<mods:mods xmlns:mods="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3" xmlns:METS="http://www.loc.gov/METS/" xmlns:fits="http://hul.harvard.edu/ois/xml/ns/fits/fits_output" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:IR="http://dl.lib.brown.edu/md/irdata" xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:rights="http://cosimo.stanford.edu/sdr/metsrights/" ID="etd128">
     <mods:titleInfo>
      <mods:title>The World in Mind</mods:title>
     </mods:titleInfo>
     <mods:name type="personal">
      <mods:namePart>Treanor, Nick B.</mods:namePart>
      <mods:role>
       <mods:roleTerm type="text">creator</mods:roleTerm>
      </mods:role>
     </mods:name>
     <mods:originInfo>
      <mods:copyrightDate keyDate="yes" encoding="w3cdtf">2008</mods:copyrightDate>
     </mods:originInfo>
     <mods:physicalDescription>
      <mods:extent>ix, 212 p.</mods:extent>
      <mods:digitalOrigin>born digital</mods:digitalOrigin>
     </mods:physicalDescription>
     <mods:note>Thesis (Ph.D.) -- Brown University (2009)</mods:note>
     <mods:name type="personal">
      <mods:namePart>Kim, Jaegwon</mods:namePart>
      <mods:role>
       <mods:roleTerm type="text">director</mods:roleTerm>
      </mods:role>
     </mods:name>
     <mods:name type="personal">
      <mods:namePart>Hill, Christopher</mods:namePart>
      <mods:role>
       <mods:roleTerm type="text">reader</mods:roleTerm>
      </mods:role>
     </mods:name>
     <mods:name type="personal">
      <mods:namePart>Sosa, Ernest</mods:namePart>
      <mods:role>
       <mods:roleTerm type="text">reader</mods:roleTerm>
      </mods:role>
     </mods:name>
     <mods:name type="corporate">
      <mods:namePart>Brown University. Philosophy</mods:namePart>
      <mods:role>
       <mods:roleTerm type="text">sponsor</mods:roleTerm>
      </mods:role>
     </mods:name>
     <mods:genre authority="aat">theses</mods:genre>
     <mods:abstract>Belief has a many/one structure that is poorly understood. Beliefs are said to be bound or tied together, to fit together to form a total view, or to construct, form, or build up a
      picture of the world. This work focuses on clarifying this conception of belief and on understanding in what sense, if any, a subject?s beliefs are both many and one. Chapter One
      defines the central task as two-fold: (i) to determine whether, or under what conditions, a subject?s beliefs compose a single overall representation, and (ii) to determine the nature
      of the relation between a subject?s many beliefs and her single overall representation. Chapter Two defuses several initial lines of objection, and sharpens the problem by contrasting
      the unity of belief with three theses with which it could easily be confused. Chapters Three and Four examine prominent accounts of belief that allege something close to the view that a subject
      has a single, overall representation. Chapter Three focuses on David Lewis, who provides a theory of belief on which belief is ?singular, not plural?, and on
      Stalnaker?s possible worlds semantics, on which a belief state is a ?conception of the way the world is?. Chapter Four focuses on Donald Davidson, who presses
      various holistic theses concerning belief and the mental generally. There is a philosophically significant use of the concept of a global representation in the work of all three philosophers,
      but the theoretical accounts of belief they offer leave untouched the problem of understanding the many/one structure of belief. Chapter Five defends a schematic formulation of what it is to
      have a global representation of the world, and assesses whether the many/one structure of belief should be understood by appeal to conjunctive belief. Chapter Six explores the potential for
      diversity judgments to account for the unity of belief, and develops a theoretical account on which unity consists in a subject subsuming the content of her beliefs under one judgment via her
      taking there to be non-identities between the states of affairs her beliefs represent.</mods:abstract>
     <mods:subject authority="local">
      <mods:topic>belief</mods:topic>
     </mods:subject>
     <mods:subject authority="local">
      <mods:topic>unity of consciousness</mods:topic>
     </mods:subject>
     <mods:subject authority="local">
      <mods:topic>unity of the proposition</mods:topic>
     </mods:subject>
     <mods:subject authority="local">
      <mods:topic>mental unity</mods:topic>
     </mods:subject>
     <mods:subject authority="FAST" authorityURI="http://id.worldcat.org/fast" valueURI="http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1016620"><mods:topic>Mental representation</mods:topic></mods:subject><mods:subject authority="FAST" authorityURI="http://id.worldcat.org/fast" valueURI="http://id.worldcat.org/fast/1136568"><mods:topic>Subjectivity</mods:topic></mods:subject><mods:recordInfo>
      <mods:recordContentSource authority="marcorg">RPB</mods:recordContentSource>
      <mods:recordCreationDate encoding="iso8601">20091218</mods:recordCreationDate>
     </mods:recordInfo>
    <mods:language><mods:languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</mods:languageTerm><mods:languageTerm type="text">English</mods:languageTerm></mods:language><mods:identifier type="doi">10.7301/Z0JW8C5T</mods:identifier><mods:accessCondition type="rights statement" xlink:href="http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/">In Copyright</mods:accessCondition><mods:accessCondition type="restriction on access">Collection is open for research.</mods:accessCondition><mods:typeOfResource authority="primo">dissertations</mods:typeOfResource></mods:mods>