PLATO’S LESSER HIPPIAS:
TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY

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PREFACE

“This dialogue can be ascribed to Plato only because it always has been, from Aristotle’s day on. It is inferior to all the others.” That is what the two editors of the standard Princeton edition of Plato’s collected works had to say about the *Lesser Hippias* fifty years ago.1 Were these editors telling the truth?

The best piece of evidence that the *Lesser Hippias* was written by Plato is to be found in the works of Aristotle: at the end of Book Δ of the *Metaphysics*2 Aristotle not only refers to the content of our dialogue—both to its argument about the identity of the true man and the false man and to its argument about voluntary and involuntary wrongdoing—but also assigns this content to a work he calls “the *Hippias*.”3 Aristotle does not name the work’s author, but this is probably because, as he often does when speaking of Socratic dialogues, he assumes his listeners know that the author is Plato.4 So, in claiming that the *Lesser Hippias* was ascribed to Plato in Aristotle’s day, the two Princeton editors were probably telling the truth.

Has it always been ascribed to Plato *since* that day? The dialogue’s genuineness has been doubted in the past, especially in the nineteenth century,5 and even within the last decade a well-regarded reference work on Plato listed the *Lesser Hippias* together

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2 *Metaphysics* 1025a6.
3 It is likely that the original title of the *Lesser Hippias* was simply *Hippias*. We call it the *Lesser Hippias*, or *Hippias Minor*, because another, longer dialogue that features the sophist Hippias (the so-called *Greater Hippias*, or *Hippias Major*) has also come down to us under Plato’s name.
5 Cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, Volume IV (Cambridge, 1975), p. 191: “Though some nineteenth-century critics doubted [the *Lesser Hippias*] on moral grounds . . . , it is now widely accepted that Aristotle’s reference to it by name is a guarantee of Platonic authorship. It is also almost universally thought to be either the earliest, or among the earliest, of Plato’s dialogues.”
with the spurious dialogues. Nevertheless, it is likely that in every age since Aristotle’s, including the nineteenth century, most mainstream scholars have accepted the *Lesser Hippias* as a genuine work of Plato’s; here, too, our Princeton editors were probably telling the truth.

It is in their assertion that the *Lesser Hippias* is inferior to all the other dialogues, and in their suggestion that its intrinsic qualities give us no reason to attribute it to Plato, that our editors seem to me to have spoken falsely. It is obvious that the *Lesser Hippias* is not as moving a dialogue as the *Apology*, the *Crito*, or the *Phaedo*; nor as inspired as the *Symposium* or the *Phaedrus*; nor as rich in ideas as the *Protagoras* or the *Theaetetus*, not to mention the *Republic*. But to disregard its gem-like qualities—its sparkling humor, its logical precision, its literary polish, the purity of its portraiture of Socrates—or to think it less worthy of Plato’s powers than, say, the *Ion*, the *Lysis*, or the *Laches*, seems to me to betray a lack of judgment, or else a lack of familiarity with Plato’s works.

It would be uncharitable to impute either of these shortcomings to the editors of a standard edition of Plato’s collected works, so I will not accuse our two editors of having spoken falsely out of ignorance; on the contrary, I will credit them with having spoken falsely by design, out of a secret love for the *Lesser Hippias*, a gem of a dialogue which they knew owed part of its charm to its remaining something of a hidden gem. It was as

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6 Debra Nails, *The People of Plato* (Indianapolis, 2002), p. xxxi. Nails has explained to me in a private communication that the *Lesser Hippias*, while not a forgery, might well have been composed by another member of Plato’s circle and added to the Academy’s collection at an early date; this could account for its “immature” style and for the fact that it was known to Aristotle. In explaining her decision Nails cited the work of Holger Thesleff (*Studies in the Styles of Plato*, Helsinki, 1967; *Studies in Platonic Chronology*, Helsinki, 1982) and Thomas Szlezák (*Platon und die Schriftlichkeit der Philosophie*, Berlin, 1985).

7 Benjamin Jowett (*The Dialogues of Plato*, Oxford, 1892, 3rd edition) concluded his introduction to the *Lesser Hippias* with these words: “The *Lesser Hippias*, though inferior to the other dialogues, may be reasonably believed to have been written by Plato, on the ground (1) of its considerable excellence; (2) of uniform tradition beginning with Aristotle and his school. That the dialogue falls below the standard of Plato’s other works, or that he has attributed to Socrates an unmeaning paradox . . . , are not sufficient reasons for doubting the genuineness of the work.”
its jealous guardians, surely, not as its detractors, that the Princeton editors wrote as they did, purposely misrepresenting their beloved *Lesser Hippias* as an inferior work unworthy of Plato’s genius, the better to keep it safely in the shade, away from the crowd, where connoisseurs like themselves could enjoy it more completely.

I too have been motivated by a love for the *Lesser Hippias* to write what I have written, though my love led me, rightly or wrongly, to try to set this dialogue on a hill, or on a candlestick, rather than under a bushel. When I started working on this dissertation, it seemed to me that none of the existing translations gave readers of English the careful modern version that they deserved, so I tried to supply that lack; and as far as I could tell, there was no English commentary that guided students of Ancient Greek through this dialogue line by line, so I tried to supply that lack as well. If the Princteon editors were right, if the true way to love this dialogue is by keeping it obscure, and if I have loved it perversely by working to make its charming qualities known to a wider audience, unintentionally spoiling its charm to the extent that I attained my goal, I am comforted by the thought that my incompetence has saved me from doing much damage.

**Why read the *Lesser Hippias?*** Because it is a deep meditation on truthfulness and falseness, competence and incompetence, and on always trying to know where you stand in relation to these ideas. This is why I highlight the fact that in the following pages, though I tried to be a faithful and competent lover of this dialogue, knowledgeable readers are bound to detect many falsehoods and many more signs of incompetence: because only by setting this very fact—and others like it—on a candlestick, rather than under a bushel, do I or you have any chance of being true to the spirit of Plato’s words.
SUMMARY OF PLATO’S LESSER HIPPIAS

POLITE INTRODUCTION

363a  “But you, why are you silent . . . ?” Eudikos invites Socrates to praise or refute something in the speech that has just been made by Hippias.

363bc  Socrates politely replies that he would like to learn from Hippias which Homeric hero he thinks is better, Achilles or Odysseus.

363c-364b  More polite words from Eudikos, Hippias, and Socrates portray Hippias as an all-around Olympic “athlete” in the intellectual sphere whose past words and actions are such that he could hardly shy away from answering Socrates’ questions.

ACHILLES VS. ODYSSEUS

364bc  Socrates poses his question directly: Which do you say is better, and on what basis, Achilles or Odysseus?

364c  Hippias says that Homer represents Achilles as the best man who went to Troy, Nestor as the wisest, and Odysseus as the “most devious” (polytropōtatos).

364c-e  Socrates does not understand what Hippias means by “most devious” and begs Hippias to be gentle and patient with him as he asks more questions; Hippias agrees.

364e-365c  Socrates asks whether Homer does not represent Achilles as devious (polytropos). Hippias rejects this idea, citing a passage from the Iliad in which Achilles is portrayed as a truthful man in contrast to Odysseus. Socrates learns that when Hippias speaks of a “devious” man, he means a false man (pseudēs).

FALSE AND TRUE

365cd  Hippias endorses what he says is Homer’s view about the true man and the false man—that they are not the same, but different men—and agrees to defend this view by answering questions on Homer’s behalf and his own.

365d-366c  Socrates leads Hippias to admit that people who are false (in a given sphere) are those with the knowledge and ability to speak falsely (in that sphere) whenever they wish to, and that anyone lacking such ability and knowledge is not a false man.

366c-367d  Hippias is led to admit that he, Hippias, is best able to tell the truth and to speak falsely in the sphere of arithmetic, because of his knowledge of the field; an ignoramus who wished to speak falsely might involuntarily tell the truth, by chance, whereas Hippias, if he wished to speak falsely, would never fail to do so. In the field of arithmetic, then, “the true man” and “the false man” are one and the same.

367d-368a  Hippias is led to admit that in the fields of geometry and astronomy, too, in which he is also well versed, the true man and the false man are the same man.
SOCRATES ON HIPPIAS

368a-369a With ironic humor Socrates recalls at length an earlier occasion on which Hippias showed off his many different kinds of knowledge, from handicrafts to literary arts to mathematical sciences to a memory technique; if anyone can call to mind a field of knowledge where the true man and the false man are not the same, it should be Hippias.

369a Hippias confesses that he cannot name such a field of knowledge right now.

369ab With more ironic humor Socrates “reminds” Hippias of the conclusion that seems to follow: that if Odysseus is a false man, he is also a true man, and if Achilles is a true man, he is also a false man; in other words, what appeared to be Hippias’s basis for distinguishing Achilles from Odysseus, and for elevating the one above the other, has fallen away.

HIPPIAS VS. SOCRATES

369bc Hippias criticizes Socrates for always making these kinds of arguments; he then offers to demonstrate in a lengthy speech that Achilles is better than Odysseus and invites Socrates to make a speech of his own on the other side; in this way, he says, the present company will know more fully whether Hippias or Socrates speaks better.

369de Socrates assures Hippias that he does not pretend to rival him in wisdom; on the contrary, his very persistence in examining Hippias’s words is a sign of his respect—it is something Socrates does, for his own benefit, with people he considers to be wise.

FALSE ACHILLES

369e-370d It has just occurred to Socrates that there is a lack of consistency between Achilles’ words and actions in the Iliad: Achilles says he will soon sail home, but he makes no attempt to do so; it seems as if Homer’s Achilles is not a man of his word.

370de Socrates assures Hippias that the reason he pursued this line of inquiry in the first place is that he was genuinely puzzled; it is hard to tell which is the better man, Achilles or Odysseus, even in the matter of falseness and truthfulness.

370e Hippias draws a commonsensical distinction that ought to set Socrates straight: when Achilles speaks falsely, he does so involuntarily (akōn), whereas whenever Odysseus speaks falsely, he does so voluntarily (hekōn), by design.

370e-371d Socrates accuses Hippias of trying to deceive him and of imitating Odysseus; when asked to explain what he means, Socrates offers a rather ludicrous reading of Homer’s verses according to which Achilles not only speaks falsely on purpose but deliberately contradicts himself in front of Odysseus in the belief that by avoiding detection in doing so, he will rival and surpass Odysseus in craftiness and falseness.

371de Hippias resists this reading by pointing out that even in the verses just cited by
Socrates, Achilles contradicts himself involuntarily, because of his kindly nature, whereas whatever truths or falsehoods Odysseus utters, he utters by design.

371e In that case, Socrates counters, Odysseus is better than Achilles, for it has already been shown (366b-367b) that those who speak falsely (or truly) of their own volition, whenever they wish to, are better than those who do so involuntarily.

371e-372a An exasperated Hippias asks Socrates how those who do wrong on purpose could possibly be better than those who err involuntarily, when it is the latter, not the former, who seem to deserve our forgiveness.

SOCRATES ON SOCRATES

372a-c Socrates speaks at length of his own humble dealings with men like Hippias; when he says that he is persistent in questioning wise men (cf. 369d8), as Hippias now sees, he is telling the truth: “Indeed, perhaps this trait of mine is my one and only good point, my other traits being quite ordinary, for in matters of any consequence I am mistaken and do not know how things are. . . Yet I have this one wonderful good point, which saves me: I am not ashamed to learn. . . .” Ungrateful students misrepresent what they have learned as their own discovery, but Socrates has never played a teacher false in this way; unashamed of his need for instruction, he celebrates his teacher as a wise man.

372d Socrates’ current disagreement with Hippias, like his many disagreements with wise men in the past, is due to his being the kind of ignorant person that he is; another sign of his ignorance is that on this very issue—whether those who err voluntarily are better than those who err involuntarily—he himself is now of one mind, now of another: “. . . and I wander in this area, clearly because of my lack of knowledge.”

APPEALS FOR HELP

372e-373a Socrates asks Hippias to cure him of his ignorance and set his soul at rest, not by making a speech, but by answering his questions as before; if Hippias will do this, he will be of great help to Socrates—“and I imagine you yourself will not be harmed, either.”

373ab When Hippias says nothing, Socrates calls upon Eudikos to plead with Hippias on his behalf; Eudikos reminds Hippias of his former talk about not shying away from people’s questions; Hippias remembers, but criticizes Socrates for always making trouble.

373b With consummate irony Socrates avers that he does not make trouble on purpose (hekôn)—“for then I would be wise and clever, by your account”—but involuntarily (akôn), so Hippias should forgive him; for as Hippias just said (372a), one ought to forgive a person who errs involuntarily.

373c Eudikos urges Hippias to answer Socrates’ questions; Hippias reluctantly agrees.
CHOICE VS. HELPLESSNESS

373c Socrates assures Hippias that he genuinely wants to know the answer to the present question: Which are better, those who err voluntarily or those who err involuntarily?

373c-375d Socrates asks a long series of questions involving a progression of examples beginning with running and wrestling and other bodily activities, passing on to the use of inanimate tools and animal souls, and ending with the human soul; Hippias agrees in every case that having the ability to do well or poorly at will is preferable to having no choice but to do poorly—though it is never expressed as straightforwardly as this; Socrates prefers the more paradoxical formulation that the better body, tool, or soul is the one with which a person errs voluntarily, rather than involuntarily.

375d Agreeing with Socrates up to this point, Hippias puts his foot down when it comes to the idea that those who commit injustice voluntarily are better than those who do so involuntarily.

375d-376b Socrates leads Hippias to admit that the abler and wiser soul is more just than the inferior soul, and that when the abler, better soul commits injustice, it will do so voluntarily, whereas the inferior soul will do so involuntarily.

UNSETTLING CONCLUSION

376b Socrates reaches the final step of his long argument—“So the man who voluntarily errs and does shameful, unjust things . . ., if in fact such a man exists, would be none other than the good man”—but Hippias cannot agree with him here.

376bc Nor can Socrates himself, who repeats what he said before (372d), that he “wanders” in this area; such inconstancy is to be expected of ordinary folk like Socrates, but if wise men like Hippias are going to wander, too—“now here we are in dire straits, if not even after coming to you are we to rest from our wandering!”
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EUDIKOS: But you, why are you silent, Socrates, when Hippias has put so much on display? Why not chime in and speak well of something he said, or else try to refute a point, if you think he’s said something wrong, especially now that we are the only ones left, the people who could best claim to participate in the life of the mind?

SOCRATES: Yes, yes, Eudikos, I must say, there are things I would gladly learn from Hippias, among the points he was making just now about Homer. Why, even from your father Apemantos I used to hear that the *Iliad* is a finer poem of Homer’s than the *Odyssey*, and finer to just the extent to which Achilles is better than Odysseus (for as one of these poems, he said, is on Odysseus, so is the other on Achilles). Well then, that’s what I would gladly ask and learn about, if Hippias doesn’t mind: how he regards these two men, which one he says is better—for he’s already treated us to a display of many other things of every sort, and about other poets, too, not just about Homer.

EUDIKOS: Ah, but it is clear that if you ask him a question, Hippias will not begrudge you an answer. Isn’t that right, Hippias? If Socrates asks you something, will you reply? Or what will you do?

HIPPIAS: Why, indeed, it would be strange behavior on my part, Eudikos, if I go to Olympia for the panhellenic festival whenever the Olympian Games are held, going up from my home in Elis into the sanctuary, and always show myself ready to recite any speech of the ones I’ve prepared for display that anyone wishes to hear, and to answer any question that anyone wishes to ask, but should now shy away from Socrates’ questioning.

SOCRATES: What a blessed state you’re in, Hippias, if every four years at the time of the Olympics you enter the sacred precinct with such high hopes about your soul and its capacity for wisdom! I would be surprised, in fact, if any of the athletes in physical contests goes there to compete with such a fearless and assured belief in his body as you say you have in your mind.

HIPPIAS: It’s only natural, Socrates, that I should be in this state, for since I began to compete at Olympia, never yet have I encountered anyone better than myself at anything.

SOCRATES: What a good thing to hear, Hippias, that both for the city of the Eleans and for your parents yours is the glory that crowns their wisdom. But now, what do you say to us about Achilles and Odysseus? Which do you say is better and on what basis? You see, when there were many of us in the room and you were making your display, I failed to follow what you were saying—for I hesitated to ask my many questions, as there was a large crowd in the room and I didn’t wish to be in your way by questioning you, interrupting your display. But now, since there are fewer of us and Eudikos here is urging me to ask, do tell and teach us clearly: what were you saying about these two men? How did you distinguish them?
HIPPIAS: For you, Socrates, I’m willing to go through even more clearly than I did before what I have to say about these men and others as well. I say that Homer portrays Achilles as the best man of those who went to Troy, Nestor as the wisest, and Odysseus as the most devious.¹

SOCRATES: Oh dear, Hippias: might you do me this little favor, not to jeer at me if I struggle to understand the things you say and keep asking questions about them? Please try to go easy on me and answer gently.

HIPPIAS: Why, it would be shameful, Socrates, if I who educate others in just this sphere and think for this reason that I deserve to take their money, should myself, when questioned by you, not be forgiving and answer gently.

SOCRATES: That’s very good to hear. Now let me tell you, when you said Achilles is represented as “best,” I thought I understood what you were saying, and likewise when you spoke of Nestor as “wisest”; but when you said that the poet represents Odysseus as “most devious”—by that, to tell you the truth, I really have no idea what you mean. But tell me, if I might understand any better from this: Isn’t Achilles portrayed by Homer as devious?

HIPPIAS: Hardly, Socrates, but rather most straightforward² and most true! For in the “Prayers” scene, to take but one example, when the poet depicts them conversing with each other, he has Achilles say to Odysseus:

Zeus-sprung son of Laertes, Odysseus of many devices,
I must declare my intention bluntly, just as I
Shall see it through and as I think it will be accomplished;
For hateful to me as the gates of Hell is that man
Who hides one thing in his heart, and says another.
But I shall speak as it will be accomplished.³

In these lines he shows the character of each man, how Achilles is true and straightforward, while Odysseus is devious and false—for he represents Achilles as speaking these lines to Odysseus.

SOCRATES: Now at last, Hippias, I may perhaps understand what you mean. When you speak of the devious man, you mean a false man, or so it appears.

HIPPIAS: Certainly, Socrates, for Homer portrays Odysseus as just that sort of man in many places both in the Iliad and in the Odyssey.

¹ polytropos (“devious”) can mean either “much-turned,” i.e., repeatedly deflected and turned off course, as Odysseus was in coming home from Troy, or “turning many ways,” i.e., shifty, wily, chameleon-like.
² haplous (“straightforward”) as applied to people can mean “simple,” “open,” “frank.” Its basic meaning is “single.” It is opposed to the word diplous (“double,” “duplicious”).
³ Iliad 9.308-10, 312-14. Plato’s version of these lines departs slightly from later standard editions of Homer.
SOCRATES: So it looks as if Homer was of the opinion that one person is a true man, while a different person is false, not the same person.

HIPPIAS: Yes, of course, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Do you think so yourself, Hippias?

HIPPIAS: Most certainly—why, it would be strange if I did not.

SOCRATES: Well, let us leave Homer alone, then, since it is, after all, impossible to ask him what he was thinking when he composed these lines. Since you evidently take the charge upon yourself, endorsing what you say is Homer’s meaning, answer for the two of you together, Homer and yourself.

HIPPIAS: I shall do that. Come, ask whatever you wish.

SOCRATES: Do you say that the false are incompetent\(^4\) to do a thing—incapacitated, so to speak, like the sick—or competent\(^5\) to do some thing?

HIPPIAS: Competent, I say, very competent indeed, in many other ways and especially to deceive their fellow man.

SOCRATES: It seems they’re competent, then, by your account, and devious, is that right?\(^a\)

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And are they devious deceivers owing to stupidity and folly, or rather to slyness and discernment of a sort?

HIPPIAS: To slyness, most certainly, and discernment.

SOCRATES: So they’re discerning, it seems.

\(^4\) The basic meaning of \textit{adunatos} (“incompetent,” “incapacitated”) is “unable” or “disabled.” It is sometimes used of people who are physically incapable of doing something, e.g., invalids who are disabled (\textit{adunatoi}) for service in the army, or older women who are no longer able to bear children (\textit{ēdē adunatoi tiktein}). It is also used of people who are no good at doing something, though able to do it in some sense, e.g., a person who can speak but is no match for the orator (\textit{adunatos eipein}, lit., “unable to speak”), or people who can drink but are unable to compete with the heavy drinkers (\textit{adunatoi pinein}, lit., “unable to drink”). Later in this dialogue (366b, 367b, 367e, 368a) Socrates will use the phrase \textit{adunatos pseudesthai} (“unable/incompetent to speak falsely”) to describe a person who can, and often does, utter falsehoods, but who cannot do so with masterful consistency. Forms of \textit{adunatos} are always rendered as “incompetent” in this translation, except in the present passage, where a single form is rendered twice, once as “incompetent” and again as “incapacitated.”

\(^5\) The basic meaning of \textit{dunatos} (“competent”) is “able,” “capable,” “powerful.” Generally speaking, a person who is \textit{dunatos ti poiein} (“able to do some thing”) is not merely able to do some thing but good at doing it, i.e., competent to do it. Cf. the English adjective “able” when it modifies a noun (“an able seaman,” “an able speaker”). Forms of \textit{dunatos} are rendered below either as “competent” or as “able” (“ablest,” “most ably,” “with the . . . ability”).
HIPPIAS: Yes, by Zeus, all too discerning.

SOCRATES: And being discerning, do they not know what they do, or do they know?

HIPPIAS: They know very well indeed: that’s how they work their mischief.  

SOCRATES: And knowing these things which they know, are they ignorant, or wise?

HIPPIAS: Wise, to be sure—that is, in just this sphere, deception.

SOCRATES: Hold on, now: let’s recall what it is that you say. You say that the false are competent, discerning, knowledgeable, and wise in just those matters in which they are false?

HIPPIAS: I do indeed.

SOCRATES: And that the true and the false are different people and most opposed to one another?

HIPPIAS: That is what I am saying.

SOCRATES: All right, then. In the class of the able and wise, it seems, belong the false, by your account.

HIPPIAS: Yes, certainly.

SOCRATES: And when you say that the false are able and wise “in just this sphere,” do you mean that they’re competent to speak falsely, if that is their wish, or incompetent, in that very sphere in which they speak falsely?

HIPPIAS: Competent, I mean.

SOCRATES: So, by way of recapitulation, the false are those with the wisdom and ability to speak falsely.

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: So a man who was incompetent to speak falsely, and likewise ignorant, would not be false?

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6 The basic meaning of kakourgein (“work . . . mischief”) is “do harm,” “work wickedness,” though it can also suggest the bad workmanship of a laborer. Its forms are rendered below as “troublemaker” (373b), “makes trouble” (373b, a few lines later), “work badly” (375c), and “works badly, makes trouble” (375d).

7 sophos (“wise”). The word can also mean “clever” and is sometimes used pejoratively.
HIPPIAS: That is so.

SOCRATES: And is each person “competent,” or “able,”\(^8\) who does what he wishes whenever he wishes (I’m not speaking now of cases where one is prevented by disease or things of that sort; rather, the sense in which you, say, are competent and able to write my name whenever you wish: that’s my meaning)—or don’t you call that sort of person “able”?

HIPPIAS: Yes, I do.

SOCRATES: Come then, Hippias, tell me: Aren’t you well versed in calculations and arithmetic?

HIPPIAS: Absolutely, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then even if someone asked you how big a number three times seven hundred is, you could, if you wished, tell the truth about this most quickly and surely of all?

HIPPIAS: By all means.

SOCRATES: Because you are ablest and wisest in these matters?

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Now are you wisest and ablest only, or are you best, too, in that very sphere in which you are ablest and wisest, the field of arithmetic?

HIPPIAS: Best, too, I should think, Socrates.

SOCRATES: So when it comes to telling the truth in this field, you are the one who would do so most ably, is that correct?

HIPPIAS: In my view, yes.

SOCRATES: And what of falsehoods about these same things? Do answer me, Hippias, as before, in a noble, generous manner. If someone were to ask you how many are three times seven hundred, are you the one who would speak most falsely and in every case consistently tell falsehoods about these matters, assuming you wished to speak falsely and never give true responses, or would one ignorant of calculations be able to speak more falsely than you, assuming you wished to? Or might the ignorant one, every so often, though wishing to tell falsehoods, tell the truth in spite of himself, by chance, because of his lack of knowledge, whereas you, the wise one, if in fact you wished to speak falsely, would in every case consistently speak falsely?

\(^8\) Here one Greek word (\textit{dunatos}) is translated twice. See note 5.
HIPPIAS: Yes, it is as you say.

SOCRATES: Now, the false man, is he false in other areas, yet not in that of counting, and would he not speak falsely while counting things?

HIPPIAS: Yes, by Zeus, when it comes to counting as well.

SOCRATES: So shall we lay this down too, Hippias, that in the field of calculation and counting there is a person who is false? b

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Who, then, might this be? If he is really going to be false, as you were granting just now, won’t it have to be the case that he is competent to speak falsely? For it was said by you, if you recall, that someone incompetent to speak falsely would never amount to a false man.

HIPPIAS: Why, I do recall—that is what was said.

SOCRATES: Now, weren’t you just shown to be most competent to speak falsely in the field of calculation?

HIPPIAS: Yes, that too was said, at least.

SOCRATES: Well now, are you also most competent to tell a truth in this field? c

HIPPIAS: By all means.

SOCRATES: Then the same person is most competent to tell falsehoods and truths in the field of calculation, and this is the man who is good in this field, the arithmetician?

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then who turns out to be false, Hippias, in the field of calculation, other than the person who is good? For the same man is also competent, and that man also true.

HIPPIAS: So it appears.

SOCRATES: Do you see then that the same man is both false and true in this field and that the true man is no better than the false? For surely the one is the same as the other, and not most opposed, as you thought just now? d

HIPPIAS: No, not here, it appears.

SOCRATES: Then would you have us investigate elsewhere as well?
HIPPIAS: If *you* would.

SOCRATES: Well then, are you not well versed in geometry, too?

HIPPIAS: I am.

SOCRATES: Well, then? In geometry, too, is it not like this: the same man is most competent to speak falsely and to tell the truth concerning plane figures, namely the geometrician?

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Now, other than this man, is anybody good in this field?

HIPPIAS: No other.

SOCRATES: Then the good and wise geometer is ablest in both ways, and if anyone is false when it comes to plane figures, it would be this man, the one who is good, for he is competent, whereas the bad one was said to be incompetent to speak falsely, and so he would not prove false, not having the competence to speak falsely, as has been granted?

HIPPIAS: That is so.

SOCRATES: Let us proceed, then, and inspect our third man, too: the astronomer, in whose art you think you are even more skilled than in the previous ones—right, Hippias?

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Well, isn’t the same thing true in astronomy as well?

HIPPIAS: It is likely, Socrates.

SOCRATES: So also in astronomy, if *anyone* is false, the good astronomer will be false, the one competent to speak falsely? It surely won’t be the incompetent fellow, an ignorant man.

HIPPIAS: So it appears.

SOCRATES: The same man, then, in astronomy, too, will be both true and false?

HIPPIAS: It looks that way.

SOCRATES: Come now, Hippias, just like this, without reserve, look over all the fields of knowledge and see if there is any place where it is other than this. For surely in the greatest number of arts you are the wisest of all men, as I once heard you boast when you were detailing the full extent of your enviable wisdom in the market-place near the
money-changers’ tables. You said that you had once arrived at Olympia bearing only works of your own in all the things you had about your body: first, that a ring you wore on your finger (that’s where you started) you wore as its maker, as someone skilled in carving rings—signet and all, your own handiwork—and a skin-scrapers and an oil-flask which you had made yourself; next, the shoes you wore, you said you had cut the leather and made them yourself, and that you had woven your mantle and your little tunic; and, what everyone found most extraordinary, a fine example of the most extensive wisdom, when you said that the girdle you wore on your tunic was like those fancy Persian girdles, the expensive kind, and that you had made this, twisting the braids yourself; and that on top of this, you’d come bearing poems, epics and tragedies and dithyrambs, and many prose compositions of every sort; and that in the technical fields, of course, which I was enumerating just now, you’d come there skilled above the rest, and in the correctness of rhythms and attunements and the elements of language, and still other things besides these, very many, I seem to recall—and yet wouldn’t you know, I seem to have forgotten your mnemonic technique, in which you think yourself most brilliant—and I imagine a great many other things have also slipped my mind.

Well, as I say, looking both to your own arts—they are enough—and those of the others, tell me if you find any place, working from the admissions made by you and me together, where there is the true man on the one hand and the false man on the other, separate and not the same. Look for this in any field of wisdom you please, or of slyness, or whatever you care to name it. But you will not find it, my friend, for it does not exist—

HIPPIAS: Well, I am not able, Socrates, not just now.

SOCRATES: Nor will you be, is my guess. Yet if I speak the truth, you recall what consequence faces us as a result of the argument, Hippias.

HIPPIAS: I’m not quite seeing what you mean, Socrates.

SOCRATES: No, for right now, perhaps, you aren’t using your mnemonic technique—clearly because you don’t think there’s a need. Well, I will remind you. You do know that you said Achilles is true, while Odysseus is false and devious?

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then do you see now that the same man has been shown to be both false and true, so that if Odysseus was false, he also proves true, and if Achilles was true, he also proves false, and the men are not at odds with each other, nor opposites, but alike?

HIPPIAS: Oh, Socrates, you are always twisting words into some such argument: you isolate whatever part of the discussion makes for most trouble, and you fasten upon that, handling a little at a time and failing to engage with the subject of the discussion as a whole. Yet even now, if you wish, basing my case upon many pieces of evidence, I will demonstrate to you in a suitable speech that Homer portrays Achilles as better than Odysseus and free from falseness, and the latter as deceitful, a teller of many lies, and
worse than Achilles. And if you wish, in your turn set a speech of your own beside mine, speech against speech, maintaining that the other man is better—and these people here will know more fully which of us speaks better.

SOCRATES: Oh, Hippias, rest assured, I don’t dispute the claim that you are wiser than I am. It’s just that I am always in the habit of paying attention whenever there is something in what someone says, especially when the speaker seems to me to be a wise man, and it is out of a desire to learn what he means that I make inquiries, reconsider his words, and bring together his statements, that I may learn; while if the speaker seems to me to be an ordinary fellow, I neither ask many questions nor concern myself with what he says. And this is how you will recognize the people I consider to be wise: you will find me being persistent in attending to the statements of such a person and asking questions of him, that I may learn something and profit by it.

Yet even now, in hearing you speak, I’ve noticed that in the lines you spoke a moment ago, while demonstrating that Achilles speaks to Odysseus as he might to a dissembler, it strikes me as odd, if what you say is true, that nowhere is Odysseus shown to have spoken falsely, he of the devious character, whereas it does appear that Achilles is a devious character by your account; at any rate, he speaks falsely. You see, having earlier spoken those very lines which you cited just now—

For hateful to me as the gates of Hell is that man
Who hides one thing in his heart, and says another,9

—a little later he says that he will neither be won over by Odysseus and Agamemnon nor remain in the Troad at all, but rather, he says,

Tomorrow, when I have made sacrifice to Zeus and all the gods
And loaded well my ships and hauled them forth to the sea,
You will behold, if you wish, if this be among your concerns,
Sailing very early over the teeming Hellespont
My ships, and the men therein eager to row;
And if the glorious Earth-shaker grant a fair voyage,
On the third day I would come to fertile Phthia.10

And already before this, while reviling Agamemnon, he said:

And now I am going to Phthia, since it is surely far better
To go home with my curved ships, nor am I minded
To continue here, dishonored, to heap up wealth and riches for you.11

Having said these things at that time in front of the whole army, and at that other time to his own friends, nowhere is he shown to have either prepared or attempted to launch his

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9 Iliad 9.312-313.
10 Iliad 9.357-363 (with one very minor departure from later standard editions of Homer).
11 Iliad 1.169-171 (with one minor departure from later standard editions).
ships as if he meant to sail home, but with real superiority he shows himself to have little regard for truth-telling.

Now Hippias, from the start I asked you my question out of a genuine doubt as to which of these two men has been represented as better by the poet, and in the belief that both are extremely good and that it is hard to tell which is better, even in the matter of falseness and truthfulness, as well as the rest of virtue, for both are nearly equal even in this respect.

HIPPIAS: That’s because you take an incorrect view of it, Socrates. You see, the falsehoods that Achilles utters, he obviously utters not by design, but in spite of himself, because he is compelled by the misfortune of the army to remain and come to the rescue, whereas those Odysseus utters, he utters by design, of his own volition.

SOCRATES: You are trying to deceive me, dearest Hippias, and are yourself imitating Odysseus.

HIPPIAS: Not at all, Socrates! What ever do you mean, and to what do you refer?

SOCRATES: The fact that you are saying it is not by design that Achilles speaks falsely, a man who was such a conjurer and a designing mind on top of his dissembling (as Homer portrays him) that he appears to be so much shrewder even than Odysseus in easily dissembling without being noticed by him, that he dared to contradict himself right in front of him and managed to escape Odysseus’s notice. At any rate, Odysseus isn’t shown saying anything to him as if he senses that Achilles is speaking falsely.

HIPPIAS: What is this you are saying, Socrates?

SOCRATES: Don’t you know that later on, after saying to Odysseus that he will sail away with the dawn, in speaking to Ajax he does not say again that he will sail away, but says something else?

HIPPIAS: Where?

\[12\] *akōn* (“in spite of himself”). The basic meaning of *akōn* is “not voluntarily,” “not by choice.” The emphasis sometimes rests on the agent’s unwillingness to act as he does (or lack of awareness of what he is doing), sometimes on his inability to do otherwise. To keep these senses alive in the reader’s mind, and to avoid monotony, forms of *akōn* are sometimes rendered below as “involuntarily,” sometimes as “in spite of himself” (“in spite of itself/themselves”). The adverbs *akomōs* (374d9-e1) and *akousiōs* (374e3-7, 374d7, 375a5, 375b1, 375b3, 375c5) are consistently rendered “involuntarily.” But whereas the English word “involuntarily” usually suggests mere absence of intent (like the phrase “didn’t mean to”), the corresponding Greek words in this dialogue often suggest reluctance and lack of ability to do otherwise (like the English phrases “against his will” and “can’t help it”).

\[13\] *hekōn* (“of his own volition”). The basic meaning of *hekōn* is “voluntarily,” “on purpose.” The emphasis sometimes rests on the agent’s will or wish to act as he does (or awareness of what he is doing), sometimes on his ability to do otherwise. Forms of *hekōn* are rendered below as “voluntarily” or as “of his own volition” (“of its/their own volition”). The adverb *hekousiōs* (374e3-4, 374d6, 374e2, 375a8-b1, 375b4, 375c4) is consistently rendered “voluntarily.”
SOCRATES: In those lines where he says:

    I will not turn my mind to bloody battle
    Until wise Priam’s son, Hector the brilliant,
    Comes up against the Myrmidons’ ships and lodges
    Through slaughter of Argives, and burns the ships with fire;
    But he, around this lodge of mine and my black ship,
    Hector, I think, eager though he be, will hold his hand from the fighting.\(^{14}\)

Now Hippias, do you really suppose he was so forgetful, he who was born of the goddess Thetis and educated by Cheiron, wisest of tutors, that shortly after reviling dissemblers in the strongest language, he himself on the spur of the moment said to Odysseus that he would sail away, and to Ajax that he would stay—not by design, in the belief that Odysseus was over the hill and that in this very thing, being crafty and speaking falsely, he would surpass him?

Hippias: That’s not how I see it, Socrates. Rather, even in this very passage it’s because he was won over by kindly feeling that he said other things to Ajax than to Odysseus, whereas the true things that Odysseus says, he always says by design, and likewise all that he speaks falsely.

SOCRATES: So, it looks like Odysseus is better than Achilles.

Hippias: I should hardly think so, Socrates!

SOCRATES: What? Did it not appear just now that those who speak falsely of their own volition are better than those who do so in spite of themselves?

Hippias: And how could it be, Socrates, that those who voluntarily do wrong and voluntarily form designs and perform bad acts are better than those who act involuntarily, when in their case there seems to be much room for forgiveness, if without knowing it a man does wrong or speaks falsely or does any other bad thing? Surely even the laws are much harsher towards those who voluntarily perform bad acts and speak falsely than with those who do so in spite of themselves.

SOCRATES: Do you see, Hippias, that I tell the truth, saying as I do that I am persistent in my questionings of the wise? Indeed, perhaps this trait of mine is my one and only good point, my other traits being quite ordinary, for in matters of any consequence I am mistaken and do not know how things are. I find sufficient evidence of this in that whenever I rub shoulders with one of you people with great reputations for wisdom, you to whose wisdom all the Greeks bear witness, I am shown to know nothing—for I have virtually none of the same opinions as you do; and I ask you, what greater evidence is there of ignorance than when one is at odds with wise men? Yet I have this one wonderful good point, which saves me: I am not ashamed to learn, but I inquire and I ask questions, and

\(^{14}\) *Iliad* 9.650-655 (with minor departures from later standard editions of Homer).
my gratitude is great for one who answers, and never yet have I defrauded anyone of gratitude. For never yet have I learned a thing and been loath to admit it, representing as my own what I had learned, as if I had discovered it; rather, I celebrate my teacher for being wise, making plain what I have learned from him.

And so now, too, I do not agree with you but am very much at odds with what you are saying. And I know very well that the fault lies in me, in that I am such a man as I am—to give no grand description of myself. For my impression, Hippias, is quite the reverse of what you say: those who harm their fellow man, do wrong, speak falsely, deceive and err of their own volition, not involuntarily, appear to me to be better than those who do so in spite of themselves. Sometimes, though, just the reverse of all this seems right to me, and I wander in this area, clearly because of my lack of knowledge. Right now, though, for the present, a periodic fit, as it were, is upon me, and those who voluntarily go astray in some field seem to me to be better than those who err involuntarily. And I charge that the previous arguments are to blame for this present affliction of mine, so that it now appears, for the present, that those who do each of these things involuntarily are worse than those who do them voluntarily.

You, then, grant my wish and do not refuse to heal my soul—for mind you, you will do me much greater good by relieving my soul of ignorance than my body of disease. To be sure, if you wish to make a long speech, I tell you in advance that you could not cure me, for I would fail to follow. But if you are willing to answer me as you were just now, you will be very helpful to me, and I imagine you yourself will not be harmed, either.

I would be justified in calling on you too, son of Apemantos, for it was you that prompted me to converse with Hippias. So now, if Hippias is not inclined to answer me, plead with him on my behalf.

EUDIKOS: Ah, but Socrates, I imagine Hippias will need none of our pleading, for his former talk is not suggestive of this, but rather, that he would not shy away from any man’s questioning. Isn’t that right, Hippias? Was that not what you were saying?

HIPPIAS: I was, Eudikos. But Socrates, you see, is always confusing things with his arguments and rather resembles a troublemaker.

SOCRATES: Oh, my good Hippias, by no means do I do this of my own volition—for then I would be wise and clever, by your account—but in spite of myself, so forgive me; for you again say that whoever makes trouble in spite of himself, one ought to forgive.

EUDIKOS: Yes, and don’t think of acting differently, Hippias, but both for our sake and with a view to your former statements, answer whatever questions Socrates asks you.

HIPPIAS: All right, I’ll answer, since you are pleading. Come, ask what you will.

SOCRATES: Yes, yes—and I must say, Hippias, I really do desire to look fully into the matter now under discussion: which in fact are better, those who err of their own volition or those who err in spite of themselves. Now, I think I might approach the inquiry most correctly as follows. Come, answer: Do you call someone a good runner?
HIPPIAS: I do.

SOCRATES: And a bad runner?

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Now, he that runs well is a good runner, and he that runs badly, a bad runner?

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Again, he that runs slowly runs badly, while he that runs fast runs well?

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: In a footrace, then, and in running, speed is good, while slowness is bad?

HIPPIAS: Why, of course.

SOCRATES: Well then, which is the better runner, he that runs slowly of his own volition, or he that does so in spite of himself?

HIPPIAS: The former.

SOCRATES: Now, to run is to do something, is it not?

HIPPIAS: To do something, surely.

SOCRATES: And if to do something, isn’t it also to perform some act?

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: So the man who runs badly performs a bad and shameful act in a footrace?

HIPPIAS: A bad one, of course.

SOCRATES: And the man who runs slowly, runs badly?

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Now doesn’t the good runner perform this bad and shameful act voluntarily, and the bad one, involuntarily?

HIPPIAS: It seems so, yes.

SOCRATES: In a footrace, then, a man who involuntarily performs bad acts is inferior to one who does so voluntarily?
HIPPIAS: In a footrace, yes.

SOCRATES: And what about in wrestling? Which is the better wrestler: one who gets thrown of his own volition, or one who gets thrown in spite of himself?

HIPPIAS: The former, it would seem.

SOCRATES: And is it an inferior and more shameful thing in wrestling to get thrown or to throw?

HIPPIAS: To get thrown.

SOCRATES: So in wrestling, too, a man who voluntarily performs the poor and shameful acts is a better wrestler than one who involuntarily does the same.

HIPPIAS: It looks that way.

SOCRATES: And in all the rest of the use of the body? Doesn’t a man who is better in body have the ability to perform both kinds of acts, the strong and the feeble, the shameful and the beautiful, so that whenever he performs acts that are poor in a bodily sense, the man who is better in body performs them of his own volition, whereas the man who is inferior performs them in spite of himself?

HIPPIAS: It seems to be that way in matters of strength as well.

SOCRATES: And what of good comportment, Hippias? Doesn’t it belong to the better body to strike shameful, sorry poses voluntarily, and to the inferior one to do so involuntarily? Or how does it seem to you?

HIPPIAS: The same.

SOCRATES: So bad comportment, too: the voluntary kind springs from bodily excellence and the involuntary kind from inferiority of the body?

HIPPIAS: So it appears.

SOCRATES: And what do you say about voice? Which do you claim is better: the kind that voluntarily sings out of tune, or the kind that does so involuntarily?

HIPPIAS: Voluntarily.

SOCRATES: And is the latter kind in worse condition?

HIPPIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And would you rather possess good things or bad things?

HIPPIAS: Good things.

SOCRATES: Well then, would you prefer to possess feet that limp voluntarily, or involuntarily?

HIPPIAS: Voluntarily.

SOCRATES: But having a limp in one’s step—is that not an inferiority of the feet and bad comportment?

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: What else? Isn’t dimness of vision an inferiority of the eyes?

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Well then, which eyes would you rather possess, which would you prefer to live with: those with which a person might see dimly and askew of his own volition, or those with which he would do so in spite of himself?

HIPPIAS: Of his own volition.

SOCRATES: So you are of the belief that of the things possessed by you, those which voluntarily perform in an inferior way are better than those which do so involuntarily?

HIPPIAS: Yes, in cases like that.

SOCRATES: So then all such things as ears, nose, mouth, and all the senses are covered by one statement, that those which involuntarily perform badly are not to be desired as possessions, on the grounds that they are inferior, whereas those which voluntarily do the same are to be so desired, on the grounds that they are good?

HIPPIAS: I think so, yes.

SOCRATES: What else? Which instruments is it better to have to do with: those with which one does bad work voluntarily, or involuntarily? For instance, is the better rudder one with which a man will involuntarily steer badly, or one with which he will do so voluntarily?

HIPPIAS: Voluntarily.

SOCRATES: Is it not the same with a bow and arrow, too, and lyre and pipes and all the rest?
HIPPIAS: You speak the truth.

SOCRATES: What else? A soul: is it better to have in one’s possession a horse’s soul with which a man will voluntarily ride badly, or with which he will do so in spite of himself?

HIPPIAS: Voluntarily.

SOCRATES: So that one is better.

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: So with the better equine soul he would voluntarily do the inferior work of this kind of soul, but with that of the inferior nag, involuntarily?

HIPPIAS: Quite so.

SOCRATES: Then also with a canine soul and those of all the other animals?

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: What else, then? A human soul: is it better to have in one’s possession the soul of an archer which voluntarily misses the target, or one which misses involuntarily?

HIPPIAS: Voluntarily.

SOCRATES: This soul too is better, then, at archery?

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: So even a soul that involuntarily errs is inferior to one that errs voluntarily?

HIPPIAS: In archery, yes.

SOCRATES: And what about in medicine? Isn’t the soul that in the treatment of bodies performs bad acts of its own volition, more skilled in medicine?

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: So this soul is better in this art than the soul that is not so skilled?

HIPPIAS: Better.

SOCRATES: What else? The soul more skilled in cithara-playing, more skilled in piping, and all the other activities throughout the arts and sciences—doesn’t the better soul perform bad and shameful acts and go astray of its own volition, whereas the inferior soul does all this in spite of itself?
HIPPIAS: So it appears.

SOCRATES: But surely, I should think, in the case of *slaves*’ souls, we would prefer to possess those which voluntarily err and work badly, rather than those which err involuntarily, on the grounds that the former are better at all such work?

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: What else? Our own soul: wouldn’t we wish to possess it in as good a state as possible?

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Well then, won’t it be better if it works badly, makes trouble, and goes astray of its own volition than if it does so in spite of itself?

HIPPIAS: It *would* be strange, Socrates, if those who voluntarily commit injustices are to be better than those who do so involuntarily.

SOCRATES: And yet they do appear to be so from what has been said.

HIPPIAS: Not to me, they don’t!

SOCRATES: And here I was thinking, Hippias, that you too had this impression. But back to answering. The virtue of justice: is it not either a kind of ability or knowledge, or both? Or mustn’t justice be one or the other of these?

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then if justice is an ability of the soul, the abler soul is more just? Surely such a soul appeared *better* to us, my excellent friend?

HIPPIAS: Yes, it did appear so.

SOCRATES: And what if it is knowledge? Isn’t the wiser soul more just, and the more ignorant soul more unjust?

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And what if it is both? Isn’t the soul that has both—knowledge and ability—more just, while the more ignorant soul is more unjust? Isn’t this how it must be?

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15 Here the same form of *kakourgein* is translated twice (“works badly, makes trouble”). See note 6.
16 *dunamis* (“ability”), related to the adjective *dunatos* (“able,” “competent”: see notes 4 and 5). *Dunamis* may have the sense of “power,” “strength,” or “natural capacity.”
HIPPIAS: It appears so.

SOCRATES: Now wasn’t this abler, wiser soul shown to be better and more capable of doing both kinds of things, both what is noble and what is shameful, in every activity? 376

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: So when it performs what is shameful, it does this of its own volition, owing to ability and art? And these, it appears, are of the essence of justice, either one or both of them?

HIPPIAS: It looks that way.

SOCRATES: And to do wrong is to do what is bad, and to refrain from doing wrong is to do what is noble?

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then the abler, better soul, when it does wrong, will do wrong voluntarily, whereas the inferior soul will do wrong involuntarily?

HIPPIAS: So it appears.

SOCRATES: And isn’t the man with the good soul a good man, while the man with the bad soul is bad?

HIPPIAS: Yes.

SOCRATES: So it belongs to a good man to do wrong voluntarily, and to a bad man involuntarily—if in fact the good man has a good soul?

HIPPIAS: Well, certainly he has.

SOCRATES: So the man who voluntarily errs and does shameful, unjust things, Hippias, if in fact such a man exists, would be none other than the good man.

HIPPIAS: I don’t see how I’m to agree with you there, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Nor indeed I with myself, Hippias. Yet this cannot fail to be how it appears to us now, at least, in the wake of the argument. Well, as I said before, I wander to and fro in this area, never holding the same opinion; and it’s not at all surprising that I should wander, or any fellow layman. But if you are going to wander, too, you wise men—now here we are in dire straits, if not even after coming to you are we to rest from our wandering!
Commentary
Abbreviations

< “from”
* (this form of the word not found in any surviving texts)
κτλ. καὶ τὰ λοιπά (= “et cetera”)
MSS manuscripts

LCL Loeb Classical Library (Harvard University Press)

The text used is that of John Burnet (Oxford 1903).

Translations are mine unless otherwise noted.

363a1 Σὺ δὲ δὴ τί σιγάς: The “you” is stressed in three ways: by the initial position of οὐ; by its expression in a pronoun apart from the verb (S 1190; S 929-930); and by the sequence σὺ δὲ δή, which signals a shift in attention from someone else to you (δὲ signals the shift, δή adds emphasis: see S 2839 and GP 259 on δὲ δή).

The δὲ in δὲ δή is sometimes more of an “and” than a “but” (cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 452b, where Socrates is questioning the second of three imagined men who come forward to contradict Gorgias in series: Σὺ δὲ δὴ τίς εἶ, ὁ ἀνθρωπος, καὶ τὸ σὸν ἐφοσιον; “And who are you, sir, and what is your line of work?”). Here, however, Eudikos’s question suggests a clear contrast between the silent Socrates and others who have already voiced their approval, so the δὲ is probably more of a “but” than an “and”: “But you, why are you silent . . . ?”

Cf. Xenophon’s *Symposium* III.10 (each guest is being asked to name the thing on which he prides himself; five have spoken, some at Socrates’ prompting; Socrates has not yet given his own reply): Σὺ δὲ δή, ἐφη ὁ Καλλιάς, ἐπὶ τίνι μέγας φρονοεῖς, ὡς Σώκρατες; “But what of you, Socrates?” said Callias. “What are you proud of?” [LCL translation]

The pseudo-Platonic *Rival Lovers* (134a) might contain an echo of the present passage (here Socrates turns from questioning the first lover, who is giving foolish answers, to questioning the second, who perceives his rival’s foolishness but has not yet pointed it out): Σὺ δὲ δὴ τί σιγάς ἢμιν, ὡς λῶστε, τοῦτου ταῦτα λέγοντος; “But you, why are you silent, excellent sir, while this fellow here is saying these things?”
ὥ Σώκρατες: Polite ὦ before a name in the vocative is standard in ordinary conversation (S 1284) and is usually best left untranslated (cf. note on ὦ Σώκρατες at 369b8). Socrates’ name is declined at S 264 (see also 264b).

Ἱππίου τοσα υταἐπιδειξαμένου: genitive absolute (S 2070), as in the passage from Rival Lovers quoted above (. . . τούτου ταύτα λέγοντος). Note that Plato sets the words Σώκρατες and Ἰππίου side by side, underscoring in his syntax the initial contrast between the dialogue’s two main characters: Socrates, a man who has held his tongue, and Hippias, a man who has been showing off his powers of speech.

tοσατα may be understood either as a direct object (“so many things”) or adverbially (“so much,” “so fully”). See LSJ, τοσοῦτος, III: “neut. also as adverb, so much, so far, . . . pl., τοσουτα . . . .”

When the verb ἐπιδείκνυμι (“display,” “exhibit”) occurs in the middle voice, as here, what is put on display is usually something belonging to the displayer, something he is proud to show off, such as his rhetorical skill (LSJ, ἐπιδείκνυμι, I.2a-b).

A set speech delivered by an orator to wow his audience was called a λόγων ἐπίδειξις (“display of words,” “verbal exhibition”) or simply a ἐπίδειξις (cf. LSJ, ἐπίδειξις, 3). The noun occurs later at 363d2 and 364b6, b8.

At the start of Plato’s Gorgias Socrates politely defers a Gorgianic ἐπίδειξις, asking instead whether Gorgias would be willing to “have a conversation” (διαλεχθῆναι), i.e., subject himself to Socrates’ questioning (Gorgias 447b9-c1): Ἐὖ λέγεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. ἀλλ’ ἀρα ἄρα θελήσει ἂν ἡ μῖν διαλεχθῆναι; “That’s nice, Callicles. But would he be willing to converse with us?” Callicles replies that answering questions is one of the things that Gorgias has just done as part of an ἐπίδειξις (Gorgias 447c5-8): καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐν τούτῳ ἦν τῆς ἐπιδείξεως ἐκέλευε γούν νυν ἐρωτάν ὅτι τις βούλοιτο τῶν ἐνδον ὄντων, καὶ ποῦ ἄπαντα ἐφή ἀποκρινεῖθαι. “For in fact this was one of (the parts of) his display; at any rate, he was just now calling for anyone inside to ask whatever he wished, and he said that he would reply to everyone.” Cf. 363c7-d4 below, where Hippias describes his willingness to “answer whatever questions anyone wishes to ask” (d3: ἀποκρινόμενον τῷ βουλομένῳ ὅτι ἂν τὶς ἐρωτᾷ) in connection with speeches prepared “for display” (d2: εἰς ἐπιδείξειν).

οὐχὶ: rarer, more emphatic form of οὐ (S 2688b).

ἡ . . . ἢ: introducing two alternatives: “either . . . or.”

συνεπαινεῖς τι: The συν- of συνεπαινέω may either denote joint action (“join in praising”) or simply indicate agreement (“agree to,” “approve”). The former seems more likely here, though see LSJ, συνεπαινέω: “approve together, give joint assent, . . . ; συνεπαινεῖν τι approve, consent or agree to [our passage cited] . . . II. join in praising . . . .”
in praising some one] of the things that have been said . . . .”

363a3 καὶ: marks the second alternative as an additional possibility, perhaps reflecting Eudikos’s heightened interest in this possibility (GP 305 (7); 306 (iii)): “or, alternatively,” “or else.”

363a3 ἐλέγχεις: Although ἐλέγχω is occasionally found with no direct object (see LSJ, ἐλέγχω, II.3), it usually takes a person or thing in the accusative. Thus τι τῶν εἰσημένων is evidently serving as the direct object not just of συνεπαινεῖς but of ἐλέγχεις.

The verb ἐλέγχω has an archaic meaning of “disgrace,” “put to shame.” Its later meanings include “put to the test,” “cross-examine,” “question,” “refute.” Here the sense appears to be “(try to) refute (by asking questions).”

The noun ἔλεγχος has both an archaic neuter form which means “disgrace” and a later masculine form which means “cross-examining, . . . esp. for purposes of refutation” (LSJ, ἔλεγχος, B.II). The first words uttered by Hesiod’s Muses (“Field-dwelling shepherds, ignoble disgraces, mere bellies” [LCL translation]) contain the archaic neuter form (Theogony 26: ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ’ ἐλέγχεα, γάστερες οἶον). Socrates’ characteristic way of examining and refuting his interlocutors, perhaps the best illustration of the later meaning, is widely referred to today as “the Socratic elenchus.”

363a3 εἰ τί σοι μὴ καλῶς δοξεὶ εἰσηρέναι: as usual, μή instead of οὐ in the protasis of a conditional (cf. S 2702.2, 2705c).

The adv. καλῶς sometimes means “beautifully” or “nobly,” but it commonly means little more than “well” or “rightly” (cf. LSJ, καλός, C.II). Here μὴ καλῶς seems to mean little more than “incorrectly” or “wrong” (adv.).

Hippias should be understood as the personal subject of δοξεὶ (“if he seems to you . . .”), partly because one would otherwise have to supply αὐτόν or Ἱππίαν as the understood acc. subject of the act. inf. εἰσηρέναι (“if it seems to you that [he] has spoken . . .”), but also because the personal construction in Greek is preferred to the impersonal (cf. S 1982-3, esp. 1983a).

The τι may be taken adverbially (“if he seems to you to have spoken incorrectly in any respect”) or as the direct object of εἰσηρέναι (“if he seems to you to have said something wrong”).

The whole passage resembles Hippiolytus 297-299 (Nurse addressing Phaedra):

εἰ ἔν, τὶ σίγας; οὐκ ἔχομεν οἰγάν, τέχνων, ἀλλ᾽ ἐ μ ἐλέγχειν, εἰ τι μὴ καλῶς λέγω, ἢ τοίον εὖ λεχθεῖοι συγχωρεῖν λόγοις.

“Well, why are you silent? You ought not to be mute, child, but should either refute me, if I have said something amiss, or comply with the good advice I have given.” [LCL translation]

363a4 ἀλλὰς τε ἐπειδῆ καὶ: The common phrase ἀλλὰς τε ( . . . ) καὶ means literally
“both otherwise and . . .” or “both for other reasons and . . . .” Its function in everyday Attic is very close to that of English “especially” (S 2980). Another word is often added between the τε and the καί (ἵν, εἰ, ἐπειδὴ, πάντως, etc.); sometimes the καί is left out (LSJ, ἄλλως, I.3). Here καί is retained and ἐπειδὴ is added: “especially since,” “especially now that . . . .”

363a4 αὐτοὶ: a special use of emphatic αὐτός (S 1209ab): “[we] alone” or “only [we].” Cf. LSJ, αὐτός, I.3 (“αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἔομεν we are by ourselves, i.e., among friends”) and Plato’s Parmenides 137a6-7: ὁμοὶ δὲ δὲι γὰρ χαοίζεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καί, ὅ Ζήνων λέγει, αὐτοὶ ἔομεν. “Even so, I’ll do it, since it is right for me to oblige you; and besides, we are, as Zeno says, by ourselves.” [Mary Louise Gill & Paul Ryan translation]

363a4 λελείμμεθα: perf. pass. (< λείπω): “we have been left,” “we are left.”

363a4 μάλιστ’: “Best” (in the sense of “most of all” or “better than anyone else”) is sometimes a good translation for the superlative adv. μάλατα (< μάλα). Cf. Socrates’ use of μάλατα at 366d1: . . . εἰ βούλοιο, πάντων τάχιστα καὶ μάλιστ’ ἂν εἴποις τάληθη περὶ τούτου; . . . you could, if you wished, tell him the truth about that more quickly and better than anyone else?” [LCL translation].

363a4 ἂν ἀντιποιοῦμαι: potential opt. (S 1824).

In its middle sense of “lay claim to,” ἀντιποιεῖω often takes an object in the genitive (e.g., Plato, Meno 90d2: τοὺς ἀντιποιούμενους . . . τῆς τέχνης, “those who lay claim to the art”). Here, however, its object is an inf. clause (the closest parallel cited in LSJ is Meno 91c6-7: τῶν ἀντιποιούμενων τι ἐπίστασθαι εὔφηγετείν, “of those who claim to know how to do some good service”).

363a5 μετεῖμι: inf. (with impersonal subject) + dat. of the person to whom there is a share [+ gen. of the thing shared in] (LSJ, μέτειμι, II.1): “[could claim] that there is a share to us in [+ gen.],” or, more idiomatically, “[could claim] that we have a share in,” “[could claim] to participate in . . . .”

363a5 τῆς . . . διατριβῆς: gen. dependent upon μετεῖναι (see previous note).

The noun διατριβή (< διατρίβω, “wear away,” “consume,” “spend [time]”) may mean a frivolous “amusement” or “pastime,” a serious “occupation” or “way of spending time,” or even a whole “way of life,” approaching the primary meanings of βίος (LSJ, βίος, I: “life,” “mode of life,” “manner of living”).

Cf. Aristotle’s History of Animals 487a20 (a good illustration of the closeness of βίος and διατριβή, as well as another, more concrete example of διατριβή + a prepositional phrase introduced by ἐν): τὰ μὲν . . . τῶν βίων καὶ τὴν τροφὴν ποιεῖται ἐν τῷ ὕγρῳ, καὶ δέχεται τὸ ὕγρον καὶ ἄφησι, τοῦτο δὲ στερισόμενα οὐ δύναται ξῆν, οἷον πολλοὶ συμβαίνει τῶν ἐκθύνων τὰ δὲ τὴν μὲν τροφῆν ποιεῖται καὶ τὴν διατριβήν ἐν τῷ ὕγρῳ, οὐ μέντοι δέχεται τὸ ὕδωρ ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄφεσι . . . . “Some (water animals) make their life
and procure their food in the water, and they admit water and send it out, and if
deprived of water cannot live, as happens to the majority of fishes; whereas
others [e.g., otters, beavers, crocodiles] procure their food and make their (way
of) life in the water, yet they do not admit water, but air . . . ."

363a5 ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ. The word φιλοσοφία, especially before Aristotle’s time, was
much less specific than the word “philosophy” as used today. It seems to have
embraced all high, and even not so high, intellectual pursuits. Socrates in Plato’s
Theaetetus (143d) speaks of “geometry or any other philosophia (γεωμετρίαν ἢ
tyna áßllhnh phiλοσοφίαν). Isocrates applies it to his own study of rhetoric (ἡ
περὶ τοὺς λόγους φιλοσοφία, cited in LSJ under φιλοσοφία, 2: “systematic,
methodical treatment of a subject”). Probably the closest thing to a general word
for “intellectuals” in Plato’s day was φιλόσοφοι (cf. LSJ, φιλόσοφος, I.1:
“used [by Plato] of all men of education and learning . . .”). Thus ἐν
phiλοσοφίᾳ διατριβή means something like “the way of life (of those who spend
their days) in intellectual pursuits,” or as we say more succinctly in English, “the
life of the mind.”

Cf. Theaetetus 172c-173c: “[T]hose who have spent a long time in
intellectual pursuits [οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φιλοσοφίαις πολὺν χρόνον διατριβήσαντες]
appear ridiculous when they enter the courts of law as speakers. . . . Those who
have knocked about in courts and the like from their youth up seem to me, when
compared with those who have been brought up in philosophy and similar
pursuits [πορεύεται ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ διατριβῇ τεθραμμένους],
to be as slaves in breeding compared with freedmen . . . . So much for them,
Theodorus. Shall we describe those who belong to our band . . . ? —By all
means, Socrates, describe them . . . . —Very well, . . . and let us speak of the
leaders [περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων]; for why should anyone talk about mediocre
intellectuals [τί γὰρ ἐν τοῖς γε φαύλοις διατριβήσαντας ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ
λέγοι]?” [LCL translation, slightly altered]

Eudikos’s words suggest a kind of hierarchy in the world of those who fancy
themselves philosophoi. He speaks as if he and the rest who remain have greater
intellectual credentials than those who have left, yet whereas Hippias, the center
of attention in the present gathering, is spoken of by Socrates as if he were a wise
man (οοφός; see esp. 372bc), all Eudikos says of himself is that he is among
those most qualified to claim to have a share in the pursuit of wisdom—several
rungs down from where Hippias seems to be.

Socrates puts Hippias on an intellectual pedestal throughout the dialogue,
even as he refutes him. Cf. the exchange between Hippias and Socrates at 369cd:
eὶ δὲ βούλει, σοὶ ἢ ἣν ἀντιπαράβαλλε λόγον παρὰ λόγον . . . καὶ μᾶλλον
εἰσονταί οὔτοι ὑπότερος ἢμεῖν λέγει. — Ὡ Ἰππία, ἐγὼ τοι ὑπὸ
ἀμφοτεροῖ ἐὰν οὐχὶ σὲ εἶναι σοφότερον ἢ ἐμή. “. . . and if you wish, in your
turn set a speech of your own beside mine, speech against speech, . . . and these
people here will know more fully which of us speaks better.” —“Oh, Hippias,
rest assured, I do not dispute the claim that you are wiser than I am!” Cf. also
Socrates’ closing words (376c): καὶ ἐμὲ μὲν οὐδὲν θυμιαστὸν πλανάσθαι
οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἱδώτην· εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑμεῖς πλανήσεσθε οἱ σοφοὶ, τούτῳ ἢδη καὶ
“And it’s not at all surprising that I should wander, or any fellow layman; but if you are going to wander, too, you wise men—now here we are in dire straits, if not even after coming to you are we to rest from our wandering!”

καὶ μήν, ὦ Εὐδίκε, ἐστι γε: The combination of particles καὶ μήν . . . γε is typically used to signal an acceptance of, or favorable reaction to, an invitation, some additional point being introduced as part of the response (cf. GP 353-55 (4), 355-56 (5) [our passage cited, 356]). The γε emphasizes the new point introduced (GP 351-2): “And indeed, Eudikos, there are things,” “Yes, yes, Eudikos, I must say, there are things . . . .”

α ἡδέως ἄν πυνθοίμην Ἰππίου: potential opt. (S 1824). The verb πυνθάνομαι ranges over the concepts of asking, hearing, and learning. Here, as often, the thing obtained is in the accusative, and the person from whom it is obtained is in the genitive (cf. LSJ, πυνθάνομαι, I: “learn, whether by hearsay or by inquiry . . . 1. πυνθάνεσθαι τί τινος learn something from a person): “which I would gladly learn from Hippias . . . .”

ὁν: partitive genitive. As often, the relative pronoun has been attracted from the accusative into the genitive case (S 2522), and its antecedent has been omitted (S 2509): “of/among the things which . . . .”

καὶ γάρ: Upon encountering this combination of particles, the first thing to try to determine is which of the two, καὶ or γάρ, is providing the logical link to the previous statement. When it is καὶ that does this work, as sometimes in answers, the basic sense of καὶ γάρ is “yes, and,” “and further,” “and in fact” (GP 109.II; S 2814), καὶ serving as the conjunction, γάρ acting adverbially with affirmative force. When it is γάρ that does this work, as it normally does, the basic sense of καὶ γάρ is “for even” or “for in fact” (cf. GP 108.I), γάρ serving as a conjunction, signaling that the present statement backs up the previous statement in some way, καὶ acting adverbially, indicating addition with a sense of climax or surprise (cf. GP 316.C - 317).

If γάρ is providing the logical link in this passage, then Socrates’ present statement must back up his first one in some way. But how? Perhaps one of the things that Hippias “was saying just now about Homer” (b1) was that “the Iliad is a finer poem of Homer’s than the Odyssey” (b2-3). If so, Socrates might naturally add at this point: “Why, [not only from Hippias just now but] even from your father Apemantos I used to hear that the Iliad is a finer . . . .”

This requires the reader to do a lot of unpacking, but as Denniston writes of γάρ, “[t]he connexion of thought is sometimes lacking in logical precision. . . . Compression of thought is often the source of the difficulty” (GP 61 (2)). In any case, γάρ is being used here in a lively, colloquial way, not as part of a formal argument. Its sense is probably closer to “Why, . . . .” than to “For . . . .”

tοῦ οοῦ πατρὸς Λατημάντου: gen. of the person heard from (S 1361).
The form οὐ can be either the personal pronoun (“of you” < οὐ, S 325), whose accent would mark it as emphatic (S 325a, 1192), or the possessive (“your,” “your own” < ὁ οὖς, S 330), which always has an accent. Here it is probably best heard as possessive. Cf. Plato’s Laches 180e, where the phrase is in the nom. case, removing the grammatical ambiguity: ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐγώ καὶ ὁ οὖς πατήρ ἐταίρῳ τε καὶ φίλῳ ἤμεν “for your father and I were always companions and friends . . . .”

The adj. ἀπήμαντος, like its lexical twin ἀπήμων, means “free from harm,” “free from sorrow” (< πῆμα, “misery,” “calamity”). When Socrates addresses Eudikos at 373a6 as “son of Apemantos” (ὦ παῖ Ἀπημάντου), it comes on the heels of a comment about being freed from an affliction (πάθημα) and not being harmed (cf. esp. 373a5: οἶμαι δὲ οὐδ’ αὐτὸν οὲ βλαβήσεσθαι. “. . . and I imagine you yourself will not be harmed, either.”).

363b2 ἤξουον: The impf. tense may indicate that Apemantos’s statement was heard on more than one occasion (“I used to hear . . .”; cf. S 1893). But it could simply convey the sense of a temporal framework within which his statements were heard on a single occasion (cf. S 1908-9, esp. 1908b). Cf. the use of the impf. at 368b3-5 (Socrates to Hippias): ὡς ἐγὼ ποτὲ σου ἤξουον μεγαλαυχουμένου, πολλὴν οὐφικα καὶ ζήλωτην οἰκοτού διεξιόντος ἐν ἁγορᾷ ἐπὶ ταῖς τραπέζαις. “. . . as I once heard you boast when you were detailing your own wisdom, extensive and enviable, in the market-place near the money-changers’ tables.”

363b2 Ἡ Ἰλιάς: “the Iliad.” The adj. Ἰλιάς, used here as a noun, is an irregular feminine form; the regular adj. is Ἰλιακός, -ή, -όν (“Ilian,” “Trojan”). A feminine adjectival form is used, it seems, because a fuller way of referring to the Iliad was as Ἡ Ἰλιάς ποίησις, “the Ilian poem,” “the poem about Troy.”

363b2 εἴη: As usual, indicative shifts to optative in secondary sequence in indirect discourse, though, as always, the indicative form (ἐστί) could have been retained (S 2599, 2615).

363b3 τῷ Ὄμηρῳ: a so-called “dative of interest,” an umbrella term used by Smyth (1474). It may be explained specifically as a dat. of advantage (S 1481) (“[that the Iliad is a finer poem,] (a poem more) to Homer’s credit, [than the Odyssey] . . . .”), though its sense is not far removed from that of a dat. of agent (S 1488) (“[a finer poem] (composed) by Homer,” “[a poem] (composed) [more finely] by Homer”), or from that of a dat. of possession (S 1476): “[that the Iliad is a finer poem] of Homer’s [than the Odyssey] . . . .” Cf. Smyth on the dat. of advantage (S 1481): “The dative often has to be translated as if the possessive genitive were used . . . .”

τοσούτῳ . . . ὦ: dative of degree of difference (cf. S 1513): lit., “[and finer] by this much, (namely, the amount) by which . . . ,” or, more smoothly, “[and finer] to just the extent to which . . . . ”

τοσούτος and ὦσος are quantitatively correlative pronouns, not to be confused with the qualitatively correlative pronouns τοιοῦτος and οίος. See chart at S 340.

ἐκάτερον γὰρ τούτων τὸ μὲν εἰς Ὑδυσσεά ἑψη πεποίηθαι, τὸ δὲ εἰς Ἀχιλλέα: The governing verb is ἑψη; it is either impf. or 2nd aor. (< φημί). Smyth presents this form as impf. (S 783), allowing that it may also be 2nd aor. (S 788). It is listed as 2nd aor. in LSJ.

The verb ποιέω can mean “compose (in verse),” i.e., make or write as a poet (LSJ, ποιέω, A.I.4a). Cf. note on πεποιηκέναι at 364c5.

The preposition ἐκινσὶ can be used “of the subject of a work, esp. in titles” (LSJ, εἰς, IV.1b), much like English “on” (e.g., Milton’s poem On Shakespeare).

The Attic article preserves its older function of demonstrative pronoun (as often in Homer) before μὲν and δὲ: τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δὲ “the one (poem) . . . the other” (S 1107).

The sense of the passage is clear enough: Apeamantos said that each of these two Homeric poems has one of these two heroes as its subject. Apart from ἐκάτερον γὰρ τούτων, the Greek may be turned into English fairly easily: “. . . he said that the one (poem) is composed on Odysseus (as its subject), and the other on Achilles.” Nor is it hard to render the words ἐκάτερον γὰρ τούτων separately: “for each of these (two men),” or “for each of these (two poems).” The challenge is to reflect all the syntax in one translation (an attempt: “. . . for as one of these, he said, is a poem on Odysseus, so is the other on Achilles.”).

περὶ ἐκείνου οὖν ἡδέως ἀν . . . ἀναπυθοίμην: resumptive οὖν (“Well then, [to pick up where I left off,] . . .”), marked, as often, by a demonstrative pronoun (GP 428 (4)). Had there been no demonstrative pronoun here, it would still be clear that this οὖν is resumptive, for Socrates is reiterating his “I’d gladly learn” statement from a6 (ἡδέως ἄν πυθοίμην), albeit with two changes: (1) the verb πυνθάνομαι has been replaced by the compound ἀναπυνθάνομαι, which seems to suggest more active, persistent inquiring; (2) the verb is now complemented by a prepositional phrase (LSJ, ἀναπυνθάνομαι, 2: “learn by inquiry, . . . ἀναπυνθάνεσθαι περὶ τινος Plato, Hippias Minor 363b”).

Resumptive οὖν, and connective οὖν in general, typically comes second in its sentence (GP 427 (2)). Here, as often, the prepositional phrase is maintained as a unit and οὖν comes third (cf. 367d9: Περὶ ταῦτα οὖν . . . ). The word order highlights ἐκείνου: “Well then, that’s what I would gladly ask/learn about . . . .”

eβουλομένῳ ἔστιν Ἰππίς: lit., “if it is for Hippias wishing,” or, more idiomatically, “if the idea pleases Hippias,” “if Hippias doesn’t mind.” See LSJ, βούλομαι, II.4 (“βουλομένῳ μοι ἔστι, with inf., it is according to my wish that . . .”) and S 1487 (“ἐμοὶ βουλομένῳ ἔστι, etc. — Instead of a sentence with a finite verb, a participle usually denoting inclination or aversion is added to the
ivative of the person interested, which depends on a form of εἶναι, γίγνεσθαι, etc.

Cf. Plato’s Gorgias 448d (Socrates to Gorgias after being invited to question Polus): Οὔ, εἰ αὐτῷ γε οἱ βουλομένοι ἐστίν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ ἃν ἥδιον σὲ. “No, if you yourself will be so good as to answer, why, I would far rather ask you.” [LCL translation]

363b7 ὅπως αὐτῷ δοξεῖ: indirect question (direct version: πῶς αὐτῷ δοξεῖ “How does it seem to him . . . ,” i.e., “What is his opinion . . . ?”). If ἀναπυθοίμην were not complemented by a prepositional phrase (πέρὶ ἑξείνου), this indirect question would serve as its direct object (“ask/learn how it seems to him . . . ”). As it is, ὅπως αὐτῷ δοξεῖ κτλ. may best be understood as spelling out the content of ἑξείνου: “Well, that’s what I would gladly ask/learn about, if Hippias doesn’t mind: how it seems to him . . . .”

363b7 περὶ τοῖν ἀνδροίν τοῦτοιν: dual, either gen. or dat. (always the same form in the dual: S 202), here to be taken as gen., as usual with περὶ + something thought about (cf. S 1693.1b). The word order is varied at 364c1 (περὶ τοῦτοιν τοῖν ἀνδροίν), but the meaning is the same: “regarding these two men.”

Pairs play a prominent role in the Lesser Hippias (Odysseus and Achilles, Socrates and Hippias, the false man and the true man, those who err voluntarily and those who err involuntary). The use of the dual at this early point in the dialogue (and again at 364c1, 370d7, e1, and twice at e4) helps alert the reader to this fact. Cf. S 999: “The dual is chiefly employed of two persons or things which, by nature or association, form a pair . . . .”

363b7 πότερον ἀμείνω φησὶν εἶναι: Here Socrates shifts to the direct-question form, using πότερον where he might have used ὁπότερον (see note on ὅπως αὐτῷ δοξεῖ, b7 above). Although the form πότερον (< πότερος) is often adverbial neut. acc., introducing a question with two alternatives (cf. 365e9-10: πότερον ἀμαθεῖς εἰσιν ἢ σοφοί; “[A]re they ignorant or wise?”), here it is pronominal masc. acc. and means “which (one) . . . ?” or “which man . . . ?”

Here ἀμείνω (< ἀμείνων, declined like βελτίων, S 293) is masc. sing. acc. (“which one he says is better”), though elsewhere it can be neut. pl. nom. or acc. ἀμείνων and βελτίων both mean “better”: both are used as comparatives of ἀγαθός (S 319.1). But whereas Homer often applies ἀμείνων to people, he uses βελτίων infrequently and always in the neuter, never of people. Compare Iliad 21.106-7 (Achilles to Lycaon: ἀλλὰ φίλος θάνε καὶ σὺ· τί ἢ ὀλοφύρεαυ ὀντός; / κάτθεν καὶ Πάτροκλος, ὃ πέρ σέο πολλὸν ἀμείνων. “So, friend, you die also. Why all this clamour about it? / Patroklos also is dead, who was better by far than you are.”) and Iliad 21.485-6 (Hera to Artemis: ἢτοι βέλτερόν ἐστι κατ’ οὖρες θῆκες ἐναίρειν / ὁγιστέρος τ’ ἐλάφους ἢ χρείσσοσιν ἵππι μάχεσθαι. “Better for you to hunt down the ravening beasts in the mountains / and deer of the wilds, than try to fight in strength with your betters.”) [Richmond Lattimore’s translation]
See also S 319a: “ἀμείνων, ἀριστος, express aptitude, capacity, or worth (able, brave, excellent); βέλτιως, βέλτιστος, express a moral idea (virtuous); κρείττων, κράτιστος, force and superiority . . .”

363c1 ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπά ἡμῖν ἐπιδείκται: The first καὶ — ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἄλλα — is what Smyth calls a “καὶ of balanced contrast” (S 2885-6); it reinforces the logical link between this causal clause and the main clause and is probably best left untranslated. Cf. Plato’s Symposium 199c5-d1: ἵθελον μοι περὶ Ἐρωτος, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάντα καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς διήλθες οἶδε ἐστι, καὶ τόδε εἶπέ: “Come, then, since you have gone through the rest of his character (so) beautifully and magnificently, tell me this too about Eros: . . .”

The second καὶ — πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπά — is like the καὶ in such phrases as πολλὰ καὶ καλά (“many fine [things]”); it too may be left untranslated (“many [other things] of every sort”). Cf. S 2879: “Adjectives of quantity, as πολύς and ὄλιγος in the plural, are usually joined to an adjective in the same construction by καὶ or τῇ καὶ.” Cf. also GP 290 (2): “πολύς and a qualitative attribute applied to a single substantive . . . are normally linked by καὶ.” As Denniston observes, this is one of those uses of καὶ “where English idiom . . . differs from Greek” (GP 289.1).

As at a2, ἐπιδείκτευμι in the middle voice (perfect tense here, aorist there) denotes a showing-off of one’s own powers (see earlier note on Ἰππίου τουσαύτα ἐπιδείκτευμενον): lit., “since he has displayed for us many other things [and] of every kind,” i.e., “for he’s already treated us to a display of many other things of every sort . . .”

363c1 καὶ περὶ ποιητῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ περὶ Ὀμήρου: Although at first sight these two καὶ’s, each of which precedes a περὶ, seem to form a parallel construction (καὶ περὶ . . . καὶ περὶ “both about . . . and about”), one must account for the τε, evidently part of a τε . . . καὶ construction. This leads to the right analysis: simple copulative καὶ (“and . . .”) followed by τε . . . καὶ (“both . . . and”).

Generally speaking, τε tends to come second in its word group; one might have expected “περὶ τε ποιητῶν ἄλλων” instead of “περὶ ποιητῶν τε ἄλλων.” But when the first word is a preposition, it is not that unusual for a substantive to come next, followed by τε (GP 516, our passage cited at 517, top).

What may be more unusual is the force of this τε . . . καὶ construction. Normally, τε . . . καὶ joins two elements straightforwardly: “A and B.” But the same construction is also found “where the thought implies a more elaborate relationship than that of mere addition” (GP 514 (7)). For instance, a speaker may use this construction to convey the thought “My statement is just as true of A as it is of B; it applies to A, too, not just to B.” This seems to be what Socrates is doing here. He has already noted that Hippias discussed Homer in his display (a6-b1); here the point is that Homer was not the only poet discussed: “and about other poets, too, not just about Homer.”

Cf. GP 515: “τε . . . καὶ, ‘just as much as’, ‘not only . . . but also’. (The emphatic expression may be either the first or the second.) . . .” Among other examples, Denniston cites Sophocles’ Antigone 1251-2 (Chorus to Messenger,
both wondering why Eurydice, whose son has just committed suicide, is making no noise in the house): . . . ἐμοὶ δ’ οὖν ἦ τ’ ἄγαν σιγὴ βαρύ / δοκεῖ προσεῖναι χὴ [= ξαί ἦ] μάτην πολλὴ βοή “. . . But to me, in any case, a silence too strict seems to promise trouble just as much as a fruitless abundance of weeping” [Jebb’s translation].

363c4 Ἀλλὰ: This kind of ἀλλὰ, often found in replies in Plato, says in effect: “Oh, if that’s what you’re thinking/hoping is the case, well, let me assure you, [it is the case].” Denniston calls this “a favourite idiom of Plato’s” (GP 20 (7), our passage cited). Eudikos is picking up on Socrates’ “if” clause at b6 (εἰ βουλομένῳ ἐστίν Ἱππία), assuring him that he can dispense with the “if”: “Well,” “Why,” “Ah, but . . . .”

363c4 δῆλον ὅτι: supply ἐστίν. The phrase δῆλον ὅτι is sometimes printed as one word when it functions as an adverb (there is a separate entry for δηλονότι in LSJ: “clearly,” “manifestly”). Here, however, it works just as well to hear it as a phrase: “it is clear that . . . .”

363c4 οὐ φθονήσει Ἱππίας . . . ἀποκρίνεσθαι: In other contexts φθονέω takes a gen. of the thing grudgingly withheld and a dat. of the person from whom it is withheld (cf. Plato’s Euthydemus 297d: μή μοι φθονήσῃς τοῦ μαθήματος. “Do not begrudge me the lesson.”); here, as often, it simply takes an infinitive: “Hippias will not refuse [from feelings of ill-will] to answer.”

A similar use of φθονήσῃς occurs at 372e7 (Socrates to Hippias: μὴ φθονήσῃς ἰάσασθαι τὴν ψυχήν μου “[D]o not refuse to heal my soul . . . ”).

363c4 ἐὰν τι αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾷς: Not just ἐρωτάω, but most verbs denoting an act of asking, demanding, etc., take a double object in the accusative (S 1628): “if you ask him something,” “if you ask him a question.”

In contracted -αω verbs in the present tense there is no distinction in form between indicative and subjunctive (S 385). Here ἐρωτᾷς is subjunctive: it joins with ἐὰν in forming the protasis of a Future More Vivid conditional (S 2323; chart at S 2297).

363c5 ἦ γάρ: Interrogative ἦ (GP 282.II) combined with γάρ creates “an appeal for confirmation” much like French n’est-ce pas? or German nicht wahr? (GP 86; 284 (2)(ii)): “Is that not so?” “Isn’t that right?”

363c6 ἄποκρινη: 2nd pers. sing., fut. mid. indic. (< ἄποκρίνω, “separate,” “decide,” but often found as a deponent, ἄποκρινομαι, “give [one’s] answer,” “reply”). Verbs whose stems end in a liquid (λ or ρ) or a nasal (μ or ν)—here it is a nasal—are inflected in the future act. and mid. as contracted εω-verbs are inflected in the present (S 400; S 535). For example, fut. mid. ἄποκρινομαι (“I shall answer”) and ἄποκρινη (“you will answer”) have the same endings as pres. mid. ποιοῦμαι (“I am making”) and ποιή (“you are making”).
πῶς ποιήσεις: Here ποιέω is intransitive, as often with an adverb, and has the sense of “act” or “do,” not “make” (LSJ, ποιέω, B.I.3): lit., “How will you act?” (= “What will you do?”).

Καὶ γάρ: The unspoken starting point of Hippias’s lengthy reply is evidently “Yes, I will take a question from Socrates.” Hearing this ellipse enables one to hear γάρ as a linking conjunction (“for”) and καί as adverbial (“indeed, in fact,” “indeed”): “[Yes, I will take a question from Socrates;] for, indeed, I would be acting strangely [were I to do otherwise].” See note on καὶ γάρ at b1, above.

Isocrates, the greatest teacher of rhetoric in Plato’s day and Plato’s greatest rival as an educator, was very fond of using καὶ γάρ “in sentences which disclaim an absurdity, inconsistency, or the like; the absurdity being expressed by εἰ or by μὲν . . . δέ . . .” (GP 109, Denniston quoting R. W. Chapman). Here Plato uses just such a sentence, complete with καὶ γάρ, εἰ, and μὲν . . . δέ, to set a rhetorical tone for Hippias in his first line in the dialogue. Two similar examples from Isocrates:

[Plataicus 52] Καὶ γάρ ἀν πάντων εἰὴ δεινότατον, εἰ πρότερον μὲν ἡμῖν μετέδοτε τῆς πατρίδος τῆς ἰμετέρας αὐτῶν, νῦν δὲ μηδὲ τὴν ἰμετέραν ἀποδοῦναι δόξειν ὑμῖν. “For it would be the cruellest blow of all, if you, having long ago bestowed upon us the right of a common citizenship with yourselves, should now decide not even to restore to us our own.”

[Against Callimachus 68] Καὶ γάρ ἀν εἰὴ δεινόν, εἰ τοὺς μὲν ἡδικημότας τιμωρίας ἀφεῖναι κύριαι γένοιτο, ἐφ’ ἡμῖν δὲ τοῖς εὑρείσιν ἀκυροῖς κατασταθεῖν. “For it would be outrageous if those covenants should be held valid for the exculpation of the evil-doers, but should be made invalid for us, your benefactors!” [LCL translations]

ἀν δεινὰ ποιοῦν: optative + ἂν in the apodosis of a Future Less Vivid conditional (S 2329; chart at S 2297): lit., “I would be doing strange things,” or, more loosely, “it would be strange behavior on my part . . .”

Ὀλυμπίαζε: anticipating ἐπανιών at d1: “[going up] to Olympia.”

The suffix –ζε (properly –δε) indicates motion towards (S 342), as does the –ος in αὐτός at 364a5.

Olympia, site of the prestigious Olympic Games, was a panhellenic sanctuary in the plain of Elis in the western Peloponnese (see note on οἴκωθεν ἐξ Ἡλίδος at 363d1).

μὲν: answered by δέ at d4.

eἰς: Since a spatial direction has already been indicated by Ὄλυμπίαζε (c7), this εἰς may indicate purpose (“for”), though it need not (“to Olympia to the festival”).

tὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων πανήγυριν: The word πανήγυρις (< πᾶς, “all,” + ἀγνοίς, “gathering,” “crowd”) denotes a general or national assembly, especially a nationwide “festal assembly” (LSJ, πανήγυρις, 1).
The phrase τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων πανήγυριν is counterbalanced at d4 by the grammatically similar phrase τὴν Ἑλληνίδος Πανίνην. The former, following μέν, refers to the greatest crowd of people before whom a sophist might perform; the latter, following δέ, refers to an intimate interaction with one invididual.

363c8 ὅταν τὰ Ὀλυμπία ή: subjunctive with ἀν (ὅταν = ὅτε + ἀν) in a temporal clause within a sentence whose “leading verb denotes a repeated or customary action” in primary sequence (S 2409; cf. S 2410 and S 2337).

The Olympic Games, together with the rest of the religious festival held in honor of Olympic Zeus, were called τὰ Ὀλυμπία, short for τὰ Ὀλυμπιακαί Ἱερά (“the Olympian [holy] rites”): “whenever the Olympic Games are (held) . . . .”

363d1 ἐπανωθὲν: pres. part. < ἐπάνειμι (:< ἐπί- + ἀνά- + εἶμι), “return,” or, as here, “go up” (LSJ, ἐπάνειμι, II: “go up, Ὀλυμπίαζε Plato, Hippias Minor 363d”).

363d1 οἴκοθεν ἰξῆ Ἤλιδος: “from my house, out of Elis,” “from my home in Elis . . . .” Elis (Ἕλις) was the name both of a plain in the northwest Peloponnese and of a city in that plain. The Eleans hosted and oversaw the Olympic Games.

363d1 εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν: The word ἱερὸν can mean “temple” or “shrine,” but its basic meaning is “holy place.” Here it evidently refers not to the Temple of Zeus itself, which housed Phidias’s famous statue, but rather to the entire sacred precinct within whose borders the Olympic Games were held.

363d1 παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν καὶ λέγοντα . . . καὶ ἀποκρινόμενον: “I exhibit myself both speaking . . . and answering,” or, more loosely, “I show myself ready (both) to recite . . . and to answer . . . .”

The verb παρέχω can mean “present or offer for a purpose,” often with a reflexive pronoun. It can take an infinitive denoting the action of others upon the subject of παρέχω, or, as here, a participle denoting the actions of the subject himself (cf. LSJ, παρέχω, II.3: “with reflexive pronoun and a predicative, show, exhibit oneself so and so”).

Example of the infinitive construction (Plato’s Apology 33b, Socrates speaking): ἄλλ’ ὀμοίως καὶ πλουτίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτάν . . . “but to rich man and poor man alike I offer myself (up) for questioning [i.e., for them to question me] . . . .” (See also Meno 70b5-c3, quoted in note on d3, below.)

Example of the participial construction with no reflexive pronoun (Plato’s Protagoras 348a, Socrates to Protagoras): ἐτομός εἰμὶ οὐ παρέχειν ἀποκρινόμενος “I am ready to offer (myself up) to you as answerer. . . .”

363d2 ὅτι ἄν τίς βούληται: present general relative clause with subjunctive + ἀν (as usual in primary sequence: S 2567) introduced by the neut. sing. acc. of the indefinite relative pronoun ὅστις (antecedent omitted): “[saying] whatever anyone wishes,” “[reciting] any (speech) that anyone wishes (to hear) . . . .”
363d2 ὅν: “... of (the things) which,” “... among (the speeches) which...”

This relative pronoun would have been in the nom. case (ὁ) had it not been
attracted into the case of its omitted antecedent (S 2522, 2531), a partitive
genitive dependent upon ὅτι in the previous phrase.

363d2 ἀν μοι εἰς ἐπίδειξιν παρασκευασμένον ἦ: perf. pass. subjunctive + ἀν in
present general relative clause (S 2567). The neut. pl. subject (implied in ὅν) has
its verb in the singular, as usual (S 958).

Here εἰς indicates purpose (“for display”: see last two paragraphs of note on
Ἱππίου τοσαύτα ἐπιδειξαμένου at a1, above).

Here μοι is probably best understood as a dative of agent (S 1488): “[which] have been prepared by me for display...”

363d3 ἀποκρινόμενον τῷ βουλομένῳ ὅτι ἀν τις ἐρωτᾷ: The verb ἀποκρίνομαι
can take a dative of the person answered and an accusative of the question to be
answered. Cf. the English construction “Answer me this:...”

On the set phrase ὁ βουλομένος see LSJ, βουλομαι, II.3 (“ὁ βουλομένος,
any one who likes...”).

As at d2, here ὅτι (< ὅστις) introduces a present general relative clause with
subjunctive + ἀν (S 2567): “answering anyone who likes (to ask), whatever
anyone asks,” “answering whatever question anyone wishes to ask...”

Cf. Plato’s Meno 70b5-c3 (Socrates to Meno): καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ θέος
ὑμᾶς εἰθεκεν, ἀφόρμος τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὸς ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐὰν τις τι
ἐρωτᾷ, ὡσπερ εἰκὸς τοὺς εἰδότας, ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς παράκρητον αὐτὸν ἐρωτάν
tῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ ὅτι ἀν τις βούληται, καὶ οὐδενὶ ὅτῳ ὅπως ἀποκρινόμενος. “Nay more, he [Gorgias] has given you the regular habit of
answering any chance question in a fearless, magnificent manner, as befits those
who know: for he sets himself the example of offering himself to be questioned
by any Greek who chooses, and on any point he likes, and he has an answer for
everybody” [LCL translation].

363d4 νῦν δὲ τὴν Σωκράτους ἐρωτήσων φύγομι: “... but should now avoid
the questioning of Socrates.”

The present sentence is a Future Less Vivid conditional sentence (S 2329)
whose apodosis comes first (ἄν δεινα ποιοῦν, “I would be acting strangely”),
followed by a long protasis divided into two parts by a μὲν... δὲ construction
(εἰ Ὁλυμπίαζε μὲν... νῦν δὲ...). The present clause is the second, more
decisive part of that protasis, the only part with a verb in the optative mood (as
expected in a FLV conditional).

Σωκράτους is subjective gen. (S 1328, 1330; S 264).

φύγομι is aor. opt. (< φεύγω).

If the rhetorical structure of the present sentence reminds one of Isocrates
(see second paragraph of note on Καὶ γάρ at c7, above), it may also bring to
mind Plato’s Apology 28de (Socrates speaking): ἐγώ οὖν δεινά ὅν εἴη
εἰργασμένος, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ὅτε μὲν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον, οὓς
PUTEΣτὶ εἴλεθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Αμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ
Δηλιώ, τότε μὲν οὖ ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον ἐμενον ὡσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκανδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττονος, ὡς ἔγω φήθην τε καὶ ὕπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δειν ἐκαὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτόν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἑνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθείς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὑποῖ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλοι πράγμα λίπομι τήν τάξιν. “So I should have done a terrible thing, if, when the commanders whom you chose to command me stationed me, both at Potidaea and Amphipolis and at Delium, I remained where they stationed me, like anybody else, and ran the risk of death, but when the god gave me a station, as I believed and understood, with orders to spend my life in philosophy and in examining myself and others, then I were to desert my post through fear of death or anything else whatsoever.” [LCL translation].

364a1 Μακαριῶν γε . . . πάθος πέπονθας: As the noun πάθος can mean “state” or “condition” (LSJ, πάθος, III.1), so the verb πάσχω (perf. πέπονθα) can mean “be in a (certain) state of mind” (LSJ, πάσχω, II.2). The state is indicated by a direct object in the accusative (here a noun phrase, μακαριῶν γε πάθος).

Emphatic γε following an adjective at the start of a sentence often “has a force which may fairly be described as exclamatory” (GP 126 (10), 127 (i)): “(What) a blessed state you are in . . . !”

364a1 ἐκάστης Ὀλυμπιάδος: gen. of time “within which or at a certain point of which” (S 1444), sometimes best expressed in English by “at” (e.g., νυκτός, “at night”). Ὀλυμπιάς may mean either “an Olympiad,” i.e., a four-year stretch of time marked on either end by a celebration of the Olympic Games, or “the Olympic Games” themselves (LSJ, Ὀλυμπιάς, II.1, 3).

364a2 οὕτως εὐελπίς ὡν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς σοφίαν: The adj. εὐελπίς literally means “of good hope”: in other words, “hopeful,” “confident,” “sanguine.” The article is often used in Greek where an unemphatic possessive pronoun is used in English and it is clear who is meant (S 1121). Thus περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς means “concerning your soul” in this context.

Here εἰς expresses relation (“in regard to,” “in respect of”), or possibly limit (“so far as . . .”) (cf. LSJ, εἰς, III.1, IV.2); “being so confident concerning your soul in regard to wisdom,” “with such a sanguine outlook on your soul, so far as wisdom is concerned . . . .”

364a3 ἀφικνῇ εἰς τὸ ἱερόν: pres. indic. in the protasis of a simple present conditional, introduced by εἰ at a1 (S 2298: “Simple present or past conditions simply state a supposition with no implication as to its reality or probability”). As very often in Greek, it is the participial phrase (οὕτως εὐελπίς ὡν κτλ.), not the phrase with the finite verb (ἀφικνῇ κτλ.), that contains the leading idea (S 2147a).

The verb ἀφικνέομαι (“arrive at,” “come to”) is often completed by a preposition: “come to the sacred precinct,” “enter the sanctuary.”

364a3 καὶ θαυμάσαιμ᾽ ὡν: potential opt. in the apodosis of a simple present conditional
(S 2300e: “[Simple Present . . . Conditions] **Potential optative**: θαυμάζοιμ ἄν εἴ οἶσθα. *I should be surprised if you know* Plato, *Protagoras* 312c”).

Copulative καί (“and”) may have “intensive or heightening force” (S 2869; cf. GP 291 (6)): “And (indeed) I would be surprised . . . ,” “I would be surprised, in fact, if . . . .”

### 364a3

εἴ τις τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀθλητῶν: indefinite τις + partitive genitive.

An “athlete” (ἀθλητής) was one who competed with others for some sort of prize (see LSJ, ἁθλος, ὁ, “contest either in war or sport, esp. contest for a prize”; ἀθλον, τό, “prize of contest”; ἀθλεύω, “contend for a prize”). The competition was not necessarily physical in nature, though it normally was.

περὶ + a noun in the acc. is sometimes the equivalent of an adjective formed from that noun (LSJ, περί, C.I.5: “frequently in place of an adjective, ὀργανα [τὰ] περὶ γεωργίαν ["(the) tools connected with agriculture,” Plato, Republic 370d], i.e., γεωργικά [“agricultural (tools)”] . . ; also in place of a genitive, οἱ περὶ Λυσίαν λόγοι, the speeches of Lysias [Plato, *Phaedrus* 279a]). Thus περὶ τὸ σῶμα may be rendered adjectivally: “if any of the physical competitors . . . .”

### 364a4

οὐτως ἀφόβως τε καὶ πιστευτικῶς ἔχων τῷ σώματι: An adverb + a form of ἔχω often = an adjective + a form of εἰμί. See S 1438.

Like the verb πιστεύω, the adverb πιστευτικῶς can take a dative of the person or thing trusted in (LSJ, πιστευτικῶς: “ἔχειν τινι rely upon . . . , Plato, *Hippias Minor* 364a”): “being so fearless and so relying upon his body,” “with such a fearless and assured belief in his body . . . .”

### 364a5

ἔρχεται αὐτόσε ἄγωνιομένος: future participle (< ἄγωνιζομαι) expressing purpose (S 2065: “especially after verbs denoting to come, go, send, summon, etc.”).

As αὐτόσε can mean “there,” “the very place,” so αὐτόσε can mean “thither,” “to the very place” (S 342): “goes to that (very) place to compete . . . .” (Cf. the notes on Ὀλυμπίαζε at 363c7 and on Φθίηνδ’ at 370c6.)

### 364a5

ὁσσερ σῷ φής τῇ διάνοιᾳ: The relative adv. ὅσσερ answers the demonstrative adv. οὕτως at a4 (cf. S 2990). On the force of the -περ in ὅσσερ see GP 490 (3): “περ often has little force: ὅσσερ, for example, is in Attic a merely stylistic substitute for the simple ὦς.”

Here “you” is expressed in a pronoun apart from the verb (S 1190), perhaps for the same reason that ὅσσερ (lit., “just as”) is chosen by Plato instead of ὦς (“as”), and αὐτόσε (lit., “to the very [same] place”) is chosen instead of ἔκεισε (“to that place”), namely, in order to create a parallel verbal structure that clearly opposes Hippias to the physical ἀθληταί.

Like τῷ σώματι, the phrase τῇ διάνοιᾳ is dependent upon πιστευτικῶς in a4. Its meanings include “thought,” “intention,” “thinking faculty,” “intelligence.”

The pairing of σῶμα and διάνοια (“body and mind”) is not as common as the pairing of σῶμα and ψυχή (“body and soul”). Plato’s choice of διάνοια here
reflects the present focus on the soul’s *intellectual* capacity (cf. a2 above: περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς οὐφιάν “concerning your soul as far as wisdom is concerned”). Cf. Aristotle’s *Politics* 1270b38: καὶ τοῖς γε διὰ βίου κυρίους εἶναι κοίσεων μεγάλοιν ἀμφιβολήματος (ἔτι γὰρ, ἄσπερ καὶ σῶματος, καὶ διανοίας γήρας). “But that judges of important causes should hold office for life is a disputable thing, for the **mind** grows old as well as the **body.”* [Revised Oxford translation]

Unlike νόος [= νοῦς], which is the general word for “mind” in classical Greek, διάνοια is not found in Homer and seems less at home in poetry than in prose. When Anaxagoras needed a lofty, dignified term for the intellectual motive force of the universe, he chose νοῦς, not διάνοια. The pairing of σῶμα and νοῦς is comparatively rare. Cf. Theognis 648-

364a7 Ἐικότως, ὦ Σῶκρατες, ἐγὼ τοῦτο πέπονθα: See note on Μακαριόν γε . . . πάθος πέπονθας at 364a1.

The adv. εἰκότως (“suitably,” “in keeping with,” “reasonably”) comes from the perf. part. εἰκώς, εἰκότος (< ἐκώς, “be like,” “look like”), often used in speaking of the likely or the probable. The closest thing in English to the use of εἰκότως here may be using the adv. “naturally” or the adj. “natural” to mean “as might be expected from the circumstances,” “in keeping with the relevant facts” (cf. LSJ, ἑοικότως, Att. εἰκότως, 2: “. . . naturally, as was to be expected” [meanings deleted in the 1996 Supplement]): “Naturally, Socrates, I am in this state,” “It’s only natural, Socrates, that I find myself in this state . . . .”

364a7 ἐξ οὗ: “from (that time) when,” “since” (LSJ, ἔξ, II.1: “Of time, elliptic with relative pronoun . . . , ἐξ οὗ [χρόνου], since . . . ”).

364a8 ἦργαια: “I began (to). . . .”

ηργαια (< ἀρχῶ) is mid. perf. of “dated past action” (S 1949: “The perfect is sometimes used of a past action whose time is specifically stated: οὐδενὶ πώποτε ὦδεν. . . . This use approaches that of the aorist.”).

Generally speaking, middle forms of ἀρχῶ mean “begin,” “start (to do something),” whereas active forms mean “take the lead,” “be the first (to do something).” See S 1734.5.

364a8 Ὀλυμπάσσαιν: adv. (sometimes lacking the final ν): “at Olympia.”

364a8 οὐδὲν πώποτε: dat. with ἐνέτυχον (aor. < ἐντυχεῖν). οὐπώτε means “not ever” or “never” and is used with past, pres., and fut. tenses; οὐπώτε means “never yet” and is used almost exclusively with past
tenses. Here the οὐ- in οὐδενί may be construed with πώποτε: “never yet [did I encounter] anyone . . . .”

364a8 ἕρειττων: “better” (dat. < ἕρειττων, often with sense of “stronger,” “mightier,” especially in battle). See last two paragraphs of note on πότερον ἀμείνω φησὶν εἶναι at 363b7, above.

364a9 εἰς οὐδενί: lit., “in regard to nothing,” i.e., “for anything,” “at anything.”
When a compound negative like οὐδέν (< οὐδέ + ἐν) follows another negative (here οὐδενί in the same clause with the same verb, it does not add up to a positive as in English (see S 2760-2 on “accumulation of negatives,” esp. the quotation from Aristophanes’ Ecclesiazusae (l. 605) cited at S 2761: οὐδείς οὐδέν πενίᾳ δράσει no one will do anything because of want”).
Here εἰς expresses relation (LSJ, εἰς, IV.2: “in regard to . . . .” πόλεως εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν “of a city most renowned for wisdom”), Plato, Apology 29d”) or perhaps purpose (cf. the English phrase “good for”).

364a9 ἐμαυτοῦ: genitive of comparison (S 1431): “than myself . . . .”

364b1 Καλόν γε λέγεις: lit., “You say a fine thing.” Such a statement in Plato’s Greek may be less a critical appraisal of the quality of what was just said than an expression of how glad one is to hear it said (cf. LSJ, λέγω (B), III.6: “εὖ γε λέγεις . . . good news! that is well!”): “What a good thing to hear . . . !” Cf. Πάνυ καλῶς λέγεις at 364d7. On the “exclamatory” use of emphatic γε see note on Μακαρίων γε . . . πάθος πέπονθας at 364a1.

364b1 καὶ τῇ Ἡλείων πόλει . . . καὶ τοῖς γονεῦοι τοῖς σοῖς: The adj. Ἡλείος, like its lexical twin Ἡλειακός, means “of or from Elis.” The article would be used if a famous individual such as “Hippias the Elean” were being picked out (see, e.g., Plato’s Protagoras 314c1: Ἡππίας ὁ Ἡλεῖος). In referring to “the Eleans” no article is needed (cf. S 1136, 1138).
Initially, as one is reading along, the first καὶ sounds like a straightforward “and,” but the parallelism of the two dative phrases reveals a καὶ . . . καὶ . . . construction: “both for the city of the Eleans . . . and for your parents.”
The wide separation of these parallel phrases and the jingly sound of the final words of the sentence (τὴν δόξαν εἶναι τὴν οἶν καὶ τοῖς γονεῦοι τοῖς σοῖς) lends an artificial air to Socrates’ praise of Hippias.

364b2 τῆς σοφίας ἀνάθημα τὴν δόξαν εἶναι τὴν οἶν: This passage has puzzled scholars. Some have supposed that our text is corrupt (see critical apparatus: “b2 εἶναι secl. Baumann: εἶναι οἷμαι ci. Vermehren” [= “Baumann bracketed εἶναι; Vermehren conjectured εἶναι οἷμαι”]). If we assume the text is sound, we seem forced to construe everything after Ἡππία (b1) as an indirect statement in apposition to καλόν: “[You make a fine statement, Hippias, namely,] that . . . your fame is an ἀνάθημα of wisdom . . . .”
The word ἀνάθημα (< ἀνατίθημι, “set up [as a votive gift],” “dedicate”) can refer to a physical object that adorns the insides of a temple, such as a statue of a god; more generally, it designates the “delight” or “crowning glory” of something [gen.] (for someone [dat.]). For example, in Homer’s Odyssey (1.152) song and dance (μολπή τ’ ὀρχηστής τε) are described as the “crowns of a banquet” (ἀναθήματα δαιτός), i.e., the finest, most delightful parts of a banquet. In a fragment of Euripides (fr. 518) good children (παῖδες . . . χρηστοί) are described as the “crown of life” (ἀνάθημα . . . βιότου) for their parents (τοῖς τεκοῦσι), i.e., the pride and joy of their lives.

Socrates will later refer to Hippias as one “of those who have great reputations for wisdom and to whose wisdom all the Greeks bear witness” (372b5-6: τῶν εὐδοκιμοῦντων ἐπὶ σοφία καὶ οἶς οἱ Ἑλληνες πάντες μάρτυρες ἐίσαι τῆς σοφίας). The syntax of the present sentence suggests that for Hippias’s parents and countrymen, who would naturally have viewed Hippias as a literal or symbolic extension of themselves, Hippias’s panhellenic fame is the crowning glory, not perhaps of their collective life, as in the fragment from Euripides (ἀνάθημα . . . βιότου), but of their collective wisdom (τῆς σοφίας ἀνάθημα). In other words, Hippias’s parents and the Eleans generally, basking in the glory of a brilliant native son, feel their collective wisdom “crowned” by the fame of Hippias.

A literal translation: “You make a fine statement, Hippias, (namely,) that both for the city of the Eleans and for your parents [καὶ τῇ Ἡλείων πόλι . . . καὶ τοῖς γονεῦσι τοῖς σοίς] your fame [τὴν δόξαν . . . τὴν σήν] is the crowning glory [ἀνάθημα . . . εἶναι] of their wisdom [τῆς σοφίας].” A looser translation, reflecting the prominence of τὴν σήν (separated by εἶναι from τὴν δόξαν and echoed by τοῖς σοίς): “. . . that both for the city of the Eleans and for your parents yours is the glory that crowns their wisdom.”

364b3 ἀτάρ: The choice of ἀτάρ here instead of ἀλλά (by far the commoner particle) draws attention to the fact that this talk of Hippias’s greatness, as nice as it is (cf. b1: Καλόν γε λέγεις), has not yet yielded an answer to Socrates’ question. Socrates now switches tracks before his question is forgotten altogether: “But,” “But now, . . .” (Cf. GP 52: “In particular, Attic writers employ ἀτάρ to express a break-off, a sudden change of topic. This is the prevailing sense in Euripides, Aristophanes, Plato, and Xenophon.”)

364b3 δή: emphatic, letting Hippias know that Socrates really does want to know the answer to his question (cf. S 2843a): “But now, what do you say to us . . . ?”

364b3 τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως . . . τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως: Names of well-known people often take the article in Greek (S 1136), though when Achilles and Odysseus were first mentioned (363b4-5), the article was not used. Here there is all the more reason to expect the article, since names of people or things that have been mentioned already, and are therefore ready to be picked out again as “the” one already mentioned, often take an article (cf. S 1120b, 1136). The article with proper names is usually best left untranslated in English.
364b4 πότερον ἀμείνοι: both masc. sing. acc. See note on πότερον ἀμείνοι φησίν εἶναι at 363b7.

364b4 κατά τί: Like adverbial interrogative τί (as at 363a1: τί σιγάζει), which is more common but less precise than the present phrase, κατά τί is a way of asking “Why?” (LSJ, κατά, B.III.1: “κατά τί: for what purpose? why?”). Its structure implies some sort of rational conformity, or correspondence, of one thing to another (as yet unknown); the question being asked is what that other thing is. Here the assumed correspondence is between the superiority of one of the two heroes and the respect in which he is superior (“in what respect?”); or, taking κατά τί more closely with φης than with ἀμείνοι, between Hippias’s statement and the basis on which he makes his statement (“on what basis?”).

364b5 μὲν: answered by δὲ at b8.

364b5 πολλοὶ ἕνδον ἡμεν: lit., “we were many within,” i.e., “there were many of us in the house/room.” Socrates’ use of the word ἕνδον here (repeated at b7) leads Paul Friedländer and others to assume that the present conversation must be taking place in an outdoor setting, different from that of Hippias’s performance. In the Gorgias, however, Socrates uses the word ἕνδον to point out his current location in somebody’s house (“within these walls”). Nothing rules out the possibility that he is doing the same thing here.

Gorgias 455cd: ἰσως γὰρ καὶ τυχάνει τις τῶν ἕνδον ὄντων μαθητής σου βουλόμενος γενέσθαι, ὡς ἐγὼ τινας σχεδον καὶ συχνος αἰσθάνομαι, οὐ̣ οἴσως αἰσχύνοιτ’ ἂν σε ἀνεφέσθαι. ὑπ’ ἐμοί οὐν ἀνεφυτέων νόμισον καὶ ὑπ’ ἑκείων ἀνεφυτάσθαι . . . “for it is quite likely that some one within these walls has a wish to become your pupil—indeed I fancy I perceive more than one, yes, a number of them, who, perhaps, would be ashamed to press you with questions. So, when you are being pressed with mine, consider that you are being questioned by them as well . . .” [LCL translation].

Nevertheless, it would be just like Plato to suggest by a repetition of ἕνδον in this context that sophistic speech-making has something to hide (and hence is best done indoors), whereas Socratic question-and-answer has nothing to hide and can therefore be done in the open. Cf. Plato’s Protagoras 311a: καὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλά Πρωταγόρας ἕνδον διατρίβει, ὡστε, ὥστε, καταληψόμεθα αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ εἰς ἔνδον. “Protagoras, you see, spends most of his time indoors, so have no fear, we shall find him in all right, most likely.” [LCL translation]. Later in the Protagoras, right after a Socratic conversation is concluded, there is a dramatic passing from outside to inside a rich man’s house (314c-e), whereupon Socrates’ sightings of the sophists Protagoras, Hippias, and Prodicus are linked by Homeric quotation to Odysseus’s sightings of famous heroes in his journey from the land of the living to the land of the dead (314e-316a, esp. 315b9 and c8).

364b6 ἀπελεύφθην σου τῶν λεγομένων: In the active voice, ἀπολεύφω can mean
“leave behind” in a race, i.e., outdistance (LSJ, ἀπολείπω, I.3). Here it occurs in the passive, where its meanings include “be distant from,” “fall short of,” “be left in ignorance of” + gen. (LSJ, ἁπολείπω, C.II.1-2). Cf. Euripides, Orestes 1085 (Pyldades to Orestes): ἦ πολύ λέξειμαι τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων “How far you are from understanding my intentions!”

As one reads along, it sounds as if the pronoun σου is governed directly by ἀπελείφθην, though in retrospect σου seems to be dependent upon τῶν λεγομένων: “I lagged behind your statements,” “I failed to follow what you were saying.” Cf. 373a2-3: μακρὸν μὲν οὖν λόγον εἰ ἡθέλεις λέγειν, πορεύομαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἔμηλες ἀκολουθήσαιми “To be sure, if you are inclined to make a long speech, I tell you in advance that you could not heal me, for I would fail to follow . . . .”


The prefix ἐπανα- (< ἐπί “upon,” “over” + ἀνά “up,” “throughout”) often denotes repetition (cf. the use of English “upon”): “for I shrank from asking question upon question,” “for I drew back from asking my many questions . . . .”

364b7 διότι . . . τε . . . καὶ . . . : introducing a pair of reasons: “(in part) because . . . and (also) . . .”

364b7 ὠχλος . . . πολὺς ἔνδον ἤν: The noun ὠχλος has negative political overtones (LSJ, ὠχλος, I.2: “in political sense, populace, mob [people] . . .”), though those may be very faint here.

The adj. πολύς can indicate greatness not just of number but of “size, degree, intensity,” etc. (LSJ, πολύς, I.2): “a large crowd was inside,” “there was a large crowd in the room,” or more colloquially, “the room was mobbed . . . .”

364b7 μὴ ὁσι ἐμποδῶν εἶην . . . τῇ ἐπαδειξεῖ: The verb in this negative purpose clause is optative, not subjunctive, because we are in secondary sequence (S 2196). ἐμποδῶν means “in the way” (lit., “at the feet,” as a stumbling block; cf. the English “impede”) and can take a dat. of the person or thing being impeded. Here it seems to take two datives in succession (ὁσι and τῇ ἐπαδειξεῖ) [“in order that I might not be in your way, . . . impeding your display”], the first of which (ὁσι) may be, but need not be, construed separately, either as a dat. of disadvantage (S 1481) or perhaps as a dat. of reference (S 1496). In any case, the syntax mirrors the meaning: Socrates and his pesky questions (ἐμποδῶν εἶην ἐρωτῶν) come between Hippias (ὁσι) and his speech (τῇ ἐπαδειξεῖ).

364b8 νυνί: The deictic (“pointing-out”) suffix -ι adds emphasis to demonstratives and related adverbs. Cf. S 333g.

364b8 δὲ: answering μὲν at b5.

364b8 ἐπειδή . . . τε . . . καὶ: introducing another pair of reasons [“since (1) there are
fewer of us and (2) Eudikos here is urging me to ask’]. The syntax recalls διότι . . . τέ . . . καὶ at b7, but the reasons mentioned here recall the considerations introduced at the start of the μὲν clause [b5: ἤνισα μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ ἐνδον ἦμεν καὶ οὐ τῇ ἐπίδειξιν ἔποιοῦ . . . “For when (1) there were many of us inside and (2) you were making your display . . . ”].

364b8 ἐλάττους . . . ἐσμέν: nom. masc. pl. < ἐλάττων (declined like βελτίων, S 293): “we are fewer,” “there are fewer of us . . . .”

Cf. Plato’s Parmenides 136d-e (Zeno speaking): εἶ μὲν οὖν πλείοις ἦμεν, οὖν ἂν ἄξιον ἦν δεῖθαι· ἀπετῇ γὰρ τὰ τοιαύτα πολλοῖς ἐνεντίον λέγειν ἄλλος τε καὶ τηλικοῦτῳ· ἀγνοοῦν γάρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἀνευτοῦ τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἔντυχόντα τῷ ἄληθεὶν νοῦς οὐχέν. “Indeed, if there were more of us here, it wouldn’t be right to ask him—it’s not fitting, especially for a man of his age, to engage in such a discussion in front of a crowd. Ordinary people don’t know that without this comprehensive and circuitous treatment we cannot hit upon the truth and gain insight.” [Mary Louise Gill & Paul Ryan’s translation]

Cf. also Parmenides 137a6-7 (quoted in the note on αὐτοῖ at 363a4).

364b9 Εὐδίκος ὁδὲ: pointing to Eudikos as present (cf. S 1241): “Eudikos here . . . .”

364b9 κελεύει ἐρέσθαι: The verb κελεύω normally takes an acc. + an inf. (“urge someone to do [something]”), but it can take an inf. alone (LSJ, κελεύω, I.9): “urges questioning, “is calling for (me) to ask questions . . . .”

364c1 τοῦτοι τοῖν ἀνδροίν: gen. dual. See note on τοῖν ἀνδροῖν τοῦτοιν at 363b7.

364c2 διέξοινες: impf. (< διακρίνω, “distinguish,” “tell apart”). Cf. 370d6-e2: ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Ἰππία, καὶ εἰς ἄγνης σε ἡρόμην ἄπορον ὀπότερος τοῦτοι τοῖν ἀνδροῖν ἀμείνων πεποίηται τῷ ποιητῇ, καὶ ἴρομένος ἀμφότερο ἀρίστῳ εἶναι καὶ δύσκριτον ὀπότερος ὀμεῖνος εἴη . . . “Now for my part, Hippias, I’ve been questioning you from the start in a state of real uncertainty as to which of these two men is depicted as better by the poet, and in the belief that both are extremely good and that it is hard to tell which is better . . . .”

364c3 Ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ σοι, ὦ Σωκράτεις: This ἀλλά expresses “willingness to act” (GP 17 (i)): “All right,” “Very well,” “Why,” etc. Here it is perhaps best left untranslated.

The juxtaposition of ἐγὼ and σοι draws attention to the fact that Hippias is voluntarily doing something extra for Socrates. His tone, it seems, resembles that of a salesman who is willing to throw in extra merchandise as a special favor: “For you, Socrates, I . . . .”

364c3 ἤτι σαφέστερον ἦ τότε: comp. adv.: “still more clearly than (I did) then . . . .”

The words suggest that Hippias thinks he spoke clearly enough the first time.
Since Socrates has just asked the question “What were you saying about these two men?” (c1: τί ἔλεγες περὶ τούτων τοῖν ἄνδροιν;), the gender of τούτων and ἄλλων here is probably masc. (“what I say [both] about these and other men”), though it is, strictly speaking, ambiguous between masc. and neut. (“what I say [both] about these and other matters”).

The replacement of τούτοιν by τούτων and the addition of καὶ ἄλλων anticipate the expansion from the duo Achilles-Odysseus to the trio Achilles-Nestor-Odysseus at c5-7.

When a speaker has let his audience know that he is about to launch into a story, an answer, an explanation, etc., γάρ signals that he has now launched into it. This kind of γάρ, classified by Denniston and Smyth as an “explanatory” γάρ, is usually best left untranslated (GP 59 [II.(2)] and S 2808-9).

The verb ποιέω can mean “represent (in poetry),” “portray” (LSJ, ποιέω, A.I.4b [our passage mentioned together with 369c3-4]). Cf. second paragraph of note on ἑκάτερον γὰρ τούτων κτλ. at 363b4.

Here the perf. tense is used where English might use the timeless authorial present: “portrays . . . (as) . . .,” “depicts . . . (as) . . .” The Greek pres. tense may also be used in this way (cf. ποιεῖ at 364e9 and 365b5).

The adj. ἄριστος serves as a superlative of ἀγαθός and can mean “best” in various senses. Ajax, for example, was “far the best of men” on the battlefield “so long as Achilles nursed his anger” and sat on the sidelines (Iliad 2.768-9: ἄνδρῳν αὐ μὲ γ’ ἄριστος ἔην Τελαμώνιος Αἴας / ὅφ’ Ἀχιλλεύς μήνιν), while the craftsman who fashioned Ajax’s shield was “far the best of leather-workers” (Iliad 7.221: σκυτοτόμων ὄχ’ ἄριστος). Or, to take more examples from the Iliad, Achilles, in wishing he could die an honorable death at the hands of a fighter like Hector, refers to Hector as the man “who is the best of those bred here” (Iliad 21.279: ὃς ἐνθάδε γ’ ἔτραφ’ ἄριστος), while Hector, in turn, in reviling Paris for his cowardly behavior and telling him he wished he had never been born, addresses him as “best in form,” “best-looking” (Iliad 3.39: εἰδός ἄριστε). Used absolutely of a man, ἄριστος means “best” in some absolute sense. Here the sense is plain enough even for Socrates that he thinks he understands what Hippias means (see 364d7-e1).

Although βέλτιστος also serves as a superlative of ἀγαθός and may also be used absolutely of a man (cf. 373b6: ὁ βέλτιστος Ἰππία), it does not occur in Homer and therefore lacks the cultural resonance and emotional power of ἄριστος. When in the final sentence of Plato’s Phaedo Phaedo calls Socrates the “best man” he knew “of [all] the men of that time,” the word is ἄριστος, not βέλτιστος (Phaedo 118a16: ἄνδρός . . . τόν τότε ὄν ἐπειράθημεν ἄριστον . . . ). Cf. the note on πότερον ὁμείνω φηοίν εἶναι at 363b7.

tῶν εἰς Τροίαν ἄφοικόν: partitive genitive: “of those who came to Troy” (sc. to fight in the Trojan War).
σοφώτατον: “wisest.” Forms of the word ὁσοφός (“wise,” “clever,” “shrewd”) recur throughout the dialogue in reference to Hippias and other “wise men” (e.g., 366d, 368b, 369d, 372bc, 376c) as well as to “the false” (366ab). Cf. the passing use of ὁσοφός, counterfactually applied by Socrates to himself, at 373b7.

Νέστορα: Nestor, an old man at the time of the Trojan War but still a presence on the battlefield, was known for his sage advice, his honey-sweet speech, and his garrulity in recounting his own youthful exploits. Hippias too has a reputation for wisdom (364b2, 372b5-6), a way of winning others over with his words (363a1-2; cf. 369c7-8), and a tendency to boast at length about his own accomplishments (363c7-364a9, 368b3ff.).

Hippias’s native city also happened to lie in the same general region of the Peloponnese—the western half—as Nestor’s homeland. Cf. Iliad 11.669-73ff. (Nestor to Patroclus): εἴθ’ ὃς ἠβόωμι βή δὲ μοι ἐμπεδος εἶ / ὃς ὀπότ’ Ἡλείοσι καὶ ἴμην νεῖκος ἐτύχη / ἀμφὶ βοηλαοὶ, ὃτ’ ἐγὼ κτάνομαι ἰτυμονῆ / ἐσθλὸν Ἐπεισοχίδην, ὃς ἐν Ἡλίδι νειτάσσει “If only I were young now, and the strength still steady within me, / as at that time when a quarrel was made between us and the Eleans / over a driving of cattle, when I myself killed Itymoneus, / the brave son of Hypeirochos who made his home in Elis” [Richmond Lattimore’s translation, lightly revised].

πολυτροπώτατον: The basic meaning of the adj. πολύτροπος is either “much-turned,” i.e., repeatedly deflected and turned off course (as Odysseus was in coming home), or “turning many ways,” i.e., shifty, wily, chameleon-like. Cf. the English word “devious” (American Heritage Dictionary, 1976: “1. Straying or swerving from the usual, straight, or direct course or way; swerving; roundabout. 2. Straying or departing from the correct or proper way; erring. 3. Done, used, or acting in an underhanded manner; not straightforward; shifty: a devious person.”)

Similar Homeric epithets such as πολυμήχανος (“of many devices”) and πολύμητις (“of many counsels”) are often applied to Odysseus, but the epithet πολύτροπος occurs in Homer just twice, once in the very first line of the Odyssey and again when Circe recognizes Odysseus (10.330). In neither context is it clear what is meant by πολύτροπος. Nor does Socrates know what Hippias means by the word (364e1-4): ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸν Ὄδυσσεα εἶπες ὃτι πεποιηκός εἶ ὁ ποιητής πολυτροπώτατον, τοῦτο δ’, ὃς γε πρὸς σὲ τάλημεν εἰρήσθενα, παντάπασιν οὐκ οἴδ’ ὃτι λέγεις. “[B]ut when you said that the poet depicts Odysseus as polytropoïtatos—by that, to tell you the truth, I really have no idea what you mean.”

Βαβσαί: “Oh dear!” This lively exclamation is typically found in Plato when the ground falls out from under the speaker and he sees that he is in deeper difficulties than he had supposed. Cf. Lysis 218c, Republic 361d, Sophist 249d, Philebus 23b.

ἀν’: = ἀνα. Unlike interrogative οὔ (e.g., the οὐ at 364e5), interrogative ἀνα
does not by itself expect an affirmative answer. If anything, it is skeptical in tone (GP 46.II). Here it is best left untranslated.

364c8 ἂν τί μοι χαρίσαιο τοιόντε: potential opt. (S 1824), aor. mid. (< χαρίζω, usually mid., χαρίζομαι).

This τί has an accent because it precedes an enclitic (S 185). It adds indefiniteness to τοιόντε (already less definite than τόδε), making the tone quite humble (cf. LSJ, τοιόντε: “the sense is made more indefinite by τοιόντε τίς, such a one”): “might you gratify me in some such way as this . . . ,” or more colloquially, “might you do me this little favor . . . ?”

The tone is more assertive when this verb recurs as an imperative at 372e7 (Socrates to Hippias): οὐ οὖν χάρισαι . . . “You, then, be obliging . . . .”

364c9 μή μου καταγελάν: an infinitive phrase in apposition to τοιόντε (S 1897):

“[some such favor as this, viz.,] not to jeer at me . . . .”

Here μή is used instead of οὖν, as usual with an inf. that is not the result of indirect discourse (cf. S 2702, 2711).

The simple verb γελάω normally takes the dat. (of the person laughed at), but the compound καταγελάω often takes the gen. instead, which seems to reinforce the quasi-hostile force of the prefix κατα- (see LSJ, κατά, A.II.5: “in hostile sense, against” [+ gen.]; E.III: “against, in hostile sense” [in compound verbs]; cf. S 1384a).

364c9 ἐὰν μόγις μανθάνω: “if I hardly understand,” “if I understand with toil,” “if I struggle to understand . . . .” The verb in this protasis is in the subjunctive, as virtually always with ἐὰν. The adv. μόγις also occurs in the form μόλις (found here in two of our three best MSS).

364c9 τὰ λεγόμενα: “your statements,” “the things you are saying.” This phrase recurs twice at 369d in a passage in which Socrates describes himself as being persistent (d8: λυπαρή) in regard to the statements (d5, d8: τὰ λεγόμενα) of the people he considers to be wise (d7: οὖς ἂν ἐγὼ ἠγώμαι σοφοῦς εἶναι). In the present passage Socrates is already starting to show this persistence of his.

364d1 πολλάκις ἄνερωτῶ: again subjunctive, not indicative (see note on ἐὰν μόγις μανθάνο at c9).

Unless the verb ἄνερωτῶ is used absolutely here (no such usage cited in LSJ), it takes τὰ λεγόμενα as its direct object: “often inquire into [them],” “keep asking questions about [them] . . . .”

364d1 ἄλλα: expressing opposition: “Nay,” “Rather, . . . .” ἄλλα may also add urgency to the imperative (GP 14): “[Oh, but] do,” “Come, . . . .”

364d1 μοι: Although this μοι could be heard as the indirect object of ἀποκρίνεσθαι, it
is probably better construed as a dative of feeling, the so-called “ethical dative,” used “to denote the interest of the speaker, or to secure the interest of the person spoken to, in an action or statement” (S 1486). Possible renderings: “Please . . . ,” “I beg you . . .” (S 1486b).

364d1 πειρῶ: 2nd pers. sing., pres. mid. impv. (< πειράω, more often in mid., πειράομαι): “try . . . .”

364d1 πράως τε καὶ εὐχόλως: The adj. πράως is used of gentle people, tame animals, and soft things. The adj. εὐχόλως (< κόλον, “food,” “colon”) has a specific sense of “easily satisfied with one’s food” and a general sense of “good-humored,” “easy-going.”

When Socrates drank the hemlock, he drained the cup μάλα εὐχέρως καὶ εὐχόλως, “very coolly and good-humoredly” (Phaedo 117c).

364d3 Αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἄν εἰή: optative + ἄν in the apodosis of a Future Less Vivid conditional: “Why, it would be shameful . . . .”

This γάρ implies Hippias’s assent by introducing a reason that supports his assenting to Socrates (GP 73.V (1)): “[Yes, of course,] for . . . .” “Why, . . . .”

Other sentences in which an undesirable possibility is considered in the protasis of a Future Less Vivid conditional and ruled out by implication in the apodosis occur at 363c7-d4, 365c7, and 375d3-4. All are spoken by Hippias and all involve a similar use of δεινόν or δεινά (here αἰσχρὸν is used instead). Cf. the second paragraph of the note on Καὶ γὰρ at 363c7.

Another conditional sentence involving a comparable use of δεινόν is spoken by Socrates in the closing lines of the dialogue (376c4-end: εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑμεῖς κατλ.). There, however, the undesirable possibility raised in the protasis is one which Socrates fears he cannot rule out. The grammar reflects the shift in tone: Future Most Vivid (“Emotional Future”) replaces Future Less Vivid.

364d4 αὐτὰ ταῦτα: The verb παιδεύω can take a double acc. (person taught + thing taught): “[I teach others] these very things,” “[I teach others] just these things.” The phrase αὐτὰ ταῦτα may also be construed as an acc. of respect (S 1601c): “[I educate others] in just these respects,” “[I educate others] in just this sphere” (cf. αὐτὰ γε ταῦτα at 365e10).

It is unclear whether by αὐτὰ ταῦτα Hippias means gentlemanly manners (picking up on πράως τε καὶ εὐχόλως at d1) or the ability to answer questions (picking up on ἀποκρίνεσθαι at d2) or something else. Whatever it is, it must include the ability to be forgiving and gentle when answering questions (cf. d5-6: συγγνώμην τ᾽ ἔχωμι καὶ πράως ἀποκρινοίμην), since that is implied by the ethical parallel drawn by Hippias: if he himself did not exemplify such behavior when questioned by Socrates, it would be shamefully inconsistent of him to teach such behavior to others.

364d4 ἀξίω: The verb ἀξίω sometimes takes an acc. + an inf. and means “think
someone (acc.) worthy to do or be (inf.) something.” When it simply takes an inf., as here, the person thinking (someone) worthy is the same as the person thought worthy (cf. S 937) and the meaning is either specifically “think oneself worthy to do or be” (LSJ, ἄξιοι, III.1) or more generally “expect,” “consent,” “not hesitate” (LSJ, III.2, our passage cited): “I consent (to take),” i.e., “I think that I deserve (to take) and do not hesitate (to take) . . . .”

364d4 διὰ ταύτα: expressing a justification for Hippias’s conduct (cf. S 1685.2e): “on this account . . . .” The phrase διὰ ταύτα corresponds to the question διὰ τί; (“why?” “wherefore?”) and is found in the singular (διὰ τοῦτο) with little or no difference in meaning (cf. LSJ, διά, B.III.2).

364d4 χρήματα λαμβάνειν: Here, as often, χρήματα means “money,” though the general meaning of χρῆμα (< χράομαι, “to need,” “to use”) is more abstract: “thing,” “matter,” etc. (and in the plur., “goods,” “property,” “money”). Cf. Protagoras’s famous dictum: “Man is the measure of all things [πάντων χρημάτων] . . . .” (Plato, Theaetetus 152a).

The core meaning of λαμβάνω is “take.” Like English “take,” it can designate aggressive seizing as well as passive receiving. The phrase λαμβάνειν δίκην, for example, is ambiguous between “exact punishment” (cf. English “take revenge”) and “receive punishment” (cf. English “take a beating”) (LSJ, λαμβάνω, I.1.b, II.1.e). The sense of λαμβάνειν in the present passage seems neutral and transactional: “take,” “receive.”

One of the most significant differences between Socrates and the sophists is that the sophists charged money for their services, whereas Socrates never took payment. See Plato’s Apology 31bc: καὶ εἰ μὲν τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλαυον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνον ταύτα παρεκελεύομη, εἶχον ὅν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ ὀράτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ ὄτι οἱ κατηγοροὶ τάλα πάντα ἄνασκοντος οὖτω κατηγορούντες τούτῳ γε οὐχ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐγένοντο ἀπανασκοντήσασθαι παρασκονομοῦντες μάρτυρα, ὡς ἐγὼ ποτὲ τίνα ἐπαναχάζων μισθὸν ἢ ἤτησα. ἰκανόν γὰρ, οἰμάι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν. “If I derived any profit from this and received pay for these exhortations, there would be some sense in it; but now you yourselves see that my accusers, though they accuse me of everything else in such a shameless way, have not been able to work themselves up to such a pitch of shamelessness as to produce a witness to testify that I ever exacted or asked pay of anyone. For I think I have a sufficient witness that I speak the truth, namely, my poverty.” [LCL translation]

364d5 αὐτὸς: used intensively (S 1206) at the pivotal point in the sentence, where the μέν clause gives way to the δὲ clause: “myself,” i.e., “in my own case . . . .”

364d5 μὴ: Here μὴ is used instead of οὐ because we are still in the protasis of a conditional (cf. S 2705c). The protasis began with εἰ at d3 and continues to the end of the sentence.
συγγνώμην τ᾽ ἔχομι: lit., “have fellow-feeling,” i.e., “make allowances,” “be forgiving.”

The word συγγνώμη is used again by Hippias at 372a2 (οἷς πολλὴ δοξεῖ συγγνώμη εἴην) and twice again by Socrates at 373d5-6 (συγγνώμην ἔχε . . . συγγνώμην ἔχειν). At that point in the dialogue, Hippias’s patience is wearing thin, making him much less inclined to “have fellow-feeling” with Socrates. Socrates responds by echoing Hippias’s talk of συγγνώμη to great ironic effect.

Πάνυ καλῶς λέγεις: lit., “You speak very well.” Cf. LSJ, καλός, C.6 [καλός]: “in answers, to approve the words of the former speaker, well said!”

As at 364b1 (see note on Καλόν γε λέγεις), Socrates’ words here may be less a critical appraisal of the quality of what was just said than an expression of how glad he is to hear it said: “That’s very good to hear.”

ἐγώ γάρ τοι: At 364b3, after praising Hippias (Καλόν γε λέγεις κτλ.), Socrates used “ἀπάρτι δί ἔ . . .” to get the conversation back on track (see notes above). Here, again after praising Hippias (Πάνυ καλῶς λέγεις), Socrates shifts gears by using (a) ἐγώ, which puts the focus back on himself; (b) γάρ, which indicates that he is now going to explain why he sounded so thrown at c8; and (c) τοι, a particle “designed to arrest the attention” (GP 547.IV on position of τοι) and “establish . . . a close rapport between the mind of the speaker and the mind of another person” (GP 537). Possible renderings: “Now I, you see,” “Now let me tell you . . .”


οὐ μανθάνειν ὅτι ἔλεγες: Verbs of hearing or perceiving, including συνίημι (“understand”), often take the gen. of the person or thing perceived (S 1361). Cf. Plato’s Philebus 17a6-7: Τά μὲν πώς, ὁ Σωκράτες, δοξοὶ οὐ μανθάνειν, τά δὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον δέομαι ἄλγεις ἀκούσαι. “In some respects I think I understand you, Socrates, but in others I need to hear what you are saying even more clearly.”

Here ὅτι is an indefinite relative pronoun (< ὅστις) introducing an indirect question (S 2663; cf. S 1263). It may also be called an “indirect interrogative” (S 2666; cf. S 340).

Where English says, “I see where you stand,” “I know who you are,” “I understand what you are saying,” etc., Greek tends to say, “I see you, where you stand,” “I know you, who you are,” “I understand you, what you are saying.” Such anticipation or prolepsis (S 2182, 3045) of the subject of the subordinate clause is sometimes called the “lilies of the field” construction, after the King James Bible version of Matthew 6:28 (. . . καταμάθετε τὰ χρήμα τοῦ ἄγου πῶς αὐξάνουσιν “. . . Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow . . .”). Cf. Shakespeare, King Lear 1.1.270 (Cordelia to Goneril and Regan): “I know you what you are . . . .”
364e1 ἤνικα τὸν Νέστορα οὐφώτατον: elliptical; ἑφησθα and πεποίησθαι are understood: “when (you said) that Nestor (is depicted as) [the] wisest . . . .”

364e2 πεποίησθα εἴη: replacement of indicative by optative in secondary sequence in indirect discourse (S 2599, 2615). The original verb was perfect indicative (πεποίησθε), so the resulting verb is perfect optative, formed as usual by a periphrasis of the perfect participle and a form of εἴη (S 599c, 694).

364e3 τούτο ὁ . . . παντάπασιν ὦκ οὐδ’ ὅτι λέγεις: After the initial ὁ at e1, here we have a second ὁ “with a demonstrative pronoun standing in apposition to a preceding substantival phrase” (GP 184 (ii)), “the logical connexion being given twice over . . . for the sake of clearness and emphasis” (GP 183 (4)). This kind of ὁ is usually best left untranslated.

Cf. a similar duplication of ὁ in Plato’s Apology (32e8-d3): τότε μέντοι ἐγὼ οὐλόγοι ἀλλ’ ἔγνω αὐτ ἐνεδειξάμην ὅτι ἐμοί θανάτου μέν μέλει . . . οὐδ’ ὅτι οὐκ αὐτόν ἔχων ὅτι ἀνύοιον ἔργαςθαι, τούτου ὁ ἦ τὸ πᾶν μέλαι. “At that time, however, I showed not just in word, but by my action, that for death . . . I do not care the slightest bit, but that for avoiding doing anything unjust or impious, for that I care absolutely.”

The adv. παντάπασιν(ν) (“all in all,” “altogether,” “wholly”) combines with οὐκ to mean “not . . . at all” (cf. LSJ, παντάπασι, 1: “with a negative, παντάπασι οὐδέν, οὐδέν παντάπασι, nothing at all . . .”).

When λέγω has the sense of “mean,” it sometimes takes two accusatives, one of which is the explanandum and the other of which is the explanans: x | y λέγω = “By x (explanandum) | I mean y (explanans).” See LSJ, λέγω (B), III.9 (“with double acc., τοιοῦτον τι σε λέγειν τὸ κρείττον [Plato] Gorgias 489d [that you mean some such thing by (the word) stronger’]”) and 365b7-8 below: Νῦν ἤδη, ὃ Ἰππία, κινδυνεύω μανθάνειν ὁ λέγεις τὸν πολύτροπον | ψευδῇ λέγεις . . . . “Now at last, Hippias, I may perhaps understand what you mean: by the *devious man* | you mean a *false man* . . . .” In the present passage τούτο stands in, while the explanans remains unknown. Instead of a direct question with λέγω + double acc. (τούτο δὲ τί λέγεις; “What do you mean by that?”) we have τούτο (acc.) + indirect interrogative ὅτι (acc.) + λέγεις: “by that . . . I do not know at all what you mean.”

364e3 ὡς γε πρός σὲ τὰληθῆ εἰρήσθαι: absolute inf. supplemented by ὡς (S 2012): “to speak the truth to you,” i.e., “to tell you the truth.” Here ὡς is a conjunction (LSJ, ὡς, B.II.3), while γε serves “to emphasize the modification or condition introduced” by ὡς (LSJ, γε, I.3: “after conjunctions”). Cf. GP 146.IV: “When γε follows a conjunction . . . , we may, if we like, say that it stresses the whole clause . . . .”

An enclitic pronoun like γε usually receives an accent, regardless of semantic emphasis, when it follows an oxytone preposition (S 187, N. 2).

τὰληθῆ = τὰ ἄλληθῆ, lit., “the true things,” or as we say in English, “the truth.”

A central theme of the dialogue, the question of the truthfulness or falseness of Achilles and Odysseus, is introduced in the next few lines. Here Plato plants
the first of several remarks in which the truthfulness or falseness of Socrates or Hippias is referred to in passing. Cf. 369a4 (Socrates: ei δ’ ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ δέγω “but if I speak the truth”); 369e5 (Socrates: ei οὐ ἀληθῆ λέγεις “if you speak the truth”); 370e10 (Socrates: Ἐξεσεπτάς με, ὃ φίλτατε Ἱππία, καὶ αὐτὸς τὸν Ὁδυσσεά μιμή “You are trying to deceive me, dearest Hippias, and are yourself imitating Odysseus”); 372a6 (Socrates: Ὅραξ, ὃ Ἱππία, ὅτι ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω . . .; “Do you see, Hippias, that I speak the truth . . .?”); 375a1 (Hippias: Ἀληθῆ λέγεις “You speak the truth”).

364e καί: introducing a request (LSJ, καί, A.II: “at the beginning of a sentence, 1. in appeals or requests . . . καί μοι λέγε . . . Plato, Euthyphro 3a”). Here καί may have adversative force (cf. S 2871): “And (yet) tell me,” “But tell me . . . .”

Cf. Plato’s Apology 25a9-13 (Socrates interrogating Meletus): Πάντες ἁγία, ὡς έοικεν, Αὐθηναίοι καλούς κάραιοις ποιούσι πλήν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δέ μόνος διαφθείρω, οὕτω λέγεις; —Πάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. — Πολλὴν γέ μου κατέγνωσας δυστυχικῶν. καί μοι ὁπόχριναι: “All the Athenians, then, as it seems, make them excellent, except myself, and I alone corrupt them. Is this what you mean? — Very decidedly, that is what I mean. — You have condemned me to great unhappiness! But answer me: . . .” [LCL translation]

364e ἂν τι ἑνθένδε μᾶλλον μάθω: Here ἂν = ἑν (= aorist subjunctive μάθω).
This is probably best construed as the protasis of a Future More Vivid conditional (with imperative εἰτε in the apodosis: S 2326e): “if from here I (will) learn something more,” “if I’ll understand any better from (asking you) this . . . .”

364e5 οὐ: anticipating an affirmative answer (S 2651).

364e5 τῷ Ὀμήρῳ: dat. of agent with passive verb in perfect tense (S 1488).

364e7 Ἡμιστά γε: The adj. ἡμιστος (“least,” probably superl. < adv. ἡμικα, “slightly”) is often used adverbially (n. pl. acc.) in dismissive replies. Here again, as at 364a1 and b1, following an adj. or adv. at the opening of a sentence, γε has an “exclamatory” force (GP 126 (10), 127 (i)): “Least of all . . . !” “Not at all . . . !” “Hardly . . . !”

364e7 ἀπλούστατος: Used of people, ἀπλούς (contraction < ἀπλόδος) means “simple,” “frank,” “straightforward.” Its basic meaning is “single.” Its normal opposite is ἀπλούς (“double,” “double-minded,” “duplicitous”).

Cf. Plato’s Phaedrus 230a (Socrates to Phaedrus): . . . σχοπῶ οὐ ταῦτα ἄλλα ἔμαυτόν, εἴτε τι θηρίων ὁν τυγχάνω Τυφώνος πολυπλοκότερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεθυμένον, εἴτε ἡμερότερον τε καὶ ἀπλούστερον ζῷον . . . . “. . . I investigate not these things, but myself, to know whether I am a monster more complicated and more furious than Typhon or a gentler and simpler creature . . . .” [LCL translation]
καὶ ἀληθέστατος: “and most true,” i.e., most truthful, most honest.

These words are omitted in two of our three best MSS. But they are the same two MSS that (wrongly) omit ὅτι ποιούσιν, ἦ ἐπίστανται at 365e7. The latter omission is probably due to a scribe’s eyes skipping from one ἐπίστανται to another ἐπίστανται a few words later. The present omission may be due to a similar skipping from one α----στατος to another α----στατος two words later.

ἐπεὶ καί: When καί follows causal ἐπεί, it sometimes “marks an addition . . . to a general, unexpressed, concept: ‘in addition to everything else’.” (GP 296-7). Possible (over)translations: “since, in addition to many other passages I might mention, . . .” ; “for to take but one example, . . .”

ἐν Λιταίς: The “embassy” scene from the Iliad (Book 9), in which Odysseus, Phoenix, and Ajax are sent to Achilles to try to appease his anger and win him back for the war, was referred to in ancient times both as Πρεσβεία (“Embassy”) and as Λιταί (“Prayers,” from a dramatic image used by Phoenix at 9.503ff.).

πρὸς ἀλλήλους . . . διαλεγομένους: “conversing with each other . . . .” When πρὸς + acc. is used of a kind of “intercourse or reciprocal action” (LSJ, πρός, C.I.6), the best translation is often “with.”

ποιεῖ αὐτοῦς διαλεγομένους: timeless authorial present instead of the perfect (see note on πεποιηκέναι at 364c5): “portrays them conversing . . . .”

If there were no participle here but an inf. (διαλέγεσθαι) instead, the meaning would be: “makes them converse,” i.e., “causes them to converse” (see LSJ, ποιέω, A.II.b). But given the participle, ποιεῖ should probably be construed in its literary sense of “portray,” “represent” (cf. LSJ, ποιέω, A.I.b: “ποιήσας τὸν Ἀχιλλέα λέγοντα having represented Achilles saying . . .”).

αὐτῷ: apparently some kind of dat. of interest (S 1474ff.) referring to Homer, who puts words into his characters’ mouths to serve his poetic purposes: lit., “[Achilles says] for him,” i.e., “he has [Achilles say] . . . .”

Διογένες Λαερτιάδη πολυμήχαν' Ὄδυσσεύ: a good example of a formulaic or ready-made line, recycled by the oral poet as needed. This one occurs seven times in the Iliad alone and around a dozen other times in the Odyssey: “Zeus-sprung son of Laertes, Odysseus of many devices . . . .”

The verses quoted by Hippias correspond very closely to lines 308-10 and 312-14 of Book 9 of later standard editions of the Iliad (differences emboldened):

διογένες Λαερτιάδη πολυμήχαν' Ὄδυσσεύ 308
χρή μὲν δὴ τὸν μῆθον ἀπήλεγέως ἀποκεῖν, 309
ἡ περὶ δὴ φρονέω τε καὶ ὡς τετελεσμένον ἔσται, 310
ώς μὴ μοι τρύζητε παρόμοιοι ἀλλοθεν ἀλλος. 311
ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κεῖνος ὁμός Αἴδαο πύλησιν 312
Son of Laertes and seed of Zeus, resourceful Odysseus:
without consideration for you I must make my answer,
the way I think, and the way it will be accomplished, that you may not
come one after another, and sit by me, and speak softly.
For as I detest the doorways of Death, I detest that man, who
hides one thing in the depths of his heart, and speaks forth another.
But I will speak to you the way it seems best to me . . . .

[Richmond Lattimore’s translation]

It is not known whether Plato was simply working from a different text, or was
quoting Homer imperfectly from memory, or altered the text on purpose to suit
the present context, or wanted his character Hippias to seem to be doing any of
the above. Still, it is worth noting that Plato’s version puts Socrates in a better
position to highlight the gap (which he does at 370a-371b) between what
Achilles says he will do and what he does do. Where Plato has χρανέω ("I shall
see it through"), the standard text has φρονέω ("I think"); where Plato has ὡς
καὶ τετελεσμένον ἔσται ("as it will be accomplished"), the standard text has ὡς
μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἄριστα ("as it seems best to me"); and whereas line 311 (absent
from Plato’s version) may serve Homer’s purposes well, it does not serve Plato’s
or Hippias’s here, since neither is concerned with the plot of the embassy scene
as such—the failed attempts by the three envoys, “one after another,” to “sit by”
Achilles and persuade him (311: . . . παρήμενοι ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος).

365a2 μὲν δή: affirmative μὲν strengthened by δή (GP 392, first full paragraph, our
Homer passage cited).

365a2 τὸν μῦθον . . . ἀποειπεῖν: The verb ἀποειπεῖν (“speak out,” “declare”) is
pronounced (and spelled) ἀπειπεῖν in Attic.
A μῦθος need not be vocalized. Often translated “story” or “speech,” μῦθος
can also mean “unspoken word” or “purpose” (LSJ, μῦθος, I.5): “speak out . . .
my (unspoken) word,” “declare . . . my intention.”

365a2 ἀπηλεγέως: “without caring for anything,” “bluntly,” “frankly” (< ἀπο- +
 ἄλεγω, “have a care”).

365a3 ὡσπερ δή . . . τε καὶ ὡς . . . : δή strengthening ὡσπερ. The prominent adverbs
of manner (“just as . . . and as . . .”) emphasize the close relation between the
way Achilles says events will unfold and the way they will unfold.

365a3 κρανέω: fut. (< κραίνω): “I shall accomplish (it),” “I shall see (it) through.”

365a3 τελέσοιμαι ὡς: “I think (it) will be accomplished . . . .”
tελέσοιμαι looks just like an uncontracted pres. mid./pass. inf.
(<τελέω, “fulfill,” “accomplish”). Here, however, it is probably a fut. mid. inf. (used passively: S 807), the intervocalic sigma having dropped out (τελέσωθα becomes τελέεσθα) and before vowel contraction.

οἶω is an act. form of οἴομαι. Homeric meanings include “presage,” “expect,” “think.”

365a4 ἐχθρὸς . . . ὅμος Αἴδαο πύλην: “hateful . . . (equally) to the gates of Hades,” i.e., equally as hateful as the gates of Hades.

The adv. ὅμος (“equally,” “alike”) can take a dative. Cf. the English constructions “equal to,” “like unto.”

Αἴδαο is gen. sing. < Αἴδης (a poetic form = Ἅιδης, “Hades”).

πύλην is dat. pl. < πύλη.

365a4 κεύθῃ: subjunctive (<κεύθω, “hide,” “conceal”) in a pres. general conditional rel. clause (S 2567) introduced by ὅς χ᾽ (= ὃς ἄν: see note above). The metrical length of -ῃ is shortened before ἐνί: a final long vowel preceding a word that begins with a vowel is often shortened in epic poetry (“epic corremption”).

365b1 ἐγὼν: “in (his) heart,” “in (his) mind . . . .

ἐγὼν (in Ionic Greek and more widely in poetry) = ἐν.

φρέσιν is dat. pl. (<φρήν [almost always found in the plural], “diaphragm,” “heart,” “mind”).

365b2 ὁτάρζο: The particle ὁτάρζο is found in epic and pastoral poetry, “its place elsewhere being taken by ἀτάρζω (GP 55).” Homer himself sometimes uses ἀτάρζω, sometimes ὁτάρζο, “according to metrical convenience” (GP 51). Predominantly adversative in Attic prose (see note on ἀτάρζο at 364b3), it is often used in poetry as a progressive particle, with little or no adversative force (GP 55 (2); cf. LSJ, ἀτάρζο, 3). Here, however, it appears to be strongly adversative: “But . . . .”

365b2 ἐγὼν: (before vowels in epic poetry) = ἐγώ.
365b2 ἐρέω: fut. (= Attic ἐρῶ): “I will say,” “I will speak . . . .”

365b2 καί: adverbial (perhaps best left untranslated). How Achilles says it will be brought to pass is also (καί) how it will be brought to pass.

365b2 τετελεσμένον ἔσται: periphrastic form of the fut. perf. (S 601): lit., “it will have been accomplished,” or simply, “it will be accomplished.” Cf. S 1956: “When stress is laid upon complete fulfillment, the future perfect may imply rapidity, immediate consequence, or certainty, of action accomplished in the future.”

365b3 τοῦτοῖς . . . τοῖς ἔπεοιν: The word ἔπος (“word,” “speech,” “song”), when used in the pl., often means “verses” or “lines” of poetry, esp. “epic” (ἐπικός < ἔπος) poetry (cf. LSJ, ἔπος, IV.c: “lines, verses, esp. of spoken lines in the drama”). The interruption of ἐν τοῦτοῖς τοῖς ἔπεοιν (“in these lines”) by δὴλοι places emphasis on τοῦτοῖς (“in these lines”). Socrates uses a similar construction at d1 (ταῦτα ἐποίησεν τά ἐπη).

365b3 δὴλοι: “makes plain,” “reveals,” “shows” (< δηλόω).

365b3 τρόπον: “way,” “manner,” “character” (LSJ, τρόπος, III.2: “a man’s ways, habits, character”).

The same root is found in the compound πολύτροπος (see note at 364c6 on πολύτροποτατος). Whereas Achilles’ character is simple (ἄπλος), Odysseus’s “way” (τρόπος) is to be a man “of many ways” (πολύτροπος).

365b3 ἐκατέρου τοῦ ἀνδρός: “of each man . . . .” The article, best left untranslated in English, is normal here in Greek (see S 1171, 1179 and LSJ, ἐκάτερος: “when joined with a substantive, the substantive almost always takes the article”).

365b4 ὡς: “how” in the sense of “that,” or simply “that” (S 2577, 2578c).

365b4 εἶη: optative in secondary sequence in indirect discourse (S 2599, 2615).

Although the leading verb (δὴλοι) is in the timeless authorial present, secondary sequence still obtains.

365b4 ἀληθής: See note on καὶ ἀληθέστατος at 364e7.

365b5 ψευδής: “false,” i.e., deceitful. Socrates and Hippias elaborate the meaning of this adjective at d6ff., concluding that in order for a person to qualify as ψευδής, it is not enough for him to be inclined to speak falsely in some area—he must be competent to speak falsely in that area (see 366b, 367bc, 367e). The question whether a person must also be inclined to speak falsely in order to count as ψευδής is never raised (though it comes close to being raised at 370e5ff.).

365b5 ποιεῖ . . . τὸν Ἀχιλλέα . . . λέγοντα: See note on ποιεῖ ἀλλήλους
διαλεγομένους at 364e9.

365b7 Νῦν ἡδή: The adverb ἡδή contrasts one moment, typically the present, either with later moments (“already [now/then],” i.e., “and not any later”) or with earlier ones (“finally [now/then],” i.e., “and not any earlier”). Here ἡδή contrasts the present moment with the past: “Now at last . . . .”

365b7 καινονεύω μανθάνει: The verb καινονεύω literally means “run a risk” (“I run the risk of understanding”) but often just expresses possibility or probability: “perhaps I understand . . . .” The impersonal καινονέκτω (“it may be”) is also used, but the personal construction is preferred, as often in Greek (cf. 372b1-2: καινονεύω . . . ἔχειν).

365b8 τὸν πολύτροπον ψευδή λέγεις: “By the devious (man) | you mean (a) false (man) . . .” (see final paragraph of note on τοῦτο δ᾽ κτλ. at 364e3).

If Socrates had wanted to make it explicit that he was speaking here about the word “πολύτροπος,” he might have used the neut. article (τό) and repeated Hippias’s nominative form πολύτροπος by way of quotation. Cf. S 1153g (“τό οὔμετρος ὄταν λέγω, τὴν πόλιν λέγω when I say You, I mean the State [Demosthenes 18.88]”). See also LSJ, ὁ, ἡ, τό, B.1.5 (“in neut. before any word or expression which itself is made the object of thought, τὸ ἄνθρωπος the word or notion man . . .”).

It is unclear whether Socrates takes himself to be proposing a definition of πολύτροπος (“πολύτροπος” = “ψευδής”) or whether he is simply suggesting that if a man is πολύτροπος, he is ψευδής (“X is πολύτροπος only if X is ψευδής.”). Strictly speaking, his words imply only the latter. At 365e1-2, however, Socrates has no trouble getting Hippias to agree that οἱ ψευδεῖς are, among other things, πολύτροποι (i.e., “X is πολύτροπος if X is ψευδής.”). So Socrates and Hippias do at least arrive at a biconditional: “X is πολύτροπος if and only if X is ψευδής.”

365b8 ὡς γε φαίνεται: “as it appears.” The ὡς introduces a qualifying aside, the γε emphasizes the qualification. See note on ὡς γε κτλ. at 364e3.

365c1 Μάλιστα: lit., “most [of all]” (superl. < μάλα), often used in confident affirmative replies.

365c2 πολλαχοῦ: “in many places.”

Cf. the endings of other place words such as ποῦ (“where?”), οὐδαμοῦ (“nowhere”), and πανταχοῦ (“everywhere”).

365c3 Ἐδόκει . . . Ὑμήρω: ‘Edókei is not impersonal. Its subject is ἔτερος μὲν . . . ἔτερος δὲ: “one person seemed to Homer, while a different person seemed to Homer . . . .” A less awkward translation: “Homer was of the opinion that one person . . . ., while another person . . . .”
ἄρα: inferential here (“so,” “then”), as often in Plato.
Inferential ἄρα is perhaps “slightly less formal” (GP 41, first full paragraph) than inferential οὐν or δή (“therefore,” “then”).

ὡς ἔοικεν: < ἔοικα, “be like,” “seem” (perf. tense with pres. meaning): “(as) it seems . . .”

ἀλλά’ οὖν; Here ἀλλά may be left untranslated, since in places where English says, “A, not B,” Greek tends to say, “A, ἀλλά’ οὖν B.”

Cf. GP 2: “In English, καὶ οὐ is usually best rendered ‘and not’, ἀλλά’ οὖν ‘not’. [Examples:] ‘I want some blotting paper: red, and not too thick.’ ‘I want some blotting paper: red, not white.’”

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει: The rhetorical question πῶς γὰρ οὖ; “confirms a positive statement” (GP 86): “For how not?” i.e., “Of course.” Although the verb μέλλει literally points to some likelihood in the future (“For how is it not likely that it should be so?”), this addition to the sense of “πῶς γὰρ οὖ;” is probably very attenuated here, since the talk is of a dead poet.

Compare the expression τί οὐ μέλλω; (LSJ, μέλλω, I.d: “why shouldn’t I?” “why is it not likely that I should?, i.e., yes, of course”). Cf. also Phaedo 78ab (Cebes speaking with Socrates): ὅθεν δὲ ἀπελάπτομεν ἐπανέλθομεν, εἰ οὐ ἵδομένω ἔστιν. —Αλλὰ μήν ἵδομένῳ γε: πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; —Καλῶς, ἑφή, λέγεις. “But let us return to the point where we left off, if you are willing.” “Oh, I am willing, of course.” “Good,” said he. [LCL translation]

Ἡ καὶ οὖ δοξεῖ αὕτῳ: Sometimes interrogative ἦ + καί is a set phrase which “inquires with a certain eagerness,” though sometimes the καί means “too” or “also” and “goes closely with an individual word” (GP 285 (5) (ii)). Here καί may go closely with emphatic οὖ (intensified by αὐτῷ): “Does it seem (so) to you yourself, too . . .?” “Are you also of this opinion, Hippias?”

Πάντων μάλιστα: lit., “Most of all,” a fuller, more emphatic version of “Μάλιστα” (see note at c1 above): “Most certainly,” “Absolutely.”


ἂν δεινόν εἴη εἰ μή; optative + ἂν in the apodosis of a Future Less Vivid conditional: “. . . it would be strange if (it did) not (seem so to me, too).” See note on Αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἂν εἴη at 364d3.

Τὸν μὲν Ὁμηρὸν: answered by οὖ ὃ’ at d2. See note on ἐάσωμεν at c8 below.

τοίνυν: inferential (“then,” “well then,” “well now”).

τοίνυν is a fairly colloquial word, “commonest in those parts of Attic prose which approach most closely to the idiom of ordinary speech” (GP 568). Rarely
does a word intervene between μέν and τοίνυν (GP 580). Here a key word (Ὁμήρου) does intervene.

365c8 ἐάσωμεν: hortative subjunctive (S 1797) < ἔαω (“permit,” “leave alone,” “let be”): “let us leave [Homer] alone . . . .”

Plato’s Socrates likes to shift from the question of what some absent third person thinks to the more vital question: “What do you think?”

Cf. Meno 71d: εἴ δὲ βούλει, αὐτὸς εἰπέ· δοκεῖ γὰρ δίποτοι σοι ἀπερ ἐκεῖνοι. MEN. Ἔρμος. Ἐκεῖνον μὲν τοῖνυν ἕωμεν, ἐπείδη καὶ ἀπεστιν· οὐ δὲ αὐτός, ὦ πρὸς θεόν, Μένων, τι φής ἄρετήν εἶναι; “. . . [O]f you like, make your own statement, for I expect you share his [≡ Gorgias’s] views. Meno: I do. Socrates: Then let us leave him alone, since in fact he is not present, and do you tell me, in heaven’s name, what is your own account of virtue.” [LCL translation, lightly revised]

365c8 ἐπειδή καὶ ἀδύνατον: “since, in addition (to other reasons I might mention), it is impossible . . . .” See note on ἐπειδή καί at 364e8.

Cf. Plato’s Crito 50c7-9 (the Laws of Athens pressing Socrates to answer their question): Ὡ Σώκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ λεγόμενα ἄλλ’ ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδή καὶ εἰόθες χρῆσθαι τῷ ἐρωτάν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαί. “O Socrates, don’t marvel at our language, but answer the question, since you are, after all, in the habit of employing the question-and-answer method.”

365d1 ἐπανεφέσθαι: See note on ὄν νουν γὰρ ἐπανεφέσθαί at 364b6.

365d1 τί ποτε νοῶν ταῦτα ἐποίησεν τὰ ἔπη: lit., “thinking what he composed these lines,” i.e., “what he was thinking” when he composed these lines.” Again, as so often in Greek (see 364a2-3, above), it is the participial phrase (τί ποτε νοῶν), not the phrase with the finite verb (tauτα ἐποίησεν τὰ ἔπη), that contains the leading idea (S 2147a).

Indefinite ποτέ (“ever,” “once,” “at length”) adds a certain intensity to questions (LSJ, πότε, III.3). Cf. the difference in English between “What were you thinking?” and “What ever were you thinking?”

On the interruption of ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη by ἐποίησεν see note on τούτοις . . . τοῖς ἔπειν at 365b3.

The fullest Platonic elaboration of the ideas expressed in this passage occurs at Protagoras 347e-348a (Socrates to Protagoras): οὗτῳ δὲ καὶ αἱ τοιαί δυνατοί, ἑαν μὲν λάβωνται ἀνδρὸν οἰοίπερ ἤμων οἱ πολλοί φασιν εἶναι, οὔδὲν δεονται ἄλλοτρια φωνῆς οὐδὲ ποιητῶν, οὐς οὔτε ἀνεφέσθαι οἱν τε ἐστιν περὶ ὅν λέγουσιν, ἐπαγόμενοι τε αὐτοὺς οἱ πολλοὶ εν τοῖς λόγοις οἵ μὲν ταῦτα φασίν τὸν ποιητὴν νοείν, οί δ’ ἔτερα, περὶ πράγματος διαλεγόμενοι δ’ ἄνυνται ἐξελέγξαεν ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας δυνατοίς ἔσον χαίρειν, αὐτοὶ δ’ ἐαυτοὶς σύνευοιν δ’ ἐαυτῶν, ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν λόγοις πείραν ἄλληξαν λαμβάνοντες καὶ διδόντες, τοῖς τοιούτοις μοι δοκεῖ χρῆναι μάλλον μιμεῖσθαι ἐμὲ τε καὶ σέ, καταθεμένους τοὺς ποιητῶς αὐτοὺς δι’ ἔμων αὐτῶν πρὸς ἄλλης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, τῆς
ἀληθείας καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πείραν λαμβάνοντας:

“And so a gathering like this of ours, when it includes such men as most of us claim to be, requires no extraneous voices, not even of the poets, whom one cannot question on the sense of what they say; when they are adduced in discussion we are generally told by some that the poet thought so and so, and by others, something different, and they go on arguing about a matter which they are powerless to determine. No, this sort of meeting is avoided by men of culture, who prefer to converse directly with each other, and to use their own way of speech in putting one another by turns to the test. It is this sort of person that I think you and I ought rather to imitate; putting the poets aside, let us hold our discussion together in our own persons, making trial of the truth and of ourselves.” [LCL translation]

365d2 οὖ δ΄ : = οὖ δέ, answering Τὸν μὲν Ὄμηρον (e8).

365d2 φαίνη ώναδέχομενος τὴν αἰτίαν: The verb ἀναδέχομαι (“take up,” “receive”) sometimes has the sense of “take upon oneself” (LSJ, ἀναδέχομαι, II.4b, our passage cited).

Socrates’ language here suggests a courtroom scene in which Homer is let off the hook in some way and Hippias voluntarily bears some burden in his stead: “since you evidently take the charge upon yourself. . . .”

365d2 οοὶ συνδοκεῖ: The subject of συνδοκεῖ is ταῦτα. The συν- in συνδοκεῖ implies the agreement of one person with another: “[these things] seem [good] to you, too . . . .”

365d3 ἄπερ: neut. acc. pl. rel. pronoun reinforced by περ (GP 487.II, 490 (3)): “[these] very [things] which,” “just [these things] which . . . .”

Although there is often little difference between forms of ὃς and forms of ὅπερ (LSJ, ὅπερ, I.1: “frequently indistinguishable from simple ὃς”), the addition of περ makes good sense here.

365d3 ἀπόκριναι: 2nd pers. sing., aor. mid. impv. (see note on ἀποκρινῇ at 363c6): “answer . . . .”

365d3 κοινῇ: fem. dat. (< κοινός), used adverbially: “in common,” “jointly.”

365d3 ύπὲρ: “on behalf of,” “in the name of . . . .”

365d5 Ἐσται ταῦτα: lit., “These things will be,” i.e., “I’ll do as you say.”

365d5 ἂλλ᾽ ἐρώτα = ἂλλὰ ἐρώτα (2nd pers. sing. pres. act. impv. < ἐρωτάω).

Sometimes when a speaker uses ἂλλὰ with an imperative, he is signaling that there has been enough talk about a proposed course of action and that the time has come to pursue it (GP 14): “Come, ask . . . .”
The phrase ὅτι βούλει (“whatever you want”) may be classified as a general conditional relative clause (S 2569).

One of our three best MSS has ἐν βραχεῖ (“in brief,” “in a short time”) instead of ἐμβραχυ (see below). It also has ὅπερ (“[just] what”) instead of ὅτι (“whatever”).

In Attic, to judge from a few Platonic and Aristophanic examples, when you add ἐμβραχυ (< ἐν + βραχύς) to an indefinite relative pronoun, e.g., ὅτι (“whatever”), you make it clear that your “whatever” is absolute, that your “anything” means simply anything, anything at all. Cf. LSJ, ἐμβραχυ: “in Attic with relative [pronouns] such as ὧστις, ὧπου, etc.; in sense, at all, soever . . . [our passage cited].”

Aristophanes, Thesmophoriazusae 389-90: Ποῦ δ’ οὐξὶ διαβέβληχ’, ὅπωρε ἐμβραχυ / εἰοίην θεατα καὶ τραγῳδοὶ καὶ χοροὶ . . . “Where has he [= Euripides] not slandered [us women], wheresoever / there are spectators and choruses . . . ?”

Plato, Symposium 216e-217a (Alcibiades speaking of Socrates):

“I don’t know whether anyone has seen the glorious images inside of him when he has been caught in a serious mood and opened up, but I’ve seen them once already, and they seemed to me to be so divine and golden, so utterly beautiful and amazing, that I simply had to do whatever Socrates bade me.”

Later in the Lesser Hippias, when Hippias is upset and, after a brief break, reluctantly submits to further questioning, he repeats his earlier phrase but leaves out ἐμβραχυ (373c4: ἀλλ’ ἐρωτά ὅτι βούλει). It is the difference between a generous “Come, ask whatever you wish,” and a tight-lipped “Come, ask what you will.”

Socrates may add οἷον here to soften the impact of the phrase ἀδυνάτους τι ποιεῖν (“unable to do a thing”) and also, perhaps, of the next phrase, ὡσπερ τοὺς κάμνοντας (“like the sick”). These phrases, taken literally, suggest that false people are totally incapacitated for action, unable to lift a finger, like those on sick beds.

The basic meaning of ἀδύνατος is “unable” or “disabled.” It is sometimes used of people who are physically incapable of doing something, e.g., invalids who are “disabled” (ἀδύνατοι) for service in the army, or older women who are now “unable to bear children” (Plato’s Theaetetus 149b7: ἀδύνατοι τίτσειν). It is also used of people who are no good at doing something, though able to do it in some sense, e.g., a person who can speak but is no match for the orator (ἀδύνατος εἰπεῖν; cf. Aristotle’s Rhetoric 1379a2), or people who can
drink but are unable to compete with the heavy drinkers (ἀδύνατοι πίνειν: cf. Plato's *Symposium* 176c).

Later in this dialogue (366b6, 367b3-4, 367e5, 368a5), Socrates will use the phrase ἀδύνατος ἔφευγεσθαι (lit., “unable to speak falsely”) to describe a person who can, and often does, utter falsehoods, but who cannot do so with masterful consistency.

In the present passage Socrates is helping himself to two senses of ἀδύνατος at once: “lacking in skill or ability” and “lacking in physical strength.” The word ἀδυνάτους might be translated twice in order to show this: “Do you say that the false are incompetent to do a thing—incapacitated, so to speak, like the sick—or competent to do some thing?”

365d7 δυνατοὺς: The basic meaning of δυνατός as applied to people is “able,” “capable,” “powerful.” Generally speaking in Greek, and particularly in the *Lesser Hippias*, people who are δυνατοὶ τι ποιεῖν are not merely able to do some thing but good at doing it, i.e., competent to do it. Cf. the English adjective “able” when it modifies a noun (“an able seaman,” “an able speaker,” etc.).

365d7 ἐγογε: emphatic ἐγώ, used in affirmative replies, usually implying a verb such as “think,” “say,” or “do” and suggesting a possible contrast with what others might think, say, or do: “I (for my part) (say) . . . .”

365d8 καὶ μάλα σφόδρα: Used before an intensive adverb such as μάλα or σφόδρα, καὶ is “little more than a particle of emphasis,” conveying “a sense of climax” and denoting “that something is not only true, but true in a marked degree” (GP 316-7 (C), 317 (1)). The phrase καὶ μάλα σφόδρα is quite emphatic: “very much so indeed,” “very well (able) indeed.”

365d8 ἄλλα . . . πολλὰ: accusative of respect (S 1600): “in many other ways . . . .”

365d8 καὶ: “and especially . . . .” Cf. LSJ, ἄλλος, II.6 (“οἱ τε ἄλλοι καὶ . . . all others and especially . . .”) and note on ἄλλως τε ἐπειδὴ καὶ at 363a4.

365d8 ἐξαπατάν ἄνθρωπους: infinitive phrase filling out Δυνατοὺς at d7: “[Able] . . . to deceive people.”

365e1 Δυνατοὶ μὲν δή: The μὲν emphasizes Δυνατοὶ while pointing ahead to the next question; the δή has inferential force: “They are able, then, . . . .”

Cf. GP 258: “Μὲν δὴ is frequently used by the historians as a formula of transition, the clause often summing up the preceding section of the narrative.”

365e1 ὡς ἐσκει: “(as) it seems . . . .” See note on 365c3.

365e2 ἦ γὰρ: an appeal for confirmation (see note on at ἦ γὰρ 363c5).

365e3 ἀπατεῶνες: “rogues,” “cheats,” “deceivers” (< ἀπατεῶν < ἀπάτη, trick, fraud).
The word ἀπατεών, normally a noun, may also serve as an adjective (LSJ).

365e3 ὑπό: “from,” “owing to.”
   Even with a verb that is not in the passive voice, the preposition ὑπό can express cause or agency (LSJ, ὑπό, A.II.3).

365e4 πανουργίας: “knavery,” “slyness” (< πᾶν “everything” + ἑργάζομαι “do,” “perform”). In English we say of a person who exhibits πανουργία, “There’s nothing he won’t do [to get his way].”

365e4 φρονήσεως τινός: “a kind of discernment.” Indefinite τις may mean “a kind of,” “of a sort” (S 1267, last four lines).
   Although it typically means “good sense” or “practical wisdom” in Plato and Aristotle, φρόνησις may also be morally neutral (“thought,” “perceptiveness”). Like other words in the “φρονέω” family (φρόνημα, φρονηματίζομαι, etc.), it is capable of taking on a pejorative sense as well. For their fifth definition of φρόνησις (“arrogance,” “pride”) LSJ cite Euripides, Suppliant Women 216-218 (Theseus to Adrastus):

   ἀλλ’ ἡ φρόνησις τοῦ θεοῦ μείζον οθένειν
   γίνεται, τὸ γαύρον δ’ ἐν φρεσκεκλεκτὸν
dοκοῦμεν εἶναι δαμόνων σοφώτεροι.

   “But our presumption seeks to lord it over heaven, and in the pride of our hearts we think we are wiser than the gods.” [E. P. Coleridge’s translation]

365e5 πάντων μάλιστα: “most certainly.” See note on Πάντων μάλιστα at 365c7.

365e5 Ψφόνιμωι μὲν ἀρά: The μὲν emphasizes Ψφόνιμωι while pointing ahead to the next question; the ἀρά has inferential force: “So they’re discerning . . . .”

365e6 μὰ Δία: particle used in oaths + acc. of deity appealed to (< Ζεῦς): “by Zeus.”

365e6 λίαν γε: The adverb λίαν denotes excess, the particle γε adds intensity: “all too (discerning).”

365e7 οὐχ ἐπιστάνται ὅτι ποιοῦσιν: The grammar is ambiguous between “[D]o they not know [the answer to the question of] what they are doing . . . ?” and “[D]o they not know [how to do] what they do . . . ?” In the first case, ὅτι [= ὧ τι < ὅστις] serves as an indirect interrogative pronoun, introducing an indirect question; in the second, it functions as an indefinite relative pronoun, introducing a relative clause. Cf. Smyth 2668d (“The context must sometimes determine whether a sentence is an indirect question or a relative clause . . . ”).
   The next few lines (365e8-366a1) suggest that what is in question here is whether false people have the practical know-how to achieve success in what they do, not whether they are conscious of what they are doing. If so, ὅτι ποιοῦσιν is a relative clause in this context: “[how to do] what they do.”

“Finally then I went to the handworkers. For I was conscious that I know practically nothing, but I knew that they knew many fine things. And in this I was not deceived; they did know what I did not, and in this way they were wiser than I.” [LCL translation]

365e8 Καὶ μάλα σφόδρα: See note on καὶ μάλα σφόδρα at 365d8.

365e8 καὶ: emphasizing the verb (GP 320 (6)): “That’s how they work their mischief,” “That’s the reason they cause the trouble they cause.”

365e9 πότερον: The singular neuter accusative form of πότερος, used adverbially, often introduces an “either-or” question. It is usually best left untranslated.

365e10 μὲν οὖν: As often in replies, μέν affirms, οὖν emphasizes the affirmation (cf. GP 475 (3); 476 (iii), our passage cited at top of 478): “certainly,” “to be sure.”

365e10 αὐτά γε ταύτα: accusative of respect (S 1601c) with limiting γε adding “detail to an assent already expressed” (GP 136 (iv)): “—that is, in just this sphere, . . .”

Cf. Plato’s *Laches* 185ε: Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὔπω ἐὔρωπας ἀνευ διδασκάλων τεχνικοτέρους γεγονότας εἰς ἕνα ἣ μετά διδασκάλων; ΣΩ. Ἔγωγε, ὦ Λάχης, οἷς γε σὺ οὐχ ἀν ἐθέλοις πιστεύσαι . . . εἰ μὴ τί σοι τῆς αὐτῶν τεχνῆς ἔργου ἐχομεν ἐπιδείξει . . . . “But I say, Socrates, have you never noticed how some people have become more skilled in certain things without teachers than others with them?” SOCRATES: “Yes, Laches, I have; people, that is, whom you would not care to trust . . . unless they could put forward some example of their personal skill . . . .” [LCL translation]

366a1 ἐξαπατῶν: infinitive in explanatory apposition to αὐτά γε ταύτα (S 988).

The infinitive ἐξαπατῶν fills out the meaning of the adjective Σοφοί at e10 (cf. LSJ, σοφός, I.3, two lines above II: “also with infinitive . . .”).

366a2 Ἔχε δὴ: “Hold on, now: . . .”

The use of δὴ after an imperative adds emphasis to the verb and “appears to have been mainly colloquial in the fifth and fourth centuries” (GP 216 (iii)). The best translation is usually “come” or “now.”

366a2 ἁναμηνηθόμεν: deliberative subjunctive, aorist passive [active in meaning] (< ἁναμμῆνω, “remind”): “let us recall . . .”

366a4 εἰς ἀπερ ψευδεῖς: lit., “in (respect to) just those matters in which they are false.” A fuller form of the same phrase: εἰς ταύτα ἀπερ ψευδεῖς εἰσιν.
"Yes, I do say so," "I do indeed (say so)." Here γὰρ indicates assent (GP 86, VIII), while οὖν strengthens the force of the assent (GP 447 (3)).

"Well now . . . ." See LSJ, φέρω, IX ("imperative φέρε like ἀγε, as adverb, come, now, well"). Cf. note on Ἐχε δη at 366a2.

"(as) it seems . . . ." See note on 365c3.

"in (respect to) . . . ." Cf. note on εἰς ἅπερ ψεύδεις at 366a4, above.

Although the verb ψεύδομαι ("to say falsely") usually means "to lie," i.e., to say something false on purpose with an intention to deceive, it can also simply mean "to say something false."

Cf. Plato, Symposium 214e (Alcibiades to Socrates): ἐάν τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, μεταξὺ ἐπιλαβῶ, ἕνα βούλη, καὶ εἰπὲ ὅτι τοῦτο ψεύδομαι· ἐχόν γὰρ εἶναι οὐδὲν ψεύζομαι. "If I say anything that isn’t true, feel free to interrupt me and say that in this I speak falsely; for as far as I can help it I’ll say nothing false."

The phrase ἐν κεφαλαίῳ (κεφάλαιον, "chief point," "sum," "gist of the matter" < κεφάλαιος, "chief," "principal" < κεφαλή, "head") has the adverbial sense of "summarily," "in a way that sums things up."

eἰρῆσθαι ("to speak") is an absolute infinitive supplemented by ὡς (S 2012). This ἄρα is inferential ("so"). See note on ἄρα at 365c3.

As δύνατος (b5) takes the infinitive ψεύδεσθαι, so ἀδύνατος takes the same infinitive here (LSJ, ἀδύνατος, I.1: "unable to do a thing, with inf."); and as σοφοὶ (b5) also takes the infinitive ψεύδεσθαι, so ἀμαθής may take it here as well, if ψεύδεσθαι can be construed as an accusative of respect ("ignorant in respect to speaking falsely").

Cf. Laches 194d (Nicias to Socrates): Πολλὰς ἀκόμα σου λέγοντος, ὅτι ταῦτα ἄγαθα ἐκαστὸς ἤμων, ἀπει σοφός, ἃ δὲ ἀμαθής, ταύτα δὲ χακός. "Often have I heard you say that each of us is good in just those respects in which he is wise, and bad in those respects in which he is ignorant."

οὐκ ὅν εἴη ψεύδης: potential opt.: "... would not be false."
Since the emphasis falls on \( \Deltaυνατος \), and since this word is now being treated as a term to be defined, perhaps \( \gamma \varepsilon \) is best represented here by quotation marks: “And is each person “able” who . . . ?”

\( \delta \alpha: \) probably not inferential (“so,” “then”), but rather simply adding liveliness to a question already made lively by \( \gamma \varepsilon \).

\( \delta \varepsilon \ \alpha \nu \ ποιη \ τοτε \ \delta \ \alpha \nu \ βουληται, \ \deltaταν \ βουληται: \) The adv. \( \tauοτε \) (“then,” “at that time”) anticipates \( \delta \tauαν \) and is probably best left untranslated in English: “who does what(ever) he wishes when(ever) he wishes . . . .”

The \( \delta \varepsilon \) introduces a present general relative clause with \( \alpha \nu \ + \ \text{subjunctive} \) (S 2567; cf. S 1768, 2545c), while the \( \delta \) introduces another pres. gen. rel. clause with \( \alpha \nu \ + \ \text{subjunctive} \) within that clause. The action is further specified by an indefinite temporal clause, again with \( \alpha \nu \ + \ \text{subjunctive} \) \[\delta \tauαν = \delta \tauε + \alpha \nu\].

366c1 \( \sigmaυχ \ \upsilonο \ νοσου \ \lambdaεγο \ \varepsilon\xiευρομενον \ \upsilonο\deltaε \ \tauοιο\upsilonον: \) lit., “I do not mean (a person) prevented by disease nor (by) [the] things of that sort.”

What is the point of this clarification? Socrates’ compressed language may reflect the following line of thought: “In speaking of a person who does what he wishes when he wishes, I mean a person whose mind is such that he can do what he wishes when he wishes. Granted, even an expert practitioner may be prevented by some physical accident from exercising his knowledge, and thus perform no more ably than his ignorant counterpart—but I discount all such cases as beside the point.” If this is correct, Socrates’ words would mean something like this: “I’m not speaking (now) of [cases where] one [is] prevented by disease or things of that sort . . . .”

It is possible that the \( \sigmaυχ \) governs \( \upsilonο \ \nuοσου \ . . . \varepsilon\xiευρομενον \), rather than \( \lambdaεγο \). If so, the sense would be this: “I mean one who is not prevented by disease or things of that sort . . . .” However one takes the \( \sigmaυχ \) (I do prefer taking it closely with \( \lambdaεγο \), since this creates a stronger contrast between \( \sigmaυχ . . . \lambdaεγο \) in c1 and \( \alphaλλα . . . \ \sigmaυτο \ \lambdaεγο \) in c2-3), Socrates’ point seems to be that the cases he is talking about are those in which extraneous factors such as the need for bed rest during an illness do not prevent an expert from exercising his knowledge and so do not obscure the clear contrast between the ability of experts and the inability of laymen.

366c2 \( \varthetaοσεφ \ . . . \ \sigmaυτο \ \lambdaεγο: \) Here \( \varthetaοσεφ \) (“[just as”]) introduces an example (cf. LSJ, \( \varthetaοσεφ \), 1.1: “as for instance”) that illustrates the sense in which Socrates intends his words to be taken, a sense later pointed to by \( \sigmaυτο \ \lambdaεγο: \) “(the sense) in which you, say, are able to write my name when you wish: that’s my meaning.”

366c2 \( \tauοιο\upsilonον: = \tauο \ \upsilonο\muον. \)

366c3 \( \eta \ \sigmaυχ, \ \delta\varepsilon \ \alpha\nu \ \sigmaυτος \ \epsilonχη, \ ναλεις \ \upsilon \ \deltaυνατον: \) “Or do you not call “able” whoever is this way?” ; “Or don’t you call that sort of person “able”?”
As οὐχ anticipates an affirmative answer (S 2651), so nominative οὐ (S 1190) may also put some pressure on Hippias to say “Yes.” (“That’s what I and others say—don’t you?”).

366c5 Λέγε δή μοι, οὖ Ιππία: “Come then, Hippias, tell me . . . .”

δὴ with an imperative “sometimes implies a connexion, logical or temporal, the command either arising out of, or simply following upon, a previous action or speech” (GP 216 (iii)). See note on Ἐξε δή at 366a2.

366c5 οὖ οὖ μέντοι ἐμπειρος εἰ: “Aren’t you experienced in . . . ?”

As often with οὖ and in questions introduced by οὐ, μέντοι is not adversative here, but emphatic; its τοι makes the question more personal, while its μέν invites confirmation that Hippias really is ἐμπειρος λογισμῶν καὶ λογιστικῆς (cf. GP 399 II.1 [our passage cited at 403 (b)]).

366c6 λογισμῶν καὶ λογιστικῆς: genitives with ἐμπειρος (“experienced in . . .” or “adept at . . .”).

λογισμοὶ are “calculations,” while λογιστικῆ (= ἡ λογιστικῆ τέχνη) is the art of calculation, i.e., “arithmetic.” LSJ distinguishes between λογιστικῆ, “practical arithmetic,” and ἀριθμητική, arithmetic in the sense of “the science of number” (LSJ, λογιστικῆ).

In Plato’s Republic Socrates uses both terms together (525a9: λογιστικῆ τε καὶ ἀριθμητικῆ), then proceeds to distinguish between the imperfect pursuit of λογιστικῆ for lowly, practical purposes and the fuller pursuit of λογιστικῆ (no mention now of ἀριθμητικῆ) in which students proceed to the contemplation of the nature of numbers by pure intellect (525c2-3: ἐως ἃν ἐπὶ θέαν τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν φύσεως ἀφίκωνται τῇ νοήσει αὐτῆ).

In the Gorgias (451a-c) Socrates says that ἀριθμητική and λογιστικῆ are concerned with the same thing (περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ [c2]), namely the odd and the even numbers, but that whereas ἀριθμητικῆ deals with how great a quantity each of these numbers is (ὅσα ἃν ἐκάτερα τυγχάνῃ ὄντα [b4]), λογιστικῆ considers them both in themselves and in relation to each other (καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλα πῶς ἔχει [c3-4]).


366c7 Οὐκοῦν: interrogative (S 2951).

The οὐκ introduces a question that expects an affirmative answer, the οὖν marks an inference: “Then (isn’t it the case that) . . . ?”

366c7 εἶ καὶ τίς ξε ἐρωτό: protasis in a Future Less Vivid conditional (S 2329; chart at S 2297).

Often εἰ καί means “even if” (GP 299 (6); 300 (i); 302-305). The idea may be that this question is unlikely to be asked, or difficult to answer, but that even so Hippias could answer it: “even if someone were to ask you . . . .”
366c7 τὰ τρίς ἐπτακόσια ὅποος ἐστὶν ἀριθμός: indirect question: “how big a
number three times seven hundred is . . . .”

In English it would be odd to say “the three times seven hundred,” but the
article is natural and helpful in Greek: it both distinguishes the subject of the
clause (τὰ τρίς ἐπτακόσια) from the predicate noun phrase (ὅποος . . . ἀριθμός) (S 1150) and indicates that the numerical quantity “3 x 700” is meant,
as opposed to 3 x 700 physical things (S 1125c).

366c8 πάντων τάχιστα καὶ μάλιστ᾽ ἂν εἴποις: superlative adverbs (τάχιστα . . . μάλιστα) with partitive genitive (πάντων) and potential optative (ἀν εἶποις).
See note on μάλιστ' at 363a4.

366d1 τάληθη: = τὰ ἀληθῆ: lit., “the true things.” This phrase is often used in Greek
where we say “the truth” in English.

366d1 Πάνω γε: a strong affirmative reply, common in Plato: “By all means.”

366d2 Ἀρα ὅτι: causal ὅτι: “Because . . . .”

ἀρα, unlike οὐ or μή, does not itself imply an expectation of either a “yes”
answer or a “no,” though sometimes the context suggests such an expectation.
When it does, and when the expected answer is “yes,” it may be that “the appeal
is the more confident because less obviously stressed” (GP 46.II (3)).

366d2 κατὰ ταῦτα: “in respect to these things,” “in these matters.”

366d3 Πότερον: See note on πότερον at 365e9.

366d3 οὖν: perhaps not inferential (“then”), but merely progressive: “Now, . . . ?”

366d4 ἢ καὶ ἄριστος: adverbial καί: “or best, too, . . . ?”

366d4 ταῦτα ἄπερ: accusatives of respect: “in respect to those (very) things in respect
to which (you are) . . . .”, “in that very field in which you are . . . ?”

366d5 τὰ λογιστικά: “arithmetical matters.”

366d5 Καὶ ἄριστος δήποτε, ὦ Σώκρατες: “Best, too, I should think, Socrates.”

The δῆ in δήποτε adds emphasis, while the ποῦ politely gestures toward the
possibility that one is mistaken, so that “the certainty of δῆ is toned down by the
doubtfulness of ποῦ”—though there is often no real doubt in the speaker’s mind
(GP 267; cf. S 2850).

366d6 μὲν δῆ: This δῆ, which is probably connective (“then”), strengthens μὲν. The
μὲν, in combination with δῆ, marks the wrapping-up of one section of the
argument (about being qualified to tell the truth) and points ahead to the next
(about being qualified to speak falsely). See note on Δυνατοὶ μὲν δῆ at 365e1.
άν . . . εἶποις: potential optative (S 1824).

Τί δὲ: “And what (is your opinion regarding) . . . ?”; “And what of . . . ?”
Socrates often asks “τί δέ;” when moving on to a new point in a line of questioning. See GP 176 (c) [on τί δέ]: “As a formula of transition: ‘And what (of this that follows)?’” Cf. LSJ, τις, B.I.8.f: “τί δέ; serving to pass on quickly to a fresh point . . . .”

καί μοι . . . ἀπόκριναι: See note on καί at 364e4 and note on μοι at 364d1: “(And) do answer me . . . .”

ὡςπερ τὰ πρότερα: “as before . . . .” Cf. LSJ, πρότερος, IV (“neut. πρότερον frequently as adverb, before . . . : also used with the article”).
These words seem to refer both to the quality of Hippias’s recent responses and to Socrates’ initial request for gentleness at 364c8-d2.

γενναίως καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς: lit., “nobly and in a manner befitting a great man.” The noble manner Socrates has in mind may be that of a gentleman who always gives honest answers—even when they mean his own embarrassment. Cf. Laches 196b (Laches to Socrates): ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν φαινέται Νικίας οὐκ ἔθελεν γενναίος ὡμολογεῖν ὅτι οὐδὲν λέγει, ἄλλα στρέφεται ἄνω καὶ κάτω ἐπιγραμμόμενος τὴν αὐτοῦ ἄποφις. “Now, it appears to me that Nicias won’t honestly admit that he is making no sense, but is floundering this way and that in an attempt to cover up his own confusion.”

τὰ τρίς ἐπτακόσια πόσα ἐστί: “how many are three times seven hundred. . . .” See note on τὰ τρίς ἐπτακόσια κτλ. at 366c7).

πότερον σὺ: pointing ahead to a less impressive candidate, the ignorant person: “(are) you (the one who) . . . , (or is some lesser person better at this than you)?”

κατὰ ταὐτὰ: = κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ: “in the same way,” “uniformly,” “consistently.”

ὁ ἀμαθὴς εἰς λογισμοὺς: “he who is unlearned in regard to calculations,” i.e., “he who is ignorant of calculations.”

δύναιτ᾽ ἂν σοῦ μᾶλλον ψεύδεσθαι βουλομένου: “would [he . . . ] be able to speak more falsely than you, assuming you wished to?”

δύναιτ᾽ ἂν = δύναιτο ἂν (potential opt.). Accented σοῦ is emphatic (S 325a). Genitive βουλομένου agrees with σοῦ.

πολλάκις: The adverb πολλάκις normally means “often” or “many times,” but it can also mean “perhaps,” “perchance,” typically in a protasis in which an unlikely but real possibility is raised. The link between the meanings may be the idea that an unlikely possibility is realized every so often, in the course of many
chances. Here the best translation may reflect that link: “every so often . . . .”

Cf. Aristophanes, *Ecclesiazusae* 791-2 (Man to Neighbor, listing a series of unlikely events that might cause people to stop obeying the new law): σεισµὸς εἰ γένοιτο πολλάκις, ἢ πῦρ ἀπῶροφον “If there should be an earthquake, **perchance**, or horrible lightning . . . .”

Cf. also Plato, *Phaedo* 60e3 (Socrates to Cebes, explaining why in his final days he has turned to composing poetry, when he had always assumed that a recurring dream telling him to “make music and practice it” was really telling him to practice philosophy, the highest kind of music): καὶ ἀφοσιούμενος, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις ταύτην τὴν μουσικὴν μοι ἐπιτάττοι ποιεῖν. “. . . and to satisfy my conscience, on the off chance that [my recurring dream] was ordering me to make this kind of music.”

367a2 ἄν: anticipating the ἄν at a3 (S 1765).

367a3 τάληθη ἄν εἴσοι ἄκων: potential opt.: “might tell the truth involuntarily . . . .”

Like ἐκών (“voluntarily,” “of his own volition”), the word ἄκων (“involuntarily,” “in spite of himself”) is a cross between a participle and an adjective, often to be translated adverbially into English.

The word ἄκων does not appear again until 370e7. But from there to the end of the dialogue, both ἄκων and ἐκών will figure prominently.

367a3 εἴ τύχοι: lit., “if it should chance,” i.e., “perchance,” “by chance.”

Cf. LSJ, τυγχάνω, A.I.3: “ἂν τύχῃ, εἴ τύχοι, it may be, Plato, *Cratylus* 430a, *Hippias Minor* 367a . . . .”

367a3 διὰ τὸ μή εἰδέναι: “on account of his lack of knowledge . . . .” The phrase recurs at 372d8-e1, where Socrates applies it to himself.

Articular infinitives take μή instead of οὐ (S 2712).

367a4 εἴπερ: In adding a περ to this εἰ, Socrates is emphasizing the εἰ clause (“if . . . .” “if in fact . . .”), as if to add: “and I don’t mean to suggest you ever would . . . .” Note the absence of a περ at 366c8 (εἰ βούλεσθαι), where no such politeness is required.

Cf. GP 488, note 1: “Jebb’s statement . . . that the tone of εἴπερ is usually confident,’ while ‘that of εἰ δή is sceptical’, perhaps goes rather too far: εἴπερ is clearly sceptical in Aristophanes, *Frogs* 634, Plato, *Protagogoras* 319a, *Laws* 902a, and elsewhere: though *often*, no doubt, it is confident.” The present εἴπερ certainly seems to be skeptical, if only out of polite respect for Hippias’s feelings.

367a4 κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ: see note on κατὰ ταύτα at 366e5.

367a5 Ναι, οὗτος ἔχει ὡς οὐ λέγεις: ὡς answering οὗτος: “Yes, it is (so:) as you say.” An adverb + a form of ἔχω often = an adjective + a form of εἰμί. See S 1438.

367a6 Ὁ ψευδής οὖν πότερον: The οὖν is probably progressive (“Now,” “Well, . . .”),
not inferential (“then”).

Here πότερον, usually the first word in its clause, leaves its prominent place to make room for ὃ ψευδής, a new subject to which Socrates now shifts.

367a6 περὶ μὲν τὰλλα . . . οὐ μὲντοι περὶ ἀριθμόν: “[false] in other regards . . . , yet not in regard to counting . . . ?”

Here μὲν is answered by a lively, adversative μὲντοι (GP 404 (2)(i): “With preceding μὲν”) rather than by the more common, less lively δέ. Socrates is pointing up the absurdity of the thought that a false man would not be false when it comes to counting money, weighing merchandise, etc. It is clear from his reply that Hippias takes the bait (c8: Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία περὶ ἀριθμόν).

In addition to “number,” ἀριθμός can mean “numbering,” “counting” (LSJ, ἀριθμός, II).

τὰλλα = τὰ ἄλλα.

367a7 ἀριθμόν: Here ἀριθμόν is not the gen. pl. of ἀριθμός but a nom. sing. pres. participle (< ἀριθμεῖν, to count): “(when) counting,” “(in) counting (things).”

367a7 οὐδέ . . . ἄν ψεύσατο: potential opt.: “and would he not speak falsely . . . ?”

Here “οὐδέ . . .” is equivalent to “καὶ οὐ . . . .” In appending this οὐδέ clause to οὐ μὲντοι περὶ ἀριθμόν, Socrates puts added pressure on Hippias to reject the thought that a false man would be false in other regards but not when it comes to counting things.

The word πότερον at a6 introduces an “either-or” question whose second alternative is never stated (cf. LSJ, πότερος, II.3: “the second alternative is sometimes left to be supplied”). Had it been stated, it might have run as follows: ἥ καὶ περὶ ἀριθμόν ψευδής ἔστιν; “or is [the false man] false in regard to counting, too?” Cf. Hippias’s response in the following line (a8: Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία περὶ ἀριθμόν).

367a8 Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία περὶ ἀριθμόν: emphatic reply analyzable into two sense units: (1) Καὶ . . . περὶ ἀριθμόν, providing the content of the reply (“. . . in regard to counting, too”), and (2) ναὶ μὰ Δία, providing the emphasis (“Yea, by Zeus . . .”). See note on μὰ Δία at 365e6.

367a8 ἰναίτινα ἄρα καὶ τούτο: “So are we to lay this down too . . . ?”; “So shall we posit this as well . . . ?”

Here ἰναίτιν (aor. < τίθημι) is deliberative subjunctive (S 1805), καὶ is adverbial (“also,” “too”), and ἄρα is inferential.

367a9 εἶναι τινα ἄνθρωπον ψευδῆ: Since εἶναι does not come between τινα ἄνθρωπον and ψευδῆ, but rather before them, it is probably serving not as a copula linking subject (τινα ἄνθρωπον) and predicate (ψευδῆ) but rather as the leading idea in its clause: “[that] . . . there is some person (who is) false?”

367b1 οὖν: somewhere between strictly inferential (“then”) and more loosely
progressive (“Now, . . . ?”). See GP 434.

367b2 οὐχὶ δεῖ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ: “Need it not fall to him . . . ?”

ὑπάρχειν + dat. can mean “it belongs to (him),” “it falls to (him),” “it is given to (him),” etc. Cf. LSJ, ὑπάρχω, III.1 and V.2.

See note on οὐχὶ at 363a2.

367b2 εἴπερ μέλλει πρεσβύνης ἔσεσθαι: “if in fact he is going to be false,” “if he is really going to be false . . . .”

The περ adds emphasis to the εἰ clause as a whole, but especially to πρεσβύνης, a word which Socrates has taken great pains to define (365d6-366b7).

367b2 ὡς σὺ ἄρτι ὡμολόγεις: “as you were agreeing just now . . .”

The nominative σὺ, emphasized by the word order and already somewhat emphatic for being there at all (S 1190), underscores the fact that the conclusion being drawn now is a consequence of Hippias’s own statements. The phrases εἰ μέμνησαι and ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐλέγετο (b4) drive the point home.

ἄρτι points back to 366b6-7.

ὡμολόγεις is impf. (< ὡμολογέω).

367b4 μέμνησαι: 2nd sing. perf. mid. < μιμνῆσκω (with pres. meaning in perf. tense): “you remember” (lit., “you are in a state of having reminded yourself . . .”).

367b4 ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐλέγετο ὅτι: Reading along, it seems as if ὅ . . . ἀδύνατος (b3-4) will be the subject of ἐλέγετο (“[he] was said”). But then the ὅτι is encountered, not the expected infinitive, and it appears that ἐλέγετο must be taken impersonally (“it was said”) and that ὅ . . . ἀδύνατος must be imported into the ὅτι clause as its subject.

Another alternative is to treat this as an instance of anacoluthon, i.e., a failure to follow out a construction on the same grammatical lines on which it began. See S 3004-8, esp. 3007: “Artificial or rhetorical anacoluthon is the result of a deliberate purpose to give to written language the vividness, naturalness, and unaffected freedom of the easy flow of conversation, and is best seen in the dialogues of Plato.”

As noted at 364e3 above, an enclitic pronoun like σοῦ usually receives an accent, regardless of semantic emphasis, when it follows an oxytone preposition.

367b4 οὐχ ἂν ποτὲ πρεσβύνης γένοιτο: potential opt. (S 1824): “would never amount to a false man.”

The use of γένοιτο here, instead of εἴπη, seems to suggest the idea of coming up or measuring up to the high standard set for ὁ πρεσβύνης at 365d6-b7. Cf. LSJ, γίγνομαι, I.2: “of sums, ὁ γεγονός ὀρθιμός τῶν ψήφων the total of the votes, Plato, Apology 36a: ἔκατον εἴςοι στατήρων γέγονοι τρισχίλιαι τριακόσιαι ἐξήκοντα [δραχμαί] 120 staters amount to 3,360 drachmae . . . .”

Cf. also the use of aorist forms of γίγνομαι to mean “prove oneself,” not mentioned in LSJ, but illustrated by such passages as Plato, Republic 327c
“But do you see how many we are?” he said. “Surely.” “You must either then prove yourselves the better men or stay here”) and Plato, *Menexenus* 242bc (“Then did they meet with the Persians in the battle, Ἑλλησ πόλεμον, Ἑλληνας, ἀνδρεῖς ἄγαθοι γενόμενοι καὶ ἐλευθερώσαντες οἰς ἐβοήθουν . . . . These were the first of our men who, after the Persian war and now helping Greeks against Greeks in the cause of freedom, proved themselves men of valour and delivered those whom they were aiding . . . .”) [LCL translations].

367b5 Ἀλλὰ: “Why,” “Well, . . .”

This may be the kind of Ἀλλὰ that “repudiates the very idea” that things could be otherwise—for Hippias prides himself on his memory skills (368d6-7; cf. 369a4-8). Or it may be the kind of Ἀλλὰ with which “agreement is presented, not as self-evident, but as wrung from the speaker malgré lui” (GP 16 (6)—for Hippias probably sees that he is about to be refuted. It is in any case the kind of Ἀλλὰ that “introduces the substantiation by the second speaker of an hypothesis . . . expressed by the first” (GP 20 (7)), the “hypothesis” being ei μέμνησα at b4. Cf. note on Ἀλλὰ at 363c4.

367b5 μέμνησα: see note on μέμνησα at 367b4.

367b5 ἐλέχητε οὖτως: lit., “so it was said,” or more colloquially, “that’s what was said.”

367b6 Οὐκοῦν ἄρτι ἔφανης οὔ: “Now, weren’t you just shown [to be] . . . ?”

This οὔ seems less emphatic than the οὔ at b3, since its position in its clause is not as prominent (see note on ὡς οὔ ἄρτι ὡμολόγεις at b2-3, above).

The οὗ- in this οὐκοῦν anticipates an affirmative answer, while the -οῦν is loosely progressive (“Now, . . .”), not strictly inferential (“then”) (GP 434). ἔφανης is 2nd aor. pass. < φαίνομαι.

367b6 ὡν: supplementary participle with ἔφανης. The present construction (form of φαίνομαι + part.) seems to mean, as it normally does, “were revealed as being” (= “shown to be”), whereas the phrase ἔφανης εἶναι (form of φαίνομαι + inf.) normally means “appeared to be better,” whether truly so or not. See S 2143.

367b7 ἐλέξθη γέ τοι καὶ τούτο: “This too was said, at any rate.”

The γε in γέ τοι is limitative (“at least,” “at any rate”), while the τοι adds lively emphasis (GP 550 (4), our passage cited on p. 551). The combination γέ τοι, according to Denniston, is a colloquial idiom, livelier than but otherwise almost identical to γοῦν, by which a speaker gives “a reason, valid so far as it goes, for accepting a proposition” (GP 550 (4)(i)).

367c1 Ἀργό οὖν: = Ἀρός οὖν. This οὖν is probably loosely progressive (“Well now”).

Unlike the οὖν- in οὐκοῦν, interrogative Ἀργό does not by itself expect an affirmative answer; if anything, it is skeptical in tone (GP 46.II). After securing a
reluctant reply to a question whose oὐχ put pressure on Hippias to say “yes,” Socrates now asks a softball question which Hippias will be all too glad to say “yes” to (c2: Πάνυ γε)—so even a skeptical ἄφαι will do.

367c2 Πάνυ γε: See note on Πάνυ γε at 366d1.

367c4 ὁ λογιστικός: “the one skilled in calculating,” “the arithmetician.”

367c5 οὔν: Given the γάρ at c6, this οὔν is probably best heard as inferential (“then”).

367c5 γίγνεται: “turns out to be . . .” Here the choice of γίγνεται, rather than ἐστί, seems to reflect the subjective experience of Hippias and Socrates, partners in dialogue, for whom the good (calculator) is coming (to be seen) to be false, his identity being revealed by the investigation.

367c5 ἄλλος ἃ: “other than . . .”

367c6 καὶ: adverbial (“also”): “For the same one is also able, and that one, also true.”

367c7 Φαίνεται: “It appears (so).”

367c7 οὔν: inferential (“then”).

367c8 οὐδὲν: adverbial: “in no way,” “no.”

367d1 δήποι: “I should think . . .” See note on Καὶ ἄριστος δήποι κτλ. at 366d5.

367d1 ὁ αὐτός . . . ἐστί: “. . . he (the true man) is . . . the same (as the false man),” “. . . the one is . . . the same as the other . . . .”

The understood subject of this ἐστί appears to be “the true man” of c8 (ὁ ἄληθής). The phrase ὁ αὐτός may simply mean “the same,” as in the English phrase “the same as.” Cf. LSJ, αὐτός, III. (“with article . . . with dative, to denote sameness or agreement, esp. in Prose . . .”) and Plato, Euthydemus 298a, cited by LSJ (ἡ οὖ ἤ ὁ αὐτός τῷ λίθῳ; “Or are you the same as [the] stone?”).

367d1 καὶ οὐχ ἐναντιώτατα ἔχει: adverb + ἔχει = adjective + ἐστί (S 1438): “and is not most opposed [sc. to the false man] . . . .”

367d2 ὁδοὺ: imperfect, 2nd pers. sing. < οἶμα.

367d2 ἄρτι: “just now.”

Socrates is thinking back to 366a5-6: Ἀλλοις δὲ τοὺς ἄληθεῖς τε καὶ ψευδεῖς, καὶ ἑναντιώτατος ἄλληλοις; —ΠΠ. λέγω ταῦτα. “And [you say] that the true and the false are different people, and are most opposed to one another?” Hippias: “That is what I am saying.”
Oὐ φαίνεται ἐνταυθά γε: limitative γε (GP 140.II): “It appears not—(not) here, at least.”

Βούλει οὖν σκεψόμεθα καὶ ἀλλοθεί: “Then would you have us investigate elsewhere as well?”

This οὖν may be taken either as inferential (“then”) or as more loosely progressive (“Well, . . .”).

In Attic, βούλει sometimes governs a finite verb in the subjunctive, rather than an infinitive. See LSJ, βούλομαι, II: “Attic usages: 1. βούλει or βούλεσθε followed by Verb in subj., βούλει λάβωμαι; would you have me take hold? [Sophocles, Philoctetes 761].”

Εἰ [ἀλλως] γε οὖ βούλει: The MSS read ἀλλως, but some editors, including Burnet, suggest that we remove it. If ἀλλως is correct, as I think it is, the sense would be: “If you wish to do so anyway,” i.e., “If you for your part would have us do so.”

ἀλλως (literally, “otherwise,” “for other reasons”) is used by Aeschylus in a context in which one man, on his way to Argos for reasons of his own, is asked by another man if he will deliver a message to Clytemnestra while he is there, “since you are going to Argos anyway [ἐπείπερ ἀλλως . . . εἰς Ἀγρος κεῖες]” (The Libation Bearers 680, quoted in LSJ, ἀλλως, I.2.b: “at all events, anyhow”). In the present passage, Hippias suggests that he would have Socrates travel with him in a certain direction only if Socrates himself, for independent reasons of his own, would care to go in that direction.

Here γε may be heard as emphasizing the conditional quality of the response. See GP 146.IV: “When γε follows a conjunction, εἰ, ἐπεί, &c., we may, if we like, say that it stresses the whole clause: but it is perhaps more accurate to say that it stresses the logical relationship expressed by the conjunction: thus, εἰ γε emphasizes the hypothetical nature of a statement: ‘I assert a truth subject to the validity of a hypothesis, but not independently of it.’”


καὶ: adverbial (“also,” “too”).

ἐγώγε: “(Yes,) I am.” See note on ἐγώγε at 365d7.

Τί οὖν: Like τί δέ, but more forceful, τί οὖν often has the effect of moving us on to the next (obvious) question, sometimes betraying impatience in the questioner: “What, then?” “Well, what [more is there to say]?”

See Plato’s Apology, 36b3-5: Τιμάται δ’ οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνήρ θανάτου. ἐιεν- ἔγω δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὃ ἀνδρείς Ἀθηναίοι; ἡ δήλον ὃτι τῆς ἀξίας; τί οὖν; τί ἀξίος εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτείσαι . . . . “Well, the man proposes the penalty of death for me. Very well; and what penalty do I offer to you as a counterproposal, men of Athens? Or is it clear that it should be what I deserve? What, then? What do I deserve to suffer or pay . . . ?”
Cf. *Phaedo* 63e8-9 (Simmias asking Socrates to *go ahead and share* what he has said he would share but has not quite gotten around to sharing): Τί οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὃ Σώκρατες; αὔτὸς ἔχον τὴν δίανοιαν ταύτην ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἀπέναι, ἢ κἂν ἤμην μεταδοῦσιν; “Well, Socrates?” he said. “Do you intend to keep this thought to yourself as you depart, or might you share it with us as well?”

Cf. also *Theaetetus* 168d6 (Socrates has just asked Theodorus whether he took note of what Protagoras urged them to do, and Theodorus has said that he did): Τί οὖν; κελεύεις πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ; “Well? Do you propose that we heed his word?”

367d7 καί: adverbial, as in the previous line.

367d8 περὶ τῶν διαγραμμάτων: “concerning geometrical figures,” “in dealing with plane figures . . . ” A διάγραμμα is a “figure marked out by lines,” often specifically a geometrical figure (LSJ, διάγραμμα, I.1).

367d9 Περὶ ταύτα ὁ ἄγαθὸς ἀλλός τις ἢ οὗτος: “Now, is anyone other than this man | good concerning these things?” “Now, other than this man, is anybody good in this field?”

Despite the absence of a πότερον, it is possible to construe this ἢ as disjunctive (“or”), although in that case one might expect Hippias to answer “Οὗτος,” since this would be the more straightforward answer to a question of the form “A or B?” It seems more likely that here, as often with ἀλλός, ἢ is comparative (“[other] than”).

367e1 Οὐχοῦν . . . γε: The force of the -οῦν in this οὐχοῦν is probably inferential (“then”).

According to Denniston, the basic use of γε is its “determinative” use, whereby “it serves to focus the attention upon a single idea, and place it, as it were, in the limelight” (GP 114). Denniston adds that determinative γε most commonly follows a connecting particle (such as οὐχοῦν); he includes the present passage among his pieces of evidence (GP 119-120).

Since it has just been agreed that the geometrician is δυνατῶτατος (d7-9) and that no one else is good in this field, perhaps the point of this γε is to make it clear that the ἄγαθὸς καὶ σοφὸς γεωμέτρης is δυνατῶτατος not merely in the sense of “very able” but in the sense of “most able of all.” Normally, a definite article could mark this distinction [see S 1085: “The superlative expresses either the highest degree of a quality ("the relative superlative: ὁ σοφῷτατος ἄνηγος the wisest man) or a very high degree of a quality (the absolute superlative, which does not take the article: ἄνηγο σοφῷτατος a very wise man.").”]. Here, however, the article is added to the phrase ἄγαθὸς καὶ σοφὸς γεωμέτρης and not to δυνατῶτατος, to indicate that δυνατῶτατος is the predicate, not the subject, of the sentence. Thus γε may be doing what the article might otherwise
have done, marking the superlative as expressing the *highest* degree of a quality, not merely a *very* high degree.

367e2 γεωμέτρης: Whereas γεωμετρικός in line d9 is an adjective used as a noun ("[the] skilled in geometry," "the geometrical one," "the geometrician"), γεωμέτρης is a straightforward agent-noun ("[the] geometry," "the geometrical one," "the geometrician"). One might have expected the form *γεωμετρητής, on analogy with μετρητής ("measurer") and other agent-nouns that end in -τής, such as ποιητής ("poet") and μαθητής ("pupil"). See S 839 for a list of Greek agent-noun endings.

367e3 ἀμφότερα: adverbial neut. pl. acc.: "in both respects," "in both ways."

367e3 εἴπετι τις ἄλλος: Where English idiom says, "He’ll do it, if anyone will," "He is, if anyone is," etc., Greek idiom tends to say: "He’ll do it, if *τις ἄλλος* will," "He is, if *τις ἄλλος* is," etc.

Cf. Plato, Euthyphro 15a (Socrates to Euthyphro): οἶσθα γὰρ εἴπετι τις ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων "for you know, if anyone does . . . ."

Cf. also Meno 93bc: ΣΩ. . . . Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἁγαθὸν ἄν φαίης ἄνδρα γεγονέναι; ΑΝ. Ἰσογή, πάντων γε μάλιστα. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ διδάσκαλον ἁγαθὸν, εἴπετι τις ἄλλος τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλος ἢν, κάσεινον εἶναι; "SOCRATES: . . . [W]ould you not say that Themistocles was a good man? ANYTUS: I would, particularly so. SOCRATES: And *if any man ever* was a good teacher of his own virtue, he especially was a good teacher of his?" [LCL translations].

The idiom also occurs in the form εἴ τις καὶ ἄλλος. See 368a4 below.

367e4 ἀν εἴη: potential opt. in the apodosis of a simple present conditional (S 2300e).

367e4 οὗ ὀδὸς ἀδύνατος ἢν ψεύδεσθαι: an instance of the so-called "philosophical imperfect" (S 1903), recalling an earlier moment in the discussion: "whereas the one who is bad *was (said to be)* incompetent to speak falsely . . . ."

In fact, this was not said explicitly. What was said is that the one who is good in the field of calculation is false—and true—in that field (367c4-8) and that in order to count as “false,” a person must be *δυνατὸς* ψεύδεσθαι, i.e., competent to speak falsely (367b2-5, amplifying 366b6-7). It follows that the one who is good in the field of calculation is competent to speak falsely in this field, and that someone who is *not* competent to speak falsely in the field of calculation is *not* good in this field. It does not necessarily follow that someone who is bad (in a given field) is incompetent to speak falsely (in that field).

367e5 ὡστε οὐκ ἄν γένοιτο ψευδής ὁ μὴ δυνάμενος ψεύδεσθαι: “and so he would not prove false, he who is not competent to speak falsely . . . .”

On the use of potential opt., or any other mood, in a ὡστε clause see S 2255: “A clause with ὡστε and a finite verb contains the main thought, and is often so loosely connected with the leading verb as to be practically independent and
coordinate. ὡστε may thus be simply introductory and take any construction found in an independent sentence.” Cf. LSJ, ὡστε, B.II.2: “at the beginning of a sentence, to mark a strong conclusion, and so, therefore . . .”

The μή in the phrase ὁ μὴ δυνάμενος ἡσύχασθαι probably does not bear a generalizing, quasi-conditioned sense (“whoever is not . . .”), which it often does, but rather a characterizing, quasi-causal sense (“he who is [of such a sort as] not . . .”). Cf. S 2734, 2705g. Cf. also LSJ, μή, B.6: “with causal significance”.

On the sense of γένοιτο here (“prove”) see end of note on οὐκ ἂν ποτε κτλ. at 367b4.

367e6 "Εστι ταῦτα: lit., “These things are [the case],” i.e., “That is so.”

367e8 "Ετι τοῖνυν: “Well now, further, . . .”

Either ἐτι (often, but not always, with δὲ) or τοῖνυν may be used independently to signal that the speaker is moving on to a further example (LSJ, ἐτι, II.1: “besides, may more, . . . further”; LSJ, τοῖνυν, A.3.c: “adding or passing to a fresh item or point, further, moreover, again”). Together, they signal the same thing, if somewhat more fully (several examples listed at GP 576, top).

367e8 καὶ τὸν τρίτον ἐπισκεψόμεθα: adverbial καί, hortatory subjunctive: “. . . let us inspect the third man, too, . . .”

This is the first we hear of the astronomer, or of a “third man,” so why not simply τρίτον, or τρίτον τινά; Why the article?

In Book VII of Plato’s Republic Socrates and Glaucon proceed from arithmetic (521c-526c) to geometry (526c-527c) to astronomy (527cff.), explicitly listing astronomy third, after geometry, which comes second (527cd: Δἐυτερον δὴ τούτο τιθῶμεν μάθημα τοῖς νέοις; Τιθῶμεν, ἔφη. Τί δὲ; τρίτον θῶμεν ἀστρονομιάν; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ; Ἴμοι γοῦν . . . “Shall we, then, lay this [i.e., geometry] down as a second branch of study for our lads?” “Let us do so,” he said. “Shall we set down astronomy as a third, or do you dissent?” “I certainly agree” [LCL translation]]. Socrates then makes a point of reversing their initial order: they really ought to have listed astronomy fourth, after solid geometry, which properly comes third (528a-e)—though since solid geometry has not yet come into its own as a recognized field of human inquiry, it is understandable that he and Glaucon initially overlooked it (528b; 528de).

Also, although we associate the idea of the so-called “quadrivium”—mathematics, geometry, music, and astronomy—with a time long after Plato’s, already in Plato’s Protagoras these same four subjects are mentioned as technai commonly taught by sophists, and by Hippias in particular (Protagoras 318de, Protagoras speaking: Ἰπποχράτης γὰρ παρ’ ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος οὐ πείσεται ἀπέρ ἂν ἐπαθὲν ἄλλῳ τῷ συγγενόμενος τὸν σοφιστάν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι λοιπῶνται τοὺς νέους τὰς γὰρ τέχνας αὐτοὺς πεφευγότας ἄκοιντας πάλιν αὐτὸν ἀγοντες ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τέχνας, λογισμοῦς τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικήν διδάσκοντες—καὶ ἄμα εἰς τὸν Ἡσιάν ἀπέβλεψεν—παρὰ δ’ ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος μαθήσεται οὖ περὶ ἄλλου του ἢ περὶ οὖν ἢχει. “For Hippocrates, if he comes to me, will not be treated as he would
have been if he had joined the classes of an ordinary sophist. The generality of them maltreat the young; for when they have escaped from the arts they bring them back against their will and force them into arts, teaching them arithmetic and astronomy and geometry and music (and here he glanced at Hippias); “whereas if he applies to me, he will learn precisely and solely that for which he has come.” [LCL translation, lightly revised]).

If it was natural to Plato and his readers to mention astronomy in the same breath with arithmetic and geometry, and if the customary order was arithmetic first, geometry second, astronomy third, this would explain the article before τρίτον in the present passage.

On the general significance of the ordinal “third” in Ancient Greek see LSJ, τρίτος: “the third frequently appears as completing the tale, e.g., the third and last libation was offered to Ζεὺς Σωτήρ . . . .”

367e9 ἀστρονόμον: “[the] astronomer.”

367e9 ἡς αὐ, ὦ ἑκχνης ἐτι μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμων οἴει εἶναι: “[the astronomer, i.e., the one versed in astronomy,] in which art, in turn, you think you are still more skilled . . . .”

Like ἐμπειρός (cf. 367d6), the adj. ἐπιστήμων takes a noun in the genitive (ἡς . . . τεχνῆς).

368a1 ἡ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν: “than the previous ones,” “than the (arts) just mentioned.”

Although the words ἐτι μᾶλλον . . . ἡ (“still more . . . than”) do set up a comparison, the phrase τῶν ἐμπροσθεν is in the genitive simply because it is parallel to τεχνῆς, not because this is an instance of the genitive of comparison—it is not. See S 1069: “With ἡ, the persons or things compared usually stand in the same case, and always so when they are connected by the same verb . . . .”

368a1 ἣ γάρ: See note on ἣ γάρ at 363c5.

368a2 ὡσύνην: “Well then, . . . ?” “Well, . . . ?” See S 2951 and GP 434.

Here the point of ὡσύνην may be to suggest that if Hippias is the expert astronomer he claims to be, well then, he of all people must surely see that the same thing obtains in astronomy.

368a2 καί: adverbial.

368a2 ταὐτα ταὐτά ἐστιν: = τὰ αὐτὰ ταὐτά ἐστιν: “. . . are[n’t] these same things [the case]?” or more idiomatically, “. . . is[n’t] the same thing true . . . ?”

368a3 Εἰκός γε, ὦ Σώκρατες: “It’s likely, Socrates,” “It is likely Socrates, yes.”

Εἰκός is a neuter participle (< ἐοικα, “be like,” “look like”) meaning likely, probable, reasonable. Cf. note on Εἰκότως, ὦ Σώκρατες, κτλ. at 364a7.
γε in responses is often best rendered “yes.” Here γε may simply intensify the admission, or mark Hippias’s reluctance to admit anything further. Either way, γε makes the reply more lively.

Cf. GP 130 (11): “The Greek for ‘yes’ is ναί: but ναί is much rarer than ‘yes’, because the lively Greek mind was seldom satisfied with the baldness of an unqualified answer . . . .”

368a3 Καὶ ἐν ἀστρονομίᾳ ἄρα: inferential ἄρα: “So in astronomy, too, . . . ?”

368a4 εἰπε τις καὶ ἄλλος ψευδής: “if anyone is false . . . .”
See note on εἰπε τις ἄλλος at 367e. On “superfluous” καὶ see S 2889.

368a5 οὒ γὰρ ὦ γε ἀδύνατος: “For it won’t be the incompetent [one],” “It surely won’t be the incompetent fellow . . . .”

Here γάρ has either the common connective sense (“for”) or the rarer, and most likely original, “asseverative” sense (“certainly,” “surely”), or perhaps a bit of each. Cf. GP 57.

When γε emphasizes a word that is preceded by an article, it usually lies in-between the word and the article, as here ( putStrLn γε ἀδύνατος). See GP 146.1V (1).

368a5 ἀμαθῆς γάρ: “. . . , that is, an ignorant person.”

Schanz may have been wrong to bracket all the words from οὔ γὰρ to ἀμαθῆς γάρ (see critical apparatus), but I think that he was noticing a real problem here. If the sense of the present γάρ is “for,” as one would normally expect, it should introduce a reason for thinking that the preceding claim is true. Specifically, it should introduce a reason for thinking that someone incompetent to speak falsely (ὁ ἀδύνατος ψεύδεσθαι) is not false. But if we already know that someone is incompetent to speak falsely, do we need a further reason for thinking that he is not false? No: as Hippias agreed at 366b4-5, false people are those with the wisdom and ability to speak falsely (οἴ ψευδεῖς εἰσιν οἱ σοφοὶ τε καὶ δυνατοί ψεύδεσθαι); so once we know that someone is incompetent to speak falsely, we thereby know that he is not false. Moreover, Socrates reminded Hippias as recently as 367e that someone lacking the competence to speak falsely “would not prove false” (οὐς ἂν γένοιτο ψευδής ὁ μὴ δυνάμενος ψεύδεσθαι).

So if the present γάρ is not being used to introduce a reason, how is it being used? Socrates has just placed the term ὁ δυνατός ψεύδεσθαι in apposition to the term ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀστρονόμος (368a4-5), making it clear that the expert is the one who is competent to speak falsely. If γάρ were now serving to put the term ἀμαθῆς in apposition to the term ὁ ἀδύνατος, it would yield a satisfying sense for the whole: “. . . if anyone is going to be false, won’t it be the expert in the field, the one competent to speak falsely? It certainly won’t be the incompetent person, the ignorant man.” But is γάρ ever used in this way?

There is a recognized “appositional” use of γάρ, whereby the particle “ceases to be a conjunction, though the meaning is still explanatory, ‘that is to say,’ ‘to wit’” (GP 67 (9)). This kind of γάρ is primarily found in Aristotle, but it already occurs in Herodotus. See Denniston’s list of examples on pp. 67-8, especially
Aristotle, *De Anima* 410b2-4 (here Aristotle is pointing out an absurdity in Empedocles’ views): ἔτι δ’ ἐκάστῃ τῶν ἄρχων ἄγνοια πλείων ἢ σύνεσις ύπάρξει· γνώσεται μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἐκάστῃ, πολλὰ δ’ ἄγνοησεν· πάντα γάρ τάλλα. “Further, each of the principles will have far more ignorance than knowledge; for though each of them will know one thing, there will be many of which it will be ignorant—viz. all the others.” [Revised Oxford Translation].

368a6 Φαίνεται οὖτως: “So it appears.”

368a6 ἄρα: inferential (“so,” “then”).

368a6 καὶ: adverbal.

368a7 Ἡσύχεν: “[So] it seems,” “It looks that way.” See note on ὡς ἡσύχεν at 365c3.

368a8 Ἰθα δὴ . . . ἐπισκέψωι: “Come now, . . . consider . . .”

The first imperative sets up the second. Like ἄγε (δή) and φέρε (δή), Ἰθα (δή) often precedes another imperative (S 1836).

The δή is emphatic, perhaps implying a logical or temporal connection (GP 216 (iii), 218 (“Ἰθα δή, with imperative”).

ἵθα = 2nd sing. pres. impv. < εἶμι (S 773).

ἐπισκέψωι = 2nd sing. aor. mid. impv. < ἐπισκόπεω. The middle form is used because, in good Attic, all tenses of σκοπέω other than pres. and impf. are supplied from the deponent σκέπτομαι. See Smyth, “Appendix: List of Verbs,” σκόπεω, p. 715.

368a8 ἀνέδην οὖτωσι ἐπισκέψιμαι κατὰ πασῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, εἰ: “. . . without restriction, just like this, (look) over all the kinds of knowledge (and) consider whether . . . .”

The adverb ἀνέδην (< ἀνίημι, “let go,” “let loose”) denotes the abandonment of restraint, whether physical, verbal, or mental.

The adverb οὖτωσι (“in just this way,” “just like this”) = οὖτως + deictic iota added for emphasis. See note on νυνὶ at 364b8.

While κατὰ + gen. often indicates physical motion down upon or over, it sometimes means “concerning” or “with regard to” (LSJ, κατά, A.II.1, 7; cf. S 1690.1a, c).

In Plato especially, ἐπιστήμη often means “professional skill” or “scientific knowledge,” the kind possessed by experts. In English we say “arts” and “sciences,” but rarely “knowledges.” Hence LSJ’s suggested translation of ἐπιστήμην as “kinds of knowledge.”

368b1 εἰ ποι ἔστιν ἄλλως ἔχον ἢ οὖτως: “if anywhere there is (a thing) being [= “(a thing) that is”] otherwise than so,” or more idiomatically, “whether in any field it is otherwise than this.” See S 1438.

Here Plato could have used the feminine gender (εἰ ποι ἔστιν ἄλλως ἔχουσα ἢ οὖτως: “if anywhere there is [an epístēmē that is] otherwise than so”),
or a smoother construction (e.g., εἰ ποὺ ἀλλως ἔχει ἢ οὐτως: “if anywhere it is otherwise than so”), but the construction that he does use seems to fit the rhetorical context. The neuter gender and existential ἔστιν underscore the idea that Socrates’ requirements are minimal (‘Find anything, any counterexample at all—just point out its existence.’). The more the reader is made to feel that Hippias is being given free rein to find a counterexample, the more dramatic the impact when Hippias fails to produce one (369a3).

368b2 πάντως: The adverb πάντως (lit. “in all ways”) often expresses strong confidence in an affirmation: “assuredly,” “doubtless . . . .”

368b2 δὲ: “(For) . . . .”

This could be an example of “δὲ for γάρ,” introducing an additional point by way of explanation “without stressing the logical connexion” (GP 169). δὲ for γάρ is rarely seen in prose, but when it does occur, it typically serves to introduce a parenthesis, sometimes a very short one (e.g., Plato, Cratylus 428a: ἀλλʼ εὐνεγήτει καὶ Σωκράτη τόνδε—δίκαιος δʼ εἰ—καὶ ἔμε. “[B]ut oblige Socrates—you owe it to him—and me”), sometimes a longer one (e.g., Plato, Charmides 153b, where Socrates interrupts his narration of dialogue to explain why Chaerephon asked a certain question: ὩΣόκρατες, ἢ δʼ ὃς, πῶς ἐσώθης ἐκ τῆς μάχης; ὡς ἐγενέσθαι ἐν τῇ Ποτειδαίᾳ, ἢ ἀρτὶ ἦσαν οἱ τῇδε πεπυσμένοι. “Socrates, he said, how did you survive the battle? (Shortly before we came away there had been a battle at Potidaea, of which the people here had only just had news.”) [LCL translations].

In the present passage, the parenthesis, if one may call it that, extends all the way to 368e, where its end is clearly marked with the words ἀλλʼ ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω (368e1: “But as I say . . . ”). Socrates then slips into an extremely brief parenthesis (368e2: —ἐκανεὶ δὲ—), this time with a δὲ that clearly is an example of δὲ for γάρ.

368b2 πλείστας τέχνας: accusative of respect modifying σοφώτατος (S 1600, 1601c): “[wisest] . . . in the greatest number of arts . . . .”

πλείστας is superlative < πολύς (S 319.8).

368b2 ἄνθρωπων: added out of piety, it seems, and perhaps postponed for emphasis.

In Plato’s Apology Socrates distinguishes “human wisdom” (ἱ ἄνθρωποινὴ σοφία), which he suggests “is worth little or nothing” (ὁλγον τι νός ἄξια ἕστιν καὶ οὐδενός), from the true wisdom of “the god” (ὁ θεός) (Ap. 23a5-7). Cf. esp. the words that he imagines being spoken by the oracle (Ap. 23b2-4): “Οὐτος ἴμων, ὅ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατος ἕστιν, ὅτις ἔστερ Σωκράτης ἐγνοκεν ὑμὸς οὐδενός ἄξιος ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν.” “This one among you, human beings, is wisest: whoever, like Socrates, is aware that he is worth nothing in truth when it comes to wisdom.”

368b3 μεγαλαυχουμένου: pres. mid. participle < μεγαλαυχέω, boast.
See end of note on ἵνα μηδὲν ἐμαυτὸν μεῖξον εἰπω at 372d3.
πολλὴν: “much/great (in extent),” i.e., “extensive,” or else perhaps “(worth) much,” “of great consequence” (LSJ, πολύς, I.2, 3).

diēξιόντος: < diēξεμ [diá + ék + eiμ], “go (out) through,” or, in counting or recounting, “go through in detail” (LSJ, diēξεμ, II).

ἐν ἁγορᾷ ἐπὶ ταῖς τραπέζαις: The word ἁγορα does not require the article in a prepositional phrase, perhaps because it was treated as a proper name (S 1136, 1141), perhaps because common phrases containing ἁγορα became established before the demonstrative ὁ, ἡ, τό had come into regular use as a definite article (S 1126 (1)).

In addition to “on, upon, over, in,” ἐπί + dat. may also mean “at, by, beside, near.”

The original meaning of τραπέζα seems to be “four-footed table” (probably < *τετράπεζα; cf. τετράπεζος, four-footed). τραπέζα means “table” generally, though here it refers specifically to the tables of the money-changers, i.e., the Athenian banks.

Plato is clearly poking fun at Hippias in the wider context, but this phrase itself (ἐν ἁγορᾷ ἐπὶ ταῖς τραπέζαις) is probably not derogatory, our later associations with Jesus’ act of overthrowing the money-changers’ tables notwithstanding. The idea that Plato would have looked down on an intellectual for exhibiting his mind in such an overtly commercial location, though it sounds plausible, is probably mistaken. Socrates himself was accustomed to speak there, too (see Apology 17c8-9: εἴωθα λέγειν . . . ἐν ἁγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν).

ἀ εἰχες περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀπαντα σωματοῦ ἔργα ἔχων: “bearing (only) works of your own | (in) all the things you had about your body.”

If it were only clothing and jewelry that Hippias “had (on)” about his person, there would be nothing to prevent taking εἰχες and ἔχουν to mean “wore” and “wearing” (LSJ, ἔχω, A.II.3). But since Hippias will also speak of a skin-scaper and an oil-flask (c2), as well as poems (c8), it is probably best to translate these two forms of ἔχειν more generally, reserving “wear” for the specific talk of jewelry, shoes, and garments.

ἔχειν sometimes takes a double acc. (“to have A as B”). When translating this construction into English, “in” is sometimes preferable to “as” (“having you as a friend” = “having a friend in you”).

δακτύλιον: “a (finger) ring” (< δάκτυλος, finger).

ἐντεύθεν γὰρ ἡρχο: “(for) that’s where you started (from) . . . .”

ἡρχο = 2nd pers. sing. impf. mid. indic. < ἡρχο. See note on ἡρχομαι at 364a8.

The adverb ἐντεύθεν means “from here” or “from there.”

ὡς ἐπιστάμενος δακτυλίους γλύφειν: “as one who knows how to carve rings,”
“as someone versed in crafting rings.”

The verb γλύφω is variously applied to the engraving of a seal, the carving of a statue, the making of toy boats, etc. Here it seems to refer to the creation of a whole ring, not just the engraving of a signet.

368c1 καὶ ἄλλην οφραγίδα οὖν ἔγγον: The word οφραγίς, which generally means "seal," often means the signet in a signet ring. If Socrates is speaking of a signet that is separate from the ring already mentioned, the present phrase may mean “and a signet besides, your own work.” If, as seems more likely, Socrates is speaking of the signet in the very ring he has mentioned, the phrase may mean “and (the) signet as well, your own work;” i.e., “signet and all, your own work.”

In enumerations ἄλλος can mean “besides,” “as well,” “to boot” (S 1272 and LSJ, ἄλλος, II.8). See Aeschines, In Timarchum 163.8: προοφιλών . . . οὐ τὴν ἐπωβέλεσα μόνον, ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλην ὀβρίζειν “not only sentenced to pay the one-sixth fine, but convicted of hubris to boot . . . .” Cf. Plato, Gorgias 473d1: τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων “the citizens and the foreigners besides . . . .”

368c2 στλεγγίδα: < στλεγγίς, a scraper for the skin, used to remove oil and dirt, typically in gymasia or baths. The Latin equivalent is strigilis, “strigil.”

368c2 λήρυθον: < λήρυθος, fl. of oil.

368c3 σκυτοτομῆσαι: lit., “cut leather,” esp. in making shoes. The verb σκυτοτομέω sometimes takes ὑποδήματα (“shoes,” “sandals”) as a direct object and then must mean “make [shoes] (sc. by cutting leather).”

368c4 τὸ ἰμάτιον . . . τῶν χιτωνίσκων: The standard dress of an ancient Greek citizen, at least by the 4th century B.C.E., consisted of an outer garment, or mantle, called the himation, and an undergarment, or tunic, called the chiton. χιτωνίσκος is the diminutive form, suggesting a shorter or daintier garment than usual (cf. S 856). The chiton was commonly worn with a belt or girdle (ζωνή).

Cf. Luke 6:29: τὸ τύπτοντι σε ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκωνᾶν πάφες καὶ τὴν ἄλλην, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵροντός σου τὸ ἰμάτιον καὶ τὸν χιτώνα μή κολύσης. “To the person who strikes you on one cheek, offer the other one as well, and from the person who takes your cloak, do not withhold even your tunic.” [New American Bible translation]

Not just a homemade ἰμάτιον, but homemade ὑποδήματα, a homemade λήρυθος, and a homemade στλεγγίς are mentioned in Plato’s Charmides at 161e-162a (Socrates speaking to Charmides: Τί οὖν; ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, δοξεῖ ἂν σοι πόλις εὐ οἰκεῖοθεία ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ νόμου τοῦ κελεύοντος τὸ ἐαυτοῦ ἰμάτιον ἐκαστὸν ὑφαίνειν καὶ πλίνειν, καὶ ὑποδήματα σκυτοτομεῖν, καὶ λήρυθον καὶ στλεγγίδα καὶ τάλλα πάντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τῶν μὲν ἄλληριόν μὴ ἀπέστησαι, τὰ δὲ ἐαυτοῦ ἐκαστὸν ἐφαγὰζεθαί τε καὶ πράττειν; ὡσ ἐμοίκε δοξεῖ, ἢ δ’ ὡς. “Well then,” I went on, “do you think a state would be well conducted under a law which enjoined that everyone should weave and scour his own coat, and make his own shoes, and his own flask and
scraper, and everything else on the same principle of not touching the affairs of others but performing and doing his own for himself?” “I think not,” he replied. [LCL translation]).

368c4 ψήψω: aor. act. inf. < ψαύω, weave.

368c4 γε: Although this γε may be understood as emphatic and as an example of what Denniston calls “epexegetical” γε, which “gives force and urgency to an addition or supplement,” sometimes in the form of a relative clause (GP 138.12, 139 (iii)), it may be better understood as indicative with a relative pronoun, denoting “that the speaker or writer is not concerned with what might or might not be true apart from the qualification laid down in the subordinate clause” (GP 140.11, 141 (2)(i)). Here what “might or might not be true” is whether the accomplishment that Socrates is about to mention really is an example of the greatest wisdom, apart from the fact that a crowd of people thought it was.

368c5 σοφίας πλείστης ἐπίδειγμα: “a fine example of the most extensive wisdom . . . .”

An ἐπίδειγμα is an exemplary specimen or display. Cf. ἐπιδειξαμένου at 363a2; ἐπιδειξεῖν at 364b6; ἐπιδείξει at 364b8.

See notes on πλείστας at 368b2 and on πολλήν at b3.

368c6 εἶναι μὲν οίῳ αἱ Περσικαὶ τῶν πολυτελῶν: predicate use of partitive genitive (S 1319), elaborated by a relative clause: “was (one) of the costly (ones), such as the Persian (girdles),” or more colloquially, “was like those (fancy) Persian girdles, the expensive kind . . . .”

Hippias was also the name of a notorious late 6th-century tyrant of Athens who fled to Asia Minor, found protection at the court of the Persian king, and personally guided the Persian forces to Marathon in 490 B.C.E.

368c7 πλέξω: aor. act. inf. < πλέκω.

Here Socrates describes Hippias as “twisting” or “plaiting” a girdle with his hands; at 369bc8 Hippias will describe Socrates as “twisting” or “plaiting” arguments out of words (τινὰς τοιούτους πλέκεις λόγους).

368c8 πρός . . . τούτοις: “in addition to these,” “on top of these . . . .”

368c8 ποιήματα ἔχων ἔλθειν: lit., “[that you] came bearing poems.” The participle ἔχων is often used where English uses “with” (S 2068a): “[that you] came with poems.” In a comical passage like this, where ἔχειν has repeatedly referred to the wearing of clothing, this may be a play on words.

368c8 ἐπι: “epic verses,” “epic poems.” See note on τούτοις . . . τοῖς ἔπεισαν at 365b3.

368d1 διθυράμβους: The dithyramb (διθύραμβος) was a kind of choral song associated with Dionysus, often performed in competitions. Simonides, Pindar, and Bacchylides were all successful composers of dithyrambs. The genre, not as
old or as fixed as epic, attracted many musical innovators in the days of Socrates and Plato.

Here the order of Socrates’ catalogue reflects an ancient literary hierarchy: epic poetry with Homer’s *Iliad* and *Odyssey* at the top; tragedies and dithyrambs and other lesser poetic genres below; prose genres at a lower level generally.

368d1 καταλογάδην . . . λόγους . . . συγκειμένους: “accounts composed in prose,” i.e., prose compositions as opposed to poetry.

-δην (as in συλλήβδην, “in short”) is one of several different adverbial endings in Greek (S 344) used to express manner.

Present forms of the deponent κέιμαι replace perfect passive forms of τίθημι, an example of a wider phenomenon in which active or middle-deponent forms of one verb replace the passive forms of another. See S 1752.

368d2 δή: Here emphatic δή may be expressive “of what is obvious and natural” (S 2841): “of course, . . .”

368d2 ὄν: relative pronoun attracted from acc. into gen. case by antecedent (S 2522a).

368d3 ἔλεγον: Neither “speak of” nor “mention” is listed as a normal meaning of λέγειν in LSJ. Originally, and especially in Homer, λέγειν denotes gathering, counting, including something in one’s count (cf. LSJ, λέγω, I-II). Since Socrates is making a kind of inventory here and has already included arithmetical calculation, geometry, and astronomy in his catalogue of Hippias’s skills, perhaps ἔλεγον should be rendered “I was enumerating . . .”

368d3 ἐπιστήμων: nom. sing. adj. (“knowing,” “skilled”), not to be confused with ἐπιστημόν < ἐπιστήμη (“knowledge,” “science”), which is what two of our three best MSS falsely read.

Although it is embedded in indirect discourse governed by ἐφησθα (b5, c3, c6), this adjective is not in the accusative but in the nominative case, because it qualifies the subject of the governing verb. Cf. S 1973, esp. Smyth’s citation from Plato’s *Symposium* 174d: “ἔγω οὐχ ὀμολογήσω ἄκλητος ἣκειν I shall not admit that I have come uninvited”.

368d3 διαφερόντως τῶν ἀλλῶν: adverb (< διαφέρω, “differ,” “excel”) + genitive of comparison: lit., “differently than the others,” or more idiomatically, “above all others,” “above the rest . . .”

368d4 περί . . . ὀρθότητος: The gen. sing. noun ὀρθότητος (< ὀρθότης, “correctness”), not to be confused with the nom. sing. superl. adj. ὀρθότατος (< ὀρθός, “correct”), clearly governs γραμμάτων and is itself governed by περί.

Does ὀρθότητος also govern the words ὑμιῶν and ἀρμονίων, or are these governed directly by περί, on a par with ὀρθότητος? Reading along, one hears ὑμιῶν and ἀρμονίων and (initially) γραμμάτων as governed directly by περί. It is only when ὀρθότητος is reached that one is compelled to revise one’s
understanding of the syntax of γραμμάτων and tempted to revise one’s understanding of the syntax of ὑθμόν and ἁρμονίν. Context and linguistic uniformity suggest that ὀρθότητος governs all three.

368d4 ὑθμόν: “rhythms.”

Ὑθμός has various abstract meanings (“order,” “proportion,” “temper,” “condition,” “form”), but it basically means the time observed in singing, dancing, marching, breathing, and other rhythmical activities. Cf. the discussion of musical rhythms (ὑθμοί) in Book III of Plato’s Republic (399e-400d).

368d4 ἁρμονί: “attunements.”

Originally denoting joining or fastening (as of two pieces of wood), the word ἁρμονία was applied to the stringing or tuning of musical instruments, then to the musical scale or music itself. A certain set of tensions applied to the several strings of a musical instrument resulted in a corresponding ἁρμονία, i.e., a set of musical intervals between the tones produced by the strings—in other words, a musical scale or musical mode. Different sets of tensions yielded different ἁρμονίαι, corresponding to different human moods. Cf. the discussion of musical modes (ἁρμονίαι) in Book III of Plato’s Republic (398d-399d).

368d4 γραμμάτων: Although the written word, specifically its elements (“letters”) or works composed of such (“literature”), is the usual meaning of γράμμα, here its sense may include the sung or spoken word (cf. LSJ, γράμμα, II.1.b: “articulate sound”). In Book III of Plato’s Republic (398cd) Socrates takes it for granted that sung music (τὸ μέλος) has three components: words, mode, and rhythm (λόγου τε καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ ὑθμοῦ).

368d5 ἀλλὰ ἐτὶ πρὸς τούτοις: “others still besides these” (cf. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις at 368c8).

368d5 πάνυ: “very” (with adjectives or adverbs).

368d5 ὡς: “as,” introducing a parenthetical, qualifying clause (LSJ, ὡς, Ab.II.1). Like the ὡς in ὡς ἔοικεν (see 365c3), it is perhaps best left untranslated.

368d6 καίτοι: “and yet wouldn’t you know, . . .”

Here καίτοι is “used by a speaker in pulling himself up abruptly” (GP 557 (ii), our passage cited at end of paragraph). Although “and yet” is usually the best translation for καίτοι, sometimes it is preferable to render the -τοι in καίτοι as a full-blooded τοι, a particle “designed to arrest the attention” (GP 547.IV on position of τοι) and “establish . . . a close rapport between the mind of the speaker and the mind of another person” (GP 537). Cf. GP 555, Καίτοι: “The primary force [of καίτοι] is, no doubt, ‘and, I would have you know’.”

καὶ alone is occasionally used “where the context implies an adversative sense” (GP 292 (9)).
τό γε μνημονικόν . . . σου . . . τέχνημα: “your memorization device,” “your mnemonic technique . . . .”

A τέχνημα is either a “work of art” or an “artful device.” Hippias’s skill at memorization is also mentioned in the Greater Hippias (285e-286a).

A personal pronoun in the genitive case, when it modifies a noun that takes the article, stands in predicate position, not attributive. See S 1185, esp. N.2: “My pretty book: τὸ καλὸν μου βιβλίον”—a noun-phrase of the same form as “τὸ μνημονικόν σου τέχνημα”.

On the placement of γε see end of note on οὖ γὰρ ὃ γε ἀδύνατος at 368a5.

ἐπελαθόμην: 2nd aor. indic. mid. < ἐπιλήθω (“cause to forget”): “I forgot . . . .”
λήθω and λανθάνω are equivalent forms (LSJ, λήθω: “collateral forms”), the shorter form λήθω being favored in compounds (e.g., ἐπὶ + λανθάνω = ἐπιλήθω).

ὡς ἐοικε: See 365c3.

οὖ οἴει λαμπρότατος εἶναι: “you think you are most illustrious,” “you think yourself most brilliant . . . .”

The subject of the infinitive is omitted because it is identical to that of the governing verb (οἴει). The predicate (with inf.) is in the nom. case because it modifies the subject of the governing verb (S 1973).

καὶ ἀλλα πάμπολλα: “very many other things, too.”
πάμπολλα (“very great,” “large,” “numerous”) means “very many” in the plural.

ἐπιλελήσθαι: perf. mid. inf. < ἐπιλήθω (see note on ἐπελαθόμην at 368d6): “[and I imagine] I’ve forgotten . . . .”

ἀλλὰ ὅπερ ἐγὼ λέγω: “But as (to that which) I am saying,” “Well, as I say . . . .”

This ἀλλὰ may be strongly or weakly adversative: “But” or “Well, . . . .”

The relative pronoun ὃ is strengthened by περὶ (GP 487.II, 490 (3); see note on ὅπερ at 365d3). The omitted antecedent is probably best understood as an adverbal accusative (“as to that which . . . .”: cf. LSJ, ὃς, B.IV.2). In English we normally just say “as . . . .”

The usual phrase in Plato is ὅπερ λέγω (twice in Phaedo, twice in Republic, once each in Apology and Crito and Cratylus), not ὅπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, which is found only here. Perhaps this ἐγὼ further sharpens the contrast between Socrates and Hippias.

καὶ: “both” in a both . . . and construction (second καὶ at e2).

ἵκαναι δὲ: explanatory aside (“—they are enough—”). See end of note on δὲ at 368b2.
368e3 ἐάν ποὺ εὑρη ὁποὺ ἐστίν: lit., “if anywhere you find . . . where there is,” or more idiomatically, “if you find any place . . . where there is . . .”

This is the protasis (ἐάν + aor. subj.) of a Future More Vivid conditional whose apodosis has an imperative (εἰπέ) in place of the future indicative (S 2323, 2326e).

The indirect interrogative pronoun ὅπου introduces an indirect question dependent on εὑρη.

368e3 ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἐμοὶ τε καὶ σοί: lit., “from the things (that have been) agreed upon by me and you,” i.e., “working from the admissions made by me and you . . . .”

Both ἐμοὶ and σοί are emphatic (S 325a). Socrates seems to want to remind Hippias that the two of them are jointly bound to the logical consequences of their former answers—though strictly speaking, Socrates has just been asking the questions, not giving answers.

368e4 μὲν . . . δὲ: In most contexts, “on the one hand . . . on the other hand” is a heavy-handed translation of μέν . . . δέ. Here it is unusually appropriate.

368e4 χωρίς: “separate(ly),” “distinct.”

When the adverb χωρίς is used as a predicative adjective with εἶναι, it can mean “of different nature, kind, or quality” (LSJ, χωρίς, I.2).

Cf. Protagoras 336ab: εἰ ὡς ἐπημεω ἐμοῦ καὶ Πρωταργόρου ἄρχων, τοῦτον δέου, ἄσπερ τὸ πρῶτον μοι ἄπειρώνα το εἰρημένα, σωτω καὶ νῦν ἄποδοχάες: εἰ δὲ μή, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἑστα τῶν διαλόγων; χωρίς γὰρ ἐγώ· ὃμην εἶναι τό συνεῖναι τῇ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγομένοις καὶ τῷ δημιουργείν. “So if you desire to hear Protagoras and me, ask him to resume the method of answering which he used at first—in short sentences and keeping to the point raised. Otherwise what is to be our mode of discussion? For I thought that to hold a joint discussion and to make a harangue were two distinct things.” [LCL translation]

368e5 ἐν ἣτιν βούλει σοφίᾳ: “in whatever wisdom you wish,” “in any field of wisdom you please . . . .”

Logically unfolded, this is a prepositional phrase (ἐν [ταύτῃ τῇ] σοφίᾳ) filled out by an indefinite relative clause ([ἡντίνα] βούλει). Although a relative pronoun + βούλει is “treated almost like one word,” making attraction of the relative pronoun into the case of its antecedent rare (S 2527), here the attraction does take place (from acc. into dat. case: S 2522b).

368e5 τούτο σκέψαι: aor. impv. mid. < σκοπέω (see end of note on Ἰθι δή . . . ἐπισκέψαι at 368a8): “look for this . . . .”

ὁ τίον χαίρεις ὅνομάζων: lit., “whatsoever you enjoy naming (it),” or more idiomatically, “whatever you care to name it.”

Like other verbs of emotion, χαίρειν is often supplemented by a participle denoting the activity giving rise to the emotion (S 2100).

The form ὁ τίον is the neut. acc. sing. indefinite rel. pron. (ὅ τι) made still less definite by the addition of οὖν (S 339e). It is in the accusative case because ὅνομάζειν can take a double accusative (direct object “it” may be understood).

An omitted neuter antecedent (τούτῳ, with ἐν at e5) may also be understood.

οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν: existential ἔστιν (accent on penult: S 187b): “for it does not exist.”

ἐπεὶ οὐ εἶπέ: “—and yet you say (it),” “—though you tell me.”

Occasionally ἐπεί, especially when it introduces an emphatic qualification (here οὐ provides the emphasis), is best rendered “and yet,” “[a]lthough” (LSJ, ἐπεί, B.4). Cf. S 2244, 2380.

Ἀλλ᾽: Sometimes when a person starts to give an answer, especially when his answer is not an easy one to give, “the speaker winds himself up, as it were, with ἀλλά” (GP 18 (b)): “Well, . . .”

οὐχ ἔχω: “I cannot,” “I am not able” (infinitive εἰπέν understood). On the construction of ἔχω + infinitive see S 2000a and LSJ, ἔχω, A.III.1a.

νῦν γε οὔτως: “. . . that is, not just now.”

The adv. οὔτως sometimes has a diminishing or belittling force (“so,” “merely so,” “simply”) and by itself can mean “off-hand” or “at once” (LSJ, οὔτως, IV). Cf. our English expression “just like that” (= “without any further work”).

On the limitative use of γε see note on αὐτὰ γε ταῦτα at 365e10.

Οὐδὲ γε ἔξεις: In dialogue, δὲ γε (or, in the negative, οὐδὲ γε) often indicates a retort, δὲ signaling a rejoinder, δὲ γε a lively rejoinder (cf. GP 152-3, 156 (1.i)). See note on δὲ γ′ at 366b7.

Since auxiliary verbs are little used in Greek, the Greek speaker repeats the whole verbal idea, though the emphasis clearly falls on the future tense: “Nor will you be able.” An English speaker may simply say, “Nor will you be.”


ὁ ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τοῦ λόγου: Here not just συμβαίνει but probably also ἐκ denote a result: “(that) which results for us from the argument,” “what consequence faces us as a result of the argument.” Alternatively, ἐκ may mean “in accordance with” (LSJ, ἐκ, III.7).

Où πάνυ τι ἐννοοῦ . . . ὁ λέγεις: “I’m not quite noticing what you mean . . .”
The phrase οὐ πάνυ (or οὐ πάνυ τι) means “not quite,” either in the straightforward sense of “not entirely” or as a tactful, roundabout way of saying “not at all” (LSJ, πάνυ, 3).

A superfluous τι is sometimes added to words like πάνυ, πολύ, and σχεδόν (LSJ, τις, A.II.11c and 14a), words expressing that something is so to such-and-such a degree. In conjunction with σχεδόν or with the phrases οὐ πάνυ and οὐ πολύ, τι evidently softens the force of the statement by making it less definite. Cf. LSJ, σχεδόν, IV.2: “frequently used to soften a positive assertion with a sense of modesty, sometimes of irony [three examples cited with σχεδόν τι].”

369a7 Νυν: “now,” “right now.” See note on νυν at 364b8.

369a7 γὰρ: “Yes, for . . . ,” “No, for . . . .” This γὰρ implies Socrates’ endorsement of Hippias’s response by supporting that response with an explanation (GP 73.V (1); cf. GP 75 (3)). Cf. note on Αἰσχρόν γάρ ἂν εἰη at 364d3.

369a7 χράομαι: 2nd pers. sing. pres. mid. indic. < χράομαι, “use,” “make use of” (+ dat.). χράομαι is one of ten alpha-contract verbs that have ἂ where other-άω verbs, like τιμάω, have long ἂ (S 394-395; for normal conjugation see S 385, p. 122).

369a8 δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ οἴει δεῖν: lit., “for (it is) clear that you do not think there is a need.” Plato might have written a simpler clause: οὐ γὰρ οἴει δεῖν (“for you do not think there is a need,” “because you don’t think there’s a need”). The context suggests that the addition of δῆλον . . . ὅτι (cf. note on δῆλον ὅτι at 363c4) colors this whole simpler clause, including the γὰρ: “clearly because you don’t think there’s a need.”

369a8 ἀλλά: Like the ἀλλά at 368e1, this ἀλλά may be strongly or weakly adversative: “But” or “Well, . . .”

369a8 ὑπομνήσω: fut. < ὑπομιμνήσκω, “put (someone) in mind,” “remind.”

Hippias seems to want to be let off the hook, but Socrates will not allow it. Cf. the very end of Plato’s Philebus (67b), where it is Socrates who wants to be let go: ΠΡΩ. Αἰθέστατα, ὦ Σωκράτες, εἰρήσθοι σου νῦν ἣδη φαμὲν ἄπαντες. ΣΩ. Οὔκ ὁμοίω καὶ ἀφίετε με; ΠΡΩ. Σμικρὸν ἐτι τὸ λοιπὸν, ὦ Σώκρατες: οὐ γὰρ δήποτε οὐ γε ἀτερείς πρότερος ἴμων, ὑπομνήσω δὲ σε τὰ λειτόμενα. “PROTARCHUS: Socrates, we all now declare that what you have said is perfectly true. SOCRATES: Then you will let me go?

PROTARCHUS: There is still a little left, Socrates. I am sure you will not give up before we do, and I will remind you of what remains.” [LCL translation]

369b3 οὖν: probably loosely progressive, not strictly inferential: “Well, . . .”

369b3 ἀναπέφαντα . . . ὡν: 3rd pers. sing. perf. pass. (< ἀναφαίνω) + participle: “stands revealed as being . . .”; “has been shown to be . . . .”
369b4 ἦν: imperfect—not as in the protasis of a present contrary-to-fact conditional (“If Odysseus were false . . .”), but rather as recalling an earlier moment in the discussion (“if Odysseus was false . . .,” “if Odysseus is, as we were saying, false . . .”). This is another instance of the so-called “philosophical imperfect” (S 1903), seen already in the ἦν at 367e5.

369b5 γίγνεται: “turns out to be,” “proves.” See note on γίγνεται at 367c5.

369b6 διάφοροι ἀλλήλων: either “different from each other” or “at odds with each other.”

369b8 Ὁ Σώκρατες: “O Socrates,” “Oh, Socrates . . . .”

Although ὦ is usually best left untranslated, here an English interjection may be called for. Cf. S 1285: “The vocative is usually found in the interior of a sentence. At the beginning it is emphatic.”

This and d1 below (Ὡ Ἰππία) are the only points in the dialogue where a sentence begins with an ὦ followed immediately by a name. The only other place where a sentence begins with an ὦ is at 373b6 (Ὡ βέλτιστε Ἰππία). In both passages (369b-d and 373b), Hippias is accusing Socrates of misbehavior and Socrates is responding in a defensive, ironic way.

369b8 ἰεί: Hippias’s use of ἰεί here and at 373e4 suggests that he and Socrates have met before, or at least that Socrates’ reputation precedes him. Cf. 368b3 above, where Socrates said that he once heard Hippias boasting in the marketplace. It is likely that the two conversed on that occasion, though Socrates does not say.

369b8 τινὰς τοιούτους: τινὰς adds indefiniteness to τοιούτους (LSJ, τοιοῦτος, 2): “some such . . .”

369b8 πλέκεις: Cf. Socrates’ use of πλέξαι at 368c7.

The root meaning of πλέκω is plait, twine, twist, whence the abstract meaning devise, contrive. The direct object of this verb is always, it seems, the finished plaited product, never the multiple strands out of which it is composed (thus all the examples in LSJ). Nevertheless, πλέκεις suggests the plaiting of multiple strands (= words, parts of an argument) into a braid (= whole argument): “You are always twisting words into some argument such as this,” or more literally and abstractly, “You are always contriving arguments such as these.”

369b9 ἀπολαμβάνων ὃ ἂν ἢ δυσχερέστατον τοῦ λόγου: “isolating whatever part of the discussion makes for most trouble.”

ἀπολαμβάνω can mean to take a part of something so as to render that part separate from the rest.

Something that is δυσχερές is hard to handle or vexing.

369b9 ὃ ἂν ἢ: subjunctive with ἂν in present general conditional rel. clause (S 2567).
369b9 ἔχῃ: form of ἔχω in middle voice + object in genitive: “you cleave [to this],” “you fasten [upon this] . . . .”

369c1 κατὰ ομικρὸν ἐφαπτόμενος: “handling (it) a little at a time . . . .”

ἐφαπτόμενος can mean laying hold of, touching, handling, treating.
κατὰ ομικρὸν can mean little by little, piecemeal.

Cf. the passages from Plato’s Protagoras quoted in the note on οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκολουθήσαμι at 373a3.

369c1 ἀγωνίζῃ: Out of athletic and military senses of ἀγωνίζομαι (contend, fight, i.e., engage with others in rivalry or warfare) seems to have developed an intellectual meaning with overtones of manly valor (grapple with an issue, engage with a matter). Recall the earlier use of ἀγωνίζομαι at 364a5 (ἀγωνιούμενος) and a8 (ἀγωνίζεσαι) when Hippias was being described as a kind of Olympic athlete.

369c2 περὶ ὅτου ἄν ὁ λόγος ὦ: See note on ὦ ἄν ὦ at 369b9.

369c2 ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν: “and yet even now,” “though even now . . . .”

On this use of ἐπεὶ see note on ἐπεί σὺ εἰπέ at 369a2.

369c3 ἐπὶ: “on the basis of,” “on the strength of . . . .”

With an object in the genitive, ἐπὶ may mean “upon” with a sense of support or dependence that goes beyond strict physical upon-ness. For example, a ship may be said to be moored ἐπὶ its anchor, or a blind old man to travel ἐπὶ his attendant daughter (LSJ, ἐπὶ, A.I.2a-b: “in various relations not strictly local”).

Here, it seems, it is logical dependence or rhetorical support that is meant.

369c3 ἵκανῷ λόγῳ: This may mean a speech long enough for Hippias’s purposes, though perhaps a bit longer than Socrates’ favored mode of inquiry permits: “in an ample speech,” “in a speech of sufficient scope.” See LSJ, ἵκανος, II: “of size, large enough . . . ; of number or magnitude, considerable . . . ; of time, considerable, long.”

Cf. μακρὸν μὲν οὖν λόγον εἰ πέλεις λέγειν κτλ. at 373a2 and the passages from Plato’s Protagoras quoted in the note on οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκολουθήσαμι at 373a3.

369c6 ἀντίπαρακαλέ λόγον παρά λόγον: competitive language (ἀντί- = opposing, against), as of two rival artisans setting their works side by side (παρά-, παρά) for comparison by a panel of judges: “set a speech (of your own) beside (mine), speech against speech . . . .”

369c6 ὡς: indicating “the thought or the assertion of the subject of the principal verb” (S 2996): “as though,” “maintaining that . . . .”

369c7 μᾶλλον εἰσούσαται: future of οἴδα: lit., “they will know more,” i.e., they will know more fully and therefore be in a better position to judge.
οὐτοί: “these people here.” Cf. what Eudikos said about these people at 363a4-5: “οἱ μᾶλλον ἵν ἄντιποροσαίμεθα μετείναι ἣμιν τῆς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατομῆς. . . (we) who could best claim to participate in the life of the mind.”

ὀπότερος: indirect interrogative pronoun (< πότερος): “which of the two,” “which of us.”

Ὡ Ἰππία: See note on Ὡ Σύκρατες at 369b8.

τοι: “let me tell you,” “you must know,” “rest assured . . . .”

Here, as usual, τοι “bring[s] home to the comprehension of the person addressed a truth of which he is ignorant, or temporarily oblivious” (GP 537, second sentence; our passage cited at GP 540).

οὐχ ἀμφισβητῶ μὴ οὐχί: “I do not dispute (the claim) that . . . .”

A so-called “sympathetic” μή, best left untranslated, is often used after verbs of negative meaning “to confirm the negative idea of the leading verb” (S 2739, 2740; our passage cited at S 2744.8). When such a verb is itself made negative (as it is here by preceding οὐχ), a sympathetic οὐ, also best left untranslated, is added after the μή. This yields μή οῦ (S 2745), a combination which indicates “a certain pressure of interest on the part of the person involved” (S 2742b). Further complicating matters is that ἀμφισβητῶ (+ acc. + inf.) at times has the opposite, positive meaning of “argue,” “maintain that” (LSJ, ἀμφισβητῶ, I.5).

οὐχί is a rarer, more emphatic form of οὖ (S 2688b).

ἀεὶ εἰώθα: a verb found almost exclusively in the perfect, with a present sense: “I am ever in the habit,” “I am accustomed on every occasion . . . .”

ἐπειδὰν τίς λέγει τί: either “whenever someone says something” or “whenever there is something in what someone says” (LSJ, λέγω, B.III.6: “λέγειν τι. say something, i.e., speak to the point or purpose . . . .”; LSJ, τίς, A.II.5a, esp. the last line: “τι λέγειν, to be near the mark, opp. οὐδὲν λέγειν” (= to talk nonsense, say what is not)).

προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν: lit., “to apply the mind,” i.e., “to pay attention.”


ὁτι = ὁ τι < ὁστις, serving here as an indirect interrogative pronoun.

διαπυνθάνομαι: “I make a thorough inquiry,” “I make inquiries.”

This verb is normally completed by a direct object, but here it may be absolute (LSJ, διαπυνθάνομαι, final line of entry: “absolute, Pl., Hippias Minor 369d”).

ἐπανασκοπῶ: “I take another look,” “I reconsider (his words).”
The verb denotes repeated inspection or reconsideration. Here it may take τὰ λεγόμενα as a direct object, but it need not.

369d4 συμβιβάζω: The verb means “bring together,” often in the sense of “reconcile.” Socrates is in the habit of gathering together and bringing into logical contact the different statements made by his interlocutor in the course of a discussion. Cf. the summing up done by Socrates at 366ab (a2: “Hold on, now. Let’s recall what it is that you say . . .”; b4: “So, by way of recapitulation, . . .”) and the reminding done at 367b4 (“For it was said by you, if you remember . . .”) and 369a (a5: “you recall what consequence faces us as a result of the argument, Hippias . . .”; a8: “Well, I will remind you.”).

369d4 φαῦλος: “ordinary,” often in the pejorative sense of “common,” “in inferior,” “undistinguished,” etc. Socrates will later use this adjective in describing himself (see note on τάλα εἶχον πάνυ φαῦλα at 372b2).

Cf. the contrast drawn between φαῦλος and σοφός at Plato, Symposium 174c (Aristodemus to Socrates): Ἰσως μέντοι καινυνεύσω καὶ ἐγὼ ωὐς ὦς σὺ λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἄλλα καθ’ Ὄμηρον φαῦλος ὃν ἐπι σοφοῦ ἀνθρώποι ἔναν θεϊνην ἀξιλητοῖς. “Socrates, I am afraid Homer’s description is bound to fit me better than yours. Mine is a case of an obvious inferior arriving uninvited at the the table of a man of letters.” [Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff’s translation]

369d6 ἐπανερωτῶ: “I (neither) ask many questions . . .” Cf. the note on όμνου γάρ ἐπανερεύθαι at 364b6.

369d7 μοι μέλει ὃν λέγει: Here, as often, μέλει is impersonal (“there is a care”) with a person in the dat. (“to someone”) and an object in the gen. (“for something”): lit., “[nor] is there a care to me for [the things] which he says,” or more idiomatically, “[nor] do I concern myself with what he says.”

A fuller, more explicit form of the same phrase: μοι μέλει τούτων ὃ λέγει. See note on ὃν at 363b1.

369d7 γνώσῃ: future, 2nd pers. sing. < γιγνώσκω.

369d7 τούτῳ: instrumental dative: “by this,” “hereby,” “this is how (you will) . . .”

369d7 οὐς ὃν . . . ἣγώμαι: subjunctive with ὃν in a Future More Vivid conditional relative clause (S 2565).

369d8 γάρ: perhaps best translated by a colon, not by a word. See note on γάρ at 364c5.

369d8 λιπαρή . . . περὶ: “persistent in (regard to)” (cf. 372b1, where λιπαρῆς takes the preposition πρὸς).

Cf. Plato, Cratylus 412e-413a (Socrates speaking): μέχρι μὲν ὃν ἐνταῦθα, ὃ νυνή ἐλέγομεν, ποιὰ πολλῶν ὁμολογεῖται τούτῳ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον· ἐγὼ
δέ, ὦ Ἐρμόγενε, ἄτε λαπαρής ὃν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ταῦτα μὲν πάντα διαστῆναι . . . ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἤρεμα αὐτοὺς ἐπανετρωτὰ ἀκούσας ταῦτα μηδὲν ἤττον. “Τί οὖν ποτ’ ἔστιν, ὦ ἁρώτα, δίκαιον, εἰ τοῦτο οὔτως ἔχει,” δοκόω τε ἢ ἴππο μαχρότερα τοῦ προοίμοντος ἐσφατά καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ ἐσκαμένα ἀλλεσθαί. “Up to this point, as I said just now, many men agree about justice and I, Hermogenes, being persistent in it, have found out all these things . . . . But when, after hearing these things, I nevertheless ask them quietly, “What then, my friend, if this is true, is justice?” they think I am asking too many questions and am leaping over the trenches.” [LCL translation, revised]

369e1 τούτου: Socrates shifts the number from plural (d7: οὗς; d8: οοφοῦς) to singular. Here perhaps τούτου = τοιούτου (LSJ, οὗτος, C.III): “such a person.”

369e2 ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν: See note on same phrase at 369c2.

369e2 οὖν λέγοντος: probably not a genitive absolute (“while you were talking”), but rather the genitive object of ἐννενόηκα, complemented by ὄτι (LSJ, ἐννοέω, I.3): lit., “I have taken note of you talking, that . . . ,” or more colloquially, “in hearing you speak, I’ve noticed that . . . .”

369e3 ἐπεισοῦ: See note on τούτοις . . . τοῖς ἐπεισοῦ at 365b3.

369e4 ὡς ἀλαζόνα ὄντα: An ἀλαζόνα is a person who boasts, puts on airs, or otherwise pretends to be something he is not (esp. a charlatan wandering from city to city): “as being a poser,” “as (he might speak) to a dissembler . . . .”

370a1 φαίνεται ψευσάμενος: either “is shown to have spoken falsely” or “is shown to speak falsely,” depending on whether the aorist tense of ψευσάμενος suggests time prior to the main verb (cf. S 1872c) or merely indicates simple occurrence (cf. S 1872, first paragraph).

370a2 πολύτροπος τις: “a devious one,” “a devious fellow.”

   Indefinite τις, combined with a predicate adjective, creates the effect of a substantive used as a predicate (LSJ, τις, A.II.7). Cf. the difference in English between “He is sly” and “He’s a sly one.”

370a2 ψεύδεται γοῦν: “at any rate, he speaks falsely.”

   Here γοῦν, as usual, is a γοῦν of “part proof,” indicating that the present statement counts, as far as it goes, as evidence for a preceding statement (GP 451 (ii)).

370a3 προειπὼν: “having earlier spoken” or “having proclaimed.” The prefix προ- may be temporal (“spoken before,” in advance of other things) or spatial (“spoken forth,” for all to hear).

   Here Socrates suggests that Achilles does not act in accordance with his former statements. At 373bc Eudikos will suggest that Hippias is in danger of not
acting in accordance with his former statements. The same basic verb is used in both places, here in the form of an aorist active participle, there in the form of a perfect passive participle (προειρημένα at 373b1-2 and προειρημένων at c2).

Whereas Hippias confidently predicts his own ability to handle Socrates’ questioning (363c8-22), Socrates humbly predicts his own inability to follow Hippias’s speechmaking (373a3): μακρὸν μὲν οὖν λόγον εἰ .Theme les λέγειν, προλέγω οὐκ οὕτω ἄν ἐκπαιδευθήσομαι “To be sure, if you are inclined to make a long speech, I tell you in advance that you could not heal me, for I would fail to follow . . . .”
370b6  αἰ κε ː = αἰ κε (Homeric αἰ = Attic εἰ; Homeric κε = Attic ἄν). The combination αἰ κε is equivalent to Attic ἔαν (εἰ + ἄν).

370b6  κεν: = κε.

370b6  τοι: Here, as often, Homeric τοι = Attic σοι.

370b6  τα: “these things.” The Greek definite article was originally a demonstrative pronoun and usually serves as one in Homer (S 1099, 1100).

370b6  μεμήλῃ: perfect subjunctive with present sense (< μέλω, “be an object of care or thought [+ dat. of person concerned]”). Cf. note on μοι μέλει ὤν λέγει at 369d7.

370b7  ἦρι μάλ Notícias = ἦρι μάλα, “very early.”

370b7  Ἑλλήσποντον ἐπ᾽ ἱχθυόεντα: either “upon the fishy Hellespont” (ἐπί + acc. with verb of motion upon) or, with the idea of extension over a space (LSJ, ἐπί, C.5), “over the fishy Hellespont.”

370b7  πλεούσας: < πλέω. This form would be uncontracted even in Attic (S 397: “Verbs in -εω of two syllables do not contract ε with ο or ω”).

370c1  νῆας: accusative plural. See note on νῆας at 370b5.

370c1  ἐν δ᾽: adverbial (LSJ, ἐν, C.1): “and therein . . . .”

370c1  μεμαῖτος: perfect with present sense (< μέμονα): “furiously eager,” “very eager.”

370c1  ἐρεσσήμεναι: -έμεναι is one of several pres. act. infinitive endings in Homer. Homeric ἐρεσσήμεναι = Attic ἐρέσσειν (< ἐρέσσω, row).

370c2  εὐπλοίην: “a fair voyage.” The word occurs only once in Homer’s two epics (a so-called hapax legomenon).

370c2  ει . . . κεν = ἔαν.

370c2  δώῃ: 3rd pers. sing. act. subjunctive (< δίδωμι).

370c2  κλυτὸς Ἐννοσίγαιος: “glorious Earth-shaker” (= Poseidon).

370c3  Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἱκοίμην: “I would/could come to fertile Pthia.”

Φθίην = Φθίαν (< Φθία, Thessaly, Achilles’ homeland in Thessaly).

ἐρίβωλον = “with large clods (of rich earth),” i.e., “fertile.”
ίκοιμην (< ἰκνέομαι “come (to),” “reach”) is aorist potential opt. with χεν (= ἄν) in the apodosis of a so-called “mixed” conditional (Future More Vivid protasis [ei . . . χεν . . . δώθη] + Future Less Vivid apodosis [χεν . . . ἰκοιμημένη]).

On the seeming irregularity of “mixed” conditionals see S 2355: “In addition to the ordinary forms of correspondence between protasis and apodosis . . . , Greek shows many other combinations expressing distinct shades of feeling. Most of these combinations, though less frequent than the ordinary forms, are no less “regular.” . . . [T]he student should beware of thinking that conditional sentences invariably follow a conventional pattern, departure from which is to be counted as violation of rule.”

Cf. Plato, Crito 44ab: ΣΩ . . . τῇ γὰρ του ύποτεφαίρι δὲι μὲ ἀποθνήσκειν ἢ ἦν ἢ ἐλθῇ τὸ πλοίον. ΚΡ. Φαίοι γέ τοι δή οἱ τούτων κύριοι. ΣΩ. Οὗ τοῖν τῆς ἐποιούσης ἡμέρας οἴμαι αὕτῳ ἥξειν ἀλλὰ τῆς ἕτερας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ τινος ἐνυπνίου ὁ ἑώρασα ὠλγόν πρότερον ταυτίς τῆς νυκτός· καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καιρῷ τοίν ποῦ ὡγὸν ἑγεῖρα με. ΚΡ. Ἡν δὲ δή τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον; ΣΩ. Ἐδόκει τίς μοί γινὴ προσέκλησα καλή καὶ εὐειδής, λευκὰ ἰμάτια ἐχουσα, καλέσα με καὶ εἰπεῖν. “Ω Σώκρατες,

ἡματί κεν τριτάτῳ θυτίμην ἐρίβωλον ἴκοιο.”

ΚΡ. Ἀτοπον τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ω Σώκρατες.

SOCRATES: . . . I must die on the day after the ship comes in, must I not?
CRITIO: So say those who have charge of these matters.
SOCRATES: Well, I think it will not come in today, but tomorrow. And my reason for this is a dream which I had a little while ago in the course of this night. Perhaps you let me sleep, in fact, at just the right time.
CRITIO: What was the dream?
SOCRATES: I dreamt that a beautiful, fair woman, clothed in white raiment, came to me and called me and said, “Socrates, on the third day thou wouldst come to fertile Phthia.”
CRITIO: A strange dream, Socrates. [LCL translation, lightly revised]

370c4 ἐτὶ δὲ πρότερον τούτων: “and already before these (two passages) . . . .”

Like English “still,” Greek ἐτὶ can trace continuity from earlier to later time, whether past (“Later, when I was still a boy”), present (“Still today . . . .”) or future (“And she will still . . . ”). But ἐτὶ can also trace continuity from later to earlier time (LSJ, ἐτὶ, I.2: “of the Past, . . . with the sense, already”). That seems to be the sense here.

It is possible to take ἐτὶ πρότερον as a unit (“still earlier [than] . . . .”), though such a phrase would normally be found only after an initial occurrence of πρότερον (“earlier”), not after such a phrase as ὀλόγον ύποτεφαίρον (“a little later”), which is what we have here (370b1).

370c4 πρὸς: This preposition may be governed by λοιδορούμενος, though only the Septuagint is cited for this usage in LSJ (λοιδοφέω, II). Otherwise, it is merely governed by εἶπεν (as πρὸς is by εἰπών a few lines later at 370d3).

First alternative: “railing against Agamemnon, said . . . .”
Second alternative: “said in reply to Agamemnon, in words of abuse . . . .”

370c6 εἰμι: In Homer, too, as regularly in Attic, the present of εἰμι occurs with future meaning: “I am going (to go),” “I shall go.”

370c6 Φθίηνδο’: = Φθίηνδε: “to Phthia.” See note on Φθίην κτλ. at 370c3.

The suffix –δε indicates motion towards (S 342), as does the –σε in αὐτόσε at 364a5 and the –ζε in Ὄλυμπιαζε at 363c7.

370c6 ἵ: affirmative particle, mostly with adverbs and adjectives, as here (GP 280): “in truth,” “really,” “surely.”

370c6 λῶιν: = λῷον (< λῷων): “more desirable,” “better,” “preferable.”

370c7 ἵμεν: Homeric ἵμεν = Attic ἵναι. The ending -μεν is another active infinitive ending in Homer (see note on ἐρεσσέμεναι at 370c1).

370c7 ώι ὀϊω . . . ἀφύξειν: “(nor) do I mean to heap up . . . for you . . . .”

ωι = σοι.

οϊω = οἰόμαι, here in the sense of mean, intend (see LSJ, οἰόμαι, two lines above II).

ἀφύξειν < ἀφύσσω, lit., “draw (liquid),” here in the sense of heap up.

370d1 ἑὼν: = ὣν.

370d2 τοτὲ μεν . . . τοτὲ δέ: “at that time . . . and at that other (later) time . . . .”

Normally the accent falls on the penult of τότε, but when the word occurs in corresponding clauses with μέν and δέ, it falls on the ultima (LSJ, τοτὲ, “with changed accent”).

370d2 ἐναντίον: “facing,” “in the presence of,” “in front of” (+ gen).

370d4 ὡς ἀποπλευούμενος οἴκαδε: future participle (< ἀποπλέω): “as one intending to sail away for home . . . .”

ὡς + future participle sometimes denotes not just purpose but purpose as avowed by the agent in question, whether his real aim or not (S 2086). Socrates’ point seems to be that Achilles did not even make a show of acting with this aim.

370d5 πάνυ γενναίως: ironic: “very nobly,” “like a real nobleman,” “with real superiority . . . .”

370d5 ὀλιγωρῶν: dependent on φαίνεται at 370d3: “is shown to think lightly of . . . .” “shows himself to have little regard for . . . .”

370d5 τοῦ τάληθη λέγειν: articular infinitive in the genitive, the object of ὀλιγωρῶν: “telling (the) true things,” “telling the truth,” “truth-telling.”
370d6 ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν: “Now (I), . . .”

The placement of ἐγὼ at the head of the sentence, followed by these two particles, emphasizes the 1st person.

The combination μὲν οὖν is often used in transitions (see S 2901c).

370d6 καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς: “(also) from the start,” “at the start.”

The καὶ suggests a temporal parallel: Socrates was originally “at a loss” (ἀποφόρων) as to how to answer this question, and he remains at a loss.

370d7 οὐκ ἠρώμην: “I questioned you,” “I asked you my question . . . .”

ἠρώμην is aor. < ἐρομαι (found only in this aorist in Attic, which uses ἐρωτάω as the corresponding present).

It is tempting to hear this verb as a “progressive perfect” in English (“I have been questioning you”), but that sense is normally expressed by the present tense in Greek (S 1885), not by the aorist.

370d7 τούτων τοῖν ἀνδροῖν: partitive genitive dual after the indirect interrogative pronoun ὄντες (which in itself expresses the sense “which of two?”). Cf. note on περὶ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν τούτων at 363b7.

370e1 πεποίηται: perf. pass. indicative (< ποιέω).

Here the mood of the direct question (“πότερος πεποίηται . . . ;”) is vividly retained in an indirect question in secondary sequence (main verb: ἠρώμην at d7), though later in this same sentence (370e2) the optative (εἴη) is used in the same construction (S 2677-8). Since the perf. pass. opt. of ποιέω is unwieldy (πεποιημένος εἴη), and since the -οίη- in πεποίηται makes it sound like an optative already, it is understandable why Plato retained the indicative.

370e1 ἀρίστω: “very good,” “excellent,” “extremely good.”

As the dual number of ἀρίστω suggests, the present context requires the kind of superlative that expresses not the highest degree of some quality (“the relative superlative”) but a very high degree of it (“the absolute superlative”). Unlike the relative superlative, the absolute superlative never takes the article (S 1085, cited above in the note on Οὐκοῦν . . . γε at 367e1).

On the meaning of ἀρίστω see note on ἀρίστον at 364e5.

370e2 δύσκριτον: “hard to discern,” “hard to tell.” Cf. the use of διέκρινες at 364e2.

370e2 εἴη: opt. in ind. question in secondary sequence. See note on πεποίηται at e1.

370e2 καὶ περὶ ψεύδους καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ἀλλής ἀρετῆς: “even in regard to falseness and truthfulness, as well as the rest of virtue.”

Although this meaning is not attested in LSJ, here ψεύδους (gen. < ψεῦδος) probably means the personal quality of falseness, i.e., the character trait whose opposite is truthfulness (LSJ, ἀλήθεια, II), since Socrates goes on to talk of “the
rest of virtue” (τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς), i.e., all the other good personal qualities a human being can have. There may be a suggestion here, however playful, that human virtue includes falseness and truthfulness, not just the latter.

The first and third καί’s probably link (1) ψεύδους καὶ ἀληθείας and (2) τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς (with περί logically governing (1) and (2)), the point being that Achilles and Odysseus are similar even or also (καί) in the area of truthfulness and falseness, as well as (καί) the other ethical categories (e.g., courage in war, where claims about the similarity of Achilles and Odysseus would be less controversial).

370e3 καὶ κατὰ τούτο: “even in this respect” (LSJ, κατά, B.IV.2).

370e4 παραπλησίω: dual adj. (< παραπλήσιος): “nearly resembling,” “nearly equal.”


370e5 γὰρ (near beginning of line): In answers, γὰρ may provide “a motive for the language used, or the tone adopted, by the previous speaker” (GP 75 (3)): “That’s because (you) . . . .”

370e5 γὰρ (near end of line): introducing an explanation: “You see, . . . .”

370e6 ἐκ ἐπιβουλῆς: “treacherously,” “by design” (< ἐπιβουλή, ἡ, plot, scheme). ἐκ + a noun is often just a periphrastic way of creating an adverb out of the noun (LSJ, ἐκ, A.III.8).

370e7 ἄκων: “involuntarily,” “in spite of himself.” Like ἐκόν, the word ἄκων is a cross between a participle and an adjective, often to be translated adverbially into English. See note on ἄκων at 367a3.

370e7 διά . . . ἀναγκασθείς: “compelled on account of” + acc. (cf. S 1685, 2b).

370e7 συμφορὰν: “misfortune.”

370e8 βοηθῆσαι: When used absolutely, βοηθῶ means “come to the rescue.”

370e8 ἐκόν: “voluntarily,” “of his own volition.” See note on ἄκων at 367a3.

370e10 Ἐξαπατᾶς με: “You are trying to deceive me . . . .” Since to say “You are deceiving me” would be to imply that the would-be deceiver is failing to deceive, this present tense is probably best construed as a “conative” present (S 1878: “The present may express an action begun, attempted, or intended.”).

370e11 μιμῆ: < μιμέομαι, imitate. Here Socrates likens Hippias to Odysseus. Soon
Hippias will liken Socrates to a mischief-maker (373b5: ἐοικεν ὦσπερ κακουργοῦντι).

371a1 Οὐδεμῶς: “In no way,” “Not at all.”

371a1 δή: emphatic, adding feeling to the question.
When δή occurs in questions, it normally comes right after the interrogative pronoun (as at 364b3: ἀτὰρ τί δή λέγεις), emphasizing either that particular pronoun or the question as a whole. Here δή comes before the interrogative pronoun and may be emphasizing λέγεις instead: “What (ever) do you mean?”

371a1 πρὸς τί: lit., “in reference to what,” i.e., “... to what do you refer?”

371a3 οὔτω γόης: “so (much of a) wizard,” “such a conjurer.”
It is adjectives and verbs, not nouns, that are normally modified by οὔτω.
The pairing of γόης here with the adj. ἐπίβουλος raises the possibility that γόης was occasionally used adjectivaly (it does resemble adjectives like πλήρης, full). The strongest evidence, however, to be found in LSJ for such a usage is only a late (2nd-3rd cent. C.E.) use of the comparative. adj. γοητότερος. The word γόης itself means sorcerer, later cheat.

371a3 ἐπίβουλος: “plotting (against),” “treacherous,” “designing (fellow).”

371a3 πρὸς τῇ ἀλαζονείᾳ: “on top of his dissembling.”
The combination πρὸς + dat. often means in addition to (cf. S 1695, 2).

371a4 ὡστε: This ὡστε introduces the first of two result clauses. The second, a result clause within this result clause, starts at a6. Both ὡστε clauses take the indicative, normally used instead of the infinitive when one wants to make it clear that the result is an actual fact, not just a likely consequence (S 2257-8).

371a4 καὶ τοῦ Ὄδυσσεως: adverbial καὶ, gen. of comparison: “even than Odysseus.”

371a4 τοοοὔτων: Given the comparative (πλέον) in the next line, one might have expected τοοουτῳ (dat. of degree of difference), which is more common in such constructions (LSJ, τοοοοήτος, III, first eight lines). Cf. the τοοουετῳ at 363b3.

371a5 φονεῖν πλέον: “have more understanding,” “be wiser,” “be shrewder.”
Cf. note on φονεῖν πλέον at 365e4.

371a5 πρὸς τὸ ὄδιδως λανθάνειν αὐτὸν ἀλαζονευόμενος: “in (regard to) easily dissembling without his notice.”

τὸ ὄδιδως λανθάνειν αὐτὸν ἀλαζονευόμενος is one long articular infinitive. αὐτὸν is the direct object of λανθάνειν, while ἀλαζονευόμενος refers to the understood subject of λανθάνειν, viz., Achilles. Within an articular infinitive that is in an oblique case (here accusative, governed by πρὸς), a word
agreeing with the subject of the infinitive is normally put in the nominative case when the infinitive expresses “some action or state of the subject of the main verb” (S 1973a). Here the relevant “main verb” is ψαίνεται (a5), the leading verb of the first ὡστε clause.

The simple sentence ἐλάνθανον αὐτόν (finite form of λανθάνω + acc. direct object) would mean “I escaped his notice” (cf. S 1597). The sentence ἐλάνθανον αὐτόν δακρύων would mean “I escaped his notice (in) shedding (my) tears,” or more idiomatically in English, “I shed tears without his noticing.” Generally speaking, when λανθάνω takes a participle, the participle is best expressed in English as a finite verb, while the form of λανθάνω itself is best expressed as an adverbial phrase (S 2096a, d). In the present passage, given the articular infinitive construction, the participle (ἄλαζονευόμενος) is best expressed in English as a gerund (“dissembling”).

371a6 ἐναντίον αὐτόν: lit., “opposite him,” i.e., “right in front of him.”
Note the echo of ἐναντίον in ἐναντία at a7, a kind of word play appropriate to the playfulness of this passage.

371a6 αὐτός ἐαντὶ . . . ἐναντία λέγειν: lit., “he himself [dared] to say things opposite to himself,” i.e., “he [dared] to contradict himself.”

371a6 ἑτόλμα: imperfect, perhaps iterative (cf. S 1893): “dared (repeatedly).”

371a7 ἐλάνθανεν: imperfect, also perhaps iterative: “kept escaping (the) notice (of).”
Cf. the final paragraph of the note on πρὸς τὸ ὑμῖν λανθάνειν κτλ. at a5 above.

371a7 γοῦν: as usual, a γοῦν of “part-proof.” See note on ψεύδεται γοῦν at 370a2.

371b2 Ποιὰ δὴ ταῦτα λέγεις: “What do you mean by this . . . ?” ; “What is this you are saying . . . ?”

The qualitative force of ποιὰς is sometimes more emotional than logical and is therefore sometimes best conveyed by English “what” (LSJ, ποιὰς, IV, “simply, what, which?”). Cf. LSJ, ποιὰς, I.1: “in Homer, commonly expressing surprise and anger, ποιὰν τὸν μῦθον ἔσεπες what manner of speech hast thou spoken! Iliad 1.552 . . . .”

δὴ may indicate surprise or indignation. Cf. the δὴ at 371a1.

As explained above (end of note on τοῦτο δ’ κτλ. at 364e3), λέγω + two acc. objects (A & B) sometimes means: “By B, I mean A,” or more literally, “I say A [in saying] B.” Here A is an interrogative pronoun, B a demonstrative pronoun: lit., “What sorts of things are you saying [in saying] these things?”

371b3 ὃστερον ἡ ὑς: temporal ὑς: lit., “later than when,” i.e., “after . . . .”

371b4 ᾧμα τῇ ἦοι: “(at the same time) with the dawn.”
Here ᾧμα serves as a preposition that takes the dative (LSJ, ᾧμα, B.).
Ionic ἰοὶ (<᾽ ἱώς) = Attic ἔφο (<᾽ ἐώς). The use of ἰοὶ instead of ἔφο gives the phrase a more Homeric air.

371b5 αὖ φησιν: “say again,” i.e., “reiterate.”

371b6 δή: This is the third δή in as many questions from Hippias, a sign of his heightened emotional state. Like the previous δή, this δή is probably best expressed in English by tone of voice alone. See note on δή at 371a1.


371b8 γάρ: probably best left untranslated, since in the previous line of Homer (Iliad 9.649: ἀλλ᾽ ὑμεῖς ἔφεσθε καὶ ἀγγελὴν ἀπόφασθε) Achilles signals to Ajax et al. that he is about to leave them with a final message for Agamemnon; the γάρ signals that he is now giving that message. See note on γάρ at 364c5.

371b8 οὐ . . . πρὶν . . . πρὶν γ᾽: negative + adverbial πρὶν (lit., “no sooner”), followed by another πρὶν used as a conjunction (“before,” “until”), as often in Homer: “No sooner will I . . . than . . . .”, “I will not . . . until . . . .”

371b8 πολέμῳ: Homeric genitive singular ending -οιο = Attic genitive singular ending -ου (S 230 D.1).

371b8 μεδήσομαι: fut. < μέδομαι, be mindful of (+ gen.): “I will [not] turn my mind to . . . .”

371b8 αἵματόεις: gen. sing. < αἵματόεις, bloody; declined like χαρίεις (S 299).

371c1 πρὶν γ᾽: + inf. (ἰκέσθαι . . . κατά τε φλέξαι). Emphatic γε lays stress on the condition expressed in the πρὶν clause (LSJ, γε, I.3). Cf. the combined force of the italics in the following English phrase: “then, maybe, but not before then.”

371c1 Πριάμοιο δαΐφρονος: The meaning of δαΐφρων is uncertain, probably either “warlike” (< δάϊς, war, battle) or “wise” (< *δάω, learn, teach; cf. διδάσκω). Priam (Πρίαμος) was king of Troy during the Trojan War.

371c1 Ἐγγύσα δίον: δίος may mean “illustrious,” “noblest,” “excellent.” As his name suggests, Hector was the prop or stay of Troy (Ἔγγύσα < ἐγγύς; see LSJ, Ἐγγύς, II). Like Achilles for the Greeks, he was the best fighter on his side of the war.

371c2 Μυρμιδόνων: genitive plural. The Myrmidons (Μυρμιδόνες) were subjects of Achilles in Thessaly and soldiers under his command at Troy.

371c2 ἐπί: with acc., “up to,” “as far as,” sometimes in the hostile sense of “against”
κλισίας: “huts,” “lodges,” “camp.”
κλισίας is the acc. pl. of κλισίη, literally a place for reclining (< κλίνω).
Homeric κλισίη = Attic κλισία.

νῆας: acc. pl. (see note on νῆας at 370b5).

Αργείους: “Argives” (Ἀργείου), lit., those from Argos. This is one of Homer’s names for Greeks in general.

κατά . . . φλέξαι: In Attic, this κατά would be the prefix of the compound verb καταφλέγω, burn up, consume, and its separation from φλέγω would properly be called “tmesis” (< τέμνω, cut). Since in Homeric Greek, however, the elements of many compound verbs were still in the process of coalescing, it is something of an anachronism to apply the term “tmesis” to Homer’s language (cf. S 1650).

ἀμφί . . . τῇ᾽ μῆ κλισίῃ: “around this lodge of mine . . . .”
The preposition ἀμφί (“about,” “around,” “at”) governs the dative phrase τῇ᾽ μῆ κλισίῃ. The word τῇ has demonstrative force (S 1100), reminding us that Achilles is speaking these words to Ajax et al. within his own lodge.

μιν: accusative pronoun meaning him, her, it, closely related in usage to Attic αὐτόν, αὐτήν, αὐτό. Despite its placement between ἀμφί and τῇ᾽ μῆ κλισίῃ, it is probably best to hear it as anticipating Ἐκτορᾶ in the next line (αὐτόν . . . Ἐκτορᾶ: “Hector himself”).
Our standard editions of Homer read τοῖ here (“let me tell you,” “surely”) instead of μιν. One of our three best MSS reads μὴν (“verily,” “surely”).

νηΐ: dat. sing. (see note on νῆας at 370b5).

καὶ μεμαῶτα: “eager though he be . . . .”
When followed by a participle, καὶ alone may have the force of καῖπερ (S 2083) or εἰ καὶ (LSJ, καὶ, B.9).
The participle μεμαῶτα is acc. sing. < μέμονα, be very eager (perf. with pres. sense).

οχήσεσθαι: fut. inf. mid. (< ἔχω) with a reflexive, intransitive sense.
οχήσεσθαι governs μάχης in the genitive: lit., “[that he] will hold (himself) from the fighting].”

ὁίω: = οἴομαι.

οὐ δή οὖν, ὦ Ἡππία, πότερον . . . ὅτε: “Now, Hippias, do you really suppose . . . ?”
The particles δὴ οὖν provide connection as well as emphasis (GP 469).
The neuter πότερον indicates a question with two alternatives. The second alternative, somewhat obscured by Plato’s syntax, can be said to emerge at d4-7 (ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ χτλ.).

371c6 οὔτως: answered by ὀστε at 371d2.

371c6 ἐπιλήμονα: masc. acc. sing. (< ἐπιλήμων, forgetful).

371d1 τὸν τής Θέτιδος: “the son of Thetis.” Achilles born was born of a mortal father, Peleus, and of an immortal mother, the sea-goddess Thetis.

371d1 Χείρονος: Cheiron (Χείρων), an unusually wise and civilized centaur, was said to have tutored Achilles, Jason, Asclepius, and other great men.

371d2 ὀστε: answers οὔτως (c6) and takes the infitive φάναι (d4).

371d2 ὀλίγον πρότερον: “a little earlier.”

371d2 τοὺς ἀλαζόνας: generic article in the plural, denoting an entire class of individuals viewed collectively (S 1122-3): “dissemblers.”

371d3 τῇ ἐσχάτῃ λοιδορίᾳ: lit., “with the utmost verbal abuse,” or more freely, “in the strongest language.”

371d2 αὐτόν: accusative subject of φάναι (d4), governed by ὀστε (371d2).

371d3 παραχρῆμα: “on the spur of the moment,” i.e., without planning or plotting (opposed to ἐπιβουλεύοντα at 371d5).


371d4 ἀλλ᾽ οὖχ: See note on ἀλλ᾽ οὖχ at 365c4 and end of note on οὐ δή οὖν χτλ. at 371c6.

371d5 ἐπιβουλεύοντα: lit., “plotting,” i.e., “by design” (opposed to παραχρῆμα at d3).

371d5 ἀρχαῖον: The adj. ἀρχαῖος (“ancient,” “old”) is sometimes pejorative, as here: “old-fashioned,” “behind the times,” “over the hill.”

371d6 αὐτοῦ . . . περιέσεσθαι: future infinitive (< περίειμι, “be superior to,” “surpass”) + gen. of comparison with a verb denoting a person’s superiority or inferiority to someone else (S 1402-3): “[believing] that he (Achilles) would surpass him (Odysseus) . . .”

371d6 αὐτῷ τούτῳ: dat. of respect (S 1516): “in this very thing,” “in just this respect.”
τὸ τεχνάζειν τε καὶ ψεύδεσθαι: compound articular infinitive in apposition to αὐτῷ τοῦτῳ: “[viz., in respect of] being crafty and speaking falsely . . .”

Like its positive counterpart γοῦν, οὖξουν... ψεύδεσθαι emphasizes a statement (the οὖξ makes the statement negative) while also indicating its limited scope: lit., “It doesn’t seem [so] to me, [though others may conceivably share your view] . . . .” See GP 422 (5).

This ἀλλὰ is “eliminative,” rejecting A as false, substituting B as true. “Οὐκ Α, ἀλλὰ Β” = “Not A, but (rather) B.” See GP 1 (1.i.b).

καὶ: adverbial (“even,” “also”).

αὐτὰ ταῦτα: either a “free use” of the accusative (“in these very things,” “in this very passage”) or the remainder of a double accusative construction with ἀναπείθω (LSJ: “ἀναπείθω τινά τι persuade one of a thing”), transformed here into the passive voice (“having been persuaded of these very things”). On “free uses of the accusative” (umbrella term under which Smyth groups acc. of respect and adverbial acc.) see S 1600-1611.

ὑπὸ εὐνοίας: “by (his own) kindly feeling . . . .”

See LSJ, ὑπό, A.II.3 (“of the agency of feelings, passions, etc.”). Cf. S 1698b on ὑπό + “internal cause.”

ἀναπεισθείς . . . εἶπεν: “(it’s because he was) won over . . . (that) he said . . . .”

Here ἁναπεισθείς is a circumstantial participle implying cause (S 2060, 2064) and containing the “leading thought” of the sentence (S 2147a).

ἐπιβουλεύσαντες: “by (prior) design.”

The tense of an aorist participle need not imply action prior to that of the leading verb, though for pragmatic reasons it generally comes to this (S 1872c).

ἀὖ: Here ἁὖα may express not merely logical inference (GP 40-41) but also “a lively feeling of interest” (GP 33), “as when the truth is just realized after a previous erroneous opinion and one finds oneself undeceived either agreeably or disagreeably” (S 2795). Some call this the “ἁὖα of enlightenment.” Cf. GP 35: “In . . . the predominant Attic usage, ἁὖα denotes, not interest in general, but in particular the interest or surprise occasioned by enlightenment or disillusionment.”

"Ήμιστά γε δήπου: “Hardly, I should think . . . !” “I should hardly think so . . . !” See notes on Ἀμιστά γε at 364e7 and on Καὶ ἁφιστας δήπου κατά at 366d5.

Τί δέ: Although Socrates often asks “τί δέ;” when moving on to a new point in a
line of questioning (see note on Τί δέ ἐστι at 366e1), here, as often in drama and prose, the question carries more emotional weight, and its sense is closer to “What?” or “Oh, really?”

Cf. GP 175 (iv)(a) on the “commonest” use of τί δέ: “Expressing surprise or incredulity, and usually introducing a further question (‘What?!’)”.

371e8 βελτίους: predicate adjective, masc. acc. pl. (< βελτίων, S 293).

Note the shift from ἀμείνον at e4 to a form of the less-Homeric βελτίων. See end of note on πότερον ἀμείνον φησὶν εἶναι at 363b7.

371e9 Καὶ πώς: “And (yet) how . . . .?”

When καί directly precedes the interrogative in a question, it “may either (a) simply denote that the speaker requires further information: or (b), more commonly, convey an emotional effect of surprise, contempt, and so forth” (GP 309 (10.i)). The present καί is a clear example of (b). Cf. LSJ, καί, A.II.2 (“in questions, to introduce an objection or express surprise”).

371e9 ἄν: Often a speaker will throw an ἄν in early, in order to signal “the character of the construction” before it unfolds; he may even do so twice (S 1765a). When the main verb comes, the ἄν is usually repeated (see ἄν εἶνε at 372a1-2 below).

A premature ἄν may also be added for rhetorical reasons, “to give prominence to particular words” (S 1765b). The words given prominence here are πῶς and βελτίους.

372a1 κακὰ ἐργασάμενοι: “do evil deeds,” “perform bad acts.”

Socrates will turn this language against Hippias at 373d8ff: ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ ποιεῖν, οὐ καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι τί;—ΠΠ. Ναι.—ΣΩ. Ὡ κακός ἢραθέων κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν ἐν δρόμῳ τούτῳ ἐγγάζεται;—ΠΠ. Κακὸν· πῶς γάρ οὖ; . . . —ΣΩ. Ἔν δρόμῳ μὲν ἢρα πονηρότερος ὃ ἢρων κακὰ ἐργαζόμενος ἢ ὃ ἢρων; “SOCRATES: And if to do, isn’t it also to perform some act? HIPPPIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: So the man who runs badly performs a bad and shameful act in a footrace? HIPPPIAS: A bad one, of course. . . . SOCRATES: In a footrace, then, a man who involuntarily performs bad acts is inferior to one who does so voluntarily?”

372a1 ἄν εἶνε: potential opt. See note on ἄν at 371e9.

372a2 οἷς πολλῇ δοξεῖ συγγνώμη ἐίναι: lit., “for whom much fellow-feeling seems to be,” or more idiomatically, “in whose case there seems to be much room for forgiveness . . . .”

The bare phrase συγγνώμη ἐστὶ (sometimes even without the ἐστὶ) can mean “it is excusable” (LSJ, συγγνώμη, 1.c). The noun συγγνώμη often takes a dative of the person being excused.

Cf. συγγνώμην τ’ ἔχουσι at 364d5 and συγγνώμην ἔχε at 373b8.

372a2 ἄν μὴ εἰδὼς τίς: Circumstantial participles are often best rendered by adverbs
or adverbial phrases (cf. S 2054a): “if someone unwittingly . . .,” “if, without knowing it, a person . . .”

372a3 ἀδικήσῃ: aorist subjunctive in the protasis of a present general conditional (S 2337) whose apodosis is the rel. clause οἱς πολλῆς δοξῆς συγγνώμη εἶναι (a2).
Aorist tense in the protasis of a general conditional indicates simple occurrence, not past time, though here, as often, temporal priority is implied (cf. S 2336b).

372a3 καὶ: either adverbial (“also,” “even”) or copulative (“and”).


372a6 ἐγώ: This ἐγώ may imply a contrast with others who do not tell the truth, such as Achilles or Odysseus or Hippias, though it could just be an unemphatic pronoun (S 930: “[O]ften in poetry and sometimes in prose the pronoun is expressed when no contrast is intended.”).

372b1 λιπαρής . . . πρὸς: “persistent in (regard to) . . .”
Cf. the note on λιπαρής . . . περὶ at 369d8.

372b1 τὰς ἑρωτήσεις: either “the questionings” or “my questionings.” An article often takes the place of an unemphatic possessive pronoun (S 1121).

372b2 κινδυνεύω: “perhaps I . . .,” “I may well . . .”
See note on κινδυνεύω μάθαινε at 365b7.

372b2 ἐν μόνον ἐξεῖν τούτῳ ἄγαθόν: “[perhaps I] have this one thing only (as a) good (point),” or more idiomatically, “[perhaps] this is my one and only good quality.”
The neuter form of the adjective ἄγαθός can mean “a good,” “a blessing,” “a good quality,” etc. (LSJ, ἄγαθός, II.4).
The verb ἐχω can take a double accusative. See LSJ, ἐχω, A.I.13, which cites Sophocles, Trachiniae 1188 (Ζην ἐχων ἐπώμοτον “having Zeus as my witness”) and Euripides, Hippolytus 953 (Ὀρφέα τ’ ἄνακτ’ ἐχων “having Orpheus as your lord”).

372b2 τᾶλλα ἐχων πάνυ φαύλα: lit., “having (all) the other things (as) very ordinary,” or more idiomatically, “my other traits being quite ordinary.”

372b2 τᾶλλα = τὰ ἄλλα. Although the phrase is often used abverbially to mean “for the rest,” “in all other respects” (LSJ, ἄλλος, II.6), here it seems to be serving as a neuter substantive modified by φαύλα.
The adjective φαύλος is usually pejorative (“poor,” “bad,” “inferior”), as at 369d6 above, though it can be used in a neutral sense (“commonplace,” “everyday,” “ordinary”), or even in a mildly positive sense (“simple,” “unaffected”).
Cf. Plato, Theaetetus 147a-c6: εἴ τις ἡμᾶς τῶν φαύλων τι καὶ προχείρων ἔχει, οἷον πεί τιλοῦ ὁτι ποτ’ ἐστίν, εἰ ἀποχωρίσεται αὐτῷ πιλός ὁ τῶν νυτηρέων καὶ πιλός ὁ τῶν ἰπνοπλαθῶν καὶ πιλός ὁ τῶν πλνδουργῶν, οὐκ ἂν γελοῖοι εἶμεν; . . . Ἐπειτὰ γέ που ἔξεν φαύλος καὶ βραχέως ἀποσχίζεται προχείρων ὁδόν. οἷον καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ πιλοῦ ἔφωτει φαύλον που καὶ ἀπλοῦν εἰπεῖν ὃτι γῇ ύγρῷ φυραθείσα πιλός ὁν εἴη, τὸ δ’ ὃτου ἔχαν χαίρειν. “If any one should ask us about some common everyday thing, for instance, what clay is, and we should reply that it is the potters’ clay and the oven-makers’ clay and the brickmakers’ clay, should we not be ridiculous? . . . Secondly, when we might have given a short, everyday answer, we go an interminable distance round; for instance, in the question about clay, the everyday, simple thing would be to say “clay is earth mixed with moisture” without regard to whose clay it is.” [LCL translation]

Cf. also Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers III.63-64 (on Plato): χρηται δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ διαφέροντος σημαινόμενον τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὄνομασιν, ὁ γοῦν φαύλος λέγεται παρ’ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀπλοῦ, ὡς καὶ παρὰ Εὐρυπίδη ἐν Λικυμνίῳ φέρεται ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ὀὕτως: φαύλον, ἄχυρόμενον, τὰ μέγιστ’ ἁγαθόν, πάσαν ἐν ἔργῳ περιτεμνόμενον σοφίαν, λέοντος ἀτριβωνα.

χρηται δὲ ὁ Πλάτων ἔνιοτε αὐτῷ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κακοῦ: ἔστι δ’ ὃτε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μικροῦ.

“And [Plato] sometimes applies the same terms with very different meanings. For instance, the word φαύλος (slight, plain) is employed by him in the sense of ἀπλοῦς (simple, honest), just as it is applied to Heracles in the Licymnus of Euripides in the following passage:

Plain, unadorned, good for the greatest tasks,
all his wisdom limited to deeds,
unversed in talk.

But sometimes Plato uses this same word (φαύλος) to mean what is bad, and at other times for what is small and petty.” [LCL translation, revised]

372b3 τῶν μὲν γὰρ πραγμάτων ἦ ἔχει ἐσφαλμαί: perfect passive < ὁφάλλω: “for I am fallen (short) of matters how/as they are . . . ,” or more idiomatically, “for I am mistaken as to the facts . . . .”

In the passive voice the verb ὁφάλλω (“make to fall,” “trip up”) can mean be mistaken, err, go wrong, and can also take a genitive of the thing aimed at and missed (LSJ, ὁφάλλω, III.1-2; cf. S 1352). Its occurrence here anticipates the prominent use of the verbs ἄμαρτάνω (“err,” “miss the mark,” “go astray”) and πλανώμαι (“wander,” “stray”) between 372d6-8 and the end of the dialogue (see esp. 376c2-6).

The basic meaning of πράγμα is thing, matter, affair, but in phrases such as οὐδὲν πράγμα (“no matter,” i.e., “no big deal”) it can mean thing of consequence or importance (LSJ, πράγμα, II.4). The plural form πράγματα often refers to the kinds of affairs controlled by those who wield power, i.e.,
state-affairs (LSJ, πράγμα, III.2). Given Socrates' tone in the present passage, the sense of τῶν πραγμάτων here may be “matters of any consequence.”

The feminine dative relative pronoun ᾧ often serves as an adverb of manner meaning “how” or “as” (LSJ, ᾧ, II.1). Here ᾧ might be heard as filling out the sense of τῶν πραγμάτων (“I fall short of [understanding] matters as they are”), or else as introducing an indirect question (“I fall short of [understanding] how matters are,” i.e., “I fall short of [understanding] how matters are”). See final paragraph of note on σου μανθάνειν ὅτι ἔλεγς at 364d8.

372b3 οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅπη ἔστι: “I do not know how they are.”

The direct interrogative πῇ (“In what way?” “How?”) is correlated with the indirect interrogative ὅπη (“. . . in what way,” “. . . how . . .”), which in other contexts serves as an indefinite relative adverb (S 346).


372b5 τῷ: = τινι.

372b5 ὑμῶν τῶν εὐδοκιμοῦντων ἐπὶ σοφίας: partitive genitive dependent upon τῷ: “[one] of you who have great reputations for wisdom . . . .”

Cf. Greater Hippias 291a (Socrates to Hippias): καλῶς μὲν ούτωι ἀμπέχομεν, καλῶς δὲ ὑποδεδεμένω, εὐδοκιμοῦντι δὲ ἐπὶ σοφία ἐν πάσι τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν. “. . . you who are so beautifully clad, so beautifully shod, and so famous for your wisdom among all the Greeks.” [LCL translation]

372b5 οἷς οἱ Ἑλλήνες πάντες μάρτυρες εἰσὶ τῆς σοφίας: lit., “for whom all the Greeks are witnesses of (the) wisdom,” or more idiomatically, “[you] to whose wisdom all the Greeks bear witness . . . .”

Here οἷς is best construed as a dat. of advantage and probably best translated as “whose” or “of whom,” as if it were a possessive genitive modifying τῆς σοφίας. Cf. S 1481 (on the dative of advantage): “The dative often has to be translated as if the possessive genitive were used . . . .”

372b6 φαίνομαι οὐδὲν εἰδώς: Here, it seems, the usual distinction between φαίνομαι + inf. and φαίνομαι + part. is observed (S 2143). Cf. note on ὡν at 367b6.

372b6 τῶν αὐτῶν: partitive genitive with οὐδέν: “[none] of the same things . . . .”

372b7 ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν: lit., “to speak a word,” a common way of toning down a hyperbolic statement (like “so to speak” or “practically speaking” in English). See LSJ, ἔπος, II.4: “ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, almost, practically, qualifying a too absolute expression . . . .”

Here εἰπεῖν is an absolute infinitive supplemented by ὡς (S 2012), like εἰσήθοσα at 364e3.
372c1 καίτοι: Usually adversative, here καίτοι simply marks a logical transition to the next step in a lively, rhetorical argument (cf. GP 561 (3) and 562 (ii), our passage cited at GP 563 and 564): “And (I ask you,) . . . ?”

372c3 γὰρ: Probably best translated as a colon, this γὰρ introduces a further explanation of what is meant by τοῦτο at c2 (already alluded to in other words at 372a6-b2 and still earlier at 369d4-e2). See note on γὰρ at 364c5.

372c3 οὐ . . . αἰσχύνομαι μανθάνων: “I am not ashamed to learn . . . .” When a distinction is drawn between (1) αἰσχύνομαι + participle and (2) αἰσχύνομαι + infinitive, it is the difference between (1) a person who does engage, however sheepishly, in the activity in question (expressed by the participle), and (2) a person whose shame effectively restrains him from the activity (expressed by the infinitive). When negatives are added, as they often are, the distinction is less likely to be observed (S 2126). Here Socrates is describing himself as someone who does not let shame keep him from learning.

Cf. Plato, Laches 21ab (Socrates speaking): εἰ δὲ τὸν ἦμον καταγελάσεται, ὅτι τὴν κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἄξιοιμεν φοιτάν, τῶν Ἄμηρον δοξεῖ μοι ἁρμάζει θεοβάλλεσθαι, ὃς ἐπεσε ὡς ἀγαθήν ἀνθρώπῳ παρεῖναι. καὶ ἤμετ δὲν ἐκαστάς
χάριν ἐφ᾽ τις τι ἔρει, εἰ καὶ ἠμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν μερισμάτων ἐπιμέλειαν. “And if anyone makes fun of us for seeing fit to go to school at our time of life, I think we should appeal to Homer, who said that “shame is no good mate for a needy man.”” So let us not mind what anyone may say, but join together in arranging for our own and the boys’ tuition.” [LCL translation]

372c4 χάριν πολλήν ἔχω: lit., “I have much gratitude,” or more loosely, “my gratitude is great . . . .”

372c5 οὐδένα πώποτε ἀποστέρησα χάριτος: “. . . never yet have I defrauded anyone of gratitude.” ἀποστέρησα is aorist < ἀποστερέω (rob, defraud + acc. of the person robbed + gen. of the thing of which the person is deprived).

Socrates’ modest use of οὐδένα πώποτε + an aorist verb in the 1st person recalls Hippias’s boastful use of οὐδένι πώποτε + an aorist verb in the 1st person at 364a8-9 (. . . οὐδενὶ πώποτε κρείττονει εἰς οὐδὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἐντυχον. “. . . never yet have I encountered anyone better than myself at anything.”).

Cf. also Republic 338b (Thrasymachus speaking with Socrates): Αὐτὴ δὴ, ἔφη, ἢ Σωκράτους σοφίας αὐτὸν μὲν μὴ ἐθέλειν διδάσκειν, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων περιόντων μανθάνειν καὶ τοῦτον μηδὲ χάριν ἀποδείκνυα. Ὄτι μὲν, ἤμεν δ’ ἐγώ, μανθάνων παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀληθῆ εἶπες, ὁ Θρασύμαχος, ὅτι δὲ οὐ με φῆς χάριν ἐκτίνειν, ψευδῆ· ἐκτίνοι γὰρ ὄσην δύναμαι. δύναμαι δὲ ἐπαινεῖν μόνον· χρήματα γὰρ οὖν ἔχω. “That’s Socrates’ wisdom for you: he himself is unwilling to teach, but he goes around and learns from others and doesn’t even render thanks for this.” “When you say,” I said, “that I learn from others, you speak the truth,” Thrasymachus; but when you say that I fail
to pay my debt of gratitude, you speak falsely. For I do pay, as much as I’m able—though I’m able only to praise, for I have no money.”

372c5 ἔξαρνος ἐγενόμην μαθὼν τι: The adjective ἔξαρνος (“denying”) + a form of γίγνομαι or εἰμί is equivalent to the verb ἔξαρνέομαι, deny (LSJ, ἔξαρνος). Here the content of the denial is expressed by a participial phrase: “[never yet] have I denied having learned something,” or more freely, “[never yet] have I learned a thing and been loath to admit it.”

372c5 ἐμαυτοῦ ποιοῦμενος τὸ μάθημα εἶναι: “making (out) the learned thing to be my own,” or more idiomatically, “representing as my own what I (had) learned.”

Cf. the use of ποιέω to mean “represent.” See note on πεποιηκέναι at 364c5.

Cf. also the related verb προσποιέω, usually found in the middle voice (LSJ, προσποιέω, II.2: “take to oneself what does not belong to one, pretend to, lay claim to . . .”).

372c5 ὡς εὑρημα: “as (my own) discovery.”

Like the εἶναι that precedes it, the phrase ὡς εὑρημα may be added here to disambiguate the phrase ἐμαυτοῦ ποιοῦμενος τὸ μάθημα, which by itself could bear the harmless sense of “making the lesson my own,” i.e., internalizing the lesson.

372c8 καὶ δή καὶ νῦν: “And (indeed) now, too, . . .”

The sequence of particles καὶ δή καὶ is often used when a speaker cites a particular instance corroborating a preceding general statement (cf. GP 256-6). Here the preceding statement is that Socrates disagrees with wise men in general (372b4-c2), and the particular instance cited is Socrates’ present disagreement with Hippias (372d1ff.).

372d1 ὃ σὺ λέγεις οὐχ ὀμολογῶ σοι: The verb ὀμολογέω may take a dat. of the person agreed with or an acc. of the thing agreed to. Occasionally, as here, it takes both: “I do not agree with you in what you are saying . . . .”


372d1 διαφέρομαι: recalls διαφέρῃτα at c2.

372d2 καὶ τοῦτ’, εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι δι’ ἐμὲ γίγνεται: lit., “and I well know this, that it comes about through me,” or more idiomatically, “and I know (very) well that this is due to me . . . .” (i.e., that this is “my fault”).

The τοῦτο properly functions as the subject of the ὅτι clause, but through “prolepsis” it becomes the direct object of οἶδ’ . See S 2182: “The subject of the dependent clause is often anticipated and made the object of the verb of the principal clause. This transference, which gives a more prominent place to the
subject of the subordinate clause, it called *anticipation* or *prolepsis.*” Cf. the final paragraph in the note on σου μανθάνειν ὅτι ἐλεγές at 364d8.

372d2 ὅτι τοιούτος εἰμι οἴόουερ εἰμί: “because I am such (a man) as I am . . . .”

372d3 ἵνα μηδὲν ἐμαυτόν μεῖζον εἶπο: lit., “in order to say nothing greater (of) myself,” or more idiomatically, “to give no grand description of myself.”


Here Socrates may be thinking of the great things that Hippias says about himself (cf. esp. μεγαλαυχουμένου at 368b3).

372d4 πᾶν: adverbial: “altogether,” “completely,” “quite.”

372d4 τούναντιόν: = τὸ ἐναντίον.

372d4 ὅ: Comparative ὅ, normally “than” in English, is sometimes used “after positive adjectives which imply comparison” (LSJ, ὅ, B.1). After ἐναντίος, comparative ὅ corresponds to English “of” (“quite the opposite of . . . ”).


One of the famous Socratic paradoxes is that “no one errs willingly.” Cf. *Protagoras* 345de (Socrates speaking): ἐγὼ γὰρ σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν σοφῶν ἄνθρωπον ἱκεῖται οὐδένα ἄνθρωπον ἐκόντα ἐξαιρετάνειν οὐδὲ αἰσχρὰ τε καὶ κακὰ ἐκόντα ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ εὖ ιόσοιν ὅτι πάντες οἱ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ ποιοῦντες ἂνοιγέων: “For I dare say, this is what I believe: that none of the wise men holds that any person goes astray of his own volition or voluntarily performs bad and shameful acts, but well they know that all who do shameful and bad things do so involuntarily . . . .”

372d6 ἀλλὰ μὴ ἂνοιγέων: Here ἀλλὰ may be left untranslated. Cf. the note on ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ at 365c4.

On the use of μὴ instead of οὐ with participles indicating no definite people see S 2734.

372d7 εἶναι: An implicit φαίνονται, picking up on the φαίνεται at d4, seems to be understood.
πλανῶμαι: “I wander,” “I am in doubt” (LSJ, πλανῶμαι, II.1 & 5).

This verb recurs dramatically in the closing lines of the dialogue: πλανῶμαι (376c2), πλανάσθαι (e3), πλανήσεσθε (c4). Its cognate πλάνη (“wandering”) is the dialogue’s final word (e5). See the discussion of σφάλλω in the note on τῶν μὲν γάρ πραγμάτων ἦ ἔχει ἐσφάλματι at 372b3.

μέντοι: “(And) yet . . . ,” “. . . , though, . . .”

Unlike the μέντοι at 366c5 or the μέντοι at 372c1, this μέντοι is adversative, as usual in prose authors (GP 404 (2)).

On the adversative force of μέντοι see GP 405 (iii): “Like μήν, μέντοι is normally a balancing adversative, and seldom goes so far as to eliminate, or seriously invalidate, the opposed idea, like ἀλλά or μὲν οὖν.”

καὶ: adverbial (“also,” “too”).

dῆλον ὅτι: adverbial phrase meaning “clearly” (see note on δῆλον ὅτι at 363c4).

dιὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι: “on account of (my) lack of knowledge . . . .”

See note on διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι at 367a3.

νυν: “now,” “right now.” See note on νυν at 364b8.

Here again, as at 369a7 (Νυν γὰρ ἱώσως οὐ χρῆ τῷ μνημονίῳ τεχνήματι), νυν suggests with gentle irony that the situation would not be so awkward for Hippias at another time.

ἐν τῷ παρόντι: (neut. part. < πάρειμι): “in the present moment,” “at present . . . .”

This common adverbial phrase, which sounds somewhat redundant after νυν, is itself repeated at e5 (νῦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι).

μοι ὡσπερ κατηβολή περιελήλυθεν: “a periodic fit, as it were, is upon me. . . .”

The ὡσπερ apologizes for the medical metaphor (LSJ, ὡσπερ, II: “to limit or modify an assertion or apologize for a metaphor, as it were, so to speak . . .”). The metaphor is continued in subsequent lines: τοῦ γὰρ παρόντος παθήματος (372e4), ἰάσασθαι (372e7), ἰάσαι, (373a3), νόσου (373a2).

The noun κατηβολή (also spelled καταβολή) was apparently applied to “the periodic recurrence and onset of the fever” and to “the holy disease,” viz., epilepsy (Scholia in Platonem (scholia vetera), W. C. Greene, ed. [Hippias Minor 372e: κατηβολή]: ἡ τοῦ πυρετοῦ περίοδος καὶ ὀρμή . . . καὶ ἱερὰ νόσος . . .). In Plato’s Gorgias it seems to refer to the onset of weakness in a body, or body politic, that has long been stuffed with unwholesome food (Gorgias 519a4: ὅταν όνν ἐλθῇ ἢ καταβολή αὐτῆ τῆς ὀσθενείας “so when this onset of weakness comes . . .”).

The verb περιέρχομαι is especially appropriate to something that not only comes upon a person and encompasses him but does so by “coming round” again
after a time, as does a periodic attack of a chronic disease (cf. LSJ, περιέρχομαι, II.1).

Sickness has already been mentioned twice in this dialogue (365d6-7; 366c1), both times in connection with the idea of a lack of ability. The present image of Socrates as a sick man at the mercy of his “disease” combines this earlier focus on lack of ability with the present focus on involuntary behavior: not only is Socrates currently of the opinion that those who err voluntarily are better than those who err involuntarily, but he holds this opinion, so to speak, involuntarily, compelled by the previous argument, which he blames for his present condition (e3-4). Cf. Socrates’ later retort that if he is causing trouble, he is doing so involuntarily (373b6-9). A quasi-medical complaint is voiced in the closing lines of the dialogue when Socrates describes himself as a pitiable layman who seeks relief from professionals (376c3-6).

372e2 οἱ ἑκόντες ἔξαμαρτάνοντες περὶ τι: “those who voluntarily go astray in some field . . . .”

Like its older cousin ἁμαρτάνω, the compound ἔξαμαρτάνω is able to take a prepositional phrase introduced by περὶ, indicating the matter in which one errs (LSJ, ἁμαρτάνω, II.1; LSJ, ἔξαμαρτάνω, I.2).

The ἐ- or ἐκ- in compound verbs often expresses completion, though in the case of ἔξαμαρτάνοι it may simply reinforce the idea of being “off” target. Cf. LSJ, ἐκ, C.: “In composition the sense of removal prevails; out, away, off . . . .”

It seems that if there is any significant difference in use or meaning between ἁμαρτάνω and ἔξαμαρτάνω, it is that ἁμαρτάνω, while often used abstractly, is more firmly rooted in the physical meaning of missing a target, e.g., with a spear throw, whereas the use of ἔξαμαρτάνω is almost invariably abstract. This difference, however, should not be overemphasized. The two verbs cover essentially the same ground (“miss the mark,” “fail,” “go wrong,” “err”) and appear to be used interchangeably in this dialogue.

Cf. Plato’s Republic 336e: Ὡ Θρασύμαχε, μὴ χαλεπὸς ἡμῖν ἱστι· εἰ γὰρ τι ἔξαμαρτάνομεν ἐν τῇ τῶν λόγων σκέψει ἐγὼ τε καὶ ὁδε, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἅπαντες ἁμαρτάνομεν. “Oh, Thrasymachus, please don’t be harsh with us: if we are somehow going astray in our exploration of words, I and my friend here, please know that we are straying involuntarily.”

372e3 βελτίους: predicate adjective. See note on βελτίους at 371e8.

372e3 τῶν ἑκόντων: genitive of comparison.

372e3 αἰτίωμαι: present indicative (= αἰτιάωμαι, “I charge,” “I allege”) introducing an indirect statement.

372e3 τοῦ νῦν παρόντος παθήματος . . . αἰτίως: “responsible . . . for the condition now present . . . .” “to blame . . . for my current affliction . . . .”

The adjective αἰτίως takes a genitive of the thing one is responsible for. Cf. the “genitive of crime and accountability” with verbs (S 1375ff.).
If there is a significant difference between the words πάθημα and πάθος, which mean much the same thing, it may be that πάθημα is more likely to be used pejoratively. Contrast Socrates’ use of πάθημα here with his use of πάθος at 364a1 (Μακαριόν γε, ὦ Ἰππία, πάθος πέπονθας . . . “What a blessed state you are in, Hippias . . .!”).

372e4 τοὺς ἐμπροσθεν λόγους: subject of indirect statement introduced by αἰτιώματι:
“the previous argument(s) . . .”
The adverb ἐμπροσθεν (“before,” “of old”) is sometimes best translated as an adjective.

372e5 ὡστε φαίνεσθαι: If this ὡστε took a verb in the indicative, rather than an infinitive, one could tell from the grammatical construction that the outcome described in the result clause is not only “natural” but “actual” (cf. S 2257, 2260). As it is, one can tell this only from context.

Either (1) the accusative noun phrase τοὺς ἀκοντας τοῦτων ἔκαστα ποιοῦντας is the subject of φαίνεσθαι (“so that those who do each of these things involuntarily appear worse . . .”), or else (2) φαίνεσθαι is impersonal and introduces an indirect statement with εἶναι understood (“so that it appears that those who do each of these things involuntarily [are] worse . . .”). Both the general Greek preference for personal constructions and Socrates’ later use of φαίνονται in a similar context (373d5) argue for the personal reading (1).

372e6 πονηροτέρους: predicate adjective (“worse”).
πονηρός occupies a less basic place in the Greek language than does κακός (in Homer, for example, κακός is ubiquitous, while πονηρός is not found at all), but the semantic ranges of both words are extensive and largely the same. The English adjective “bad” is the best all-purpose translation for either word.

In the Lesser Hippias a form of πονηρός is used to refer to the worse of two runners (373e6), to the worse of two bodies (374b7), and to an inferior horse (375a5); πονηρός is opposed to ἄγαθός in a discussion of sense organs (374ε1-2); and πονηρότερος is opposed to βελτίων in a discussion of human bodies (374b2-3 and b5-7) but also to ὁμείνων in a discussion of human souls (375e1-2; cf. 376a6-7).

372e6 οὖν: inferential (“then,” “therefore”).

372e7 χάρισαι: aor. mid. impv. (< χαρίζω, usually mid., χαρίζομαι): “make yourself agreeable,” “be obliging,” i.e., be so kind as to do what I want you to do.
Cf. 364c8-9: ἄρ’ ὃν τί μοι χαρίσαι τοιοῦτο, μή μου καταγελάν . . . “Might you do me this little favor, not to jeer at me . . .?”

372e7 μὴ φθονήσῃς ἵσσοςσαι τὴν ψυχήν μου: aor. subjunctive in a prohibition in the 2nd person (S 1800, 1840): “do not refuse (from feelings of ill-will) to heal my soul . . .”
If Socrates had wished to imply that Hippias was already refusing to do this and that he should stop refusing, he would probably have used the present imperative (S 1841).

Cf. Eudikos’s use of the verb φθονέω at 363c4-5: Ἀλλὰ δήλον ὅτι οὐ φθονήσει Ἡππίας, ἕαν τι αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾷς, ἀπαχρίνεσθαι. “Ah, but it is clear that if you ask him a question, Hippias will not refuse to answer.”

372e7 πολύ . . . μείζον: adverbial acc. expressing measure or degree (S 1609) + comparative adj. (< μέγας [S 319.5]): “much greater,” “greater by far. . . .”

373a1 τοι: Here τοι, as usual, “brings the truth home” to the listener (GP 399.II (1)): “I’ll have you know,” “mind you, . . .”

373a1 ἐργάσῃ: future middle indicative (< ἐργάζομαι): “you will do . . . .”

373a1 ἀμαθίας παύσας τὴν ψυχήν: “having given my soul rest from ignorance,” “by relieving my soul of ignorance. . . .”

The verb παύω can mean “give rest” or “provide relief” to a person [acc.] from a thing [gen.] (LSJ, παύω, I.2).

Cf. 376c5-6: . . . εἰ μηδὲ παρ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἀφικόμενοι παυσόμεθα τῆς πλάνης. “. . . if not even after coming to you are we to rest from our wandering.”

373a2 νόσου τὸ σῶμα: The participle παύσας is understood.

Cf. the use of the agent-noun παυστήρ in this passage from Sophocles’ Philoctetes (1437-8, Heracles to Philoctetes): ἔγὼ δ᾽ Ἀσκληπιὸν παυστήρα πέμψω σῆς νόσου προὶς Ἰλιον. “And I shall send Asclepius to Troy as the healer of your sickness.”

Cf. also Plato, Republic 377bc (Socrates to Adeimantus): τοὺς δ᾽ ἐγκριθέντας πείσωμεν τὰς τροφοῦς τε καὶ μητέρας λέγειν τοῖς παιδίν, καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τοῖς μύθοις πολλὰ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σῶματα τοῖς χειρισίν . . . “And the stories on the accepted list we will induce nurses and mothers to tell to the children and so shape their souls by these stories far rather than their bodies by their hands.” [LCL translation]

373a2 μακρὸν . . . λόγον . . . λέγειν: cognate accusative (S 1564): “to make a long speech . . . .”

The placement of μακρὸν at the start of the sentence, followed by μὲν οὖν, makes it emphatic. Socrates may be thinking back to Hippias’s words at 369c3 (ἀποδείξεις σοι ἰκανός λόγο . . . ).

373a2 μὲν οὖν: either purely transitional (“Now, . . .”) or also affirmative/emphatic (“To be sure, . . .”) Cf. GP 470ff.

373a2 εἰ ἑθέλεις: “if you wish,” “if you are intent (on) . . . .”

This is the first of two successive occurrences of εἰ ἑθέλεις (= εἰ ἑθέλεις),
the first introduced by μέν, that second by δέ (373a4). The bare meaning of ἐθέλω, “be willing” (LSJ, ἐθέλω, I: “of consent rather than desire”), fits the second occurrence, where the question is whether Hippias is willing to do what Socrates wants him to do. Here, however, where the question is whether Hippias is intent on doing something which Socrates does not want him to do, something stronger than “if you are willing . . .” is needed.

373a3 προλέγω: Here the prefix προ- is temporal: “tell beforehand,” “tell in advance.”

See note on προειπών at 370a3.

373a3 οὐχ ἂν με ἱάσαι: potential optative: “you would/could not heal me.”

The sentence may be analyzed as a so-called “mixed” conditional: simple present protasis + Future Less Vivid apodosis (cf. S 2300e, 2356). See end of note on Φθίην ἐγίβωλον ἵκοιμην at 370c3.

373a3 οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄκολονυθήσαμαι: potential opt.: “for I could not follow,” “for I would fail to follow . . .”

Socrates’ words recall 364b6 (ἀπελεύφθην σοι τὸν λεγομένον “I failed to follow what you were saying . . .”).

Cf. Plato’s Protagoras 334ed (Socrates speaking): Ὡ Προταγόρα, ἐγὼ τυγχάνων ἐπιλήσομαι τις ὃν ἀνθρώπος, καὶ ἐάν τις μοι μακρὰ λέγῃ, ἐπιλαμβάνομαι περὶ οὗ ἂν ἢ ὁ λόγος, ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ ἔτυχαν ὑπόκωφος ὄν, ὥσπερ οὖν ἄρχομαι, εἰπέρ ἔμελλές μοι διαλέξει θεοῦν, μείζονον φθέγγεσθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡστὸ καὶ νῦν, ἐπείδη ἐπιλήσομον ἐνέτυχες, σύντετειν μοι τὰς ἀποχρώσεις καὶ βραχυτέρας ποίει, εἰ μέλλω σοι ἐπεσθαί. “Protagoras, I find I am a forgetful sort of person, and if someone addresses me at any length I forget the subject on which he is talking. So, just as you, in entering on a discussion with me, would think fit to speak louder to me than to others if I happened to be hard of hearing, please bear in mind now that you have to deal with a forgetful person, and therefore cut up your answers into shorter pieces, that I may be able to follow you.” [LCL translation]

Cf. also Protagoras 335bc: ἐπειδὰν οὐ βούλῃ διαλέξεσθαι ὡς ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἐπεσθαί, τότε οὐ διαλέξομαι, οὐ μὲν γὰρ, ὃς λέγεται περὶ σοῦ, φής δὲ καὶ αὐτός, καὶ ἐν μακρολογία καὶ ἐν βραχυλογίᾳ οἰός τ’ ἐί συνουσίας ποιεῖθα—οὐφος γὰρ εἰ—ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταύτα αὕδατος, ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἂν οἰός τ’ εἴναι. “[W]henever you wish to converse in a way that I am able to follow, then I will converse with you. For you . . . can hold discussions both in the long style and in the brief style—for you are wise—whereas I am unable to handle these long speeches, though I would fain be able.”

373a4 ὡσπερ δὲ ἄρτι: The contrast with μακρὸν μὲν ὃν λόγον ἢ ἱάσεως λέγειν (a2) suggests these two alternatives: (1) wishing to answer Socrates in a long-winded way, as Hippias did at 371e9-372a5 and as he proposed to do on a grander scale at 369c2-8, and (2) being willing to answer Socrates briefly. This can make it seem as if ὡσπερ δὲ ἄρτι should be taken closely with μοι ἀποκρώνεσθαι: “if
you are willing to answer me as (you were answering me) just now (—viz., briefly and to the point) . . . ."

However, since Socrates has just ruled out the viability of (1), the real alternatives for Hippias seem to be these: (A) being willing to answer Socrates briefly, and (B) refusing to answer Socrates at all. If this is how matters stand, ὅσπερ δὲ ἄρτι should probably be taken with ei ἰataireς μοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι as a whole: “if you are willing, as you were just now, to answer me . . . .”

πάνυ ὄνησεις: future active indicative (< ὄνινημ, “benefit,” “help,” used here without the object μοι, which is easily supplied from the preceding clause) + adv.: “you will be very helpful (to me),” “you will be of great help (to me).”

οὐδ’ αὐτὸν σὲ βλαβήσεσθαί: “. . . [and I think that] you yourself will not be harmed, either.”

Here oüde is best rendered “not . . . either” (LSJ, oüde, B.II).

αὐτὸν σὲ (“you yourself”) is the acc. subject of the fut. pass. inf. βλαβήσεσθαί (< βλάπτω).

Socrates' ironic understatement is a fitting end to a passage (372a6-373a5) in which he portrays himself as a pitiful person in need of being benefited by Hippias, but whose persistence in questioning people such as Hippias is itself a wonderful blessing (372a6-b2; 372c2-3).

In Plato’s Apology Socrates describes his characteristic interactions with others as benefiting them as well as himself. Cf. esp. Apology 36cd: τί οὖν εἰμι ἄξιος παθεῖν τοιούτος ὄν; . . . τί οὖν πρέπει ἄνδρι πένητι εὐνυχέτη δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑστεράς παρακελεύσῃ; οὖν ἔσθ’ ὅτι μᾶλλον, ὡς ἄνδρας Ἀθηναίοι, πρέπει οὗτος ὃς τὸν τοιούτον ἄνδρα ἐν προτανείῳ στειοῦθα, πολὺ γε μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ τὶς ὑμῶν . . . νενίκηκεν Ὀλυμπίαις· ὃ μὲν γάρ ὕμας ποιει εὐδαιμόνες δοξεῖν εἶναι, ἐγώ δὲ εἶναι . . . . “What, then, do I deserve to have happen to me, being such a man as I am? . . . What, then, is fitting for a poor man, your benefactor, who needs spare time for exhorting you? There isn’t anything more fitting, men of Athens, than that such a man be given free meals in the prytaneum—far more than if one of you . . . has won a victory at the Olympics; for that man causes you to seem to be in a blessed state, whereas I cause you to be in such a state . . . .”

δικαίως: “justly,” “rightly,” “with (good) reason.”

ἄν καὶ σὲ παρακαλοῖν: potential opt. (S 1824), adverbial καί: “I would call upon you, too . . . .”

Plato’s Socrates sometimes invites a minor character (e.g., Prodicus in the Protagoras, Phaedo in the Phaedo) to be his collaborator in dealing with opposition from a major character (Protagoras in the Protagoras, Simmias and Cebes in the Phaedo). When he does, he typically uses the verb παρακαλέω.

Cf. Protagoras 339e-340 (Socrates to Prodicus): Ὁ Πρόδικε, ἐφην ἐγώ, ὁς μὲντοι Σιμωνίδης πολιτής· δίκαιος εἰ βοηθεῖν τῷ ἄνδρι. δοκῶ οὖν μοι
ἐγὼ παρακαλεῖν σέ· ὥσπερ ἔφη Ὅμηρος τὸν Σκάμανδρον πολιορκοῦμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως τὸν Σιμώνιτα παρακαλεῖν, εἰπόντα— 
φίλε κασίγνητε, σθένος ἁμότεροι περ ἁμότεροι περ σχόμεν,

ἀτάρ καὶ ἔγὼ σὲ παρακαλῶ, μὴ ἥμιν ὁ Πρωταγόρας τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἐκπέρσῃ.

“Prodicus,” I said, “surely Simonides was your townsman: you are bound to come to the man’s rescue. Accordingly I allow myself to call for your assistance—just as Scamander, in Homer, when besieged by Achilles, called Simois to his aid, saying—

Dear brother, let us both together stay this warrior’s might.

In the same way I call upon you, lest Protagoras lay Simonides in ruins.” [LCL translation, lightly revised]

Cf. also Phaedo 89c (Phaedo narrating an exchange between himself and Socrates): Ἀλλ᾽, ἂν δ᾽ ἐγὼ, πρὸς δύο λέγεται οὐδ᾽ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς οἶος τε εἶναι. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμὲ, ἑφη, τὸν Ἰόλεων παρακάλει, ἐως ἐτί φῶς ἔστιν. 

Παρακάλω τούτων, ἑφαν, σύχ ὡς Ἡρακλῆς, ἄλλ᾽ ὡς Ἰόλεως τὸν Ἡρακλῆ. Ὅυδὲν διοίσει, ἑφη.

“But,” I replied, “they say that even Heracles is not a match for two.”

“Well,” he said, “call me to help you, as your Iolaus, while there is still light.”

“I call you to help, then,” I said, “not as Heracles calling Iolaus, but as Iolaus calling Heracles.”

“IT makes no difference,” he said. [LCL translation, lightly revised]

373a6 ὄ παι Ἀπημάντου: See final paragraph of note on τοῦ σοῦ πατρὸς Ἀπημάντου at 363b1.

373a6 ἐπῆρας: aorist < ἐπαίρω, arouse, incite, prompt.

373a7 καί: adverbial, as often with νῦν (“now too”). A comma is placed before this καί in Burnet’s edition, but a colon seems preferable.

373a9 Ἀλλ᾽ = Ἀλλά: “Ah, but . . .” This ἀλλά expresses opposition to what the previous speaker has said (GP 7 (3)(i)), while also introducing an assurance that his wish will be granted (GP 20 (7)). Cf. the note on Ἀλλὰ at 363c4.

373a9 οὐδὲν δεήσεσθαι . . . τῆς ἱμετέρας δεήσεως: “will have no need of our pleading.” “will need none of our pleading.”

This οὐδὲν is probably best understood as adverbial (lit., “will need our pleading in no way”), since when the verb δέομαι means “have need of,” as here, it normally takes an object in the genitive. When δέομαι means “beg” or “ask,” it sometimes takes an object in the accusative + the person of whom the request is made in the genitive (cf. S 1398).
Note the play on words: δεήσεως ("will need" < δέομαι) . . . δεήσεως ("pleading" < δέομαι).

373b1 τὰ προειρημένα: See note on προειρήμ. at 370a3.

373b2 ἢ γάρ: See note on ἢ γάρ at 363c5.

373b2 Ἐγώγε: "(Yes,) I was (saying that)." Cf. note on Ἐγώγε at 365d7.

373b2 ἀεὶ: See note on ἀεὶ at 369b8.

373b2 ταράττει: “is [always] stirring (things) up,” “is [always] causing confusion . . . .”

A form of the verb ταράττω is used in conjunction with a form of the verb πλανάω— an important verb in our dialogue—at Phaedo 79c (Socrates questioning Cebes): . . . ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρῆται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι . . . τότε μὲν ἐλέκται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα ἔχοντα, καὶ αὐτὴ πλανάται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ εἰλιγγά ὀσπερ μεθύουσα, ἢτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη: “... when the soul makes use of the body for any inquiry, . . . then it is dragged by the body to things which never remain the same, and it wanders about and is confused and dizzy like a drunken man because it lays hold upon such things?” [LCL translation]

See note on πλανώματι at 372d7 above and compare 376c2-3 below (Socrates speaking): . . . ἐγὼ περὶ ταύτα ἄνω καὶ κάτω πλανώματι καὶ οὐδέποτε ταύτα μοι δοκεῖ. “I wander to and fro in this area, never holding the same opinion.”

373b4 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις: “in the arguments,” or more idiomatically, “with his arguments.”

See S 1121 and the note on οὕτως εὐθέλπις ὄν κτλ. at 364a2.

The preposition ἐν is sometimes used “of the instrument, means, or manner” (LSJ, ἐν, III) and variously translated as “in,” “by,” or “with.”

373b5 ἔσευεν ὀσπερ κακουργοῦντι: When ἔσευεν takes a participle, it normally means “seems to be (doing something).” Cf. LSJ, ἔσευ, I. 1 (“c. part.”).

It is hard to tell whether this ὀσπερ intensifies (“seems just like . . .”) or weakens (“seems, as it were, . . .”) the force of its phrase. Since a superfluous ὀσπερ is not normally added to ἔσευεν, and since ὀσπερ, when it weakens the force of an assertion or metaphor, often precedes a participle (LSJ, ὀσπερ, II, “freq. with parts.”), it is likely that this ὀσπερ, like the ὀσπερ used by Socrates at 372e1, is softening the blow of the comparison: “seems, as it were, to be causing trouble,” or more freely, “rather resembles a troublemaker.”

The verb κακουργέω was used by Hippias at 365e8-9 in speaking of false people and whether they know what they do: Καὶ μάλα ὀφόρα ἐπίστασαντας διὰ ταύτα καὶ κακουργοῦσιν. “They know very well indeed: that’s how they work their mischief.”

Cf. the critical words that Callicles has for Socrates at Gorgias 482c (Ὦ Σῶκρατες, δοκεῖς νεανιεύεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὃς ἀληθῶς δημηγόρος ὄν
“Socrates, I think you’re grandstanding in these speeches, acting like a true crowd-pleaser”) and a little later at 483a (ὁ δὴ καὶ οὐ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκὼς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις . . . “This is in fact the clever trick you’ve thought of, with which you work mischief in your discussions . . .”) [Donald J. Zeyl’s translation].

See also the note on µιμῇ at 370e11.

373b6 Ὡ βέλτιστε — — : “My good — —,” “Oh, my dear friend — —.”

This tactful mode of address is often found in Plato when the speaker, usually Socrates, is trying to correct someone or redirect his behavior, especially when emotions are running high. Cf. the note on Ὡ Σώκρατες at 369b8.

373b6 οὔτι: adverbial (< οὔτις): “in no way,” “by no means.”

373b7 ἥ: 1st person imperfect (< εἰμί), as if in the apodosis of a present contrary-to-fact conditional. A fuller version of Socrates’ side remark would run as follows:

—εἰ γὰρ ἐκὼν ταύτα ἐγὼ ἐποίουν, σοφὸς ἃν ἡ καὶ δεινός (“—for if I were doing these things of my own volition, then I would be wise and clever . . .”).

373b8 ὡστε μου συγγνώμην ἔχε: “. . . so forgive me . . . .”

On the use of ὡστε with an imperative see S 2275. On the meaning of συγγνώμην ἔχε see the note on συγγνώμην τ᾽ ἔχοιμι at 364d5.

373b8 αὖ: Here the sense of αὖ may be that again, as in the previous line (b7), and as at 373b1-3, Hippias’s former statements are coming back to haunt him.

373c1 Καὶ . . . γε: Here καὶ indicates, and γε emphasizes, that the speaker is tacking something onto what was just said (cf. GP 157): “Yes, and . . . .”

373c2 ἑνεκά: Usually ἑνεκά follows the object it governs (in the genitive). Here it stands between ἡμῶν and τῶν προειρημένων οἰ λόγων, governing both. In English two different translations might be used: “both for us [= for our sake] and with a view to your former volition . . . .”

373c2 τῶν προειρημένων: See notes on τὰ προειρημένα at 373b1 and on προειπὼν at 370a3.

373c2 ἀποκρίνου ἃ ἃν σε ἐρωτᾷ: subjunctive with ἃν in a Future More Vivid conditional relative clause, with imperative in place of future indicative in the main clause (S 2565): “answer whatever questions [Socrates] asks you.”

373c4 Ἀλλ᾽ ἀποκρινοῦμαι: This ἀλλά seems to indicate reluctant acquiescence (GP 19 (iii)(a)) “Very well, I’ll answer . . . .”

373c4 οὐ γε δεομένου: gen. absolute: lit., “with you begging,” or more idiomatically, “since you are pleading.”
ἀλλ᾽ ἐρώτα: See note on ἀλλ᾽ ἐρώτα at 365d5.

ὁτι βούλει: See beginning and end of note on ἐμβοῦλει ὁτι βούλει at 365d5.

Καὶ μὴν . . . γε: See note on καὶ μὴν, ὦ Εὐδίκε, ἔστι γε at 363a6.

ποτεροί ποτε ἀμείνους: “Which (in fact) are better . . . ?”

The ποτέ adds intensity to Socrates’ question. See second paragraph of the note on τί ποτε νοῶν πτλ. at 365d1.

οὖν: progressive, proceeding to “a new stage in the march of thought” (GP 426): “Now, . . . .”

ἐπὶ τὴν σκέψιν . . . ἄν . . . ἐλθεῖν: potential opt. in indirect statement (S 2023).
Since the infinitive here (ἐλθεῖν) has no expressed subject, its subject is that of the main verb, ὦμα (S 1973): “[I think] that I would come at the inquiry,” or more idiomatically, “[I think] I might approach the inquiry . . . .”

ὄρθοτατ᾽ = ὥρθοτατα, superlative adverb (S 345): “most correctly . . . .”

ἂν . . . ἐλθεῖν: potential opt. in indirect statement (S 2023).

Since the infinitive here (ἐλθεῖν) has no expressed subject, its subject is that of the main verb, ὦμαι (S 1973): “[I think] that I would come at the inquiry,” or more idiomatically, “[I think] I might approach the inquiry . . . .”

ὥδε: “in this way,” i.e., “as follows” (S 1245).

ἄρα: inferential (“so,” “then”). See note on ἄρα at 365c3.

Ἀλλὰ: assentient in a reply where the speaker “not only agrees, but repudiates the very idea that dissent is possible” (GP 16 (6)): “Why, . . . ?” Cf. the note on Ἀλλὰ at 367b5.

τί μὲλλει: lit., “What [else] is it likely [to be]?” or more idiomatically, “What else
is there to say)?” “Why, yes, of course.” See note on Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει at 365c5.

The interrogative pronoun τίς always retains its acute accent (S 154a (2)).

373d6 οὖν: perhaps at once progressive and inferential: “Well then, . . . .”

373d7 Ἀν’ οὖν οὐ: “Now, is . . . not . . . ?” Here οὖν is progressive.

ἀφα “forecasts an affirmative reply” when followed by οὗ (GP 46 (3)).

373d7 ποιεῖν τί: If the τί is nominative, this phrase means: “a doing,” or “a sort of doing” (S 1267, last four lines of paragraph). If the τί is accusative, as seems more likely, the phrase means: “to do something.”

373d7 τὸ θεῖν: articular infinitive as a subject in the nominative (S 2031): “running.”

373d8 μὲν οὖν: The combination μὲν οὖν is used in affirmative replies (“certainly,” “to be sure”), but also in contradictions or corrections (“nay,” “on the contrary”). Here it may be taken as formally contradicting the οὗ in Socrates’ question. See GP 480 (“Again, where a nonne question precedes, μὲν οὖν may be taken as contradicting the negative: ‘doch’.”).

373d8 ἐργάζεσθαι τί: Like ποιεῖν, the verb ἐργάζεσθαι can mean both “doing” and “making,” but it is more tightly bound to the senses of working, performing tasks, and doing deeds than is ποιεῖν. Possible renderings: “a sort of performing,” “to perform some act.”

373e2 τότε: Probably best left untranslated in English, this τότε seems to refer back to the verbal idea contained in the nominative subject (ὁ κακῶς . . . θέων), helping to make it clear that the “bad and shameful” act which this subject performs in a footrace is not anything beyond what has already been mentioned but simply this, running badly, the very act that defines him as a subject.

A literal rendering: “So the one who runs badly, [in doing] this [very thing] performs a bad and shameful act in a footrace?”

373e2 πῶς γὰρ οὐ: “For how not (so)?” i.e., “Yes, of course.” See note on Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει at 365c5. When it ends a sentence, οὕ receives an accent (S 180a).

373e4 ἐκὼν: This should be taken closely with ἐργάζεται at the end of the line.

373e5 Ἐοικέν γε: See the notes on Ἐοικέν at 368a7 and on ὡς Ἐοικέν at 365c3.

The γε suggests that Hippias is using his tone of voice to resist the trend of Socrates’ questions, however feebly: “It seems so.”

373e6 Ἐν δρόμῳ μὲν ἄρα: The μὲν anticipates the δέ at 374a1 (cf. note on Ἐν δρόμῳ μὲν at d4 above). The ἄρα is inferential. Both particles give extra weight to δρόμῳ: “In a footrace, then, . . . .”
373e6 πονηρότερος: See note on πονηροτέρους at 372e6.

374a1 Ἐν δρόμῳ γε: As stated above (in the note on οὐ γὰρ ὃ γε ἀδύνατος at 368a5), when γε emphasizes a word that is preceded by an article (or in this case a preposition), it usually lies in-between the word and the article (or preposition). When such a γε is nevertheless postponed until after the stressed word, a stronger emphasis than usual may be felt (GP 147 (b), our passage cited): “In a footrace, yes.”

374a1 Τί δ᾽ ἐν πάλη: “And what (about) in wrestling?” “And what (do you say) in (the case of) wrestling?”

Cf. 374e2: Τί δὲ φωνῆς πέρι λέγεις; “And what do you say about voice?”

374a2 πίπτων . . . τὸ πίπτειν . . . τὸ καταβάλλειν: Although πίπτειν literally means “fall,” while καταβάλλειν means “throw down” or “throw,” it is probably best to translate πίπτειν here as if it were the passive of καταβάλλειν, since in Greek, and particularly in Attic, certain intransitive verbs tend to replace the passives of certain transitive verbs. Cf. S 1752 (“πίπτειν in ἐκπίπτειν (fall out) be expelled = pass. of ἐκβάλλειν: οἱ ἐκπεπτωκότες ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου those who had been expelled by the people”).

374a5 Καὶ ἐν πάλη ἄρα: adverbal καί, emphasizing πάλη (GP 325-6.V); inferential ἄρα: “So in (the case of) wrestling, too, . . .”

374a7 Τί δὲ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ τῇ τοῦ σώματος χρείᾳ: The phrase ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ χρείᾳ would be ambiguous between “in the other use” and “in (all) the rest of (the) use,” since the word ἄλλος + the article often means “the rest” or “all besides” (LSJ, ἄλλος, II.6). Adding a form of πᾶς removes this ambiguity: “And what (about) in all the rest of the use of the body?”

A similar construction is found in Herodotus (3.68.3): καὶ ταύτῃ τε συνοίκες καὶ τῇ συνοίκες τῇ συνοίκες τῇ τῇ Καμβύσεω γυναιξί (“and he lived with this woman and with all the other wives of Cambyses”).

374a8 οἱ βελτίων τὸ σῶμα: The accusative of respect is often used of parts of the body (S 1601a). Here it is used of the body as a whole: “he who is better in body.” The accusative of respect is also often applied to adjectives meaning “better” or “worse” (S 1600a).

374a8 καὶ τὰ ἱσχυρὰ καὶ τὰ ἀσθενῆ: “the strong and the feeble . . .”

Here τὰ ἱσχυρὰ (“the strong”) and τὰ ἀσθενῆ (“the weak,” “the feeble”) seem to be being used in the sense of “the acts of a strong body,” “the acts of a weak body.”

The καὶ . . . καὶ construction, emphasizing each element separately (S 2877), is here perhaps best translated as a single italicized “and”.

374b1 τὰ αἰσχρὰ . . . τὰ καλά: Since Socrates is speaking of bodily acts in a social
context, either “ugly” or “shameful” would be a suitable translation for **αἰσχρά**, either “beautiful” or “noble” for **καλά**.

374b1 ὅταν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πονηρὰ ἑργάζηται: “whenever he performs acts that are bad/poor in a bodily sense . . .”

When κατὰ (+ acc.) means *in relation to, as far as concerns, after the fashion of*, etc. (LSJ, κατά, B.IV.2, 3), it is often in contrast to something else. Cf. Agamemnon’s words to Clytemnestra in Aeschylus’s *Agamemnon* (925): λέγω κατ’ ἄνδρα, μὴ θεόν, σέβειν ἐμέ “I tell you to revere me as a man, not (as) a god.” Since the adjective πονηρός can mean “morally bad” (cf. note on πονηροτέρους at 372e6), it seems that Socrates is here suggesting a contrast between πονηρά in a bodily sense (κατὰ τὸ σῶμα) and πονηρά in a moral or spiritual sense (κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν).

374b3 Ἐοικεν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἰσχύν οὔτως ἔχειν: adverbial καί: “Cases where strength is concerned seem to be like this, too,” or, “It seems to be this way in matters of strength as well.”

See S 1153 (and esp. 1153c): “The article has the power to make substantive any word or words to which it is prefixed.” So here, τὰ + κατὰ + τὴν ἰσχύν = a single noun-phrase meaning “the things concerning strength,” or “cases where strength is concerned,” or more simply, “matters of strength.”

There are three different ways to construe the grammatical role of the phrase τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἰσχύν. It could be nominative, serving as the subject of ἐοικεν ("Cases where strength is concerned seem to be like this, too"). Or it could be accusative, serving as the subject of the infinitive ἔχειν in an impersonal construction with ἐοικεν ("It seems that matters of strength are like this also"). Or it could be an accusative of respect, limiting the application of οὕτως ἔχειν ("It seems to be this way in matters of strength as well"). The first option seems the most likely, since personal constructions with forms of ἐοικα are regularly preferred in Greek over corresponding impersonal constructions with ἐοικε(ν) (S 1983). But compare Τὰ γοῦν τοιαῦτα at 374d7, which would seem to support the third option.

374b5 Τί δὲ κατ’ εὐσχημοσύνην: “And what of good comportment?”

Socrates seems to be using κατὰ as Hippias just used it, omitting the τὰ for brevity’s sake (see previous note).

Prepositions or conjunctions that have an acute accent on the ultima, such as κατὰ or ἀλλά, lose their accents in elision. When other kinds of “oxytones” (words that have an acute accent on the ultima) suffer elision, the accent is not lost, but moved to the penult. For example, πολλά + ἐπάθον = πόλλ᾽ ἐπάθον (S 174).

In addition to its general meaning of *figure, shape, form*, the word σχῆμα may specifically mean *bearing, air, mien, as well as gesture, posture, position (of the body)* (LSJ, σχῆμα, 1, 3, 7). A person who is εὐσχήμων is one who is “elegant in figure, mien and bearing,” or one who makes a good outward show—though bad on the inside (LSJ, εὐσχήμων, 1, 2). The abstract noun
εὐσχημοσύνη normally means *gracefulness, decorum*, sometimes of a superficial kind (at *Republic* 366b, for example, Adeimantus discusses the possibility of fooling gods and men by combining the greatest injustice “with counterfeit decorum” [b4: μετ’ εὐσχημοσύνης καὶ δήλου]). In the present passage, context seems to require a meaning rooted in the bodily meanings of σχῆμα (note the use of σώματος at b6).

374b5 οὐ τοῦ βελτίωνος σώματος ἐστίν: genitive “of belonging,” used predicatively with εἰμί, as often of a person’s or thing’s *nature* (S 1304): “Is it not (the nature) of a better body,” “Does it not belong to the better body . . .?”

374b6 ἔκοντος: attracted into the genitive by σώματος (cf. S 1978), though modifying the (unexpressed) accusative subject of the infinitive σχηματίζειν (cf. S 936).


An infinitive that serves as the subject of its sentence, as σχηματίζειν does here, may or may not take the article (cf. S 1984, S 2031).

Direct objects may be said to be of two basic kinds: (1) the external object, or “object affected,” that which directly receives the action in question and is not already implied in the verbal idea (e.g., ἀνδρὰ τύπτειν “to strike a man”); and (2) the internal object, or “object effected,” that which is brought about by the action in question and typically already implied in the verb (e.g., πληγὰς τύπτειν “to strike blows”) (S 1554). Many internal objects are also cognate accusatives, i.e., direct objects “of the same origin as” (S 1564) or “of kindred meaning with” (S 1567) the verb (e.g., τεῖχος τειχίζειν “to build a wall”). In the phrase σχήματα σχηματίζειν, the word σχήματα is both an internal object and a cognate accusative.

374b8 Καὶ ἄσχημοσύνη ἄρα ἢ μὲν ἐκούσιος . . . ἢ δὲ ἅγονος: adverbial καί.

The singular feminine subject ἄσχημοσύνη (“lack of gracefulness,” “bad comportment”) is divided into two parallel subjects by the ἢ μὲν . . . ἢ δὲ construction: “So bad comportment, too: the voluntary kind . . . , (while) the involuntary kind . . . .”

ἐκούσιος is often a two-termination adjective, as here, though it also occurs as a three-termination adjective. Cf. S 289d.

374c1 πρὸς ἄρετῆς ἐστίν, . . . πρὸς πονηρίας σώματος: The word σώματος seems to apply both to ἄρετῆς and to πονηρίας: “(springs) from excellence of body, . . . (springs) from inferiority of body.”

The basic meaning of πρὸς + genitive is “from” or “from the side of,” though it can also mean “on the side of (genealogically),” and “at the hand of” (LSJ, πρὸς, A.1.5, II.1). Here the use of πρὸς + genitive resembles that of the genitives “of belonging” found at b5-7 (see note on οὐ τοῦ βελτίωνος σώματος ἐστίν at b5), which indicate that something is characteristic of, or naturally comes from, something else. Cf. S 1695b (“Characteristic: οὐ γὰρ ἢν πρὸς τοῦ
for it was not the way of Cyrus” and LSJ, πρός, A.IV (“of that which is derivable from”).

374c2 Τί δὲ . . . λέγεις: “And what do you say . . . ?” Cf. notes on Τί δ’ ἐν πάλη at 374a1 and on Τί δὲ at 371e7.

374c2 φωνῆς πέρι: an instance of “anastrophe,” the turning-back of an acute accent from ultima to penult, when a disyllabic preposition comes after, not before, the word it governs (S 175a: “τούτων πέρι (for περὶ τούτων)

374c3 βελτίω: fem. sing. acc. < βελτίων (S 293).

374c3 ἀπάδουσαν: < ἀπᾴδω, sing out of tune.

374c4 Μοχθηροτέραν: comp. < μοχθηρός, in bad condition.

374c5 Δέξαιο δ’ ἂν πότερον: potential optative with ἂν (S 1824) used in a question (S 1831): “And would you prefer . . . ?” “And would you rather . . . ?”

When a form of δέχομαι is supplemented by an infinitive (here κεκτῆσθαι) and accompanied by πότερον (introducing two alternatives), it means “prefer” (LSJ, δέχομαι, I.1: “c. inf., prefer”).

374c5 κεκτῆσθαι: “to possess” (perfect middle infinitive < κτάομαι, acquire). Cf. note on ἐκτῆσθαι at 375a8.

374c6 Πότερον: Normally, πότερον (neut. acc. < πότερος) functions as an adverb, and that is probably how it is working here. It is possible, however, to construe this πότερον as the direct (neuter) object of δέξαιο, in keeping with its original use as a pronoun (cf. S 2660): “And which would you prefer: . . . ?”

374c7 πόδας: masc. acc. pl. < πούς.

374c7 ἐκουσίως χωλαίνοντας: “that limp voluntarily . . . .”

374d1 Χωλεία . . . ποδῶν: lit., “lameness of feet,” if indeed χωλεία governs ποδῶν (see next note). The expression may have sounded as redundant to Plato’s first readers as it does to us; but compare Aristophanes, Thesmophoriazusae 24: χωλὸς εἶναι τῷ σκέλει “to be lame in my [two] legs” (dual acc. of respect).

374d1 οὐχὶ: See note on οὐχὶ at 363a2.

The placement of οὐχὶ after ποδῶν suggests that ποδῶν is governed by the subject χωλεία, not by the predicate nominatives πονηρία and ἀσχημοσύνη, though these may also be understood with ποδῶν (cf. d3: πονηρία ὀφθαλμῶν).

374d2 Τί δὲ: a brief way of saying: “So that’s where you stand on that last question—what about this next one?” See note on Τί δὲ at 366e1. Cf. note on Τί δὲ at 371e7.
374d2 ἀμβλυωπία: “dim-sightedness” (< ἀμβλύς, dull, dim + ὦψ, eye, face).

374d3 οὖν: here inferential (S 2964; GP 426): “then,” “therefore,” “well then . . . .”

374d3 ἂν βούλοιο: potential optative (cf. Δέξαμο . . . ἂν at 374c5): “[which eyes] would you wish [to] . . . ,” “[which eyes] would you prefer [to] . . . ?”

374d4 ποτέροις συνεῖναι: < σύνειμι, be with, live with + dat.: “which (eyes) (would you rather) live with?”

374d4 οἷς: dat. of instrument or means (S 1507), antecedent omitted (S 2509): “(those) with which . . . ?”

374d5 ἂν . . . ἀμβλυώττοι καὶ παρορῴη: potential optative (S 1824): “would see dimly and askew . . . .”

The verb ἀμβλυώττω (be weak-sighted, lack sharp vision) is used in Plato’s Republic to describe the temporarily dim vision of an enlightened person upon returning to the cave of shadows and images (Republic 516e9: ἐν ὦ ἀμβλυώττει “while his vision was still dim”; 517d6: ἐτι ἀμβλυώττων “while still blinking through the gloom” [LCL translation]).

παρά + ὁράω = παροράω (look at by the way, overlook, see amiss). Here the prefix παρα- appears to mean “amiss” or “wrong.” Cf. the verb παρακούω (hear beside, eavesdrop, mishear).

374d6 Βελτίω: neut. acc. pl. < βελτίων (S 293; contrast βελτίω at 374c3), prominently placed as the first word in its sentence and emphasized by the lively particle ἄρα (cf. note on ἄρ᾽ at 371e4).

374d6 ἡγήσας: 2nd pers. sing. perfect middle indicative < ἡγέομαι, believe, hold.

The perfect of this verb is usual in Herodotus (LSJ, ἡγέομαι, III.1), but not in Plato. Socrates may use it here to suggest a lasting state of belief in which Hippias stands committed: “you are of the belief . . . .”

374d6 τῶν σαυτοῦ: The τῶν is partitive genitive (S 1306), the reflexive pronoun σαυτοῦ is genitive of possession (S 1297ff., esp. 1299): “of the things of yourself,” “of the things possessed by you . . . .”

374d6 τὰ ἐκυψοῦντος πονηρὰ ἐφαγαξόμενα: “those which voluntarily perform bad/sorry acts,” “those which voluntarily perform poorly . . . .”

374d7 Τὰ γοῦν τοιαῦτα: This γοῦν is not the usual γοῦν of “part proof” (see note on ψεύδεται γοῦν at 370a2) but rather one used in conceding a point while also emphatically limiting its scope. Denniston gives our passage a fine translation (GP 451 (i)): “Yes, in cases like that.”
Οὐκοὗν: merely inferential, nearly indistinguishable from οὖν (S 2952), or perhaps also interrogative, expecting an affirmative answer (S 2951), in which case the sentence could end with a question mark: “Then,” “So then . . . ?”

Cf. GP 433 (2): “In Plato . . . the boundary between οὐκοὗν questions and οὐκοUiThread statements cannot be rigidly drawn. There is probably always some tinge of interrogation in the tone: and it is significant that . . . Plato uses οὐκοUiThread in dialogue only, never in continuous discourse. . . . I should be inclined, in fact, to . . . insert the question-mark everywhere . . . .”

οἷον: adverbial use of neut. sing. acc. (< οἷος). Often a good translation of οἷον, especially in technical works, is “e.g.” (LSJ, οἷος, V.2.b: “as for instance, . . . as for example”). Here “such as” works well.

ὦτα: acc. pl. (< ὦς, τό, ear (gen. ὦτός)).


αἰσθήσεις: In the singular, αἴσθησις commonly has the abstract meaning of sensation or sense-perception. In the plural it more often denotes the organs of sense-perception, i.e., the senses.

eἷς λόγος συνέχει: “one statement embraces/cover[s] all . . . .”

Rather than reason, argument, or speech, three common meanings for λόγος in Plato, here the meaning is probably statement, or perhaps rule (cf. LSJ, λόγος, III.2d, 3; IX.3b).

The root meaning of συνέχω is hold together, keep together; it can also mean enclose (LSJ, συνέχω, I.1, 2b). Here συνέχει evidently means embrace or cover in a logical sense (LSJ, συνέχω, I.3: “contain, comprise, embrace [our passage cited]”).

τὰς . . . ἐργαζόμενας . . . έἶναι: indirect discourse spelling out the content of the λόγος mentioned above: “that those [senses] which perform . . . are . . . .”

The phrase τὰς . . . ἐργαζόμενας agrees in gender with αἰσθήσεως, which is understood.

ἀκτήτους: “not worth getting,” “not to be desired as possessions.”

Like most two-termination adjectives (S 288), ἀκτήτος is a compound (< alpha privative + κτήτος, that may be acquired; worth getting, desirable).

ὁς πονηρὰς οὔσας: “as being bad,” “since they are in poor condition.”

Here ὁς is used adverbially to introduce a reason or motive (cf. S 2086). This causal use of ὁς + participle is not to be confused with the causal use of ὁς as a subordinating conjunction + a finite verb (cf. LSJ, ὁς, B.IV vs. C.I.1, 2), though the two may have identical English translations.
374e2 Ἐμοίγε δοξεῖ: See last two paragraphs of note on Εἰκός γε κτλ. at 368a3.

The particle γε has “a tendency to attach itself to pronouns” even when the pronoun requires “no stress, or at most a secondary stress” (GP 122). Thus the emphasis here may fall more on δοξεῖ than on Ἐμοί: “I think so, yes.”

374e3 ὀργάνων ποτέρων βέλτιων ἡ κοινωνία: “With which instruments (is there) the better association . . . ?” “Which instruments is it better to have to do with . . . ?”

An ὀργάνον is an instrument or tool, whether mechanical, musical, logical, or biological (e.g., a sense organ). Socrates’ transition from talk of αἰσθήσεις (sense organs) to talk of ὀργάνα is thus quite smooth.

The abstract noun κοινωνία, communion, association, is closely related to the verb κοινωνέω (< κοινός, comm, shared in common), which in addition to meaning have in common with, share, can also mean have dealings with [someone], have to do with [something] (LSJ, κοινωνέω, 2b). The non-personal object of κοινωνία, the thing that is shared by the people in question or that with which a person has to do, is usually in the genitive case (LSJ, κοινωνία, 2). Cf. Euripides, Iphigenia in Tauris 254: καὶ τίς θαλάσσης βουκόλοις κοινωνία; “And what do herdsmen have to do with the sea?”

374e4 οἶον: “for example” (see note on οἶον at 374d8).

374e4 πηδάλιον: “steering paddle,” “rudder” (of a ship).

374e5 κυβερνήσει: < κυβερνάω, steer, act as helmsman.

374e5 βέλτιον ἢ ὣ: One can tell from Hippias’s reply (e5: Ὡτ ἔχων) that he hears this ἢ not as the ἢ of comparison (“than”) after a comparative adjective (“[Is] . . . better than (one) with which . . . ?”), but rather as the ἢ of disjunction (“or”): “[Is] . . . (the) better (rudder), or (one) with which . . . ?”

374e5 Οὐ καὶ τόξων ὠσαύτως καὶ λύρα: The οὐ expects an affirmative answer (S 2651): “Is not a bow the same way also, and a lyre . . . ?” “Is it not the same with bow and arrow, too, and lyre . . . ?”

The second καί is adverbial (“also,” “too”), coming as it does right after an οὐ. The second καί is almost certainly an “and,” though in other contexts where ὠσαύτως (in like manner, the same way) is followed by καί, the καί is best rendered “as” (LSJ, ὠσαύτως, 1; cf. LSJ, καί, A.III.1: “after words implying sameness or likeness, as”).

A τόξον is a bow, though τόξα (pl.) may also mean bow and arrows, or sometimes only arrows (LSJ, τόξον, II).

374e6 αὐλοὶ: Musical pipes, fitted with vibrating reeds, were normally played in pairs, a hand on each pipe.

374e6 τἄλλα σύμπαντα: “the others all together,” “all the rest.”
Ἀληθῆ λέγεις: “You speak the truth.” Cf. 372a6 (Ὁρᾶς, ὦ Ἱππία, ὅτι ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω . . . ; “Do you see, Hippias, that I speak the truth . . .?”).

κεκτῆσθαι . . . ἄμεινον: The perfect inf. κεκτήσαται (< κτάσαι) is the subject of the predicate adj. ἄμεινον, with ἐστὶ understood: “Is possessing . . . better,” “Is it better to possess . . .,” “Is it better to have in one’s possession . . .?”

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ἡ . . . ἢ <ἡ> : relative pron. (dative of means), followed by ἡ of disjunction (“or”), followed by another relative pron. (dative of means).

There is no second ἡ in the MSS, but given the form of Hippias’s reply at a2-3 (Ἡ ἔκών instead of just Ἐκών), and given the likelihood that a scribe, when faced with the abnormal sequence ἢ ἢ, would have taken it for an error and omitted the ἡ, this is a plausible conjecture.

ἱππεύσει: fut. <ἱππεύω, be a horseman, ride.

Ἀμείνων: feminine predicate adjective, the understood subject being ψυχή (or more specifically, ψυχῇ ἱπποῦ ἡ ἑκών τις κακῶς ἱππεύσει).

Τῇ ἀμείνῳ ἃ ἡ ψυχή: The placement of lively ἃ emphasizes ἄμεινον: “So with the better soul . . .”

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Τῇ ἀμείνῳ ἃ ἡ ψυχή: The placement of lively ἃ emphasizes ἄμεινον: “So with the better soul . . .”

τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα ταύτης τὰ πονηρὰ: “the acts of this soul that are poor(ly performed),” or more idiomatically, “the faulty work of this kind of soul . . . .”

The first unit in this complex phrase is τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα, which standing alone would simply mean “the deeds/acts/work(s) of the soul.” The next word, ταύτης, modifies τῆς ψυχῆς, and these three words taken together may mean “this kind of soul” or “such a soul,” i.e., an equine soul, rather than merely “this soul” (cf. note on τούτου at 369e1). The last unit, τὰ πονηρά, delimits a subset of τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα ταύτης (“the acts of this kind of soul”), namely, the acts that are πονηρά.

ἄν ποιοῖ: potential optative. The subject is presumably the τις from a2: “one would do,” “he would do.”

τῇ δὲ τῆς πονηρᾶς: “the (soul) of the faulty mare,” “that of the faulty (female) horse.”

Here we expect to find a phrase that is parallel to Τῇ ἄμεινον (ψυχῆ) at a3 [“With the better (soul)"], e.g., τῇ δὲ πονηροτέρῃ (ψυχῆ) [“With the worse (soul)"]. What we get instead are three different manuscript readings, all
questionable: (1) τῇ δὲ τῆς πονηρᾶς, (2) τῇ δὲ τῆς πονηρίας, and (3) τῇ δὲ τῆς πονηρῆς. In (1), which Burnet accepts, τῇ presumably refers to the soul of the (second, inferior) horse, while the words τῆς πονηρᾶς evidently refer to the horse itself, which Socrates seems to imagine as a female nag.

375a6 Πάνυ γε: See note on Πάνυ γε at 366d1.

375a6 Οὐκοῦν: here interrogative, expecting an affirmative answer (the “Ναί” a7), as well as inferential (cf. note on Οὐκοῦν at 374d8): “Then . . . ?”

375a6 καὶ κυνός: adverbial καί, gen. κυνός (< κύων, dog) parallel to ἵππου (a4 and a1): “also (with the soul) of a dog,” “also (with) a canine (soul) . . . .”

375a7 Τί δὲ δή; ἄνθρωπος: The δή is emphatic, adding feeling to the question, and possibly also connective, indicating a link between logical steps (cf. GP 204.1, 210 (5), and 236.1V).

The variation after three plain “Τί δή;”s (374d2, 374e3, 375a1) comes at a significant point in Socrates’ line of questioning. He now begins to talk about a human soul, a fact underscored by the position of ἄνθρωπος (ἄνθρωπον ὑπηρέθαι). Compare the position of ὑπηρέθαι at a1 (ὑπηρέθαι κεκτήσαι ἵππου), where Socrates began to talk about souls.

375a8 ἐκτῆσθαι = κεκτῆσθαι. The two are alternate forms of the perfect infinitive of κτάομαι. Cf. LSJ, κτάομαι: “pf. κέκτημαι Hesiod, Works and Days 437, etc., ἐκτῆσθαι Iliad 9.402, Aesch., Prometheus Bound 795, Hdt. 2.44, and sometimes in Plato . . . .”

Plato uses both forms in rapid succession (avoiding hiatus) at Theaetetus 198d2-3: πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι τοῦ κεκτήσθαι ἔνεκα (“before possessing, for the sake of possessing”).

375a8 τοξότου: < τοξότης, bowman, archer: “[a human soul,] (that) of an archer, . . . ”

375a8 ὡς . . . ὡς: “a [human soul] . . . which . . . [or] one which . . . ?”

As the indefinite pronoun τίς, usually translated as “anyone” or “someone,” is sometimes better rendered as “a person,” “a [noun],” or “one,” so the indefinite relative pronoun ὃς, usually translated as “whoever” or “anyone who,” is sometimes better rendered as “a person (who),” “a [noun] who,” or “one who.” Cf. LSJ, ὃς, II (“ὁ ὃντινα . . . one through whom”).

375a8 ἀμαρτάνει τοῦ σκόπου: “misses the mark,” “misses the target.”

Genitive objects are used with verbs that signify aiming at some end, obtaining one’s end, or (as here) falling short of or missing some goal. See S 1349, 1350, 1352, and compare Socrates’ use of τῶν . . . πραγμάτων at 372b3, as well as his earlier use of τῶν λεγομένων at 364b6.

375b2 καὶ αὕτη: adverbial καί: “this (soul) too . . . ?”
375b2 εἰς τοξικήν: < ἡ τοξική τέχνη (the art of the bow, i.e., archery): “in regard to archery,” “for archery,” “at archery.”

375b3 Καὶ ψυχῆ ἄρα: “So a soul, too . . . ?” “So even a soul . . . ?”
Socrates emphasizes the word ψυχῆ by sandwiching it between an adverbial καὶ, which “normally comes next before the emphatic word” (GP 325-6), and a lively inferential ἄρα, which tends to highlight the word it follows (cf. the use of ἄρα at 374b8 and at 371e4).

375b4 Ἐν τοξικῇ γε: See note on Ἐν δρόμῳ γε at 374a1.

375b4 Τί δ’ ἐν ἰατρικῇ: < ἡ ἰατρικὴ τέχνη (the healer’s art, the medical art): “And what about in medicine?”

375b4 οὐχὶ: See note on οὐχὶ at 363a2.

375b5 περὶ τὰ σώματα: “in attendance upon bodies,” “in the treatment of bodies.”
περὶ + acc. can be used of “the object about which a person is occupied or concerned” (LSJ, περὶ, C.1.3), as a groom about a horse (ὁ περὶ τὸν ἵππον [“the man employed about the horse”], Xenophon, On the Art of Horsemanship 6.3).

375b5 ἰατρικωτέρα: predicate adjective: “more medical,” “more skilled in medicine.”

375b6 Ἀμείνων ἄρα αὕτη: “So this soul is better . . . .”
The word Ἀμείνων, placed prominently at the head of the sentence, is further emphasized by ἄρα. Hippias echoes this key word in his reply (b7).

375b6 τῆς μὴ [ἰατρικῆς]: genitive of comparison.
Here μὴ is used instead of οὐ because Socrates is imagining a type, not a specific individual. Cf. the use of μὴ with generic participles, S 2052.
If ἰατρικῆς is retained, the expression means: “the soul that is not skilled in medicine.” This is an acceptable sense in the context, though Socrates’ point is made sharper if ἰατρικῆς is omitted (as Burnet suggests, following Schleiermacher): “the soul that does not,” i.e., the soul that in the treatment of bodies does not perform bad acts of its own volition (contrast b5).

375b7 ή καθαριστικωτέρα καὶ αὐλητικωτέρα: It is possible to construe this καὶ as a straightforward “and,” but it seems more natural to hear it as a καὶ that links alternatives, like ἢ (GP 292 (8)): “the soul that is more skilled at playing the cithara, (or) more skilled at piping, . . .” Otherwise, by the time the comma at c1 is reached, Socrates would have described the soul of an amazingly versatile man—an attractive possibility, perhaps, given the earlier emphasis on Hippias’s own versatility, though still quite strange in the present context.

375b8 καὶ τάλλα πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὰς τέχνας τε καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας: The neut. pl.
phrase τῶλα πάντα (“all the others”) has no particular noun as its antecedent. Instead, it gestures vaguely at “all the rest,” like the neut. pl. cetera in et cetera.

As phrases of the form κατά + [acc. noun] are sometimes periphrases for corresponding adverbs (e.g., κατά τάχος = ταχέως [LSJ, κατά, B.VIII]), so phrases of the form τά κατά + [acc. noun] are sometimes periphrases for corresponding adjectival noun-phrases (e.g., τά κατά πόλεμον = τά πολεμικά [LSJ, κατά, B.IV.2]). The present phrase, in other words, may be equivalent to the English phrase “and all the other technical and scientific (activities).”

Another way to make sense of this κατά is quasi-spatially, as denoting distribution throughout an area (cf. LSJ, κατά, B.I.2): “and all the other (activities) throughout the arts and sciences.”

375c2 ἐξαμαρτάνει: See note on οἱ ἑκόνες ἐξαμαρτάνοντες κτλ. at 372e2.

375c3 Φαίνεται: “It appears so.”

375c3 Ἀλλὰ μήν που τάς γε τῶν δούλων ψυχὰς: “But surely, I suppose, [we would choose to possess] slaves’ souls . . . .”

The unit ἀλλὰ μήν, often augmented by γε, may be adversative (“but surely,” “and yet”) or progressive (“well then,” “further,” “again”) (GP 341 (1), (4); cf. S 2786), either of which would suit the present passage.

The polite tone of uncertainty introduced by που softens the force of μήν, much as it softens emphatic δή in δήπου. Cf. the note on Ἡκιστά γε δήπου at 371e6.

Here γε “serves to define more sharply the new idea introduced: ‘this, and nothing else’” (GP 119 (ii)).

375c4 κεκτῆσθαι δεξαίμεθ᾽ ἂν μᾶλλον . . . . ἢ: potential optative: “we would prefer to possess [acc. direct obj.] rather than . . . .”

375c5 κακουργούσας: “[which] work ill,” “[which] work badly.”

The same verb (κακουργέω) that at 365e-9 and at 373b8 meant work mischief, or cause trouble, here seems to mean work badly, or do shoddy work, as a skilled or unskilled laborer.

Cf. Socrates’ use of the kindred noun κακοσφία (“wickedness,” “malpractice,” “bad workmanship”) at Republic 421d-422a: Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὀργανά γε μή ἔχουν παρέχεθαι ὑπὸ πενίας ἢ τι ἄλλο τὸν εἰς τὴν τέχνην τὰ τε ἔργα ποιῆσαι ἐγκάθιστα καὶ τοὺς υἱοὺς ἢ ἄλλους σῶς ἢν διδάσας κεῖτα πημορικοῦσα διδάσκεται . . . Ἐτέρα δή, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸς φύλαξιν ἰνακτίμαζε, τὸν παντὶ τρόπῳ φυλακτέον . . . . Τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα; Πλούσισ τε, ἂν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ πενία: ὡς τοῦ μὲν τρυφῆν καὶ ἄργηαν καὶ νεοτερισμόν ἑμποιοῦντος, τῆς δὲ ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ κακοσφίαν πρὸς τῷ νεοτερισμῷ. “And yet again, if from poverty he is unable to provide himself with tools and other requirements of his art, the work that he turns out will be worse, and he will also make inferior workmen of his sons or any others whom he teaches . . . . Here, then, is a second group of things it seems that our guardians must guard
against . . .” “What are they?” “Wealth and poverty,” I said, “since the one brings luxury, idleness and innovation, and the other illiberality and bad workmanship in addition to innovation.” [LCL translation, lightly revised]

375c5 ὡς ἀμείνους οὖσας εἰς ταῦτα: “insasmuch as (the former) are better for these (tasks),” or more freely, “on the grounds that the former are better at all this work.”

See note on ὡς πονηρὰς οὖσας at 374e1.

375c6 τὴν ἡμετέραν αὐτῶν: “the (soul) of ourselves,” “our own soul.”

Even alone, without a form of αὐτός, the possessive pronouns ἐμός (“my”), ὃς (“your”), ἡμέτερος (“our”), and ύμετέρος (“your”) are sometimes used reflexively (“my own,” “your own,” etc.) (S 1198, 1199.2b, 1200.2a). They are also all equivalent, roughly speaking, to the corresponding genitive forms of the personal pronoun (e.g., ἐμός = μου [“my,” “of me”], ἡμέτερος = ἡμῶν [“our,” “of us”]) (S 1196). Plural reflexive personal pronouns are created when oblique cases of αὐτοί are added to corresponding forms of the personal pronoun (e.g., ἡμῶν + αὐτῶν [“of us” + “(our)selves”] = ἡμῶν αὐτῶν [“of ourselves”]) (S 329). When using the possessive pronoun ἡμέτερος or ύμετέρος reflexively, a speaker will often add αὐτῶν—always in the genitive, since ἡμέτερος αὐτῶν [“our own”] is equivalent to ἡμῶν αὐτῶν [“of ourselves”]—in order to make it a stronger, unambiguous reflexive (S 1200.2b).

375c7 οὐ βουλοίμεθ᾽ ἂν ὡς βελτίστην ἐκτῆσθαι: “would we not wish to possess [our own soul] (in) as good (a state) as possible?” ὡς (or ὅτι) + superl. adj. = “as [adj.] as possible” (S 1086). Here the adjective-phrase is used predicatively (cf. S 1040b (1)).

375d1 ὡς πονηρὰς οὖσας εἰς ταῦτα: “insasmuch as (the former) are better for these (tasks),” or more freely, “on the grounds that the former are better at all this work.”

See note on ὡς πονηρὰς οὖσας at 374e1.

375d2 ὡς πονηρὰς οὖσας εἰς ταῦτα: “insasmuch as (the former) are better for these (tasks),” or more freely, “on the grounds that the former are better at all this work.”

See note on ὡς πονηρὰς οὖσας at 374e1.

375d3 ὡς πονηρὰς οὖσας εἰς ταῦτα: “insasmuch as (the former) are better for these (tasks),” or more freely, “on the grounds that the former are better at all this work.”

See note on ὡς πονηρὰς οὖσας at 374e1.

why this mixed conditional form? Hippias may want to register simultaneously (1) the remoteness and (2) the dreadfulness of this possibility. The apodosis of a Future Less Vivid conditional serves to indicate (1), while (2) is best conveyed by a Future Most Vivid conditional, what Smyth calls an “Emotional Future” conditional, the protasis of which “expresses strong feeling” and “commonly suggests something undesired, or feared” (S 2328). Such a
protasis may have modal force, e.g., “am to do” or “must do,” rather than “shall do” or “do.” Cf. Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 206-208 [cited in part at Smyth 2328b]: βαρεῖα μὲν κῆρ τῷ μῆ παθέωθαι, / βαρεῖα δ’ εἶ / τέκνον δοίξο, δόμων ἄγαλμα [“(It were) grievous ruin not to obey, and grievous (too) if I am to slay my child, the pride and joy of my house”].

μεντᾶν = μέντοι ἄν. In a reply with ἄν + optative, μέντοι is often emphatic, expressing “lively surprise or indignation” (GP 402 (iii)), the μὲν expressing the certainty of that which is asserted, while the τοι, as usual, “brings the truth home” to the listener (GP 399.11 (1)). Here μέντοι is used to protest against the previous speaker’s words: “Nay, . . .”

375d5 Ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνονται γε: “(And) yet they do appear (to be so) . . . .”

Typically, in responses after conditional statements, Ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γε eagerly substantiates the condition put forward by the first speaker, often echoing one of his words. Cf. Plato, *Euthyphro* 6e: Ἀλλ᾽ εἰ οὕτω βούλει, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὕτω σοι φράσω. — Ἀλλὰ μὴν βούλομαι γε [“Well, if you wish, Socrates, I will show you in that way, too.” “(Oh,) but I do wish (it)”]. This and many other examples, including our passage here, are cited by Denniston at GP 343 (3). In the present passage, however, the assertion made by Socrates does not substantiate the same condition articulated by Hippias: it is nearly the same, but it adds the important word φαίνονται (or φαίνεται, if other MSS are correct) and focuses attention (γε) on this difference. Cf. the use of φαίνεσθαι at 372e5 and at 376c1.

375d6 Οὔκουν ἔμοιγε: The οὖν in οὔκουν (to be distinguished from οὐκοῦν) emphasizes the negative, while the γε in emphatic ἔμοιγε stresses that the scope of Hippias’s denial is limited to his own perspective: “Not to me!” “Not to me, they don’t.”

375d7 Ἕγῳ δ’ ὑμην: imperf. < οἴομαι. Hippias having emphasized his point of view, Socrates now emphasizes his own (note the placement of Ἕγῳ immediately after Hippias’s ἔμοιγε): “But I thought . . . .,” “And (here) I was thinking . . . .”

375d7 καὶ σοὶ φανῆναι: adverbial καί, emphatic σοί (note accent: S 325a): “that it/they appeared (this way) to you, too,” “that you too had this impression.”

375d7 πάλιν δ’ ἀπόκριναι: aor. mid. impv. < ἀποκρίνομαι. The two basic meanings of πάλιν are back and again: “But answer again,” “But back to answering.”

375d8 ἡ δικαιοσύνη: “(the virtue of) justice,” i.e., the thing possessed by a just person in virtue of which he is just.

375d8 δύναμις τις: Indefinite τις, when used in its adjectival function with a noun, may be the equivalent of the English indefinite article (“a,” “an”) or express a wider sense of indefiniteness (S 1267): “a power,” “a power of some sort,” “an ability,” “a kind of ability.”
ἐπιστήμη: perhaps to be construed closely with τις: “(a) knowledge,” i.e., a kind of knowledge. Cf. the end of note on ἄνεδην οὐτωσος ἐπισκέψαι κτλ. at 368a8.

οὐκ ἀνάγκη: introducing an indirect statement: lit., “is there not a necessity,” i.e., “is it not necessary [that] . . . ,” “must it not be [the case that] . . . ?”

ἔν γε τι τούτων: partitive genitive with ἕν (neut. < εἷς): “some one of these,” i.e., “one or the other of these.” The τι makes ἕν indefinite (“some one,” “one or the other”), while γε restricts the scope of the question to the thought that δικαιοσύνη, the virtue of justice, must at least be one of these, whatever else might be true of it. When γε is used in this “limitative” way, “the common rendering ‘at least’ is on the right lines,” though as Denniston adds, “it gives excessive weight to the particle, which should rather be rendered in English by an inflexion of the voice, or by italics” (GP 114-5 (2)).

τὴν δικαιοσύνην: The article helps make it clear that δικαιοσύνην is the subject of the infinitive (cf. S 1150): “[that] justice is . . . ?”

γάρ που: Here γάρ may retain an original asseverative force (“surely”), somewhat like the δή in δήπου. Cf. GP 57: “[T]he analogy of δή and μήν . . . would suggest that an earlier, asseverative force lay behind the causal sense of γάρ. This supposition accords well with the derivation from γε and ἄρα, particularly if it is regarded here as limitative in force. The combination would then mean ‘this, at any rate (γε), is true, as I realize (ἄρα).’”

The combination γάρ που allows a speaker to state something confidently (γάρ) while also politely opening the door for his listener (που) to confirm or deny the statement. Cf. GP 494 (near top of page): “γάρ που is often used by Plato in such appeals for assent.”

See, e.g., Phaedo 59ab (Phaedo to Echecrates): καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχεδὸν τι οὕτω διεκείμεθα, τοτὲ μὲν γελώντες, ἐνίοτε δὲ διαχρύοντες, εἰς δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ διαφέροντως, Ἀπολλόδωρος—οἶθα γάρ που τὸν ἅγαρ καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ. EX. Πῶς γάρ οὐ: “And all of us who were there were in much the same condition, sometimes laughing and sometimes weeping; especially one of us, Apollodorus—you know the man, surely, and his character.” ECHECRATES: “Yes, of course.” [LCL translation, lightly revised]

ἐφάνη: 2nd aorist passive: “appeared [better].” Here, as at 376a3, there is no participle or infinitive to suggest a stronger or weaker sense for the verb φαίνομαι. See S 2143 and the note on ὄν at 367b6.

ὦ ἄριστε: “(my) excellent (friend).” Cf. note on ἄριστον at 364c5.

This complimentary mode of address, together with the polite pressure of γάρ που, encourages Hippias to assent.
Ἐφάνη γάρ: “Yes, it did appear so.”

In replies, when γάρ expresses assent (S 2806), it sometimes introduces a further statement (“Yes, for . . .”), as for instance at 364d3 above. If there is no such further statement in Hippias’s reply, it may be because it has already been supplied by Socrates. That is, Hippias may be answering Socrates’ initial question by saying: “Yes, the abler soul is more just, for (as you say) the abler soul did appear to us to be better.” Alternatively, Hippias may take himself to be side-stepping Socrates’ initial question and responding only to his last appeal for assent: “Yes, the abler soul did appear to us to be better.”

Τί δ᾽ εἰ: “And what if (it is) . . . ?”

ἡ ἀμφοτέρας ἔχουσα: “the (soul) that has both,” “the (soul) possessing both.”

οὐχ οὕτως ἀνάγκη ἔχειν: “Must it not be so?” “Isn’t this how it must be?” See S 1438 and the note on οὐκ ἀνάγκη at 375d9 above.

Φαίνεται: Hippias’s admission that “it appears so,” both here and at 376a7, is more significant than usual given the earlier exchange at 375d5-7 and Socrates’ later remark at 376b8-c1. Cf. the last paragraph in the note on Ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνονται γε at 375d5.

ἀμείνων οὖσα ἐφάνη: “was revealed as being better,” “was shown to be better.” Cf. the note on οὖν at 376b6.

Like the so-called “philosophical imperfect” (S 1903), this aorist ἐφάνη appears to hark back to an earlier point in the argument, although nowhere in that argument was this conclusion explicitly drawn. Socrates may be thinking of the exchange at 366d3-6: ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν σοφώτατός τε καὶ δυνατώτατός μόνον, ἢ καὶ ἀριστοτατά ταῦτα ἄπερ δυνατώτατός τε καὶ σοφώτατός . . . ; — ΠΠ. Καὶ ἀριστοτάτο δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες. “Are you, then, wisest and ablest only, or best, too, in that area in which you are ablest and wisest . . . ?” “Best, too, presumably, Socrates.”

ἀμφότερα μᾶλλον δυναμένη ποιεῖν: Like οὖσα at e9, δυναμένη is governed by ἐφάνη: “[shown to be] more capable of doing both (kinds of) things . . . .”

περὶ πᾶσαν ἐργασίαν: “connected with every (kind of) work,” “in every activity . . . .” Cf. LSJ, περὶ, C.4 (“round or about a place, and so in”) and C.5 (“in Prose, to denote circumstances connected with any person or thing”).

διὰ: Here διὰ + acc. means “by reason of,” “owing to” (S 1685.2b).

In what sense are δύναμις and τέχνη (the antecedents of ταῦτα) of justice (δικαιοσύνης in the genitive)? It was recently agreed (375d8-e1) that a kind of
ability (δύναμις τις) and/or knowledge (ἐπιστήμη—now the word is τέχνη) is what justice is. Socrates could hardly be suggesting here that δύναμις and/or τέχνη belong to justice as attributes or properties. He must be saying something closer to “these appear to be of the essence of justice.”

376a3 ἦτοι ἄμφοτερα ἦ τὸ ἔτερον: “either both, or [the] one (or the other),” i.e., “either one or both of them.”

The τοι in ἦτοι adds at least a minimal degree of vividness (GP 553 (7)), perhaps with the suggestion that this alternative is the more likely. See LSJ, ἦ (A), A.I.2: “in Classical Greek the alternative introduced by ἦτοι is emphasized . . .” See also S 2858: “ἵτωι may be used instead of the first ἦ when the first member, as is commonly the case, contains the more probable choice. In English the order is often inverted.”

When ἔτερον takes the article, it means “the other,” “the one,” or “one (of two)” (S 337).

376a4 Καὶ: copulative, introducing an additional premise: “And . . . ,”

376a4 τὸ μὲν γε ἄδικεῖν: articular infinitive: “to do wrong . . . .”

The γε concentrates attention, if only momentarily, on the μὲν clause (GP 159).

376a5 τὸ δὲ μὴ ἄδικεῖν: “to not do wrong,” “to do no wrong,” “to refrain from doing wrong.” Articular infinitives take μή for a negative (S 2711, 2712).

376a6 ὅτανπερ ἄδικῇ, ἑκοῦσα ἄδικήσει: “when it (ever) does wrong [if it ever does], it will do wrong voluntarily.”

ὅταν + subjunctive (ἄδικη) in a temporal clause joined to a main clause containing a future indicative verb (ἄδικήσει) is grammatically analogous to a Future More Vivid conditional (ἐάν + subj. in protasis, fut. indic. in apodosis). By contrast, ὅταν + subjunctive joined to a main clause containing a present indicative verb is analogous to a Present General conditional (ἐάν + subj. in protasis, pres. indic. in apodosis) (cf. S 2399b, 2401, 2410). The sense of ὅταν is somewhat different in the two contexts. In the one that is analogous to a Present General conditional, the action denoted in the temporal clause is assumed to have occurred repeatedly and to continue to occur from time to time (cf. Socrates’ description of his divine sign in Plato’s Apology (31d): φωνή τις, ἦ, ὅταν γένηται, ᾧ ἄποτε ἐματαιεῖ με τοῦτο ἢ ἢν μέλλων πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὕτω, “a kind of voice which, whenever it comes, always deters me from whatever I am about to do, but never urges me forward,” cited by Smyth at 2410). By contrast, in the present context, analogous to a Future More Vivid conditional, there is little if any suggestion that the action denoted in the temporal clause has occurred or ever will occur. Rather, the sense of ὅταν here is close to the English expression “if and when.” Cf. LSJ, ὅταν: “with a conditional force, so as nearly to = ἐάν . . . .”
When περ is added to ὅταν, it emphasizes the ὅταν clause. Here it may specifically stress that the current proposition stops short of asserting that such a soul will do wrong. Cf. the function of the εἰπερ clause at b5-6 below.

376b1 Οὐκοῦν: progressive, not inferential (GP 434): “Now, (isn’t it true that) . . . ?”

376b2 Ἄγαθοῦ μὲν ἄρα ἄνδρός ἐστιν: “So it belongs to a good man . . . .”

Here again the genitive is used in saying that it is the part of someone, or that it is in his nature or character, to do something. Cf. S 1304 and see note on οὐ τοῦ βελτίονος κτλ. at 374b5.

The positions of μὲν (introducing a μὲν . . . δέ opposition) and of ἄρα (inferential) and of ἄγαθοῦ itself combine to highlight ἄγαθοῦ.

376b3 ἑκόντα ἄδικεῖν: infinitive (without the article) serving as subject (S 1984): “to do wrong voluntarily.”

The masc. sing. accusative form of ἑκών agrees with the (understood) individual male subject of the infinitive. Cf. S 1972: “In general the subject of the infinitive, if expressed at all, stands in the accusative . . . .”

376b3 εἰπερ: Socrates adds a περ to his εἰ, thereby emphasizing his εἰ clause (“if . . . .”) and prompting Hippias to respond to it alone. The tone conveyed by εἰπερ here seems to be one of feigned doubt: Hippias has just admitted that the man who has the good soul is a good man (b1-2), but is the reverse also true, that the good man has a good soul? Socrates needs this extra point to create an iron-clad argument, so it is not completely trivial. Yet he must feel confident of its truth and of winning Hippias’s assent to it. Cf. the last paragraph of the note on εἰπερ at 367a4.

376b4 Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔχει γε: “But surely he has.” “Well, certainly he does (have such a soul).”

This is a typical Platonic use of Ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γε in a reply, confirming what was proposed in an εἰπερ clause by the previous speaker and emphatically echoing one of his words (here ἔχει) (GP 343 (3), our passage cited on 344).

376b5 εἰπερ τίς ἐστιν οὗτος: “if in fact this (man) is any (actual) (person),” “if in fact anyone is this (man),” “if in fact there is such a man, . . . ”

If the tone of εἰπερ at b3 was one of feigned doubt (see note), here the tone is notably different. For apart from the doubts on this general topic which Socrates expresses in the present dialogue (at 372d7ff. and 376b8ff.), there is evidence elsewhere in Plato’s works that Socrates entertained serious doubts about the existence of such a person. See the note on ἄμαρτάνοντες ἑκόντες at 372d6.

376b6 οὐχ ἃν ἀλλός εἴη ἢ ὁ ἀγαθός: potential opt: “would not be [a person] other than the good (man),” i.e., “would be none other than the good man.”

Singular ἀλλός, which usually means “another” (the pronoun or the adj.), sometimes means other, different, as in the English phrase “is other than” (cf.
LSJ, ἀλλός, III: “less frequently, = ἀλλοίος, of other sort, different”). Here it may be heard equally as a pronoun (“another person,” “a person other [than]”) or as an adjective meaning “other.”

376b7 ὡς ἔχω ὅπως σοι συγχωρήσω... ταῦτα: “I don’t know how I am to agree with you in this,” “I don’t see how I’m to agree with you here . . . .”

The expression ὡς ἔχω (lit., “I have not [the wherewithal to (determine)],” i.e., “I know not,” “I don’t see”) denotes “baffled will, the existence of an obstacle to carrying out an act desired by the speaker or some one else” (S 2546).

When ὅπως is used in an indirect deliberative question (Direct: “How am I [to do X]?” Indirect: “[I don’t know] how I am [to do X].”), it may govern a verb in either the future indicative or the subjunctive (S 2549; cf. LSJ, ὅπως, A.III.1.b, III.2). Here the form συγχωρήσω may be either future indicative or aorist subjunctive, probably without any difference in meaning.

συγχωρήσω may be being used transitively (“concede [some point]”) or intransitively (“agree”). If transitively, ταῦτα is an accusative direct object [“concede this to you”]. If intransitively, a possibility made more likely by the extreme postponement of ταῦτα, the use of ταῦτα (still acc.) must be adverbial [“agree with you in this”].

376b8 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐμοί: “Nor indeed [do I see how] I [am to agree] with myself . . . .”

The negative counterpart of καὶ γὰρ (“for also,” “and indeed”) is οὐδὲ γάρ (“for neither,” “nor indeed”). The use of οὐδὲ γάρ in which οὐδέ, not γάρ, links the expression to its context (“nor indeed”) is “confined to answers, and is associated with ἐγώ, and with word echoes” (GP 111, our passage cited).

Note the juxtaposition of ἐγώ and (emphatic) ἐμοί. Cf. Socrates’ use of the phrase αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ at 371a6.

376b8 ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον οὕτω φαίνεσθαι νῦν ἡμῖν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου: “yet this cannot fail to be how it appears to us now, at least, in the wake of the argument.”

ἐστί must be understood after ἀναγκαῖον (“[it is] necessary [that]” + inf.).

The emphasis of νῦν by γε suggests, given the context, that at another time he and Hippias may have quite the opposite impression. Cf. 372d7-8 (ἐνίοτε μέντοι καὶ τοῦναντίον δοκεῖ μοι τούτων . . . “Sometimes, though, just the reverse of all this seems right to me . . . .”) and see note on νῦν at 372e1.

This use of ἐκ is probably like the use of “from” in the English expression “it appears from what you’ve said” (cf. 375d5: Ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνονται γε ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων). Alternatively, this ἐκ may have a temporal sense (an amplification of νῦν γε), denoting time immediately following, like the English expression “fresh from” (see LSJ, ἐκ, II.2: “of particular points of time, . . . ἐκ τῆς θυσίας γενέσθαι to have just finished sacrifice, Hdt. 1.50, etc.”).

376c1 ὡς μέντοι πάλαι ἔλεγον: “Well, as I said before, . . . .” Socrates is referring to what he said at 372d7-e1.

The literal sense of ὡς is “[the] very [thing] which.” But forms of ὡς are “frequently indistinguishable from simple ὡς” (LSJ, ὡς, I.1), and in such
an expression in English we would probably use “as” instead of “which” (cf. note on ὁλλ᾽ ὅπερ ἐγὼ λέγω at 368e1).
This μέντοι is perhaps not adversative (“yet”) but progressive (“Well, . . .”). (GP 406 (3)).
The adv. πάλαι primarily means “long ago.” But it can also mean “before,” or even “not long ago,” “just now.” See LSJ, πάλαι, II (“before, opposed to the present, sometimes of time just past”).

376c2 ἄνω καὶ κάτω: This expression can mean “to and fro” as well as “up and down.” Plato repeatedly uses this figure of speech to describe the vacillation of the human mind. See, for example, Protagoras 356d5 (ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω) and Gorgias 493a5 (ἄνω κάτω).

376c2 οὐδέποτε: Greek has a number of ways of saying “never”: οὐπότε, οὐδέποτε, οὐπόποτε, οὐδεπόποτε, and the corresponding forms in which μή replaces οὐ. οὐπότε means “not ever,” or “never” (used with past, present, and future tenses), while οὐπόποτε means “never yet” (used with past tenses). The forms οὐδέποτε and οὐδεπόποτε may be understood as καί + οὐπότε and καί + οὐπόποτε, respectively (in Attic, οὐδέποτε is typically used with present and future tenses only, οὐδεπόποτε being reserved for past tenses [LSJ]). The incorporated καί is sometimes a linking καί (“and not ever,” “and never”), sometimes adverbial (“not even ever,” “never” [emphatic]; cf. LSJ, καί, B.4: “with adverbs, to give emphasis”). Since a linking καί (“and”) immediately precedes the present οὐδέποτε, its incorporated καί must be adverbial. In other words, the present οὐδέποτε is an emphatic “never,” a bit stronger than οὐπότε.

376c3 ταῦτα: = τὰ αὐτά.

376c3 μοι δοκεῖ: lit., “[never do the same things] seem (true) to me,” or more freely, “[never] do I hold [the same] opinion(s).”

376c3 καί: copulative: “and . . .”

376c3 ἐμὲ μὲν οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν πλανᾶσθαι: “(the fact) that I wander is nothing to wonder at . . .,” “it’s not at all surprising that I wander . . . .”
The main verb ἐστί is understood. The subject of the clause is the infinitive πλανᾶσθαι (see note on πλανῶμαι at 372d7) together with its own subject ἐμὲ: “(the fact) that I wander” (S 1972, 1984). The predicate is οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν [ἐστι] (“[is] nothing wonderful, nothing to wonder at”). οὐδὲν may be adverbial (“not at all”).
The emphatic form ἐμὲ (S 325a) is further emphasized by its position before μὲν.

376c4 οὐδὲ ἀλλὸν ἰδιώτην: “(neither I) nor another layman,” “or that a fellow layman does, either.”
The words ἄλλον ἰδιώτην are grammatically parallel to ἐμέ, another accusative subject of the infinitive πλανᾶσθαι.

The semantic range of ἰδιώτης is defined by a series of oppositions: a private individual who minds his own business vs. the public officials who run state affairs; a private who serves in the army vs. the army commanders; a layman who attends public religious ceremonies vs. the priests who run the show and know the arcana; an amateur whose efforts are trifles compared with the works of professional craftsmen and artists.

376c4 εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑμεῖς πλανήσεσθε οἱ σοφοί: protasis in a Future Most Vivid, or “Emotional Future,” conditional (see note on Δεινὸν μεντὰν εἴη κτλ. at 375d3). The verb is fut. mid.: “but if you are going to wander, too, you wise men . . .”

On the possible extra significance of Socrates’ use of the emotional future in conjunction with the word δεινὸν see note on Αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἂν εἴη at 364d3.

376c5 τούτο ἡδη καὶ ἡμῖν δεινὸν: A linking verb is understood, presumably ἐστί, or possibly ἔσται. Normally, the apodosis of a Future Most Vivid conditional has its verb in the future tense, but it need not (cf. S 2328, 2326b). Indeed, the present tense fits well here, not only because of ἡδη (often best translated “now”) but also because the condition expressed in the protasis (“if you [pl.] are going to wander too”) is already coming true: Hippias has been showing signs of “wandering.”

The adv. ἡδη may mean “now” in the sense of “really” or “actually” (cf. LSJ, ἡδη, I.3), as in the following English idiom: “That? That’s nothing. But look here: now this is (really) something . . .” Cf. Aristophanes, Acharnians 315 (Chorus to Dikaiopolis): Τούτο τοῦτος δεινὸν ἡδη καὶ ταραξιάρδιον "Now this utterance [the last and most inflammatory of a series of politically incorrect comments made by Dik.] is (really) dreadful and infuriating . . .!"

Adverbial καί in dialogue, following a demonstrative immediately or, as here, “after a short interval” (GP 307 (8)), often plays a structural role (GP 294), not quite meaning also or even, but rather emphasizing the idea that this [a demonstrative like οὗτος or ὁδε] is x, when the observation “This is x” is a point the speaker wants to drive home to his listener.

For example, in Plato’s Phaedo, after Echecrates has asked Phaedo to tell him why so much time passed between the trial and death of Socrates, Phaedo concludes his long reply by saying: διὰ ταύτα καί πολύς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης καὶ θανάτου “This is why there was (so) much time for Socrates in jail between his trial and death . . .” (Phaedo 58c).

The same construction is occasionally found in question form, as when Meno finds it hard to believe, early in the Meno, that Socrates does not even know what virtue is: ἄλλα ταύτα περὶ σοῦ καί οὐκαδε ἀπαγγέλλωμεν; “Why, is this the news we’re to bring home about you?” (Meno 71c).

Denniston gives many more illustrations of this construction (GP 307-8), observing that “καί following demonstratives” in such a context is “too lively an idiom to be common in formal oratory” (GP 307 (8)). One more example from
Denniston, similar to the present passage: “τόδε καὶ δεινὸν (‘There’s the rub’)” [GP 308, first line; Euripides, *Iphegenia at Aulis* 127 (Old Man to Agamemnon, imagining the anger of Achilles at being cheated of his bride)].

Especially since an adj. + εἰμί often = an adv. + ἔχω (S 1438), it is possible that the expression ἦμιν δεινὸν (ἐστί understood) conveys the same idea as an expression used by the orator Antiphon in the opening line of his speech *Against the Stepmother (for Poisoning)*, cited by LSJ (δεινός, I, Adv.): “δεινὸς καὶ ἄπόρως ἔχει μοι. I am in dire straits . . . .”

The present τοῦτο may mean nothing more than “this,” but as Denniston translates τόδε καὶ δεινὸν as “There’s the rub,” so we might translate τοῦτο ἦδη καὶ ἦμιν δεινὸν as “—now here we are in dire straits . . . .” Cf. LSJ, οὗτος, C.1.5 (“much like an adverb, in local sense . . . πολλὰ ὄρῳ ταῦτα πρόβατα I see many sheep here, Xenophon, *Anabasis* 3.5.9”).

376c5 εἰ μηδὲ παρ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἀφικόμενοι παυσόμεθα τῆς πλάνης: The final clause of the dialogue is an additional protasis in an Emotional Future conditional (see note on εἰ δὲ καὶ ἦμιν δεινὸν at c4): “. . . if not even after coming to you are we to rest from our wandering!”

In a protasis, as a rule, an οὐ word like οὐδὲ (“not even”) is replaced by its sister μή word (here μηδέ), though this rule has exceptions (S 2702.2, 2698).

παρ᾽ = παρά. In prose, when παρά + acc. denotes motion “to,” it is motion to someone, not something (S 1692.3a). Both εἰς and πρὸς + acc. may denote the latter.

The verb παύω in middle/passive (παυσόμεθα is future middle) + an object in the genitive often means “rest from” or “cease from” a thing (LSJ, παύω, I.2, Pass. and Med.). Cf. note on ἀμαθίας παύσας τὴν ψυχήν at 373a1.

The noun πλάνη (“wandering”) and its cognate verb in middle/passive (πλανάσθαι) is frequently used by Plato to describe the “wandering” or error of human minds. Cf. the passage from the *Phaedo* (79c) cited in the note on ταράττει at 373b2.

Cf. also the description in the *Phaedo* (81a) of the heavenly existence of a human soul after death (Socrates speaking): οἱ ἀφικομένῃ ὑπάρχει αὐτή εὐδαιμονι εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ ἄνοιας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἔρωτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀπῆλλαμενή “. . . and having come to this place [the soul] can now be happy, released from wandering and ignorance and fears and wild loves and all the other ills of human existence . . . .”
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GREEK TEXT AND GRAMMATICAL AIDS (to be used with my commentary)


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