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The Latin American Guerrilla Today

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THE LATIN AMERICAN GUERRILLA TODAY

For more than ten years Fidel Castro has been encouraging and aiding Latin American revolutionaries to take to the backlands and mountains of their own countries to imitate his guerrilla campaign and victory. Today, however, there are fewer than 1,000 rural guerrillas holding out in only a few countries. They are weak, of declining importance, and do not pose serious threats to the governments. Guerrilla insurgency in the hinterlands became increasingly anachronistic and irrelevant in many Latin American countries in the decade of the 1960s as societies urbanized and modernized at accelerated rates.

As rural guerrilla fortunes have faded, however, a new breed of revolutionary has appeared in the cities. In Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, and Guatemala urban guerrillas have engaged in spectacular acts of terrorism and violence. Six foreign ambassadors have been kidnaped during the last three years, of whom two were murdered. About a dozen other diplomats and a large number of government officials also have been kidnaped. Robberies of banks and arms depots, airline hijackings, arson, sabotage, and killings of police and security officials have reached unprecedented proportions in several countries. Terrorism is likely to increase in at least a half-dozen Latin American countries this year and could challenge the governments of Uruguay and Guatemala.

The Rural Guerrilla After a Decade

Prominent students of the Cuban revolution believe that Castro never intended to wage a rural guerrilla war when he landed in Cuba from Mexico in 1956, but that he hoped to join in a quick urban putsch. His experience during the preceding ten years as a student radical, adventurer, and violent revolutionary was acquired in the cities. Even after Castro was forced into the sierra after his expedition foundered, he continued to rely heavily on urban support groups. His radio appeals were beamed mainly to middle-class, nationalist audiences, and in April 1958 he helped organize an abortive national strike in the towns and cities.

Castro's small guerrilla band won some skirmishes with regular military forces, but ultimately the Batista regime collapsed because

Castro captured the imagination of an oppressed, disenchanted middle class through highly effective public relations. Once in power, however, Castro quickly alienated urban groups through his radical appeals to peasants and workers. The regime exaggerated and glorified the accomplishments of Castro and his guerrilla colleagues, and created a rural, agrarian mystique for the revolution.

In the months following Castro's victory, exiles and revolutionaries from a number of Latin American countries unsuccessfully attempted to initiate guerrilla struggles in their own countries. By 1960 Castro and Che Guevara were giving support to such revolutionaries on a large scale. Misinterpreting their own experiences, they recommended that rural guerrilla methods be employed and gave little consideration to urban tactics. Large numbers of Latin American youths

traveled to Cuba for training in rural guerrilla techniques, and Guevara's guerrilla handbook was widely distributed and used throughout the hemisphere. In fact, the Cuban leaders and their revolutionary disciples were so confident of these methods that from 1959 through 1965 almost every country in Latin America skirmished with revolutionaries inspired or supported by Havana. A few of these efforts endured, but by mid-decade most of the remaining guerrilla bands were of declining importance.

These efforts failed principally because the Cuban leaders themselves refused to understand the true dynamics of how they came to power and because they imposed an unworkable strategy on their followers. As rapidly as new guerrilla efforts were conceived, however, security and counterinsurgent forces in many Latin American countries were expanded and became more effective. The rural guerrillas also failed because of ineptness and disputes over leadership, tactics, and ideology. Generally, they were poorly trained and equipped despite Cuban efforts, and, desiring quick results, were unprepared psychologically for protracted conflict. Rural guerrillas have been unable in virtually every instance to attract significant middle-class support, mainly because their programs and campaigns have been directed at rural groups.

In 1966 and 1967 Cuba attempted to revitalize waning guerrilla fortunes in the hemisphere through an intensified, reckless commitment to continental rural guerrilla war. The Latin American Solidarity Organization was founded as a hemispheric revolutionary front. It held its first conclave the summer of 1967. In the meantime, Che Guevara with 16 other Cubans was spearheading a new guerrilla effort in Bolivia. Cuban advisers were also operating with guerrillas in Guatemala and Venezuela, and possibly in Colombia. Castro insisted more stridently than ever that meaningful change could result only from violent struggle in the countryside. The French Marxist, Regis Debray, earlier had published a treatise expanding the point, asserting

that guerrilla action must be an exclusively rural phenomenon without significant aid from the cities. His *Revolution Within the Revolution* became the new Cuban manifesto on guerrilla war.

Cuba's efforts to "export" the revolution reached their zenith during this period. Guevara's summary defeat in Bolivia in October 1967 and the concurrent failures of guerrillas elsewhere demonstrated more clearly than before the bankruptcy of Havana's approach. Young revolutionaries throughout Latin America began to reappraise Cuba's strategy. Castro unintentionally contributed to an acceleration of this re-evaluation by publishing Guevara's field diary. Che's poignant memoir of ineptitude, hopeless meanderings in dense jungles, and flight from encircling Bolivian troops has undoubtedly convinced many young revolutionaries that other tactics can lead more quickly to dramatic results. It is ironic that Che's detailed account of his own defeat is likely to endure as a more permanent legacy than his guerrilla handbook or speeches.

Carlos Marighella, the Brazilian author of the *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* has replaced both Guevara and Debray as the primary theoretician of violent revolution in the hemisphere. Debray, who was recently released from a Bolivian prison after serving more than three years of a 30-year term for his part in the Guevara fiasco, admitted on 30 December that he had underestimated the importance of urban terrorism. He now claims to be rethinking his entire treatise on guerrilla tactics, and has endorsed urban terrorism.

Guevara's precipitate failure also led to a reappraisal of tactics in Cuba. During 1968 and the first half of 1969, Havana appeared to be withdrawing from revolutionary liaisons in Latin America. Cuban support to revolutionaries in Venezuela and Colombia terminated, and guerrillas in other countries were told to acquire their own funds and arms. Castro, however, was reluctant to amend his rural guerrilla strategy and was loath to share the spotlight as foremost

revolutionary in the hemisphere with Marighella. Nevertheless, during the second half of 1969 there were signs of a gradual—if grudging—Cuban acceptance of urban methods as urban terrorists accelerated their activities in a number of Latin American cities. In November 1969 Marighella was killed, and two months later Castro came out in support of his line by publishing the *Mini-manual*.

Since then, Havana has been more flexible and cautious about endorsing revolutionary groups. Both urban and rural tactics now are supported, and in view of events in Chile, the nonviolent path to power is also publicly accepted—at least there. Underlying the pragmatism of this approach, however, is the same enduring commitment to rural guerrilla methods that has characterized the Cuban revolution since the early 1960s. Cuban leaders continue to predict that in most countries rural insurgency will be decisive in the long run and that urban tactics should be employed to create favorable conditions for rural conflict. Marighella himself was making plans to initiate rural guerrilla warfare in Goias State prior to his death.

Today, Guatemala may be the only country receiving material support from Cuba for guerrilla operations. A few Cuban advisers are in the Guatemalan countryside, and Cuban funds have been provided. In other countries, Havana appears to be giving little more than training and propaganda support to revolutionaries. Cuban intelligence agents have been active in Chile since Allende's inauguration, and it is possible that Cuba could increase its contacts with South American terrorists under Chilean cover. In the long run, however, rural guerrilla methods increasingly will be replaced with activities in the cities.

The Dawn of the Urban Guerrilla


The urban guerrilla groups that have sprung up since Che Guevara's fiasco in Bolivia are direct—albeit more sophisticated—descendants of the rural guerrillas of the 1960s. They have

learned from Havana's mistakes of the last decade, but because most of them operate in highly urbanized societies, they realize that rural methods are not applicable anyway. They are young—most of them are believed to be in their early twenties—from middle-class backgrounds, and are frequently either university or former university students. Except in Argentina the urban guerrillas generally profess to be Marxists. In the few instances where they have discussed or publicized their political programs these are vague but ultranationalistic. Today's urban revolutionary desires quick remedies for social and economic ills and has chosen the tactics of terrorism in the cities to achieve rapid results—or at least to make dramatic headlines.

In general, the urban guerrilla endorses Havana's theoretical line by ascribing long-term importance to the rural struggle and to the peasantry, but in practice he concentrates or confines his activities in urban zones. In an interview published in October 1970 in the Cuban Communist Party daily, for example, a Tupamaro admitted that plans called for extending the struggle into the countryside, but "not with the characteristics of typical rural-guerrilla warfare." He emphasized instead that, at least in Uruguay, future operations in the countryside would consist of brief, commando-type raids launched from the cities.

Thus, although urban revolutionaries look to Havana as the spiritual center of revolution in Latin America, they are zealously nationalistic and prefer to maintain tactical and financial independence. Cuba has provided training for some urban guerrillas, backs them with propaganda support, and grants haven to revolutionaries and political prisoners, but there is no evidence of more extensive contacts. There are indications that Havana would like a larger share of the action, but it is probably known among young revolutionaries that Cuba has been heavy-handed and arrogant in dispensing aid in the past.

While Cuba has persisted in emphasizing the rural nature of its revolution and has



concentrated on rural tactics for revolutionaries, the rest of Latin America has been urbanizing at accelerating rates. In 1940 there were five Latin American cities with more than a million inhabitants; in 1960 there were nine. It is estimated that today there are 17, and that in ten years there will be 26. Mexico City, Sao Paulo (Brazil), and Buenos Aires already have more than five million residents, and four other cities have more than 2.5 million. By the end of this decade five more cities will surpass the five-million level, and another five will have more than 2.5 million people. The accelerating rate of urbanization is also reflected in the growth of cities of a quarter million inhabitants or more. In 1970, 19 Latin American cities had between 500,000 and one million inhabitants, and another 32 had between 250,000 and 500,000 residents.

The new revolutionary in Latin America comes from these cities. In his *Minimanual*, Marighella said that it is "ideal" when the urban guerrilla "operates in his own city." In Uruguay and Brazil, and possibly in other countries, guerrillas follow Marighella's advice, organizing themselves into four- or five-man "firing groups." Each group is a largely autonomous tactical squad that initiates its own operations and has little contact with other groups. Marighella also emphasizes individual action, suggesting, for example, that assassinations should be performed by one guerrilla "in absolute secrecy and in cold blood." Such rigid compartmentalization accounts in large part for the ability of urban terrorists to resist police raids.

Urban terrorists have been responsible for the kidnappings of six foreign ambassadors since August 1968—two were murdered. Three US military officers have been killed by terrorists during the last three years, and at least eight other foreign diplomats or officials were kidnapped for ransom in 1970. Local officials are also targets of terrorist action—particularly in Guatemala. Airplane hijackings have become common, and in October 1970 the first combined hijacking-kidnaping occurred when a Costa Rican airliner

was hijacked to Cuba. Five US citizens aboard were threatened with death unless several revolutionaries—including a top Nicaraguan terrorist leader—were released from Costa Rican jails. Urban revolutionaries also struck in the Dominican Republic last April when the US Air Attaché was kidnapped and later released in exchange for prisoners. Terrorists have stolen millions of dollars, ransacked arms depots, engaged in various kinds of sabotage, and murdered local and foreign officials. They contributed directly to the collapse of the Onganía government in Argentina, and have undermined stability in several other countries.

As urban terrorism has increased, contacts and collaboration among urban-based activists have also been on the rise. Bolivia is the principal focus of insurgent interest in South America, and a number of foreigners have participated in ELN activities since last summer. Individual Uruguayan and perhaps Chilean advisers in urban terrorist techniques were in Bolivia last September. Three Chilean revolutionaries, rumored to be members of the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR) were killed in Bolivia last summer, and three others were allowed to return to Chile after being captured. MIR members reportedly also had contacts with the Uruguayan Tupamaros and are alleged to have participated late last year in a meeting of insurgents from several South American countries that was supposed to establish an "international army."

Argentine terrorists reportedly have contacts with terrorists from neighboring countries, and there is some collaboration between Brazilian and Uruguayan urban guerrillas. Contacts are not extensive, however, and it appears that terrorists in most countries are primarily concerned with sustaining their own activities. The Tupamaros and the Chilean MIR are the two groups most likely to engage in proselytizing. If the MIR or the Altamirano faction of the Chilean Socialist Party is permitted to aid terrorists in other countries, in fact, Santiago could become the primary revolutionary capital in Latin America. Although

Havana has provided some training and backs urban guerrillas with propaganda, the Cubans apparently have few contacts with South American terrorists.

The new breed of urban revolutionary has been most active in Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina. These countries had almost no difficulties with rural guerrillas during the 1960s and few manifestations of urban violence until the last few years. Guatemala, however, has had a long history of rural and urban violence, which intensified during much of the decade of the sixties. Urban terror recently has become more important there than has Castro-line guerrilla struggle, but revolutionaries maintain a significant capability for both kinds of action. In Bolivia there have been two abortive guerrilla episodes since 1967, and revolutionaries appear increasingly interested in adopting new urban methods. In Colombia and Venezuela rural guerrillas continue to operate in the countryside, but they are the weakened and disheartened remnants of large and important guerrilla groups that were threats in the mid 1960s. The current status of the revolutionaries in each of these countries is described in the following paragraphs.

Uruguay

The National Liberation Movement (MLN)—better known as the Tupamaros—is a revolutionary Marxist organization that has had a spectacular and rapid rise to prominence during the last few years. Since late 1969 it has been the most active and successful insurgent group in South America. It has kidnaped a total of seven Uruguayan and foreign officials during this period, and three of them—the British ambassador, a US agronomist, and the Brazilian consul—are still in captivity.

The Tupamaros are highly organized and disciplined, and through audacious and ingenious offensives have been a disruptive force far out of proportion to their numbers. They initially enjoyed considerable public sympathy, but lost

much of this support after they murdered a US AID official last August. Nevertheless, they are likely to remain a significant disruptive force for some time to come, especially in the tense political atmosphere that probably will precede the presidential election in November.

Named after Tupac Amaru, a Peruvian Indian who organized an important uprising against Spain in 1780, the movement was founded in northern Uruguay in 1962 by Raul Sendic. It was not active until 1966 when it began to conduct sporadic robberies for money, arms, and supplies such as police uniforms and identification papers. Until 1967, the movement concentrated its activities in areas outside of metropolitan Montevideo, but later turned more and more to urban violence.

From 1967 through 1969, the Tupamaros succeeded in portraying themselves as romantic, quixotic revolutionaries. They attempted to minimize personal violence and excesses, and gained considerable popularity and publicity as selfless Robin Hoods. In elaborate public relations efforts, the Tupamaros redistributed to the poor some of the money they had stolen, as well as food, milk, and other provisions. They also "exposed" alleged financial frauds through the dissemination of compromising stolen documents, which did cause considerable alarm in government and financial circles. By daring daylight robberies, they accumulated large sums of money, often robbing banks by recruiting employees or by disguising themselves as policemen or guards.

On 8 October 1969, about 40 Tupamaros raided the small town of Pando, robbing three banks, taking over the police and fire stations, and severing communications. There were casualties on both sides, and the Tupamaros claim that members captured by police were tortured and killed. The Pando raid marked a major turning point for the guerrillas, who thereafter turned increasingly to murder and other extreme forms of urban violence.

Their activities—especially the murder of police and security officials—increased in late 1969 and early 1970. In late July 1970, an Uruguayan judge was kidnaped but later released unharmed. On 31 July, US AID official Daniel Mitrione and the Brazilian consul were kidnaped; on 7 August, US agronomist Claude Fly, was abducted. Mitrione was killed on 10 August after the Pacheco government refused to negotiate with the terrorists. Tupamaro demands for the release of all imprisoned guerrillas in exchange for Fly and the Brazilian gradually faded in the face of government intransigence. By mid-September the terrorists retreated further and agreed to release the captives if major news media publicized their political manifesto. Although two Montevideo papers and a magazine subsequently printed the treatise—in violation of government censorship laws—the hostages have not been released.

The government's determination not to negotiate with the guerrillas has been complemented by a considerable show of force. Aggressive counterinsurgency campaigns—especially an unprecedented crackdown following the August kidnappings—have resulted in significant guerrilla losses. In August, Congress authorized a 20-day, limited state-of-siege as thousands of soldiers and policemen scoured the Montevideo area in search of the terrorists. A number of important guerrilla leaders, including Raul Sendic, were apprehended. As a result, an estimated 250 to 300 Tupamaros are currently imprisoned. According to some estimates, only about 150 Tupamaros remain active.

A hard core of the Tupamaro organization weathered the government's counterterrorist campaign, however. During the last few months of 1970 terrorists remained very active. They took over cinemas to make political promulgations, assaulted important communications facilities, robbed banks, and in early November they carried out one of the largest robberies in the country's history. In conjunction with these spectacular operations, they have also conducted a persistent campaign of low-level harassment designed to

attract constant publicity and to keep security forces off balance. Finally, on 8 January 1971 they added another hostage to the list of foreigners being held, when UK ambassador Jackson was kidnaped. Uruguayan police estimate that about 50 Tupamaros participated in this elaborately coordinated kidnaping in the streets of Montevideo.

The Tupamaros have a fairly extensive base of support among students and youths, who form a potentially large reservoir of new recruits. Student and faculty federations at universities and secondary schools are dominated by extreme leftists and Communists who sympathize with or overtly support guerrilla demands. In late August, for example, secondary school students demonstrated violently in Montevideo in favor of the Tupamaros. This resulted in a government decree closing the schools until the beginning of the new academic year this March. Students have been relatively quiescent in recent months, during the Uruguayan spring and summer, but student Committees for the Support of the Tupamaros have appeared.

The Tupamaros also have been supported by fairly large numbers of middle-class professionals who increasingly are disenchanted with the quality of life and economic stagnation in Uruguay. Middle-class support probably has continued to diminish, however, since the Pando raid, mainly because of the terrorists' increased emphasis on murder and other extreme forms of violence. One Tupamaro leader has stated publicly that the chivalrous tactics employed before the end of 1969 have been replaced by greater revolutionary militance. There have been reports of division within Tupamaro ranks over this decision, and it is clear that if it is followed, much middle-class support will be lost.

The Tupamaros have demonstrated remarkable resiliency, determination, and skill since last summer, and it is likely that, because they enjoy extensive support from students and youths, they will remain a formidable force in Uruguay for

some time. The boldly executed Jackson kidnapping shows that the terrorists retain the capability to carry out complex and important assaults and that the government's refusal to negotiate and police dragnets have had only limited results. Immediate Tupamaro objectives and their full capabilities are not known, but it is likely that the terrorists will remain active in the coming months, perhaps building toward a concerted, large-scale campaign of urban terrorism to coincide with the period preceding the presidential elections.

Brazil

Since September 1969, Brazilian security forces have moved aggressively and effectively against suspected leftist terrorists. A substantial number of terrorists have been rounded up, and



Carlos Lamarca Engaging in Guerrilla Training


two of the most important Brazilian guerrilla leaders and theoreticians have been killed and others exiled. In early November 1970 the government launched a massive counterterrorist operation in several major cities in an attempt to frustrate a terrorist campaign they had learned about from captured documents. Estimates of the number of persons arrested in the operation vary from 500 to more than 5,000, which has provoked widespread criticism of the police and the military.

Terrorists are still able to carry out major operations, however. This was demonstrated dramatically on 7 December when Swiss Ambassador Bucher was kidnapped in Rio de Janeiro and held nearly six weeks for ransom. After protracted negotiations the government on 14 January released 70 political prisoners, who were flown to Chile in exchange for the ambassador. For the first time, however, the government forced the terrorists to reduce their original demands significantly by adhering to a firm negotiating posture. The guerrillas dropped their demands for the publication of communiques and for free railroad transportation and yielded when the government refused to release a total of 37 other prisoners. The terrorists, in fact, were the net losers in the Bucher affair, inasmuch as their credibility and their image of invincibility in kidnap cases were undermined seriously.

The National Liberating Action (ALN), one of the two most important terrorist groups in Brazil, has been active for about three years. Former officials of the Soviet-line Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) who split off in opposition to the party's nonviolent policies form the core of the ALN's leadership as well as that of most of the other major terrorist groups. Carlos Mari-gheila, the author of the *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* and the foremost Brazilian revolutionary of recent years, was the ALN's leader until he was killed by police in November 1969. His deputy, Joaquim Camara Ferreira, took over, but died in October 1970 resisting arrest. In September 1969 ALN members, working jointly with a student group closely affiliated with the ALN, kidnapped US Ambassador Elbrick. He was released unharmed when 15 terrorists were flown to Mexico. Most of them went on to Cuba, where they were greeted by Fidel Castro.

The Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (VPR), a second important terrorist group, is headed by Carlos Lamarca, a former army captain and counterinsurgency specialist who deserted in January 1969. The VPR was responsible for the first significant terrorist action against a foreign

national in Brazil when, in October 1968, they killed US Army Captain Charles Chandler in Sao Paulo. In March 1970 VPR militants kidnaped the Japanese consul-general in Sao Paulo. He was later released in exchange for five imprisoned terrorists. In April 1970 the US consul in Rio Grande do Sul foiled an abduction attempt by the VPR when he ran down one of the terrorists in his car. In June 1970 VPR terrorists working with the ALN kidnaped the West German ambassador. Forty prisoners were flown to Algeria to secure his release. The Bucher kidnaping in December was the most recent example of VPR capabilities.



The number of militants taking part in terrorist operations is probably not more than 1,000. Most are former university students, but many are cashiered military and police personnel, extreme leftist labor figures, and professional criminals. There is a good deal of sympathy for some of the terrorists' goals among intellectuals and the radical clergy. Several priests have been accused of assisting the ALN's support sector, and military and security officials are convinced that terrorists have important contacts among the Brazilian clergy. Marighella devoted a paragraph in the *Minimanual* to the clergy, saying that "the priest who is an urban guerrilla is an active ingredient" in the struggle.

Some terrorists—particularly in the ALN—have received training in Cuba, and Uruguayan terrorists have assisted Brazilians in illegal border crossings and in obtaining passage to other coun-

tries. Brazilian revolutionaries are probably largely self-sufficient as a result of robberies of financial institutions. It is possible that Havana also has provided some financial backing, but there is no firm evidence of this. Marighella was long one of Castro's favorite revolutionaries. He attended the conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization in August 1967, and he may have returned to Brazil with definite commitments of Cuban support at a time when Havana was still relatively generous in dispensing aid.

Urban terrorism appears to be becoming a less serious problem in Brazil, even though kidnappings, robberies, and sabotage are likely to continue. Terrorist capabilities appear to have declined during 1970 as police became more effective in apprehending and killing important guerrilla leaders as well as a significant number of militants. The government's performance in the recent Bucher kidnaping enhanced its prestige, just as the terrorists' capitulation on many important points during the negotiations probably strengthened the hand of those military and security officials who advocate a stronger line in dealing with terrorists. It is possible, therefore, that urban terrorism has already reached its peak in Brazil and may now be declining in importance and intensity. Terrorists retain the capability to carry out many types of assaults and acts of sabotage, nevertheless, and undoubtedly will remain a destabilizing factor in Brazil for some time.

Argentina

Although Argentina experienced a brief episode of Cuban-supported rural guerrilla action in late 1963 and early 1964, urban terrorism did not become a problem until 1969. Some Peronists and other extremists in the labor and student sectors have long engaged in occasional acts of urban violence and strikes, but the phenomena of bank robberies, kidnappings, and other spectacular acts of urban terrorism are relatively new. Unlike terrorists in neighboring countries, most of

whom identify with Castroite or Maoist doctrines, the bulk of Argentine urban revolutionaries claim to be left-wing Peronists. Very little is known about their structure and membership. There may be as many as a dozen small groups, some of which reportedly are attempting to form coalitions or to merge forces. The Peronist Armed Forces group appears to be the most active.

During the early months of 1970, terrorists concentrated on raiding small police and military posts and on robbing banks. In March, members of the Argentine Liberation Front, a group formed in late 1969 or early 1970 from the union of three earlier revolutionary groups, seized a Paraguayan consul in Buenos Aires and demanded the release of two imprisoned leftists. The government rejected the demand. Paraguayan President Stroessner, who was vacationing in Argentina at the time, endorsed the Onganía government's decision and the terrorists later released their captive. This was the first case in Latin America in which a government successfully defied the demands of kidnapers of a foreign diplomat.

An almost immediate reaction to this escape was the attempted abduction of a Soviet diplomat, apparently by right-wing extremists led by an official of the Argentine Federal Police. The effort was foiled by the police. One of the most spectacular events of the year was the kidnap and murder of former president Pedro Aramburu. He was abducted on 29 May, and the kidnapers, who later identified themselves as Montoneros, said on 2 June that he had been tried and executed for crimes allegedly committed when he headed a provisional government from 1955-58. The military government of President Onganía, seriously embarrassed, was ousted by the armed forces a week later.

Terrorism has continued during the administration of General Levingston. On 1 July 1970 a 15-man commando group, whose members identify themselves as Montoneros, terrorized a small town near Córdoba. They robbed a bank, occupied the police station, and severed communica-

tions. Four weeks later, a similar raid was made on a town near the capital. In October, the home of the US Defense Attaché was fire-bombed, and other explosive devices were found at the homes of two other US officials. Later in the month terrorists forcibly entered the homes of three US military officers and made off with arms, uniforms, and identity documents.

Terrorism in Argentina is less spectacular than in Uruguay or Brazil, but the Aramburu murder and its aftermath demonstrate what a small and fanatical group can achieve. It is likely that terrorist bands will increase their activities this year, aiming especially at US officials. Although they have not demonstrated many of the capabilities of the Tupamaros or of one or two Brazilian terrorist groups, Argentine urban bands are slowly increasing their potential both by experience and probably through their contacts with the Tupamaros and the Chilean MIR. Argentine security and police forces have not yet had much success in halting them, and relatively few guerrillas have been imprisoned.

Little is known about the extent of support and sympathy for the terrorists, but as in Brazil and Uruguay, youths and students probably account for a substantial portion. Elements of Argentina's highly politicized labor federations probably sympathize generally with terrorist objectives, and it is also known that some radical priests, members of a group known in Argentina as the Third World Movement, have contacts in terrorist circles. Last December a "Third World" priest was given a two-year suspended prison sentence for his alleged contacts with terrorists involved in the Aramburu murder. Measures announced by the government late last year were designed to move Argentina gradually toward constitutional government during the next four or five years, but they are not expected to have a major impact in reducing terrorists' activities. It is likely, in fact, that terrorist activity will continue to increase during the next few years and may pose a more serious problem to the government.

Bolivia

Because of its geographic location in the center of South America and the weakness of its political institutions, Bolivia has long been a target of cross-border subversion. In 1970 revolutionaries from Bolivia and other South American countries, with Cuban support, attempted to avenge and vindicate Che Guevara by reviving his National Liberation Army (ELN). Even though ELN rural guerrilla efforts failed a second time, revolutionaries have continued their attempts to give the impression that a continental guerrilla movement is being forged in Bolivia. There were reports last November that a "South American Liberation Army" was trying to begin operations in Bolivia, and Cuban propaganda continues to place heavy emphasis on the international character and support of revolutionary activity in Bolivia. Despite this outside interest and rhetoric, efforts to revive rural guerrilla action have been completely frustrated. In recent months, moreover, the ELN appears to be taking an increased interest in urban guerrilla methods, and it is likely that rural efforts will be abandoned, at least temporarily.

The present ELN is the offspring of the movement founded and led by Guevara until it was all but obliterated in 1967. Inti Peredo, one of the survivors of that effort, began to reorganize revolutionary cadres in 1968 and 1969. About 50 Cuban-trained guerrillas infiltrated Bolivia in 1969, demonstrating Havana's continued interest in guerrilla warfare. In September 1969, however, Inti was killed in a police raid, and leadership passed to his brother Chato.

On 19 July 1970, the resuscitated ELN began another phase of guerrilla activity by overrunning a mining camp at Teoponte, north of La Paz. About 75 guerrillas, many of them students from La Paz, dynamited the installation and seized two German employees as hostages. The Bolivian Government later released ten political prisoners in order to free the hostages. The ELN was forced to take the defensive almost immedi-


ately, and counterinsurgency forces picked off the guerrillas systematically in skirmishes during the next few months. By early September, when eight guerrillas were killed in a fire-fight, the ELN probably had been reduced to half its original size. By the end of October, Chato Peredo had been captured and about 55 guerrillas killed. A few remained in the countryside and eight, including Peredo and three Chileans, were granted safe conducts to Chile. Rural guerrilla activity ceased.

The ELN is unusual in the recent history of insurgency in the hemisphere because of the significant level of cooperation and support it receives from revolutionaries in nearby countries. The original pronouncement of the ELN, left at the site of the Teoponte raid, indicated that six Chileans, four Argentines, two Brazilians, and two Peruvians were ELN members. Subsequent information and body counts show that at least the majority of these were with the guerrillas. The present ELN, unlike the original, however, has Bolivians in command, and there are no confirmed reports that Cuban personnel are currently in Bolivia.

In July 1970 the Uruguayan press published the text of a letter allegedly written by Chato Peredo and addressed to the Uruguayan Tupamaro terrorist group. It announced the establishment of "formal" relations between the Tupamaros and the ELN. Chato said that "in the near future we must give more and more proof of integration, not only in the sense of help, but also in the interchange of militants." In January 1970 a committee for the support of the ELN was formed in Chile. Socialist Senator Carlos Altamirano was named director and the then presidential candidate, Salvador Allende, was identified as a member. This committee was publicized heavily by Cuba's official media, but thus far Havana appears to have done no more than provide psychological support.

Following the collapse of its rural guerrilla operation, the ELN appears to be shifting

emphasis to urban tactics with the help of individual Uruguayan and perhaps Chilean advisers.

 Published statements now warn that the ELN will "fight to the final victory in the mountains and the cities." Earlier statements did not refer to urban activities. So far, however, the ELN has demonstrated a limited capacity for urban activities. It robbed a payroll truck in La Paz in December 1969 but lost several trained guerrillas in the process. It has carried out well-publicized murders of several of its political opponents in the last 18 months, including two in the capital recently. It is probably also responsible for some of the bombings that occur sporadically in La Paz, and the dynamiting of the USIS office in Santa Cruz on 7 December 1970.

Like the FAR in Guatemala, the Cuban-oriented ELN is not the only violent revolutionary group in Bolivia. The pro-Chinese Communist Party began its own militant operations in October when party members seized a cattle ranch and handed it over to peasant groups. The action was designed to gain sympathy from the peasants and to create a base for future guerrilla operations. The government's subsequent seizure of the property practically annulled the party's gains, however.

One faction of the Trotskyist Revolutionary Workers Party is also committed to guerrilla activities, but some of its better trained members have joined the ELN. The pro-Soviet Communist Party is opposed to guerrilla activities and, as a result, many of its more activist members have joined the ELN.

Because of the continued interest of Bolivian and foreign revolutionaries in maintaining an active insurgency in Bolivia, the ELN probably will

continue to be active. Significant numbers of university students are ELN members or sympathizers, and the labor unions, which have a long tradition of radicalism, may also contribute members. The ELN has made it clear in repeated announcements that it intends to persevere in the struggle, and propaganda support from Cuba has continued. It is likely that individual Chilean and Uruguayan revolutionaries will continue to donate their services. Havana provides propaganda support and is in close contact with ELN cadres, but it is not known if material backing has been provided.

Guatemala

During the last two or three years there has been more violence and terrorism in Guatemala—a country of only five million people—than in any other country in the hemisphere. It is estimated that terrorist activities since 1967 have resulted in an average of about 90 deaths a month—a third of whom have been policemen. It is also believed that about 50 prominent businessmen have been abducted for ransoms averaging about \$200,000.

The major perpetrator of the violence is the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), a pro-Cuban revolutionary group with both urban and rural wings. In January 1968, two high-ranking members of the US military group in Guatemala were murdered by the FAR, and in August US Ambassador Mein was killed resisting a kidnap attempt. The FAR was the first Latin American terrorist group to resort to kidnappings, assassinations, and other extreme forms of urban violence.

Since 1969 the FAR has escalated its activities. In the autumn, guerrillas overran an oil-drilling camp near the Mexican border, occupied a rural town, temporarily seized farms in outlying areas, and increased assassinations in rural areas. In December, the FAR launched a particularly violent but unsuccessful campaign to disrupt the March 1970 presidential election. FAR cadres killed more than a dozen security officials, the right-wing candidate for mayor of Guatemala

City, and a highly regarded editor of the country's leading newspaper. Fire bombings in downtown Guatemala City caused damage estimated in the millions of dollars.

In 1970, urban terrorism largely supplanted rural offensives. On the eve of the election the FAR secured the release of a captured colleague by kidnaping the Guatemalan foreign minister, and a week later it obtained the release of two other guerrillas in exchange for the abducted US Labor Attaché. After the election in March, West German Ambassador Von Sprei was kidnaped. He was killed on 5 April when the government reversed its earlier policy and refused to negotiate with the terrorists.

[REDACTED] Rural guerrilla operations apparently have been minimized temporarily, but guerrilla safe zones have been established in the hinterlands, perhaps as havens for urban terrorists on the run. In mid-September 1970, a two-month lull in urban activities ended with dozens of bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and various scattered acts of sabotage.

Guatemala has been one of the top countries on Havana's list of targets since the early 1960s, and today it is probably the only country in the hemisphere where Cuban guerrilla advisers are in the field. It is believed that at least 40 revolutionaries trained in Cuba were infiltrated into Guatemala late in 1969. In February 1969, the FAR reportedly received \$40,000 from Havana, and in May 1970 it received another \$15,000. In early October two more Cuban guerrilla advisers arrived in Guatemala City [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Cubans apparently are teaching both urban and rural methods.

Havana's expectations from the FAR are commensurate with its investment. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] The FAR has had periodic contacts with the Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua and the Honduran Francisco Morazan Movement. FAR instructors reportedly were dispatched to train members of the Salvadoran Revolutionary Action group in July 1969. Only in Nicaragua, however, where the small and harried FSLN is active sporadically, have revolutionaries dared to bring their embryonic units out into the open.

In October 1970 the hijackers of a Costa Rican airliner identified themselves as members of the United Revolutionary Front of Central America. This was the first public mention of this sobriquet, but fragmentary clandestine reports in early 1969 cited a group called the United Revolutionary Forces of Central America. It is not likely that a united or coordinated Central American revolutionary group exists at this time in more than a propaganda context.

The FAR has engaged in some cross-border operations, mainly into neighboring Mexico and Honduras in search of safehavens. It was in such a Mexican hideout, however, where Marcos Antonio Yon Sosa, a veteran of Guatemalan guerrilla struggles since 1960 and leader of the now moribund 13th of November Revolutionary Movement, was killed by a Mexican Army patrol in May 1970.

Terrorism is not the work of the FAR alone. The Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) is also committed to armed revolution even though its long-term strategy calls for preparing the masses prior to violent operations. Since 1962 the party has tried to gain control over its own guerrilla factions, and it has had a history of rivalry with the FAR, interspersed with occasional abortive periods of unification. Party leaders reportedly are afraid that the political gains they have made might be lost by an all-out terrorist campaign, but this has not prevented them from applauding and masterminding acts of assassination and other

violence. In August 1970, for example, the party publicly commended terrorists in Uruguay who



The upsurge of terrorist activity in November resulted in one of the harshest crackdowns in memory. On 13 November President Arana declared a 30-day state of siege that was extended in December for another month. Stringent counterinsurgency measures were adopted that resulted in the death of at least one guerrilla leader and the capture of another. The government's actions were so exaggerated that the Air Force mistakenly attacked a fleet of Salvadoran shrimp boats in the Pacific believing they were engaged in illicit activity. Four boats were sunk, two Salvadorans were killed, and 15 wounded.

Right-wing counterterrorists have also been active on a large scale. Their operations were responsible for many deaths during the recent state of siege. President Arana has admitted privately that the government is unable fully to control counterterror, for most of which police and security officials are responsible. Government and right-wing sources are believed responsible for the recent murders of two prominent politicians. On 15 January congressman Adolfo Mijangos—a well-known intellectual who had been confined to a wheelchair—was killed. On 17 January one of Guatemala's leading labor officials was machine gunned. The continuing inclusion of prominent political figures on the government's clandestine assassination list will serve to keep the cycle of retributory violence in motion.

Neither the government nor the left-wing terrorists are likely to achieve a decisive victory in the near future. US citizens and other foreigners will continue to be major targets. A US businessman was beaten and killed—perhaps by right-wing

terrorists—in early December, and US officials have escaped kidnaping in recent months largely because of heightened security precautions. FAR terrorists spent almost two days in early December following and attempting to kidnap a US diplomat. They were deterred because of the effective security measures he used, but the FAR can be expected to persevere in such efforts.

Venezuela

Since the peak of activity from 1962 through 1964, insurgency has fallen to such insignificance in Venezuela that there are now probably less than 100 guerrillas divided into several rival guerrilla factions, and only isolated acts of urban violence occur. Rural guerrillas continue to decline in importance and pose no direct threat to the government. They have conducted a few small raids and ambushes during the last few years, but are not capable of sustained operations and are expected gradually to abandon the struggle or resort to banditry. Low-level violence and crime could increase in the cities this year, but this will not be a serious problem.

The Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) was one of the primary recipients of Cuban support for many years, as well as one of the most active and formidable guerrilla groups in the hemisphere. From 1962 through 1964 it combined a high level of urban terrorism with rural operations. In 1963, the Betancourt administration probably was more beleaguered and threatened by terrorists and guerrillas than any Latin American government since Batista's in Cuba. From 1962 through 1964 urban terrorists burned factories, murdered police and security personnel, kidnaped a popular Spanish athlete, and engaged in various acts of sabotage. In early 1962 the US Embassy was bombed, US businesses were raided, and two US military advisers were kidnaped. Rural operations were carried on simultaneously, and spectacular acts such as the seizure of a Venezuelan merchant ship on the high seas were carried out.

Guerrilla fortunes declined steadily under the Leoni administration (1964-1969), however, and in 1966 the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) formally abandoned violent tactics. Under the leadership of Douglas Bravo, some FALN cadres split with the PCV over this decision, endeavoring with Cuban aid to revive rural guerrilla insurgency. By 1967, however, the FALN had fallen into such lassitude and incompetence, that Castro publicly denounced Bravo as a "pseudo-revolutionary." Cuban guerrilla advisers, including at least two members of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party who had been attached to the FALN, were withdrawn by early 1969. Other forms of Cuban support also dried up. The Pro-Castro Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) has been active since 1960. In September 1969 it split into three rival factions, two of which compete with a total of about 40 guerrillas in the field. The MIR has received Cuban aid in the past, but today it is inactive and unpromising from Havana's point of view.

Guerrilla fortunes were so dim by 1969, in fact, that President Caldera instituted a wide-ranging pacification program in March aimed at absorbing Communists and guerrillas into the legal political framework. He offered an amnesty to guerrillas who would lay down their arms, legalized the Communist Party, established relations with the USSR, reorganized the security forces and restrained aggressive armed forces operations against the guerrillas. The pacification plan has been successful in attracting some guerrillas away from their mountain redoubts and probably has undermined morale and added to the divisions among those who remain in the field.

Some Venezuelan officials appear to be apprehensive that small bands of revolutionaries may seek to emulate the successes of terrorists in other South American countries. The defense minister said publicly on 11 January that the government is concerned about a possible increase in terrorism. He cited as evidence the murder of a former guerrilla by FALN members, a bombing in

Caracas, and an attempted bombing. The US Embassy in Caracas has speculated that the recent split of the PCV into two factions could result in sharper competition among extremist groups and an increase in violence and crime. PCV dissidents, including about a third of the party's leaders, are forming a new party less subservient to Moscow. This faction could resort to robberies in order to fund its activities, even though the use of violent methods would be a departure from the peaceful approach that all factions of the PCV have endorsed since 1966. Thus, despite the current low level of violence and crime and the possibility that it will increase somewhat this year, there is virtually no chance that terrorism or guerrilla activity will be renewed on levels comparable to those of the mid-1960s.

Colombia

Rural violence has been an integral part of Colombian life since 1948 when rampant banditry and guerrilla strife that lasted a decade were



An ELN Guerrilla Training Camp

unleashed. During the 1960s three rival guerrilla forces looking to Moscow, Havana, and Peking for support emerged from the remnants of earlier rural struggle. None prospered for long, however, and all have declined appreciably during the last

few years. They no longer attract young recruits or receive much publicity in the cities or on the campuses. In all, there are probably only about 600 guerrillas in Colombia—a country of 21 million people.

The guerrillas have generally confined their activities to marginal mountain areas, and they now engage more in banditry than in guerrilla warfare. Because of these activities, they still cause trouble in the countryside and to the security forces, who have great difficulty counter-attacking.

The Army of National Liberation (ELN) is the most active guerrilla group in Colombia. It has enjoyed considerable prominence there and in the rest of Latin America since 1966, when it began guerrilla operations and lost in battle its most famous son—the guerrilla priest Camilo Torres. In early September 1970 the ELN ambushed an army patrol, killing seven soldiers and wounding eight. It was the most serious guerrilla action of any kind in Colombia in more than a year.

The ELN suffers from internal fissures and frequent defections, however, and its urban support apparatus in Bogota is reported to be in disarray. Cuban advisers may have been in the field with the ELN in 1966 and 1967, but Havana apparently had cut off all aid by 1969. The ELN is reported to have 135 men under arms, but they are divided into four groups and operate in scattered areas.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the action arm of the pro-Soviet Colombian Communist Party, is larger than the ELN but less active. Operating in four main groups, the FARC's policy since late 1968 has been to avoid provoking the government, because Moscow is reluctant to have the FAR jeopardize newly established Colombian-Soviet relations or the legal role of the Communist Party. Some small clashes with military forces take place from



The Popular Liberation Army (EPL) is the action arm of the pro-Peking Communist Party of Colombia/Marxist-Leninist. It reportedly consists of some 150-200 men in five groups. The EPL avoids clashes with superior forces, but has attacked small, isolated towns, ranches, and police posts. Such raids apparently are the product of the EPL's weakness and its need to acquire provisions and publicity. There is no evidence that the EPL receives regular financial support from Peking.

These guerrilla groups have not engaged in significant urban violence and appear to have little capacity for such action. They do not pose serious challenges to the government, and are likely to continue to fade in importance.

Outlook

Rural guerrilla insurgency probably will be eschewed as a viable method by Latin American revolutionaries in most countries in the foreseeable future. Although the Cubans are likely to continue emphasizing this approach and some urban revolutionaries will express the belief that urban and rural tactics should be employed simultaneously, fewer and fewer volunteers are likely to be enlisted for rural action. Guatemala, where all forms of violence and terrorism remain at unprecedented levels, may be the only country where a resurgence of rural guerrilla activity is possible. The Guatemalan Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) and the Cubans will probably continue to encourage and perhaps materially support revolutionaries from other Central American countries. The potential for revolution in those countries is not very great, however, and it is unlikely that new rural guerrilla groups will emerge in the next year or so.

Urban revolutionaries in South America have been far more successful than their rural counterparts in embarrassing governments and in upsetting stability. They have won important concessions from the governments—especially in forcing the release of political prisoners. In Argentina, they were able to exploit the weaknesses of

the Ongania regime and they contributed to a change of government after they kidnaped and murdered a former president. This year, terrorist activities may increase in Argentina and Bolivia, continue at relatively high levels in Brazil and Uruguay, and they could be initiated by small, fanatical bands at any time in several other countries. Prospects are, therefore, that terrorist activity will increase in as many as half a dozen South American countries.

In the entire South American continent, however, there are probably no more than 3,000 active urban revolutionaries. Police and counter-terrorist techniques became more sophisticated and effective in 1970, and terrorists have been dealt hard blows in several countries. Important guerrilla leaders in Uruguay, Brazil, and Guatemala have been killed or captured, and large numbers of terrorists are in jail. Thus, although internal security forces probably will not be able to extirpate terrorist groups, they may continue to increase their capabilities in neutralizing and suppressing them. Terrorists succeeded at first largely because governments were surprised, confused, and unprepared to deal with them. During 1970, however, as terrorist methods became better known the Guatemalan Government adopted a firm policy of refusing to negotiate with terrorists, and the Uruguayan Government persisted in

the same policy despite important kidnappings. Kidnaped foreign officials were murdered in each country as a result, but guerrillas suffered significant losses of popularity for their brutality. Although the Brazilian Government in the past acceded quickly to terrorist demands, it adopted a tougher line in the recent Bucher kidnaping and undoubtedly will uphold this firm position in future dealings with guerrillas.

Small bands of violent urban revolutionaries may be able to harass and embarrass Latin American governments for some time to come, but they are not likely to pose serious challenges to any with the possible exceptions of the regimes of Guatemala and Uruguay. In Guatemala, FAR-initiated violence and right-wing counterterror already amount to a small-scale, bloody civil war that could increase in proportion depending on what actions the government takes. In Uruguay, the Tupamaros continue to demonstrate a remarkable ability to carry out spectacular operations. They probably can add other hostages to the three foreigners they already hold, and they will undoubtedly sustain and seek to increase terrorist activities of all kinds in the months preceding the November 1971 elections. [REDACTED]

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