olympia (ML 22) and attested by Pausanias (5.24.3), whose inscription reads simply: “Lord Zeus the Olympian, son of Cronus, accept a beautiful image with a heart that is propitious for the Lacedaemonians”.¹⁵ There is also the subsequent Peloponnesian League monument celebrating the victory at Tanagra 458/7 (ML 36) which seems to contain a list much like that which appeared in the final version of the Serpent Column. In neither case is a king or regent singled out for praise. Pausanias’ epigram was far from custom at Sparta and consequently the Spartan reaction to it in Thucydides is perfectly understandable.

There were also more immediate political considerations that would make an unfavorable reaction at Sparta quite likely. Pausanias was a regent and technically fought the battle of Plataea on behalf of Pleistarchus, son of Leonidas. Pausanias was not even given sole command of the Spartan contingent at Plataea, but rather shared command with his cousin, Euryanax (Hdt. 9.10). Moreover, while Pausanias’ epigram gives backhanded recognition to the part played by the Greeks collectively by designating Pausanias “leader of the Greeks” (Ἑλλήνων ἀρχηγός), it completely ignores the special position enjoyed by Sparta within the League. The Spartans warrant no mention, nor is Pausanias

¹⁵

δέξο, ἄναξ Κρονίδα Ζεῦ Ὀλύμπιε καλὸν ἄγαλμα
ἰλάω θυμῷ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις.

identified as a member or official of that polity. The Spartans themselves had more than enough reason for wanting the epigram removed.

Our second source for the original dedication at Delphi is the mid-fourth-century speech, *Against Neaera*, which was probably written by Apollodorus, but is transmitted in the corpus of Demosthenes as speech 59. Apollodorus wishes to impress on his audience the great difficulty of earning Athenian citizenship by recounting all that had been done by the Plataeans who were nevertheless granted citizenship only after individual scrutiny. In the course of the narrative Apollodorus treats Pausanias and his inscription:

When Pausanias, King of the Lacedaemonians, tried to insult you and was not content that the Lacedaemonians alone had been thought worthy of leadership by the Greeks (in fact this city led the Greeks in freedom, but did not oppose the Spartans in ambition so as not to be envied by the allies) – indignant because of this Pausanias, King of the Lacedaemonians, inscribed on the Delphi tripod that the Greeks who fought together at the battle of Plataea and the naval battle at Salamis made in common and dedicated as a memorial to Apollo from the barbarians,

“Pausanias, leader of the Greeks, when he destroyed the army of the Medes, dedicated this monument to Phoebus”,

as if the deed and the dedication were his, but not the common property of the allies. The Greeks became enraged, and the Plataeans obtained leave to bring a suit before the Amphictyony for 1,000 talents against the Lacedaemonians on behalf of the allies, and they compelled them to erase the elegy and inscribe the cities that had a share in the deed (Ps. Dem. 59.96-98).¹⁶

¹⁶ ἔπει δὲ Πausανίας ὁ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεὺς ὑβρίζειν ἐνεχείρει ὑμᾶς, καὶ οὐκ ἡγάπα ὅτι τῆς ἡγεμονίας μόνοι ἡξιώθησαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ ἡ πόλις τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ ἡγεῖτο τῆς ἐλευθερίας τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν, τῇ δὲ φιλοτιμίᾳ οὐκ ἠναντιοῦτο τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἵνα μὴ φθονηθῶσιν ὑπὸ τῶν συμμάχων – ἐφ’ οἷς φησὶ Πausανίας ὁ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεὺς ἐπέγραψεν ἐπὶ τὸν τρίποδα <τὸν> ἐν Δελφοῖς, ὃν οἱ Ἕλληνες οἱ συμμαχεσάμενοι τὴν Πλαταιᾷ μάχην καὶ τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίαν ναυμαχήσαντες κοινῇ ποιησάμενοι ἀνέθηκαν ἀριστεῖον τῷ Απόλλωνι ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων,

Ἑλλήνων ἀρχηγός, ἔπει στρατὸν ὤλεσε Μῆδων,
Πausανίας Φοῖβῳ μνῆμ’ ἀνέθηκε τόδε,

The version presented by Apollodorus is quite different from the one that appears in Thucydides. According to Apollodorus, Pausanias is essentially working on behalf of Sparta. He feels that Sparta's share of the glory is insufficient and so claims the victory as his own. The Spartans do nothing, presumably pleased by his actions. The allies become enraged, and the Plataeans win the right to prosecute the Spartans before the Delphic Amphictyony. The Spartans are fined 1000 talents and are forced to erase the elegy and inscribe in its place a list of cities that took part in the war.

Although many have attempted to square the differences between the Thucydidean and Apollodoran versions (Bonner and Smith 1943: 2, Trevett 1990: 410, Hornblower 1991a: 218-19 and 1992: 176, and Jung 2006: 246n.72), they remain irreconcilable. The crux of the argument for compatibility is that Thucydides ignores the role of the allies and the Amphictyony and thus provides a highly selective version of the event related more completely by Apollodorus. Yet the differences between the two cannot be simplified to mere omissions. There is a substantive contradiction with regard to the attitude of the Spartan state. In Apollodorus' account a trial and fine are necessary to get the Spartans to take any action, which in turn leaves the impression that they approved of Pausanias' inscription (see also Trevett 1990: 409). In Thucydides, however, they disapprove to the extent that the matter is handled immediately (εὐθύς τότε).¹⁷ If

ὥς αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔργου ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ἀναθήματος, ἀλλ' οὐ κοινοῦ τῶν συμμάχων ὀργισθέντων δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οἱ Πλαταιεῖς λαγχάνουσι δίκην τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις εἰς τοὺς Πλαταιεῖς λαγχάνουσι δίκην τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις εἰς τοὺς Ἀμφικτύονας χιλίων ταλάντων ὑπὲρ τῶν συμμάχων, καὶ ἠνάγκασαν αὐτοὺς ἐκκολάψαντας τὰ ἐλεγεία ἐπιγράψαι τὰς πόλεις τὰς κοινωνούσας τοῦ ἔργου.

¹⁷ Fornara (1967: 291-3) has argued that the erasure of Pausanias' inscription occurred far later than is usually thought, in 468 after the regent's second recall. His interpretation turns on the μὲν οὖν immediately after the elegy is cited. Fornara takes these particles to mark the end of the digression which relates

Apollodorus has correctly reported the activities of the Amphictyony in this case, Thucydides does not omit, he misleads.

The third source for the Pausanias affair is Plutarch in his *On the Malignity of Herodotus*. Plutarch uses several pieces of evidence to disprove Herodotus' contention that only a small number of allies actually fought at Plataea. One is a story about Pausanias' inscription:

Moreover, Pausanias, already contemplating tyranny as they say, inscribed at Delphi,

“Pausanias, leader of the Greeks, when he destroyed the army of the Medes, dedicated this monument to Phoebus”.

In some way or other he shared the glory with the Greeks, whose leader he proclaimed himself to be. When the Greeks did not bear it with patience, but rather brought charges, the Lacedaemonians sent to Delphi, erased <the elegy from the tripod, and inscribed instead> the names of <all> the cities, as was just. And yet how is it likely that either the Greeks were annoyed at being excluded from the epigram if they were aware of their ab<sence> from the battle, or that the Lacedaemonians erased (the name of) their leader and their general and inscribed those who left them in the lurch and overlooked the danger? (*Mor.* 873c-d).¹⁸

Plutarch's version of events shares elements with both Thucydides and Apollodorus. On the one hand, he seems to accord better with Apollodorus (see Trevett 1990: 410 and Hornblower 1991a: 218-19). Both are adamant that complaints over the inscription had

Pausanias' past action, and resumptive of the main temporal line of the story situated after the second recall, but see Trevett (1990: 411) for a persuasive rebuttal.

¹⁸ καὶ μὴν Πausανίας, ὡς λέγουσιν, ἤδη τυραννικὰ φρονῶν ἐπέγραψεν ἐν Δελφοῖς·

Ἑλλήνων ἀρχηγός, ἐπεὶ στρατὸν ὤλεσε Μήδων,

Πausανίας Φοῖβῳ μνήμ' ἀνέθηκε τόδε,

κοινοῦμενος ἀμωσγέπως τοῖς Ἑλλήσι τὴν δόξαν ὧν ἑαυτὸν ἀνηγόρευεν ἡγεμόνα· τῶν δ' Ἑλλήνων οὐκ ἀνασχομένων ἀλλ' ἐγκαλούντων, πέμψαντες εἰς Δελφοὺς Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῦτο μὲν ἐξεκόλαψαν <ἀπὸ τοῦ τρίποδος τὸ ἐλεγείον, πασῶν δ' ἀντεπέγραψαν> τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν πόλεων, ὥσπερ ἦν δίκαιον. καίτοι πῶς εἰκός ἐστιν ἢ τοὺς Ἑλληνας ἀγανακτεῖν τῆς ἐπιγραφῆς μὴ μετασχόντας, εἰ συνήδεσαν ἑαυτοῖς τὴν ἀπεστῶ τῆς μάχης, ἢ Λακεδαιμονίους τὸν ἡγεμόνα καὶ στρατηγὸν ἐκχαράξαντας ἐπιγράψαι τοὺς ἐγκαταλιπόντας καὶ περιιδόντας τὸν κίνδυνον;

an allied component. But this is where their similarities end. Plutarch says nothing about a formal trial, fine, or indeed any compulsion exerted on Sparta. Impetus may come from the allies, but Sparta reacts without hesitation. Indeed, Sparta's willingness is central to Plutarch's larger argument that the Spartans would never have removed the inscription and replaced it with the names of the allies if those allies had not even served in the battle. If Sparta were compelled, Plutarch's argument collapses, and so in this he accords better with Thucydides. Plutarch has similarities and differences with each of the other accounts, but he can be brought into agreement with Thucydides with far greater ease. Whereas the accounts of Plutarch and Apollodorus contain contradictory implications, Thucydides has simply omitted a detail provided by Plutarch – allied involvement. The detail may seem critical, but, if allied complaints fell on sympathetic ears in Sparta, the difference between the two can be boiled down to a matter of emphasis: were concerns in Sparta seconded by the allies or were those of the allies seconded by Sparta? If Thucydides felt allied complaints played only a supporting role, we can allow him the omission.

Before weighing the differences between these three accounts, it might be helpful to note two common elements. Firstly, Pausanias starts out with a great deal of authority over the final form of the monument. His self-serving epigram is already inscribed before any complaint is made, which suggests that he did not act in committee and felt no need to submit a draft for approval.¹⁹ The fact that work on the inscription could be ordered by Pausanias without anyone's knowledge presupposes that he was directly or indirectly overseeing the entire construction project, which in turn suggests that he also

¹⁹ Apollodorus' account does open the possibility that the Spartans were complicit and that it was only the allies who were excluded from the process.

had easy access to, or perhaps direct control over, the funds set aside for that purpose.

The free hand Pausanias initially had over the inscription raises the further possibility that he may have had broader creative control over the monument itself. Even though Herodotus describes the monument's basic form when its construction is ordered by the allies, Pausanias could have had significant latitude in dealing with the details. Secondly, after the inscription is found to be unacceptable, Sparta executes the changes. Even in Apollodorus' account the Amphictyony take no independent action to alter the present form of the monument, but rather compels the Spartans to do so. In all three versions responsibility for the Serpent Column rests ultimately with Sparta.

A possible parallel for Pausanias' extraordinary personal influence over the dedication can be found in Xenophon's *Anabasis*. When the Greeks sold their captives, each general (there were several) took control of a portion of the tithe which was set aside for Apollo and Artemis of Ephesus (5.3.4). Since the whole sum is designated as reserved for those deities, it stands to reason the decision was taken either by the generals collectively (i.e. the war council) or by popular demand of the army. Xenophon goes on to tell us what he did with his share of the tithe. For Apollo he had an offering made and dedicated in the Athenian treasury at Delphi (5.3.5). His own name along with that of his friend Proxenus appeared on the object. With the money for Artemis Xenophon bought a private estate on which he had an altar and temple to the Ephesian Artemis constructed (5.3.6-13). As after Plataea, some basic decisions about the tithe are made collectively within which those entrusted with the money had near complete authority to act. The parallel cannot be taken too far, of course, but the initial authority of the party to whom the tithe is entrusted is notable.

Our broad conclusions about the disposition of the tithe to Apollo after Plataea can be sharpened considerably if we can determine which of our three surviving accounts more likely reflects the political realities immediately after Xerxes' invasion. As noted above, the primary difference in these accounts is the acquiescence of Sparta to the removal of Pausanias' inscription. In Thucydides and Plutarch Sparta is eager or at least willing to remove the hybristic epigram of its regent; in Apollodorus it is extremely reluctant and in the end must be forced to action. At stake is the power the allies had over the monuments once they were ordered. In Apollodorus they could sue the Spartans, compel action, and thus had significant oversight. In Plutarch, they must bring their complaints to Sparta, which is the only entity with the authority to address the matter – a state of affair similar to that in Thucydides. Although Apollodorus' version has found much support in recent years (Trevett 1990: 409-411, Hornblower 1991a: 218-19 and 1992: 176, Kienast 1995: 132, and Jung 2006: 246), it has several obvious strikes against it. It is automatically an uphill battle to prefer the account of a mid-fourth-century orator, whose patently self-serving court speech is fraught with historical error,²⁰ over that of an earlier historian whose obsession with precision is legend. Moreover, the central facts Apollodorus provides are hard to swallow. The Amphictyones fine the Spartans 1000 talents for the transgression of their regent. This is an unheard-of sum of money which

²⁰ In this passage alone five obvious howlers offend: the assertion that the Plataeans were the only Boeotians to resist Xerxes (95; but see Hdt 7.132.1, 8.50.2 and 9.30 *inter alia* for the conspicuous participation of Thespieae), the presence of half of the Plataeans at Thermopylae (95; see Hdt. 7.202 for their absence), the misidentification of Pausanias as the king of Sparta (96-7) though he was clearly only a regent (Hdt. 9.10.1-2 and Thuc. 1.132.1), the attribution of perpetual hatred by Sparta and the house of Archidamus for Plataea from this time up to the Peloponnesian War (98) in spite of Thucydides' testimony that Plataea need only have declared neutrality to avoid destruction (2.72), and finally the claim that Archidamus was direct involved in the unprovoked attack on Plataea by the Thebans (98-9), which is otherwise unattested. See also Trevett (1990: 408-409), who in spite of these errors prefers Apollodorus to Thucydides.

none of Apollodorus' defenders have adequately explained (see Trevett 1990: 410 and Jung 2006: 246n.72). Just half that amount will send Sparta reeling in the next century (Diod. 16.29.2). Finally, the role of the Amphictyony in this affair is wholly incredible. In recent years Hornblower (2007: 49-51; *contra* Bowden 2003) has reasserted the political importance of the Amphictyony of the fifth century. This religious body could take action against Ephialtes the Malian (Hdt. 7.213-14) and possibly Dolopian pirates as well (Plut. *Cim.* 8.3-5); control of it may even have been important enough for Sparta and Athens to vie over soon after the war (Plut. *Them.* 20.3-4).²¹ Yet so large a fine against so powerful a state is quite out of place. Even if the Amphictyony of the early fifth century were very much more powerful than surviving evidence suggests, immediate political considerations would make such action just as unlikely. Most of the members of the Amphictyony had medized and may have faced punitive action at this time by none other than the Spartan king Leotychidas (Hdt. 6.72).²² Even if the shadow of medism should not be adduced to explain all the Amphictyony's actions at this time (Sánchez 2001: 91), it cannot be ignored. That an organization whose members were so thoroughly compromised in recent years would have been sought to arbitrate such a dispute or that this body would have dared to punish so harshly a state whose command over the combined armies in Hellas was only now being relinquished remains inherently unlikely. Like much else in Apollodorus' account, it is possible, but just barely.

²¹ Sánchez (2001: 98-103) rightly questions the veracity of the episode, concluding that it is an invention of the fourth century perhaps with a genuine core whose details have been hopelessly lost.

²² Bowden (2003: 70-72) argues against any firm list of Amphictyonic states before the reorganization of that group by Philip of Macedon, but by any reckoning the number of medizing states regularly associated with the Amphictyony was notable.

Ultimately, the whole story fits much better in the political environment of the fourth century (Sánchez 2001: 104 and Fornara 1967: 293).

A careful weighing of the accounts must point to Thucydides' as the most likely. To this we can certainly add the possibility of allied complaints working in tandem with apprehensions about Pausanias in Sparta, but the notion of the intervention of an Amphictyonic court, its ludicrously high fine, and unbelievably high profile stance must be abandoned as later invention. If we set aside Apollodorus and his panhellenic court, we can sharpen our conclusions about the process by which the panhellenic monuments were constructed. As soon as the Greeks called for the dedication of the Serpent Column at Delphi, direct control over its final form fell to Pausanias, although Sparta reserved the right to make changes as it saw fit. When the Spartans decided to exercise their right, they retained creative control. Whereas Apollodorus asserts that inscribing the participating states was done at the behest of the Amphictyony, Thucydides and Plutarch both imply that the list was a Spartan idea. Later Thucydides' Plataeans state explicitly that it was the Spartans who placed the name of their city on the Serpent Column: "it will seem a terrible thing for the Lacedaemonians to destroy Plataea – for your fathers to inscribe the city on the tripod at Delphi for its excellence, but for you to erase it houses and all from all Greece on account of the Thebans" (3.57.2).²³ If we follow the stronger tradition, we must conclude that from first to last Sparta and its regent had nearly complete authority over the precise form the panhellenic monument at Delphi would take.

²³ δεινὸν δὲ δόξει εἶναι Πλάταιαν Λακεδαιμονίους πορθῆσαι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πατέρας ἀναγράψαι ἐς τὸν τρίποδα τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς δι' ἀρετὴν τὴν πόλιν, ὑμᾶς δὲ καὶ ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ πανοικεσίᾳ διὰ Θηβαίους ἐξαλεῖψαι.

Now that we have established the circumstances of the construction of the Serpent Column, can those findings be applied to the other panhellenic monuments? We can rightly set aside the three triremes immediately. What has been said about Spartan control over the construction of the monuments can only be applied if there was an intermediate stage between the order from the war council and the completion of the monument. We have no idea what went into the dedication of the ships. They may simply have been sent to the various locations without any construction to be overseen. We can, however, conclude with some confidence that the bronze statues of Apollo at Delphi, Zeus at Olympia, and Poseidon at Isthmia probably worked according to the same basic principle seen in the case of the Serpent Column. True, our sources report what details we know about the Serpent Column only because of the singular fallout over Pausanias' inscription, but until the finished product was judged to be unacceptable, there appears to have been nothing exceptional about how that monument was managed. In the absence of any details about the other three statues the Serpent Column should be taken as exemplary. Sparta likely oversaw the construction of all the major panhellenic monuments. Whether Pausanias himself was equally involved is less clear. The fact that a self-serving epigram is known only at Delphi may suggest that other, less ambitious men (Leotychidas or Euryanax, for example) were tapped to manage the monuments at Olympia and Isthmia, but that is only a guess since Pausanias may have tried to stake a private claim to the Serpent Column alone.

The panhellenic nature of the four great bronze monuments dedicated at three major panhellenic sites must be qualified in light of the above conclusions about the Serpent Column. Money for the monuments was set aside by the Greeks collectively.

Decisions about the location and perhaps basic form of the monuments were likely made in the war council. That body was panhellenic in composition, but, as argued above, dominated by its Spartan commander. After ordering the monuments, it appears that the Greeks delegated the execution of what they and their Spartan commander agreed upon to Sparta and its regent (but perhaps also to other prominent Spartans). The individual in charge likely commissioned the work and filled in details as he wished. In this he worked alone without consulting Sparta or the other allied governments. Ultimately, authority over the monuments was Sparta's. If the finished product was deemed unacceptable, only the Spartan government was in a position to order changes. The memory that such a monument presents can be meaningfully called panhellenic, but the panhellenism there expressed does not transcend the polis. Rather, it is mediated and positioned by the most dominant polis in the League, Sparta.

There remains one other possible expression of unmediated panhellenism in the years after Xerxes' invasion, the Plataea Elegy. I have left this work to last since it is the most challenging to address. We have no independent information about the original context of performance or the patron. What we have are fragments and guesses. For our purposes the question of patron is critical. The options abound, but Sparta under more or less influence from Pausanias (Schachter 1998: 29-30, Aloni 2001: 103, Stehle 2001: 117, and Shaw 2001: 180-81) and a large group of states (Boedeker 1995: 225) predominate. No one can be said to have gained broad scholarly approval. I will here only argue against the notion that the work must have been prompted by the Hellenic League or other panhellenic body. It is important to note from the outset that no one has

categorically defended the position I am criticizing here. Jung (2006: 235-41) emphasizes the panhellenic outlook of the Plataea Elegy, but ultimately decides that Simonides sought to emphasize the role of Sparta and the Peloponnesians (238). He does not, however, expressly say who acted as patron. Boedeker (1995) remains the most vocal proponent of the direct involvement of a large number of states, but nevertheless cites the state of Plataea alone as another possible patron (1995: 225). The Plataea Elegy is simply too important to any reconstruction of the war's social memory to write off as uncertain. Panhellenism is an undeniable element of the poem, but as above, the question is whether it represents a purely panhellenic memory or rather someone's version of panhellenism.

Three observations can be cited in support of the hypothesis that the poem is the expression of a panhellenic community: the contents of the poem itself, a comment about its bias (or lack thereof) by Plutarch, and the proposed ease with which the Greeks collectively could patron such a work. Let us begin with the first and most persuasive. In three of the surviving fragments of the poem (fr. 11, 15, and 16) at least three states (Sparta, Megara, and Corinth) and possibly a fourth (Athens) are mentioned. Both Corinth (fr. 15 and 16) and Sparta (fr. 11.25-34) come in for particularly high praise. This broader outlook raises the possibility (*cui bono*) that a community of states commissioned the work. Given the fragmentary state of the poem and the dangers of over-supplementation from Herodotus and others, this observation can only be assessed on the strength of the surviving portions.

Fragment 11 picks up the 'historical' narrative of the campaign in Sparta. We then follow the Spartan army north, picking up allies along the way. Fragments 15 and

16 are largely provided by an excerpt from Plutarch (*Mor.* 872d) and praise the Corinthian contingent before or during the battle. Since the second set of fragments treats only one state in isolation, it is best to leave it aside for the moment and focus rather on fragment 11, which deals with multiple states side by side. Given the importance of the poem and the necessarily tenuous nature of any translation, I provide the Greek below the English. Simonides states:

[But you] now rejoice, o [son] of the glorious daughter of Nereus of the sea. But I [invoke] you, Muse, as my ally, [if you care for] the prayers of men, (help me) so that someone [later re]call [the me]n who for Sparta ... [Nor did they for]get their [vir]tue ... [fame] reaching the heavens [and glory] for men [will] be immortal ... leavening the Eurotas and Sparta ... with the horse-taming sons of Zeus, the [Tyndarid] heroes and mighty Menelaus, the leaders of their [ances]tral city. [But these men (of our day)] the very best son of [Cleo]mbrotus led out ... Pausanias ... famous deeds of Corinth ... Tantalid Pelops ... city of Nisus, the very place where the others ... tribes of neighboring men ... trusting in, they who with ... plain ... of [Pan]dion having d[riv]en out ... of divine [Cecr]ops ... having conquered ... (Simonides F 11 W², trans. Sider)

ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν νῦν χαῖρε, θεᾶς ἔρικυδέος υἱέ κούρης εἰν]αλίου Νηρέος· αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ [	20
κικλήισκω] σ' ἐπίκουρον ἔμοι, π[υ – υ]ε Μοῦσα εἴ περ γ' ἀν]θρώπων εὐχομένω[ν μέλεια· ἔντυνο]ν καὶ τόνδ [ε μελ]ίφρονα κ[όσμον ἀοιδῆς ἡμετ]έρης ἵνα τις [μνή]σεται ὕ[υ – ἀνδρῶ]ν, οἱ Σπαρτ[ηι υ – υ] δούλιον ἡμ]αρ	25
· [] ἀμυν []· [] ὦ[οὐδ' ἄρε]τῆς ἐλάθ[οντο υ – υ]ν οὐρανομ[ήκ]ης καὶ κλέος ἀ]νθρώπων [ἔσσετ]αι ἀθάνατο<ν>. – υυ Εὐ]ρώταν κα[ὶ Σπαρτ]ῆς ἄστὺ λιπόντ[ες – υυ –] Ζηνὸς παισὶ σὺν ἵπποδάμοις	30
Τυνδαρίδα]ις ἥρωσι καὶ εὐρυβίηι Μενελάω[ι – υυ πατ]ρώϊης ἡγεμόνες π[ό]λεος, τοὺς δ' υἱὸς θείοιο Κλεο]μβ[ρ]ότου ἐξ[α]γ' ἄριστ[ος · [] αγ. Πausanías. – υυ – υυ – υ] καὶ ἐπικλέα ἔργα Κορίν[θ]ου	35

– uu – uu –] Τανταλίδεω Πέλοπος
 – uu – uu – Ν]ίσου πόλιν, ἔνθα περ ὦ[λλοι
 – uu – uu –] φύλα περικτιόνων
 – uu – uu –]σσι πεποιθότες, οἳ δὲ συν [
 – uu – uu – Π – u]ρατὸν πεδίον 40
 – uu – uu – Παν]δίωνος ἐξε[λάσσα]ντες
 – uu – uu – Κέκρ]οπος ἀντιθέου[
]ς δαμάσαντ[
]ι εἶδομεν[
 ὦ]νυμον α.[45

Sparta comes in for particular praise. They are the men whose memory the Muse is specifically called on to ensure as an ally of the poet (19-25); they perhaps ward off the day of slavery and so achieve deathless fame (25-8); they travel in the company of the Dioscuri and Menelaus (29-32); their leader is the son of godlike Cleombrotus, Pausanias (33-4). In all, the poet expends ten lines on the Spartans, two of which are devoted to Pausanias alone. It is this signal focus on Sparta at the beginning of the historical portion of the poem that has lead many to suggest that Simonides was on this occasion working for the Spartans or Pausanias personally and that the poem was above all intended to praise them. But the poet does not stop with Sparta. The next two lines (35-6) mention Corinth. After Corinth the reconstruction becomes uncertain. It seems that Megara is mentioned as the city of Nisus in the next line. Some other allies whose identities are not specified in the surviving portions, may also have been mentioned at this point: “the very place where the others” (ἔνθα περ ὦ[λλοι: 37). Reference to Pandion in line 41 and possibly Cecrops in the next may point to Athens, but that is not certain, since the reading of Cecrops relies on an uncertain restoration (Κέκρ]οπος) and Pandion is associated with both Athens and Megara (Schachter 1998: 27-8). With or without Athens the presence of at least two other allies mentioned by name makes the case for a Spartan point of view less open-and-shut.

What the fragment says speaks definitively for a panhellenic aspect to the poem, but what it does not say offers some important qualifications to that observation. As noted above, the allies mentioned after Sparta are most likely organized according to the march of the Spartan army north to central Greece (West 1993: 7; see also Rutherford 2001: 47): Sparta first, then Corinth, Megara, and perhaps finally Eleusis in Attica. Although the passage becomes increasingly uncertain after mentioning Megara, it is undeniable that Corinth follows immediately after Sparta. Corinth would not, however, have been the first ally the Spartans would have encountered heading north. In fact they would pass through or by Tegea, Orchomenos, Phlius, and Sicyon each of which sent contingents north with Pausanias (Hdt. 9.28). While Orchomenos and Sicyon had no particular claim to fame in the battle, Phlius and especially Tegea had reason to boast. According to Herodotus, Phlius had an actual tomb at Plataea (9.85.2), which for Herodotus put it among a select few. The Tegeans fight alongside the Spartans in the final engagement (9.59), break into the Persian camp first, and take the famed manger of Mardonius as a special prize, which they dedicate at their temple of Athena Alea (9.70.3). Their contribution was such that they appear fourth in line on the Serpent Column behind Sparta, Athens, and Corinth (ML 27). Why did Simonides choose to exclude Tegea, Phlius and the others at this point in the poem? They may very well have been mentioned later, but that is to assume. What we have in the surviving portion is a strangely unbalanced picture of allied participation. Panhellenism is there, but it is hardly a universally recognized expression of a larger memorial community of participants. If all the allies together paid for the poem, there must have been some hard feelings in the audience within the first few minutes of the performance.

The second support for reading the poem as an expression of a memorial community transcending any single state comes from Plutarch. In *On the Malignity of Herodotus* Plutarch lambastes the father of history for his bias against Corinth. One of the items he cites in defense of his own contention that Corinth had served honorably in the war is an excerpt from Simonides which has been shown to be a part of the Plataea Elegy. After citing the excerpt Plutarch assures us that the poem is not itself a product of a pro-Corinthian bias: “He did not narrate this for a choral production in Corinth or in a hymn to that city, but quite the contrary while writing those deeds in an elegy” (*Mor.* 872e).²⁴ Boedeker (1995: 225), followed by Jung (2006: 235-6), argues that Plutarch himself at least thought the elegy was not biased in favor of any one city. While this is certainly the tenor of Plutarch’s assertion, I do not believe it should be pressed too far since he was almost certainly not scouring the poem for subtle signs of political affiliation or propaganda. Plutarch can be taken to exclude the presence of rank political bias in the work, but that in itself does not speak against possibility that it was prompted by a single state none the less. Praise can be quite subtle, even if the surviving epigrams on the Persian War tend to be obvious (see West 1970: 278-82).

A final objection to a panhellenic commission can be raised from practical considerations. What would the process have been for the Hellenic League to have commissioned a literary work? As seen from the dedication of the monuments above, it is not sufficient to say that that group simply had it done collectively. We hear of no League purse. The only funds at the disposal of the group were the spoils. Yet we have no reason to believe that the League continued to have management over any monies

²⁴ ταῦτα γὰρ οὐ χορὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ διδάσκων οὐδ’ ὄσμα ποιῶν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, ἄλλως δὲ τὰς πράξεις ἐκείνας ἐν ἐλεγείᾳ γράφων ἱστόρηκεν.

once the booty was distributed to the states and the gods were given their share.

Herodotus tells us how the tithe from Plataea was spent, and there is no mention of any poetic festival or other ceremony paid for from it. Even if we were to assume that the poem was paid for from the tithe to the gods or perhaps some other unknown common funds, responsibility for specific arrangements and payment would likely fall to the Spartans (or Pausanias) as in the case of the other panhellenic monuments. Yet it is far more likely that the money came from one of the states or an individual. It is not impossible that a group of these states collected a sum for a poem to be written in their honor, but if so, then funds must have been collected casually as each state wanted to contribute. States that did not contribute would hardly have come in for a fair share of praise. This circumstance is, however, unprecedented, and a single state or individual must remain the most likely option. In this case the panhellenism found in the poem would stem from a desire (either on the part of patron or poet) to set the singular contribution of one participant against the backdrop of broad participation.²⁵

I hazard no guesses about the exact patron or context, but a direct expression of a large Greek memorial community coextensive with the membership of the Hellenic League seems the least likely. While the poem itself certainly has a strongly panhellenic feel, the surviving portions do not represent a fair balance of attention between the participating states. The panhellenism in the poem seems selective in its praise and thus positioned by factors beyond a fair and agreed upon recounting of the events. Plutarch can be taken to guarantee that the whole would not strike the modern reader as a bald work of propaganda on behalf of one or another state, but it certainly does not exclude

²⁵ For a similar theme in a commemoration see below, chapter 4, pp. 225-6.

more subtle positioning. The fact that Tegea is excluded from the opening of the historical portion of the poem may not have struck Plutarch as particularly biased, but the Tegeans of the fifth century would likely not have gone so far as to say that the poem represented the facts as they were. Even if the content of the poem pointed indubitably to a Greek memorial community (which it does not), we would still be hard pressed to imagine a way for the Hellenic League to have the poem written without recourse to an intermediary. Like the League monuments, the Plataea Elegy can be meaningfully termed panhellenic, but it is not thereby an expression of a panhellenic memorial community.

A larger, suprapolis, memory of the Persian War was never impossible. The Greeks did belong to an imagined community with a shared culture and perception of the distant past. The Persian threat under Xerxes had been repulsed by a significant number of allies who for a time had acted in concert. What the larger memorial community of Greeks lacked was the machinery to express a memory of the Persian War capable of withstanding the immense reciprocal pressures of the participating states. The Hellenic League was founded under duress. Of necessity it was formed around Sparta, the most powerful state in the Greek world at the time. Executive power was entrusted to Sparta and Sparta alone. There was no bureaucracy, no cadre of magistrates whose loyalty was to the Hellenic League or Greece above all else. When the war council decided to erect commemorations at three panhellenic centers, they had no choice but to act through an intermediary. Even if the Plataea Elegy and the festivals known later from Plataea had also been ordered by the Hellenic League, they too would inevitably have fallen under

the influence of the state to which the commission was entrusted. The Greeks could on occasion think themselves part of a larger community, but that community was imaginary in a way that transcends the modern usage in memory studies. It was imaginary in the way that all such large collectivities are, but it was also imaginary in the sense that it had no stable political reality. Put differently, the lines of exchange connecting the sum of individuals who could imagine themselves Greek were so sparse that the reciprocal pressure on individual memory was in turn too weak to have any specific impact with regard to the memory of the Persian War. This truly imaginary community could be contemplated, it could be evoked, it could be defended, but it could not speak for itself. It had no voice, only advocates. But these advocates were first and foremost members of the several poleis, and however much they waxed on the collective, they never lost sight of their own, local interests.

CHAPTER 4: COMPETITION BETWEEN MEMORIAL COMMUNITIES

Memory contestation is a popular subject of study, but the political situation in Greece requires some qualification. Disputes between different recollections of the past are usually cast in terms of what I call dominant and counter narratives. As noted in the Introduction (pp. 20-21), such language necessarily implies the existence of a memorial community exerting substantial reciprocal pressure within which one of these two narratives can achieve dominance. In the context of modern memory studies this does not present a serious problem since the nation-state provides the most common social frame within which memory is examined (see, for example, Schwartz 1982, Zerubavel 1995, Nora 1996, Jarausch 2003, Cappelletto 2005, and Lebow 2006). In the classical period such terminology is at best fit for disputes within the same city-state. Between city-states these terms mislead. Although the Greeks certainly belonged to a larger imagined community, it exerted little reciprocal pressure; it had no center, no periphery. The political map of Greece was simply too fractured, memorial trends too centrifugal. The weakness of this larger community provided a stage on which narratives could compete, but at the same time made it almost impossible for any narrative or set of narratives to gain dominance. This juxtaposition of numerous strong communities within a weak one leads to the constant, agonistic interplay of Persian War memories that, I

believe, most defines the Greek reaction to that event in the classical period and constitutes the subject of the present chapter.

An examination of the competitive aspects of Greek memorial culture has already been undertaken by Gehrke (2001) and Jung (2006: 225-97), but neither provides a sufficient model for understanding the fierce contestation of memory that occurred in the classical period. I have treated Jung in some detail above (see Introduction, pp. 4-10 and chapter 3), and so I shall be brief. His analysis of memory contestation centers on the battle of Plataea. The primary axis of this competition is between the claims of the larger panhellenic community and the individual states. They struggle for control until finally the panhellenic narrative is for a time overturned. As we have seen above, this analysis takes too much for granted when it comes to the cohesion of a panhellenic memorial community and its capacity to generate an independent narrative of its own recent past. Jung's focus on the contestation between the larger community and the individual states also overshadows the more extensive and, I believe, telling axes of competition between the individual states.

Gehrke is more sensitive to the manifold networks connecting one state's memory to another, but his choice of examples puts insufficient weight on the ferocity that could emerge from contrary claims about the past. Gehrke chooses Hellenistic Magnesia, which in 208 B.C. instituted a magnificent festival for Artemis and declared itself a sacred and inviolable city on the strength of an oracle from Delphi. Ambassadors were sent throughout the Greek world to win recognition for this new status. Their resolutions and the replies were inscribed. The surviving portions are full of references to past benefactions and ancestral connections meant to show the worthiness of the Magnesians.

These inscriptions form the core of Gehrke's study, but his conclusions are presented as having broader application, particularly for the memory of the Persian War (301-302). The story of the past provided by the Magnesians was in large measure invented for the occasion, but as Gehrke notes, it was nonetheless accepted by the other Greeks inasmuch as they recognized that city's new status (294). Magnesia is taken as typical (297), and Gehrke concludes that "every innovation...became another binding fact, as long as it was received, or 'believed'" (300-301). The principle is sound, but the ease with which Magnesia's past was accepted was not typical for the memory of the Persian War in the classical period. Rather, the Persian War was an extremely valuable and potentially quite dangerous commodity. Past events were stretched and sometimes invented, and each party hoped to have its version of events accepted within the larger community, but this process was marked by much more contestation than the case of Hellenistic Magnesia would suggest.

No single site better exposes the fierce competition between the various Greek states than Delphi, which had long before the Persian War been a venue for self-display (see Vidal-Naquet 1981: 312 and Rosenberger 2001). We shall focus our attention on two specific locations within the sanctuary: the area surrounding the temple terrace where the bulk of Persian War monuments were erected, and the entrance where the Athenians constructed a second commemoration of their victory at Marathon some 30 years after the fact. Through each we shall explore a different axis of the competition over the Persian War. On the terrace numerous states accused of supporting Persia during the war desperately tried to assert that they too had fought for the Greek side and thereby avoid the real dangers associated with such a charge. At the entrance we shall see a century-

long dispute over hegemony instigated by the new Marathon commemoration. Both demonstrate the breadth and ferocity of the debate.

Before turning to these two examples, I first consider Delphi as a site of memory. Memorial competition did not occur in a vacuum. The dynamics of dedication at a panhellenic sanctuary beyond the direct control of the dedicating state will differ from those in play when monuments are erected within a local sanctuary or on a battle site, be it under the dedicator's control or otherwise. Even among panhellenic sanctuaries dedicatory practices will have differed. Commemoration at any site entails some level of interaction with traditions and interests particular to that site. Consequently no two sites, not even the nominally neutral panhellenic sites, will have the same patterns of dedication. Put differently, the monuments at each site will, if considered as a whole, tell a different story of the Persian War. Delphi's story was by no means typical. To gain a sense of the commemorative dynamics at panhellenic sanctuaries and especially those factors particular to Delphi, I begin by surveying briefly the trends in Persian War dedication at the three panhellenic sites where commemorations of the war survive or are attested. This survey will provide the broader context within which to assess the more detailed analysis focused on Delphi alone.

Delphi immediately stands out from the other panhellenic sites in the sheer number of Persian War dedications made there. There are 34 known Persian War dedications at three panhellenic sites: 23 at Delphi, eight at Olympia, and three at Isthmia. For the sake of convenience, I provide a full list here:

Delphi

- 1) Aegina: Bronze Mast with Golden Stars ('pronaos' of the Temple of Apollo at map # 422)

- Hdt. 8.122; cf. Gauer 1968: 73-4.
- 2) Alexander I of Macedon: Golden statue of Alexander (next to the Apollo of Salamis at map # 410b)
Hdt. 8.121 and [Dem.] 12.21; cf. Gauer 1968: 101.
- 3) Amphictyony: Statues of Scyllis and Hydna (located on the Temple Terrace)
Paus. 10.19.1-2.
- 4) Athens: Statue group (see map # 110)
Paus. 10.10.1-2; cf. Gauer 1968: 65-70 and Bommelaer 1991: 110-11.
- 5) Athens: Treasury and statue base (see map # 223 and 225)
Paus. 10.11.5; *FD II (Le Trésor des Athéniens)* and III 2.1 (pp.1-10); cf. Gauer 1968: 45-65 and Bommelaer 1991: 133-8.
- 6) Athens: Portico possibly containing the remnants of Xerxes' bridge (see map # 313)
Paus. 10.11.6; *FD II (La Colonne des Naxiens et le Portique des Athéniens)* 33-121, ML 25 (pp. 53-4); cf. Gauer 1968: 36-7 and 101-102 and Bommelaer 1991: 147-50.
- 7) Athens: Bronze palm tree with gold fixtures (see map # 420)
Plut. *Nic.* 13, *Mor.* 724b, 397f; and Paus. 10.15.4-5; cf. Gauer 1968: 105-107 and Bommelaer 1991: 186.
- 8) Athens: Golden shields affixed to the Temple of Apollo (see map # 422)
Aesch. 3.116 and Paus. 10.19.4; cf. Gauer 1968: 26-7.
- 9) Callias the Athenian: Bronze Horse (located on the Temple Terrace)
Paus. 10.18.1.
- 10) Carystus: Cow and Calf (beside the statue of Apollo Sitacles at map # 521)
Paus. 10.16.6; *FD II (Terrasse du Temple)* 310-11; cf. Gauer 1968: 113-15.
- 11) Chios: Altar (see map 1, # 417)
Hdt. 2.135; *FD II (La Terrasse du Temple)* 119-137, *FD III* 3.212 and 213 (pp.173-4); cf. Gauer 1968: 110 and Bommelaer 1991: 173-5
- 12) Delphi: Trophy (beside the Temple of Athena Pronoia)
Diod. 11.14.4.
- 13) Epidaurus: Statue of Apollo (located on the Temple Terrace)
Paus. 10.15.1; cf. Gauer 1968: 102.
- 14) Gelon: Tripod (see map # 518)
Bacchyl. 3.15ff, *scholia* to Pindar *Pyth.* 1.79 (= 'Simonides' 34 Page), Diod. 11.26.7 and Athenaeus 6.231-2; *FD II (La Terrasse du Temple)* 249-54; cf. Bommelaer 1991: 188-9
- 15) Hellenic League: Bronze statue of Apollo (see map # 410b)
Hdt. 8.121-2 and Paus. 10.14.5-6; Jacquemin and Laroche 1988; cf. Gauer 1968: 71-2 and Bommelaer 1991: 169-70.
- 16) Hellenic League: Serpent Column (see map # 407)
Hdt. 9.81, Thuc. 1.132, Diod. 11.33, and Paus. 10.13.9; ML 27 (pp.57-60) and Laroche 1989; cf. Gauer 1968: 75-96 and Bommelaer 1991: 165-7.
- 17) Hermione: Statues of Demeter, Kore, and Klymenus (found behind the Opisthodomos of the Temple of Apollo at map # 422)
FD II (Terrasse du Temple) 234-5 and *FD III* 4.147 (p.221); cf. Gauer 1968: 109.
- 18) Hieron: Tripod (see map # 518)
Bacchyl. 3.15ff, *scholia* to Pindar *Pyth.* 1.79 (= 'Simonides' 34 Page), Diod. 11.26.7, Plut. *Mor.* 397e, and Athenaeus 6.231-2 and 6.232a-c; *FD II (La Terrasse du Temple)* 249-54; cf. Bommelaer 1991: 188-9
- 19) Peparethos: Bronze Apollo? (found inside the Temple of Apollo at map # 422)
FD II (Terrasse du Temple) 282-4 and *FD III* 4.179 (pp. 247-8); cf. Gauer 1968: 74.
- 20) Plataea: Bronze Bull (located on the Temple Terrace)
Paus. 10.15.1; Vatin 1981: 450-3; cf. Gauer 1968: 100-101.
- 21) Polyzelus: Tripod (located immediately to the west of the tripods of Gelon and Hieron at map # 518)
Scholia to Pindar *Pyth.* 1.79 and *AP* 6.214 (= 'Simonides' 34 Page); *FD II (Terrasse du Temple)* 254
- 22) Samos: Bronze Apollo (found in front of the Base of the Corcyreans at map # 508)

Pomtow 1918: 60-61, *FD II (Terrasse du Temple)* 248n.2 and *FD III* 4.455 (p. 132); cf. Gauer 1968: 110.

23) Thrasyboulus: Tripod (located immediately to the west of the tripods of Gelon and Hieron at map # 518)

Scholia to Pindar *Pyth.* 1.79 and *AP* 6.214 (=‘Simonides’ 34 Page); *FD (Terrasse du Temple)* 254

Olympia

24) Athens: Inscribed helmet.

Kunze 1961: 129-37 and Koenigs-Philipp 1980: 96; cf. Gauer 1968: 22-3.

25) Hellenic League: Bronze statue of Zeus

Hdt. 9.81 and Paus. 5.23.1-2; Eckstein 1969: 23-6; cf. Gauer 1968: 96-7.

26) Eretria: Bronze Bull

Paus. 5.27.9; Eckstein 1969: 50-3; cf. Gauer 1968: 108.

27) Gelon: Treasury

Paus. 6.19.7; Mallwitz 1972: 169.

28) Gelon and the Syracusans: Golden statue of Zeus (located inside the Syracusan Treasury)

Paus. 6.19.7.

29) Gelon and the Syracusans: Three linen breastplates (located inside the Syracusan Treasury)

Paus. 6.19.7.

30) Hieron and the Syracusans: Three inscribed helmets.

ML 29 (p. 62), *SEG* 23.253 and 33.328.

31) Miltiades the Athenian: Inscribed helmet.

Kunze 1956: 69-74 and Koenigs-Philipp 1980: 95-6.

Isthmia:

32) Corinth: Cenotaph.

Plut. *Mor.* 870e-f.

33) Hellenic League: Phoenician trireme.

Hdt. 8.121.1; cf. Gauer 1968: 32 and 72-3.

34) Hellenic League: Bronze statue of Poseidon.

Hdt. 9.81.1; cf. Gauer 1968: 98.¹

Let us exclude from consideration those dedications made by private citizens (the bronze horse dedicated by Callias the Athenian at Delphi and the helmet dedicated by Miltiades at Olympia) since it is the competition between states that concerns us here. I retain the monuments of Alexander and the Deinomenids since in these cases the distinction between private and state monuments naturally blurs. Additionally, it is best to leave

¹ It should be noted that all groups of dedications are classed together since they represent a single act of dedication. So, the helmets dedicated by Hieron at Olympia or the golden shields dedicated by the Athenians at Delphi receive a single entry and are considered a single dedication. So too is the Athenian treasury at Delphi and the statue base located on the adjacent retaining wall considered a single dedication. While there has been much debate about the precise relationship between the treasury and nearby statue base, I take them both to have been dedicated by the Athenians for the battle of Marathon. Finally, although the four Deinomenid monuments were clearly built and conceived in pairs, I consider each a separate monument since each tripod was dedicated by a different individual.

aside booty since there was surely so much more than survives or was attested in antiquity (eight separate items in total) that any statistic derived therefrom would be too skewed to be probative, which (in addition to Miltiades' helmet) removes three linen breastplates dedicated by Gelon and the Syracusans, four helmets (one dedicated by the Athenians and three by Hieron and the Syracusans), and finally the Phoenician trireme dedicated by the Greeks at Isthmia. The golden shields dedicated by the Athenians at Delphi are retained since they were clearly not taken from the battlefield. That leaves 28 monumental dedications made by potentates, individual states, or groups of states. This total, however, includes all possible Persian War monuments. If we exclude those whose attribution to the Persian War is uncertain (at Delphi the Athenian portico, Chian altar, Hermionian statue group, the Samian Apollo, and at Olympia the Eretrian bull),² we have only 23.

Whether we accept the higher figure of 28 or the more conservative figure of 23, Delphi's Persian War dedications vastly outnumber those from the other sites. Of the 28 possible Persian War dedications, 22 appear at Delphi, four at Olympia, and two at Isthmia. Of the 23 firmly attested Persian War dedications eighteen are at Delphi compared to three at Olympia and two at Isthmia. In either case Delphi accounts for roughly 78 % of the total.

There are reasons to believe that this ratio is not simply an accident of survival. Our sources for the monuments of certain attribution can be broken into three categories.

² That the Athenian portico held the famed cables from the Persian bridge or was in any way linked to the Persian War is a modern conjecture (*FD II [La Colonne des Naxiens et le Portique des Athéniens]* 104 and Amandry 1978) that has never won broad consensus (see Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 54 and Walsh 1986). The connection between Hermionian statue group and the Persian War is also a modern conjecture without any firm textual or epigraphic support (see Gauer 1968: 109). For the Chian Altar, see below, pp. 197-8, the Samian Apollo, pp. 197-8, and the Eretrian bull, pp. 186-7.

There are our literary sources from the fifth and early fourth centuries, which record some of the notable monuments of the Persian War as they appeared at Delphi, Olympia, and Isthmia before the depredations of the two former sites by the Phocians and Arcadians, respectively, in the mid-fourth century. There are also our literary sources recording those notable pieces that survived the fourth century. Finally we have the surviving monuments. This last category will include only those monuments that can be identified as belonging to the Persian War without the aid of literary sources and thus will be restricted to those monuments with explicit inscriptional testimony. If we consider each of these categories separately, we find that each returns a ratio similar to the total.

From the fifth and early fourth centuries Bacchylides, Herodotus, and Thucydides attest the presence of 8 monuments securely attributed to the Persian War: the Salamis Apollo and the Serpent Column dedicated by the Greeks, a bronze mast with three gold stars dedicated by the Aeginetans, a golden statue dedicated by Alexander I of Macedon, and Gelon and Hieron's tripods at Delphi; a bronze Zeus at Olympia dedicated by the Greeks; and a bronze Poseidon at Isthmia also dedicated by the Greeks. Of these eight, six appear at Delphi and one each from Olympia and Isthmia. From our first category of sources Delphi holds exactly 75 %. Our largest category is that derived from the post-classical literary tradition, most particularly Plutarch and Pausanias writing in the second century AD. The authors writing after the depredations of Olympia and Delphi record twenty Persian War monuments,³ sixteen from Delphi, three from Olympia, and one from

³ The Alexander statue, the statues of Scyllis and Hydna erected by the Amphictyony, the Athenian statue group, treasury, bronze palm tree and golden shields, the Carystian cow and calf, the trophy erected by the Delphians, the Epidaurian Apollo, all four Deinomenid tripods, the three monuments of the Hellenic League at Delphi and Olympia, the Plataean bull, the Syracusan treasury, the golden Zeus dedicated by Gelon and the Syracusans, and finally the cenotaph erected by the Corinthians.

Isthmia. At sixteen out of twenty Delphi possesses 80% of the total. Finally, five monuments can be independently confirmed from the physical remains of the dedications. All were dedicated at Delphi: the base of the Salamis Apollo (a recent attribution; see Jacquemin and Laraoche 1988), the Serpent Column (now in Istanbul), the Athenian treasury, the Delphian dedication to their local hero Phylacus (stone now lost, but attested by two 17th century travelers; see Meritt 1947, Peek 1978, Luppe 1979, and Ebert 1982), and the commemoration of the Peparethians.

The exact ratio need not concern us, but it does seem clear that a vast majority (at least 70 to 80%) of the Persian War monuments at panhellenic sites were dedicated at Delphi, which prompts the question: why did Delphi receive so large a number of dedications in comparison with the other great sites? The memorial focus on Delphi has been recognized and four possible explanations have been advanced. Rosenberger (2001: 110) argues Delphi was visited more often than the other sites and thus was a more effective place to locate state commemorations intended to speak to a wider Greek audience. Gauer (1968: 127) focuses more specifically on the oracle and its role in important decisions of state, which he believes gave Delphi a more political feel and for this reason greater claim on victory monuments. It has also been argued that Delphi was in point of fact more important to the Greek war effort against Persia and as such would naturally have received the lion's share of the spoils set aside for the gods (Mikalson 2003: 121; see also Nielsen 2007a: 168). Finally, Felten (1982: 97) has argued that the disparate figures for military dedications at Olympia and Delphi are wholly consonant with the figures throughout the classical period and are thus unsurprising. Olympia's administrators, he argues, sought to downplay the importance of the dedicator's local

identity throughout the classical period so as to make the sanctuary more panhellenic in outlook, which in turn made Delphi a more natural place for the individual cities to make their own dedications.

Each explanation has merit, but all entail some troubling drawbacks. While Delphi was visited more frequently than Olympia, Nielsen (2007b: 57) rightly notes that no site drew crowds as large as Olympia. Nor is it fair to downplay the political nature of that site (Nielsen 2007b: 29). It should be remembered that copies of the Thirty Years' Peace (Paus. 5.23.4) and the treaty of alliance between Athens, Elis, Mantinea, and Argos (5.12.8) were to be found there (see also Nielsen 2007b: 78-82). Delphi certainly does play a large role in Herodotus' account of the Persian War, but, as Felten (1982: 96-7) notes and we shall explore below (see pp. 179-81), Delphi's contribution to the war effort was not such as to make massive dedication there a foregone conclusion. Felten's own observations about larger trends at Delphi and Olympia have much to commend them, but he takes no account of Isthmia. Moreover, Felten is light on explanation. He demonstrates the trend, but attributes it simply to a desire on the part of the sanctuary's administrators to cast Olympia in a more panhellenic light without addressing the cause of that trend.

Better results emerge if we broaden the question to include all three panhellenic sites at which Persian War monuments are attested, as well as the one crown sanctuary where they are curiously absent, Nemea. As posed above, our inquiry assumes that only trends at Delphi need be explained. It tacitly recognizes the levels of dedication at Olympia and Isthmia as the norm. While this is statistically correct, the point cannot be pressed with only four examples. It is also possible that Delphi represents a 'normal'

level of dedication and that it is Olympia and Isthmia that need explaining. My point is not that we need to reassess which site's response was normal. Indeed, in the wake of so unprecedented an event as Xerxes' invasion it is hard to imagine that anyone at the time knew exactly what the 'normal' commemorative response should be. I am arguing that designating any response normal within so small a control set requires an unnecessary assumption that inevitably skews the results. Let us consider rather why the known Persian War monuments are distributed among the four crown sanctuaries so unevenly. The surest answer, I believe, lies in the local circumstances and immediate interests of those who controlled them. I shall consider below the trends in Persian War commemoration at each of the four panhellenic sites in ascending order of commemorative density (Nemea, Isthmia, Olympia, and Delphi) with particular reference to the immediate political concerns of their respective administrators (Cleonae / Argos, Corinth, Elis, and Delphi / the Amphietyon). I do not mean to suggest that only local and immediate interests determined the memorial density of these sites. The relative importance of, and preexisting trends associated with, each site surely had a part to play. I suggest only that the commemorative strategies chosen by or forced on the administrators of the great sanctuaries, who have generally received less attention in this debate, also played a significant role in determining the extent and type of commemoration.

To my knowledge, no one has yet fully examined the power of those who oversaw the great panhellenic sanctuaries to influence or determine the types of monuments dedicated at their sites in the classical period. Nielsen (2007a 169n.25 and 2007b: 53-4n.200; see also Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 60) asserts that the Eleians would

have had the power to refuse the bronze statue of Zeus offered by the Greeks after Plataea had they not been included on the list of allies there and at Delphi, but offers no evidence that they could in fact have done so. Jacquemin (1999: 101-107) examines the evidence from Delphi more fully and concludes that authority over the acceptance and placement of monuments was shared by the Delphians and Amphictyones. Her primary evidence, however, comes from epigraphic formulae of the second century A.D. Even if contemporary evidence fails, some reasonable inferences can be drawn. It is likely on its face that prospective dedicators could not simply place whatever monument they wished wherever they wished. Conceding that, we must posit some authority empowered to decide such matters. The peoples administering the site naturally come to mind. How much authority these peoples could really wield in this or that case would likely fluctuate depending on the circumstances. For our purposes it is only important to note that the local authorities did have a say. We shall see below to what ends they each directed their influence.

Although Nemea was the least prestigious of the four crown festivals (Nielsen 2007a: 169-71), it is nevertheless striking that neither the Hellenic League nor any individual ally made any Persian War dedications there (at least, as far as we know). Two explanations can be cited: that there was no tradition at Nemea for making military dedications and that Nemea's administrators played no role in the war against Xerxes (Nielsen 2007a: 171). Both have a part to play, but it is the second which is of more immediate interest. Nemea was at this time controlled by Cleonae, but that town was itself likely under the influence of nearby Argos (Nielsen 2007a: 175). The Argives had by no means distinguished themselves in the war. When the Hellenic League requested

aid, the Argives refused citing their existing hostility to the Spartans (Hdt. 7.148-9).

There were also other, less neutral versions. Some claimed that tensions with the Spartans were cited as a mere excuse and that in fact the Argives had already made a deal with the Persians (7.150). Although at this point in the text Herodotus refuses to confirm or deny the story, he later refers to Argos' collusion with the Persians as a matter of fact (9.12). Herodotus explicitly rejects, but nevertheless reports, an even more scurrilous account wherein the Argives invited the Persians into Greece because of their recent defeat at the hands of Sparta (7.152). Argos clearly emerged from the Persian War with a tainted reputation. The same can be assumed for Cleonae since it appears to have followed Argos' political lead on this occasion. Nielsen (2007a: 176) argues that this taint of medism would have made Nemea an unlikely place for the victors to commemorate the Persian War. It could be said with equal probability that the Argives and Cleonaeans were unwilling to receive any reminders of their failure to participate.

In contrast to Nemea we have every reason to expect a significant number of Persian War dedications at Isthmia. Corinth was an active and prominent participant in the war, the *probouloi* of the Hellenic League met there in 480 (Hdt. 7.172.1 and 175.1), the war council reconvened there after the battle of Salamis to vote on prizes for valor (8.123.1), and a Phoenician trireme was dedicated there from the spoils of that battle (8.121.1). Isthmia was also awarded along with Olympia and Delphi a share of the tithe from the battle of Plataea from which a bronze Poseidon was made (9.81.1). Despite being the sanctuary most easily associated with the resistance to Xerxes and the ultimate Greek victory, only one monument beyond the Phoenician trireme and the bronze Poseidon is known from Isthmia, a cenotaph set up for those Corinthians who fell at

Salamis (Plut. *Mor.* 870e-f). Why did the other Greeks not set up monuments for their own participation here as well as, or instead of, Delphi? A clue may lie in the sanctuary's only attested dedication by an individual state, Corinth. The Corinthians held firm control over the Isthmian Games and alone administered the sanctuary. It is possible that they made particular use of this panhellenic site to advertise their own contribution to victory. Unfortunately we know almost nothing about the bronze Poseidon the Greeks dedicated there after Plataea (Hdt. 9.81.1; see also Gauer 1968: 98). If it bore a list of allies at all similar to the ones in Olympia and Delphi, Corinth already enjoyed a place of honor behind only Sparta and Athens. This prominent position would have been reinforced by the cenotaph. If other states wished to make dedications, the Corinthians were in a unique position to curtail the size or expense of the offering, or to place them in an obscure part of the sanctuary. This alone may have been enough to convince others to make their dedications elsewhere and leave Isthmia to the Corinthians, who as a result needed only a few dedications to create a suitably tendentious master narrative at the site.

The commemorations known from Olympia are equally surprising. On the one hand, there are but a few monuments celebrating the actions of the mainland Greeks against the Persians. Although Olympia itself was nowhere near as prominent in the Greek resistance as Isthmia, it nevertheless played an important role within the larger imagined community of Greeks by hosting the most important and well attended pan-Greek event (Nielsen 2007b). We would be right to expect more than the bronze statue of Zeus dedicated by the Greeks collectively (Hdt. 9.81.1), possibly a bronze bull dedicated by the Eretrians, as well as two helmets dedicated by Miltiades and the Athenians for Marathon. On the other hand, this meager total is matched and in fact

slightly exceeded by the dedications made by Gelon and Hieron alone for their victories at Himera and Cyme. Gelon erected a treasury, and by Pausanias' time three linen breastplates and a large golden statue of Zeus remained within (Paus. 6.19.7); Hieron dedicated at least three helmets from Cyme. The proportion of mainland to Sicilian commemorations at Delphi is over five to one in favor of the mainland. That it is roughly even at Olympia requires some explanation.

Local interests again provide the best answer. Elis was formally part of the alliance against Xerxes (Hdt. 8.73), but its record was lackluster to say the least. Elis played no role at Thermopylae, Artemisium, Salamis, or Mycale. The Eleian troops sent to Plataea arrived too late for the battle. Elis, for reasons that are not entirely clear, had decided to sit the fence and now regretted it to the extent that they banished their leaders (9.77.3). Such half-hearted support was not enough to guarantee Elis a place among the victorious allies. The Mantineans, who did serve at Thermopylae (7.202) and, though late to Plataea, at least attempted to make up for it (9.77.2), were denied inclusion on the lists of allies that appeared at Olympia and Delphi. Elis, on the other hand, does make the list, and their control over Olympia is the most likely reason (Gauer 1968: 96-7, Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 60, and Nielsen 2007a: 169n.25 and 2007b: 53-4n.200). The allies desired to celebrate their victory at Olympia. This required Eleian approval, which was in turn purchased by including them among the allies in spite of their performance. Inclusion among the allies was the best the Eleians could hope to achieve. They had no booty to dedicate, no spoils from which to make a tithe, and no exploit to celebrate. Amid a flood of individual state dedications such an absence could have become embarrassingly noticeable. As a result, the Eleians may have discouraged the erection of

conspicuous monuments to individual exploits in an attempt to focus memorial attention exclusively on the Zeus statue which granted Elis a more than generous share of the glory. The Deinomenids, in reality celebrating a different war entirely, would naturally not have suffered under any such restriction. We might take these findings one step further and say that it was this attempt to obfuscate Persian War guilt that ultimately sets in motion the larger trend toward panhellenism Felten (1982) observes.

As a panhellenic site of Persian War memory there can be no doubt that Delphi towers above its nearest competitors. The Greeks themselves ordered the construction of two magnificent monuments (the Salamis Apollo and the Serpent Column). The Deinomenids of Syracuse (Gelon, Hieron, Polyzelus, and Thrasyboulus) each dedicated a golden tripod for the victories of their dynasty in the west. The Athenians made as many as five dedications: their treasury for Marathon, golden shields along the metopes of the Temple of Apollo (probably for Plataea), a bronze palm tree with gold fixtures for Eurymedon, a second Marathon monument (a statue group by Pheidias), and perhaps a Stoa intended to hold the cables cut from Xerxes' bridge. In addition eight individual states (Aegina, Carystus, Chios, Epidaurus, Hermione, Peparethos, Plataea, and Samos), a despot (Alexander I of Macedon), Delphi itself, and the Delphic Amphictyony each erected their own monuments. Ironically, I believe it was Delphi's early flirtation with medism that best explains this astounding density of commemoration.

From the beginning Delphi's renowned oracle showed only lukewarm support for any attempted resistance by the Greeks (Hignett 1963: 439-47, Kienast 1995: 126, and Cawkwell 2005: 90). Frequently Apollo recommended neutrality or flight (Hdt. 7.139.6-143, 7.148, and 7.169). No sooner had the conflict begun than a vast majority of the

Amphictyones defected to the Persian side (7.132), which must have prompted grave fears that Delphi would do the same. The Greeks had no intention of losing Delphi. Herodotus tells us that even before Thermopylae the allies swore to exact a tithe for Delphian Apollo from those states that medized without compulsion (7.132.2). It has been suggested that this oath was in part an attempt to keep the Delphians loyal to the Greek cause (Hignett 1963: 445 and Kienast 1995: 124). This argument can easily be expanded to include subsequent wartime dedications as well. After Salamis, Apollo was the sole beneficiary of the tithe (8.121.2), which stands in contrast to the situation after Plataea where he shared this honor with Zeus and Poseidon (9.81.1). In addition to the entire tithe after Salamis, Apollo received upon request a sumptuous offering from the Aeginetans' first prize for valor, a bronze mast with three golden stars attached (8.122). I believe Apollo was so honored at least in part to ensure the loyalty of a sanctuary whose defection could still break the will of the League's many wavering and unenthusiastic members. Such generosity (along with the solid strategic gains) did have an effect. After Salamis, even though the Greeks did not as yet control central Greece, Apollo told the Spartans to seek satisfaction from Xerxes for the death of Leonidas (8.114). After the victory at Plataea, however, winning Apollo's favor was a less pressing concern. Thus, Apollo received only a third of the tithe, and the fine to be imposed on the medizers was never collected.

Efforts to buy Apollo's favor left Delphi the premier site of Persian War memory. The Athenians already had at least one significant monument there for Marathon and work was now underway for three more, two from the Greeks collectively and a third from the Aeginetans. Such a concentration of monuments, particularly two associated

with the collective effort, encouraged others to dedicate at Delphi as well. The effects of this natural pull were augmented by two other, related factors. The administrators of Olympia, Isthmia, and Nemea were hindering free commemoration by the other Greeks, while the Delphians and Amphictyones were in no position to exert similar control over their site. To be sure, the administrators of Olympia and Nemea did not emerge from the war with their reputations unscathed, but their post-war situation remained infinitely better than that of Delphi. The majority of that site's governing body had openly medized; the Delphians themselves came very close to following suit. Ultimately both (the Delphians in particular) evaded any serious fallout, but this result was not a foregone conclusion in the years immediately after the war. Stained as they were by medism and facing potentially devastating repercussions (see below, pp. 189-90), the Delphians and Amphictyones wisely decided to allow, perhaps even encourage, as much Persian War commemoration as possible. Thus, Delphi became a kind of free market of memory.

Each of the four crown sanctuaries can rightly be considered panhellenic, but they did not thereby tell the same, panhellenic, story of the great conflict with Persia. Rather, the administrators of each site under the pressure of local interests (not to mention real experience and pre-existing social memory) created four distinct narratives of the war out of the monuments commemorated mostly by outside powers. At Nemea, where neutral Argos held sway, there was no Persian War. Isthmia focused on the glorious achievements of Corinth against the backdrop of wider participation. Olympia remained largely silent about individual state achievements, emphasizing instead the joint undertaking to preserve the illusion of active Eleian involvement. Delphi became *the* place for commemorating the Persian War on the panhellenic stage not in spite of, but

rather because of its brush with medism. Whereas the administrators of the other crown sites suppressed open memorial competition, Delphi became a memorial free-for-all. Dedicants from Sicily, Macedonia, the Peloponnese, Central Greece, and Ionia all converged to assert their own particular claims about the war and their particular role within it. This range of dedicators and differing viewpoints makes Delphi an ideal place to examine the agonistic aspect of Greek memorial culture.

In the remainder of the chapter I shall focus on two particular groupings which I believe provide a good overview of the agonistic interplay of Persian War monuments at Delphi. The first is a set of monuments on and around the temple terrace, all of which enter implicitly or explicitly into a debate over who did and did not participate in the great struggle against Xerxes. These monuments were all erected at roughly the same time (probably within the first decade after Plataea) and therefore provide a synchronic look at memorial competition. Our second group is located at the base of the Sacred Way, near the entrance of the sanctuary. The debate in this case is over hegemony. Here, only one of the monuments under consideration (the second Athenian commemoration for Marathon) is directly related to the Persian War. Our focus will fall on the monumental dialogue this commemoration set in motion, a dialogue that was still going strong almost 100 years later. This will provide a more diachronic look and also allow us to set a Persian War monument within the context of the other monuments dedicated at Delphi. We shall examine the two groupings in roughly chronological order, starting on the temple terrace and then moving down the Sacred Way to the new Marathon monument and finally through those later dedications in dialogue with it.

The first discernable axis of memorial competition at Delphi was over the issue of inclusion. As noted above, Delphi was lavished with expensive dedications by the Greeks collectively during the war. Once the Persian invasion was defeated, attention naturally turned to the temple terrace where the great bronze Apollo (see map # 410b), a bronze mast dedicated by the Aeginetans, and finally the Serpent Column (see map # 407) were under construction. In addition to the commemorative weight so many expensive memorials created, these three dedications also had an official, sanctioned quality. The Aeginetan dedication was requested by Apollo himself. The Salamis Apollo and Serpent Column had been ordered by the League war council, and the work for them was being executed by a representative of Sparta, the League's hegemon. Of these wartime monuments the Serpent Column was without doubt the most important. Of the four monuments the Greeks collectively ordered, the Column is unique (a column, not a statue of the god) and perhaps the most expensive (the others were made exclusively of bronze whereas the column was topped with a golden tripod). After the removal of Pausanias' self-serving inscription the Spartans decided to inscribe in its place a list of allies who "fought the war" (τοῖδε τὸν πόλεμον ἐπολέμεον: ML 27). Although the content of the list has been read as a simple and unproblematic expression of the generally recognized participants, nothing could be further from the truth. The list reflects a particular view of the war, one that excludes a number of states who could rightly claim to have participated. Many subsequently asserted those claims through commemorations dedicated along the top of the Sacred Way and on the temple terrace, some a stone's throw away from the Serpent Column itself.

Before we can accurately gauge the impact this list had on subsequent commemoration at Delphi, we must first clarify the relationship between the Delphi list and the one that appeared on the statue of Zeus in Olympia. The two lists show a number of similarities in the order of allies, but are ultimately different in both order and total number. For the sake of clarity I provide side by side the states enumerated in each list in the order they appear on the Serpent Column in Istanbul (ML 27) and in the passage of Pausanias that treats the Zeus statue (5.23.1-2).

Olympia

Lacedaemon
Athens
Corinth
Sicyon
Aegina
Megara
Epidauros
Tegea
Orchomenus
Phlius
Troezen
Hermione
Tiryns
Plataea
Mycenae
Ceos
Melos
Ambracia
Tenos
Lepreum
Naxos
Cynthos
Styra
Elis
Potidaea
Anactorium
Chalcis

Delphi

Lacedaemon
Athens
Corinth
Tegea
Sicyon
Aegina
Megara
Epidauros
Orchomenus
Phlius
Troezen
Hermione
Tiryns
Plataea
Thespieae
Mycenae
Ceos
Melos
Tenos
Naxos
Eretria
Chalcis
Styra
Elis
Potidaea
Leucas
Anactorium
Cynthos
Siphnos
Ambracia
Lepreum

The most striking difference between the two is that the Delphi list contains thirty-one states, whereas the Olympia list contains only twenty-seven. All states listed at Olympia also appear at Delphi, but with four additions: Thespieae, Eretria, Leucas, and Siphnos. There are also differences as to the order of allies. Tegea appears eighth in line at Olympia, but fourth behind Sparta, Athens, and Corinth at Delphi. Otherwise the order of the lists is identical down to Melos once we allow for the addition of Thespieae to the Delphic list. After Melos the order differs radically. In this part of the lists only Styra, Elis, and Potidaea appear in the same order. Meiggs and Lewis (1969: 59) and Jung (2006: 256) have suggested that the omissions are the result of carelessness on Pausanias' part or a copyist's error at the time of inscription; neither addresses the differences in the sequence of the names. Jung concludes, and Meiggs and Lewis imply, that both lists were originally identical or at least very similarly conceived. Yet Pausanias' record for accuracy is such that we cannot pin so egregious an error on him with ease (see Habicht 1985: 71-7). That the omissions (and perhaps the differences in sequence) can be attributed to carelessness at the time of inscription is even less likely. The Greeks had an amazing and seemingly infinite capacity to care about the minutiae of honor. Who was fourth in line on the list may seem a small affair in the fullness of time, but in the years immediately after the war it was not.

The reason for the differences, I believe, can be traced to the circumstances of construction (see above, chapter 3, pp. 143-53). The list that appears on the Serpent Column was not originally intended. Pausanias the regent oversaw and completed the entire project before his inscription was judged to be unacceptable. The delay between

the beginning of the project and the point at which the current list was added is difficult to guess. We have to account for the work in its entirety, the time it took for Sparta to judge the composition to be unacceptable, decide on a new course of action, and finally execute that plan. Gauer (1968: 93) settles on 477 for the debate over Pausanias' inscription, but it is only a guess based on the minimum time required to finish such a project. What we can say with some certainty is that the Delphi list would have been added to the Serpent Column sometime after the composition of the list at Olympia, which was presumably added near the Zeus statue as part of the original plan of construction. When the Spartans were faced with the necessity of removing Pausanias' inscription, the recently finished Olympia list was an obvious model. The time difference between the conception of the Olympia list and its transfer to Delphi raises the possibility that we have at Delphi a consciously revised version of the earlier list.

The list was worth being on. In desperate straits during the Peloponnesian War Thucydides' Plataeans think it worthwhile to remind their Spartan judges that they too appeared on the Delphi list (3.57.2). Herodotus feels it necessary to add that the defection of a Tenian trireme on the eve of the battle of Salamis is the reason for their appearance on this list (8.82.1). Elis, it has been surmised, bargained its way onto the Olympia list and ultimately the Delphi list as well. When the Spartans decided to add a list to the Serpent Column, it is not hard to believe that the states failing to appear on the Olympia list were eager to persuade the Spartans that they had been wrongly omitted. The Eretrian monument at Olympia may lend some credence to this possibility. Eretria did not make the Olympia list even though it had contributed to the battles at Artemisium (Hdt. 8.1.2), Salamis (8.46.2), and Plataea (9.28.5). It is possible that in the time between

the inscription of the Olympia and Delphi lists the Eretrians began work on a bronze bull at Olympia to assert their claims (for the monument, see Gauer 1968: 108). When work began on the Delphi list, however, the Eretrians appeared among the allies. Many other states may have lobbied for placement or position as well. In addition to Eretria three other states, absent from the Olympia list, appear at Delphi. Tegea, which appears eighth at Olympia, is elevated to the fourth position at Delphi perhaps in recognition of its particular contribution to the battle of Plataea (see Hdt. 9.70.3 and 71.1). This is not to say that every change between the lists can or should be attributed to careful reconsideration. The order of allies after Melos is simply too disturbed to assign every change a particular meaning. Yet the addition of states and the movement of Tegea within the first seventeen names in the Olympia list, which remains otherwise stable, should be seen as reflecting a revised notion of who could and could not claim to have fought on behalf of Greece.

As a reconsidered and revised version of the Olympia list, the Serpent Column was implicitly the final word on the issue of participation. Moreover, the size, splendor, and prominent location of this League-sanctioned monument must have underscored its authority. Indeed, the Olympia list is mentioned only by Pausanias, whereas both Thucydides and Herodotus refer to the contents of the Serpent Column. Yet the list at Delphi, revised though it was, did not reflect a common, generally accepted view. Differences in the Olympia and Delphi lists already speak to tensions over participation. But the tensions apparent in what the Delphi list includes are easily overshadowed by those implicit in what it excludes. Only those states that fought on the Greek side at Salamis and / or Plataea seem to have had a clear claim (see Ps.-Dem 59.97). None of

the Ionians states that defected at Mycale make the list (Hdt. 9.103-4). Likewise, all medizing states, regardless of past or future performance, are left out as for example are Thebes and Opuntian Locris, both of which contributed troops at Thermopylae (7.202-3), as well as Macedon, whose king gave aid and comfort to the Greeks before Plataea and ultimately defected soon thereafter (see below, pp. 195-7). The Sicilians, who claimed to have fought their war with Carthage in defense of all Greece (see above, chapter 1, pp. 60-64 and below, pp. 191-95), were also excluded. Even lukewarm allies, like Mantinea (see above, p. 178) and Corcyra (Hdt. 7.168), were ignored. Finally, there are three states, Croton (8.47), Pale in Cephallenia (9.28.5), and Seriphos (8.46.4), which did contribute to Salamis or Plataea and yet still did not make the Delphi list. It is unlikely that any of these states took their exclusion lightly.

The decision to limit participation to those who fought at Salamis and Plataea alone is not a natural or inevitable one. The Serpent Column did not commemorate the entire Persian War (as Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 59 and Jung 2006: 254 suggest), but rather a relatively small sliver of it. As seen above (chapter 1), the periodization of the war was variously understood, and so restrictive an understanding does not seem to have been the majority opinion. Decisions about inclusion on the list were ultimately Sparta's. This state oversaw the construction of the monument and later had Pausanias' inscription removed and replaced with a list of allies of its own devise. The list's perspective is thus a Spartan one. Sparta's hand in some of the most sweeping decisions about inclusion is not hard to find. Sparta headed the failed embassy to Gelon before the war had begun (Hdt. 7.157-62). Mantinea was a Spartan ally whose shabby performance at Plataea (9.77) must have been particularly disturbing. Finally, the Ionians, although they had by and

large joined the allies at Mycale and then fought under Pausanias in the next year, had more recently instigated the embarrassing recall of the regent, rejected his replacement Dorcis, and ultimately opted to serve under Athens (Thuc. 1.94-6). Through the list at Delphi the Spartans made a self-interested assertion about who was and was not on the right side of history. Surely Sparta was not the only state to hold a roughly similar view of the matter, but several of the Persian War monuments on and about the temple terrace suggest that it was far from unanimous.

The debates over who should and should not be credited with participating in the war against Xerxes went far beyond honor and status. Those who failed to make the cut faced real-world repercussions. A charge of medism in the years immediately after the war made a state vulnerable to political isolation, extortion, raids, the summary arrest of prominent political leaders, and open invasion. Although such charges were by and large politically motivated, they were thereby made no less dangerous at least in the years immediately after Plataea (Wolski 1973).⁴ Even before Xerxes crossed into Europe and so before the mass medism of northern Greece, the allies swore to fine any state that freely sided with the Persians a tenth part of their total wealth (Hdt. 7.132). After Salamis, Themistocles attempted to extort money from Andros, Paros and Carystus – all of them medizing states. Andros pleaded poverty and was left alone only when a direct attack failed (8.111-12); the Parians and Carystians paid (8.112), but even that did not save the Carystians from invasion (8.121). After Plataea the Thebans were besieged and

⁴ Gillis (1979: 81) concludes his study of medism by stating that “there was no massive revenge on medizing states when the danger had passed”. Although it is true that the Greeks did not mount a coordinated policy of exacting retribution from medizers, there are sufficient examples to demonstrate that those who collaborated with Xerxes faced serious repercussions in the years after the Persian War nonetheless.

saved only by surrendering their political leaders (9.86). These men, eminent within their own community, were summarily executed by Pausanias in Corinth without trial (9.88). Stemming the tide of Xerxes' invasion did not mark the end of the retribution sought against medizers. Leotychidas led a campaign against the Thessalians and, like Themistocles, would have extorted money from them had he not been caught in the act and recalled to Sparta (6.72). Sparta may also have used medism as an excuse to attack Caryae, a small town on the Arcadian border which had apparently failed Spartan expectations (Vitr. 1.1.5; see Huxley 1967 and Wolski 1973: 14).⁵ The archetypal medizer, Thebes, remained politically isolated until the Spartans attempted to restore them to power in 458/7. Even after that, Thebes' medism continued to plague the reputation of that state. Neutral states like Argos and Corcyra also faced challenges because of their Persian War reputation. As in the case of Thebes, only the fallout between Athens and Sparta gave Argos an opportunity to reemerge from isolation (Thuc. 1.102.4). Corcyra's neutrality remained an issue down to the eve of the Peloponnesian War (1.37.2-5).

To be counted among the defenders of Greece was a matter of honor, a matter of pride; for those whom the Spartans thought unworthy, it was a matter of survival. Faced with the manifold dangers of medism, states that could claim any service to the Greek cause were eager to do so. The Serpent Column, because of its location, prominence, and Sparta-sanctioned list, became a lightning rod for counterclaims about participation. Indeed, of the fifteen Persian War monuments dedicated on or near the temple terrace in the years immediately following the war ten were dedicated by states that had either

⁵ See also above, chapter 3, pp. 131n.6.

collaborated with Xerxes or refused aid to the Greeks: the four Deinomenids of Syracuse, Alexander of Macedon, Chios, Samos, Carystus, Peparethos, and the Delphic Amphictyony. In fact, only four states (Athens, Epidaurus, Hermione, and Plataea) present on the Serpent Column also made individual dedications after the war at Delphi. This ratio can hardly be the result of chance. States excluded from recognition by the Spartans engaged in a publicity blitz to represent themselves as equal defenders of the Greek cause. To achieve this goal each state deployed its own strategy, of which the surviving monuments at Delphi were in many cases only a part. A review of these ten ‘medizing’ monuments and the larger strategies they advanced will show that Gehrke (2001) is quite right to emphasize the role of innovation in memory. Memory is a highly malleable thing, and some states were quite successful, almost completely wiping away the memory of blame. But memory is not infinitely tensile. Other states were less successful and suffered the consequences.

As a traveler to Delphi in the classical period ascended the Sacred Way, turned past the Polygonal Wall, and began the final stretch of the walk up to the temple terrace; he would find himself surrounded by conflicting assertions about the Persian War. On his right he would see the massive Serpent Column topped with a golden tripod and bearing the names of the participants (see map # 407). Further along the road, still on the right, he would see the bronze statue of Apollo dedicated for the victory at Salamis (see map # 410b). Straight ahead would appear an equally magnificent site: two golden tripods, each supported underneath by statues of Nike and held aloft by bronze columns perhaps no less imposing than that which bore the Plataea tripod (see map # 518; for possible reconstructions, see Krumeich 1991: 43-8 and Bommelaer 1991: 188). These

monuments were dedicated by Gelon and Hieron, the Deinomenid rulers of Syracuse and Gela, for their victory over the Carthaginians at Himera in 480. To the left of these two tripods, the other two Deinomenid princes, Polyzelus and Thrasyboulus, may also have erected smaller tripods, but this is not certain (Krumeich 1991: 56-60). The proximity of these monuments to the Serpent Column, their similarity of form (golden tripods raised upon bronze columns), and the comparable circumstances for their erection (a military victory over barbarians) suggest that these monuments were in dialogue with the Serpent Column.

This view has been questioned by Krumeich, who holds that too much has been made of the similarities between the Sicilian monuments and that of the Hellenic League (1991: 49-52). If anything, Krumeich argues, the monuments of Gelon and Hieron for their victory in 480 were at least conceived and perhaps even constructed before the Serpent Column, which Herodotus tells us was planned after the battle of Plataea in 479 (1991: 49). Krumeich is surely right to note some important differences between the Deinomenid monuments and the Serpent Column. The tripod dedicated by the Hellenic League sits on the three heads of the coiled serpents, whose bodies form the column. The tripods of Gelon and Hieron likely sat on simple columns. Moreover, the Deinomenid monuments included statues of Nike which supported the basins of the tripods from underneath. In matters of detail there are differences, and it would certainly go too far to suggest that the Deinomenids tried crassly to ape the Serpent Column, but the overall effect, I believe, would still have invited comparison, especially given their proximity and circumstances of construction (see also Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 61 and Harrell 2002: 454).

Objections as to chronology are more serious. Himera was an earlier battle, and Diodorus implies construction occurred soon thereafter (11.26.7).⁶ If the construction of the Deinomenid monuments began before Plataea, we would have to rethink the relationship between them and the (later) Serpent Column. Yet the chronological indications are less clear than Krumeich makes out (see Zahrnt 1993: 363n.35). Diodorus addresses the building projects inspired and paid for by the victory after his account of the battle, but that is more likely the result of convenience than precision. It is hard to imagine that Diodorus, or even his sources, knew, cared, or related precisely when the monuments were made and rather assumed that all monuments dealing with Himera were constructed in the year of the battle. On the other hand, there are reasons to believe that Gelon would have delayed construction at least until 479. Before the battle of Plataea, Delphi, like all central Greece, remained under threat of attack. Would Gelon have sent so large a sum to a sanctuary that the Persians could very well plunder in the coming months?⁷ He probably waited until word of Plataea, especially if the Sicilian tyrant was still hedging his bets on the war in mainland Greece (Hdt. 7.163-4). From Herodotus we learn that the Hellenic League war council decided to give Delphian Apollo his share of the tithe in the form of a tripod within days of the battle of Plataea (9.81.1). Indeed, word of the victory and the manner in which the Greeks chose to commemorate it at Delphi

⁶ Athenaeus (6.232b), citing Theopompus, records a tradition wherein Hieron desired to dedicate a golden tripod and Nike, but lacking the gold he was forced to delay while he collected small quantities here and there until finally he was given a sufficient amount by a kindly Corinthian. Athenaeus also notes that Phaenias, a late fourth-century BC author of a book on the Sicilian tyrants, used the same story. The value of the story is, however, hard to gauge. It is difficult to imagine that the Deinomenids, after so handily defeating so large a Carthaginian army, would have had any more problem acquiring gold for their monuments than the Greeks after Plataea.

⁷ Similar arguments have been made about the tithe of the Hellenic League dedicated at Delphi after Salamis (Zahrnt 1993: 361). *Contra* Kienast 1995: 131.

must have reached Syracuse at roughly the same time. Even if Gelon and Hieron had long since planned to erect the monument as they eventually did (and as to this, we cannot know), the implications of such a choice will have changed upon word of the commemoration being executed by the Spartans on behalf of the Hellenic League.

The form, location, and timing of the Deinomenid tripods therefore invited comparison with the Serpent Column, and this was no accident. The Deinomenids were eager to portray themselves as equal benefactors of the Greek cause. Such a portrayal was not easy or obvious. Gelon had refused the League's request for aid (Hdt. 7.162), and Herodotus was probably not the only one to find fault with that choice despite the Carthaginian invasion (see chapter 1, p. 60-61). To make his case to the Greek world, Gelon and his brother Hieron broadly disseminated their own interpretation of events over the coming years. The Delphi tripods, located so close to the Serpent Column and its list of bona fide allies, was surely the centerpiece of this campaign, but not its only element. In Sicily, Persians and the Persian War were staged for the public. Aeschylus put on a production of his *Persae* for the Sicilian audience (*TrGF* v.III T56a and b). Epicharmus staged a comedy of the same name (*PCG* v.I pp.71-2). At Olympia Gelon constructed a treasury, which by Pausanias' time still contained three linen breastplates and a golden statue of Zeus (Paus. 6.19.7). Three helmets dedicated by Hieron for his victory over the Etruscans at Cyme survive to this day. Pindar seemed well aware of how Hieron wanted his victories in Sicily to be portrayed when in his first *Pythian Ode* he compares Himera and Cyme to Salamis and Plataea (see above, chapter 1, pp. 62-4).

The Deinomenids invested a great deal of money broadcasting their own interpretation of the Persian War. Treasuries, golden tripods, statues, plays, and poems

constituted a wildly expensive decade-long public relations blitz. In Sicily the connection between the defense of the Sicily and Xerxes' invasion may have been an easy sell, but in mainland Greece their investment took longer to mature. Deinomenid claims ran into contrary assertions about the war and their role in it. If Herodotus is any indication, the first and second generation took Deinomenid claims with a grain of salt. But the Deinomenid version, broadcast over so many different media, eventually took effect. By the fourth century Ephorus elevated the defense of Sicily to a starring role in his presentation of the Persian War (see above, chapter 1, pp. 60-61).

Perhaps the most remarkable reinterpretation of the past executed by a medizing state was undertaken by the Macedonian king Alexander I. Unlike the Deinomenids, who merely remained neutral, Alexander was a true medizer. His father gave earth and water to Darius (Hdt. 5.18). Alexander himself gave his sister in marriage to a Persian general (5.21), served on campaign with Xerxes (8.34) and Mardonius (9.44), and also acted as special envoy to Athens on Mardonius' behalf (8.136). Yet Alexander escapes the charge of medism so thoroughly that even Demosthenes, desperate for any excuse to attack the Macedonians and their ruling dynasty, never mentions it. In part, it could be said that Alexander played his hand during the period of Persian occupation quite well. Herodotus relates the incredible story of Alexander's successful plot to murder a group of insulting Persian ambassadors (5.19-22) as well as his advice to the Greeks at Tempe (7.173) and then again at Plataea (9.44-5). Herodotus' presentation of Alexander goes far beyond a mere restatement of fact. Alexander's murder of the Persian ambassadors reeks of invention and has been rightly called into question (see Badian 1994b: 108-110, Cawkwell 2005: 52, and Bowie 2007: 224). His advice to the Greeks before Plataea, if it

occurred in fact,⁸ need not have been interpreted as a guileless expression of Alexander's good will to the Greek cause. Alexander emerges as the only reluctant medizer in the work,⁹ and that has more to do with Herodotus' willingness to accept a particular interpretation of the events than the events themselves (see also Hignett 1963: 273).

Obviously Alexander did not simply let the chips fall where they may. Excluded by the Spartan list of allies, the Macedonian king took steps to assert his own version of events. If our visitor to Delphi continued to walk toward the Deinomenid monuments directly in front of him, he would note on his right, immediately beside the Salamis Apollo (see map # 140b), a golden statue of Alexander himself. Its magnificence was sufficient for Herodotus to use it as a point of reference (8.121). In the spurious letter of Philip, which is transmitted in the tradition as Demosthenes 12, the writer notes that the golden statue of Alexander was erected from the tithe realized from a group of Persian prisoners captured near the future site of Amphipolis (12.21).¹⁰ Demosthenes himself (23.200) associated the attack more closely with Alexander's son Perdiccas, but neither denies nor downplays the incident. It seems that Alexander was quick to take advantage of the changing political circumstances after Plataea by setting upon a group of retreating Persians. Alexander did not want such good deeds to go unnoticed and so dedicated a golden statue of himself within feet of the two League monuments at Delphi. Unlike the Deinomenids, Alexander saw immediate results. A mere three years after serving with

⁸ For the bibliography on this issue, see Flower and Marincola 2002: 188-9.

⁹ Badian (1994b) argues that Herodotus' picture of Alexander is in fact much more complex and that the reader is constantly prompted to conclude that Alexander had acted with great duplicity. But even if this conclusion is correct, Herodotus has still spared Alexander the harsh condemnations he directs at Gelon (7.163-5; see above, chapter 1, pp. 60-61), the Argives (see above, pp. 175-6), and Aleuadae (7.6.2, 130.3, and 172.1) – just to name a few.

¹⁰ For more on this letter, see below, chapter 5, pp. 236-7.

Mardonius at Plataea, Alexander's status as a full Greek was confirmed for the Olympic games (Hdt. 5.22),¹¹ surely both a result and component of his overall strategy to eradicate his erstwhile association with Persia.

Chios and Samos may also have tried to contest their exclusion from the list on the Serpent Column. The Chians constructed a massive altar in front of the Temple of Apollo (see map # 417). The Samians dedicated a rather modest bronze statue of Apollo whose base was found in front of the base of the Corcyreans (see map # 508) and thus on the rise behind and to the right of the Deinomenid tripods. Archaeological and inscriptional evidence points to the early fifth century as the time of construction for both monuments. Their connection with the Persian War and the liberation of the two islands has long been suggested (Gauer 1968: 110; see also Holmberg 1979: 29-30), but must remain conjecture. If the connection is accurate, then the Chians and Samians were also using Delphi to get their version of events out. As noted above (chapter 1, pp. 51-2), the Ionians tended to view the war in broader terms. The Samians and Chians could, and in all likelihood did, claim to have served with distinction at Lade (Hdt. 6.14-16, esp. 14.1). The Samians, and likely the Chians as well, also continued to commemorate their actions against the Persians under Athenian leadership long after the Peloponnesians considered the Persians War over (see Gauer 1968: 124 and Hill B 113). In addition to their earlier and more recent efforts, both states, like the Deinomenids and Alexander, had reason to feel that they too belonged among those who had stemmed the tide of Xerxes' invasion. A group of Chian conspirators traveled to Sparta in an attempt to gain support for a new revolt in Ionia and later sought King Leotychidas' help at Aegina (Hdt. 8.132). The

¹¹ For the date, see Badian 1993: 222n.31.

Samians played an even more direct role in instigating the Greek attack on the Persians at Mycale (9.90-1) and also distinguished themselves in the battle (9.103). Yet neither state appeared on the Serpent Column. The Chian altar would have been a decisive response to this implicit slight. The massive altar, which earned the Chians the privilege of *promanteia* (*FD* III 3.213 [p.174]), occupies a prominent position opposite the two League monuments. The Samian Apollo would have been a more measured response unless its original position was very much closer to the Salamis Apollo.

Less can be said about the overall strategies adopted by the Carystians and Peparethians. The base of the Peparethian dedication was found near the *adyton* of the Temple of Apollo (see map # 422). Its original position is not known. The inscription declares the monument (probably a bronze statue of Apollo) to be a tithe from the capture of two Carian ships. This might refer to Peparethian participation at Salamis, which is otherwise unattested, but its letter forms and likely type of sculpture point to a slightly earlier date (*FD* III 4.179 [p. 247]). Although Gauer (1968: 74) with good reason includes it among the Persian War monuments, it is best not to press this monument too far.

The Carystian monument is attested by Pausanias on the temple terrace (10.16.6), and fragments of the base with an accompanying inscription have been found near the base of Apollo Sitalcas (see map # 521), to the left of the Deinomenid tripods (see *FD* II [*Terrasse du Temple*] 310-11). The Carystian monument bore the likeness of a cow and calf in bronze paid for, Pausanias tells us, from the spoils taken in the Persian War. Pausanias conjectures that this form was selected because, having repulsed the barbarian, the Carystians won the security of their land. It is difficult to know exactly what the

Carystians are dedicating here. They yielded to Datis and Artephernes in 490 after a brief attempt at resistance (Hdt. 6.99). When Xerxes invaded, the Carystians made no effort to contribute to the Greek cause and then medized promptly upon the fall of Thermopylae (8.66). It is best to see the Carystian monument as a desperate attempt to avoid further punishments such as they had already incurred after Salamis (8.112). Yet the Carystian ploy did not work. Perhaps their claims were too far beyond the pale. As the Athenians and their allies swept through the Aegean attacking Persian outposts and pirate bases (Thuc. 1.98.1-2), they did not forget Carystus. In c.472 they attacked the Carystians and forced them into the Delian League (Thuc. 1.98.3; see also Hdt. 9.105).

Let us conclude our examination of the monuments erected by the Greeks excluded from the Serpent Column with the dedication made by the Amphiclytonic League. As a single entity, the Amphictyony had never medized (Sánchez 2001: 92-4), but a vast majority of its members did. Those members, particularly the overwhelmingly influential Thessalians, were under threat of retribution in the years immediately after the war. The actions of the Amphictyonic Council show an awareness of the possible dangers and reveal a concerted strategy to avoid it.¹² The group's most notable policy decision was to put a price on the head of Ephialtes, the Malian who had betrayed Leonidas' position at Thermopylae to the Persians. Malis, of course, was a member of the Amphictyony, and Ephialtes had at the time done nothing out of character with those Amphictyones who had by then defected. Yet it was now essential to disavow that memory as much as possible. Joining the persecution of prominent medizers may have seemed a risky, but effective, means to that end. Sánchez (2001: 95-7) rejects the idea

¹² *Contra* Sánchez (2001: 91), who is roundly hostile to the notion that the Amphictyony's actions can be explained by the medism of a majority of its members during the Persian War (see above, chapter 3, p. 152).

that the Amphictyonic council was here reacting to present fears, arguing that it was fully within the purview of the Amphictyony to punish those who violated the sacred land under their supervision, of which Thermopylae was a part. This fact does not, however, speak against more immediate political motives. Indeed, it is hard to imagine the Amphictyony putting a price on Ephialtes' head if Xerxes had won Salamis. Rather, they would probably have used the same excuse to charge the embattled Lacedaemonians. It may well have been within the traditional power of the Council to punish Ephialtes, but they chose to exercise that power for political reasons.

The post-war policy of the Amphictyony can also be seen among the dedications at Delphi. As this body joined in the persecution of the medizers, so too did it join in the commemoration of the great moments of the war as vigorously as any member of the Hellenic League. Their focus fell on those events which were related in some way to the territory traditionally under the supervision of the council (as Sánchez 2001: 97 rightly notes). So at Thermopylae Herodotus states in passing that the Amphictyones paid for the construction of two monuments, one to the Peloponnesians who fought there and another to the Spartans who died there (7.228). At Delphi Pausanias tells us that the Amphictyones erected a monument on the temple terrace portraying the famous diver Scyllis of Scione and his daughter Hydna who allegedly cut away the anchors of the Persians triremes during the storm off Mt. Pelion and thus aggravated the damage (10.19.1).¹³ The Amphictyones latched onto the story and celebrated the exploit of this Scionean on behalf of Greece as readily as they had that of the Spartans and Peloponnesians at Thermopylae.

¹³ Herodotus knows of Scyllis, but mentions only his skill as a diver and that he defected (8.8).

To summarize, the Serpent Column immediately attracted a firestorm of contestation. Some communities and individuals that did not make the list spent vast amounts of capital to secure for themselves a place among those to be remembered as equal participants in the great struggle against Xerxes. Innovations were made, but not invariably accepted. This was not Hellenistic Magnesia. The stakes were incredibly high. Medizers, neutral states, and lackluster allies faced serious consequences that they were desperate to avoid. Many of their fellow Greeks were unwilling to let bygones be bygones. Our ten dedicators came to various ends. Alexander succeeded in part through brilliant positioning just as the tide began to turn. The same could be said of Chios and Samos. Yet for all the expense and excuses of the Deinomenid tyrants, it was a century before their version seems to have gained much traction outside of Sicily. Carystus' commemorative narrative and the master narrative of resistance it evoked conflicted too much with Athenian self-interest and ultimately availed them nothing. For all the competition that the Serpent Column attracted though, it did not represent a center around which contrary assertions took up peripheral positions. Delphi allowed all assertions of the past to stand, several as magnificent and prominently placed as the Serpent Column itself. Each implicitly claimed dominance, but none achieved it.

The Persian War was a powerful and thereby potentially volatile memory. But if the memory of the Persian War was a threat to some, to others it proved to be a prize of unimaginable value. The long fight against the Persian threat was one of the most consequential in living memory. A relatively large alliance of Greek states faced long odds to defeat a foreign superpower. Leadership in this great event served to justify

continuing leadership. No state understood this as well as Athens. Of the 22 possible state commemorations of the Persian War at Delphi five, almost 25%, are Athenian. Of these, none evoked so thoroughgoing a response as a statue group constructed near the entrance of the sacred enclosure in the mid-fifth century to commemorate the battle of Marathon. Over the next century this monument attracted six others. The fact has been noted (Holmberg 1979: 37-8 and Pedley 2005: 150), but never sufficiently examined. This monument and the subsequent monuments constructed in the surrounding area offer an ideal place to consider our second axis of memorial competition at Delphi – hegemony. Seven monuments constitute the interlocutors in this commemorative dialogue: the Athenian statue group, three Argive monuments (one depicting the Seven against Thebes and Epigoni, another bearing a bronze statue of the Trojan horse, and a third consisting of the famed kings of Argos), a Spartan commemoration of their victory at Aegispotami, an Arcadian monument of the mid-fourth century, and finally a Tegean monument also of the mid-fourth century.

Let us begin by situating the Athenian monument in its proper context and examining its relationship to a nearby Argive monument built at roughly the same time. The Marathon statue group is described in some detail by Pausanias (10.10.1-2; see also Gauer 1968: 65-70):

On the base under the wooden horse is an epigram (stating that) the images were erected from the tithe from the Marathonian deed. There is Athena, Apollo, and a man, one of the generals, Miltiades. From the so-called eponymous heroes there is Erechtheus, Cecrops, and Pandion as well as Leos and Antiochus, who was born to Heracles by Medas, the daughter of Phylas. There is also Aegeus and Acamas, one of the sons of Theseus. These men gave their names to the Athenian tribes in accordance with an oracle from Delphi, but Codrus, the son of

Melanthus, Theseus, and Philaeus also appear (on the monument), and they are not among the eponymous heroes. The men I have enumerated Pheidias made, and these are in truth a tithe from the battle. But they dispatched (the images of) Antigonos, his son Demetrius, and Ptolemy the Egyptian to Delphi at a later time – (that of) the Egyptian because of some goodwill toward him, (those of) the Macedonians because they were afraid of them.¹⁴

Pausanias places the monument at the base of the Sacred Way. Because the southeast corner of the sanctuary was not well preserved, no firmly attested archaeological remains have been found. Its exact position is much debated, but I follow Bommelaer (1992: 279-80) in concluding that the Marathon group was set back from the Sacred Way between the Spartan and Argive monuments on the left as one enters the sanctuary (see map # 110).

The Marathon statue group is immediately striking because it is the second monument erected for that battle at Delphi.¹⁵ The first, the Athenian treasury and its accompanying statues, was dedicated naturally enough soon after the battle and likely drew on the booty derived directly from the battle itself.¹⁶ The statues in the second Marathon dedication are said by Pausanias to have been made by Pheidias, who is

¹⁴ τῶ βάθρῳ δὲ τῶ ὑπὸ τὸν ἵππον {τὸν δούρειον δὴ} ἐπίγραμμα μὲν ἐστὶν ἀπὸ δεκάτης τοῦ Μαραθωνίου ἔργου τεθῆναι τὰς εἰκόνας· εἰσὶ δὲ Ἀθηναῖα τε καὶ Ἀπόλλων καὶ ἀνὴρ τῶν στρατηγησάντων Μιλτιάδης· ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἡρώων καλουμένων <ἐπωνύμων> Ἐρεχθεύς καὶ Κέκροψ καὶ <Παν>δίων, {οὔτοι μὲν δὴ} καὶ Λεῶς τε καὶ Ἀντίοχος ὁ ἐκ Μήδης Ἡρακλεῖ γενόμενος τῆς Φύλαντος, ἔτι δὲ Αἰγεύς τε καὶ παίδων τῶν Θησέως Ἀκάμας, οὔτοι μὲν καὶ φυλαῖς Ἀθηνησιν ὀνόματα κατὰ μάντευμα ἔδοσαν τὸ ἐκ Δελφῶν· ὁ δὲ Μελάνθου Κόδρος καὶ Θησεύς καὶ Φίλαιός ἐστιν, οὔτοι δὲ οὐκέτι τῶν ἐπωνύμων εἰσὶ. τοὺς μὲν δὴ κατειλεγμένους Φειδίας ἐποίησε, καὶ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ δεκάτη καὶ οὔτοι τῆς μάχης εἰσὶν· Ἀντίγονον δὲ καὶ τὸν παῖδα Δημήτριον καὶ Πτολεμαῖον τὸν Αἰγύπτιον χρόνῳ ὕστερον ἀπέστειλαν ἐς Δελφούς, τὸν μὲν Αἰγύπτιον καὶ εὐνοίᾳ τινὶ ἐς αὐτόν, τοὺς δὲ Μακεδόνας τῶ ἐς αὐτοὺς δεῖν. The names in the text are debated, but I follow Rocha-Pereira's Teubner edition. For a defense of the major supplements and changes, see Vidal-Naquet (1986: 304-15).

¹⁵ I leave aside the golden shields on the Temple of Apollo since our earliest source for them (Aesch. 3.116) suggests that they were (re)dedicated from spoils of the battle of Plataea.

¹⁶ For a brief summary of the scholarly debate surrounding this monument, see Neer 2004: 65-7.

generally not considered to have been active until the mid 460s at the earliest (see *DNP* 9: 761).¹⁷ Pausanias states that this monument too was funded from the tithe of spoils of Marathon. Even if Pausanias is here reporting what the Athenians themselves claimed at the time of the dedication or perhaps even what was inscribed on the monument, I remain skeptical. We do not know how much booty the Athenians realized from Marathon, but even assuming it was a colossal haul, I find it incredible that after the construction of the treasury and whatever other monuments were built at the time, the Athenians saved so large a share of the tithe that almost 30 years later they could construct a remarkable bronze statue group at Delphi and still have enough left over to build the massive bronze statue of Athena Promachos on the Acropolis, also said to have been funded from the Marathon tithe (Paus. 1.28.2). It is more likely that any direct connection between the Marathon statue group and the actual spoils from the battle was invented, which for our purposes makes it all the more interesting.

Why then did the Athenians choose to commemorate this particular battle some 25 or 30 years after the event in spite of the fact that they had already built a lavish monument to that battle at Delphi? The question should not be handled in isolation. In fact, the Marathon statue group at Delphi is one of several monuments to Marathon that

¹⁷ Jung (2006: 96-108) wants to separate the heroes from the statues of Miltiades, Athena, and Apollo. He argues that the latter group was made by Pheidias in the time of Cimon, but the former was originally designed to sit atop the retaining wall beside the Athenian treasury. In this, he is following a line of argumentation introduced by Raubitschek (1974: 315-16), who argued that both groups were first built in the Cimonian period for the retaining wall beside the Athenian treasury, but then moved to the entrance of the sanctuary at some later time. The essential problem, as noted by Gauer (1968: 49), is that we know a statue group in honor of Marathon was attached to the Athenian treasury and yet Pausanias makes no mention of it. But I do not find this anomaly sufficient to justify positing a major reorganization of the Athenian monuments at Delphi. Indeed, Pausanias' description of the Athenian treasury is strikingly brief (10.11.5). Perhaps having just noted the magnificent statue group built by Pheidias, Pausanias felt inclined to skip an older, similar group (probably the ten eponymous heroes plus some hellenistic additions). Moreover, there is no support in Pausanias' description of the Marathon group made by Pheidias to suggest that two different statue groups had been jammed together at a later time.

the Athenians erect at this time. We have already mentioned the massive bronze statue of Athena Promachos on the Acropolis. In the Agora there was the Stoa Poikile, which contained among others a painting of the battle. At the battle site itself a permanent trophy was erected (see Vanderpool 1966). About a decade later the Athenians began work on the Parthenon, whose programmatic connection to the Persian War and the battle of Marathon in particular has long been posited (see Boardman 1977, 1984, 1999, Castriota 1992: 134-7, Hurwit 2005: 26 and Neils 2005: 220). In the fourth century such a connection could be assumed (Dem. 22.13). The Marathon statue group is merely a part of a larger trend in the Athenian commemoration of the Persian War in the mid-fifth century.

The growing emphasis placed on Marathon in the Athenian commemoration of the Persian War has not gone unnoticed. Since the Marathon statue group and the Stoa Poikile underscore the role of Miltiades in particular, it is often suggested that they did so under the influence of his son, Cimon (Vidal-Naquet 1986: 304, Flower 2000: 86-9, Hölkeskamp 2001: 341-5, Jung 2006: 123-4, and Gehrke 2007: 97-100), who played a dominant role in Athenian politics from the early 470's down to his ostracism in 462/1. The emphasis on Marathon, however, also appears in such 'Periclean' monuments as the Athena Promachos¹⁸ and the Parthenon and for that reason can also be attached to Athens' changing relationship to her former Persian War allies (Bollansée 1991: 106-110). In 462/1 Athens formally broke from the earlier alliance against the Persians, joined with Argos and Thessaly, and began to attack Sparta's allies along the Saronic Gulf. As a result, it could be argued that the Athenians turned memorial attention away

¹⁸ For the likely date of construction, see Meiggs 1972: 94-5.

from those battles won with the help of her Hellenic League allies to Marathon, which they had won largely on their own.

These reasons are of an entirely different nature. Cimon emphasizes the exploits of his father to enhance his own political standing. Marathon is selected because of the role played there by Miltiades and perhaps also to feed the vanity of the hoplite class that could claim the victory as its own. The fact that the Athenians felt they had an exclusive claim to the glory of Marathon is irrelevant (*pace* Hölkeskamp 2001: 347). Indeed, Cimon, although a supporter of empire, famously advocated a policy of dual hegemony (see Plut. *Cim.* 16.8-10). The followers of Pericles, on the other hand, selected Marathon in spite of its connection to Cimon and the hoplite class. In the changing conditions of the mid-fifth century, Cimon's political opponents wanted to retell the story of the Persian War as an exclusively Athenian exploit, and for this no battle suited better than Marathon.

There is no reason to believe that these contrary impulses did not work in tandem to vault Marathon into the forefront of Athens' Persian War memory. Relationships of power are complex and constantly evolving. A discourse (in this case about Marathon) can be developed by one group and be exploited by another at virtually the same time (see below, chapter 5, 255-6). In such a reconstruction Cimon begins to elevate Marathon for personal political gain. After his fall the radical democrats turn growing popular enthusiasm for Marathon to their own ends. To appreciate the meaning of the Marathon statue group, we must first weigh more precisely the various influences from Cimon and the democrats.

The Cimonian building program is much vaunted in scholarship (Vidal-Naquet 1986: 310-12, Castriota 1992, and Jung 2006: 123-4). Castriota identifies four Cimonian monuments which he believes directly or indirectly address the Persian War: the Theseion, the Temple of Athena Areia at Plataea, the Stoa Poikile, and the Cnidian Lesche at Delphi. The Theseion is surely Cimonian, but any connection between this monument and the Persian War remains highly speculative (see above, chapter 2, pp. 77n.14, *contra* Castriota 1992: 33-63). The Temple of Athena Areia and the Cnidian Lesche are not Athenian. Even though Polygnotus helped decorate the interior of both monuments (Paus. 9.4.1 and 10.25.1) and even though Polygnotus himself was closely associated with Cimon, there is no reason to suspect the Athenians or Cimon played any role in their construction (*contra* Castriota 1992: 65 and 90; see also above chapter 2, pp. 70n.3). We are left with the Stoa Poikile, to which we can add the Marathon statue group, as the only surviving indications of a connection between the memorial turn toward Marathon and the so-called Cimonian building program.¹⁹

Neither monument can be precisely dated. The Marathon statue group is dated only by the probable period of Pheidias' activity (c.465-425). The archaeological remains of the Stoa Poikile allow for a more precise date of around 460 (Shear 1984: 13). Thus, both allow a Cimonian date, but do not require it. Only the prominence of Miltiades in each monument ultimately speaks for a date of construction or at least conception before 462/1 and the ostracism of Cimon. The Marathon statue group figures Miltiades, likely at its center, alongside Athena and Apollo. On each side stand five

¹⁹ I set aside the trophy at Marathon since its date is too uncertain – likely the second quarter of the fifth century (Vanderpool 1966: 100) – and its overall commemorative meaning too debatable to shed much light on whether the impulse for its construction came from Cimon or the radical democrats.

figures, seven of the eponymous heroes of the Cleisthenic tribes along with three other figures (Codrus, Theseus, and Philaeus) probably standing in for the three missing eponymous heroes (Vidal-Naquet 1986: 304-9). Not only does Miltiades stand at the center of the monument flanked by Apollo and Athena, but the ancestor of Miltiades' clan, Philaeus, has also been added. Miltiades plays a notable, but less prominent, role in the overall composition of the Stoa Poikile. Pausanias (1.15) records that the Stoa contained four large paintings: the contemporary battle of Oenoe, the Amazonomachy, the trial of the lesser Ajax after the sack of Troy, and the battle of Marathon. In the Marathon composition Pausanias remarks that Miltiades and Callimachus the polemarch are among the figures pictured.

Miltiades undeniably enjoys in the mid-fifth century the recognition denied to him in his lifetime (Hdt. 6.136), but his prominence in these two monuments only speaks for a date before the fall of Cimon if the Athenians could not possibly have honored him so afterward. The Athenians were furious when their contingent at Ithome under Cimon's command was dismissed by the Spartans (Thuc. 1.102.4), and Cimon was ostracized almost immediately (Plut. *Cim.* 17.3). But how long did this animosity last? Ostracism required a ten-year absence. Did the mood in Athens remain static during those years? Plutarch (*Cim.* 17.4-9) gives us reason to think otherwise. Soon after the ostracism of Cimon the Athenians began attacking several of Sparta's allies (Thuc. 1.105-6). In 458/7 the Spartans finally decided a show of force was necessary. They led an army into central Greece to free their traditional homeland Doris (Thuc. 1.107.2). On their way back the Athenians provoked a battle (1.107.3-7). The entire undertaking was wholly contrary to Cimon's philolaconian policy. Nevertheless, when the Athenian army arrived

in Boeotia to face the Spartans, Cimon appeared in full armor and requested to join his tribe in the line of battle. Cimon's political enemies, Pericles among them, spoke against allowing the old general to enter the line, suggesting that he intended to sow confusion in the army. Cimon was compelled to leave, but not before he impressed on his friends and supporters the need to show their loyalty to Athens by fighting bravely. Cimon's friends set his armor up in the middle of their ranks and fought together in the subsequent battle (Tanagra) as a unit. This group, 100 in total, died to a man. The Athenians lamented the loss bitterly and began to think differently about Cimon and his associates. Plutarch attaches this story to an unlikely reconstruction whereby Cimon was recalled before his ostracism was up, but if there is any truth to the tale, it suggests that popular hostility to Cimon did not last long.

If we follow Plutarch, there is no problem in placing the Stoa Poikile in the period after the battle of Tanagra, and in fact quite a few benefits. First, let us consider the prominence of Miltiades. Once popular anger against Cimon had cooled, it is not unlikely that his surviving friends and associates would begin to reinforce the change in mood and prepare for Cimon's eventual return into politics. Cimon's enemies too may have been willing to support such a change in tone. Popular affection was fickle. If Cimon had now returned into the people's good graces, it was possible for those who had ostracized him and ejected him from camp to fall into disfavor as a result. Bringing Cimon and his supporters back into the fold was in everyone's interest. The Stoa Poikile fits nicely into this admittedly hypothetical reconstruction. The Stoa was built under the patronage of Peisianax (for references, see Jeffery 1965: 41n.4), brother-in-law of Cimon to be sure, but also an Alcmeonid and thus a relative of Pericles. The choice of Marathon

and Miltiades also provided certain advantages. Marathon featured Cimon's father and underscored the contribution of the hoplite class, but ideologically advanced the foreign policy of the radical democracy.

Moreover, a date after the ostracism of Cimon allows time for the enigmatic battle of Oenoe to occur. I will discuss the battle in full below (see below, pp. 212-20), but for now only a few details need detain us. The painting of this battle as described by Pausanias involves the Athenians and Spartans just before joining battle. Even if Pausanias has misunderstood all else, it is generally agreed that this element was part of the composition.²⁰ If we retain a date before the ostracism of Cimon, we are compelled to imagine that the depiction of this battle was added at some later date. The possibility has defenders who argue that the painting would have been added to one of the side walls (see Meiggs 1972: 472 and Develin 1993: 235-7). Pausanias' description (1.15.1-2) permits such a reconstruction, but does not demand it. Recent archaeological work has shown that all four paintings were in fact set against the back wall of the Stoa (Shear 1984: 13, 18-19; see also Bollansée 1991: 93-4 and Jung 2006: 109). With no further recourse to the side wall, a late addition to the group will have either greatly disturbed the balance of the three original paintings or required a space presciently left vacant for an as yet undetermined composition (as argued by Flower 2000: 86-9).

²⁰ Only Francis and Vickers (1985a) have argued against this basic description of the Oenoe composition. They suggest that Pausanias has misunderstood the scene quite severely. The Athenians were, in their opinion, depicted not on the verge of coming to blows with the Spartans in battle, but rather about to meet the Plataeans before the battle of Marathon. According to this reconstruction the Oenoe scene would thus depict a prelude to the Marathon scene in which the Athenians and Plataeans joined forces before Marathon in the nearby village of Oenoe in Attica. Castriota (1992: 78-9) and Hornblower (1991b: 32-3) support such a reconstruction and Badian (1993: 98) is sympathetic to, but not persuaded by, its merits. But most detailed studies of Oenoe (see Bollansée 1991: 112-14, Badian 1993: 210n.39, Develin 1993: 237, and Taylor 1998: 224) insist that such a severe misidentification of the basic tenor of the scene is unlikely.

The simplest answer, one that synchronizes all four paintings, is the most likely and should only be abandoned if such synchrony is impossible (as asserted by Meiggs 1972: 471). As it stands, there is no insoluble problem to placing a battle between Athens and Sparta and a prominent place for Cimon's father at Marathon in the same temporal context. Indeed, if we can trust Plutarch, it was Cimon's willingness to join Athens' fight against the Spartans at Tanagra that brought him back into public favor. The Stoa Poikile served to remind the Athenians not only that Cimon was a hero of the continuing war against Persia, but also that he was in no way soft on Sparta, as he and his friends had shown on the battlefield. Far from an afterthought, the 'Oenoe' composition is the very heart of the Stoa as originally conceived even if Pausanias can no longer divine its message.

The date of the Marathon statue group at Delphi must remain an even more uncertain matter. We have only its form as described by Pausanias and his attestation that Pheidias worked on the monument to indicate a date. But, if the Stoa Poikile can find a place in the years after Cimon's ostracism, why not the statue group at Delphi? As we have seen, the mood at Athens was not opposed to praise directed toward Cimon's family in the years after Tanagra. As in the case of the Stoa, the statue group's emphasis on Marathon also advanced the foreign policy of the radical democrats. Here Athena and Apollo stood shoulder to shoulder with Miltiades and ten Athenian heroes in defense of Attica and indeed all Greece. The message is clear – Athens fought alone and alone deserves leadership in the Greek world. Its exact placement within the sanctuary underscores the message. At the time, only the Corcyrean Bull appeared along this stretch of the Sacred Way which had been incorporated into the sanctuary twenty or so

years before (Holmberg 1979: 27). Unlike the Athenian monument for Eurymedon, which was placed on the temple terrace along with the other Persian War dedications, the Marathon statue group stood alone. Upon entering the sanctuary a visitor would be met by Athena and Apollo himself joining Miltiades and a chorus of Athenian heroes asserting Athens' singular claim on the Persian War.

Just past the Marathon statue group a mid-fifth-century visitor to Delphi would see another monument under construction. Pausanias is less than clear (10.10.3-4), but recent work has shown that this monument, whose massive semi-circular base survives (see map # 112), included statues of the Seven against Thebes and the Epigoni along the edge as well as the chariot of Amphiaraus in bronze in the center (Bommelaer 1992: 275-9). The relationship between this monument and the Marathon statue group is clouded by the association of the former with the battle of Oenoe. Before we can explicate this relationship, we must first consider the controversy surrounding that battle and offer some resolution.

A battle in Argive Oenoe between the Spartans on the one hand and the Athenians and Argives on the other is mentioned twice by Pausanias. He notes it as the subject of one of the paintings in the Stoa Poikile:

This stoa first contains the Athenians arranged for battle opposite the Lacedaemonians in Argive Oenoe. The painting is not of the deed at its height or when courageous acts were on display, but rather the battle is beginning, and (the combatants) are yet to come to blows (1.15.1).²¹

²¹ αὕτη δὲ ἡ στοὰ πρώτη μὲν Ἀθηναίους ἔχει τεταγμένους ἐν Οἰνότη τῆς Ἀργείας ἐναντία Λακεδαιμονίων· γέγραπται δὲ οὐκ ἐς ἀκμὴν ἀγῶνος οὐδὲ τολμημάτων ἐς ἐπίδειξιν τὸ ἔργον ἤδη προῆκον, ἀλλὰ ἀρχομένη τε ἡ μάχη καὶ ἐς χεῖρας ἔτι συνίοντες.

He cites this battle again as the occasion for our Argive monument at least according to his Argive sources:

(The statues of) these men are the works of Hypatodorus and Aristogeiton, and they made them, as the Argives themselves say, from the victory that they and their allies among the Athenians won over the Lacedaemonians in Argive Oenoe (10.10.4).²²

Pausanias provides no clues about the date at which he believed this battle occurred. If his association of the battle with these two monuments is secure, then the archaeological evidence allows us to date Oenoe to the mid-fifth century. That Sparta, Athens, and Argos are the primary participants suggests a date after the formal break between Athens and Sparta in 462/1, but before the Five Years' Truce of 451/0. The fact that two Theban sculptors, Hypatodorus and Aristogeiton, were commissioned to work on the Argive monument has been cited as a problem for such a date since at this time Thebes and Argos were presumably hostile to each other (Jeffery 1965: 50 and Develin 1993: 239), but no persuasive evidence has been introduced to suggest that artists and craftsmen curtailed their business to those states on friendly terms with their own. If Pindar felt free to offer his services to whomever he wished, why not Hypatodorus and Aristogeiton?

The existence of a mid-fifth century battle involving the Athenians and Spartans at Argive Oenoe has raised grave doubts (see Badian 1993: 97-8 and Taylor 1998: 223). Pausanias is our only source for the event. Thucydides makes no mention of the battle, nor is his silence easily explained. The *Pentecontaetia* is maddeningly succinct, but to ignore a battle between Athens and Sparta, perhaps the first of the period covered by

²² οὗτοι μὲν δὴ Ὑπατοδώρου καὶ Ἀριστογειτονός εἰσιν ἔργα, καὶ ἐποίησαν σφᾶς, ὥς αὐτοὶ Ἀργεῖοι λέγουσιν, ἀπὸ τῆς νίκης ἥντινα ἐν Οἰνότη τῇ Ἀργείᾳ αὐτοὶ τε καὶ Ἀθηναίων ἐπίκουροι Λακεδαιμονίους ἐνίκησαν.

Thucydides, is a remarkable omission in a section devoted to explaining the growing hostility between the two powers. Admittedly Thucydides does omit events from the Pentecontaetia that later generations of Greek historians felt were of the utmost importance. The Peace of Callias is the classic example, but here we see an instructive difference. The Peace of Callias is mentioned by a slew of authors from the fourth century on. Oenoe appears for the first and only time in the work of a second-century A.D. travel writer. Even if we were to follow Schreiner (1988 and 1993) and fault Thucydides with the most egregious errors in the Pentecontaetia, we would still have to explain the silence of those sources which followed alternate traditions. Meiggs (1972: 472) and, in spite of serious reservations, Badian (1993: 97-9) try to explain this silence by concluding that the battle of Oenoe was in fact a relatively small affair that occurred in the immediate aftermath of the break between Athens and Sparta. The victory was quickly touted by the radical democracy as a propaganda coup, but was then just as quickly forgotten after such battles as Tanagra and Oenophyta quickly upstaged it. While the proposition is unobjectionable, it fails to explain the silence of our sources. In matters of memory importance seldom emerges from purely factual considerations. Perception reigns, and such sumptuous commemorations should have propelled Oenoe into the stratosphere of social memory. A calm reappraisal of the facts may make Thucydides' silence more explicable, but does little to explain the apparent omission of Ephorus, the fourth century orators, and the later tradition fully acquainted with both (as Badian himself recognizes).

If we could be confident that Pausanias derived his information from the monuments themselves, his evidence would bear significant weight, but as it is, he seems

to draw on oral or literary traditions surrounding the monuments. In the case of the Argive commemoration Pausanias says explicitly that his information about the occasion of the dedication comes from Argive sources, an unnecessary comment had the monument itself spelled out the cause (*contra* Bollansée 1991: 98 and Taylor 1998: 226). Moreover, the epigraphical evidence associated with the remains of the monument itself notes only that it was a gift to Apollo from the Argives (Ἀργεῖοι ἀνέθεν τὰ πόλλωνι *vac*; *FD* III 1.90 [p. 54-6]; see also Bommelaer 1991: 113-14 and 1992: 286-92). The text is not fragmentary, and its brevity is in no way out of character for such dedications at Delphi (see, for example, the Samian Apollo and Chian altar). In all probability we have what inscriptional support the monument provided Pausanias' Argive sources.

In the case of the Stoa Poikile it is generally assumed that the paintings were in some way labeled (Bollansée 1991: 98, Badian 1993: 210n.39, and Taylor 1998: 227). This is not at all clear from the evidence. Pausanias supplies no direct clue one way or another. His certainty about what is pictured, apparent from the text, proves nothing. Pausanias speaks with equal confidence about the presence of the Plataeans and Miltiades in the Marathon painting, even though classical sources for the Stoa suggest neither were labeled. Apollodorus, a fourth century orator, felt it necessary to distinguish the Plataeans in the Marathon painting as those who were wearing Boeotian caps, not, as would be simpler and more definitive, those labeled Plataeans (Ps-Dem. 59.94). Aeschines, in his *Against Ctesiphon*, urges his audience to reflect on the fact that Miltiades was not permitted to place his name upon the painting in the Stoa (3.186). While this attestation could be taken to mean that others were so named, Aeschines' larger point speaks against it. The orator is arguing that generals in the good-old-days of

the democracy were not individually honored, and thus their names did not appear on monuments. This argument would be embarrassingly hollow if, say, Callimachus or another historical figure from Marathon were explicitly named. The evidence does not permit certainty, but it is quite likely that peoples (like the Plataeans) and individuals (like Miltiades and Callimachus) were not labeled, at least not as of the fourth century. Yet Pausanias points them out without the slightest hesitation. In so doing, he is drawing inferences about identity either from iconography or a source external to the monument. It is also possible that by Pausanias' time labels had been added, but if so, their probative value would be quite limited. I cannot categorically deny the possibility that the word 'Oenoe' appeared on the Stoa from the very beginning, but Pausanias' confidence, adduced by Bollansée, Badian, Taylor (cited above) cannot be adduced as proof. The fact that neither individuals nor peoples were named, however, speaks generally against the presence of any names on the original composition.

Of course, contemporaries would have known quite well what battles were portrayed, but in the fullness of time only the distinctive iconography of the scenes would have helped preserve that memory. In the case of Oenoe there is reason to suspect that the composition lacked such iconographic markers. Whereas distinctive episodes and individuals emerge from his description of the other scenes, Pausanias' treatment of the Oenoe composition is exceptionally bare. He notes only the peoples involved (an inference perhaps with iconographic support), the location (likely another inference), and what was obvious to any viewer (that the two lines were on the verge of contact); but no personal names, no stories. With no clear iconographic markers Pausanias' sources for

the identification of the first painting in Stoa Poikile would likely have had as little independent help from this monument as his Argive sources did from their dedication.

All things being equal, I agree that it is best to trust Pausanias who proves himself to be a conscientious reporter of the monuments he describes (Taylor 1998: 225, citing Habicht 1985: 149). But in the case of Oenoe all things are not equal. The battle is otherwise unknown, and it is unlikely that the monuments themselves were Pausanias' sources for the battle. To accept Pausanias we must accept a tradition of unknown type emerging in the imperial period against the silence of vastly better informed contemporary and near contemporary sources. No solution will be perfect. If there were a sublime, exquisitely simple, solution that somehow accounted for all existing anomalies, it would have been discovered long ago by one of the many scholars who have attempted to tackle the problem. We must accept that the answer will be messy.

I believe that the existing evidence can best be suited to the facts by abandoning the search for the otherwise unknown battle of Oenoe. If we ignore the name of the battle and simply consider what Pausanias learned about it from the monuments and his informants, an obvious solution emerges, the battle of Tanagra. The Stoa Poikile requires a significant mid-fifth century hoplite battle between the Spartans and Athenians. Tanagra alone fits the bill. The Argive monument supplies less certain indications since what Pausanias knew of the cause of its dedication relies almost wholly on tradition. If we can trust the basic elements of the Argive account (and that is a big 'if'), we are looking for a significant mid fifth-century battle that involved Sparta, Athens, and Argos. Again, Tanagra is the only real possibility. Of course, the two monuments need not refer to the same event (Taylor 1998: 225-6), but as it happens, the same battle suits both best.

Positing Tanagra as the battle commemorated on the Stoa Poikile and the Argive monument at Delphi presents two problems: (1) the Argives and Athenians lost at Tanagra and (2) Pausanias is distressingly certain that these monuments celebrate a battle in Argive Oenoe.

The first objection is not as serious as it might appear at first glance. Tanagra was, no doubt, a Spartan victory. Both Herodotus (9.35.2) and Thucydides (1.107-8) confirm the fact, and Plutarch (*Cim.* 17.4-8 and *Per.* 10.1-3) and Pausanias himself (3.11.8) rightly follow that tradition. Yet Aristodemus (12.1) cites the battle as an Athenian victory. Normally, Aristodemus, a fourth-century A.D. writer of an orator's guide to history, is justly ignored in such matters, but the tradition he preserves has more credible witnesses. Diodorus Siculus, perhaps here drawing on Ephorus, records Tanagra as a tie that both sides claimed as a victory: "and finally, since the battle had an ambiguous outcome, it happened that the Lacedaemonians and Athenians disputed the victory" (11.80.6).²³ Plato in the *Menexenus* (242a-b) and Justin (3.6.8-9) seem to follow a similar tradition. Between the attestation of Aristodemus and Diodorus / Ephorus there is a strong possibility that the Athenians (and perhaps also the Argives) claimed Tanagra as a victory in spite of their apparent defeat. We need not posit a bald prevarication. If the results were closer or at least less obvious than Herodotus and Thucydides suggest, it is not unlikely that both sides would have claimed victory.²⁴ The Stoa Poikile and the

²³ τέλος δέ, τῆς μάχης ἀμφίδοξον λαβούσης τὸ τέλος, συνέβη τούς τε Λακεδαιμονίους ἀμφισβητῆσαι περὶ τῆς νίκης καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους.

²⁴ Battles with disputed outcomes were not uncommon. A few examples from Thucydides will suffice. At the battle of Leukimne in 433 both the Corcyreans and Corinthians claimed to have won the day and erected trophies (1.54). The same would have occurred some years earlier (perhaps 460) after an indecisive battle between the Corinthians and Athenians had not the Athenians routed the Corinthian party sent to erect their victory trophy (1.105.5-6). In the early years of the Peloponnesian War (429) a naval

Argive monument at Delphi could very well be expressions of the subsequent claims of the Athenians and Argives.

The second objection returns us to the very heart of the problem. We may feel utterly unsatisfied with an otherwise unknown, mid-fifth-century, hoplite battle between the Athenians and Spartans in Argive Oenoe, but simply ignoring our only source feels a scarcely better option. Having opted for what I feel to be the lesser of two evils, I am obliged to offer some thoughts on how Pausanias and his sources could have come to such error. Tanagra provides some clues. The major literary tradition records Tanagra as an unquestioned Spartan victory. Ephorus, though a popular author with later historians, seems to have had limited influence on this point. Both Pausanias and Plutarch follow Thucydides. It stands to reason that the tradition surrounding victory monuments dedicated to what was generally considered a defeat would be exceptionally vulnerable to invention.

This may explain why these monuments stopped being associated with Tanagra. Why they then became associated with Argive Oenoe is a question requiring even more speculation. It is important to remember that the date of the battle Pausanias calls Argive Oenoe is supplied solely from recent archaeological work. Pausanias gives no indication of date (Taylor 1998: 227n.11). He must have been aware that the Stoa was a fifth century construction, but he also knew that later elements were added on, such as the trophy erected to commemorate a late fourth century victory over the brother of the successor king Cassander (1.15.1). The lettering on the Argive monument could have suggested the approximate date to a man who must have been quite familiar with archaic

engagement in the Gulf of Corinth that saw ups and downs for both the Athenian and Peloponnesian fleets resulted in two trophies set on each side of the Rhium strait where it took place (2.92.4-5).

and classical scripts, but such evidence did not stop him from misdating the nearby Trojan horse by more than a century (10.9.12; see Pouilloux and Roux 1963: 60). It could be that Pausanias or his sources considered the battle to be what scholars long suspected before archaeology clarified the date of the Argive monument and what save for that fact Develin (1993: 240) still believes is the most likely possibility, an otherwise unknown element of the Corinthian War. Here, our ignorance is more acceptable. The events of this war are less well known and our primary source for them, Xenophon, has a tendency to ignore or gloss over Spartan defeats.

There are some distinct advantages to seeing Oenoe as a later invention put in place of the originally commemorated battle of Tanagra. As argued above, the Stoa Poikile is a post-Tanagra monument intended to remind the Athenians of Cimon's loyalty to the Athenian state in spite of his affections for Sparta. Since it was his actions before the battle of Tanagra that made his hitherto ambiguous stance clear, it would be quite appropriate for that battle to be pictured in the Stoa. Indeed, the fact that the two sides have not yet joined in battle may have originally been intended to evoke the events immediately before the battle and 100 partisans of Cimon soon to die. So too in the case of the Argive monument does Tanagra offer some interpretive benefits. The imagery used on the monument, the Seven against Thebes and the Epigoni, is exceptionally appropriate for an engagement in Boeotia.²⁵

Let us now return to the relationship between the Argive monument and the Marathon statue group at Delphi under the assumption that the battle commemorated in the former is Tanagra. 462/1 marked a significant change in the political realities of the

²⁵ For a similar observation used to support Oenophyta as an alternative to Oenoe, see Francis and Vickers 1985b: 113.

Greek world. The Athenians broke from the alliance against the Persians and allied themselves with two states that had hitherto remained politically isolated largely because of the taint of medism – Argos and Thessaly (Thuc. 1.102.4). Athens was seeking a new position in opposition to its erstwhile ‘dual hegemony’ with Sparta, which had defined the Greek world since 478/7. For Athens this meant redefining its past to match its new present. The Marathon statue group in Delphi, like other such monuments in Attica, made an exclusive claim to the Persian War and thereby strongly asserted Athens’ right to sole hegemon. For Argos the opportunity was to stake out a tenable, post-medism, position. The new connection with Athens, now claiming the lion’s share of the success in the Persian War, was to be exploited. For the first time since before the Persian War hostility to Sparta could be separated from collusion with Persia. The debatable victory at Tanagra, where the Argives fought alongside the victors of Marathon, provided that opportunity. As the Athenians began work on their new Marathon monument, the Argives selected a spot just up the Sacred Way.

The relationship between the Argive monument for Tanagra and the Marathon statue group draws our attention once again back the Stoa Poikile. Here too Tanagra and Marathon may be linked. The temptation to see a programmatic statement here is enticed further when we consider that during the Peloponnesian War, perhaps in 414, the Argives commemorated a victory over the Spartans by dedicating a large bronze replica of the Trojan horse between the Marathon group and their own Tanagra monument (Paus. 10.9.12; *FD* III 1.91 [pp. 56-7], but see Pouilloux and Roux 1963: 60-66, Bommelaer 1991: 111-12 and 1992: 281-6 for the occasion and reconstruction). The fit between the two monuments was tight (see map # 111). That the Argives chose this location above

the more open ground to the east of the Marathon group has prompted Bommelaer (1992: 286) to presume some particular intention of their part. The continuation of their shared propaganda campaign with Athens may be that intention. With the new Argive statue between the Tanagra and Marathon monuments, a visitor glancing to the left as he entered the sanctuary would be greeted by a surprisingly similar, though in no way identical, scene as the one he would see passing through the Stoa Poikile (if he entered on the opposite side as Pausanias): first Marathon with Miltiades front and center, a scene evocative of the fall of Troy, and finally the battle of Tanagra. There is, of course, no answer to the Amazonomachy at Delphi, but the similarities are notable nonetheless. The glories of Athens and Argos' mythical past mingled freely between the frame of Marathon and their mutual 'victory' over the Spartans. Together the Argive and Athenian monuments at the base of the Sacred Way, like the Stoa Poikile in Athens, announced at home and abroad a new political order and supplied a suitable past tailored for the occasion.

More than any other state Athens had tied its political present to the Persian War. It comes as no surprise that when the policies enacted by the Athenians in part on the basis of their own self-serving assertions about the past had brought them to ruin, the minds of the victorious Spartans and their allies turned back to the struggle against Persia, back to the base of the Sacred Way where the Athenians had once set their pretensions in bronze. Our sources for the last days of the Peloponnesian War and the years immediately thereafter are full of Persian War remembrances. Xenophon reports that, when the allies were assembled to deliberate upon the fate of Athens, Sparta rejected the calls of the Corinthians and Thebans for annihilation, arguing that a city that had done

such great things for Greece in its time of need could not be destroyed (Xen *Hell.* 2.2.19-20). The day Lysander chose to begin the work on the new Athenian constitution was poignantly enough Salamis Day (Plut. *Lys.* 15). Soon afterward the Spartans and their allies began to pull down the Athenian Long Walls, as stipulated by the treaty. Xenophon states (with no light touch of irony) that participants thought it to be the beginning of freedom for Greece (2.2.23; see also Plut. *Lys.* 15), an evocative Persian-War-era phrase that Sparta had reused at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 1.139.3; see Raaflaub 2004: 195).²⁶

It was very much in this mood that the Spartans and their allies began work on a massive monument to commemorate their decisive victory over the Athenians at Aegispotami. The exact location of the monument has occasioned much debate. Pausanias clearly states that it was on the opposite side of the Sacred Way as the Corcyrean Bull (10.9), long identified on the right of the street as one enters (see map # 104). Yet quite early on scholars wanted to see a massive portico, also on the right, as the Aegispotami monument (see *FD* III 1.50-69 [p. 24-41]). More recent work has proven Pausanias correct,²⁷ and the Aegispotami monument is now universally agreed to have been located on the left of the Sacred Way (see map # 109). Pausanias provides a detailed description of the statues that made up the group (10.9.7-10; see also Plut. *Mor.* 397e and *Lys* 18.1). The list is long, and I touch only on the most notable pieces here. In the front stood the Dioscuri, Zeus, Apollo, and Artemis. Poseidon stood among them crowning Lysander. Close beside were Lysander's soothsayer, steersman, and herald.

²⁶ For subsequent uses of this same phrase, see below, chapter 5, pp. 255-6.

²⁷ See Pouilloux and Roux 1963: 16-23; see also Vatin 1981: 453-9, Bommelaer 1981: 14-15 and 1992: 277, and Habicht 1985: 71-5.

The last does not appear in Pausanias' text, but is confirmed by the surviving inscriptional evidence (see Bommelaer 1991: 109). Behind these figures stood a larger group of admirals and notables, both Spartan and allied, who were also at Aegispotami.²⁸ The exact dedicator is hard to make out. Pausanias (10.9.7) states that the Spartans dedicated the monument from the spoils taken from the Athenians. Plutarch (*Lys.* 18.1; see also *Mor.* 397f) notes that some of the individual pieces were dedicated by Lysander personally. Both may be correct. The bulk of the project was probably paid for from a tithe set aside by the Spartans and their allies, but individual admirals, most notably the hero of the hour, Lysander, may have been permitted to make special donations to pay for the bronze statues.

Before the construction of the Aegispotami monument a visitor to Delphi would have seen the Marathon statue group on the left of the Sacred Way as soon as he entered (see map # 110). Although the monument was set back from the road, the absence of anything between it and the entrance provided an unobstructed view. The massive Aegispotami monument was placed in the way of that view. The Marathon statue group was now squeezed between the Argive monuments and the new Spartan dedication, both of which were significantly closer to the Sacred Way. The placement of the Spartan monument was certainly no accident. Indeed, I believe the Aegispotami monument was specifically designed to outdo the Marathon statue group. The Marathon group originally contained thirteen figures: one contemporary, two gods, and ten heroes. The Aegispotami monument contained no less than 38 (the total in the text of Pausanias), but more likely 39 or 40 statues (see Bommelaer 1981: 15). Lysander took the place of

²⁸ For some possible reconstructions of the monument, see Pouilloux and Roux 1963: 55-60, Bommelaer 1981: 14-16 and 1991: 108-110.

Miltiades as the center point, but whereas Miltiades was flanked by Apollo and Athena, Lysander was crowned by Poseidon and attended by three other gods and two heroes. Whereas ten Athenian heroes stood behind Miltiades, Lysander was attended by almost three times as many Spartan and allied notables. Whatever Athens did, Sparta set out to do better; whatever Marathon was to mean for Greece, Aegispotami was to mean that and more. If the Athenians claimed to save Greece from foreign aggression, Sparta could now boast of saving Greece from a far more immediate threat to freedom.

While the location and form of the Aegispotami monument evoked the nearby Marathon statue group, the overall message conveyed by the Spartan dedication could not have been more different. For meaning the Aegispotami monument looked rather to the temple terrace and the earlier monuments to the Persian War built there, specifically the Serpent Column and the Aeginetan prize for Salamis. The Athenians appeared alone in the Marathon group accompanied only by their poliad deity and Apollo. Lysander, his staff, and other Spartan notables appeared in front of and among a diverse chorus of allies. Long term Spartan adherents like Corinth, Troezen, Epidaurus, Hermione, Megara, and Sicyon were joined by such new arrivals like Chios, Ephesus, Miletus, Samos, Carystus, and Euboea. As on the Serpent Column, the Spartans ultimately had no desire to claim the whole victory for themselves, only to assert their hegemony within a broader group. Also on the Aegispotami monument were two golden stars intended to recall the special aid given by the Dioscuri (Plut. *Lys.* 18.1 and *Mor.* 397e-f). The golden stars evoked the Aeginetan monument – three golden stars on a bronze mast – erected from their first prize for the battle of Salamis and presumably still in the pronaos of the Temple of Apollo where Herodotus had seen it some years before (8.122). The stars serve to

strengthen the connection between the great naval victory at Aegispotami and the seminal naval victory of the Persian War. Athens, of course, had long claimed the victory at Salamis as its own (see, for example, Pind. *Pyth* 1.75-80 and Thuc. 1.74). Drawing attention back to the Aeginetan monument, and thus Aegina's role in the battle, not only recalled broader participation, but also implicitly disputed Athens' claims to have contributed most to the victory. Strictly speaking the Aegispotami monument commemorated Sparta's final victory over Athens, but it also systematically challenged Athens' self-serving assertions about the past.

If the Spartans had hoped that their own Aegispotami monument would be the final assertion of hegemony to be found at the base of the Sacred Way, they were sorely mistaken. The grand coalition they put together against the Athenians did not long outlast the war. Sparta proved just as oppressive as Athens had been. Thebes was the first to break away, joined soon thereafter by Corinth, Argos, and Athens. Hegemony was again in question, and again the stretch of the Sacred Way surrounding the Marathon statue group was the commemorative locus of that competition. As Spartan power began to crumble in the late 70s and 60s of the fourth century the entrance to the sanctuary, dominated by the Aegispotami monument for 30 years, changed drastically. In the mid-fourth century three monuments are built. Directly across from the Aegispotami monument the Tegeans constructed a massive portico (see map # 108), itself once thought to be that of the Spartans (Pouilloux and Roux 1963: 16-23; see also Vatin 1981: 253-9 and Habicht 1985: 74), which towered over the monuments on the lower, south, side of the Sacred Way. In front of this, still on the north side of the Sacred Way, the Arcadians together constructed a more modest dedication (see map # 105; *FD* III 1.3-46

[pp.4-21], Pouilloux and Roux 1963: 24-30 and Bommelaer 1991: 104-106; *contra* Vatin 1981: 458-9, who finds Tegea the more likely dedicator). Both monuments were intended to commemorate victories won against the Spartans (Paus. 10.9.6). Directly across the Sacred Way from their mid-fifth century monument the Argives also constructed a new monument, another semi-circle with bronze figures lining the edge (see map # 113; Pouilloux and Roux 1963: 46-51 and Bommelaer 1991: 114-15). This time the famed kings of Argos were the subject. The occasion, Pausanias (10.10.5) tells us, was the aid given by the Argives to the Thebans when they refounded Messene.

By the fourth century, of course, the direct connection to the Persian War had faded. The Aegisopotami monument has the Marathon group very much in mind, but later Tegean and Arcadian monuments were in dialogue with the Spartan monument, not the Athenian. The Argives certainly hark back to their own mid-fifth century monument, which was originally intended to derive meaning in part from its proximity to the Marathon group, but it is hard to believe that that message was still in mind in the 60s of the next century when Athens was in fact allied with the hated Spartans. Nevertheless, Athenian claims to hegemony based on their performance in the Persian War (and in the mythological past) and Sparta's eventual response seem to have accidentally created an arena at Delphi in which the ever-shifting power politics of the fourth century found express in terms of the recent and distant past.

As in the case of the monuments around the temple terrace there was a fierce and open fight over what the Persian War meant at the entrance to the sanctuary. Athens (and Argos) made a strong assertion that remained unchallenged for over half a century, but it was not accepted; it did not become fact. Their memory of the place of Athens and

Marathon within the war remained a point of contention. After the fall of Athens Sparta's sumptuous victory monument attempted to outshine the Marathon monument and thereby to reinterpret the Athenian vision of the past on display there. Yet their own memory of events, tacitly approved by their grand coalition, also failed to gain dominance.

The dynamics that governed the use of the Persian War past in the classical period differed quite dramatically from those that Gehrke (2001) gleans from Hellenistic Magnesia. While that city's self-serving assertions about the past could be broadcast and accepted without dissent, claims to the Persian War were subject to serious contestation down to the end of the classical period. Participating and non-participating states alike spent vast sums of money broadcasting their versions of events. Not every investment paid off, and precious few became accepted fact. Almost every claim faced an explicit or implicit counterclaim. With no center to occupy, no majority to persuade, the various versions of the war competed endlessly with no firm winner or loser, no dominant narratives, no counter narratives. This was, of course, the result of the particular regime of power relationships that then held sway over as much of Greece as was broken up into poleis. Unity was fleeting, and no hegemon held mastery firmly or for long. These political realities confounded any hope of one story gaining dominance. But in 338 that political reality was forever changed. The battle of Chaeronea gave Philip effective control over the once free states of Greece. Philip was dead within two years, his son within fifteen, but the power relationships that had reigned in Greece since before the Persian War were never to recover. The poleis of classical Greece had become

supporting actors in a play increasingly dominated by the successor kingdoms and ultimately Rome. In the changing political conditions of the Hellenistic world a new narrative of the Persian War was to emerge that approached narrative dominance as none before it could.

CHAPTER 5: INVENTING A GREEK MEMORY

Our examination of the memory of the Persian War in the classical period in Chapters One through Four has highlighted some of the unique challenges that faced Philip and later Alexander the Great when in the wake of their decisive victory at Chaeronea they attempted to use the Persian War as an historical precedent for, and present call to, pan-Greek unity. The Persian War tradition had never been a united whole. It was not a single memory that could now be evoked. Despite the influence of more broadly held metanarratives and some obvious agreements deriving from the elementary facts of the invasion itself, the memory of the Persian War had always been a mosaic of various recollections that could on occasion differ radically from each other. Far from prompting unity in the past, the Persian War had played center stage in a nearly continuous string of political disputes and military conflicts. To use the Persian War as an effective symbol of unity against a common threat, the Macedonian dynasts had to reinvent the intellectual frames within which the past was recalled. They needed a new Persian War tradition.

‘Invented traditions’ appear in times of great change and are intended to establish cohesion, legitimate institutions, and inculcate beliefs (Hobsbawm 1983). Naked power alone is never enough; or rather it is never in the nature of power to be naked. Foucault observes that power constantly produces discourse, constantly produces knowledge, which in turn influences how an individual chooses to act within the local, shifting, and

unequal relationships that ultimately make up the larger networks of power upon which the likes of Philip or Alexander sit (2000b: 120 and 2000c: 340-41; see above, Introduction, pp. 14-16). As soon as Chaeronea established Philip's unquestioned military primacy in Greece, he and later his son began to produce a steady stream of discourse about the Persian War past. From the meeting of the Greeks at Corinth to the destruction of the Persian palace at Persepolis and beyond, Philip and Alexander surrounded many of their most important decisions in a particular kind of discourse about the Persian War. I believe these constant references to the past represented a concerted effort to craft a single 'Greek' memory of the Persian War from the many and fractious state memories. It was a tradition with all the trapping of the glorious past, but was in essence an invention of the late fourth century. Philip and Alexander's efforts to popularize their new tradition, its reception in mainland Greece, and its long-term impact on how the Persian War was recalled thereafter provide valuable insights into the complex relationship between power and memory.

Before turning to Philip and Alexander's invented tradition of the Persian War, it will be helpful to review the commemorative trends they were attempting to replace. A single exemplary case will do, and none is better suited than the narrative of the Persian War that appears in the *Panegyricus*, which was published by Isocrates in 380 (Sandys 1979 [=1872]: xliii, Usher 1990: 19, and Papillon 2004: 24). Unlike the many monuments, epigrams, and other state-funded productions of the classical period, the *Panegyricus* is written specifically to inspire unity among the Greeks; that is, Isocrates intends to use his Persian War narrative for the same purpose as did Philip and later Alexander.

Furthermore, the *Panegyricus* claims not to be written for an exclusively (or perhaps even predominantly) Athenian audience. Although doubtless never delivered (see Sandys 1979 [=1872]: x1ii and Papillon 2004: 27), the very title of the speech presupposes at least a nominally panhellenic context.¹ Despite Isocrates' broader aspirations (4.17), what emerges in the *Panegyricus* is a particularly fine expression of a local, in this case Athenocentric, vision of the Persian War.²

Isocrates opens by asserting that Athens had surpassed both enemy and allies in the Persian War (4.71-2) and that although the Spartans had done much in those years, Athenian accomplishments outshone theirs by far (4.73). Beginning with Marathon allows him to spotlight the Athenian contribution. The Spartans gain honorable mention, but ultimately arrive too late to contribute to the victory (4.85-7). The Plataeans are utterly forgotten. A second round pits Spartan action at Thermopylae against the Athenian naval engagement at Artemisium. Here again the Spartans come off the worse by comparison. The Spartans fight alongside a small cadre of allies, while the Athenians face the barbarians alone with a mere 60 ships (4.90), not the grand fleet of 180 that appears in Herodotus.³ The overall commander at Artemisium, the Spartan general Eurybiades, is omitted and for now so too are the many allied contingents that also served

¹ A *panegyrikos logos* is by definition a speech delivered at a panhellenic festival, either at one of the crown festivals (Olympia, Delphi, Isthmia, or Nemea) or one of Athens' two great festivals, the Panathenaea or Greater Dionysia (see Papillon 2004: 23 and Sandys 1979 [=1872]: x1i-x1ii). Even if at Athens, a substantial body of non-Athenians would have been present, as Isocrates himself asserts in this speech (4.43-6).

² For the special place of Athens in Isocrates' panhellenic vision, see Perlman 1957, 1969, and de Romilly 1992: 6.

³ That the number of Athenian ships has been intentionally reduced to bring it more into comparison with Thermopylae was long ago noted by Sandys (1979 [=1872]: 91-2). The Athenians initially supplied 127 ships for themselves and their Plataean allies as well as 20 for the Chalcidians (Hdt. 8.1.1-2). During the campaign the Athenians also sent 53 ships as reinforcements (8.14).

there (see Usher 1990: 170). Only later in the context of praising Athenian leadership does Isocrates mention in passing that an allied force was present as well (4.91).

Artemisium shines as an unqualified victory, which it was not (Hdt. 8.18; see also

Cawkwell 2005: 104-105), whereas only propriety stops Isocrates from calling

Thermopylae a defeat: “for it is not appropriate to say this, that they were defeated” (οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γε θέμις εἰπεῖν ὥς ἡττήθησαν: 4.92).

The narrative of Salamis is even more lopsided. The Peloponnesian states are demoralized and selfishly construct a wall across the Isthmus (4.93). Athens is now bereft of allies (4.93) and plans to fight alone (4.95). It is not until they are on the verge of joining battle that the Peloponnesians, who seem only now to materialize despite the fact that they were present at Salamis the whole time, are compelled by shame and self-interest to join the Athenians (4.97). Isocrates concludes by asserting: “no one is so ill disposed toward us that he would not agree that we prevailed in the war because of the naval battle and that for this Athens was responsible” (4.98).⁴ Neither assertion appears to have been generally accepted. Herodotus recognized that few in his day would concede these very points (6.139). It was, in fact, Aegina, and not Athens, that had been given the prize for the victory (Hdt. 8.93.1), a contradiction to the Athenian version that Plutarch must still explain away in the imperial period (*Mor.* 871c-d). Moreover, the victory at Salamis shared primacy with Plataea which was in the classical period most often credited to the Spartans and Peloponnesians (see Pind. *Pyth.* 1.77-8, Aeschyl. *Pers.* 816-17, and possibly Simonides fr. 13 Page; see also Jung 2006: 295-7). Isocrates none-

⁴ οὐδεὶς δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὕτως ἔχει δυσμενῶς, ὅστις οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσειε διὰ μὲν τὴν ναυμαχίαν ἡμᾶς τῷ πολέμῳ κρατῆσαι, ταύτης δὲ τὴν πόλιν αἰτίαν γενέσθαι.

too-subtly avoids that problem by ignoring Plataea completely. Rather, his rendition of the war ends with Salamis (see above, chapter 1, p. 42).

The immediate aim of this selective and severely distorted narrative of the Persian War is to demonstrate Athens' exclusive right to hegemony in the Greek world (4.99). To that end Isocrates' parochial narrative is admirably suited, but his omission and denigration of the efforts of the other Greeks who fought against the Persians is patently counterproductive when placed within his larger goal of persuading the Spartans (and implicitly others) to join together in a great panhellenic venture against Persia. It is frankly difficult to imagine that his partisan recollection of the Persian War could have won many converts among the Corinthians, Megarians, and Arcadians, to say nothing of his intended target, the Spartans. Those states that had no particular connection to the Persian War or those who had served prominently on the side of Persia must have been even less receptive. Yet it is Isocrates' stated belief that he can only persuade the Spartans to join his panhellenic crusade by demonstrating (in painful detail) that they have no right to lead it (4.18; see also Flower 2000b: 94-5). We should not assume a lack of thought or seriousness. Isocrates' jingoistic focus on Athens, his (seemingly crass) manipulation of the received tradition about the Persian War to support the hegemonic claims of his hometown, and the bitter polemic edge apparent throughout are fully in keeping with the localizing, state-centered trends that defined the memory of the Persian War from the fifth century on. The *Panegyricus* is panhellenic in outlook, but its panhellenism is wholly centered on the city-state of Athens.

Against the divisive commemorations of the classical period Philip and Alexander attempted to invent a new tradition that could serve as an effective justification for broad

panhellenic unity (under Macedon) and their proposed war of revenge against Persia (see also Flower 2000a: 101). To achieve that aim they developed, lavishly staged, and widely propagated a recollection of the war that was Greek first, and only tangentially Macedonian. It is important to keep in mind that this revolutionary choice was not made out of necessity. A traditional, state-centered, memory was open to Philip and Alexander despite the inconvenient fact that Alexander I had been on the side of Persia throughout most of the war.⁵ As discussed in chapter 4 (pp. 195-7), Alexander I had played his cards well during Xerxes' invasion. He kept his options open until it was clear that a Persian victory was hopeless and only then switched to the Greek side, attacked a column of Persians, and erected a golden statue of himself at Delphi to commemorate the fact ([Dem] 12.21; see also Hdt. 8.121). For a medizer Alexander I comes off remarkably well in Herodotus. He seems to have received even more favorable press in the work of Damastes of Sigeum (Natoli 2004: 78-9), a younger contemporary of Herodotus who wrote a *Hellenica* that featured some of the philhellenic activities of the Macedonian monarch (Speus. 4; see also Jacoby *FGrHist* 5 and Fowler 1996: 68n.59). With the rise of Philip Greek historians and intellectuals alike sought or repaid Macedonian patronage by casting Alexander I as the savior and benefactor of Greece in much the same way that Isocrates presents Athens in the *Panegyricus*.

Our best example comes from a letter written by Speusippus to Philip. The letter is thought to represent an attempt by Speusippus to gain Philip's patronage for the Academy (Markle 1976: 92-7 and Natoli 2004: 32-66). It is framed as a request on behalf of a student, Antipater of Magnesia. This Antipater is presented as a deserving

⁵ *Contra* Green 1991: 7, Bloedow 2003: 264-5, and Natoli 2004: 83-4, who argue that Alexander I's wartime record was an intrinsic source of shame and ultimately too dubious to be rehabilitated.

recipient of Philip's good will because he had mounted a criticism of Isocrates' *Philip* on the Macedonian King's behalf (Speus. 1). Although the overall argument of Isocrates' letter was praised, Antipater found that the old sophist had omitted a number of services Philip's family had done Greece over the centuries. Among them are "the benefactions of your ancestor Alexander to Greece" (3).⁶ Alexander is credited with killing the ambassadors sent by Xerxes (*sic*) to demand earth and water. He also warned the Greeks that Tempe was an unsustainable position due – in this account, but not in Herodotus – to the treachery of the Aleuadae. As a result of this intervention Alexander is called the savior of the Greeks: "once he informed the Greeks, they broke camp and were saved on account of Alexander" (3).⁷ Finally, Speusippus ends by briefly alluding to Alexander's actions at Plataea (4). Speusippus could not have been unaware that Alexander was in Xerxes' service and that there was another, less flattering, way to read his actions. Indeed, he seems to impute to Isocrates this very reading (3). Speusippus is not denying the facts of the case. He is offering a bold reinterpretation of them supported by some glaring omissions and modest changes to the Herodotean version.

Speusippus was likely not the only one engaged in this kind of revisionism.

Antipater was a budding historian offering to publish a history featuring his criticisms of Isocrates' *Philip* within the narrative (Speus. 12-13). Anaximenes of Lampsacus already enjoyed the patronage of Philip and composed a history about his activities (*FGrHist* 72; see also Natoli 2004: 59-61). His first chapter dealt with matters anterior to Philip's ascension to the throne (see Jacoby on *FGrHist* 72 F4). There it seems that Alexander I

⁶ τὰς Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ σοῦ προγόνου...τὰς εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα γενομένας εὐεργεσίας.

⁷ Ἑλλησι μὲν ὑσάντος ἀναζεύξαντες οἱ Ἕλληνες δι' Ἀλέξανδρον ἐσώθησαν.

appeared as a kind of Lycurgan figure to whom many of the traditional features of the Macedonian army were attributed (Brunt 1976). His Persian War service was likely also mentioned in glowing terms. Indeed, the letter of Philip in the Demosthenic corpus (12), which mentions the golden statue of Alexander and his attack on the Persians, was quite possibly excerpted from this work (Natoli 2004: 61). If mentioned in this context, it stands to reason that Anaximenes also treated Alexander's Persian War service in greater detail *in suo anno*.

Alexander I was not an ideal figure around whom to construct a Persian War narrative centered on Macedon, but neither was Miltiades, Themistocles or Pausanias for Athens and Sparta, and that did not stop those states from turning these figures into symbols of resistance and victory all the same. Reality imposes limits (see above, chapter 2, pp. 81-96), but those limits are fungible and over time become even more so. Had Philip and Alexander wanted to access the Persian War in the same way Sparta, Athens, and others had in the previous century and a half, they could have done so with ease. Yet I believe that the Macedonian dynasts realized that such a parochial vision no longer befit the new political realities after Chaeronea. Philip and Alexander claimed to be, and were in fact, leaders of all Greece (save Sparta). A Persian War memory centered on Macedon, or indeed any other single state, would be too narrow for their foreign and domestic ambitions. To broaden its appeal the Persian War had to become the possession of all Greeks, not merely those who could claim to have fought the Persians. Speusippus appears to have misjudged the mood in Macedon (Natoli 2004: 64-5 and 100; *contra* Markle 1976: 92-7). He criticized Isocrates for omitting Alexander I, but Philip and later Alexander would do precisely the same thing. In the open letter for which Speusippus

excoriated Isocrates, Philip is encouraged to think of all Greece as his homeland (5.127).

As far as the recollection and commemoration of the Persian War was concerned, he seems to have taken this piece of advice to heart.

After their victory at Chaeronea, Philip and Alexander found themselves in a unique position to influence the memorial customs surrounding the Persian War throughout the Greek world. Individuals and states of the classical period gained and lost power within a relatively stable regime of power relationships that had reigned in Greece since before the Persian War (see above, Introduction, pp. 19-20 and 31). That regime was typified by a balance of competing state entities, each with just enough power to check the ambitions of the others, but not nearly enough to exert much influence over the whole for long. Philip and Alexander, however, accumulated so much power after Chaeronea that it undermined that balance; it forced power relationships throughout the Greek world to realign. This realignment provided an opportunity for the Persian War tradition to be substantially reinvented (see above, Introduction, pp. 18-19 and 31). Where a dissonant chorus of state-centered memories had once held center stage, Philip and Alexander would now attempt to create for the first time a unified tradition, a pan-Greek memory of ethnic hostility that yielded the narrative center to no single polis. Below I examine five commemorations (broadly conceived) through which the Macedonian dynasts intended to evoke the Persian War: the institution of the so-called Corinthian League, the destruction of Thebes, the Granicus dedication at Athens, the restoration of Plataea, and the burning of Persepolis. Each demonstrates the strategies Philip and then Alexander used to

establish their new Persian War tradition throughout Greece as well as the significant realignment of power that made such an undertaking possible.

The first commemoration of Philip and Alexander's invented tradition was not a monument, but a performance staged at Corinth. There in the aftermath of his decisive victory at Chaeronea Philip summoned the Greeks to a congress (Diod. 16.89.2-3 and Justin 9.5.1-2). All of mainland Greece save Sparta came (Justin 9.5.3). Philip organized the attendees into a league and was naturally elected its commander-in-chief. Moderns dub the league called by Philip the Corinthian League. In fact, the institution Philip created at Corinth was manifestly to be understood as the restoration of the so-called Hellenic League that had defeated Xerxes some 140 years before (see also Bosworth 1988: 189-90 and Flower 2000a: 98). This was, of course, the very reason Philip called the Greeks to Corinth and not elsewhere. When the Greeks gathered there almost a century and a half before, there were practical considerations. Corinth was a powerful city and strategically well placed for any proposed defense of Greece. By Philip's day it was a shadow of its former self, but its potential as a symbol remained. It served to clothe the unprecedented authority Philip now enjoyed over the Greek states in a bygone (indeed long-defunct) tradition and to link his planned invasion of Persia to the defense of Greece against Xerxes.

At Corinth Philip officially announced his intentions. He called for a united war against the Persians to avenge their profanation of Greek temples (Diod. 16.89.2-3).⁸

The recollection of the Persian War in terms of an ethnic war between Greece and Asia

⁸ Both Philip and Alexander publicized the idea that the campaign against Persia was being fought to free the Greeks of Asia (see below, pp. 254-5), but no source connects that line of argumentation with the meeting at Corinth.

was not new; it had been a prominent feature of the Athenian memory of the war from the beginning. The charter of the Delian League too had called for revenge against the Persians (Thuc. 1.96.1). The Stoa Poikile and Parthenon among other prominent Athenian landmarks underscored the tenets of an ethnic and ideological conflict between Greeks and barbarians (see above, chapter 2, pp. 77-8). The emphasis Philip placed on the profanation of Greek temples added to the overall Athenian flavor. Although several states suffered the destruction of their temples, the Athenians had made this indignity a central element of their recollection of the war by leaving several temples in ruins throughout Attica (see above, chapter 2, pp. 91-95). Moreover, when reference to a specific act of profanation appears in the sources, it is to the sack of Athens (Arr. 3.18.12; see also Diod. 17.72.6).⁹ Philip was not blindly adopting the popular Athenian tale of its glorious past or flattering their vanity by using it so conspicuously. Rather, by staging the recollection of these canonical elements of the Athenian story at Corinth, as opposed to Athens, Philip reframed this intimately Athenian narrative as a Greek one. Thus presented, Athens' suffering and wartime heroics were no longer an argument for Athenian hegemony as they had been in Isocrates, but an argument for all Greece to avenge the wrongs done to their gods. Athens and her story of the war had in a sense been nationalized.

Alexander re-performed this ritual at Corinth after the murder of his father (Diod. 17.4.9, Justin 11.2.5, and Arr. 1.1.2) and again after the destruction of Thebes (Plut. *Alex.* 14.1). He also publicized his connection to Corinth and the Persian War past on his gold

⁹ Bosworth (1971) argues that the Congress Decree (Plut. *Per.* 17) was invented after Chaeronea and consciously framed so as to parallel Philip's reinstitution of the Hellenic League. Such a conclusion lends added support to the possibility that the tendency of our sources to cite Athens as the sole example of temple profanation mirror the (semi-) official propaganda coming out of the meetings at Corinth.

coinage. The imagery Alexander employed repays investigation. On the obverse is the bust of a helmeted female figure identified by scholars as Athena. On the reverse the goddess Nike holds a wreath and the mast of a ship. Until recently the Athena was understood to be that of Athens (Bellinger 1963: 4-5 and Perlman 1965: 63). Price (1991: 29) and Stewart (1993: 159-60), however, argue that the Athena on the coinage is more likely to be that of Corinth. Their conclusions are based on little beyond the historical appropriateness of a celebration of Alexander's leadership of the Corinthian League. Against their contention is the fact that the evidence for a significant cult of Athena at Corinth is remarkably poor (Blomberg 1996: 71-3). Furthermore, it has been shown that the figure represented on Corinthian coinage was that of Aphrodite Ourania and not Athena (Blomberg 1996: 67-96). That Athena could be used to evoke Corinth and its potential store of panhellenic memories is therefore unlikely.

There remains a question that has to my knowledge not yet been posed: is the figure on Alexander's gold coinage Athena? Could it rather be Aphrodite Ourania? In his study of Corinthian coinage of the sixth century, Blomberg (1996: 86-7) points out an important iconographic distinction between Athena and armed Aphrodite: armed Aphrodite is often depicted with a necklace made up of beads, whereas Athena is seldom, if ever, represented with such an adornment. A casual glance through the gold coins provided in the plates accompanying Price's massive study of the coinage of Alexander the Great and Philip Arrhidaeus (over 400 in total) shows that a significant number of the helmeted figures have a distinct beaded necklace. Furthermore, none wear the round flat earring so typical of Athena (of Athens). They have either no earring or wear one of the grape-cluster-type. Both variations are more typical of Aphrodite (Blomberg 1996: 87).

I feel confident that further study of the surviving Alexander issues would bear out the conclusion an examination of the examples provided by Price suggests: the helmeted figure on the obverse of Alexander's gold coinage is Aphrodite, not Athena. Armed Aphrodite is associated with a small number of towns, but none so prominent or likely in this case as Corinth.

Philip and Alexander had carefully staged the confirmation of their hegemony and the declaration of war against Persia at a site closely associated with the war against Xerxes. That Alexander would wish to broadcast that performance is quite reasonable. Nevertheless, we should not underestimate the novelty of the manner in which he chose to do so. Alexander placed the poliad deity of a state other than his own on his coinage. To the extent that this issue is meant to evoke the Persian War, it is not a Persian War centered on Macedon or the Temenid dynasty. What emerges is not a properly Corinthian memory either. Although the iconography marks the helmeted figure out as Aphrodite, it has been rightly noted that the figure on Alexander's coinage does not resemble the one that appears on Corinthian issues (Bellinger 1963: 5). This is not a copy of a Corinthian coin, but a cooptation of its iconography. Corinth is prominent, but it is not Corinth the city-state, but rather Corinth the seat of the restored Hellenic League and locus of panhellenic unity that is being evoked.

On the reverse Aphrodite is paired with Nike holding a wreath and ship's mast. Scholars have traditionally assumed that a reference to Salamis is meant and, although certainty is not possible, that great naval victory over the Persians remains the most likely historical referent (Price 1991: 30, Stewart 1993: 160, and Flower 2000a: 101). If the helmeted figure is presumed to be Athena of Athens, Salamis fits perfectly within a

reconstruction whereby Alexander flatters Athenian sentiment by evoking their patron goddess as well as their seminal victory over the Persians on his coinage. If, as I believe, the helmeted figure is Aphrodite, we must reconsider this possibility. Salamis can no longer be understood within the context of an Athenian narrative. Salamis is paired with Corinth and the Hellenic League and thus, like the destruction of temples, is reframed within a thoroughly panhellenic context.

A few notable strategies can be gleaned from the commemoration of the Persian War at Corinth staged by Philip and then restaged and publicized by Alexander. Unlike Isocrates in the *Panegyricus* and indeed most classical commemorations of the war, neither Philip nor Alexander appears to center the memory of the war on their own state or dynasty. In fact, our only indication that Macedon was ever mentioned in connection with the Persian War is a letter attributed to Alexander and supposedly written to Darius III after Issus, the substance of which appears in Arrian (2.14.4) and Curtius (4.1.10-11). In it Alexander includes Macedon specifically along with the rest of Greece as an object of Darius I and Xerxes' abuse and thus as a justification for the present conflict (Bosworth 1980: 231). Yet even here Macedon does not approach the prominent place enjoyed by the classical states in their respective commemorations. Macedon is never the center of Alexander's story. Nor is Corinth or Athens its center despite appearing prominently in connection with the reinstitution of the Hellenic League. By refusing the center to any single state, even their own, by resuscitating the tradition of panhellenic cooperation associated with the Hellenic League, and by drawing liberally from multiple memorial traditions, Philip and Alexander were beginning to lay the groundwork for a much broader recollection of the Persian War.

This first commemoration would have been unthinkable for even the most powerful state before Chaeronea. The association with the Hellenic League was latent at the site of Corinth, but it would have required a great deal of power for the Corinthians themselves, much less any other state, to access it. Philip's claim on the memories associated with Corinth is confirmed because all but the Spartans attend the congress he called there. Sparta's incapacity to capitalize on the panhellenic memories at Aulis even in the wake of the Peloponnesian War (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.3-4) underscore the difficulty of staging such assemblies.¹⁰ Philip performs his restoration of the Hellenic League before a packed house. Alexander stages two encore performances with similar attendance. Finally, Alexander can publicize this new conception of the Persian War in gold throughout the Greek and Near Eastern world. Their newfound power allows them to think and act outside the conceptual box of the city-state as none could before.

The second major commemoration of the Persian War occurred soon after Alexander ascended to his father's throne between his first and second invocations of the Hellenic League in Corinth. This commemoration was the utter destruction of the city of Thebes. Where one of the great centers of Hellas had once stood, there would now be only a Macedonian fortress on the Cadmeia, the remains of the reputed house of Pindar, and desolation (Arr. 1.9.9-10). It is tempting to see the destruction of Thebes as part of a concerted strategy long in the planning. Thebes had headed the alliance that opposed Philip at Chaeronea. They had also medized during Xerxes' invasion and retained close ties with Persia throughout the fourth century. What better city to be made an example of before the grand invasion of Persia? But the destruction of Thebes seems never to have

¹⁰ According to Plutarch (*Per.* 17) the Athenians in the mid-fifth century called a panhellenic assembly which failed to materialize (the so-called Congress Decree), but the authenticity of his 'decree' has been rightly questioned (see above, p. 240n.9).

been part of Philip and Alexander's original plan for the reorganization of Greece, the invention of a new Persian War tradition, or their intended war of revenge. When Philip called the Greeks to Corinth to reconvene the long-defunct Hellenic League, Thebes was surely invited and sent delegates. Like the countless other states that had medized at some point during the Persian War, the Thebans were called on to avenge the profanation of the temples. They too must have assented to contribute troops for this campaign (Diod. 16.89.3 and Justin 9.5.4-6). Although they revolted immediately after the death of Philip (Diod. 17.3.4; see also Justin 11.2.4), Alexander appears to have welcomed them back into the fold. The Thebans doubtless attended the second meeting of the Hellenic League where they would have confirmed their acquiescence to Alexander and his particular memory of the past (Diod. 17.4.9, Arr. 1.1.2, and Justin 11.2.5).

Even after Thebes revolted a second time in 335, Alexander was initially determined to be lenient (Diod. 17.9.1-4, Arr. 1.7.7-11, Plut. *Alex.* 11.4, and Justin 11.3.6). What changed Alexander's attitude was the Theban response to his generous offer. The Thebans announced that all who wished to free Greece and destroy the tyrant Alexander should join the Persians and themselves against Macedon (Plut. *Alex.* 11.4; see also Diod. 17.9.5).¹¹ This was not a private jab at Alexander. Both Diodorus and Plutarch make it clear that the message was publicized. This was no longer a question of

¹¹ The sequence of events in Diodorus is somewhat different. Alexander arrives with the intention of being lenient. He then realizes that he is despised in Thebes and decides to destroy the city utterly (17.9.4). He then announces that any Thebans who wished to rejoin the common peace could do so, and it is this final olive branch that provokes the Theban response and Alexander's subsequent rage (17.9.5-6). In Diodorus Alexander's planned punishment is thus realized in three stages. Initially full reconciliation is preferred. Then the destruction of the city is planned, but the freedom and security of the people is still hypothetically envisioned. After the Theban rebuff, however, a more severe punishment is sought – one that now threatens the life and welfare of all inhabitants. This version is much more convoluted than that which appears in Plutarch. In Diodorus Alexander seems to oscillate between severity and leniency. His decision not to accept a full reconciliation is undermotivated, whereas in Plutarch it is the Theban response to his offer of reconciliation, which more naturally causes him to rethink his plan entirely.

a state in revolt. The Thebans were striking at the very heart of the message Philip and Alexander had hoped to convey at Corinth (Faraguna 2003: 104; see also Jehne 1994: 202). The Macedonian dynasts presented the Persian War as an ethnic war that called for vengeance against Persia. What such a master narrative obfuscates is that the Greeks were currently under the dominion of a power that, in the opinion of some,¹² was every bit as foreign as Persia had been. By calling on the Greeks to join them in the defense of freedom, the Thebans were challenging the Macedonian narrative with one every bit as popular: that the Persian War had been fought for freedom regardless of the opponents. It was this narrative that the Spartans and the Thebans themselves had used against the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War (see above, chapter 4, p. 223 and Jung 2006: 286). The logical conclusion of such a story is quite different from Alexander's. If the Persian War was primarily about freedom and not an ethnically distinct invader, then history counseled the Greeks to oppose Alexander, who at this time presented a much more immediate threat to Greek freedom than Persia.

Such a direct challenge to the commemorative supports for Alexander's planned expedition against Persia, not to mention his control over mainland Greece, required severe, but above all pointed retaliation. The defeat of the Thebans and the brutal sack of their city was simply the first act, the necessary precondition for another carefully staged commemoration of the Persian War. Alexander again called an assembly of the Hellenic League (Diod. 17.14.1-4, Arr. 1.9.9-10, and Justin 11.3.8-4.8). As at Corinth this commemoration would have an audience. The four states that we know were present – Phocis, Orchomenus, Plataea, and Thespieae – led the way in the debate, calling for the

¹² Demosthenes comes immediately to mind (see, for example, 3.24).

annihilation of Thebes.¹³ Thebes' present revolt and many past wrongs were cited, but our sources for the meeting focus on what was undoubtedly the centerpiece of the case against Thebes, their medism at the time of Xerxes' invasion.

In a sense the focus on Theban medism during Xerxes' invasion appears fitting. Thebes had opted against a pan-Greek campaign against Persia and preferred rather to summon the Greeks to join the Persians against Alexander. Their present betrayal of Greece recalls their earlier betrayal. But the appropriateness of the charge is illusory, a construct of the proceedings over which Alexander presided. The formal infraction of which Thebes was guilty was breaking the truce that had secured peace after the battle of Chaeronea (Diod. 16.86.3) and the oaths Philip and then Alexander had elicited from them at Corinth (see *IG II²* 236). At the meeting of the allies, however, their guilt was retrojected into the past (Bosworth 1980: 90 and 1988: 195-6). It was viewed as part of a continuum of betrayal typified not by their present infraction, but rather their betrayal of Greece 140 years before. For Alexander's purposes the charge perfectly fit the crime. The Thebans had undercut the message he and his father intended the meeting at Corinth to convey. Their punishment had to be justified in such a way as to nullify that challenge. Thebes' claim on the Persian War tradition of freedom for the Greeks was itself undercut by linking it with their earlier medism. If the Thebans had wanted their revolt to evoke thoughts of freedom and autonomy, Alexander went through a great deal of trouble to see that it evoked instead the memory of betrayal. In this he spared no expense. The assembly was an unnecessary distraction borne solely to make his point. After the

¹³ Arrian discusses the charges earlier in his own voice in the context of the sack of Thebes (1.9.6-8), but it seems clear that he has taken the substance of what he reports there from the received tradition about the debate among the allies (Bosworth 1980: 84-5).

judgment of the Hellenic League had been passed, Alexander oversaw the eradication of Thebes. The void where the once great city sat became a memorial as potent as any constructed of marble or bronze.

Alexander's actions at Thebes underscored in negative terms what had already been sketched at Corinth. The Persian War – past and present – was an ethnic war of revenge. To be Greek was to fight Persia; to side with Persia was to cease to be Greek. The Persian War as ethnic war appears first at Athens where it was used to attract new Aegean and Ionian allies, recently in the service of Xerxes, to a larger conception of the conflict that allowed them, as Greeks, to take up the struggle against the alien 'other' (see above, chapter 2, pp. 79-80). Philip and Alexander had similar needs. They now commanded an alliance almost coextensive with mainland Greece. For the Persian War to be an effective historical antecedent it had to appeal to this larger group equally. One strategy was to present a Persian War without a particular, state-centered, point of view, but that would only appeal to states that could claim to have fought in the war. For the rest the new tradition emphasized ethnic hostility. Because the Persian War was presented as a conflict between Greece and Asia (not some Greek states versus other Greek states and Asia) all Greece could under the auspices of Alexander's campaign of revenge now claim a stake in the glorious past by virtue of being Greek. Thebes had been invited to join in this broader conception of the Persian War, but had refused and so became an object lesson to anyone who would fail to live up to the traditions to which Alexander was granting all Greece access.

Alexander's third major commemoration of the Persian War was in fact his first formal dedication of the present invasion. After the battle of Granicus Alexander had

300 panoplies sent to Athens and dedicated to Athena on the Acropolis (Arr. 1.16.7; see also Plut. *Alex.* 16.8).¹⁴ The accompanying inscription read: “Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks except the Lacedaemonians, from the barbarians inhabiting Asia”.¹⁵ Plutarch goes on to supply Alexander’s motivation – he desired to “make the Greeks partners in the victory” (κοινοῦμενος δὲ τὴν νίκην τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν). The dedication reinforces many of the themes of Alexander’s new Persian War tradition. Although the Hellenic League provided at most just under a quarter of the total force for Alexander’s invasion (Diod. 17.17.3-4),¹⁶ the Greeks are nevertheless given a disproportionate share of the credit, syntactically equal to that of Alexander himself. Macedon again remains unnamed. They are neither equal contributors along with Alexander and the Greeks, nor are they credited implicitly by association with Alexander, who could have had himself styled “King”, “King of Macedon”, or simply “the Macedonian”, but rather appears as the “son of Philip”. This remains a Greek war of revenge carried out under the auspices of the restored Hellenic League with Alexander as its hegemon (Green 1991: 157). Moreover, the fact that Alexander chose to dedicate these panoplies to Athena at Athens further underscores the theme of revenge in that they drew added meaning from the site of the famed desecration of the Temple of Athena Polias on the Acropolis.

Alexander’s Granicus dedication places significantly more emphasis on Athens than do those associated with the restoration of the Hellenic League. True, the

¹⁴ Plutarch and Arrian diverge as to the details of the dedication (see Bosworth 1980: 127). Arrian refers simply to 300 panoplies to which the inscription is attached. Plutarch suggests that the shields were dedicated separately from the rest of the armor and that the inscription accompanied only latter.

¹⁵ Ἀλέξανδρος Φιλίππου καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων τῶν τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικούντων.

¹⁶ For a discussion of the problems surrounding the total number of troops Alexander had in 334, see Bosworth 1980: 98-9.

profanation of the temples (exemplified by the wartime fate of Attica) was a central theme at Corinth. The victory of Salamis, long claimed by the Athenians as their personal contribution,¹⁷ also appeared on the coinage struck to commemorate the new Hellenic League. But in both cases Athenian imagery was being uprooted and placed within a panhellenic context. To place in Athens a monument celebrating the defeat of the Persians by the Greeks generally is to reframe both the Persian War and the current war of revenge within a decidedly Athenian context. Alexander's superfluous condemnation of Athens' longtime rival in the text of the inscription furthers this reorientation. By disgracing Sparta in the very dedication that emphatically connected Athens with the present war, Alexander seems almost to certify the claims of Isocrates and others that Athens alone should hold center stage in any Persian War narrative.

The Granicus dedication demonstrates the favor in which Alexander held Athens and its indisputable importance within his new Persian War tradition (Bosworth 1971: 613, 1988: 196-7, and Faraguna 2003: 108-109; *contra* Mitchel 1965: 190-91). Indeed, at this point in his campaign he still needed to retain Athenian loyalty and the support or at least indifference of her formidable fleet. Beneath the surface, however, such a dedication had some disquieting implications for Athens and her much vaunted stake to the Persian War past. Alexander had planted a panhellenic monument on the Acropolis in Athens. This was an unprecedented step. Persian War monuments had appeared in numerous locations with an equally diverse group of dedicants, but a state erecting a monument within the urban center of another state is not among the known permutations. Sparta did not presume to erect monuments either unilaterally or on behalf of the Hellenic

¹⁷ See, for example, Pind. *Pyth* 1. 75-7, Thuc 1.73-4, and Isoc. 4.98.

League in Athens, Corinth, Megara, or so on. If a state in the classical period wished to advertise its achievements to a larger audience, it did so on the battlefield or sought approval from one of the panhellenic centers. Alexander could have done the same, but chose rather to place his 300 panoplies in the heart of the Athenian polis. In so doing he was blurring the lines between Athens the sovereign state and Athens the member of a larger Greek community. Beneath the flattery, Alexander's dedication was a much more serious assault on Athenian ownership of its memory than his earlier co-optations. Greeks throughout the mainland had been called upon to avenge wrongs done in part to Athens and were now allowed to commemorate their achievements in that regard inside the city. In many respects it was an Athenocentric vision worthy of Isocrates, but it was a vision that now belonged to Alexander and the Greeks, and no longer exclusively to the Athenians.

After his decisive victory at Gaugamela Alexander again turned his attentions to the war against Xerxes that had provided the ideological justification for the present invasion. Alexander sent a message to the Plataeans, and later had it proclaimed at the Olympic Games, that he would rebuild their town "because their ancestors gave their territory to the Greeks for the struggle on behalf of freedom" (ὅτι τὴν χώραν οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν ἐναγωνίσασθαι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας παρέσχον: Plut. *Alex.* 34.1; see also *Arist.* 11.9). This was in fact the third such announcement made by the Macedonians. After the battle of Chaeronea Philip ordered the restoration of Plataea to the Plataeans (Paus. 4.27.10 and 9.1.8).¹⁸ After the obliteration of Thebes by Alexander in 335 a similar announcement was made (Arr. 1.9.10). It is not entirely clear

¹⁸ Philip also seems to have restored Orchomenus and Thespieae at this time (see Roebuck 1948: 80).

how these pledges translate into the actual reconstruction of Plataea since no one source mentions all three or even recognizes the existence of the other pledges. It is possible that a single event has been broken into three, but it is equally plausible that repeated promises of direct aid in the ongoing reconstruction of the town were presented or ultimately simplified into promises to rebuild it altogether. Indeed, Plutarch in the *Aristeides* notes that after Gaugamela Alexander reconstructed Plataea's walls, a detail omitted from the *Alexander* where he promises simply to rebuild the city. Whether earlier announcements were also tied to the Plataeans' Persian War service is not known, but it was certainly the centerpiece of Alexander's second, very public pledge to rebuild Plataea or more probably redouble his commitment to its ongoing reconstruction.

To assess the memory of the Persian War that Alexander was articulating through his largess after Gaugamela, it will first be necessary to consider the present status of a group of Plataean traditions strongly associated with the Persian War past and known from later sources. The Glaucon decree (for the text, see Étienne and Piérart 1975: 51-3), an inscription found at Plataea and dated to the mid-third century B.C., refers to a festival in honor of those who fell at the battle of Plataea, called the Eleutheria (21-4), a pair of cults to Zeus Eleutherius and the Homonoia of the Greeks (17-20, 29-30, and 39-40) and a supervisory body called "the common council of the Hellenes" (τὸ κοινὸν συνέδριον τῶν Ἑλλήνων: 25-6). An Eleutheria festival celebrated every four years and yearly meetings for a council of the Greeks at Plataea are also mentioned by Plutarch in the imperial period (*Arist.* 21). What exactly Alexander wanted from his association with Plataea's service in the Persian War depends a great deal on the state of these institutions at the time. Of course, Plutarch (and doubtless the Plataeans of his day) thought that they

reached back to the battle itself, but it is beyond doubt that the substance of all four traditions mentioned by the Glaucon decree date from the period after refoundation even if some looked back to the dim memory of similar practices the fifth century (see above, chapter 3, pp. 135-41). The question is at what point after refoundation were they introduced.

There is a *prima facie* case to be made for the time of Philip and Alexander (West 1977; see also Bosworth 1971: 606-607). Traditions are most easily (and understandably) invented in times of great transition and instability (Hobsbawm 1983: 4-5; see above, Introduction, pp. 30-31). When Philip first permitted the Plataeans to return to their homeland a generation had passed since any native cult activity had occurred there (Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.1). It makes sense that those who returned would be extremely susceptible to invention and that the customs first attested in the mid-third century were introduced when the town was refounded under the guise of a restoration of bygone tradition. Jung has recently made a full and detailed case against this possibility. He argues rather that the Eleutheria, the meetings of the council of the Greeks at Plataea, as well as the overall thematic emphasis on freedom should be dated to the period of the Lamian War (2006: 329-40), which lasted from 323 to 322, and that the cult of the Homonoia of the Greeks likely emerged in connection with the Chremonidean War in sixties of the third century (2006: 321-29).

Jung presents three arguments against dating the Eleutheria and its accompanying emphasis on freedom to the period of Macedonian rule,¹⁹ which is where the editors of

¹⁹ I set aside a consideration of the institution of the council of the Greeks since the evidence for it yields no firm basis for judging the date of its institution. The editors of the Glaucon decree originally argued that the council at Plataea was synonymous with the council of the restored Hellenic League and so date its institution to the time of Philip (Étienne and Piérart 1975: 68). Jung (2006: 335-6) focuses his arguments

the decree placed it (Étienne and Piérart 1975: 67-8). The first is that the Macedonians would have been reluctant to celebrate a battle whose reputed hero, Sparta, remained outside the restored Hellenic League (2006: 336). Secondly, they would have been equally unlikely to emphasize freedom since Philip and Alexander never associated that theme with the Hellenic League and focused rather on the Persian War as an ethnic war (2006: 337). Finally, Jung simply finds it unlikely that a tradition invented to serve Macedonian rule could fall so quickly into the service of an anti-Macedonian alliance (2006: 337), which is certainly the political context in which the Glaucon decree was passed (Étienne and Piérart 1975: 70-71). None presents a serious problem.

Sparta was indeed hostile to Macedonian interests (see below, pp. 261-3), but that did not stop Philip and Alexander from resuscitating the old Hellenic League which was just as much associated with Sparta as the battle of Plataea had been (see above, chapter 3, pp. 124-35). We also know for a fact that Alexander did associate the battle of Plataea with Gaugamela. Spartan hostility was clearly no hindrance to Alexander's use of Plataea and its traditions and as a result provides no clues about the date at which the festival at Plataea appeared. Indeed, Jung's own proposal of the Lamian War would still have the Eleutheria emerge without any Spartan involvement (2006: 338-9).

It is true that Philip and Alexander emphasized those aspects of the Persian War tradition that could most easily support the present ethnic war of revenge, and it was this aspect of that war that held center stage at Corinth. But Philip and Alexander did employ the recollection of the Persian War as a war for freedom as well (see also Faraguna 2003: 102). Philip's first and only action against the Persians as the newly elected leader of the

for a later date on disproving this point. But ultimately the identity of the council is irrelevant. Even if Jung is right and the council at Plataea is a body distinct from the council of the Hellenic League, it does not prove a late date.

Greeks was to dispatch two of his generals to Ionia with express orders to free the Greeks (Diod. 16.91.2). When Alexander campaigned along the Ionian coast, he announced to the Greeks there that the very reason he had undertaken this war was to free the Greeks (Diod. 17.24.1; see also Arr. 1.18.1-2). More to the point, Alexander proclaimed that he intended to rebuild Plataea specifically because that state had sacrificed so much “on behalf of freedom” (ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας).²⁰ It is hard to imagine that Alexander would make freedom the centerpiece of his proposed largess toward the Plataeans, but at the same time shy from instituting (or approving and patronizing) their games in honor of freedom. There are in fact good reasons why Alexander would have wanted to advertise his connection to Greek freedom at Plataea. Thebes had mounted a serious challenge to Alexander’s ability to use a call to freedom. An emphasis on Plataea counters that challenge and moreover shows Alexander in the light of the defender of Greek freedom since that city was twice destroyed by the Thebans (Thuc. 3.68 and Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.1) and finally restored by Philip and Alexander. Instituting a festival to freedom there would serve to underscore further the illegitimacy of Thebes’ claims.

Jung’s third argument against an early date is that a tradition designed to support Macedonian hegemony would not likely be used by anti-Macedonian partisans within eighty years of its invention. Yet this is to assume that a given discourse of memory has a set ideological value that can severely limit its use along the political spectrum. On the contrary, narratives developed within one political context can with the greatest ease be adopted by opponents of that very policy (Halbwachs 1992 [=1925]: 141 and Foucault 1978: 100-102). Nor is eighty years insufficient time for these shifts in usage to take

²⁰ In the *Aristeides* (11.9) Alexander mentions only their courage, but these are likely coordinate pieces of information.

place. Freedom itself was perhaps the most used discourse in Greek history with Sparta and Athens claiming it simultaneously before the Peloponnesian War (see Raaflaub 2004: 166-202). As noted above, Philip and Alexander touted it along the Ionian coast before and again after Thebes revolted under the banner of that very concept. Later it would be used and reused by Hellenistic monarchs and Rome even up to the time of Nero (Suet. *Nero* 24.2; see also Dixon 2007: 153), all in contradiction to what might appear its original political context and even intrinsic ideological value. That we find freedom used by those in opposition to Macedon in the mid-third century in no way speaks against its use by the Macedonians in the late fourth.

As to the cult of the Homonoia of the Greeks Jung echoes the conclusion of the editors of the Glaucon decree, who argue that it dates from the mid-third century, at the time of the Chremonidean War (Étienne and Piérart 1975: 68-74; see also Étienne 1985: 259-60). Here too I believe the arguments against an early date fail to outweigh the benefits of aligning the invention of these new traditions with the refoundation of Plataea under Macedonian rule (West 1977). Jung makes much of the fact that a cult for the Homonoia of the Greeks (as opposed to the Homonoia of the citizens of a single state) is a late invention. The Glaucon decree is the earliest example, and the next appears in the Roman period (Jung 2006: 325-6). This fact carries little argumentative weight however. Our record for the development of that cult overall and especially at Plataea is much too sparse to conclude that its institution must be exceptionally close in time to our first evidence for it. The cult for homonoia within the city was known in the fourth century (Jung 2006: 325-6) as was the notion of the homonoia of all the Greeks (West 1977: 312-14). The jump between a cult for concord within a state and throughout Greece is a

major leap; so too is that between the notion of concord across Greece and its institution as cult. Nevertheless, there is no good reason to think that the spark must have occurred in the mid-third, and not the late fourth, century.

Jung further supports a late date for the cult of the Homonoia of the Greeks by arguing that its ideological implications are more suited to the anti-Macedonian movement during the Chremonidean War than the period of Macedonian rule (2006: 326-8; see also Étienne 1985: 260).²¹ As we have seen above, such arguments from ideological suitability are extremely subjective. Yes, the worship of Greek unity was very much in line with the political and ideological objectives of the Athenians and their allies during the Chremonidean War, but as it happens it fits Alexander's political and ideological objectives just as well. More than any political figures since the Persian War, Philip and Alexander advocated Greek unity (West 1977: 316-19). The restoration of the Hellenic League effectively unified all of mainland Greece (except Sparta) under one banner. It was to support this new political unity that Philip and then Alexander developed and propagated a Greek memory of the Persian War to which no single state had any proprietary claim. If anything, a cult that emphasized Greek unity (and not the heroics of Athens or any other single state)²² in the face of Persian aggression advances Alexander's aims far more than it does those of Athens.

²¹ Étienne (1985: 260) adds three more points against the conclusion that the cult was established under Philip and Alexander. Two are reused by Jung in connection with the focus on freedom: that emphasizing the battle of Plataea would be unlikely given the hostility of Sparta and that the initiation of the cult under Alexander would result in an unbelievably rapid move of the cult from a pro- to an anti-Macedonian stance. My arguments against these points above suit their use in reference to the cult of Homonoia equally well. A third – that emphasizing the battle of Plataea would recall Macedonian medism – simply cannot stand since it is clear that the Macedonians made much of the Persian War, the entirety of which could be a potential embarrassment.

²² Jung (2006: 338-9) cites the preponderant role of Aristides and Athens in the stories surrounding the institution of the cults at Plataea (Plut. *Arist.* 20-21) and argues that they indicate that the expansion of the

With little positive evidence on either side certainty is impossible, but I believe that the balance of the available evidence suggests that after the refoundation of Plataea by Philip and under the continued patronage of Alexander an important set of invented traditions emerged. If it is agreed that these traditions were invented under Macedonian rule and doubtless with their approval, what does Alexander's choice to single Plataea out for honorable mention after his victory at Gaugamela say about his attempt to forge a new memory of the Persian War? Plutarch gives the impression that Plataea was selected in a general outpouring of Hellenic pride. Alexander also abolishes tyrannies in Greece (*Alex.* 34.1) and rewards Croton with a share of the booty in commemoration of the single Crotonian ship that served at the battle of Salamis (34.2). Specific attention to Plataea suggests that Alexander may have wanted to present Gaugamela as the new Plataea. Indeed, Gaugamela could be seen as the decisive land battle in the current war against the barbarian, as Plataea had been almost a century and a half before. By a comparison with Plataea (and its recently invented traditions) Alexander also underscored a recurrent theme that the facts of Gaugamela and the present war lacked – panhellenism.

The tenor of the commemoration of the Persian War at Plataea was decidedly panhellenic. A council of the Greeks – not the political representatives of Macedon, Plataea, or any other single state – oversaw the festival and cults.²³ The cult of the

cults occurred at a time of particular Athenian influence (i.e. during the Lamian War). While Plutarch is now reporting the details of a tradition that is at least continuous from his own time back to the Hellenistic period (in contrast to the situation in the classical period), it should be noted that the cult practices and memories he observes are still at least four hundred years separated from what they were when instituted. A focus on Athens may date back to the Hellenistic period, but it could just as easily have arisen later. As before Plutarch must be used with extreme caution.

²³ For some conjectures about membership at the time of the Glaucon decree, see Jung 2006: 307-308. Under Alexander membership would presumably have been much larger, possibly coextensive with the restored Hellenic League if not synonymous with the body (see Étienne and Piérart 1975: 68).

Homonoia of the Greeks stressed the unity of the Greeks and thus the contribution of all to the battle in marked contrast to the impression that emerges from Herodotus (see, for example, 9.52, 60.1, and 85.3). Perhaps no piece of evidence typifies the attitude of these new traditions as well as the epigram from the 'restored' altar of Zeus Eleutherius, attributed erroneously to Simonides (for more see below, chapter 3, pp. 135-7):

The Greeks, [trusting in the courageous will of their spirit],
once drove out the Persians with the force of Nike, the
work of Ares and erected this as an altar of Zeus
Eleutherius common to free Greece ('Simonides' 15
Page).²⁴

The subject of the epigram is not the people of a particular state, but the Greeks who together win the victory and erect a common altar to free Greece. The contrast to the monuments the Greeks did in fact erect after the battle of Plataea is striking (see above, chapter 4, pp. 184-91). There it is not the Greeks, but rather the explicitly named participants who are credited with fighting the Persians. They and not the Greeks generally erect a monument which was implicitly not common to free Greece, but was the commemorative property of those who earned the right to be named. The altar of Zeus Eleutherius avoids such details and focuses rather on the collective achievement of Greece to the benefit and detriment of no particular state. Alexander may have felt that associating so panhellenic a tradition with Gaugamela served to include the Greeks in this victory, just as his overly generous recognition of their participation at Granicus had done.

To what extent Philip or Alexander ultimately stood behind the details of the new traditions at Plataea is not known, but it was doubtless their approval and patronage that

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τόνδε ποθ' Ἕλληνας Νίκης κράτει, ἔργω Ἄρης,
[εὐτόλμω ψυχῆς λήματι πειθόμενοι,]
Πέρσας ἐξελάσαντες ἑλευθέρα Ἑλλάδι κοινόν
ἰδρύσαντο Διὸς βωμὸν Ἐλευθερίου.

turned the small-town celebration into a panhellenic event. If the late tradition in Plutarch's day reflects in broad terms the cult established under Alexander (*Arist.* 21), elites from states across the new Hellenic League gathered every year. Delegates from states that had participated in the war sat alongside those whose states had remained neutral or fought for Xerxes. They oversaw a cult whose inscription named no names, but honored the fight for freedom staged by the Greeks in common. Every fourth year they put on games for a larger audience before whom these same themes were performed and celebrated. Special attention paid to Plataea after Gaugamela would have greatly increased its importance and popularity. A city that was extinct in 338 was within ten years reshaping the way Greeks thought about their past thanks to the exceptional power and influence the Macedonian monarchy could now wield in the affairs of the mainland.

The last of Alexander's great commemorations of the Persian War was another performance. In the winter between 331 and 330 Alexander arrived at the grand palace built by Darius I and Xerxes at Persepolis. Our sources differ as to detail (see Diod. 17.70-2, Curt. 5.6.19-7.8, and Plut. *Alex.* 38), but our best tradition (Arr. 3.18.11-12) and recent archaeological work suggest that after the treasury was emptied Alexander gave the palace over to his troops who hastily looted it (Hammond 1992). Afterward the complex was burned and left in ruins. Alexander remained in the town of Persepolis for some months thereafter before returning to his pursuit of Darius III. The destruction of the palace at Persepolis was for Alexander a rare display of gratuitous vandalism. The young king had shown himself conspicuously respectful of local customs and obliging to conquered foes (see Bosworth 1988: 229-41). He had recently declared himself the legitimate lord of Asia and would shortly style himself the successor and avenger of the

soon-to-be murdered Darius (see Brosius 2003). The total destruction of the palace at Persepolis, now his own possession and the seat of the power he was claiming his by right, stands out as an anomaly (Badian 1967: 187, 1994a: 284, and Brosius 2003: 183).

What had made this aberration necessary was yet another challenge to Alexander's claim on the memory of the Persian War emerging from mainland Greece (Badian 1967: 188, Bosworth 1988: 92-4, and Hammond 1992: 362). In 331 Sparta's King Agis III raised the banner of revolt.²⁵ Seven years before when Philip summoned the Greeks to Corinth Sparta alone remained aloof. When the allies were summoned after the death of Philip, Sparta again refused to attend, citing that it was not their custom to follow others, but rather to lead (Arr. 1.1.2; see also Plut. *Mor.* 240a-b).²⁶ Their response struck at the core of Philip and Alexander's new Persian War tradition. The Macedonian dynasts were drawing freely on recollections of the Persian War to support their position as the new leaders of a restored Hellenic League. The Spartan counterclaim splashed cold water on their pretensions. Leadership was a Persian War legacy to which Sparta felt it had an exclusive claim. Implicit in this assertion is that a particular past could be owned and passed along lines of descent. It belonged to those who had earned it and could not be commandeered by another. The implication struck deep. If Sparta (and the others participating states) owned the Persian War tradition, then Philip and Alexander were usurping a past that did not and could never belong to them. This is the classical memorial tradition in a nutshell. For the time being Sparta was

²⁵ The facts of the revolt are much debated (see Badian 1967, 1994a, Borza 1972, and Cartledge and Spawforth 1992: 16-27). For a brief summation of the evidence and problems, see Bosworth 1988: 198-204.

²⁶ The claim appears also in Isocrates' *Panegyricus* (18) and may have been a traditional refrain at Sparta.

sufficiently weak and isolated to allow these challenges to go unanswered, but in 331 Agis III instigated a significant uprising and likely made the traditional Spartan claim to leadership as well as the particular memory of the Persian War that supported it a centerpiece of his propaganda campaign. States from around the Peloponnese flocked to his cause, and there must have been fears that it would spread to central Greece and Athens (Badian 1967: 183).

Alexander was probably informed of this revolt by the time he reached Susa where he immediately promised to give back to its rightful owners the war booty that the Persians took at the time of Xerxes' invasion (Arr. 3.16.7-8; see Badian 1967: 188). The return of lost treasures struck the right tone, but it seems that a much more conspicuous display was felt necessary. Consequently when Alexander arrived in Persepolis it was with the intention of destroying the royal palace. For all the variations in the reports of our sources they all agree that the Persian palace was not burned because Alexander was currently at war with Persia or because it had symbolized years of interference in Greek affairs from the King's Peace on. As in the case of the destruction of Thebes, the act was presented as belated vengeance for various wrongs committed at the time of Xerxes' invasion (Arr. 3.18.12; see also Diod. 17.72, Curt. 5.7.4, and Plut. *Alex.* 38.2). These wrongs were typified by the destruction of Athens and the profanation of her temples, but here again Alexander seems to have couched his vengeance within a panhellenic context. Arrian imputes to Alexander the desire to avenge not only the destruction of Athens, but also the burning of temples (presumably in Athens and elsewhere) and all the other wrongs suffered by the Greeks.

The destruction of the palace at Persepolis was not a subtle use of power. As in the case of Thebes, Alexander was (over)reacting to a direct challenge to his panhellenic vision of the Persian War past. This bleak monument set in the heart of the Persian homeland served to confirm in no uncertain terms the connection between his present invasion and the Persian War tradition. Xerxes had finally been made to pay for his wrongs, and Alexander had exacted that payment. He was not the first to claim to have avenged the wrongs of Xerxes on the Persian Empire (Bellen 1974). Long ago Aeschylus, probably reflecting a general sentiment, spoke as though the Persians had paid for their arrogance with the losses they incurred at Plataea (*Pers.* 800-42). Of course, the Delian League was founded on the proposition that in fact such losses were insufficient satisfaction (Thuc. 1.96.1). In the fourth century Isocrates recalls with pride that the Athenians had made the barbarians pay for their impiety through the terms of the Peace of Callias (4.117-18). But the power Alexander wielded gave him the ability to surpass any and all past and future attempts at revenge. He had traveled to the center of the Persian Empire, took the palace Xerxes helped to build, and destroyed it utterly just as the Persians had once destroyed Athens. What impact the destruction of Xerxes' palace had on the immediately political realities of Greece is hard to say, but Agis' revolt never gained traction outside the Peloponnese and soon fell to defeat (Diod. 17.62.6-63.4).

Alexander never again expended so much effort developing his connection to the Persian War past, but he did not simply abandon it (see also Bellen 1974: 63 and Flower 2000a: 115-28). His series of gold coins celebrating the Persian War as a panhellenic victory continued to be struck. The particular regard in which he held the town of Plataea was announced at the Olympic Games of 328 (see Bosworth 1980: 91). In the next year

Alexander came upon a Bactrian town inhabited by a group of Greeks, the Branchidae, who were accused of betraying a temple in their charge to Xerxes. The town was destroyed and the inhabitants butchered for this perceived offense (Curt. 7.5.28-35; Strabo 11.11.4, and 14.1.5; see also Bosworth 1988: 108-109). Even after Persepolis the Persian War past was still something Alexander felt was worth controlling.

In sum, Philip and Alexander wanted a Greece unified under their hegemony. For that they needed to justify the position their military might had given them at Chaeronea. The new league established at Corinth gave Macedonian rule a legal basis. The great invasion of Persia gave it a purpose. Constant references to the Persian War of old gave it the appearance of legitimacy and continuity. Yet the existing commemorative tradition surrounding that event was unserviceable. A new tradition was needed. The separate memories of the various participating states were abandoned. At Corinth Philip and then Alexander laid the groundwork for a conception of the Persian War centered not on the state, but rather on a larger collective. The Persian War was now to be the common property of Greece. The specifics and details of the war, so important in the classical period for marking inclusion and primacy within the tradition, were recalled sparingly and selectively, but just as often ignored entirely. Like most invented traditions the new Persian War was drawn in broad strokes designed to incorporate the largest number of members within the new commemorative club (Hobsbawm 1983: 10-11; see also Fentress and Wickham 1992: 72). All Greeks were called upon to rally around an ethnic war of revenge that by definition placed them on the right side of history. At Thebes and throughout the campaign against Persia the invented tradition introduced at Corinth continued to be reinforced and developed.

Inventing such a radically new tradition was no small task. It required more than the mere accumulation of power; a significant realignment of the manifold power relationships that ran throughout the Greek world was a necessary precondition. In other words, the system of city-states had to be dealt a severe blow before any tradition that denigrated the role of the polis could take hold. Chaeronea had been fought for rather more immediate and practical reasons, but it also had the effect of giving Philip and then Alexander a commemorative latitude unthinkable before. A nominally free state could be reserved as a stage for a grand Persian War performance. Another could be tried for a generations-old offense and extirpated. A third could be conjured out of extinction and capitalized as a Persian War theme park dedicated to the new tradition. The very seat of the Persian Empire could be destroyed to underscore the message. This was not the kind of power an Athens or Sparta had at their disposal even in their heyday. For the first time there was a single concentration of power around which all of mainland Greece had to orbit. For the first time there was a real opportunity for a wide-ranging memorial community of Greeks to exert enough reciprocal pressure on the memories of its members to compete with that of the individual states.

The power Philip and Alexander accumulated, the significant changes that accumulation had on the broader networks of power that ran throughout the Greek world, as well as the substantial effort that went into the publication of their new Persian War tradition afforded that tradition a unique prominence. But memory cannot simply be imposed from the top (see above, Introduction, pp. 14-16). Alexander could disseminate what he wanted about the Persian War, but to influence others, the numerous insignificant

shareholders of power within the Greek world would have to accept the pan-Greek memory of the war and act as though it were a reality. Even after such a realignment of the larger networks of power as followed the battle of Chaeronea, changes in memorial practices were remarkably slow and uneven.

Within the city-states of mainland Greece, where pre-existing Persian War traditions remained a powerful force, the immediate reaction of the various small shareholders seem to have oscillated between outright rejection in favor of local tradition or guarded adaptation of isolated elements that suited local interests.²⁷ Serious challenges to Alexander's invented tradition of the Persian War had, of course, already taken place during his lifetime. Thebes recalled the idea of the Persian War as a war fought for freedom and whose memory could be summoned against any force (Greek or barbarian) attempting to disturb the system of autonomous poleis. Sparta asserted a much narrower, more proprietary, claim on the Persian War. Alexander took both challenges seriously and made a point of responding forcefully in terms that put the question of the Persian War tradition front and center. But the most critical challenge erupted upon word of his death when Athens led a large and well-financed effort against Macedonian rule in the Lamian War (323-322 B.C.).

Alexander had made free use of Athenian imagery to flesh out his conception of the Persian War. But despite the undeniably prominent place Athens enjoyed in this new tradition, Alexander never squelched or replaced older traditions (Worthington 2000: 94). When word of Alexander's death reached Athens, the old Athenocentric memory of the Persian War was once again employed. Diodorus, relying now on the estimable historian

²⁷ Flower (2000a: 131) cautiously concludes that "it is unlikely that Alexander's panhellenism had no effect whatsoever on popular opinion".

Hieronymus of Cardia, relates the substance of the message the Athenians sent throughout Greece when they announced their intention to revolt from Macedon:

The orators...moved a decree...that they dispatch ambassadors to approach the Greek cities and inform them that in the past as well the Athenian people, judging all Greece to be the common homeland of the Greeks, defeated the barbarians by sea when they fought to enslave them and now think they must fight in the forefront with their bodies, treasure, and ships on behalf of the common salvation of the Greeks (Diod. 18.10.2-3).²⁸

The emphasis given to Greece as the common homeland of all Greeks recalls Philip and Alexander's pan-Greek memory, but even in this declaration intended for a non-Athenian audience, the old Athenocentrism shines through. Although the Persian War is fought in common defense of Greece, it is Athens that does all the fighting. The rest of Greece stands passive. Within the larger context this reference to the Persian War serves a familiar function. It justifies the hegemony of one state (Athens) over the rest who are indebted to the hegemon for specific services rendered during the great Persian War.

As the first year of the Lamian War drew to a close Hyperides delivered the customary eulogy for the fallen. Large parts of that speech survive. Two references to the Persian War provide a unique contemporary insight into an Athenian conception of that war immediately after Alexander's death. In describing the recent Athenian victory over the Macedonians at Thermopylae Hyperides recalls the earlier battle fought there against Xerxes: "from there he came to Thermopylae and took the passes through which

²⁸ οἱ ῥήτορες...ἔγραψαν ψήφισμα...ἐκπέμψαι δὲ καὶ πρέσβεις τοὺς ἐπελευσομένους τὰς Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ διδάξοντας ὅτι καὶ πρότερον μὲν ὁ δῆμος, τὴν Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν κοινὴν εἶναι πατρίδα κρίνων τῶν Ἑλλήνων, τοὺς ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ στρατευσαμένους βαρβάρους ἡμύνατο κατὰ θάλασσαν καὶ νῦν οἴεται δεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων σωτηρίας καὶ σώμασι καὶ χρήμασι καὶ ναυσὶ προκινδυνεύειν.

also before this time the barbarians marched against the Greeks” (*Hyp. Epit.* 12).²⁹

Macedon, far from sharing in the Persian War tradition along with all Greece, is placed rather in parallel with the Persians (see Worthington 2000: 95 and Herrman 2009: 23). Moreover, the sentence denies any explicit credit to the Spartans or Greeks in general for attempting to stop this earlier attack. Hyperides again cites the Persian War as a point of comparison with the present conflict when he considers the valor of the fallen:

Of those in the next generation who accomplished deeds
worthy of their ancestors, I mention those around Miltiades,
Themistocles, and the others who in freeing Greece brought
esteem to their homeland and made their own lives
honorable (*Hyp. Epit.* 37).³⁰

The exclusive claim of the Athenians on the Persian War is restated. Those who fought with Miltiades, Themistocles, and Athens’ other generals freed Greece and consequently conferred honor on their polis. Gone are the broad strokes of Alexander’s pan-Greek memory designed specifically to undermine the claims of individual states on the Persian War. Hyperides’ war is the private possession of Athens. Details are cited to prove the case. The claims of the other participating states are ignored; that of Macedon is rejected.

Elsewhere Alexander’s new memorial traditions seem to have had more success. In the Greek Anthology an anonymous epigram survives purporting to be a dedication in honor of the Thespians who accompanied Alexander on his grand expedition against Persia:

²⁹ ἔντεῦθεν δ’ ἐλθὼν εἰς Πύλας καὶ καταλαβὼν τὰς [πα]ρόδους, δι’ ὧν καὶ πρότερον ἐ[πὶ τ]οὺς Ἑλλήνας οἱ βάρβαροι ἐ[πο]ρεύθησαν...

³⁰ [τ]ῶν <δὲ> μετ’ ἐκείνους μὲν [γ]εγεννημένων, ἄξια [δ]ὲ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀρε[τ]ῆς διαπεπραγμένων, [λ]έγω δὴ τοὺς περὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἳ τὴν Ἑλλάδα [ἐ]λευθερώσαντες ἔντιμον μὲν τὴν πατρίδα κατέστησαν, ἔνδοξον <δὲ> τὸν αὐτῶν βίον <ἐ>ποίησαν,...

Spacious Thespieae once sent these men with arms against
barbarian Asia as avengers of their ancestors. They
destroyed the cities of the Persians with Alexander and
erected a cunningly-wrought tripod to Zeus the Thunderer
(AP 334).³¹

The Persian War as a past wrong requiring vengeance – a centerpiece of Philip and Alexander’s tradition – appears prominently. The destruction of Persepolis, perhaps Alexander’s most impressive commemoration, is recalled. Although these prominent elements of the new Persian War tradition could be celebrated at Thespieae, it is important to point out a signal change in perspective. The memory recalled in the Thespian epigram is Thespian, not Greek. It is Thespieae that sends troops to Asia to avenge its ancestors. Alexander is mentioned, but the Macedonians and the other Greek allies disappear. The wrongs avenged are not those Alexander used to typify Persian impiety – the burning of the Athens and the profanation of temples there – but rather those related more intimately to Thespieae, presumably the destruction of that city and its temples. The influence of Alexander on Thespieae’s memory of the Persian War past is undeniable. But the Thespians did not accept *in toto* the memory being generated from the top. They took what elements they found advantageous and adapted them to their own local interests.

Over time, however, the impact of Alexander’s construction of a pan-Greek frame within which to recall the war was hard to escape. Philip and Alexander’s new conception of the Persian War was the product of a new regime of power relationships that despite significant changes and fluctuations remained in force for centuries to come. In many ways it was a different world after Alexander, one in which the Persian War

³¹

Θεσπιαὶ εὐρύχοροι πέμψαν ποτὲ τούσδε σὺν ὅπλοις
τιμῶρους προγόνων βάρβαρον εἰς Ἀσίην,
οἱ μετ’ Ἀλεξάνδρου Περσῶν ἄστη καθελόντες
στήσαν Ἐριβρεμέτη δαιδάλεον τρίποδα.

traditions of the classical period were increasingly out of place. Local memories of the Persian War remain vibrant, but the tendency to think in terms of larger collectives was becoming an increasingly popular element both within and beyond the old states of mainland Greece.

The point is made most succinctly if we return to Athens. It is telling that when in the mid-third century the Athenians attempted to resist the extension of Antigonid power from the old Macedonian homeland they evoked the Persian War in terms more reminiscent of Alexander than Isocrates or Hyperides. In 265/4 the Athenian Chremonides moved a resolution confirming a perpetual alliance with Sparta and others against Antigonid Macedon. The decree begins with a sizeable recapitulation of the events of the Persian War:

Previously the Athenians, Lacedaemonians, and their allies concluded a common friendship and alliance with each other, competed together in many glorious battles against those attempting to enslave their cities, and from this acquired honor for themselves and provided freedom to the other Greeks (Syll³ 434/5).³²

The Athenians still play a prominent role, and the unit of conceptual measure remains the polis, but now Athens shares center stage with Sparta and the other allied states. This large collective makes common cause against the enemy and thus gains glory for itself and provides freedom to the rest of the Greeks. The role the decree concedes to the Spartans and the other allies is immediately striking. While the credit goes to those who specifically fought against the Persians (not the Greeks generally), this is not the kind of

³² πρότερον μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι οἱ ἐκατέρων φίλιαν καὶ συμμαχίαν κοινὴν ποιησάμενοι πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς ἀγῶνας ἡγωνίσαντο μετ' ἁλλήλων πρὸς τοὺς καταδουλοῦσθαι τὰς πόλεις ἐπιχειροῦντας, ἐξ ὧν ἑαυτοῖς τε δόξαν ἐκτήσαντο καὶ ἄλλοις Ἑλλήσιν παρσκεύασαν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.

Persian War that appears in the Athenian monuments of the fifth century or in the various orations of the fourth. Athenocentrism is toned down to virtual silence – and that in a decree moved by an Athenian with the approval of the Athenian demos. True, the purpose of the decree is to confirm a large alliance and in this circumstance such a broader view of the Persian War is appropriate, but we should keep in mind that Isocrates had a similar purpose when writing his *Panegyricus* and that did not stop him from producing a patently Athenocentric account. The mere fact that the decree mentions the allies at all, much less gives them an equal share of the credit, suggests that by the mid-third century Alexander's emphasis on larger frames of recollection was beginning to become a force even in this bastion of the old tradition.

If there is a success story to tell about the invented tradition that emerges in the wake of Chaeronea, it is not ultimately to be found in the poleis of old Greece that had joined together to repel the Persian invader so long ago. Despite being open to using some of the conceptual frames, themes and strategies developed by Alexander, despite partaking in the celebration of panhellenic unity at Plataea, despite being mired in a power structure that relegated them to increasing political insignificance; these states remained by and large loyal to the old ways (themselves constantly revised) well into the imperial period (see Cartledge and Spawforth 1992: 190-93 and Alcock 2002: 74-86).

Where Alexander's invented tradition had the most success was within the much larger Hellenistic world he had created. The emerging powers of that new world had little use for the old tradition of proprietary state memories that would wholly exclude them from this valuable piece of commemorative and ideological property. Rather, they made use of the very strategies Alexander developed to associate themselves with the

glorious Persian War past. For example, Antigonos Monophthalmos and his son Demetrius Poliorcetes, Polyperchon, and Ptolemy Soter all attempted to evoke the Persian War by restoring the Hellenic League at Corinth as did Philip and Alexander, and they were not the last (Dixon 2007). Ptolemy Philadelphus received honorable mention in the Glaucon decree (11) and stood behind the larger effort to oppose Antigonos Gonatus, which was itself steeped in Persian War memory (*CAH*² 7.1: 236-40). Attalus I drew parallels between his own victory over the Gauls and the Persian War by dedicating a monument depicting it along with Marathon and two mythological scenes (the Gigantomachy and Amazonomachy in imitation of the Stoa Poikile) on the Athenian Acropolis, much as Alexander had done in the case of Granicus (Paus. 1.25.2; see also Pliny *HN* 34.84). The greatly altered relationships of power surrounding these commemorative acts and the incredulity with which they were probably viewed, allow us here for the first time in my opinion to speak of true *lieux de mémoire* in reference to the Persian War (see above, Introduction, pp. 25-6 and 31).

Ultimately, Alexander's greatest legacy in terms of Persian War memory was that he had created a way for those who had not participated in that war to claim it as their own. Once broken from the hold of those who participated in the event itself, the potential for exporting the Persian War to ever larger audiences was limitless. If all mainland Greece could enjoy what had once belonged to a few, why not all Greeks? If all Greeks, why not those claiming to have taken up the mantle of Greece? So enters Rome and the modern West.

The relationship between memory and power is undeniable, but it is not simple or direct. A powerful group or individual cannot literally reshape recollections about the past held by others. Power affords a social prominence to the recollection of the powerful, but that prominence does not necessarily translate into acceptance. The fate of Philip and Alexander's commemorative program did not hinge on the power that accrued to them personally, which collapsed rapidly after the death of Alexander, but rather on the wider networks of power relationships that their victory at Chaeronea had irreparably altered. A system of city-states kept in balance by a broad distribution of power had now fallen into orbit around the preponderant power of Macedon. This was a change in the substructure of power and transcended the mere question of what individual claimed to sit at the top. Had Philip opted for a traditional, state-centered memory as unsuited to the new substructure as those before, it too would have fallen into disuse outside Macedon despite the personal power he and his son commanded. But Philip and Alexander were alive to the new realities, and it is for this reason that their invented tradition continued to impact the Greek and Mediterranean worlds long after their deaths.

CONCLUSION: GREEK MEMORIAL CULTURE

In 338 Philip of Macedon marched south to face the combined armies of Thebes, Athens, and their allies. Philip won and within months called a general assembly to Corinth. It was an invitation only one refused. At Corinth, where a little over 140 years before the Greeks sent *probouloi* to empower Sparta to lead a coalition against Persia, Philip began to craft a new tradition of the Persian War that would in time far outshine the old traditions of mainland Greece. It is a singular irony that this turn of events was itself caused by a dispute over how the Persian War should be remembered (see above, Introduction, pp. 1-3). The event that had in popular imagination secured Greek freedom ultimately delivered them all into the thrall of King Philip. In this study I have attempted to examine those aspects of Persian War memory that animated the dispute that led to the battle of Chaeronea – a dispute triggered by the golden shields dedicated by the Athenians at Delphi.

The inscription on the Athenian shields suggested a particular story about the Persian War, one in which Athens alone emerged victorious and Thebes lived forever under the taint of ignominious betrayal. Viewing the shields from the temple terrace, Aeschines needed only to turn around to see a host of different Persian War stories. While divisions within the Greek tradition about the Persian War are generally recognized, the depth of those divisions has gone largely unexplored. In fact the different

commemorative narratives that would have surrounded Aeschines at Delphi and appeared throughout the Greek world did not fit within one generally recognized story of the Persian War. Rather, each evoked more or less distinct master narratives that supplied the larger commemorative context for the monument. An examination of even so basic an element of these larger Persian War stories as when the war began and when it ended reveals profound differences within and between states. This is not to say that differences were total; quite the contrary. The Greeks, regardless of their wartime performance, were members of a larger imagined community of Greeks that shared certain notions about how the world worked, called metanarratives. These metanarratives as well as certain elementary facts emerging from the event itself ensured a degree of mutual intelligibility. The Greek memory of the Persian War was fractured, not shattered.

Memorial communities are everywhere and come in all sizes. A state as complex as Athens – to say nothing of the assemblage of poleis and ethnoi that made up the imagined community of Greeks – is likely to be an intricate hive of overlapping memorial communities. Differences can (or rather could if the evidence were extant) be found at every level. Yet there are good reasons to suspect that the most significant differences emerged between city states. Poleis were the most well organized and well funded imagined communities in Greece at the time. As such, these communities exerted a great deal of reciprocal pressure on their members. This reciprocal pressure predisposed the Greeks to recall the Persian War in terms of their polis. Even before the first blows were struck at Thermopylae the participants would have framed the coming threat within the pre-existing collective memories of their respective poleis. During the war combatants were assigned expeditions, arranged in the line of battle, and fought according to these

same state divisions. As a result, few had the same real experience of the war. After the fighting participants returned home where the preponderant reciprocal pressure of the polis continued to shape Persian War memory as present interests demanded. Mounting hostilities between former Hellenic League allies only exacerbated existing differences. The dissonant chorus of state commemorations that met Aeschines at Delphi in 340/39 was therefore not a new phenomenon. The Greek states that had taken part in the Persian War had never found much common ground as to the facts, meaning, or implications of that war.

The inscription on the Athenian shields makes particular reference to the Greeks as the party against whom the Persians and Thebans fought. The imagined community of Greeks is frequently invoked in the monuments and narratives of the Persian War. The Persian invasion was, after all, defeated by a coalition of Greek states, and Herodotus suggests that panhellenism was very much a part of the rhetoric of the hour. But the imagined community of Greeks did not exert the same kind of reciprocal pressure as did the poleis. Individuals could imagine themselves Greeks, but the lines of exchange connecting those Greeks were so sparse that little beyond the basic cultural assumptions about the world held currency throughout. For a time several Greek states were politically connected by the Hellenic League, but this group was too weak and temporary to resist the influence of the individual poleis. Although the Greeks who fought against Xerxes erected several monuments in common, none managed to express the collective memory of the larger community. Rather, each was executed by an intermediary, and as a result its panhellenic message was positioned by a particular polis. The notion of the larger community of Greeks was a prominent and important concept, but the community

itself remained inert and passive, more a point of reference or audience than an agent in its own right.

It was in fact the juxtaposition of strong state memorial communities within a weak Greek community that spurred the fierce competition that can be seen at Delphi. Had the community of Greeks exerted formidable reciprocal pressure, this competition would have been more restrained, not unlike that which occurred within the state. On the other hand, if the larger community had exerted no reciprocal pressure, if the Greeks did not share a memorial community at all; there would have been as little memorial competition as there was between Sparta and Persia. Indeed, the grand monuments erected at Delphi would have been unthinkable without a larger community. The Persian War was a frequently used weapon in the unceasing competition over privileges and honors precisely because it could be portrayed as a panhellenic event to a larger Greek audience. The Athenians spent vast sums publicizing their own contributions to the war effort. Other lesser powers also spent considerable resources desperately trying to avoid the dangers that came with failing the 'Greek' cause. The weakness of the panhellenic memorial community perpetuated this competition. There was no center to validate one past over the other. Even if there were a center, dominance gained there would have had very little impact since the panhellenic community lacked the reciprocal pressure to maintain a single notion of the past throughout Greece. Memories competed decade after decade from the Persian War right up to the year Aeschines arrived in Delphi as representative to the Amphictyony.

The regime of power relationships centered on the polis that ensured the weakness of the larger Greek collective came crashing down in 338 when the dispute over the

Athenian shields got out of hand and triggered a war. Mainland Greece with the exception of Sparta was now bound within a single political organization. With Philip and his son Alexander at the helm the imagined community of Greeks was vastly more capable of exerting a reciprocal pressure comparable to that of the individual member states. The Macedonian dynasts wanted to secure their authority over Greece and mount a substantial invasion of the Persian Empire. To ground their ambitions in the hallowed past they invented a new tradition, one that denied the spotlight to any single polis and emphasized the notion of the Persian War as an ethnic war of Greeks versus Persians. Both of these aspects served to make the Persian War a memory for all Greeks and not just for those whose ancestors fought the war. Without the massive realignment of power relationships after Chaeronea, however, it would have been unthinkable to put Greece ahead of the various poleis. Even with it Alexander's new tradition had only a modest impact on the city-states of old Greece. It was in the larger Mediterranean world that Alexander's new tradition proved the most successful. There it continued to influence the Persian War memories of a much broader audience long after the squabbles that consumed Aeschines' time in Delphi ceased to be fully comprehensible.

My thesis focuses on Persian War memory within a restricted time frame, but some basic conclusions applicable to Greek memorial culture in general can be drawn. Persian War memory broke apart because the memorial community of the Greeks was only loosely connected and consequently exerted slight reciprocal pressure on its members. These same factors would have greatly predisposed the recollection of other recent events and indeed the grand narratives of the past in general to become as distinct and localized as

that of the Persian War. Participation in the Persian War was quite broad, and still no single story of that ‘panhellenic’ event managed dominance throughout Greece, and those that appear to have achieved some broader popularity did not retain it for long. For example, several states implicitly accepted Sparta’s rewriting of the Persian War past in the years after the Peloponnesian War, but even so gossamer an acquiescence as that could not last. If we take into account the regional and truly local events which must have further distorted perceptions of the past between states, it is difficult not to conclude that the master narratives of the Persian War probably reveal more agreement than we would expect from the grand narratives in which they fit. With no dominant narrative to act as a pan-Greek default, there would not have been one history of Greece for contemporaries to draw on, but countless histories, each implicitly claiming the same validity as the rest.

The weakness of the Greek memorial community not only prompted memories to fracture, it also inclined those fractures to run quite deep. The late senator from New York, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, once famously said, “everyone is entitled to his own opinions, but not his own facts.” The implication of this observation is that while we may arrange the facts in different constellations and use them in the service of different conclusions, the ‘facts’ remain. In a sense, Hayden White (1978) draws on a similar concept when he argues that historical narratives become meaningful when certain facts from a larger ‘chronicle’ are emplotted into a story. Again, the facts remain above the fray. My conclusions uphold the basic sentiment, but demand some qualification. The Greeks tended to use their own experience to craft narratives of the past; that is, they do not generally seem to have wholly fabricated the past as present needs demanded. Yet it

would go too far to suggest that in such a divisive memorial culture a generally recognized chronicle of facts could be cited for or against the stories of the past then in circulation. Disagreements in the classical period could and often did turn on mere matters of interpretation, but they could also go much deeper. Herodotus cites an Athenian story in which the Corinthians attempt to flee from Salamis, a matter of fact that he says the Corinthians and the other Greeks disputed (8.94). He also notes that the Corinthians and many other allies played no part in the battle of Plataea (9.69). Again the facts were in question. Simonides seems to have praised the Corinthians for their role in that battle (see above, chapter 3, p. 156). Moreover, the battlefield itself was marked by numerous tombs, all asserting a contrary set of facts about that event (Hdt. 9.85). The Greeks certainly felt entitled to their own opinions, but not infrequently they also staked claims to their own facts as well.

Recognizing the greater latitude afforded the recollections of the past apparent in Greek memorial culture also suggests some broader lessons for the study of classical history. We should not assume the presence or knowledge of a single notion of the past, much less the one that modern scholarship has constructed over decades of careful research. Themistocles, Pausanias, Pericles, and Aeschines were closer to the events in question, but that does not guarantee they perceived them in what we would call an accurate way. Each may have in fact been animated by largely biased and in some cases fabricated perceptions of even the recent past. A similar note of caution should be voiced with regard to historiography. To say that a given account is inaccurate is the job of the historian, but we may go too far when we presume that the author or his audience would have been equally aware of the inaccuracies we observe. The figure for the number of

Athenian ships at Salamis that is asserted by Thucydides' Athenians is likely false (1.74.1). But to argue that the error is intentional in that Thucydides can assume his audience would recognize it as such (see Walters 1981 and Hornblower 1991a: 119), gives insufficient heed to the astounding variety of historical truths present in the classical period. It assumes the presence of an agreed-upon 'chronicle' of facts that could be consulted at any time. Historical truth was not nearly so monolithic. Indeed, Herodotus knew quite well that there were lots of pasts out there. The merits of some could be weighed, those of others could not (see, for example, Hdt. 7.151-2). The fallout over the Athenian shields at Delphi reminds us that perceptions of the past remained 'Herodotean' throughout the classical period. We abandon his more sensitive approach at our own peril.

My conclusions about the memories of the Persian War in the classical period also offer some insights into the larger issue of Greek identity. The presence of a sense of Greek identity is, of course, not in question. We know from our sources that the Greeks of the classical period perceived themselves as belonging to a larger collective of Greeks (see above, chapter 1, pp. 37-8). I argue merely that this collective failed to achieve any significant unanimity with regard to the Persian War and probably the past in general. Outside of certain shared cultural assumptions (metanarratives) and some elementary agreements deriving from shared experience, each state formed more or less distinct narratives about the past. The memory of the Persian War, far from binding the Greeks together, fractured along existing political lines and quickly became a tool of the divisive interstate politics that defined the age. The apparent implication is to call into


question the unifying role often attributed to the Persian War tradition. Yet this is not an inevitable or, I believe, persuasive conclusion.

Jan Assmann argues that disagreement lay at the very heart of the Greek *Schriftkultur* (1992: 259-92). A similar observation might be made about Greek memorial culture. The Persian War could serve to strengthen the bonds between Greeks not because it gave them a common past to agree on, but rather because it gave them a common past to dispute. Lines of exchange need not be coordinate. The conversation does not need to be amiable to forge collective bonds, it just needs to happen. Regional or local events in Attica or the Peloponnese provided less opportunity to forge more distant connections. The Persian War affected everyone. The memorial community of Greeks was far too weak to exert much pressure on how it was remembered, but it did provide a ready stage on which it could be remembered. We might think of Alexander I's entry into the Olympic Games as an apposite parallel (Hdt. 5.22). Winning mattered, yes; but in terms of identity what mattered more was being allowed to compete. The Persian War gave the Greeks something they could all disagree about, something they could all compete over. Such a divisive memorial culture would naturally limit the cohesiveness of any unifying identity – think again of Aeschines and the shields – but within those limits fierce competition could multiply the lines of exchange on which nascent memorial communities rely.

The past upon which the golden shields at Delphi pronounced judgment was a shifting web of distinct, but related notions. There was no larger consensus, no dominant narrative in comparison with which the probity of Athenian claims could be tested. From

the Athenian point of view, probably from Aeschines' as well, the inscription related a simple truth about the Persian War. For the other Greeks whose substantial efforts against Xerxes were elided, however, the dedication's single-minded focus on Athens must have seemed at best a half-truth. For the Thebans, whose support of the Greek cause prior to Thermopylae was forgotten in favor of their much-regretted brush with medism, the inscription was an impermissible insult. Philip likely received word of this burgeoning dispute with great interest. For the sake of the Persian War past, now just under a century and a half old, Athens and Thebes were accidentally giving him what he most wanted, an invitation into central Greece. It is impossible to know, but tempting to speculate, that the circumstances that led to Chaeronea further convinced Philip to invent a new Persian War tradition that would serve to unify Greece not through contestation and competition, but through agreement and consensus.

MAP: DELPHI



The map is modified from Bommelaer 1991: Plate 5. A select key is provided below.

104: Base of the Corcyrean Bull

105: Base of the Arcadians

108: Tegean Portico

109: Aegispotami Monument

110: Athenian Statue Group

111: Base of the Trojan Horse

112: Base of the Seven and Epigoni

113: Kings of Argos

223: Athenian Treasury

225: Athenian Statue Group

313: Athenian Portico

407: Base of the Serpent Column

408: Base of the Crotonians

410b: Base of the Salamis Apollo

417: Altar of Apollo

420: Bronze Palm Tree

422: Temple of Apollo

508: Base of the Corcyreans

518: Deinomenid Monuments

521: Apollo Sitalcas (?)

ABBREVIATIONS

CAH² = 1977-. *The Cambridge Ancient History*, Second Edition. Cambridge

DNP = 1996-2003. *Der Neue Pauly: Enzyklopädie der Antike*. Stuttgart.

FD = *Fouilles de Delphes*.

FD II (*Terrasse du Temple*) = Courby, F. 1915-1927. *La Terrasse du Temple* (3 fascicules). Paris.

FD II (*Le Trésor des Athéniens*) = Audiat, J. 1933. *Le Trésor des Athéniens*. Paris.

FD II (*La Colonne des Naxiens et le Portique des Athéniens*) = Amandry, P. 1953. *La Colonne des Naxiens et le Portique des Athéniens*. Paris.

FD III 1 = Bourguet, E. 1910-1929. *Inscriptions de l'entrée du Sanctuaire au Trésor des Athéniens*. Paris.

FD III 2 = Colin, G. 1909-1913. *Inscriptions du Trésor des Athéniens*. Paris.

FD III 3 = Daux, G. and A. Salac. 1932-1943. *Inscriptions depuis le Trésor des Athéniens jusqu'aux bases de Gélon*. Paris.

FD III 4.87-275 = Flacelière, R. 1954. *Inscriptions de la Terrasse du Temple*. Paris.

FD III 4.351-516 = Pouilloux, J. 1976. *Inscriptions de la Terrasse du Temple et de la région Nord du sanctuaire*, n°351-516. Paris.

FGrHist = Jacoby, F. 1923-58. *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*. Leiden.

ML = Meiggs, R. and D. Lewis. 1969. *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* Oxford.

Hill = Hill, G., R. Meiggs, and A. Andrewes. 1951. *Sources for Greek History between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars*. Oxford.

IG = 1873 -. *Inscriptiones Graecae*. Berlin.

PCG = Kassel, R. and C. Austin. 1983 – . *Poetae Comici Graeci*. Berlin.

Syll = Dittenberger, W. 1915-24. *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*. Leipzig.

TrGF = Schnell, B., R. Kannicht, and S. Radt (eds.) 1971 – . *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*. Berlin.

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