

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**POL 23-8 DOMA RED**43*

50ms

SECRET

Action

009415

ARA

Info

1967 APR 11 AM 1 04

SS

GPM

SP

SC

L

H

SAL

P

USIA

NSG

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

OPR

RSR

ZCZCESA 16EXX081SDA741

PP RUEHC

DE RUESSD 554S/1 1010320

ZNY SSSSS

P R 110219Z APR 67

FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO RUEOE/AMCONSUL SAGODELOSCABALLEROS

STATE GRNC

BT

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 SANTO DOMINGO 3115

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENTS SINCE IMBERT SHOOTING

1. SERIES DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING POLITICAL AND MILITARY SECTORS SINCE ATTEMPT ASSASSINATE IMBERT MARCH 21 HAVE PRODUCED NEW AND PERHAPS MOST FLUID POLITICO-MILITARY SITUATION SINCE BALAGUER TOOK OFFICE. THIS MESSAGE RELATES THESE DEVELOPMENTS TO EMERGING SITUATION AND ATTEMPTS ASSESS THEIR SIGNIFICANCE ON BASIS EVIDENCE NOW AVAILABLE. WE WISH EMPHASIZE AT OUTSET, HOWEVER, THAT PUBLIC AT LARGE, PARTICULARLY OUTSIDE CAPITAL, GENERALLY UNAWARE BACKGROUND OF AND LARGELY UNAFFECTED BY THESE DEVELOPMENTS. THEREFORE, EXCEPT FOR USUAL SPATE VAGUE AND CONTRADICTORY RUMORS AND OCCASIONAL ISOLATED INCIDENTS NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO CURRENT SITUATION, NATION HAS REMAINED TRANQUIL AND RELATIVELY UNCONCERNED THROUGHOUT.

PAGE TWO RUESSD 554S/1 S E C R E T

2. MAJOR FACTORS BEARING ON THIS ANALYSIS ARE FOLLOWING:
A. BRAZEN DAYLIGHT ATTACK ON IMBERT, WHICH RESURRECTED HIM FROM RELATIVE OBLIVION HE ENTERED IN SEPTEMBER 1965 AND RAISED HIM AND AMIAMA TO GREATEST "ANTI-TRUJILLISTA" EMINENCE ENJOYED SINCE COUNCIL OF STATE DAYS. THIS EXPRESSED IN POLITICAL, NOT POPULAR, TERMS, HOWEVER, AND HEAVILY EXPLOITED FOR OWN PURPOSES BY ELEMENTS OF BOTH LEFT AND RIGHT;

B. BALAGUER'S GENUINE CONCERN OVER IMPLICATIONS OF SHOOTING AND ENSUING DEVELOPMENTS FOR CONTINUED STABILITY OF NATIONS, WHICH HAS BEEN GIVEN EXPRESSION IN HIS COOPERATION WITH AND ACQUIESCENCE IN AMIAMA'S NEEDS AND DESIRES RE INVESTIGATION;

SECRET

MICROFILMED BY RS/E

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NN 969000*

SECRET

-2- SECTION 1 of 3 SANTO DOMINGO 3115, 110219Z APR. 67

C. IMBERT'S AND AMIAMA'S QUICK ATTRIBUTION OF BLAME FOR ATTACK ON "TRUJILLISTAS," POPULAR ACCEPTANCE THEREOF, AND ATTENDANT FOCUS OF INVESTIGATION ON ELEMENTS DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH TRUJILLO FAMILY OR IN AIR FORCE AT SAN ISIDRO, ALL OF WHICH HAS FREED OTHER INITIALLY SUSPECT SECTORS, PARTICULARLY IN LEFT, TO PURSUE OWN AIMS AND EXPLOIT SITUATION AS THEY DEEM FIT;

PAGE THREE RUESSD 554S/1 S E C R E T
D. AMIAMA'S SUCCESS IN DIRECT CONFRONTATIONS WITH PRESIDENT IN FORCING REMOVAL (EVENTUALLY FROM POLICE FORCE AND FROM CAPITAL) OF FORMER POLICE CHIEF TEJEDA ALVAREZ, WHICH HAS STRENGTHENED AMIAMA'S ALREADY STRONG HAND AND MAY HAVE EMBOLDENED HIM AND HIS SUPPORTERS SEEK TO WIDEN THEIR BEACHHEAD IN GOVERNMENT;

E. IMPRESSIVE MILITARY COOPERATION WITH INVESTIGATION UNDER ARMED FORCES SECRETARY PEREZ Y PEREZ, SOME ASPECTS OF WHICH HAVE SEEMED HUMILIATING TO CERTAIN MILITARY ELEMENTS, AND WHICH HAS STRAINED INTRA-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS AND WEAKENED POSITION OF PEREZ Y PEREZ WITH MILITARY. VIOLATION HERETOFORE SACROSANCT SAN ISIDRO--WHICH MORE THAN ANY OTHER SECTOR UNDER GUN OF INVESTIGATION--HAS STIRRED AIR FORCE ELEMENTS AND HEIGHTENED POSSIBILITY ALLIANCES BETWEEN CERTAIN MILITARY ELEMENTS AND INTERESTED POLITICAL SECTORS;

F. FURTHER WEAKENING OF PEREZ' POSITION BY AMIAMA--STIMULATED OR ENDORSED PRAISE FOR PEREZ IN EL NACIONAL AND BY PRD, BOTH ANATHEMA TO MILITARY, WHICH COULD DEVELOP PRESSURE FOR HIS EVENTUAL REPLACEMENT AND AT LEAST TEMPORARILY STRAIN, IF NOT BREAK, MOLD INTO WHICH MILITARY HAS SETTLED OVER PAST 14 MONTHS;

PAGE FOUR RUESSD 554S/1 S E C R E T
G. AMIAMA-PRD COLLABORATION ON PRD'S OPEN LETTER TO AMIAMA, WHICH HAS GIVEN EVIDENCE OF A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEM THAT IS CLOSER THAN PREVIOUSLY BELIEVED AND HAS RAISED SERIOUS QUESTIONS AS TO THEIR ULTIMATE INTENTIONS AND OBJECTIVES; AND

SECRET

SECRET

-3- SECTION 1 of 3 SANTO DOMINGO 3115, 110219Z APR. 67

H. NIVAR SEIJAS TRANSFER TO FIRST BRIGADE AND APPOINTMENT NEW POLICE CHIEF IN WHOSE ABILITY COME THROUGH IN CRUNCH PRESIDENT SAID TO HAVE FULL CONFIDENCE, WHICH MOVES SEEM AT LEAST IN PART TO HAVE BEEN INTENDED CONSOLIDATE PRESIDENT'S SECURITY BASE IN CAPITAL IN POSSIBLE PREPARATION FOR EVENTUAL CONFRONTATION WITH EITHER POLITICAL OR MILITARY TROUBLEMAKERS IN EVENT INVESTIGATION FAILS OR SAN ISIDRO RESISTS FURTHER COOPERATION WITH IT.

3. THESE FACTORS, AND OTHER LESSER ONES, HAVE RESULTED IN NEW AND FLUID SITUATION WITH POTENTIAL FOR CREATION AND/OR CONSOLIDATION NEW POLITICAL AND POLITICO-MILITARY ALIGNMENTS AND ALLIANCES THAT APPEARED MORE DIFFICULT OF ACHIEVEMENT BEFORE ATTACK ON IMBERT. WHILE THERE IS LITTLE HARD EVIDENCE INDICATE THAT ANY OF THESE NEW OR REVISED RELATIONSHIPS ARE YET BEYOND PLANNING OR FORMATIVE STAGES, VARIOUS ASPECTS OF SITUATION CURRENTLY WARRANT CLOSE EXAMINATION. MOST POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT OF THESE ARE: A) DEVELOPING AMIAMA-PRD RELATIONSHIP;

PAGE FIVE RUESSD 5545/1 S E C R E T

B) AMIAMA'S OWN ULTIMATE INTENTIONS AND OBJECTIVES; AND C) EFFECT OF THESE AND OTHER FACTORS ON INTRA-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS AND OVERALL MILITARY POSTURE TOWARDS BALAGUER.

4. SEEDS OF POTENTIALLY ACTIVE AMIAMA-PRD RELATIONSHIP WERE SOWN AT LEAST TWO MONTHS BEFORE IMBERT SHOOTING VIA PENA GOMEZ VISITS TO AMIAMA, WHICH LATTER REPORTEDLY INTERPRETED AS PRD SOUNDINGS AS TO HIS WILLINGNESS PARTICIPATE IN OR EVEN LEAD BROAD ANTI-TRUJILLISTA MOVEMENT IN OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT. QUITE ASIDE FROM PRD APPROACHES, AMIAMA EVEN THEN HAD, IN HIS VIEW, GOOD POLITICAL AND PERSONAL REASONS FOR DISSATISFACTION WITH BALAGUER. HE CONSIDERED BALAGUER TOO WEAK RESIST ONSLAUGHT OF "TRUJILLISTAS" SURROUNDING HIM AND BELIEVED HE HAD SUFFERED PERSONAL AFFRONT IN FORM OF REDUCTION HIS PENSION AND PERSONAL GUARD CONTINGENT, DOWNGRADING OF MAY 30 CELEBRATION, AND SUMMARY DISMISSAL FROM GOVERNMENT OF HIS CLOSE POLITICAL AND PERSONAL FRIEND, TABARE ALVAREZ. NOTWITHSTANDING THIS, HE APPEARED RELUCTANT THROW IN WITH PENA GOMEZ (WHOSE PERSONAL EMISSARY, CESAR ROQUE, HAS BEFORE AND SINCE IMBERT SHOOTING BEEN FREQUENT VISITOR TO AMIAMA'S HOME).

GP-2 CRIMMINS
BT

SECRET

POL 23-8 DOM REP

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

50-S

SECRET

Action
ARA
Info
SS
GPM
SP
SC
L
H
SAL
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
OPR
RSR

KVZCZCESB003EXX085VV SDA742

009414
1967 APR 11 AM 12.59

PP RUEHC
DE RUESSD 555S/2 1010350
ZNY SSSSS
P R 110219Z APR 67
FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUESOE/AMCONSUL SAGODELOSCABALLEROS
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 SANTO DOMINGO 3115

5. (A) PRD MEANWHILE HELD ITS NATIONAL COUNCIL AND BEGAN ORGANIZATIONAL WORK FOR CONSTRUCTION, "WITHOUT DISTINCTIONS OF IDEOLOGY", OF "VAST MOVEMENT OF RESISTANCE" TO BALAGUER. IT HAS BEEN SEEKING TO BROADEN ITS POWER BASE WITH STUDENT, LABOR AND OTHER SECTORS AS MEANS OF CREATING POSITION FROM WHICH IT APPARENTLY HOPES BE ABLE EXERT STRONGEST POSSIBLE PRESSURE ON ADMINISTRATION. WHAT SUCCESS IT WILL ACHIEVE REMAINS TO BE SEEN. BUT ITS CHANCES OF SUCCESS WOULD INCREASE CONSIDERABLY WERE IT ABLE DRAW UPON POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES (AND MILITARY POTENTIAL) OF WHAT MAY BE CALLED "CIVICO" RIGHT, I.E., THOSE VEHEMENTLY "ANTI-TRUJILLISTA" ELEMENTS OF RIGHT WHO HELD SWAY DURING COUNCIL OF STATE AND MOST OF TRIUMVIRATE PERIOD AND WHO HAVE BEEN DEPRIVED OF THEIR ZEALOUSLY GUARDED POSITIONS OF POWER AND INFLUENCE SINCE SEPTEMBER 1965. IT IS THESE ELEMENTS FOR WHOM AMIAMA IS NOW, IF HE WAS NOT BEFORE, MAJOR SPOKESMAN AND STANDARD-BEARER.

PAGE TWO RUESSD 555S/2 S E C R E T

(B) COUNTERPART OF THIS PRD INTEREST IS "CIVICO" RIGHT'S OWN NEED FOR SUPPORT OUTSIDE ITS OWN RANKS IN ORDER GIVE ACCEPTABLE "POPULAR" COVER TO ITS PURSUIT ITS OBJECTIVES AND TO MAKE THESE OBJECTIVES ATTAINABLE IN FACE BROAD MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SUPPORT ENJOYED BY BALAGUER. IMMEDIATE "CIVICO" OBJECTIVES ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE OF PRD: THEY WISH FORCE BALAGUER INTO RESPONSIVENESS TO AND DEPENDENCE ON THEM FOR CONTINUED STABILITY. ULTIMATELY "CIVICOS" -- AS WELL AS ELEMENTS OF LEFT -- SEEK POWER FOR THEMSELVES, OR AT LEAST POSITION FROM WHICH POWER IS MORE NEARLY ATTAINABLE THAN IT IS NOW.

(C) ELEMENTS WERE IN PLACE, THEN, FOR NEW OR CLOSER ALLIANCES BEFORE IMBERT WAS SHOT. BUT BEFORE ATTACK BALGUER HELD ALMOST ALL KEY CARDS. HE HAD ACHIEVED RATHER DEFT BALANCE

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 - SANTO DOMINGO 3115, 110219Z APRIL 67 (SECTION II OF III)
OF POLITICAL FORCES, ENJOYED BROAD POPULAR SUPPORT, IMPETUS
HIS ECONOMIC PROGRAMS WAS BEGINNING BE FELT, AND MILITARY GAVE
NO SIGNS OF SIGNIFICANT DISSATISFACTION. THESE FAVORABLE
FACTORS MADE GOVERNMENT RELATIVELY INVULNERABLE TO DISJOINTED
ATTACKS OF DIVIDED OPPOSITION, EACH OF WHOSE MAJOR SECTORS
WAS PURSUING ITS OWN COURSE AND OBJECTIVES. PRD PROBABLY

PAGE RUESSD 555S/2 S E C R E T

VIEWED SHOOTING OF IMBERT AS POTENTIAL CATALYST WHICH IT COULD
TURN TO ITS ADVANTAGE. IT ALSO PROVIDED "CIVICOS" WITH
UNEXPECTED OPPORTUNITY BY GIVING ONE OF THEIR MORE RESPECT-
ABLE ELEMENTS (AMIAMA) Foothold IN GOVERNMENT FROM WHICH HE
CONA, IF HE SO CHOOSES, CREATE SERIOUS POLITICAL, MILITARY AND
DEPENDS IN GREAT MEASURE ON HIS INTENTIONS AND ULTIMATE
OBJECTIVES HE AND THOSE HE REPRESENTS MAY HAVE IN MIND.

6. (A) WHILE AMIAMA WAS THRUST ACCIDENTALLY INTO CURRENT
PROMINENCE, HIS PRIVATE STATEMENTS TO CAS SOURCES IMMEDIATELY
AFTER SHOOTING INDICATED HE VIEWED INCIDENT AS CLEAR ILLUS-
TRATION OF NEED TO FORCE DISMANTLING OF WHAT HIS GROUP CON-
SIDERS DANGEROUS "TRUJILLISTA" EDIFICE -- WHICH DIRECTLY
THREATENS THEIR INTERESTS AND, IN THEIR VIEW, POSSIBLY THEIR
LIVES -- BEING BUILT AROUND PRESIDENT AND BEHIND HIS BACK.
(BEFORE SHOOTING AMIAMA HAD SHOWN LITTLE FAITH IN BALAGUER'S
WILLINGNESS OR ABILITY PREVENT GROWTH OF "TRUJILLISTAS"
INFLUENCE). WE INFER THAT TEARING DOWN EDIFICE WOULD, IN
AMIAMA'S VIEW, SERVE DOUBLE PURPOSE OF REDRESSING BALANCE OF
POWER ON RIGHT AND MINIMIZING CHANCES OF FOLLOW-UP-ATTACK ON

PAGE FOUR RUESSD 555S/2 S E C R E T

IMBERT OR HIMSELF. THIS OBJECTIVE WOULD SEEM TO RANK IN HIS
MIND EQUALLY WITH HIS DESIRE SOLVE SHOOTING. ITS ATTAINMENT
WOULD CERTAINLY REDOUND MORE LASTINGLY TO HIS CREDIT IN CIR-
CLES WHICH NOW LOOK TO HIM AS COUNTERPOISE TO BALGUER AND
WOULD PROBABLY OPEN UP ENTIRELY NEW POLITICAL HORIZONS TO HIM --
AND TO THEM.

(B) MOST SESIRABLE RESOLUTION CURRENT SITUATION, TOWARDS
WHICH PRESIDENT HAS COOPERATED FULLY, WOULD, OF COURSE, BE
FOR AMIAMA TO SOLVE CRIME, TAKE HIS LAURELS AND GRACEFULLY
LEAVE GOVERNMENT. BUT AMIAMA'S PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO
"ANTI-TRUJILLISTA" CAUSE MIGHT MAKE HIM RELUCTANT TO LEAVE
WITHOUT HAVING SCORED SIGNIFICANT SUCCESSES TOWARDS

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 - SANTO DOMINGO 3115, 110219Z APRIL 67 (SECTION II OF III)

HIS POSSIBLE BROADER OBJECTIVE. INDICATIVE OF POSSIBILITY HE CONSIDERS HIS TENURE INDEFINITE, NOTWITHSTANDING HIS PRIVATE STATEMENTS TO EFFECT HE WOULD LEAVE OFFICE WITHIN MONTH -- WIN, LOSE, OR DRAW, HAVE BEEN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS PLEDGING TO LOOK INTO ALL UNSOLVED ISSUES INVOLVING POLICE, SUCH AS GUIDO GIL CASE. PRD HAS LENT ITS CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT TO BOLSTERING THIS STATED INTENTION BY PUBLICLY CHARGING AMIAMA WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR HALTING "REPRESSION" AND

PAGE FIVE RUESSD 555S/2 S E C R E T

PUNISHING ALL CRIMES COMMITTED "WITH IMPUNITY DURING BALAGUER GOVERNMENT", WARNING THAT "BLOOD WILL AGAIN RUN IN STREETS" IF AMIAMA FAILS. FACT THAT AMIAMA COLLABORATED IN PREPARATION PRD STATEMENT LENDS CREDENCE TO POSSIBILITY AMIAMA INTENDS ALLOW HIMSELF TO BE PRESSURED INTO SPEAR-HEADING OPPOSITION'S CAUSE IN BOSOM OF GOVERNMENT. (AMIAMA'S INITIAL RESPONSE TO PRD STATEMENT WAS APRIL 9 ORDER TO POLICE CHIEF PROHIBITING UNTOWARD POLICE BEHAVIOR AND REQUIRING THAT ALL INFRACTION OF LAWS, CONSTITUTION OR HUMAN RIGHTS, HOWEVER MINOR, BE REPORTED TO HIM IMMEDIATELY).

7. (A) ON OTHER HAND, AMIAMA AND HIS ASSOCIATES MAY FOR ONE OR ANOTHER REASON DECIDE THEIR PURPOSES WILL BE BETTER SERVED BY AMIAMA QUITTING IN HUFF. SHOULD AMIAMA CONSIDER HIS INVESTIGATION IS GETTING NOWHERE, WHICH NOT UNLIKELY, CONSIDERING PRESENT STATE OF INVESTIGATION, AND DECIDE TO COVER HIS FAILURE TO DELIVER ASSAILANTS BY CHARGING PRESIDENT WITH BREACH OF AITHH OR BLAME OBSTRUCTIONISM BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, HIS RESIGNATION MIGHT WELL SERVE UNITE ALL "ANTI-TRUJILLISTA" SECTORS IN OPPOSITION TO PRESIDENT UNDER AMIAMA'S STILL RESPECTABLE LEADERSHIP. SUCH DEVELOPMENT WOULD, OF COURSE, HASTEN FRUITION PRD'S MOVEMENT OF RESISTANCE. (INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, NUMBER HIGH GODR OFFICIALS HOLD AMIAMA KNOWS HE WILL FAIL IN INVESTIGATION AND IS PREPARING FACE-SAVING WAY OUT EMBARRASSING TO ADMINISTRATION).

GP-2 CRIMMINS

BT

SECRET

Pol 23-8 DOM REP

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

50-S

SECRET

Action
ARA
Info
SS
GPM
SP
SC
L
H
SAL
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
OPR
RSR

VZCZCESB005EXX086VV SDA743
PP RUEHC
DE RUESSD 556S/3 1010440
ZNY SSSSS
P R 110219Z APR 67
FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUESOE/AMCONSUL SAGODELOSCABALLEROS
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 SANTO DOMINGO 3115

009428
1967 APR 11 AM 1 46

(B) AMIAMA HAS FOR OVER WEEK PRIVATLLY BEEN BUILDING RECORD FOR WHAT MIGHT BE FALL-BACK POSITION SHOULD HE FEEL "COMPELLED" TO RESIGN. HE THRICE THREATENED TO RESIGN OVER TEJEDA ISSUE ALONE, ON GROUNDS TEJEDA CONTINUED OBSTRUCTING INVESTIGATION AND THAT PRESIDENT'S FAILURE REMOVE HIM COMPLETELY FROM INVOLVEMENT IN POLICE AFFAIRS CONSTITUTED BOTH BREACH OF FAITH BY PRESIENT AND DIRECT PERSONAL AFFRONT TO AMIAMA. TEJEDA'S (AND NIVAR'S) TRANSFER FROM PALACE MAY HAVE SATISFIED BUT SEQUENCE EMPHASIZED FACT AMIAMA HAS BEHAVED LIKE PRIMA DONNA, AND HE HAS PRIVATELY GIVEN IMPRES- SION HE CONSIDERS HIMSELF ARBITER OF NATION'S LAST CHANCE FOR CONTINUED STABILITY.

(C) AMIAMA'S BEHAVIOR HAS SLOS RESULTED, PERHPPS UNWIT- TINGLY, IN WEAKENING ARMED FORCES SECRETARY PEREZ Y PEREZ,

PAGE TWO RUESSD 556S/3 S E C R E T
WHOSE STATURE WITH MILITARY HAS SUFFERED BOTH BY HIS CARRYING OUT TO LETTER AMIAMA'S MULTIPLE WISHES AND BY AMIAMA- INSPIRED OR ENDORSED PUBLIC ACCOLADES IN EL NACIONAL AND BY PRD. NACIONAL'S PRAISE OF PEREZ FOR PERMITTING INVESTIGATORS REMOVE SUSPECT AUTOMOBILE AND ITS AIR FORCE SERGEANT OWNER FROM SAN ISIDRO DISTURBED PEREZ TO POINT WHERE HE PRIVATELY ISSUED CIRCULAR REASSURING MILITARY OF HIS CONTINUED SUPPORT THEIR INTERESTS.

8. TO RECAPITULATE: WHILE WE MUST FOR TIME BEING CONSIDER AMIAMA'S BEHAVIOR RESULT PRIMARILY OF HIS STRONG LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN SOLVING IMBERT CASE, WE MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE HE HAS EQUALLY STRONG DESIRE PROTECT IMBERT (AND HIMSELF) FROM NEW ATTACK AND SAFEGUARD AND RESTORE THEIR PERSONAL AND POLITICAL INTERESTS. NEW EMINENCE TO WHICH AMIAMA HAS RISEN CREATES HEAVY DEMANDS ON HIM TO FURTHER INTERESTS OF THOSE HE PREPRESENTS AND OF THOSE WHO HAVE OPPORTUNISTICALLY RALLIED

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 - SANTO DOMINGO 3115, 110219Z APRIL 67

TO HIM. IF HIS INTENTIONS AND OBJECTIVES ARE ENTIRELY LEGITIMATE AND RESTRICTED TO SOLVING SHOOTING AND PROTECTING AGAINST FOLLOW-UP ATTACK, SO MUCH THE BETTER. BUT IF SO, HE HAS APPEARED PURSUE THEM IN PECULIAR WAYS. INSTEAD OF

PAGE THREE RUESSD 556S/3 S E C R E T

USING SIMPLE EXPEDIENT DISCUSSING HIS PROBLEMS WITH PRESIDENT, HE HAS SOUGHT EXERT PRESSURE ON BALAGUER THROUGH RESIGNATION THREATS, EMBASSY AND PRD, OBVIOUSLY TO CREATE IMPRESSION (SO FAR NOT MADE PUBLIC) THAT PRESIDENT HAS CAPITULATED TO HIS DEMANDS. INSTEAD OF SIMPLY SPEAKING OUT ON ISSUES TROUBLING HIM, HE ENGAGED IN MANEUVER WITH PRD WHEREBY HE WAS CALLED UPON LINE UP WITH OR AGAINST IT. (HIS FIRST RESPONSE TO PRD LETTER, WHILE LEGITIMATE AND NECESSARY IN ABSTRACT, HAS POLITICAL EFFECT OF IDENTIFYING HIMSELF WITH PRD CHARGES AND DEMANDS.) FURTHER, THE EFFECT, INTENDED OR NOT, OF HIS CAMPAIGN OF PRAISE FOR PEREZ Y PEREZ HAS BEEN TO UNDERMINE HIM WITH HIS SUBORDINATES.

9. A. EFFECT OF ALL THIS ON MILITARY HAS BEEN TO STIR EVIDENT-- BUT NOT, SO FAR, SIGNIFICANT--DISQUIET THEREIN FOR FIRST TIME SINCE INAUGURATION. PARTICULARLY SUSCEPTIBLE HAVE BEEN TRADITIONAL MALCONTENTS AT SAN ISIDRO AND NUMBER DISPLACED HIGH-RANKING OFFICERS, E. G., PERDOMO, WHO AFTER ALL WAS WESSIN'S SECOND-IN-COMMAND, AND FOLCH PEREZ, WHO WAS RELIABLY REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN REPLACED LAST SEPTEMBER FOR MEETING WITH IMBERT. SAN ISIDRO, BECAUSE IT IS PARTICULAR OBJECT INVESTI-

PAGE FOUR RUESSD 556S/3 S E C R E T

GATION, MIGHT BE CONSIDERING RESISTANCE TO FURTHER ENCROACHMENTS BY AMIAMA; DISPLACED OFFICERS HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN MOVED, FOR FIRST TIME, TO CONTEMPLATE POSSIBILITY OF ALTERNATIVE TO BALAGUER. PERHAPS MORE MEANINGFUL FOR LONG RUN, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN UNHAPPINESS CREATED BY SUSPICION OF PEREZ Y PEREZ' TRUE MOTIVES IN COOPERATING WITH AMIAMA, AND UNEASINESS AS TO HOW FAR PEREZ--AND BALAGUER-- INTEND TO GO IN MEETING AMIAMA'S REQUIREMENTS. PRESIDENT TOLD AMBASSADOR, FOR INSTANCE, THAT HE HAD BEEN SUBJECT TO GENTLE BUT NOTICEABLE PRESSURE FROM MILITARY AGAINST ORIGINAL DISMISSAL OF TEJEDA.

B. SITUATION HAS NOT YET CREATED ANY DISCERNIBLE SIGNIFICANT DISLOCATIONS IN MILITARY WHICH, WITH EXCEPTIONS NOTED ABOVE, WE CONTINUE READ AS ESSENTIALLY LOYAL AND REASON-
SECRET

SECRET

- 3 - SANTO DOMINGO 3115, 110219Z APRIL 67

SIVE TO BALAGUER. FURTHER, WE DO NOT BELIEVE BALAGUER'S OVERALL RELATIONSHIP WITH MILITARY WOULD SUFFER SIGNIFICANTLY SHOULD HE EITHER RESIST PRESSURES TO REPLACE PEREZ OR SHOULD HE CONTINUE SHIFT OTHER OFFICERS AROUND TO ENSURE MILITARY REMAINS RESPONSIVE TO PRESIDENT IN NEW SITUATION. WHATEVER UNHAPPINESS EXISTS SEEMS DIRECTED PRIMARILY AGAINST PEREZ, NOT AGAINST PRESIDENT, WITH POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF ELEMENTS

PAGE FIVE RUESSD 556S/3 S E C R E T

IN AIR FORCE, WHO ARE LIKELY HOD BOTH PEREZ AND PRESIDENT EQUALLY GUILTY OF SELLING OUT MILITARY INTERESTS TO AMIAMA. DANGER THAT DOES EXIST, WE BELIEVE, IS THAT WHICH IS INHERENT IN OPPORTUNITY THAT MAY NOW BE DANGLING BEFORE DISCONTENTED MINORITY TO RALLY TO NEW POWER CENTER WHICH, ALTHOUGH STILL IN AMORPHOUS FORMATIVE STATE, DID NOT EXIST BEFORE WHEN MALCONTENTS HAD NOT REAL PLACE TO GO. HOWEVER, THIS DANGER COULD BE AT LEAST TEMPORARILY ATTENUATED BY MEASURES SUCH AS ASSIGNING CERTAIN KEY ELEMENTS INVOLVED TO ATTACHE SLOTS ABROAD.

10. IN SUM, SHOOTING OF IMBERT, WHICH WAS INCIDENT OF MOST POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE TO HAVE OCCURRED SINCE BALAGUER TOOK OFFICE, HAS LOOSENEED PREVIOUSLY EXISTING POLITICO-MILITARY FABRIC AND HAS INCREASED VOLATILITY OF POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT. PRESIDENT HAS HANDLED SITUATION WELL THUS FAR, AND STANDS TO GAIN SO LONG AS MINIMUM OF POLITICS AND MAXIMUM OF GOOD INTENTIONS PREVAIL IN INVESTIGATION AND ITS AFTERMATH. BUT THIS DESIRABLE MIXTURE OF INGREDIENTS NOT THE RULE HERE, AND BALAGUER IS VULNERABLE TO MANUEVERINGS AND ACTIONS OF ALL ELEMENTS SEEKING TO EXPLOIT SITUATION AS WELL AS TO FURTHER ACCIDENTAL DEVELOPMENTS. MOREOVER, WHILE

PAGE SIX RUESSD 556/3 S E C R E T

PRESIDENT RETAINS MOST KEY CARDS, DECK HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT REDISTRIBUTED WITH AMIAMA NOW HOLDING TRUMP OR TWO WHICH, IF USED JUDICIOUSLY, COULD COST PRESIDENT A FEW TRICKS.

11. PRESIDENT HAS NOT INDICATED SIGNIFICANT CONCERN OVER SITUATION IN RELATION TO HIS PROPOSED ABSENCE FROM COUNTRY THIS WEEK AT SUMMIT. HE IS CAPPING HIS EFFORTS TO ENSURE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE TRANQUILITY WITH PRE-DEPARTURE SPEECH TONIGHT. LEFT, INCLUDING ITS MODERATES, HAS ON OTHER HAND BEEN PREDICTING UNSPECIFIED DIRE EVENTS. THESE PREDICTIONS STEM PARTLY FROM

SECRET

SECRET

- 4 - SANTO DOMINGO 3115, 110219Z APRIL 67

TACTICAL REASONS BUT ALSO PARTLY FROM CONCERN THAT PRESIDENT'S RESTRAINING HAND WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE TO MODERATE GOVERNMENT'S REACTION TO ANYTHING THAT MAY HAPPEN. AT LEAST MODERATE LEFT APPARENTLY FEELS THAT PRESIDENT'S TRIP PRESENTS UNKNOWN POTENTIAL ADVENTURERS WITH GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY TO ACT IN SOME FASHION, IF ONLY TO EMBARRASS PRESIDENT AT SUMMIT. HOWEVER, WE HAVE NO SIGNIFICANT INDICATORS OF SPECIFIC IMMINENT TROUBLE FROM ANY QUARTER AND, RECOGNIZING POSSIBILITY OF ACCIDENTS OR EXECUTION OF UNKNOWN PLANS, SHARE PRESIDENT'S APPARENT CONFIDENCE THAT WEEK WILL BE NERVOUS BUT RELATIVELY TRANQUIL ONE.

GP-2 CRIMMINS

BT

SECRET