Senator Lodge.22 Different ones?

Mr. Bielaski. Different ones, and 280-some that they seized in Larsen's apartment, here in Washington.

Senator Longe. What happened to them?

Mr. Bielaski. The Department of Justice has them:

Senator Longe. Still has them?

Mr. Bielaski. Yes, sir (State Department Employee Investigation, hearings pursuant to S. Res. 231, 81st Cong., 1950, pp. 933, 945, 949, 950).

## THEFTS OF SECRETS BY SOVIET AGENTS

The subcommittee took cognizance of the records of other committees and investigative bodies and observed the extensive thefts of secret documents by Communist agents.

## THE CANADIAN ROYAL COMMISSION

In September 1945, Igor Gouzenko slipped away from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa with the files which ultimately provoked a fullscale investigation by a Canadian Royal Commission.23 The report of this Royal Commission, based as it was on irrefutable documentation from the fountainhead of the conspiracy, demonstrates beyond challenge the international and intercontinental nature of the Kremlin's net. The report had some vitally significant things to say about the secrets which passed to Moscow through the North American and European tunnels of the underground:

\* \* The evidence indicates that there were agents working along the same lines in the United Kingdom, the United States, and elsewhere. The Russians would know from their agents in Canada that information was being pooled: By getting some information on a subject here, some in England, and some in the United States, and then assembling it, a very large body of data could be built up.

However, much secret and valuable information was handed over. Some of it is so secret still, that it can be referred to only obliquely and with the greatest care, and this is especially so in the case of certain secret information shared by Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

From the beginning there was the closest cooperation in scientific research between Canada, the United Kingdom and, later the United States.

22 Henry Cabot Lodge, presently United States Ambassador to the United Nations, was a member of the Special Senate Committee which made some inquiries into the Amerasia case. In his minority report on the results of these inquiries, Mr. Lodge gave the following statement about the Amerasia documents:

At the time of the arrests, some 1,800 documents, the majority of which were of Government origin or were Government property, were recovered. These documents represented reports from the State Department, the Navy Department, OSS, Office of War Information, Federal Communications Commission, Foreign Economic Administration, and the War Department. According to the testimony of the chief FBI agent in charge of the Amerasia investigation, Mr. D. Milton Ladd: "some of them dealt with military matters, political affairs, etc. Many of these documents bore the classification 'secret,' 'confidential' or 'restricted.' Some were originals, some were copies prepared at the time the originals were made, and others were copies from the originals."

That many of these documents were of great importance is shown by the following brief descriptions of some of the documents: A "top secret" document dealing with targets in Japan; a "top secret" document on the Japanese Air Force; a "top secret" report on Japanese resources; a "top secret" document which revealed the United States breakdown and mastery of Japanese codes; a "confidential" Office of Naval Intelligence report on the organization of Japanese naval forces; a "strictly confidential" communication from Ambassador Gauss on the reorganization of the Chinese Air Force; a "classified" report on airplane and seaplane anchorages in Japan, Formosa, and Korea prepared by Military Intelligence; an Office of Naval Intelligence "confidential" report on China coast physical geography and coastwise shipping routes, bearing the penciled notation "war plans, coastal areas, inner passage, mined areas"; a "very secret" document containing a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington; two "secret" documents of the Military Intelligence Division entitled "Changes to Order of Battle of Chinese Army"; a document marked "top secret for eyes only," the very highest classification given; a "confidential" forecast of the Pacific war by Secretary Grew, which indicated the location of American submarines, together with other classified documents dealing with such subjects as the composition of United States forces in Manila and an operations plan for Naval Intelligence for their entire counter-intelligence organization in the United States.

23 The Report of the Royal Commission appointed under Order in Council P. C. 411 of February 5, 1946, To Investigate the Facts Relating to and the Circumstances Surrounding the Communication, by Public Officials and Other Persons in Positions of Trust of Secret and Confidential Information to Agents of a Foreign Power, June 27, 1946.

## INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS 17

Next to the atomic bomb it would appear to us that the development of radar was perhaps the most vital work accomplished by the English-speaking democracies in the technical field during the period in question. British scientists had already done valuable pioneering work before 1939, but the improvements made since then had been considerable and many of these are still in the top secret category. Information of the greatest importance in this field was communicated to the Russians by agents.

The work done in connection with antisubmarine devices, asdic, is as important as the work done on radar—some authorities say that it is more important. Much of it is still in the top secret category. The information before us leads us to the conclusion that much, and very possibly all, of the information available in Canada on this subject has been compromised. It would at least be unwise

to assume anything else.

The advances made in Canada by Canadians in developing and improving explosives and propellants were outstanding. Canadian scientists were given very full information on the work being done in the same fields in the United Kingdom and the United States. The very names of many formulas are still supposed to be secret: the production methods even more so. But the names and much of the secret information were given to the Russians as well as continuing information about trials, experiments and proposed future research. This information was of great value.

Another development in which Canada played a leading role is the "V. T. Fuse," the name being a code name. "This is the fuse that knocked the Japanese Air Force out of the air" \* \* One of the agents upon whom we are reporting had the wiring diagram of this fuse. There are certain details of the manufacture which were known only to the Americans; and the United States of America is, we are told, the only country that can build the fuse at the present time. This fuse is the "electro bomb" referred to in some of the Russian documents. None of the armaments sent to Russia during the war included this fuse.

In conclusion, therefore, we can say that much vital technical information, which should still be secret to the authorities of Canada, Great Britain and the United States, has been made known to the Russians by reason of the espionage activities reported on herein. The full extent of the information handed over is impossible to say; as we have already pointed out, these operations have been going on for some time. We should emphasize that the bulk of the technical information sought by the espionage leaders related to research developments which would play an important part in the postwar defenses of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

\* \* Much of the political information obtained was classified as top secret and related not only to the policies of the Canadian Government but to those of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States. The value of information of this type needs no particularization.

Again, Canadian citizenship documents such as passports, naturalization certificates, and marriage or birth certificates were sought for illegal purposes and in some cases obtained. Such documents were sought not only for use in Canada but also, as illustrated for example by the Witczak passport case dealt with in section V of this report, for use in the United States. Sam Carr accepted in 1945 an assignment to facilitate the entry of other planted agents into Canada in the future, and it is clear that this type of operation, which was not a new development, was intended to be used more extensively in the future. Such planted agents could in time be used not only for espionage but for sabotage, leadership of subversive political groups, and other purposes. It is unnecessary to comment on the possible gravity of these operations. (The report of the Canadian Royal Commission pp. 616-620.)

## THE BENTLEY RING'S HARVEST

About the time Gouzenko was telling his story to the Canadian authorities, Miss Bentley was telling hers to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In 1948 she made her first public statement under oath.24

<sup>24</sup> Hearings regarding Communist espionage in the United States Government by House of Representatives, Un-American Activities Committee, 80th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 522-531.