

MARGINAL BUT NOT POWERLESS
LOCAL POLITICS IN AN EASTERN GERMAN VILLAGE

By
Catherine L. Corliss
BA, Boston University, 2000
AM, Brown University, 2005

Dissertation

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in the Department of Political Science at Brown University

PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND

MAY 2012

© Copyright 2012 by Catherine L. Corliss

This dissertation by Catherine L. Corliss is accepted in its present form by the
Department of Political Science as satisfying the dissertation requirement for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy.

Date_____

Professor Pauline Jones Luong, Advisor

Recommended to the Graduate Council

Date_____

Professor Mark Blyth, Reader

Date_____

Professor James Morone, Reader

Approved by the Graduate Council

Date_____

Peter M. Weber, Dean of the Graduate School

CATHERINE L. CORLISS

EDUCATION

Brown University

PhD, Political Science | Expected May 2012

Dissertation: *Marginal But Not Powerless: Local Politics in an Eastern German Village*

AM, Political Science | May 2005

Boston University

BA with Distinction | May 2000

Major: International Relations; Minor: German Language and Literature

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Research Grant | Summer 2008

Department of Political Science | Brown University | Providence RI

Dissertation Fellowship | Academic Year 2007-2008

The Graduate School | Brown University | Providence RI

Humboldt Exchange Fellowship | Spring 2007

Humboldt University | Berlin, Germany

Research Travel Grant | Spring 2007

The Graduate School | Brown University | Providence RI

Research Grant | Spring 2007

Department of German Studies | Brown University | Providence RI

Language Grant | Summer 2006

Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst (DAAD) | Bonn, Germany

Research Grant | Summer 2005, 2006, 2007

The Graduate School | Brown University | Providence RI

University Fellowship | Academic Year 2003-2004

The Graduate School | Brown University | Providence RI

Salzburg Seminar Fellowship | Spring 1999

Salzburg Seminar | Salzburg, Austria

University Scholarship | Academic Years 1996-2000

Boston University | Boston, MA

PUBLICATIONS

Fitzgerald, Jennifer, K. Amber Kurtis and Catherine L. Corliss. Forthcoming. "Anxious Publics: Worries About Crime and Immigration." *Comparative Political Studies* 45(4).

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Brown University | 2004-2009

- *Comparing Identity in Europe and the United States*. Summer 2009
- *The American Presidency*. Spring 2009
- *Politics, States and Markets in Developing Countries*. Fall 2008
- *The Roots of Radical Political Islam*. Fall 2006
- *International Political Economy of Development*. Spring 2006
- *Introduction to Political Thought*. Fall 2005
- *Foundations of Political Analysis*. Spring 2005
- *Introduction of Comparative Politics*. Fall 2004

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Germany | Spring 2007, Academic Year 2007-2008

Dissertation Fieldwork

Germany | Summer 2006

Language Training and Pre-Dissertation Fieldwork

RELEVANT EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING

Review of International Political Economy | August 2009 – August 2011

Managing Editor

Harvard University | Academic Year 2008-2009, Summer 2009

Qualitative Research Assistant | Fair Trade Project

Institute for Human Sciences Summer Program | Cortona, Italy | July 2008

Participant | "European Challenges"

Consortium for Qualitative Research Methods (CQRN) | January 2006

Participant

HONORS

Phi Beta Kappa
Magna cum Laude
Distinction in International Relations
College Honors
Golden Key National Honor Society
Pi Sigma Alpha (Political Science Honor Society)
Dean's List (1996-2000)

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

American Political Science Association

LANGUAGES

German: Advanced

French: Advanced reading

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Just as my advisor had told me it would, everything changed once I got in the field. This project began secondary to my original dissertation research. As I learned more about the case and engaged with the participants of the mosque debate, I came to realize that there was a real story to tell. Though reluctant to alter my research plans, I was driven to do so by the events in Heinersdorf. I was rewarded many times over, and hopefully this work will demonstrate that.

Institutions, colleagues, family, and friends came together to make the research and writing of this dissertation possible. The programs and participants of the Consortium for Qualitative Research Methods at Arizona State University and the Institute for the Human Sciences Summer Program offered invaluable tools and insights. The DAAD funded language training and pre-dissertation fieldwork and Humboldt University, the Department of German Studies at Brown University and the Graduate School at Brown provided funding that allowed me to conduct dissertation fieldwork in Germany.

While in Germany, Peter Knapp, Knut and Sabine Rauter, Georg Schmitt, and Fabian Ruehle were great hosts and conversationalists, making long research trips so much more enjoyable. I am forever indebted to the many participants of this debate who allowed me to take part in various activities and who shared their insights and

opinions. Members of the IPAHB welcomed me into their homes for long conversations over coffee and cake, and members of the BVV hosted me in their offices, where they often opened their vast files for me as well.

Back in the United States, the professors and graduate students in the Department of Political Science at Brown University created a congenial atmosphere of scholarship and exchange. I consider myself fortunate to be a part of such a department. Josip Dasovic and Jennifer Fitzgerald, colleagues and friends, offered support and advice during the early writing stages. As the dissertation developed, Jennifer Fitzgerald read drafts, and provided excellent comments and critiques. Pauline Jones Luong has been a valued advisor, all the while setting the standards for comparative research. As my superior at RIPE, Mark Blythe met with me regularly, and never failed to insert some dissertation guidance into the mix. I would also like to thank Jim Morone, who was particularly helpful in seeing the forest for the trees when I could not.

At the heart of this work is Alan Zuckerman, who passed away in 2009. As my advisor for six years, Alan was patient and even, listening intently and thoughtfully. Not one to offer directives, he was more suggestive in his mentoring, encouraging his students to develop ideas and problem-solve for themselves, always confident in their eventual success. Though research and writing could often be lonely, with Alan there was never a moment when I felt alone in the process. He was quick with a funny story or reassuring word and, if truly stumped, he would certainly loan me a book off his shelf—selected quite deliberately—that would steer me in the right direction. Alan was

thrilled by the research that I had conducted in Heinersdorf and looked forward to the dissertation. Though his passing was very difficult, I am reassured by his enduring guidance and determined to be part of his legacy.

Finally, I must thank my family and friends, who have been both patiently supportive and great sources of distraction from the stress and solace of writing. Fred Como, a former teacher who has become a mentor and friend, shared his own war stories and pushed me to persevere when momentum slowed. My husband, Noah Butler, has been an invaluable source of support and advice. He has been my partner on this journey and I look forward to our next one. My parents, Bob and Karen Corliss, have always encouraged me to follow my passions, even if it brought them along into unknown territories. I am so grateful for their patience, understanding, and support.

CONTENTS

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations	xii
Maps: Berlin, Pankow and Heinersdorf	xiii
1 Introduction	1
2 Civil Society, Marginalization and An Explanation for the Case	12
3 Marginalization in the Making	33
4 A Jolt to the Village	58
5 Marginal But Not Powerless	77
6 The ‘Success’ of the IPAHB	100
7 Conclusion	121
Appendix 1 Images	131
References	148

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Ahmadiyya	an Islamic religious movement that originated in Pakistan in the 19 th century
<i>Antifa</i>	<i>Antifaschistische Aktion</i> (Antifascist Action)
BVV	<i>Bezirksverordnetenversammlung</i> (borough council)
CDU	<i>Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands</i> (Christian Democratic Union of Germany)
Die Linke	The Left Party
Die Grünen	Green Party
FDP	<i>Freie Demokratische Partei</i> (Free Democratic Party)
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	German Democratic Republic
<i>Gemeindekirchenrat</i>	Church council
Heinersdorf	small village located in the borough of Pankow in the city of Berlin
HÖD	<i>Heinersdorf Öffne Dich!</i> (Heinersdorf Open Your Minds!)
IPAHB	<i>Interessengemeinschaft Pankow-Heinersdorfer Bürger</i> (Citizens Initiative of Pankow-Heinersdorf)
NPD	<i>Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands</i> (National Democratic Party of Germany)
<i>Ossi</i>	colloquialism describing eastern Germans
Pankow	one of Berlin's twelve boroughs, located in the northeast of the city
PDS	<i>Partei des Demokratische Sozialismus</i> (Party of Democratic Socialism)
SED	<i>Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands</i> (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)
SPD	<i>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</i> (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
TLG	<i>Treuhandliegenschaftsgesellschaft, TLG Immobilien</i> , successor to TRG
TRG	<i>Treuhandanstalt</i> (Treuhand), closed in 1994
<i>Wessi</i>	colloquialism describing western Germans
ZKW	<i>Zukunftswerkstatt</i> (Workshop for the Future)

MAPS: BERLIN, PANKOW, AND HEINERSDORF

THE BOROUGHS OF BERLIN



PANKOW AND HEINERSDORF



1: INTRODUCTION

Human nature cannot be studied in cities except at a disadvantage - a village is the place. There you can know your man inside and out - in a city you but know his crust; and his crust is usually a lie.

--Mark Twain, 1883

30 MARCH 2006

On the night of March 30th, 2006, Ina Thull arrived at Heinersdorf's school auditorium early in order to get a good seat. She was angry and frustrated even before the meeting began. In the weeks before, she and her neighbors had learned from the newspaper that the local government had recently approved construction plans for her village's first mosque. A lifelong Heinersdorfer with roots going back two centuries, Ina kept herself up-to-date with the goings-on in the eastern German village in the former GDR, but even she was caught completely by surprise. The borough council did not inform the community about the proposal for construction, and there was no Muslim congregation in the village for whom to build a mosque. She had questions: Why, after years of ignoring the village, was the borough council now interested in its development? Why had the council not been more forthright with the plans in order to engage the community? Who was this congregation and why had they chosen to relocate to Heinersdorf?

The auditorium quickly filled with people, from Heinersdorf and beyond, and was at capacity long before the informational meeting was to begin. Despite warnings from

the village pastor of a large turnout, the borough council anticipated an audience of 200-300; 1500 people arrived to hear the council members speak. Ina was still waiting to get into the gymnasium when she heard that it was at capacity. As word spread among the people outside that they would not be gaining entry, demands arose for loudspeakers to be set up so that they could at least hear the meeting. Caught off-guard, the council did not have such equipment, and resolved to open the windows in hopes of appeasing the growing crowd outside. At this point, though, the crowd could not be settled. Ina spoke with those around her of frustration, disenfranchisement, of being completely ignored by those who claimed to represent them. As discussions grew louder, there were angry outbursts and ultimately an eruption of a nostalgic refrain: *"Wir sind das Volk!"* ("We are the people!") they chanted, once again struggling to wrest power from their government, fighting for a chance to be heard. But no one would be heard this evening. Shocked and fearful of the "angry mob" outside, the borough council cancelled the meeting, with assurances that they would reschedule for a later date. Such a meeting would never take place.

The following week, Ina went to the village pub to meet with others from that evening. *"Nein zur Moschee!"* ("No to the Mosque!") became a phrase not only on signs and fliers but also on the tongues of many in the Eastern German village of Heinersdorf in the spring of 2006. When the government failed to assuage their fears and concerns, local Heinersdorfers reacted with shock and anger, taking to the streets in protest. "No to the Mosque!" became, in short order, far more than just a recurrent rallying cry. The ways in which residents organized to express their immediate

opposition to government decision-making led, in real ways, to a sustained local citizens' initiative. A group of Heinersdorfers, previously mere acquaintances and not particularly active in politics, established a citizen's group to challenge the borough council and the plans for the mosque construction. What came to pass in the following weeks, months, and years was an intense debate—over the construction of the mosque, over the responsibilities of the government, and over the future of Heinersdorf.

CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN A MARGINALIZED EASTERN GERMANY

Active civic engagement is not yet characteristic of the former German Democratic Republic. As the literature on post-communist civil society attests, the development of civic engagement has been slow in post-communist countries, with Eastern Germany in particular having a very weak civil society. Furthermore, the people of Heinersdorf are a marginal group, which, in contrast to the current literature, was able to establish an active citizens' initiative with few pre-existing institutions or leaders. Given weak civil society in post-communist counties in general and marginalization in eastern Germany in particular, how were Heinersdorfers successful in establishing an enduring, "home-grown" citizens' group?

The story begins in a village in the borough of Pankow in East Berlin. In this village, Heinersdorf, a Berlin Muslim congregation purchased property on which to build a mosque. With little fanfare, the Pankow borough council approved the application for a building permit. Little fanfare, however, meant that very few villagers knew of the plans for a mosque or the permit application. Locals finally found out by reading about

it in the newspaper. Despite being taken totally and completely by surprise, citizens organized rather quickly. Neighbors talked over fences, acquaintances met on the street, friends chatted at the local pub. As it became clearer that the borough council was not concerned with the worries of Heinersdorfers, residents realized that a citizens' group would more effectively make their voices heard. Neighbors, acquaintances and friends slowly came together to form a larger group—the *Interessengemeinschaft Pankow-Heinersdorfer Bürger*, the Citizens' Initiative of Pankow-Heinersdorf (IPAHB). The citizens' initiative began to meet regularly, serving not only as an outlet for grievances and concerns but also as a sounding board for possible actions to express opposition to the mosque. It organized marches and demonstrations, a postcard drive, and information stands. It posted a large advertisement in the local newspaper, and started a campaign, "*Mein Licht Für Heinersdorf*," ("My Light For Heinersdorf"), in which homes and businesses symbolically kept a candle in the window in expression of solidarity with the cause.

The mosque debate launched villagers on a new political path, away from disinterest and inactivity and toward active civic engagement. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, scholars have examined the development—or lack thereof—of civil society in post-communist countries. Civic engagement in Eastern Germany, for example, has been minimal; rare instances have featured the engagement of the extreme right. The increase in political engagement in Heinersdorf appears to follow this trend. Upon closer investigation, however, it becomes clear that the motivations and discourses are different in this case. On the surface, and according to many media outlets and Western

observers, the story of Heinersdorf is one of ignorant and xenophobic *Ossis* who do not want a mosque in their village. Delving deeper, though, the events in Heinersdorf reveal a complex relationship between the East and the West that has only intensified since reunification. The relationship is asymmetrical, and in more than just structural ways. Citizens of Heinersdorf were not only reacting to the possible construction of a new mosque, but also to the local borough government, which had marginalized them for so long.

I argue that three factors contributed to the establishment of the IPAHB as a lasting citizens' initiative: the Ossi identity that resulted from the asymmetrical relationship between East and West; the informal networks that developed among members of the IPAHB; and the emergence of a leader who was not an insider, but had the trust of the group. These factors, considered by the literature to be impediments to civil society, are in this case facilitators of civic engagement. The impact of these factors reveals additional possibilities for affecting civic engagement; the formation of civil society may therefore have not one but multiple rubrics.

REACTING TO MUSLIMS IN EUROPE

The plans for the mosque in Heinersdorf are reflective of a growing theme in European politics. The Muslim population in Western Europe is no longer made up of guestworkers living there temporarily. Today's Muslims have firm roots in Europe, with family and extended family living there. Though the exact number is unknown, in 2003, the high estimate of the Muslim population was 23 million, or five percent of the

population (Savage 2004:26). And, with a birthrate that is more than triple that of non-Muslims, Muslims should comprise 20 percent of the population of Europe by 2050 (28). Aware of these changes, people have expressed concerns about strains on the social welfare system, the threat of terrorism, and a loss of their cultural identity. This growing Muslim population has reinvigorated Europe's numerous far right parties, which play on the Islamophobia that is so prevalent. Not only have governments tightened immigration policies, but they have also passed legislation specifically targeted at Muslim populations.

Indeed, the effects of demographic shifts in Western Europe, specifically with regard to Muslim populations, have drawn increasing scholarly attention recently (Bunzl 2003; Fetzer and Soper 2005; Klaussen 2005; Foner and Alba 2008; Strabac and Listhaug 2008). New discussions about the reach and effects of secularism, nationalism, and social movements have new foci. As debates about headscarves and mosques emerge from Great Britain to Germany, the Netherlands to France, Islam has moved to the forefront. Such a new focus on Islam in Europe, however, can whitewash perspectives of events and thus generate misunderstandings of the complexity of proximate social causes. Heinersdorf presents just such a case, in which seemingly anti-democratic views led to a democratic outcome—civic engagement.

RESEARCH

This work is a case study of recent active and sustained political engagement in Heinersdorf. The foundation of most comparative research, case studies “offer many

more opportunities than is often recognized for falsifying the researcher's main hypotheses, and ... much can be learned from making explicit the comparisons that are often implicitly built into case studies" (Campbell 1975:179). Because the case of Heinersdorf provides a challenge to existing theories, it can be considered a 'deviant case'. Such cases are "selected in order to reveal why the cases are deviant—that is, to uncover relevant additional variables that were not considered previously, or to refine the (operational) definitions of some or all of the variables" (Lijphart 1971:692). One of the most valuable types of case study, deviant case studies can be utilized to better specify existing theories.

Different types and sources of data come together to illustrate the case of unlikely collective action in Heinersdorf. Over a two year period, I spent 14 months conducting fieldwork in Germany. I conducted research in the western city of Cologne and the eastern German town of Königs-Wusterhausen, but I spent the majority of my time in Heinersdorf. Given the current nature of the events, the most appropriate method proved to be participant-observation and semi-structured interviews with the main actors involved. I was a participant-observer at formal meetings of the IPAHB and any demonstrations that they organized. Early on in the research, I drafted questionnaires for members of the IPAHB to test working hypotheses and develop a better focus for my work. I joined members for informal dinners, to attend lectures, and to visit museums.

I conducted semi-structured interviews with members of the IPAHB, members of HÖD, former and current members of the borough council, the pastor of the village

church, and a local journalist that had covered the story. To provide further documentation of my findings, I relied on local newspapers to chronicle the events and provide a timeline. The former president of the borough council, as well as a few other council members, allowed full access to their files from the mosque debate. These included council meeting minutes, email correspondence between members of the borough council, correspondence with the Ahmadiyya congregation, and letters from private citizens of Heinersdorf as well as political parties and organizations. More generally, research on an anti-mosque group in Cologne and a citizens' initiative in Königs-Wusterhausen helped to reveal the uniqueness of the case of Heinersdorf. The multiple perspectives that come together as a result of these varied data offer a deep and detailed depiction of the case.

ORGANIZATION

This work focuses on civic engagement in a marginalized population in post-communist Europe, addressing specifically the puzzle presented by the events in Heinersdorf. After a survey of the literature, it offers a historical survey to illuminate the dynamics of marginalization in eastern Germany. The work then proceeds to the case of the Ahmadiyya mosque and, finally, an explanation of the puzzle of engagement in Heinersdorf.

Chapter Two surveys the literatures relevant to this case. It looks first at the literature on civil society, more specifically post-communist civil society, examining current explanations for its continued weakness. The chapter then turns to the

literature on social exclusion, of which marginalization is one type. Looking first at definitions of marginalization, it moves on to marginal groups in action and the prerequisites for action. Both sets of literature would predict a lack of civic activity in Heinersdorf. The empirical facts of the case show the opposite. The chapter concludes with the explanation for civic engagement in Heinersdorf, derived from these literatures as well as research on collective action.

Chapter Three expands on the designation of eastern Germans as a marginal group. It examines more closely the dynamics of marginalization in eastern Germany, how they developed and how eastern Germans have reacted to marginalization. Identities, institutions, and social networks have had roles in the development of these dynamics, beginning even before the fall of the Wall. As the marginal status of eastern Germans became more apparent and ingrained, there were signs of resistance. Osis have not been quiescent with regard to their status; however, reactions have been rather short-lived and unsuccessful in changing the status quo. The experiences of Osis in the past 60 years, even before the fall of the Wall, have served to establish a marginal group. The experiences of Heinersdorfers in particular have heightened feelings of marginalization.

Chapters Four and Five provide the details of the case. Chapter Four begins with a description of the village of Heinersdorf, a dormant and underdeveloped village on the outskirts of East Berlin, and proceeds to outline the particulars of the mosque debate. A local newspaper announced the government's approval of mosque construction plans in Heinersdorf, where there were no mosques

and there were no Muslims. The government did nothing to prepare the village and villagers responded with outrage and great suspicion. The announcement of the Ahmadiyya congregation's plans to build a mosque in Heinersdorf took villagers completely by surprise. Chapter Five recounts the activation of civic engagement in the village. It did not take long after that initial newspaper article for villagers, most previously strangers and without prior experience with political engagement, to come together and establish a lasting opposition group. This group expressed its opposition in various ways, with diverse media, and through multiple forms of organization. It met with political parties, initiated a postcard campaign and demonstrated in the streets to express its opposition to the mosque.

Chapter Six offers insight into the explanation for the development of civic engagement in Heinersdorf. While the IPAHB was not successful in their efforts to prevent the construction of the mosque, these efforts do not translate into failure. The IPAHB succeeded in establishing an active citizens' initiative that addressed various problems in the village and acted as a liaison between villagers and their representatives on the borough council. The group's success is primarily due to three factors: (1) a strong Ossi identity; (2) the new networks; and (3) the non-indigenous leader that emerged.

Chapter Seven is the conclusion of the analysis. It also looks to the future of the IPAHB, as recent events have resulted in important changes for the group. It considers the implications of the findings and the generalizability of the themes here.

CONCLUSION

Overall, this work provides a description and understanding of the mosque debate in Heinersdorf. But it does more than that as well. Far more than a passing opposition to a particular issue, the group opposed to the mosque in Heinersdorf established an enduring citizens' initiative that expressed opposition not only to the mosque, but also to the relationship between the local government and its constituency, and the marginalized status of the village. The mosque may have been the catalyst for action, but it was not the cause. This work demonstrates that there is in fact civic engagement in post-communist eastern Germany and that, with the centrality of Ossi-ness and vitality of informal networks, this engagement may be particularly eastern.

2: CIVIL SOCIETY, MARGINALIZATION, AND AN EXPLANATION FOR THE CASE

The events in Heinersdorf, in which marginalized citizens of the former GDR successfully established an organization to contest the actions of the local government, evidence developing civic engagement in the village. This case challenges and contributes to two bodies of literature: that on civil society, and the marginalization literature. For scholars of post-communist civil society, issues such as the legacy of communism and a general disappointment with post-communist developments have caused a continued weakness of civil society in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The presence of the IPAHB is evidence of a burgeoning civic community due in part to some of the same reasons that scholars have offered for its weakness. Further, scholars of marginalization posit that marginalized communities must have pre-established organizations and leaders in order for resistance. The IPAHB's emergence calls this into question, as it was successful without the presence of indigenous organizations or leaders.

CIVIL SOCIETY

The concept of civil society has experienced a resurgence in the past two decades, due in part to the strong citizens' movements that brought an end to communist dictatorships in Central and Eastern Europe. Though there is not a

consensus on a definition, broadly speaking, civil society encompasses all organizations and associations that exist primarily beyond the state and the market. It is, according to Howard, “the realm of organizations, groups, and associations that are formally established, legally protected, autonomously run, and voluntarily joined by ordinary citizens” (2003:35). It was just such groups that brought down the Berlin Wall in 1989 and inspired great optimism with regard to the future of civil society in post-communist Europe.

Much of the recent theorizing of civil society takes a page from Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* and argues that mass participation is the lifeblood of democracy. According to Tocqueville, “in democratic countries the science of association is the mother of all science [. . .] If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve among them in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased” (1969[1835]:110). Diamond, who once quipped, “We are all Tocquevilleans now” (2000:9), depicts civil society as a panacea of sorts, that “stimulates political participation, develops a democratic culture of tolerance and bargaining, creates additional channels for articulating and representing interests, generates cross-cutting cleavages, recruits and trains new political leaders, improves the functioning of democratic institutions, widens and enriches the flow of information to citizens, and produces supporting coalitions on behalf of economic reform” (1999:xxiii).

One of the most influential Tocquevilleans is Putnam, who views civil society as a mechanism to produce “social capital,” or trust and reciprocity based on interpersonal connections. An abundance of social capital makes people “healthy, wealthy and wise”

(2000:287). Specifically, the more horizontal connections between people, the easier it is to solve collective problems, the smoother communities will function and progress, the more tolerant and empathetic people will be (288). In short, social capital provides the foundations on which a democracy may thrive.

While initial perspectives on civil society focused on its positive impact on democracy and society, studies quickly emerged that considered the possibility that an engaged populace could have negative effects. After all, an active civil society could just as easily encourage opposition to a democratic state as it could a tyrannical one (Foley and Edwards 1996). Berman's analysis of political engagement in pre-World War II Germany, in which civic engagement did not unite but rather divided society, illustrates just this scenario. According to Berman,

The vigor of German civil society actually developed in inverse relation to the vigor and responsiveness of national political institutions and structures. Instead of helping to reduce social cleavages, Germany's weak and poorly designed political institutions exacerbated them; instead of responding to the demands of an increasingly mobilized population, the country's political structures obstructed meaningful participation in public life. As a result, citizens' energies and interests were deflected into private associational activities, which were generally organized within rather than across group boundaries. The vigor of civil society activities then continued to draw public interest and involvement away from parties and politics, further sapping their strength and significance. (1997:423)

In this analysis, civil society reinforced divisions within society and sapped the strength of political parties. The political context here plays an invaluable role; if political institutions are weak, they may fall victim to a strong civil society.

The negative effects of a vibrant civil society are also central in the argument of Armony, who emphasizes the unpredictable effects of increased social capital: "the

orientations of social capital depend on such factors as underlying tensions in society and embedded patterns of social relations, the capacity of different groups to access and mobilize resources, the catalyst that triggers defensive posture in civil society, and the links between civil society groups and the state” (Armony 2004:208). Further, even if an association has a small base, if its message is potent, it can contaminate the majority and compromise social harmony (Chambers and Kopstein 2001). These analyses consider the effects of a strong civil society, not yet a concern in the literature on post-communist Europe, which addresses a general weakness in civil society.

CIVIL SOCIETY IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE

The peaceful revolutions of 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe brought a sudden end to the communist dictatorships that had ruled for the previous four decades. This so-called “third wave” of democratization called particular attention to the powerful and transformative role of civil society. In Bunce’s view, these mass protests “signaled the breakdown of the authoritarian order; created a widespread sense that there were alternatives to that order; pushed authoritarian leaders... to the bargaining table; created (and sometimes restored) a large opposition united by its rejection of the incumbent regime; and gave opposition leaders a resource advantage when bargaining with authoritarian elites” (Bunce 2003:172). The famous image of East Germans at the Berlin Wall chanting, “Wir sind das Volk!” evoked a widespread feeling that people—when united—were capable of achieving great things; for them, the future was bright. Only a few years later, the mood had shifted significantly. As Smolar

observed in 1996, “talk of ‘civil society’ is no longer much heard in the streets, and the idea seems to have gone back whence it came, to discussions held among intellectuals on the changing shape of pos-communist countries” (1996:24). The fall of civil society seemed just as rapid as its rise.

DEMOCRATIZATION BACKWARDS

Citizens’ groups that had been so instrumental in the toppling of communism quickly found themselves with their main objectives achieved and so on a new playing field. Groups had developed within the confines of communist society and established goals with regard to its leadership. With the disappearance of their opposition, these groups no longer had a reason for existing. In East Germany, for instance, citizens’ movements, above all New Forum, which had initially participated in a series of Round Tables after the fall of the Berlin Wall, were swiftly marginalized by the decision for reunification. Some movements originally fared better than those in East Germany, for instance Solidarity in Poland and Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia. Over time, however, they too were unsuccessful in negotiating the transition. The vibrant civil society of the revolution collapsed, as did all else familiar. Hankiss depicts the scene in 1994: “[People] have lost their way in the labyrinths of social and industrial relationships, which are in the midst of a chaotic transformation. People do not know anymore, or yet, what are the rules of the new games, what are their duties and rights, what they have to do for what, what is the cost and reward of what. There is no authority to tell, there are no values to refer to” (quoted in Smolar 1996:34). Civil society lay dormant, and it was unclear when it might re-emerge.

As Chin and Rose aptly describe, these third wave countries started democratization backwards (2001). They initiated free elections without having first established the institutions necessary to maintain a democracy, one such institution being civil society. The weakness and even disintegration of civil society in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe has been a focus of many post-transition analyses. Crotty organized focus groups in Russia to examine membership in voluntary organizations, finding that none were members of advocacy groups and a mere ten percent were members of political parties (2001, 2003). Barnes examines national surveys in the early 1990s and again a decade later, observing a “dramatic” decline in membership in associations, particularly those with political motivations (2006). In an extensive examination of national surveys, Howard provides ample evidence of a weak civil society across post-communist Europe. For instance, as compared to older democracies, in which each individual is a member of an average of 2.39 organizations, in post-communist countries individuals are members of an average of 0.91 organizations (2003:65). Howard also finds that almost every post-communist country fell in rankings of organizational membership between the 1990-1991 surveys and those in 1995-1997. Demonstrating a continuation of this trend, Russia’s 1995-1997 average of 0.65 memberships per person fell to an average of 0.45 in 1999 and East Germany’s average of 1.44 memberships per person in 1995-1997 fell to 0.78 in 1999 (73). These figures illustrate not only a waning level of participation in associations, but more generally, societies where civil society is practically nonexistent.

In addition to membership levels, measures of trust among citizens also yield

insights into the development of civil society. Trust in political institutions and also in other individuals is vital for the success of a democracy; the absence of such trust in post-communist societies has also been a topic for those interested in civil society. (Mishler and Rose 2001; Shin and Rose 2001; Crotty 2003). Looking at personal trust in ten post-communist countries, Mishler and Rose found that 12 percent of respondents trust political parties (2001:42); in Russia, the figure is one-third lower (Shin and Rose 2001). In a region where one would expect unions to engender trust, only 22 percent of respondents trust trade unions. With regard to fellow citizens, less than one half of respondents admit to trusting others (Mishler and Rose 2001:42). Trust in elected leaders is another difficulty for citizens of post-communist countries. EuroBarometer surveys reveal that an average of 72 percent of East Europeans find their current administration to be more corrupt than that which it succeeded (Rose-Ackerman 2001:425). If people have little trust—in government, in parties, or in one another—it is less likely that they will be active participants in society.

While there is a prevailing consensus among scholars regarding the weakness of post-communist civil society at the individual level, some have suggested that an analysis of civil society at the collective level would yield different results. Fagan, for instance, considers the idea of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) without civil society. With foreign assistance, in terms of both financial aid and information, NGOs have developed in post-communist countries and wield a limited amount of power at the elite level. These groups, however, have had little success cultivating connections in the opposite direction, with society as a whole, raising questions as to their ultimate

relevance (2005). A more optimistic view is evident in Petrova and Tarrow (2007). Introducing the term “transactional activism” to describe relations between citizens’ groups, these scholars charge that civil society has been developing and strengthening at the collective level. According Petrova and Tarrow, “a weakness [at the individual level] does not necessarily imply a lack of societal capacity for weaving relations among civil society groups and between them, political parties, and power holders, all of which may flourish in the face of a low level of mass participation” (80). While this may be the case, the authors are hesitant to draw conclusions for the future, leaving unclear what the existence of transactional activism means for civil society at the individual level and for these new democracies more generally.

EXPLANATIONS FOR A WEAK CIVIL SOCIETY

Explanations for the apparent weakness in post-communist civil society target the legacy of communist rule (Bernhard and Karakoc 2007; Kostovicova 2006), the potholed transition process (Lomax 1997, Vanhuysse 2006), or a combination of both (Barnes 2006; Bernhagen and Marsh 2007; Bernhard 1996; Bunce 1999; Ekiert 1996; Fish 1998; Grix 2000; Howard 2003; Offe 1991; Smolar 1996). As Barnes elaborates, “the long authoritarian experience not only destroyed all continuity with previous experience with democracy: it left in place a transition-belt-type of associations that quickly lost relevance in the democratic era. It also left negative views of politics and political participation” (2006:79). Because participation was forced by the communist state, civil society developed in a top-down manner as opposed to bottom-up, with all aspects dictated by the regime. This type of control by the state bred a particular type of

citizen—“*homo sovieticus*” (Smolar 1996)—who was distrustful of formal institutions and unable to think or act independently. It also forced citizens to place great value on the private sphere and the meaningful relationships that were cultivated therein, developing what came to be known as a niche society. A post-transition reorientation toward the public sphere would thus be an arduous process.

The challenges of the transition itself constitute a second focus of explanations of weak civic cultures in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. With the introduction of both democracy and capitalism came all new institutions, economic upheaval, and a more free society, the citizens of which did not yet know how to be free. Widespread disappointment pervaded these societies after the initial euphoria had worn off and the economic hardships set in, leading to a general malaise and lack of interest in participation (Geremek 1996; Rupnik 1996; Howard 2003). From the perspective of Vanhuysse, however, it was the states’ astute management of unemployment policies and pension systems that led to a quiescent civil society. In Poland and Hungary, for instance, the governments used the pension systems to assuage the unemployed masses and thus prevent political resistance (2006). The transition’s original social movements and their organizers may also have had an impact on civic engagement since the fall of communism. While Bernhard believes that the social movements fell victim to the transitions and this experience is the reason for a continued weakness of civil society (1996), Lomax sees these leaders as taking a more active role, manipulating the absence of civil society to their own benefit (1997).

Though part of the third wave, as the only country to be reunited with its western counterpart, East Germany's transition experience is unique. Its communist history is similar to that of other countries in the region, and legacies of the forty-year dictatorship have endured. East Germans, too, were subject to the omnipresence of the state. According to Grix, "the horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation which bind a civic community together were 'ordered' from above and not allowed to grow organically". East Germans, too, developed a niche society—based on relations in the private sphere and away from the purview of the state. The transition of East Germany from dictatorship to democracy, however, began and ended with reunification with West Germany a year after the fall of the Berlin Wall. West Germany exported its political, legal, and economic institutions to the East; this time it was democracy "'ordered' from above and not allowed to grow organically" (2000:270). While the support and guidance of a western government initially appeared to be an advantage over other countries that were managing transitions on their own, it is unclear if this wholesale transfer from West to East was the most effective means of establishing democracy in the East. Easterners found themselves on unequal footing with their western countrymen. Dealings between the East and the West progressed in this manner, establishing a relationship characterized by marginalization of all things eastern. Such marginalization, itself a type of social exclusion, can be an impediment to civic engagement.

SOCIAL EXCLUSION

The concept of social exclusion has a variety of definitions, often dependent on location or particular perspective. While most can agree on the basics—one who is socially excluded does not belong to his society—the nature and defining characteristics of social exclusion remain a matter of debate. Considered to be either or both a state and a process, social exclusion, according to Daly and Silver, “is best understood in terms of its *causes*” (2008:559). Levitas offers three different sources of social exclusion: poverty, unemployment, or moral or cultural detachment (2000:357-358). Instead of prioritizing one cause over another, however, Silver and Miller underscore the complex nature of social exclusion and put forward a multifaceted definition:

Social exclusion is (1) multidimensional or socioeconomic, and encompasses collective as well as individual resources, (2) dynamic or processual, along a trajectory between full integration and multiple exclusions, (3) relational, in that exclusion entails social distance or isolation, rejection, humiliation, lack of social support networks, and denial of participation, (4) active, in that there is a clear agency doing the excluding, and (5) relative to context. (2003:8)

Social exclusion is a “rupturing of the social bond” (Silver 2006b:4411); it establishes divisions within society, foiling integration and cohesion, creating ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. Not to be overlooked, however, is the fact that social exclusion is the result of social interaction and the creation of social rules by certain groups (Bedolla 2007). According to Becker,

Modern societies are not simple organizations in which everyone agrees on what the rules are and how they are to be applied in specific situations. They are, instead, highly differentiated along social class lines, ethnic lines, occupational lines, and cultural lines. These groups need not and, in fact often do not share the same rules. The problems they face in

dealing with their environments, the history and traditions they carry with them, all lead to the evolution of different sets of rules. (1991:15)

The rules that come to determine exclusion and inclusion, therefore, are not necessarily agreed upon, neither by analysts nor by citizens. Gaventa views the process as one of colonization: “the development of dominance of one set of values and procedures over another, out of which there emerges a colonial situation, in which the dominant set of values and procedures is accepted by the colonized” (1980:82).

MARGINALIZATION

The mechanisms of social exclusion are multiple and varied; one such mechanism is marginalization. Following Cohen’s definition, “a group is marginal to the extent that its members have historically been and continue to be denied access to dominant decision-making processes and institutions; stigmatized by their identification; isolated or segregated; and generally excluded from control over the resources that shape the quality of their lives” (1999:24). After such dynamics are established,

Domination does not persist of its own momentum. Inasmuch as it involves the use of power to extract work, production, services, taxes against the will of the dominated, it generates considerable friction and can be sustained only by continuous efforts at reinforcement, maintenance, and adjustment. A good part of the maintenance work consists of the symbolization of domination by demonstrations and enactments of power. (Scott 1990:45)

The main factors that contribute to the emergence and persistence of such marginal groups are identities, ideologies, institutions, and social relationships (Cohen 1999). While institutions may be more mutable, ideologies, identities and social relationships

are much slower to change. Social relations are perhaps the deepest-rooted factors in the creation of marginal groups, as informal interaction can often be habitual and not easily altered. Even without state institutions reifying marginalization, individuals and groups may maintain the same perspectives and continue to view marginal groups as unequal if not inferior.

Reactions to marginalization range widely on the spectrum, from passive acceptance and “quiescence” to total rebellion. As Scott points out, “relations of domination are at the same time, relations of resistance” (1990:45). Of course, marginalization affects groups in various ways and to different degrees. Gaventa cites the causal primacy of historical contingencies. Dominance, in his view, has evolved over time to reinforce attitudes of defeat, inevitability and immutability. In short, then, the dominated group ultimately becomes “quiescent”, making no effort to change its position (1982). While Gaventa notes quiescence on the part of the marginalized or powerless, Scott sees something else—resistance, but a masked resistance such that those in power do not recognize it. He develops the concept of “hidden transcript” to describe the clear divide between language and behavior of marginalized groups in public and that of groups when they are not in the presence of those who dominate (1990:5). Marginalization can also lead to empowerment of a sort—of institutions, media and leaders that cater to subordinate groups. Particular to the group, the development of indigenous institutions, media, and leaders fosters the solidification of a group consciousness and can also lead to a more politically active marginalized group. The type or degree of marginalization may also dictate the type of political activism that

arises—the more extreme the segregation, the more extreme the rejection of the system (Katznelson 1981).

When there is an organized and collective reaction on the part of a marginalized group, it is often a function of indigenous organizations and indigenous leaders. In overcoming quiescence in the Appalachian Valley, Gaventa asserts that, in addition to creating a sense of community, “they must develop their own resources for challenge—organization, information, sustaining values—to counter the prevailing mobilization of bias” (1980:257). Cohen, too, finds indigenous organizations and leaders indispensable with regard to collective political action (1999). Feeling misrepresented by and distrustful of institutions of the dominant population, marginalized groups must develop their own institutions and reach out to local leaders—as sources of information and community. Political activism begins here and would not exist in their absence (Morris 1984; Cohen 1999).

THE ‘SUCCESS’ OF THE IPAHB

The citizens’ reaction to the mosque news in Heinersdorf, followed by the establishment and persistence of the IPAHB, question and build upon both the literature on post-communist civil society and that on marginalization. Those embroiled in Heinersdorf’s mosque issue experienced marginalization on multiple levels. As East Germans, marginalization resulted due to the circumstances of reunification with West Germany; as Heinersdorfers, locals experienced changes in representation that distanced the people from their government and the government from the people; and

as members of the IPAHB, people were classified as extremists and limited in their interaction with the local government. In their reaction to this marginalization, they defied the precedents and predictions of the literature and established an active and engaged citizens' initiative.

Following the literature, civil society should be weak and a marginalized group without organizations and leadership should be quiescent. How was it that the citizens of Heinersdorf were able to create a lasting civic organization? The explanation for this puzzle focuses on some of the same issues as the two sets of literature it engages as well as factors from the literature on collective action. The explanation lies in the identity that the group solidified, the network connections that it created, and the leader that emerged.

IDENTITY: THE WALL IN THE MIND

In the case of the IPAHB, identity was an integral part of sustained collective action. In general, identities "consist of social relations and representations, as seen from the perspective of one actor to another" (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001:133); continued interaction between the IPAHB and the government, therefore, reinforced preexisting *Ossi* and *Wessi* identities. Members of the IPAHB reflected on the differences between mosque supporters and the opposition, and not only developed a distinct perspective on the debate but also became a more cohesive group. The "trust and cooperation that [...] generated among participants by shared understandings and identities" (Tarrow 1998:21) provided the cornerstone of the IPAHB's collective action. Such shared perspectives and identities are also theorized as collective action frames,

“action-oriented sets of beliefs and meaning that inspire the legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization” (Benford and Snow 2000:614). With regard to identity as a collective action frame, Bernstein identifies three dimensions: identity for empowerment, identity as a goal, and identity as strategy (2009:267). Social movements may need identity to initially mobilize a constituency (Calhoun 1994), or to develop an agenda and target opposition (Snow and Benford 1988; Klandermans 1992; Hunt et al. 1994). Two dimensions of identity, as empowerment and as strategy, are evident in the case of the IPAHB .

In its initial mobilization as well as its arguments and programs, the IPAHB utilized the Ossi identity, which developed during the post-communist transition. The initial excitement and enthusiasm for the fall of the Wall and reunification with West Germany was short-lived—things soured with the great hardships that eastern Germans faced in the years that followed. Reunification with West Germany featured a devaluing of all things East German as the West favored exporting its own laws and institutions to the East instead of working toward a new East-West hybrid. Relations between westerners and easterners reflected the difficulty of the times, as westerners viewed easterners as lazy and ungrateful while easterners saw westerners as superficial and superior. These categories were reflected in the political landscape of Heinersdorf and were a catalyst for action.

Dynamics of marginalization developed as the West attempted more-and-more to rid eastern Germany of the GDR. Marginalization on the part of the local government as well as the media reinforced feelings of difference between the easterners and their

western counterparts, increasing feelings of distrust and an 'us vs. them' mentality. A strong Ossi identity emerged early on as those opposed to the mosque stressed the differences between the local government and the media on the one hand and the Heinersdorfers on the other. It linked members of the IPAHB together and provided fodder for the group's arguments and emerging political platform. This identity helped to clearly characterize the opponents of the IPAHB, tying the group's struggle to the deeply rooted and more engrained struggle of Ossis against Wessis.

CONNECTIONS: RECLAIMING AND RENAMING THE NICHE SOCIETY

Pre-existing institutions and organizations often set the stage for the development of a social movement. Under normal circumstances, "emerging movements grow out of and remain dependent upon established institutions and organizations" (Friedman and McAdam 1992:162). This indigenous "infrastructure" is necessary for collective action (Freeman 1973). And as Tarrow elaborates, "contention crystallizes into a movement when it taps embedded social networks and connective structures and produces collective action frames and collective identities able to sustain contention with powerful opponents" (1998:23). For Tarrow, these institutions need not be official organizations. Describing the multifaceted nature of church groups in 19th century United States, he concedes, "it was not so much these formal organizations, but the informal social networks that lay at their heart and the informal connective structures among them that were potential centers of collective action" (49). Informal networks such as these existed in eastern Germany during the GDR, but faded since the fall of the Wall.

Under communist rule in the GDR, where most aspects of public life were dictated by the state, the networks and communities that developed in the private sphere were extremely important. Not only was it of social import to have a place to freely express emotions and opinions, but it was also of economic import to have ways around the great limitations and shortages in the market. Berdahl emphasizes, “money could be important, but one needed connections in order to spend it” (1999:121). This niche society, so-called because people only lived freely in the small niches that were hidden from the state’s view, is one of the three factors that Howard identifies as causing a weakness in civil society. In Howard’s analysis, the networks survived the transition to democracy and provided eastern Germans with sufficient social interaction such that they did not seek to join additional groups or organizations (2003). The village of Heinersdorf presents an alternate image of post-communist eastern Germany, depicting a severely weathered community whose networks had disintegrated due to changes in the way of life. The IPAHB offered an opportunity for people to get together, share opinions, exchange ideas and develop connections again—to reawaken the niche society. Weekly meetings and weekend demonstrations led to informal dinners and holiday get-togethers, as members of the citizens’ initiative rediscovered the feeling of community. The strong bonds that developed between members of the IPAHB fostered enthusiasm and dedication in the group, ‘crystallizing’ it (Tarrow 1998:23) and ensuring its continued existence.

LEADERSHIP: NEITHER INDIGENOUS NOR EXOGENOUS

Leadership often plays an important role in contentious action. And for Gaventa and Cohen, a marginal group must have its own organizations and leadership in order to successfully organize a resistance (1982; 1999). The effect of leadership on contentious action varies, but may be significant. As Aminzade, Goldstone, and Perry indicate,

Assuming that 'minimal' structural conditions for a protest or revolutionary movement to arise are present—that is, there is a segment of the population and/or elite that is disaffected from the status quo, and there are limits to what the state is able or willing to do, either to meet popular demands or repress opponents—then the role of leadership becomes crucial at several points in actualizing the potential for protest and social change. (2001:152)

Before the mosque debate, the leaders in the community were the parish priest and the principal of the local elementary school. Each, however, had their own prerogatives and, particularly with regard to the parish priest, more than a few detractors. Neither chose to take a position of leadership in the IPAHB. When the news broke of the impending mosque construction, people turned to each other, but not specifically to one person.

Initially, leadership was acephalic. Members of the IPAHB worked together to build consensus; over time, it became clear that more leadership was necessary. Aminzade, et al. explain,

Even though much grassroots and antiestablishment organizing aims for an absence of formal 'leaders,' preferring to disseminate authority in collective forms, the key leadership *actions*—people-oriented actions of providing motivation, building coalitions and commitment, and articulating a vision that draws an emotional and enthusiastic response; and task-oriented actions of plotting a movements strategy and assembling the resources and assigning responsibilities to see that strategy carried out—still need to be undertaken. (2001:152)

A leader of the IPAHB emerged over time and as a result of the resistance. Erich Zimmerman was with the IPAHB from the start, but, because he was a political official, his role in the group as well as the confidence of its members developed more slowly. His leadership actions were both people-oriented and task-oriented, as his astute advice and steering, as well as his political connections, empowered the IPAHB to persist beyond its initial protest efforts.

CONCLUSION

The literature on post-communist civil society as well as the marginalization literature suggests that the citizens' initiative that developed in Heinersdorf was a highly unlikely outcome. With persistent post-transition disappointment and no indigenous organizations or leaders, scholars would be extremely skeptical that civic engagement could emerge in Heinersdorf. And yet, the IPAHB demonstrates that this was not the case. My explanation for the development of a lasting initiative builds on the civil society literature as well as the literature on collective action for support. It focuses on three factors— identity, connections, and leadership—that were fundamental to the enduring presence of the IPAHB. With a collective identity, re-established connections and a leader-in-the-making, the people of Heinersdorf were able to establish a citizens' group that not just challenged the local government and protested the construction of a mosque, but also became a liaison between Heinersdorfers and their representatives, facilitating communication that beforehand had been nonexistent.

The social and political environment of Heinersdorf in 2006 is best understood from a historical perspective. The legacy of communism remained, as did the legacy of the transition from communist rule. It is in the transition, in fact, that the dynamics of marginalization developed roots. The political and economic system that the West exported to the East, the interactions between easterners and westerners, and the identities that developed on both sides led to a German society characterized by marginalization.

3: MARGINALIZATION IN THE MAKING

INTRODUCTION

To this day, unification hasn't happened yet. Unity is completed, but only on paper.

--Günter Grass, 2010

The fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent reunification of East and West Germany disrupted every aspect of life for residents of the former GDR. Presented to West Germany "like a decapitated John the Baptist to an eager Salome" (Borneman 1991:36), the East German state was under West German control almost immediately after the Wall came down. Reunification entailed a 'cleaning of the slate', erasing all semblance of the GDR and completely transferring West German laws, rules, and institutions. Following Cohen, institutions, social relations and identities fortified the character of relations between East and West (1999). These asymmetrical relations—and developing dynamics of marginalization that resulted from them—had their roots in the past, even before reunification, but flourished in the years thereafter.

THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic came into being as separate states in 1949. At the border between greater Cold War tensions,

the two states “became outposts for conflicting systems” (Dennis and Kolinsky 2004:1), competing intensively for the title of the ‘true’ German state. This competition, however, was lopsided. The GDR’s campaign against the FRG was all- encompassing and endless. The government “preached fear and loathing” of the West (Stern 2006:331) and used “its most ardent rhetoric to rubbish the Western state and vilify it as a hotbed of National Socialist and reactionary politics” (Dennis and Kolinsky 2004:3). Those in the West were seemingly oblivious. They were proud of their liberal democratic state and focused on economic recovery; turning westward for support from the United States, Great Britain, and France, the FRG turned its back on the GDR.

While their government demonized the FRG, East Germans were preoccupied with life just beyond the Wall. Borneman elucidates,

They defined the state not in political but, essentially, in geographic terms. They felt acutely their separateness as GDR citizens. Division made them East Germans, or, as West Berliners say, ‘Ossis’ and not ‘Wessis.’ They dreamed continually of the lost other half, like an amputee twitching his lost, ghost limb. It became a focus of fantasy and thwarted desire. (1991:131)

West German television, available in the East as well, served to enhance the fantasy. Watching weekly series and television commercials provided East Germans an intimate look at life in the FRG—“how the western half of the country was prospering materially, and in the glow of a Western embrace” (Stern 2006:332). The occasional package from western relatives was a welcome and cherished surprise. One easterner described anxiously awaiting the annual Christmas package from relatives in West Berlin and savoring every square of the delicious chocolate bars inside (Friedl, Ernst. Personal interview. 23 April 2007).

Distinct East and West identities were forming despite the notion of one nation in two states, and there was a shared assumption of western dominance due to economic success and material wealth (Berdahl 1999:159). The desire for reunification and emulation of the West shaped eastern identity, while the emerging western identity was one of pride in postwar development and accomplishments, and superiority over the counterparts in the East. These identities continued to develop and change after the fall of the Wall. While the Cold War rivalries may have faded by 1990, “the political, economic and social divides between the two Germanies were slower to fade, or refused to do so altogether” (Dennis and Kolinsky 2004:1). In fact, these divides have widened with time. As McFalls points out, “only unification could achieve what had always eluded the GDR—the forging of a distinct, self-conscious eastern German identity, for the sudden and complete imposition of a new social order generated ubiquitous and unambiguous contacts and conflicts between eastern culture and western values, norms, and meanings” (2002:89).

REUNIFICATION AND MARGINALIZATION

There was great hope and optimism at the time of reunification, to be replaced all too quickly by resentment and animosity. The process was swift and cutting—a complete dissolution of all East German laws and institutions and imposition of those of West Germany. Weiss details his emotions and those of his compatriots:

This beautiful land. In this land I grew up; it was the land of my first love, the land of my dreams, the land of my anger. It was the land of my children and it was to have been the land of my unborn grandchild. Now it is being taken away from under my feet. My hopes are withering and

my dreams are dying. I am being made into an emigrant in my own land. I wanted to make a motherland out of my land. In a motherland weapons aren't necessary... But now a raw, garish, shirt-sleeved fatherland is bursting in on us. It leaves us no way out, we can't defend ourselves against it. (1990:27)

The asymmetric relations between the two Germanies, which could have dissipated with reunification, were instead reinforced by the process. In this '*Kohlonization*' of the former GDR (Christ and Neubauer 1991), East Germans were on the sidelines, only minimally involved as the West dominated the transformation of eastern society and economy.

INSTITUTIONS

THE TREUHAND

In the days immediate after the fall of the Wall, a large task for reformers was to deal with the state-owned properties and firms. The GDR government created the *Treuhandanstalt* or trusteeship agency (*Treuhand*) (TRG) in early 1990. At that time, its responsibility was "to administer the corporate assets of the combines, enterprises and institutions in the public interest" (Dennis 1993:118). It would be a trusteeship of state-owned assets and its actions were subject to government approval. In this form, the Treuhand was very short-lived. Subsequent elections ushered in much more conservative leaders, who then altered the responsibilities of the agency, changing its focus from primarily oversight to privatization. With new West German managers at the helm, the Treuhand began the arduous task of transferring ownership from the state to private individuals. While the original intention had been to restructure and rehabilitate firms, the Treuhand was ill-prepared and unwilling to orchestrate such reconstruction.

Instead it found itself breaking firms up, selling viable plants or liquidating firms altogether at “bargain-basement prices” (Mushaben 2010:567). The Treuhand was blamed for the destruction of a large portion of GDR industry and became a symbol of West German colonization. According to Mushaben, “dubious Treuhand methods denied collateral-deprived Easterners opportunities for capital accumulation, making it impossible for would-be entrepreneurs to co-finance their own transformation. Instead of generating competition, privatization created new monopolies” (569). In charge of these monopolies were westerners, interested more in boosting the western economy than supporting that in the East. As Maier observes, “flagship firms thus disappeared or shrank drastically, while their diverse productive units might end up tucked away as component parts of West German corporations” (Maier 1997:296). The Treuhand’s policy of privatization turned into a “fire sale” for West German investors who, by 1994 had taken over 85 percent of GDR industries (Mushaben 2010:569).

Indeed, opportunities for West German entrepreneurs were around every corner in the former GDR; these opportunities made them rich, both legally and illegally. An example of the latter, the sale of the *Wärmeanlagenbau Gesellschaft Berlin* (WBB), is considered to be one of the biggest stories of fraud of the reunification. WBB, which finished stainless steel tubing that was used to connect cities and towns to power plants in the countryside, could have proven a lucrative investment for any western power company. One such company sent a representative, Michael Rottmann, to WBB headquarters in Berlin. Weeks later, the chief executives of WBB were meeting secretly with Rottmann and a Swiss businessman establishing a partnership that would approach

the Treuhand to purchase WBB. Using falsified paperwork, the partnership easily convinced the Treuhand to make the sale. Previously, Rottmann had been a mere employee of a small power company; after the sale, he owned a 2,000-employee firm with plants in the former GDR, Poland, and the Soviet Union. A short four years later, the WBB was bankrupt, its offices closed and employees out of work. Its boss had vanished with the equivalent of 50 million Euros (Dettmar et al. 2010).

The story of the WBB is an instance of the Treuhand prioritizing a quick sale over due diligence and the responsible transfer of power. It also demonstrates the western perceptions that the East was ‘ripe for the picking’ and supports eastern interpretations of the Treuhand—that it had no respect for eastern industry or its business structure. The Treuhand’s management of property and businesses certainly did not help bolster the foundering East German economy, which was not responding to reunification as many had hoped.

EMPLOYMENT AND THE ECONOMY

The most euphoric optimism of reunification was tied to the fate of the East German economy. On July 1, 1990, when the Deutschmark was first introduced in the east, Chancellor Kohl promised ‘blühende Landschaften’ (‘blossoming landscapes’); the reality, however, was not *Länder* in bloom but rather “Länder in gloom” (Dennis 1993). As Mushaben elaborates, “things started to blossom alright: once crowded worksites were quickly overgrown with weeds and wildflowers, as whole industries shut down and millions lost their permanent jobs disguised as ‘short layoffs’ (2010:569). The economic collapse was rapid. The months and years after reunification featured “massive de-

industrialization, the disappearance of entire categories of qualifications and jobs and abrupt social dislocation” (Dennis 2000a:96). East Germans were seemingly powerless as West Germans took over Treuhand properties; pre-existing managers “felt cheated when the West German ones occupied all the major positions” (Silver 2010:172). Soon, more than one in four workers were unemployed. By 1991, industrial output was below one-third of the 1989 level and by 1992 employment in the industrial sector was under one million, as compared to over three million in 1989; productivity in the East was 32 percent of that in the West (Maier 1997:298).

While unemployment caused economic hardships throughout the country, its effects in the East were much greater. Unemployment was now a feature of everyday life, something very foreign—literally and figuratively—to the former citizens of the GDR. With one of the highest employment rates in the world, GDR society was built around the workplace. Its welfare system was firm-centered, and, ideologically, a great value was placed on labor. Following Goedicke, “this organization of work pervading all spheres of the society was decisive for the shaping of life courses and social integration” in the GDR (2006b:89). The precarious employment situation in the East calls to mind terms such as ‘secondary integration’ or ‘social exclusion,’ as “many Easterners move among unemployment, training, and employment schemes, never to land a stable job” (Silver 2010:175). Ultimately, two-thirds of the population of the former GDR had to look for a job that had nothing to do with their education or training (Hengst and Kröger 2010). The stories of Heinersdorfers Ada Christlieb and Gottfried

Schoedel illustrate the trying times for East Germans with regard to employment after the Wall.

TWO CASES OF UNEMPLOYMENT

ADA CHRISTLIEB

Born and raised in Chemnitz in the 1950s, Ada Christlieb attended a vocational high school, training in window display and poster design. She continued her studies at the university, focusing on graphic design. At the conclusion of her studies, she found employment with a large advertising firm that designed store windows in East Berlin and then worked on advertisements for large hotels in the city. Experiencing great success, she was motivated to go out on her own, opening a small firm in 1987. She was confident in her abilities both as a designer and as a business-owner, and looked forward to expanding the business over time. Her timing, however, would prove to be her downfall. In 1989, according to Ada, “everything abruptly came to a halt” and suddenly, her “entire profession was somehow on the street”. West German agencies took over the advertising industry. Her clients no longer existed and no new ones came through the door. To make things worse, since everything in the GDR was done by hand, eastern designers had no computer experience and found that they could not compete with western designers. Of Ada’s friends and colleagues, only three remained in the industry after 1989; all the others were forced out. One of the latter, in 1991, Ada decided to reorient herself entirely. In the GDR, she had organized and chaperoned educational excursions for students during school vacations; she referenced this experience in an application to be a social worker counseling families in Weißensee. A

new regulation in the mid-1990s requiring specific training forced her to leave this job, which she found both interesting and rewarding, and go back to school. In 2001, at the age of 54, Ada began her studies in social work at a local technical college (Christlieb, Ada. Personal interview. 6 December 2007).

GOTTFRIED SCHOEDEL

After finishing high school in Magdeburg, Gottfried Schoedel studied cybernetics at the university for six years, ultimately finding employment conducting research and development with microprocessors and then later working with large robots. According to Gottfried, his job was great fun and he very much enjoyed the work. Shortly after reunification, however, when all industry in the GDR collapsed, Gottfried was forced to go to the West for training with western robots. He found work with a new firm, but then lost his job again—there was no longer a need for robots. Gottfried sought out additional training and then began working for an American firm for ticketing systems. These years were indeed difficult for him, as he realized the stark differences between easterners and westerners. A great competitiveness between colleagues led to stagnation; it prevented them from working together and making progress. The firm downsized from 20 employees to two, and then collapsed within a few short years. Gottfried again attempted to get more training. Despite being initially rebuffed due to his age (he was in his late 50s), Gottfried convinced the agency to admit him. After training, he became certified, completed an internship dealing with computers, and secured yet another job. He found this last job, working as part of a technological support team for the Bundestag, to be a better fit, attributing this to the fact that there

were more easterners than westerners working there. (Schoedel, Gottfried. Personal interview. 7 December 2007).

THE ECONOMY TODAY

Economic trends that began with reunification endure today. From Anderson's perspective, "the economy is a tale of two Germanys, one rich and prosperous—the other essentially a ward of the state" (2010:18). The per capita GDP in the East is equal to 70 percent that in the West, and investment in research and development in the East amounts to one-sixth of what the West invests. Further, wages of those who are employed equal to approximately 80 percent of western wages, and the unemployment rate in the East is almost double that in the West (Hengst and Kröger 2010). Easterners continue to seek out work in the West; those who choose to commute number in the hundreds of thousands (Silver 2010:175). "East Germany is no longer a place to be; it is a place to leave," as McAdams observes, to the point that "even immigrant workers steer clear of the area" (2010:33). Thus, along with its once-mammoth factories, eastern Germany's towns and villages are emptying out. According to Silver, cities are attempting to plan for population contraction, "creating new parks and restructuring infrastructure for more compact urban living" (2010:173). The new expanses of unpopulated land have led to environmental changes as well. Eastern Germany offers a great potential for 'renaturation,' as it has transformed from a land of production to a land of prairies. Particularly in the sparsely populated states of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Brandenburg, but also in the low mountain ranges, space is opening up for the regrowth of plants and repopulation of animals. Recent years have witnessed

spikes in the populations of lynxes, foxes, and moose in the eastern states (Kröhnert et al. 2008:10).

The transformation of the eastern economy has had a profound effect on the people that live there. While the communist state may no longer be present to enforce the centrality of work in society, work and employment continue to have a strong impact on society, albeit in very different ways. Instead of reliable employment and most aspects of life shaped by work, easterners focus on maintaining employment and observing the massive changes to their environment—social and actual—due to a lack thereof.

REPRESENTATION

In the political realm, western parties effortlessly absorbed their eastern counterparts such that, “by the October 1990 Bundestag election, the eastern party system had essentially become an extension of the party system from the West” (Dalton and Jou 2010:35). Despite Willy Brandt’s famed statement about unification, “what belongs together will now grow together,” the political system looks very similar to that of the FRG before reunification. According to Dalton and Jou, “this is not so much growing together, as being overtaken by the well-established parties in the West” (49).

While the parties may not have changed, however, constituencies were divided according to East-West interests. Party support reflects regional differences, as Kopstein and Ziblatt observe “two distinctive but now overlapping electorates” (2006:135). The CDU/CSU, FDP and Greens receive majorities in the West while the Left Party (formerly the PDS) finds favor among eastern voters. Although western parties

attempted to reach out to eastern voters, they often found eastern platforms conflicting with those in the West (144). “Citizens and their representatives,” explains Anderson, “seem to operate within different coordinate systems and seek to realize very different visions, depending on whether they hail from one side or the other of the former wall” (Anderson 2010:18).

In addition to these differing visions, the lack of support for western parties in the East may be due to an absence of easterners in politics. As Yoder notes, “twenty years after unification, achieving descriptive, substantive and symbolic representation for the east is still a work in progress” (2010:562). In the 2009 Bundestag elections, for instance, the chancellor’s cabinet featured only two eastern politicians (McAdams 2010:38), and political officials from the East currently hold about five percent of the leadership positions at the national level (Yoder 2010:549). Not only are eastern Germans in the minority as parliamentarians but also as members of political parties, associations and unions. Of elites in economics, law, academia, administration and media, five percent hail from the East (551). This may be rooted in the enduring ‘*BesserWessi*’ (‘West is Best’) attitude that the western way is the only way. Following Yoder, “East Germans eager to participate in shaping policy learned that, by and large, the only route was through the political parties and the parliamentary system, where recruitment and socialization patterns, political discourse, and norms for behavior were all determined by the West” (552). Easterners must emulate their western counterparts in order to succeed; nonconformists will continue to be marginalized (560).

SOCIAL INTERACTIONS

Social interaction between easterners and westerners after the fall of the Wall started out on a positive note. Yet, as tensions quickly mounted, relations soured. When the Wall came down, westerners welcomed easterners with open arms—and sometimes a banana or two. Easterners came to the West in droves, some to relocate, but many just for the ultimate consumer experience. Stores were ill-prepared for the onslaught, running out of parking spaces outside and inside finding themselves with empty shelves where there would normally be yogurt, kiwis and bananas—items rarely, if ever, available in the GDR. Angry western shoppers quickly identified easterners as the culprits.

While easterners were enjoying exploring the west, westerners did not feel similarly compelled to go eastward. A year after reunification, 33 percent of easterners had vacationed in the West while fewer than three percent of westerners had enjoyed a holiday in the East (Staab 1998:18). There was a similar imbalance in terms of employment, as easterners flocked to the west in search of jobs. As they settled into new positions in the West, they encountered discrimination and harassment from their West German coworkers. Some were refused service at the factory canteen, others were verbally attacked, and still others were assigned to the least desirable tasks. In subsequent years, “some of the young men and women who went to the West for work [...] returned, even at the expense of income declines, because they did not fit in” (Silver 2010:173).

In the East, westerners arrived as new managers and members of state governments, effectively teaching administration and governance (Maier 1997:298). In addition to these formal roles, westerners also arrived in the former GDR as private citizens—seeking restitution. There had been much debate and discussion regarding the issue of restitution even before reunification, as leaders considered the choice between inaction, financial compensation, and full property restitution. Ultimately, of the three options, the most extreme and difficult course of action—property restitution—prevailed. Burnett observes, “The result was disastrous. At street level, the situation became a nightmare. Easterners watched big, shiny cars with West German license plates cruising the streets of town and villages as drivers looked for houses that had once been owned by them or their families. The claimants wanted them back and they wanted vacant possession”. Residents of properties in question were often harassed and intimidated, with the goal of forcing them out of homes they had lived in for decades. Though German law precluded eviction, “the upshot was mistrust and hatred towards Westerners” (2007:18).

Years after reunification, social relationships between eastern Germans and western Germans remain distant and strained—though not dichotomous. Kocka clarifies, “there is, of course, some mixing. A thin layer of West Germans live and work in the East, usually in leading positions. East Germans move to the West to work and be trained. Still, different newspapers are read in the East than in the West, and the best-seller lists differ. West German and East German historians tend to publish in different journals” (quoted in Howard 1995:58). While about 85 percent of Easterners have

friends or family in the West, only one third of westerners have such relationships with individuals in the East (Conradt 2002). The extremely low rate of intermarriage between easterner and westerners, hovering around two percent in 1998, proves that romantic relationships are even scarcer (Howard 2003:8). Even in Berlin, where West meets East, locals remain loyal to their districts, visiting restaurants, bars, and shopping centers on 'their' side of the city. In fact, "79 percent of eastern Berliners and 68 percent of western Berliners do not have regular contact with people who live on the opposite side of the city" (Silver 2010:183).

East-West interactions began with western officials taking over eastern industries and institutions as well as curious easterners exploring the revered and beloved West for the first time, and were characterized by superiority and later hostility. Because "the real work of marginalization [...] happens systematically through the daily actions of individuals" (Cohen 1999:47), social relations between easterners and westerners, as well as the telling lack thereof, have helped to reinforce the asymmetrical dynamics that have developed in post-reunification society.

IDENTITY

Identity politics emerged early, but started to solidify after reunification as discourses in the east and west began to establish identities with regard to the regional 'other', creating what McAdams has called "an enduring culture of inequality" (2002:40). According to Staab, "instead of focusing on common grounds, Easterners and Westerners built new loyalties around excluding standards and only very reluctantly attempted to integrate the compatriots across the former demarcation line into one

another's identity" (1998:19). While the physical Wall ceased to exist, the "Wall in the minds" of easterners and westerners (Schneider 1983) remained.

At the time of reunification, the differences between easterners and westerners were glaringly obvious. Berdahl describes easterners with pale complexions, oily hair, bad teeth, and out-of-date clothing. Westerners were quite the opposite, with bronzed faces, trendy hairstyles and designer clothing (1999:167). As consumer goods became readily accessible and easterners imitated the styles of westerners, superficial markers became less relevant. The 'Ossi'- 'Wessi' divide became based on negative images that each side had of the other. In West German eyes, Ossis were insecure, lazy, and ungrateful, reaping the benefits of the federal republic without the years of hard work. Wessis, who arrived in the east to take high-profile jobs, purchase real estate, or take over businesses were, from the East German perspective, arrogant, superficial, and stingy. They became known as 'BesserWessi' or 'know-it-alls', because they acted in just this manner. As McFalls points out, "the competitive dialogue between east and west has assured the expansion of western hegemonic culture and social practices, with all of their subjective and objective tensions, to the east" (2002:90).

A 1992 poll accurately reflects these attitudes. Asked to address easterners, westerners demanded, "'Don't complain so much, most people are better off than before'; 'More modesty and thankfulness'; and 'Shut your mouths and work more'". Easterners' comments were similarly harsh: "'Don't always think about money'; 'They won't take advice, they think they know better'; and 'Why are we being treated like minors?'" (Dennis 2000a:93). According to Dennis, "the extent of mutual grievances

and negative images is underlined by the furor in the summer of 1999 when easterners accused west Germans of seeking to enforce segregation on the beaches of the Baltic coast between nudists and ‘textiles’ who prefer to wear bikinis or trunks, thereby overriding the traditional east German preference for mixed beaches” (95).

The integration of the former GDR into the FRG focused primarily on institutions; East German pride and values, were also casualties of the ‘colonization’ process. The effects of reunification were destructive and humiliating for easterners. According to Borneman, there was this “terrifying feeling of inferiority, the sense that everything they had stood and lived for, their sacrifices and self-satisfactions alike, were worthless in the face of Western prosperity” (1991:33). As opposed to its institutions and laws, eastern identity did not disappear. In 1995, 25 percent of easterners identified themselves as ‘east German only,’ as compared to 4 percent of westerners (Dennis 2000a:93). With regard to an eastern regional identity, the numbers are even more robust—71 percent of easterners profess such a regional identity, while 46 percent of westerners maintain a western regional identity (92). Along with a strong identification with the east, there are deep-seated feelings of inferiority. Immediately after reunification, 87 percent of easterners considered themselves to be second-class citizens. While this number sank in 1995, by 1997 it was back to 80 percent (94).

Since reunification, the German people have grown apart as opposed to together, developing into “parallel societies” (Mushaben 2010:566) that differ economically, socially and culturally. A recent report on social solidarity yielded findings demonstrating differences between the two populations. While 35 percent of

westerners maintain that they lost more than they won in reunification, only one quarter of eastern Germans confess to feeling like true German citizens. Almost half of easterners (45 percent) are unsatisfied with democracy and more than half (59 percent) said that, while they did not want the GDR back, they did not feel quite right in the FRG (Hengst and Kröger 2010).

Despite similar institutions, laws and language, easterners have struggled to integrate into western society. This rift has led to a change in the character of eastern Germans as a group.

In many respects East Germans face obstacles to integration that are similar to those confronting ethnic groups. Indeed, their identity is evolving from a national one to a quasi-ethnic one, posing similar problems of social exclusion as immigrants do. The insistence on remembering life in the GDR is a reaction to Western suppression of Easterners' former national identity and culture and to persistent socioeconomic disadvantage in the united Germany. (Silver 2010:170)

As Silver implies, the differences between easterners and westerners may be sufficient to define them as two discrete ethnic groups. Baer elaborates, "If one views ethnicity as a dynamic process of cultural identity, one might posit the argument that while East Germans and West Germans no longer constitute separate German nationality groups, they may be evolving into two separate ethnic groups within the same nation-state" (1998:141).

Here, Barth's framing of ethnic groups and boundary construction is instructive. An ethnic group is understood as a population that is self-perpetuating, united by shared cultural values, occupies a bounded territory, and has members that identify themselves and are identified by others as part of a particular group (Barth 1969:10).

Social boundaries between groups are key, as “ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of social interaction and acceptance, but are quite to the contrary often the very foundations on which embracing social systems are built” (9). Howard’s view of the population of eastern Germany complements Barth. “East Germans,” asserts Howard, “do constitute a separate group in the Federal Republic of Germany: They are to a large extent self-perpetuating and territorially bounded; they have powerful and emotional ties to a common past, common values, common struggles; they are represented politically and are opposed to a common ‘other’” (1995:56).

A recent court case in the western German city of Stuttgart brought the issue of East German ethnicity into the judicial system. The lawsuit claimed that an employer discriminated against a job applicant based on her East German background. The woman, who had emigrated from the GDR in 1988, claimed that her application had been rejected and returned to her with a minus sign and the word ‘Ossi’ written next to it. As German law prohibits discrimination based on race or ethnicity, the woman sued, identifying her ethnicity as East German. Ultimately, the labor court concluded that East Germans did not constitute an ethnic group and found in favor of the defendant (“Court to Decide” 2010).

Institutional changes, social interactions, and emerging identities came together to establish and enable the dynamics of marginalization in German society after the fall of the Wall. As the population on the marginalized side, easterners reacted in various ways; some took actions in forms of resistance, the aggregations of which draw attention to mobilization and collective action.

REACTING TO MARGINALIZATION

Just a year after reunification, easterners expressed much less camaraderie with westerners, noting instead the differences between them and their marginal status in relation to them. Wessis “served as a concrete symbol for a systemic mode of domination in which easterners could accept their evident subordination only with resistance” (McFalls 2002:89). Though many did nothing, some chose to react to their marginal status in the newly unified Germany. As Howard recognizes, “they feel compelled to justify the morality of life in the GDR, which they feel is constantly under attack from the West. This sense of having to defend one’s own moral worth, in the face of constantly perceived contempt underlies the East German identity today” (1995:62).

POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

As new voters in the German political system, East Germans reacted to marginalization at the polls. When, after reunification, political parties from the GDR merged with their counterparts in the West, one party was left out—the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). Without formal ties to the West and with easterners at the helm, the PDS—the democratic incarnation of the former communist Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED)—quickly emerged as a regional party that would represent interests in the East and easterners were eager to show their support. At the sub-national level, in the new states, the PDS performed very well. The party was part of an unofficial coalition with the SPD from 1994 to 2002 in Saxony-Anhalt, and part of official coalitions with the SPD in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Berlin since 1998 and

2002, respectively (Barker 2004:55). These inroads were exclusive to the East, as only 27 percent of westerners considered the PDS to be a normal democratic party at that time (Dennis 2000a:92). The success of the PDS was inextricably linked to its identification with and manipulation of eastern German values and beliefs. According to Howard, “what the PDS has accomplished, brilliantly, is to give East Germans the impression that their identity in the unified Germany is fundamentally linked with discrimination against Ossis on every level” (Howard 1995:61). Until 2007, the PDS continued to be seen as a regional party. Its merger with a western party, however, created a new party—The Left Party—that opens the party up to a western constituency. It is yet to be clear if the new party will maintain its stronghold in the East or if this union could be viewed as yet another instance of western colonization.

OSTALGIE

Ostalgie, nostalgia for the East, was another mode of reaction to marginalization. Easterners rejected the West and embraced their GDR pasts in acts of “everyday resistance” (Scott 1985:36). A number of films that tended to cast a more favorable light on everyday life in the GDR only helped to increase feelings of nostalgia. The first of this trend was *Sonnenallee* (*Sun Avenue*), a film that depicted the carefree antics of teenagers in East Berlin. *Die Stille nach dem Schuss* (*The Legend of Rita*) and *Kleinruppin Forever* both feature characters that grew up in West Germany only to find themselves living their adult lives in East Germany. In both stories the main characters find themselves happier and at home in the GDR. The most successful Ostalgie movie was *Goodbye Lenin!*, which debuted in 2003. Set in 1989, just before the fall of the Wall, the

film follows the main character Alex for the next year as he attempts to recreate the GDR for his ailing mother who is unaware of recent events. He redecorates the apartment, stripping it of all that is flashy and western, plays classic anthems of the GDR, wears vintage GDR attire, and transplants Western foods into containers with the old GDR branding. With the success of these films, Western German television stations were inspired to rebroadcast East German TV shows, and to create Ostalgie-Shows that looked back at the life and times of people in the GDR.

As new consumers, easterners, who had so quickly gravitated to all things western, were soon returning to eastern products. They once again drove their *Trabant* cars (Appendix 1.2), drank *Vita-Cola*, ate *Spreewald* gherkins, and used the East German detergent *Spee*. As Berdahl describes, “East German products have taken on new symbolic meaning when used the second time around. These recuperations are both gestures of defiance toward and an ironic play with images and stereotypes of Ossis. And they entail the manipulation of culturally provided forms of resistance within the context of a market economy: consumer choice” (1999:176).

Though less common, political protests also became part of the Ostalgie resistance. Berlin’s *Palast der Republik* (Palace of the Republic), the seat of the parliament of the GDR, became the subject of one such protest. The GDR government built the edifice after demolishing the *Stadtschloss* (City Palace), deemed a symbol of Prussian nobility and elitist privilege. Once considered “a showpiece building” (“Memories of East” 2010) in the divided city, the palace had been closed to the public since 1993 due to asbestos contamination. In the next decade, it was cleared of all

contamination, only to be slated for demolition by the German government. People took to the streets of Berlin in opposition to the destruction; despite their efforts, the palace was razed in 2008. A second instance of protest focused on the eastern version of the *Ampelmann* (Appendix 1.1). The Ampelmann was the symbol used at crosswalks in the GDR. Unlike the western crosswalk symbols, which were generic human forms, eastern crosswalks featured a stout male figure in a hat. After reunification, western authorities set about to streamline all street and traffic signs, in so doing westernizing all eastern signage. These efforts included transforming the Ampelmann into his generic western rival. Protests aimed at protecting the Ampelmann from extinction were successful, preserving the eastern crosswalk signals and, in some cases, exporting them to the West.

The ultimate consequences of Ostalgie have been greater than anticipated, strengthening the barrier between East and West. As Silver notes, “Ostalgie—an oppositional culture resisting western German hegemony, one which not only seeks to preserve the architecture and resurrect the consumer goods and popular entertainment of the GDR, but also to commemorate, yet not necessarily idealize the lives of its citizens—has attained political significance. Indeed, the East-West gap in political attitudes may have even widened over time” (2010:180).

CONCLUSION

The reunification of East and West Germany in 1990 was far from the reunion that many had envisioned for so long. The transition process installed western political

and economic institutions in the East with little regard for the previous institutions. Interactions between easterners and westerners, though initially friendly, grew strained due to expectations and stereotypes on both sides. The nascent identities that existed before the fall of the Wall emerged strengthened by the difficulties of the transition.

Many observers predicted that eastern Germany would rebound and the East-West divide, this wall in Germans' minds, would fade with the passage of time. Twenty years after reunification, this is hardly the case. Burnett illustrates,

East Germany no longer exists, but reminders of it are everywhere: in the abandoned brick Wilhelminian buildings, in the absence of neatness and order, in the drabness. Away from Main Street, it has a threadbare gloom, an emptiness, and a sullen resistance to the tintured tidiness of the West. In spite of the modern Western-built cars and the neon lighting, the East remains another country. It is sometimes like looking down a street of ruins, a street where nobody comes any more, a ghost strasse. (2007:4)

Economic projections in the East are uncertain at best, evidence to most that, despite the financial assistance of the West, the eastern economy will not rebound like those of its former-communist neighbors. Not only have East-West differences persisted, in some cases they have strengthened. Eastern Germany and its people continue in a state of inequality with regard to the West.

Though the residents of Heinersdorf had experienced these dynamics of marginalization for more than a decade by 2006, all were shocked by the actions of their local government that spring. The borough council's decision to grant a building permit to a Muslim congregation without previously consulting the community seemed like the ultimate act of marginalization. Just as they had in the past, some easterners refused to

remain quiet and accept the situation. Citizens mobilized, first as individuals and then collectively, to react to the mosque specifically, but more broadly to the way the local government treated its citizenry and to the position of easterners in German society.

4: A JOLT TO THE COMMUNITY

The East-West divide that exists in Germany may be most palpable in Berlin, where easterners and westerners encounter each other on a regular basis. There, interactions serve to reinforce notions of difference. Such is the case in Heinersdorf, a small village in the far east of the city. A majority of Heinersdorfers had grown up in the East and lived a relatively quiet life in the village. In early March of 2006, the people of Heinersdorf were in for a surprise that would shake the village for the next two years and change it forever. The mosque debate that ensued awakened the community, as it re-engaged in the politic sphere for the first time since re-unification.

HEINERSDORF

Heinersdorf is a small community of approximately 6500 inhabitants. Although just a five-minute commute to the city, Heinersdorf has the feel of a “sleepy village” (Ebertz, Simon. Personal interview. 27 March 2008); it is “idyllic” (Eichel, Tobias. Personal interview. 03 April 2008), with a pastoral charm much appreciated by its inhabitants (Traugott, Linus. Personal interview. 22 March 2008). Villagers rely on the city for action—be it social, cultural, or political—and return to Heinersdorf for serenity.

In the past two decades, Heinersdorf has found itself a part of three different boroughs—initially a part of Pankow, it joined the borough of Weißensee in the late

1980s and, as a result of the union of the three boroughs of Weißensee, Pankow and Prenzlauerberg in 2001, it is once more a part of Pankow. These cadastral changes led also to changes in representation, leaving Heinersdorf widely forgotten. The union in 2001 merged three very different boroughs, with divergent perspectives and diverse constituencies, into one large unit. In the eyes of many, “this was not a merger of boroughs, it was a cultural revolution” (Eichel, Tobias. Personal interview. 03 April 2008). Prenzlauerberg, with its proletarian roots and a destination for new Berliners from the West, had constituents who were well educated, politically informed and leaned to the left. Weißensee was more reserved, with an established, conservative populace. Similarly, Pankow’s constituency, too, was established and conservative; however, unlike their obedient neighbors, people in Pankow were known to be reactionary, always having something to complain about (Ritter, Reinhard. Personal interview. 10 April 2008).

The boroughs also differed procedurally. While both Pankow and Weißensee had stronger executive branches that controlled the legislative branch, Prenzlauerberg’s legislative body was much stronger than its executive (Eichel, Tobias. Personal interview. 03 April 2008). In this mix were Heinersdorfers, never a priority for the local government. As a lifelong resident noted, no one ever acknowledged the village, no one made plans for it, “developed, it was not” (Roth, Denis. Personal interview. 08 April 2008). A general sentiment of mistrust for the government exists among the people of Heinersdorf—a perception, enduring since DDR times, that the government has little

time or reason to care for this small village on the outskirts of East Berlin (Eichel, Tobias. Personal interview. 03 April 2008).

Since the fall of the Wall, much changed in the village. While many small shops closed, fast food restaurants such as Burger King and Kentucky Fried Chicken opened for business, as did a few large grocery stores and a home improvement store. More important, the community faded as individuals focused more on their own fates and less on the networks and ties that had previously bound them together. Despite the many changes in the village, persistent problems did not disappear. The main road through the center of the village was routed directly off of a major thoroughfare, resulting in heavy, fast-paced traffic. Playgrounds and footpaths in the village remained in a constant state of disrepair and there was no youth center—one possible reason for increased youth violence in recent years (Appendix 1.26, 1.27). Terrible flooding during the spring months, the result of insufficient drainage and sewage connections, plagued many homeowners in the village (Appendix 1.25). The persistence of these issues was evidence, according to locals, of the lack of attention and care on the part of their local government.

Though not politically active before reunification, citizens in Heinersdorf since 1991 intermittently involved themselves in the goings on of the local government. In the early 1990s, the government proposed a road reconstruction project and locals were eager to offer their input. Heinersdorfers joined together into two separate groups to lobby the local government to fix traffic congestion issues. These two groups were at odds with each other, with opposing proposals—rather than deal with the

conflict, the government turned away entirely from the issue. Later that decade, another group formed to challenge the decision of the borough council to build a large recycling plant in the area. The council refused to engage the opposition and once again conceded.

In a further effort to help themselves when their government was not, concerned citizens accepted the invitation of the pastor of the Heinersdorf Protestant Church to form a working group that would address issues in the community. The church, which had a very limited role in the GDR, emerged as a bit of a focal point in Heinersdorf; according to one resident, it took the place of the state in the sense of “anchoring people and creating a community” (Traugott, Linus. Personal interview. 22 March 2008). Villagers reacted favorably to the pastor’s initiative, coming together to establish an active working group. Reaching a consensus proved quite difficult, however, and disagreements with the pastor and infighting among members proved to be the downfall of the group (Roth, Denis. Personal interview. 8 April 2008). Despite their various efforts, Heinerdorfers had little success in sustaining political activity and also in gaining the recognition and consideration of the borough council.

Before 2006, when a local member of the Berlin House of Representatives from the SPD would tell others that she was from Heinersdorf, immediate responses would ask where that was and if it was in fact part of Berlin (Roth, Agnes. Personal interview. 02 April 2008). This “forgotten district” was barely on the map; its residents were the “losers of reunification” (Ritter, Reinhard. Personal interview. 10 April 2008). There was a strong sense of personal affliction, leading to overwhelming frustration and a

complete lack of trust among the villagers (Lang, Richard. Personal interview. 01 April 2008). One had the impression, according to a member of the borough council, that Heinersdorfers would have a passionate reaction to any imposed government change—whether that meant building a mosque or anything else (Ritter, Reinhard. Personal interview. 10 April 2008).

THE AHMADIYYA JAMA'AT

The Ahmadiyya community of Berlin first approached Pankow's borough government with an application for a building permit in the fall of 2005. The hopes were to build a new bi-level mosque with a minaret as well as a community center with meeting rooms and a library. After a complicated search, the Ahmadi found a plot of land in the eastern village of Heinersdorf; it was not in the immediate vicinity of the congregation, but accessible by Autobahn and incredibly affordable.

The Ahmadiyya Jama'at, or the Ahmadiyya Muslim Association, is an Islamic movement. Described as "one of the most active and controversial movements in modern Islam" (Friedman 1989:1), the Ahmadiyya community was founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in the nineteenth century in India. Ahmadi believe their form of Islam to be "Islam in its pristine purity" (Valentine 2008:xv). Unlike other Muslims, who believe in the finality of prophethood, and that Mohammed was the greatest and last prophet, Ahmadi believe that other prophets succeeded Mohammed. Other Muslims thus consider Ahmadi to be unbelievers, even heretics, and they have been persecuted for their beliefs in some Muslim countries. Seeking both asylum and converts, members

of the Ahmadiyya community have been emigrating from South Asia since the early twentieth century. By the end of the twentieth century, the Ahmadiyya community was represented in almost 200 countries (“Die Ahmadiyya” 2008). Ahmadi have been in Germany since the time of the Weimar Republic and the population now exceeds 30,000. The particular group in Berlin approximated its congregation to be 200 to 250 people (Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at 2006)—much too large for the single-family home in the western borough of Reinickendorf that they used for worship and community activities for over two decades.

INITIAL PLANNING AND DISCUSSIONS

The Ahmadiyya community planned to purchase a Treuhand-owned plot of land in the village of Heinersdorf, not far from the village church. On this site, a two-story mosque and community center would replace the congregation’s current home, an undersized storefront mosque in a neighboring borough. After initial approval by the building commission, the permit application moved on to the Pankow borough council for review. The council was aware of the Ahmadiyya’s plight and some council members were adamantly in favor of the building permit. Most, though, identified themselves not as *Befürworter*, or supporters, but rather as defenders of the freedom of religion and the right to build (Traugott, Linus. Personal interview. 22 March 2008; Lang, Richard. Personal interview. 01 April 2008; Ritter, Reinhard. Personal interview. 10 April 2008).

To many members of the borough council, the location of the proposed mosque was unfamiliar. According to the council's background information, Heinersdorf was an underdeveloped area, with no youth recreation center, no playgrounds, and footpaths in disrepair. One council member actually born and raised in the village described it as "nothing" (Ebertz, Simon. Personal interview. 27 March 2008). The other member familiar with the area described it as a "terrible place" (Lang, Richard. Personal interview. 01 April 2008). One council member admitted that, prior to this issue, he had never even heard of the village (Reiniger, Lenz. Personal interview. 27 March 2008).

With little connection to the location of the mosque, the council moved ahead to the particulars of the Ahmadiyya community. Council members spoke with political officials in other towns where there were Ahmadiyya congregations. Those officials found that the groups were peaceful and engaged in the community; any fears or worries regarding the community had since subsided. And, according to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, which monitors unconstitutional organizations and activities, the Ahmadiyya had not been the focus of any reports in recent years. The borough council also reviewed the writings of Hiltrud Schröter, a scholar and vocal opponent of the Ahmadiyya Jama'at, but found that views to be very controversial among academics and experts of Islam. Ultimately, the council concluded that there were no valid reasons to oppose the mosque construction project.

ANNOUNCEMENT

Before the borough council had a chance to inform its constituents in Heinersdorf of the impending mosque construction, the local chapter of the far-right National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) and one of the local newspapers spread the word. In early March, Heinersdorfers opened their mailboxes to find a flyer from the NPD, entitled “Soon just like Paris?” (2006; Appendix 1.5). Inside, they learned of the plans for a mosque in Heinersdorf and the strong stance of the NPD as it rallied against transforming the village into something similar to Paris or, more locally, the multicultural district of Kreuzberg. Anyone who had been skeptical of the factual nature of the NPD flyer would see it confirmed by an article in the *Berliner Zeitung* on the 6th of March. It informed readers that the Ahmadiyya Muslim community of Germany would build a mosque on the corner of Tiniusstraße and Prenzlauer Promenade, mere blocks from the village center (“*Eine Moschee*” 2006:32). Furthermore, the borough council’s committee for building and development planned to invite the congregation to its next meeting on April 9th for a presentation open to the public.

Very few Heinersdorfers had known about the mosque plans previous to the announcement in the newspaper and most were taken completely by surprise, unwilling to believe its veracity. In fact, the local pastor received numerous calls as soon as the news broke, wondering if the article was a *Zeitungssente*, an April Fools-type joke that would appear in the newspaper at this time of year (Rilke, Sebastian. Personal interview. 6 December 2007). The fact that the plans appeared to be out of the initial development stages prompted suspicion among the citizens, heightened by the apparent misprint in the newspaper—the meeting would take place on March 9th, not

April 9th as initially reported. This meeting took place in a small room with a capacity of about 40 people, much too small for the 100 that turned out. An architect presented the building plans, which included a mosque with separate areas for men and women, as well as living quarters for the imam and a conference center. Officials then answered specific questions regarding the building permit and the building plans; no other questions were permitted. Those in attendance voiced their concerns nonetheless, wondering, for instance, why there would be a mosque in a village where there were no Muslims; if the real estate prices would fall due to the construction; and if congregants would further exacerbate the traffic problems in the village (Plett 2006). These questions appeared to fall on deaf ears.

IMMEDIATE REACTIONS

As commotion in the village grew, it soon became clear to the borough council that there would be strong opposition to the construction plans. The council never expected such a reaction from the people of Heinersdorf and, as the council president confessed, they had “fully underestimated the citizens’ reactions” (Ritter, Reinhard. Personal interview. 10 April 2008). In an attempt to assuage the anger and concern, the council planned a general informational session for the end of the month. They would provide background information about the Ahmadiyya as well as specifics regarding the mosque construction, and citizens would be welcome to ask questions.

In the community, frustration mounted after that initial meeting on the 9th of March. Word spread of the lack of respect that the council showed to concerned

Heinersdorfers, and citizens realized that they needed to take action. A small group of individuals scheduled a meeting at the local pub, each agreeing to bring any interested friends and neighbors. At the *Heinersdorfer Klug*, the neighborhood watering hole, the group encountered another group also meeting to discuss the mosque. Heinersdorfers who had previously been strangers quickly became acquainted due to their mutual concerns about the mosque. They shared information about the Ahmadiyya from books and websites and continued to question the borough council's decision-making process. Aware that the upcoming meeting could be their only opportunity to challenge the council, the group discussed what types of questions to pose and specifically how to phrase them. Not only did they want the opportunity to make real inquiries of the council, but they also did not want to substantiate claims in the press that they were ignorant and *fremdfeindlich*, or intolerant. When one person broached the idea of establishing a formal organization, people were hesitant, unsure of the effectiveness of organized political action and fearing for their livelihoods and reputations (Thull, Ina. Personal interview. 22 November 2007).

One of the few pre-existing formal organizations in Heinersdorf was the *Gemeindekirchenrat*, the local church council. The council focused on the relationship between the church and the community, surprisingly important in this post-communist village. Soon after the issue first came out in the newspaper, the church council voted to maintain a neutral stance and encourage constructive discussion. It drafted a formal resolution, which it passed on to the borough council, imploring the council to take villagers' concerns seriously and to offer them the opportunity to participate in

discussions and decisions regarding the mosque. Furthermore, the church council acknowledged that Heinersdorf had been neglected in the past with regard to planning and development and encouraged the borough council to consider the mosque construction in light of other possibilities for development in the village (Roth, Ernst. Personal communication. 21 March 2006).

An early voice of opposition came from a Berlin assemblyman from the CDU, Erich Zimmerman. Like his CDU colleagues on the borough council, he was against the mosque, and acted immediately to make his position known to the people of Heinersdorf. In those early weeks of the mosque debate, he appeared at the Heinersdorfer Klug, introducing himself as an assemblyman but receiving a merely lukewarm reception from suspicious Heinersdorfers. Unwaveringly persistent, Zimmerman sent an open letter to the community questioning the motives of both the council and the Ahmadiyya. He conceded that, for him, the debate was not about religious freedom and Islam in Germany. Rather, he found it

worrisome that the announcement of the construction plans alone aroused considerable contention in Heinersdorf. The first flyers have already been distributed announcing demonstrations. And the fact that Muslim communities are unfortunately often violently competitive with each other is a growing concern for many citizens. These concerns always lead to the question: Why here?

Zimmerman encouraged citizens to attend the informational meeting—if for no other reason than to convince the Ahmadiyya to find another location to build their mosque (2006).

The Ahmadiyya presented themselves in their own open letter to the community. The letter described Ahmadiyya religious beliefs: “The most important

tenets of our faith are: the motto, 'Love for all, hate for none,' no restraint in questions of religion and of course: no honor killings, no holy war, no death penalty for a Muslim that converts to Christianity or any other faith". It explained that the Ahmadi are in Germany because "followers may not practice their religion in Pakistan, for instance, as well as other Muslim countries, and thus robbed of their basic rights. For this reason, many followers have left their homelands to establish a new home in Germany. Here, we enjoy the right to religious freedom, for which we are very thankful to Germany and pray for its wellbeing". They identified themselves as Berliners and as Germans, who observe the constitution and the democratic system of the federal republic. The mosque, the Ahmadiyya congregation hoped, would introduce a new religion to the community of Heinersdorf and ultimately encourage tolerance and peace among people of different religions (2006).

THE OPEN MEETING

As the borough council prepared for the March 30th informational meeting, its members were conscious of the delicate nature of the situation, yet felt a responsibility to influence political opinions and maintain the council's position in favor the mosque construction (Ritter, Reinhard. Personal communication. 14 March 2006). All residences and places of business received an invitation from the council to attend the informational meeting, at which they would "have the opportunity to direct questions to representatives of the Ahmadiyya congregation, present [their] own position, and speak with representatives from the government of the borough of Pankow" (Ritter

2006). The meeting would take place in the auditorium of the Heinersdorf elementary school, chosen because it was the largest enclosed meeting space in the village—appropriate for the brisk March weather and the many members of the community who might be unable or unwilling to travel to a more distant location. With its capacity of 300 occupants, members of the council deemed the auditorium more than sufficient. This location, however, would quickly prove unfit for the community meeting.

When more than 1500 people arrived at the elementary school for the meeting, most were refused entrance. For this crowd, which was already quite disturbed by the actions of their government representatives, this was unbelievable and intolerable. People became agitated, ultimately coming together with the chant, “We are the people!” The borough council knew that it could not continue with its agenda for the evening and the community meeting was cancelled.

INTERESSENGEMEINSCHAFT PANKOW HEINERSDORFER BÜRGER

In the weeks following the debacle at the school, villagers started to get together to discuss the mosque issue. Small groups encountered other small groups at the village pub and, in a short time, grew into a large assembly of concerned citizens. This group of Heinersdorfers, previously mere acquaintances and not particularly active in politics, recognized the need for desperate measures and established a citizen’s initiative to challenge the borough council and the plans for the mosque construction. By mid-April, the Interessengemeinschaft Pankow Heinersdorfer Bürger, or IPAHB, came into being.

REACTIONS TO THE IPAHB

Reactions to the IPAHB varied, ranging from fear and frustration to surprise and awe. While some outsiders considered the IPAHB to be working along side the extreme right, others viewed the initiative as a symbol of more general dissatisfaction. The far left *Antifa* quickly established itself as the direct opposition of the IPAHB, which it equated with Neo-Nazi. Practicing intimidation techniques not uncommon for either extreme side of the spectrum, the Antifa posted photographs and home addresses of IPAHB members on its website and even visited members' homes to taunt them from the sidewalk. A second group that took the threat of the IPAHB very seriously was the *Mobileberatungsteam* (Mobile Advisory Team). It had experience with local-level extremist organizations and encouraged the government to join in keeping a very watchful eye on the IPAHB. Finally, a less formal local initiative arose in Heinersdorf, aiming to counter the IPAHB and offer another option for local involvement. *Heinersdorf Öffne Dich!* (Heinersdorf Open Your Minds!) (HÖD) was a small group of citizens who wanted to challenge the developing image of the village as a closed-minded and intolerant place. It presented itself as the opposite of the IPAHB—educated, worldly, and tolerant.

Most in the local government agreed that the IPAHB was representative of the prevailing sentiment of discontent in the village. One party official described IPAHB members as perennially on the losing side—it would be just as likely that they would protest if the plans were to construct a sausage factory instead of a mosque (Ritter, Reinhard. Personal interview. 10 April 2008). A second official praised the IPAHB for

succeeding where so many others had failed at encouraging political engagement, but criticized it for “*entirely splitting* the community—one was either against the mosque or for it” (Traugott, Linus. Personal interview. 22 March 2008). Further, while many were impressed by the organization and efforts of the group, they saw its goals as unrealistic and unattainable. With the exception of the CDU, local party representatives found the group to be a nuisance; the real problem that the IPAHB posed was misleading the community. In a letter to the IPAHB, the BVV addressed these concerns. Not only did the IPAHB disseminate inaccurate and incendiary information about the Ahmadiyya Jama’at, but also, more important, it created the impression that the community could successfully oppose and ultimately prevent the mosque construction. Furthermore, the petition for a referendum regarding the mosque was impermissible because it was unconstitutional. (Ritter, Reinhard. Personal communication. July 2006). By offering open office hours, the IPAHB gave citizens the opportunity to vent, but also false hope, because the group could not accomplish anything on its own—“when [a group] refuses to work with parties or the BVV, it cannot get anywhere” (Traugott, Linus. Personal interview. 22 March 2008).

HEINERSDORF ÖFFNE DICH!

Soon after the IPAHB had established itself as the voice of Heinersdorf, a smaller group of citizens founded an alternative initiative—Heinersdorf Öffne Dich! Responding not only to the IPAHB, but also to the negative depictions of Heinersdorf in the media, members of HÖD presented themselves as tolerant and open-minded, stating on their

website, “we aren’t all racists.” Instead of reacting to the mosque issue in particular, HÖD expressed the need to look forward, to improve the outlook for the future of Heinersdorf. The group was considerably smaller than the IPAHB, originally consisting of a local SPD representative, her two sons and a few other newer members of the community, what one member called “the intellectual upper class” of Heinersdorf (Roth, Denis. Personal interview. 8 April 2008). Its first and only action was in November of 2006: a billboard in the village center, which announced the group’s establishment and its goals, and offered passersby an opportunity to leave comments on a suggestion board (Appendix 1.17). The billboard remained up for ten days without incident; however, the end of the billboard signified the end of HÖD’s public actions. Despite its connections to the SPD and the Left Party as well as to the Regional Office for Integration, the group remained small and rather dormant for a number of months. It re-entered the spotlight in the fall of 2007 when, jointly with Regional Office for Integration and a private tolerance organization, it sponsored the *Zukunftskonferenz* (Conference for the Future). Thereafter, a new group, the *Zukunftswerkstatt* (Workshop for the Future) served as the successor of the old HÖD.

OPEN LETTERS TO HEINERSDORF

In addition to the correspondence between individual citizens and their representatives, there were many mass-mail letters distributed in those first few months of the mosque debate. Most mailings took strong positions in support or opposition, often missing the many nuances involved in the controversy. A very early

entrant into the fray was the NPD, which preempted both the BVV and the local newspaper in disseminating the news of the mosque construction. In that flyer from early March referencing the recent riots in Paris as well as the multicultural Berlin borough of Kreuzberg, the NPD declared, “we don’t want conditions like Paris, we don’t want conditions like Kreuzberg!” (2006). An anonymous flyer entitled, “*Moschee im Dörfli Nee!*” (“No Mosque in the Village!”), aroused suspicions of the Ahmadi and their motives, suggesting that Islamists were looking to resettle in East Berlin (2006; Appendix 1.6). A second flyer pronounced “*Pankow Bleibt Deutsch!*” (“Keep Pankow German!”), and asserted that the burden of integration should be on foreigners as opposed to native Germans (2006).

On the other side of the spectrum, many letters condemned any opposition as ignorant and intolerant racists. The Antifa, often the first line of defense against the radical right, accused a local citizens’ initiative against the mosque of attempting to mask the “racist mob”. Further, the group distributed a flyer for their own demonstration with an incendiary image—that of a garden gnome, a classic icon associated with provincial life, dangling from a noose—which many felt was a direct threat of violence (“*Den Rassistischen*” 2006; Appendix 1.8). The *Pankower Netzwerk Gegen Rassismus, Antisemitismus und rechte Gewalt* (Pankow Network Against Racism, Anti-Semitism and Far Right Violence) drafted a letter that attempted to reach out to locals and prevent their manipulation by the extreme right. It classified both the demonstration outside the informational meeting and subsequent flyers as racist and exclusionary and warned, “when you support the IPAHB, when you don’t distance

yourself from [NeoNazis] and let them demonstrate along side you, you become willing instruments of NeoNazi arguments” (2006; Appendix 1.7). Finally, a small citizens’ group, *Wir Sind Pankow!* (We Are Pankow!), proclaimed its disgust with the mosque opposition and accused it of damaging the borough’s reputation (2007).

In an effort to quell the growing unrest, the BVV sent a letter to the community in early May. It echoed the many letters that the president of the council had sent to individual citizens, emphasizing both the serious as well as the definitive nature of their decision. It aimed to quell the efforts to collectively challenge the construction project and concluded with a mild threat: “Whoever does not accept [the building project], suggests further political decision-making room and re-introduces the question of building location, will be of questionable legality and give up their constitutional rights” (Ritter 2006b). Some of the parties represented in the BVV chose to issue their own comments; in one letter the SPD attempted to appear more flexible, stating that it differentiated between different types of opposition to the mosque and even found some concerns justifiable (2006). Such efforts at extending themselves and connecting with the community, however, were generally rebuffed as ‘too little, too late’.

CONCLUSION

The outrage of the crowd on the evening of the failed community meeting was not a passing sentiment among residents of Heinersdorf. They were appalled by the behavior of the borough council and felt that they deserved to play a role in the decision

to build the mosque. Citizens felt marginalized not only by their government but also by other outside groups that attempted to steer the direction of the debate.

The first few weeks of the mosque debate set the tone for the months and years to come. Villagers clashed with politicians, radical groups, and each other, straining and fighting for a chance to be heard and to participate in government's decision-making process. The IPAHB would emerge as the main advocate of the people of Heinersdorf, spearheading various protest actions to express its opposition to the mosque. It would soon become clear that quiescence in Heinersdorf had ended and that resistance had begun.

5: MARGINAL BUT NOT POWERLESS

The people of Heinersdorf were not going down without a fight. They were incensed at the notion that the government had not considered their interests, shocked that the process had nonetheless been labeled ‘democratic’. As members explained it was time for them to exercise their democratic freedoms and take action.

WEAPONS OF THE WEAK—DEMOCRACY STYLE

Left without a voice and desperate to do something in the early days of the debate, many Heinersdorfers resorted to letter writing. General sentiments were similar—“the people should not be ignored” (Dach, Anne. Personal communication. 20 April 2006). There was a multitude of questions without answers; people wanted assurances that there would in fact be an information session, and the location would be in Heinersdorf and accessible to all Heinersdorfers. Villagers were upset by characterizations in the media and wanted to correct them. Still others were concerned about the Ahmadiyya community in particular, writing to share opinions and information about the congregation.

The borough council had been straightforward in its relations with the public—the mosque project was a foregone conclusion and further discussions were simply a courtesy. In a community that had much experience with decisions and changes being

forced upon them, however, this did not sit well. One letter likened the situation to a cartoon illustration of a telephone receiver without a speaker, saying that the offer for discussion had only an informative character and ultimately served to calm the council's political conscience (Anonymous. Personal communication. 23 May 2006). A second letter accused the council of being unaware of the responsibilities of political office (Chupp, Anita and Zodel, Oskar. Personal communication. 16 May 2006). Yet another, directed to the president of the council, requested that he make an effort to start a discussion with the parties that support the mosque construction, in order to demonstrate what they have done to assuage, or at the least understand, the concerns of their constituents (Thull, Ina. Personal communication. 29 April 2006). People accused the council of being out of touch and quick to pass judgment on its constituents. The council was labeled as inept, unable to communicate with the voters and willing to discount critics or doubters of the project as extremist, xenophobic, hysterical, and intolerant (Sonnenberg, Timo. Personal communication. 20 May 2006).

There were also suspicions regarding the Ahmadiyya's choice of location and the borough council's decision. People learned of other building sites and unsuccessful permit applications. Why had governments in four other boroughs rejected applications, and why had this history of rejection not influenced Pankow's government?

Citizens posed questions and expressed concerns about the Ahmadiyya community as well. Just who was this group, where did it come from, and why had it chosen to build a mosque in Heinersdorf? References to Hiltrud Schröter were common

in descriptions of the Ahmadi as antidemocratic, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic and homophobic. One letter predicted stonings and polygamy for the future of Heinersdorf if the mosque were to be built (Eberhardt, Friedrich. Personal communication. 15 May 2006). The Ahmadi themselves were intolerant, according to many letters, so there was no reason to extend freedom and tolerance to them.

The Pankow borough council, and more specifically its president, did its best to respond to all letters from constituents. An extended form letter recounted the facts of the case, explained motivations of the council, and defended its stance on the mosque issue. First, the TLG, an agency of the federal government, sold the land. This property had been on the market for five years with very few inquiries. Next, while they planned appropriately for the meeting on the 30th of March and were disappointed by what had occurred, they would not reschedule the large information session because the danger was too great that there would be a repeat of events. What transpired at the meeting, according to the president, “crossed the line beyond any halfway-civilized exchange and thoroughly influenced the council’s opinions” (Personal communication. 26 April 2006). Further, Heinersdorf needed something like an “urban pulse, an understanding of the path of development of this district” (5 May 2006). The council president described citizens of Pankow as generally informed, constructive, enlightened, tolerant and cosmopolitan; he was unsure if the majority of Heinersdorfers adhered to this image. Finally, while he admitted that there were groups in this world that the council would do anything to prevent moving to Pankow, the Ahmadiyya community was not one of them (24 May 2006).

ORGANIZED RESISTANCE

Two days after the cancelled information session at the school, the NPD led its first demonstration against the mosque construction. Approximately 150 protesters, all known members of extremist organizations and most from places other than Heinersdorf, marched to Pankow's town hall. On their route, they met a counter-demonstration of similar size, which local politicians had organized. Neither demonstration was particularly noteworthy, receiving little attention from the media or the community.

The IPAHB entered the fray in April 2006, when it submitted a petition for a referendum to the borough council. Upon the council's rejection of the petition some two weeks later, the IPAHB set forth to meet with various political party representatives and tolerance organizations. It also organized its first demonstration opposing the mosque. Over half the population of the village took to the streets in early June, as more than 3500 people marched from Tiniusstraße to the Pankow town hall, many holding signs and all chanting "No to the mosque!" (Appendix 1.10, 1.11). Riding the momentum of the first demonstration, the IPAHB organized a second demonstration for the end of June. On this occasion, approximately 2000 people participated in the protest, made especially noisy by World Cup whistles (Appendix 1.12, 1.13).

The first community roundtable discussion took place three months after the initial announcement regarding the mosque. It was at the suggestion of the church council, which had written a letter to the local government expressing concern that the government was reacting harshly to the mosque opposition and not paying due

attention to the citizens (Roth, Ernst. Personal communication. 15 May 2006). As an objective third party, representatives of *Projekt Ostkreuz*, a local pro-tolerance organization, organized and mediated the discussion. Attendees to the first roundtable included members of the IPAHB, congregants of the church, representatives of the CDU and SPD, and other interested citizens. In a follow-up letter to the government reporting on the roundtable, the church council indicated that participants seemed interested in an open discussion and were eager to continue with such meetings. The church council deemed the roundtable a relative success, and a “very good start on the way toward a dialogue” (Roth, Ernst. Personal communication. 12 June 2006). In reality, participants viewed it less as a dialogue and more as people talking past each other, with neither side interested in compromise.

Pressing forward, the IPAHB planned its third demonstration for early September. Participants numbered 1500 and, alit by glow sticks, marched in the evening from Heinersdorf to the landmark Old Church in Pankow, where they held their demonstration. Given the time of day and the location, the tone of this demonstration was more sedate than the previous two and extended a different impression of the mosque opposition. As opposed to a loud chanting crowd, which might be reminiscent of extremism, demonstrators protested silently as concerned citizens. A smaller counterdemonstration by the Antifa attempted to disrupt the IPAHB’s demonstration, but was unsuccessful.

Throughout 2006, the borough council delayed formal approval of the Ahmadiyya congregation’s building petition. The reasons were unclear, particularly

since the council was so unambiguous about the mosque construction. The council finally granted the building permit in the end of December. Three days before Christmas, as most people were preparing for long holiday breaks, the Ahmadi released the information to the media. Once again, Heinersdorfers felt that they were taken by surprise, quite suspicious of the timing of events. Despite the holiday, the IPAHB organized a candlelight vigil in late-December. A significantly smaller group of about 350 people gathered at the construction site to express their opposition to the mosque and great dissatisfaction with their government.

Events during the holidays may have quieted the IPAHB temporarily, but the group would not relent in its opposition. Beginning in August 2006, the IPAHB collected postcards from individuals opposed to the mosque construction, totaling over 6,000 by February 2007. In an act of protest, IPAHB members hung 12-foot-long banners of the postcards from the upper level of a Pankow mall, where the mayor was holding open office hours. Simultaneously, other members surrounded the mayor with yet more postcards and chanted "No to the Mosque!" (Appendix 1.15). In early March, prompted by residents in the immediate vicinity of the construction site, the IPAHB issued a complaint against the Ahmadiyya community and requested a temporary halt to demolition. Destruction of the factory was releasing asbestos into the air and endangering people and the environment, according to the complaint. Demolition halted briefly, but resumed two days later.

The IPAHB remained active during the spring and summer of 2007. On Saturdays, the group maintained an information booth on a main street in the center of

Pankow, where it distributed pamphlets and collected signatures. It also took the opportunity to spread its message at an annual festival in a neighboring borough. At the Weißensee Flower Festival, the IPAHB set up an information booth and launched a huge banner into the sky with the help of a multitude of helium balloons. Legible from quite a distance was the group's name and slogan, "No to the Mosque!" (Appendix 1.14). The group collected more than 800 signatures at the festival. In addition to a July demonstration with about 700 people, the IPAHB sponsored its second annual *Sommerfest* (Summer Festival) in August 2007. With the mosque construction an issue but not at the forefront, the IPAHB played host to a village festival that included beer, grilling, live music, and games for children and adults (Appendix 1.18, 1.19). The mosque debate had awakened a sense of community in Heinersdorf, and the IPAHB was becoming aware of a new potential role in the village.

"BULLDOZED" TO THE RIGHT

Since the publication of that first article revealing the mosque plans, local media had become only more enmeshed in the debate. Initial reports were mainly factual; although, as the reaction in the community grew, media outlets started depicting Heinersdorfers as racist and intolerant, with ties to the extreme right. These images intensified after the cancelled informational meeting. With an article entitled "*Moschee Wut!*" ("Mosque Rage!"), the *Berliner Zeitung* had a full-page photo of a man standing in a window of the school gymnasium, mouth wide open and fist in the air. Another photo associated with the same article focused in on another very angry man, though

surrounded by a much more sedate crowd (2006). Other headlines reporting the event read, "*Aufstand gegen Moschee*" ("Revolt Against the Mosque") and "*Mob gegen Moschee*" ("Mob Against the Mosque"), reinforcing an atmosphere of extreme tension and instability, and a village on the brink of chaos ("*Aufstand*" 2006, Gellner 2006).

Initially, IPAHB members tried to remedy the imbalanced media coverage by reaching out to media outlets themselves. Markus Kallenberg, the future president of the IPAHB, had an extended exchange with a sympathetic journalist and was appalled when he found out that the journalist's editor would not allow him to publish such a story (Kallenberg, Markus. Personal interview. 7 December 2007). A second member of the IPAHB, Gottfried Schoedel, had a similar experience, describing it as "the most vicious thing that happened to [him] during the mosque debate". Three people from a well-known political television show approached him one afternoon on his way to the S-Bahn. They conducted a comprehensive interview, in which Gottfried shared information about Heinersdorf and the Ahmadi, making a case for the opposition to the mosque. When he went to watch the television program, he found that there was only a short clip of his interview and a much longer exchange with someone, seemingly intoxicated, who ranted about the mosque and foreigners in general using a variety of slurs to describe them. Gottfried wrote a letter to the show, criticizing producers for their subjective editing and presenting an overly negative image of Heinersdorf, but never received a response (Schoedel, Gottfried. Personal interview. 7 December 2007). IPAHB members also discovered a video on YouTube entitled "Nazis," depicting a recent IPAHB demonstration and zooming in on the muscular, stone-faced bodyguard of Erich

Zimmerman; thereafter, the group always had their own videographer on hand (IPAHB Meeting. Personal observation. 7 November 2007).

People were furious at these depictions and felt themselves victims of a sensationalist media. As the mosque debate progressed, the IPAHB became wary of which journalists would be more objective and chose to avoid those who had previously been inaccurate. The agenda of their weekly meetings quickly expanded to include announcements regarding books, television shows, and public lectures of interest—steering members toward particular media outlets and away from others. The group also made sure to inform its members if it had heard of any glaringly inaccurate stories. At one meeting, for instance, IPAHB executive board member Diana Schoedel read aloud a translation of an incendiary speech by John Howard, the Australian prime minister. The speech discussed integration and specifically the integration of Muslims, putting the onus on Muslims—in very harsh tones—to assimilate or leave the country. Quickly upon the conclusion of the speech, and quieting down the raucous exclamations, Markus interjected to make a correction. In actuality this was not a speech at all, but rather an amalgam of quotes from various politicians. With this correction, Markus also offered a general warning to the group regarding such forgeries. To be taken seriously, people should make efforts to validate sources of information before taking things as fact (IPAHB Meeting. Personal observation. 12 March 2008). Members would also exchange the books and often carpool to lectures and meetings of interest. As individuals, members cancelled subscriptions or avoided purchasing newspapers they found to be biased (IPAHB Dinner. Personal Observation. 16 November

2007). They remained loyal to one local newspaper and found national media to be less subjective; more and more, they also turned to the internet as a source of news. Ina, for her part, took on the role of news filterer. She began to send a daily email to members with a list of links to pertinent news stories and television shows and she attended regular meetings of the Pankow borough council, reporting her notes at the IPAHB meetings.

There were also efforts to affect the information flow more directly. The IT expert in the group, Max Koch, created a website for the IPAHB. Here, the group posted information about Heinersdorf, its own stories and photos of the mosque debate, and announcements of upcoming events. The website was also a revenue-creating device, as the IPAHB offered an option for online donations and welcomed advertisers. The group also discussed amending the Wikipedia and Google Earth entries on Heinersdorf. These websites provided images of the mosque construction site on Tiniusstraße and offered brief accounts of the mosque debates. IPAHB members discussed adding historical information and additional photos of notable buildings to create a more balanced image of the village (IPAHB Meeting. Personal observation. 12 March 2008).

Finally, Gerald Landberg, who worked during the day for a security firm, volunteered to spearhead the IPAHB's efforts at documenting its activities. To ensure an unbiased representation of events, he filmed all public demonstrations and happenings in which the IPAHB took part. When possible, he would also film counter-demonstrations or events. He maintained a library of all the films and also sold individual DVDs at membership meetings and at the information stand—with all

proceeds going to the IPAHB. As the groups interests broadened, so did Gerald's duties. With Elli and Rudi, he toured Heinersdorf looking for examples of the extensive flooding problems in the village and seeking out interview partners. He then created a short documentary reporting on the flooding, held a viewing for the IPAHB, and passed it on to the mayor and the borough council.

As the debate progressed, the IPAHB began to foster a relationship with the local police department. While passions ran high at protest events, violence had not been present. This may be in part due to the substantial police presence at all planned demonstrations. After numerous peaceful protests, the IPAHB registered with the police to demonstrate outside the Conference for the Future. With the theme 'My Light for Heinersdorf,' participants planned on candlelight vigil of sorts. Nevertheless, the police made extensive preparations. They closed off the streets leading to the conference location hours ahead of time, and stationed 35 police cars and vans in the area. Patrolmen abounded, and more waited in vehicles. Such a police presence left a sharp impression—the police were dealing with the IPAHB as they would a violent extremist group as opposed to a peaceful citizens' initiative. In one of many attempts to challenge this notion, Rudi and Gerald scheduled meetings at the police station. There, they attempted to introduce the IPAHB, explaining its reason for existence and commitment to peace. They conveyed their own fears, both with regard to the Antifa and the Ahmadiyya community, expressing their hope that the police would be objective in their dealings with the IPAHB (Meeting with Police. Personal observation. 12 December 2007).

COMBATING POLITICAL MARGINALIZATION

REACTING TO POLITICAL ISOLATION

In the early days of the mosque debate, the IPAHB met with representatives from various political parties and government leaders. The group attended meetings with the SPD, the Green Party, the FDP, the president of the borough council, and the mayor of Pankow. Discussions failed to lead to inroads, however, and many groups cut off communications with the IPAHB.

Most political officials quickly tired of the IPAHB, seeing the mosque as a foregone conclusion and awaiting the citizens group's demise. Upon introducing himself, one IPAHB member mentioned that the government had previously complained that citizens do not participate in the government; now that they were, they were being ignored (IPAHB Meeting. Personal observation. 29 October 2007). Since the mayor of Pankow would no longer schedule meetings with the IPAHB, the group made every attempt to be present when he was attending a public event. On a rainy March afternoon, as the mayor participated in a walking tour through the local botanical gardens, IPAHB members stood silently along the path with very large yellow umbrellas. These umbrellas, simultaneously opened as the mayor approached, read, "20,000 Citizens Say 'No to the Mosque!'" This protest was a silent one, and the group did not take the opportunity to speak directly with the mayor. Nevertheless, all participants were quite satisfied with their efforts and assured that they had gotten the message across.

The next month, IPAHB members surprised the mayor as he conducted open “office hours” at an outdoor market in Pankow. People were thrilled that this would be an outdoor event, as there was a potential for being dismissed from private bars or restaurants. Situated next to a donut stand and across from the busy sausage stall, the mayor stood at a table somewhat reluctantly awaiting visits from his constituents. While at first IPAHB members had discussed an elaborate April Fools joke in which they would confess to have converted to Islam (IPAHB Meeting. Personal observation. 26 March 2008), they opted to use the occasion for more serious discussion. Individuals from the IPAHB joined the three people already in line, while other IPAHB members posted themselves in different areas of the market. Elli Metz was the first from the IPAHB to approach the mayor asking him about a local issue—the severe flooding issues that have plagued Heinersdorfers for years. When the mayor skirted the question, Elli identified herself as a member of the IPAHB and served notice that, since the local government would not concern itself with this issue, the IPAHB would. Next in line were Emilie Wolff, Diana, and Georg Christlieb. Emilie, with a photo around her neck of an Ahmadi child bride, delivered a copy of the 20,000 signatures to the mayor. At that instant, some members dispersed around the market to hand out IPAHB fliers while others opened the large yellow umbrellas again, delivering the message that 20,000 people were against the mosque in Heinersdorf. Georg then discussed the constitution with the mayor, assisted by the excerpts that he brought along. He asserted that some practices of the Ahmadiyya Jama’at were unconstitutional and asked why they should be welcomed in Heinersdorf. The mayor had little to say to any of the IPAHB members,

repeating to them that he did not have the authority to make any changes, and the decision of the government was final (IPAHB Demonstration. Personal observation. 1 April 2008; Appendix 1.16).

People from the IPAHB considered the day a success. Instead of allowing the mayor to ignore them and evade any and all interaction with the group, they found a way to get their message across. In the meantime, they were also able to disseminate information about the mosque debate and reached out to potential new members.

Feeling more and more isolated by establishment parties, the IPAHB sought other connections. In another borough of Berlin, citizens established an initiative to prevent the closing of Tempelhof Airport, a historical landmark as the site of the Berlin Airlift. The initiative sought to collect signatures in favor of a referendum against the closure. While the IPAHB was not in direct communication with the Tempelhof group, it did feel a sense of solidarity with them. At IPAHB meetings, Georg encouraged members to inform themselves about the Tempelhof issue and to sign the petition in support of the initiative. It was important to express views in opposition to the government and the IPAHB was thrilled with the effectiveness of another citizens' initiative (IPAHB Meeting. Personal observation. 7 November 2007).

Even more robust were the IPAHB's growing ties to other anti-mosque groups. The group developed loose ties to a local anti-mosque group in Moabit, which had approached the IPAHB for assistance. Rolf and Agathe Reichmann were in touch with an anti-mosque group in Munich, taking great pride in the possibility that the IPAHB had set an example for others to follow. A delegation from the IPAHB also traveled to the

western town of Wertheim in June of 2007 for a meeting with similar groups to discuss, among other issues, Islam in Germany. In the spring of the following year, the IPAHB observed with great curiosity the creation of Pax Europa, a federation of sorts of anti-“Islamization” groups throughout Germany. The IPAHB remained cautious about communications with these groups, however, as members were wary of far-right groups using the mosque issue as a launching point for more extreme agendas.

REACTING TO LOCAL COMPETITION

After the initial year of heated debate about the mosque, it became obvious to the members of the IPAHB that the group would not succeed in preventing its construction. Over the course of that time period, however, the IPAHB had come to recognize a great sense of dissatisfaction among Heinersdorfers and a glaring level of disinterest among the politicians who represented them. Members began to discuss the variety of issues that plagued Heinersdorf and brainstorm potential avenues toward remedying the problems. They added to their aspirations for the group to become a liaison between the citizens and their representatives and to make the government more accountable.

In the fall of 2007, the IPAHB secured sponsorship from the *Konrad Adenauer Stiftung*, a political foundation associated with the CDU, to host a conference on the future of Heinersdorf. While it had originally planned the event for mid-November, the group had difficulties finding a venue and was forced to postpone the event until early December. In the meantime, HÖD had partnered with the SPD and the Berlin-Brandenburg Office for Integration to organize a separate conference, the “Conference

for the Future,” which also concerned itself with the future of Heinersdorf. Organizers invited particular members of the Heinersdorf community, tolerance organizations, the Ahmadiyya community, and party officials to take part in the conference. The IPAHB was not on the list.

While the IPAHB was initially upset about being preempted by HÖD, ultimately they thought it advantageous to have their event afterwards, in order to respond to the outcome of the HÖD conference. They would not, however, stay silent biding their time. Considering it their “democratic obligation” to give Heinersdorfers an accurate description of the HÖD conference, the IPAHB planned to distribute flyers in the days leading up to the conference (IPAHB Meeting. Personal observation. 07 November 2007). The flyers recalled the initial informational meeting from which most Heinersdorfers were excluded, called attention to the organizers of the conference, most of whom were not local Heinersdorfers, and called on everyone to “do your democratic duty” and join demonstrators outside the conference. The IPAHB’s demonstration took place on the opening night of the weekend-long conference. Demonstrators held candles in reflection of the more general theme, “My Light for Heinersdorf.” Select IPAHB members wore orange vests and acted as demonstration organizers, keeping the crowd in a designated location and communicating with the police who were present; other members had a hot tea stand to help warm up chilly demonstrators. The evening, as with all other demonstrations, ended with song. A radio rendition of “Sonderzug nach Pankow” (“Special train to Pankow”), a West

German song about trying to get to the GDR, played on loudspeakers as the crowd dispersed (IPAHB Demonstration. Personal observation. 16 November 2007).

About two weeks after HÖD's Conference for the Future, the IPAHB presided over "Perspectives for Heinersdorf," a roundtable discussion. The IPAHB invited members of all political parties as well as the pastor of the church to sit at the roundtable; all Heinersdorfers were welcome to sit in the audience and pose questions. "Perspectives for Heinersdorf" was meant to be a "more democratic" alternative to the Conference for the Future, since it did not exclude anyone in the community and did not have the "hidden agenda" of promoting integration and acceptance of the Ahmadiyya community (IPAHB Meeting. Personal observation. 07 November 2007).

With a much smaller police presence, the IPAHB hosted some 250 attendees who, along with the panelists, discussed local concerns ranging from traffic problems to sidewalks in disrepair. This event marked an important change for the group. The IPAHB announced its aims to expand its own platform—in addition to its continued opposition to the mosque, it would also concern itself with other local issues, including schools, transportation and playgrounds. In so doing, the IPAHB sought to be an intermediary, facilitating the communication between citizens and the local government that had been lacking for so long.

In its new platform, the IPAHB once again found a direct opponent—the newly minted *Zukunftswerkstatt* (Workshop for the Future of Heinersdorf) (ZWK), which came into existence after the Conference for the Future. The ZWK had an agenda very similar to the IPAHB, and sought to be an advocate for the people and community of

Heinersdorf. IPAHB members' reactions to the ZWK ranged as the group discussed where the ZWK fit and whether the IPAHB should consider the ZWK a friend or a foe. Elli and Ilse Klein, for instance, favored cooperation with the group, stressing the fact that the ZWK had connections to the government and would be able to accomplish more. The IPAHB, which had essentially been cut off by the local government, would struggle much more on its own. On the other side of the debate were Markus, who suggested that the ZWK existed only to oppose the IPAHB, and Nathalie Wiener, who angrily asserted, "We are the citizens' group in Heinersdorf!" (IPAHB Meeting. Personal observation. 12 March 2008).

THE IPAHB'S NEW PLATFORM

The IPAHB's conference in the fall of 2008 yielded a list of issues in the village as well as suggestions for remedying these issues. The group also maintained its weekly office hours to listen to residents' concerns and be of assistance if possible. The IPAHB concluded that the major issues in Heinersdorf related to traffic, a lack of infrastructure, and insufficient resources for young people. Heinersdorf had traffic problems in the village center and along Prenzlauer Promenade, a main thoroughfare on the edge of the village. High levels of traffic led to dangers for children crossing the street, noise and air pollution, and unstable house foundations. Despite the number of people and vehicles traveling through the village, Heinersdorf lacked basic staples of infrastructure. There were very few shops in the village center and there were no ATMs or banks in the vicinity. Footpaths and historical sites had deteriorated, and the village offered few

community events. The lack of infrastructure extended to village resources for children. The government closed the children's center in 2000 when it allowed the lease to expire; a bikers' club took its place. Heinersdorf had no sports clubs and no library, a victim of spending cuts in recent years. Finally, the only playground in Heinersdorf remained rundown after the mayor of Pankow cancelled plans for renovations in 2007 (IPAHB 2007). With this list of issues, the IPAHB's agenda was clear.

With regard to the various transportation and traffic woes in the village, the IPAHB made some efforts to begin to deal with the problems. First, the group submitted a petition for a referendum on the city of Berlin's new plans to shorten the *Straßenbahn* route, thereby removing the final two stops in Heinersdorf. Second, Ina Thull wrote a report detailing the various plans for road reconstruction in the village center. The large trucks and high volume of traffic traveling through the village were a nuisance on multiple levels. The government began looking at options for reconstruction in 1994; in 2006, plans were in place and work was set to begin, but it never did (Thull 2008). Though it had previously decided on a plan, the government renewed discussions about the issue in the spring of 2008, reopening the floor to suggestions and alternative plans. The report vowed to argue in favor of the preexisting plan for reconstruction and keep residents abreast of new developments (Thull 2008).

Another area of concern was the lack of outdoor and indoor areas for recreation, with the singular playground in the village in a state of disrepair. The IPAHB was able to secure donations for renovations from a local radio station, which had invited the group for an interview to discuss Heinersdorf, its people, and the mosque issue. With this

funding, the IPAHB furnished the playground with new sand, a new jungle gym, and other new playground equipment. The group also co-hosted a children's festival in Heinersdorf, which offered games and activities (Appendix 1.20).

The IPAHB expanded its efforts to reach out to the community with festivals and events that were open to the public. It continued to host its annual summer festivals and flea markets, which were bustling and well attended (Appendix 1.24). In the summer of 2008, the group invited Heinersdorfers to a barbeque festival. Not only did it offer sausages, beer, and music, but also a quarterfinal game of the World Cup, which was projected on a large screen. The IPAHB encouraged residents to join in the fun, and to see which team would meet Germany in the semifinals (IPAHB 2008a; Appendix 1.23).

In a different attempt to reach out to the community, the IPAHB established a village newsletter. Ada Christlieb lent her skills as a graphic designer as she and her husband Georg drafted and designed the first ever newsletter for Heinersdorf, appropriately titled *Heinersdorfer*. The newsletter reminded readers who the IPAHB was, and updated residents on local events and developments, such as the progress of the working group on neighborhood flooding, the 100-year anniversary of the Straßenbahn in Heinersdorf, and an upcoming referendum on religious instruction in German schools. It also addressed issues relating to Islam, describing a recent tour of a Muslim school in Berlin and explaining the IPAHB's plans for attending an 'Open Door Day' at the Khadija Mosque (IPAHB 2009b).

The group made the most inroads in the area of infrastructure, dealing with the flooding issues in the village. Gerald Landberg, the group's audiovisual expert, toured the village interviewing residents and put together a video to bring attention to flooding problems in particular neighborhoods in the village. He delivered the video to the mayor of Pankow, indicating that it was courtesy of the IPAHB, and organized a screening for IPAHB members and Heinersdorf residents. This resulted in a community meeting in May 2008, which involved the IPAHB as well as government representatives from the public works and environmental affairs departments (Appendix 1.22). The approximately 100 people in attendance described flooded ground floors, blocked drainage trenches, problems with wastewater, overflowing septic tanks, wrecked cellars, damaged houses, and standing waterways (Christlieb 2008). The IPAHB, in concert with government officials, resolved to create a working group to further pursue these issues.

The working group, *AG-Schichtenwasser*, collected information from residents on the specifics of each case and relayed these details to the local government. Due to the costly and multifaceted nature of the flooding problems, the working group opted to begin by focusing on the particular issue of drainage ditches. By the fall of 2008, the Pankow public works department had cleared a majority of drainage ditches (IPAHB 2008b). Reconstruction projects were initiated in 2009 and included filling in and rerouting ditches on private property, grading the banks of drainage ditches, and planting trees and shrubbery (IPAHB 2009a). The IPAHB issued regular online reports for residents, updating them of developments and pled for residents to search for

documents and information about the old drainage system in order to proceed with renovation plans.

CONCLUSION

During the mosque debate, Heinersdorfers and the IPAHB found themselves marginalized from many angles: by the government, by the media, and by another citizens' initiative. By declaring the mosque issue a foregone conclusion, the government removed residents from any possible discussion. The cancellation of the community meeting and denial of a subsequent meeting further placed the citizens of Heinersdorf in a position of powerlessness. Depictions of the village and the mosque opposition in the media, ranging from unsophisticated and uncultured to intolerant and xenophobic, reinforced this sense of helplessness. Heinersdorfers, and later members of the IPAHB, considered themselves mischaracterized and misunderstood, with little means of remedying the problem. Finally, the counter-initiative that popped up months after the start of the debate, Heinersdorf Öffne Dich!, designated itself—and not the IPAHB—as the representative of the citizens of Heinersdorf. With the assistance of political parties and state government, it attempted to take over the role that the IPAHB was establishing for itself in the village.

The reactions of the people of Heinersdorf, and specifically the members of the IPAHB, demonstrated a resistance to marginalization. In practice, however, these actions demonstrated much more than just resistance to marginalization—an increased awareness of political mobilization and protests and of how to manage marginalization.

The letter-writing campaign of the early days led to mass demonstrations on the streets of Heinersdorf. And just as the tactics of mobilization changed, so too did the aims of the IPAHB. It realized a void in the community that it could fill, as a more general citizens' initiative working for the betterment of the village. With a renewed agenda and a redefinition of its functions, the IPAHB established itself as a part of the Heinersdorf landscape. Upon closer examination, it was the identity that the group utilized, the connections it created, and the leader that rose up that were the main elements of the IPAHB's 'success'.

6: UNDERSTANDING THE IPAHB'S 'SUCCESS'

For two and a half years, from March 2006 until October 2008, the Interessengemeinschaft Pankow-Heinersdorfer Bürger (IPAHB) worked intensely and intensively to prevent the construction of the Ahmadiyya mosque on Tiniusstraße in Heinersdorf. It arranged various activities to express opposition to the mosque and maintained organized meetings on a weekly, then biweekly basis—this despite the fact that there was little hope in reversing the plans for the mosque construction. Though many expected the group to fade into the background as construction progressed, the IPAHB failed to conform to expectations. It continued to press the mosque issue in the community and with members of the local government and also expanded its list of concerns and objectives. The Khadija Mosque opened its doors for the first time in October 2008; unflagging, the IPAHB vowed to continue its engagement in the community and activities on its behalf.

THE IPAHB

On the second floor of a building in a small industrial park in Heinersdorf, the IPAHB occupied a modest office headquarters. The space was large enough for one desk with a computer and a conference table with seating for ten. Signs hung on the walls and leaned against chairs, with slogans such as “*Nein zur Moschee!*” and “*Macht*

Heinersdorf nicht zu Kreuzberg!" ("Don't Turn Heinersdorf Into Kreuzberg!"). The IPAHB's executive council met here weekly; there were open office hours on Monday evenings, and they hosted members of the press for interviews. The address was public and listed on the IPAHB website; however, the office had minimal exterior signage and the group did not welcome unknown visitors with open arms. Threats of violence from the far left and negative depictions in the press made the IPAHB wary of outsiders and hesitant to expose their members' identities.

Biweekly meetings of the IPAHB took place in an undisclosed location; only with a majority vote of the executive council could a non-member attend a meeting as a guest. For the first two years, the IPAHB held its meetings in the special events room of a bar located in one of Heinersdorf's garden communities. Typical meetings lasted between two and three hours. As people arrived, they circulated, greeting other members; as the meeting started, latecomers gave a quick knock on the table as a short 'good evening' to all. The executive council made a point of creating an agenda for each meeting, a lesson learned early on among a group of passionate members. It also stressed the democratic nature of the group, often calling for votes and allowing all members to voice their opinions on a matter. Past and future demonstrations, various correspondence, and relevant minutes from government meetings were all standard topics of discussion. When the board exhausted the agenda, the floor was opened for announcements from members, who often shared information about whatever they deemed germane to the cause. Due to the nature of the situation—hearing about the mosque plans from the newspaper and the failed attempt at any substantial

informational meeting—members of the IPAHB took the initiative to keep themselves and others informed. They recommended television shows, referred members to particular news articles, and reported on outside events. Internet research was a daily activity for many in the group, and active members read books and attended lectures about the Ahmadiyya Jama’at and Islam more broadly. One member of the executive board sent a daily mass email with links to any news articles relevant to the cause, and took it upon herself to report the minutes of the latest borough council meetings.

From the group’s inception, the members of the IPAHB opted against cooperation with the local chapter of the NPD. Other than the mosque issue, they did not find themselves in agreement with the policies of the NPD. Not only would the classification as extreme right be an insult to its members, it could be the “deathblow” to the group, damaging the IPAHB’s credibility with mainstream parties and observers (IPAHB Meeting. Personal observation. 21 November 2007). The group thus made an effort to differentiate itself from the extreme right and denied membership to anyone with such ties. The IPAHB’s founders used Google to check members’ political pasts; they discovered that one prospective member had previously been affiliated with the extreme right *Republikaner* party, which then excluded him from membership. On one occasion, the group sent a letter to the BVV to notify them that a letter had been disseminated by a xenophobic, nationalist organization with the signature of ‘Reinhard Kohl’, very similar to the name of the first president of the IPAHB, Reto Kohl (IPAHB. Personal communication. 17 May 2006). The IPAHB also filed a successful defamation suit against a local politician who had stated in an interview that the group had been

taken over by the extreme right. Further, there was a consistent effort to ensure that statistics and sources of information were sound before using them in arguments against the mosque construction. When Rudi Schmidt announced new statistics that he had found demonstrating that the Muslim population was much larger than reported in the media, members agreed that they should rely only on government data and statistics, as they were the most reliable (IPAHB Meeting. Personal observation. 21 November 2007).

In addition to preventing the extreme right from joining the group, the IPAHB also sought to bar extremists from participating in their protest actions. At their first large protest march, for instance, the group could not prevent the NPD from taking part, but could segregate them and force them to march at the back of the contingent.

Despite their efforts, the IPAHB received the designation of extreme right from the press and politicians alike. One member likened the government to a bulldozer, shoving the IPAHB in the “far right corner”. The media was equally unkind according to members, biased by its leftist leanings and “working hand in hand” with the politicians. This was not, according to another member, how Ossis had envisioned freedom of the press (IPAHB Meeting. Personal observation. 21 November 2007).

The IPAHB’s arguments against the mosque construction concentrated on two targets—the borough council and the Ahmadiyya form of Islam. With regard to the borough council, the IPAHB was quite suspicious and claimed that the government was acting against the will of the people. The IPAHB’s use of the concept of democracy also helped to unify members as Ossis. To most members, the state of democracy in their

country was “miserable, completely miserable” (Thull, Ina. Personal interview. 22 November 2007). The group questioned the government’s motivations and tactics, accusing it of not acting in accordance with the will of the people. IPAHB members felt strongly that the government failed to fulfill its obligations to the people in the mosque case. It shut out citizens and “attempted to pull the wool over their eyes” (IPAHB Meeting. Personal observation. 07 November 2007). Politicians in turn were dishonest and only served their own self-interest. One example members cited was the mayor of Pankow at that time. He was actually someone quite familiar to Heinersdorfers—a former high-ranking official of the local SED, he reinvented himself after reunification, joining the PDS and then Die Linke. One IPAHB member described him as “alter Wein in neuen Schläuchen,” or “old wine in new skins” (Christlieb, Georg. Personal interview. 6 December 2007). The mayor’s reputation in the village was not at all positive, as most viewed him as the worst type of politician, who would do anything to stay in power.

With the exception of the mayor, the majority of those in local government in Pankow hailed from the West. This was a problem particular to eastern Germany: politicians were imported from the West, without local knowledge or experience. Yet they thought that “they could pressure and control the easterners, govern however they chose without any recourse or accountability” (Christlieb, Ada. Personal interview. 6 December 2007). As one IPAHB member lamented, “if we knew in 1989 how things would be, the wall would still be standing today” (IPAHB Meeting. Personal observation. 21 November 2007).

Before the mosque debate, members of the IPAHB knew little about Islam and nothing about Ahmadiyya Islam. They immediately set about to change this—using the internet they found articles both by the Ahmadiyya Jama’at and also by its critics; they bought and exchanged books about the hardships of Ahmadi women; together they attended lectures given by Islamists, politicians, and religious figures. Information was powerful for the IPAHB; however, as opposed to becoming more familiar and comfortable with the prospect of a neighborhood mosque, this knowledge served to strengthen their position against the mosque. The IPAHB labeled the teachings and practices of the Ahmadiyya community misogynistic, anti-Semitic and homophobic. In addition, they compared the Ahmadiyya Koran with Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*. The Russians during the GDR times were a second comparison; like the Russians, the Ahmadi would slowly but persistently impose their way of life on Heinersdorfers. Members believed it therefore valid to argue that the Ahmadi were anti-democratic and in direct violation of the German constitution. As a common IPAHB slogan proclaimed, “Who says ‘yes’ to the Ahmadiyya says ‘no’ to democracy!”

THE ‘SUCCESS’ OF THE IPAHB

Though one may easily say that the IPAHB was a failure because it could not change the mind of the government and it did not stymie the construction of the mosque, in many ways the group was a success. Contrary to expectations, these former citizens of the GDR became actively engaged in the community and created a lasting citizens’ organization. Three factors explain why the IPAHB has had success with a

marginalized population known for a generally weak civil society: (1) the Ossi identity; (2) a renewed sense of community; and (3) leadership with political ties. The explanation for this case lies at the intersection of internal and external conditions. While collective action theorists have often focused on either internal or external factors, more recent work has emphasized that instances of contentious action are, “simultaneously the dramatic demonstration of human agency—that is, they determine their own course, and we must take their internal dynamics seriously—and they are inextricable from their contexts, shaped by encounters with and structures of the state, dominant culture, and other social movements” (Whittier 2002:306; Bernstein 1997; Giugni; McAdam and Tilly 1999; Morris 1992; Rochon and Meyer 1997). General external conditions led to the existence of the Ossi identity as well as the deteriorated nature of community in Heinersdorf, while the specific external environment of the mosque debate impacted the type of leadership necessary to engage in the debate. These external aspects shaped the internal issues of framing and the development of a collective identity, the increased networks, and the leader that emerged.

IDENTITY: THE CENTRALITY OF OSSI-NESS

Collective action often relies on framing, which entails assigning meaning to deeds or events. To be effective, frames must have resonance; they must connect with members of the group and be relevant to their life experiences (Snow and Benford 1988:199). Though the literature does not always discuss them in concert, “framing and

identity construction processes are interconnected in a dynamic, almost recursive fashion” (Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994:203). Hunt et al. elaborate,

Identity constructions, whether intended or not, are inherent in all social movement framing activities. Not only do framing processes link individuals and groups ideologically but they proffer, buttress, and embellish identities that range from collaborative to conflictual. They do this by situating or placing relevant sets of actors in time and space and by attributing characteristics to them that suggest specifiable relationships and lines of action. (185)

For marginalized groups, these identities are often not new, but based on embedded identities (Tilly 1999) and that over time as a result of varied levels of interactions with the dominant group (Whittier 2002, Meyer 2002). Such collective identities may, however, be inactive. “Oppositional consciousness,” Morris indicates, “often lies dormant within the institutions, lifestyles, and culture of oppressed groups. Members of such groups are usually not without basic collective identities, injustice frames, and the like that are conducive to individual and collective social protest” (1992:370). It was just such an oppositional consciousness that the IPAHB was able to activate and utilize in its stand against the mosque.

The Ossi identity was primarily a product of post-reunification dynamics between East and West, as easterners found themselves continually marginalized by westerners. It is a dichotomous relationship in which one needs the other in order to define itself and, for this reason, the Ossi identity may be weak or dormant in much of the East. On the border, however, where easterners and westerners meet and interact on a regular basis, these identities are at the fore. Such was the case with the mosque debate in Heinersdorf. It pitted the borough council, largely made up of western

politicians, and the western media against easterners in the village. From the announcement of the mosque plans in the newspaper and the chants of 'Wir sind das Volk!' at the informational meeting, the Ossi identity was ignited in Heinersdorf. That the IPAHB was able to harness the power of this identity is one reason for its success as a citizens' initiative.

The IPAHB utilized the Ossi identity was strategically, to target those responsible for the issue, the local government. It was the local government that the IPAHB declared was undemocratic, failing to represent the will of the people. The IPAHB recalled the transition from communism to democracy, judging that expectations from that time have not been met. Just as East Germans had taken to the streets in 1989 to challenge the GDR government, according to the IPAHB, Ossis needed to mobilize against the undemocratic actions of the borough council.

The recent history of relations between Heinersdorf and the local government created lasting feelings of frustration among villagers. Problems in the village persisted without government intervention—or even acknowledgement in some cases—and villagers came to think of themselves as forgotten and completely disconnected from their representatives. From the start, there were aspects of the mosque issue that were unclear and unexplained. Suspicious villagers conjured up various conspiracies that might be at work. The main conspirators, according to the IPAHB, were the mayor of Pankow and the members of the borough council. People believed that the council was permitting the mosque construction in Heinersdorf to prevent it from being in another area of the borough (Christlieb, Ada. Personal interview. 6 December 2007). Memories

of western imposition were not so distant, and people felt threatened that the mosque construction was an attempt by the western government to further sanitize the East. That was the way of Wessis, after all, to take all that was good from the East and to give it only what Wessis did not want (IPAHB dinner. Personal observation. 1 April 2008).

Heinersdorfers were not without reason for suspicion. In private, council members laughed about the extreme backlash that would take place had the Ahmadiyya congregation chosen to build near Kollwitzplatz, a trendy neighborhood of young urban (mostly western) professionals (Reiniger, Lenz. Personal interview. 27 March 2008). The borough council had quietly dealt with the mosque issue for months without actively sharing any information with the village and when the information did come out, it was via the NPD and the local newspaper, not the council itself. The date of the initial informational meeting was misprinted in the newspaper and then the meeting was a failure due to its inability to accommodate those in attendance. Were these purposeful actions to exclude Heinersdorfers? Theories abounded.

People also discovered that the Pankow borough council was the fifth borough council to review a proposal from the Ahmadiyya community. How was it that four other borough councils had rejected their application and yet the Pankow council accepted it? More theories abounded. A further reason for suspicion had to do with the sale of the property. The TLG, responsible for so many questionable real estate transactions in the past 15 years, owned the land on Tiniusstraße. While the listed price of the property was 80 Euros per square meter, the Ahmadi purchased it for less than half, at 35 Euros per square meter. Many also heard that there had been other

potential buyers for the property, but somehow the Ahmadi received priority. Again, people in Heinersdorf suspected that the government had played a role in orchestrating the deal. Suspicions extended to HÖD and the ZKW, both of which received financial and logistical support from the local political parties. This Ossi paranoia that the West was 'out to get them' worked in the IPAHB's favor, further banding members together.

The Ossi identity also played an empowering role, mobilizing members of the IPAHB and framing actions as resistance. Interpreting the government's actions as an attempt to alter the community, members of the IPAHB believed that "our culture, our traditions, should not be forgotten" (Georg Christlieb. Personal interview. 6 December 2007). They had to act to resist the marginalizing policies of the borough council.

Though often portraying themselves as the victims of the government and the press, members of the IPAHB also expressed pride in their Ossi background and viewed it as an advantage. Its members believed that the IPAHB was the first anti-mosque group to take to the streets in protest precisely because it was composed of former citizens of the GDR. West Germans were not as interested in politics as East Germans, they reasoned (Thull, Ina. Personal interview. 22 November 2007); and, if they were to oppose something, it would be in the form of a lawsuit—"they would not have the energy or courage to participate in demonstrations" (Kallenberg, Markus. Personal interview. 7 December 2007). As Ossis, IPAHB members were accustomed to enduring hardships and knew how to band together to work toward a common goal (Thull, Ina. Personal interview. 22 November 2007). They saw a general malaise in German society; people had become selfish and myopic. It was, therefore, the democratic duty of the

IPAHB to keep people informed and to encourage them to discuss their views, to attend demonstrations, to take a side (IPAHB Meeting. Personal observation. 7 November 2007).

An Ossi organization simply by virtue of the biographies of its members, the IPAHB chose to emphasize this Ossi-ness as a defining characteristic of the group. In doing so, it gave the group a greater history and a greater cause, allowing it to survive beyond the construction of the mosque.

NETWORKS REEMERGE

Unlike life in the GDR, in which people depended on each other for emotional and material support, life in reunified Germany was much more solitary, the people much more self-sufficient. Friendship networks weakened as people turned inward and focused only on their own welfare. Such was the case in Heinersdorf in early 2006: the feeling of community and togetherness in the village was almost nonexistent. People were, therefore, even less prepared to react to the mosque news as a collective whole. The IPAHB came into being as a result of small groups of neighbors and acquaintances linking up with one another. It established connections between those who were previously unconnected and created a community where there hadn't been one in a long time. The network of friends that developed in the IPAHB is one factor that has contributed to its steadfastness and success.

The Ossi identity was not the only vestige of reunification that played a role in the success of the IPAHB. The niche society that had been so central to East German life had corroded after the fall of the Wall, leaving Heinersdorfers less connected and

yearning for community. Without indigenous networks and organizations, as Chapter Two discussed, both marginalization and collective action scholars argue that an aggrieved group would be unable to mobilize. Pre-existing organizations are a source of participants, incentives, a communication network, and leadership. Incentives for participation, McAdam clarifies, “are the myriad of interpersonal rewards that provide the motive force for participation in these groups” (McAdam 1982:45). In the case of the IPAHB, there were no existing organizations to provide such incentives, but as the group developed, it found that it had its own incentive for continued participation. As Schwartz and Paul indicate, “personal ties among group members [can be] sufficiently dense to activate group obligations in the face of free-rider impulses” (1992:215). The friendship networks and sense of community that the group created led members to view the IPAHB as more than a citizens’ initiative against a mosque, which in turn increased the level of dedication among members.

Initial meetings of the IPAHB were weekly affairs that could last late into the evening. After these meetings, IPAHB members would often stay to chat over another beer or two. They talked about topics both general and specific, public and private. When Markus found a job after being unemployed for a number of months, hearty congratulations erupted from the group (IPAHB Meeting. Personal Observation. 12 March 2008). And after Markus’ wife was hospitalized for a chronic illness, members reached out to show their support. There was the feeling that, “we’re in this together,” a sentiment that had not been around since before reunification (Landberg, Gerald. Personal interview. 15 November 2007).

People became further acquainted as they planned for demonstrations, drafted and distributed fliers, and hosted information stands in the neighborhood. After big events, many often gathered for dinner at the Greek restaurant in the village where over time the group had a standing reservation for the large table in the back of the dining room. Dinner conversation topics ranged from gossip to overseas vacations to local politics. As friendships developed, members got together to celebrate birthdays and New Years Eve, to watch soccer matches on the weekends and to barbecue in the nice weather. For the Christliebs, who had recently moved to the area, membership in the IPAHB gave them an instant social network that made them feel as if they had lived in Heinersdorf for decades (Personal interview. 6 December 2007). For Rudi Schmidt, an older bachelor who worked long hours at his taxicab company, the IPAHB became his family and support system (Personal interview. 21 November 2007).

As with other informal social events, the IPAHB's annual summer festival and flea market were times to put the mosque issue aside and enjoy time with neighbors and friends. The events were well supported, with sponsors ranging from security firms to car dealerships to home improvement businesses, and well attended, with the average number of visitors approaching 1000. The festival featured a variety of food stalls, serving sausages, whole roasted pig, soft-serve ice cream, beer and wine. Other stalls sold small wares, whether locally produced honey and jam or silk-screened t-shirts and sweatshirts emblazoned with the logo, "*Du bist Heinersdorf*" ("You are Heinersdorf"). The IPAHB hosted an information stand, showing videos of demonstrations and offering pamphlets to interested visitors. There was also a "wheel of fortune" booth, where

people purchased spins on the wheel for chances to win such prizes as a weekend vacation to Bavaria, a car stereo, or a car navigation system. Face painters created elaborate animals on the faces of the children, who then proceeded to the inflatable moonwalk to bounce the evening away. The main attraction at the summer festivals was the five-person band playing classic American oldies. The band, whose lead singer was a member of the IPAHB, serenaded the crowd with such songs as “Sweet Home Alabama,” “Proud Mary” and “Mr. Tambourine Man.” People swarmed the dance floor while others sat on the long picnic benches, arms on shoulders, swaying to the music. To emphasize the celebratory atmosphere, the night culminated with a fireworks display.

The annual IPAHB Christmas party, a light-hearted affair, welcomed members and their families to gather around a festively decorated table and feast on a catered dinner (Appendix 1.21). While a silent film of past IPAHB demonstrations played on a large screen, members chatted. Most did attempt to set business aside for the evening, but even casual discussions between IPAHB members could often move toward talk of the mosque. Good moods prevailed, however, and dinner was followed by a wide variety of sketches, most of which involved an assortment of costumes and props. Emilie had prepared a number of humorous interactive skits and enthusiastically directed with the help of Elli as her assistant. Crowd participation was mandatory, though most were very willing ‘actors,’ and everyone was thoroughly entertained.

The connections that grew out of participation in the IPAHB became integral to its survival. Not only did the IPAHB offer members a social outlet—new friends and

acquaintances with whom to share their lives—but it also established trust and a sense of responsibility among members, integral components for successful collective action.

A DEVELOPING LEADERSHIP

The IPAHB was a union of Heinersdorf residents, who had originally gathered in small groups to discuss and plan for opposition to the mosque construction. Management of such a group is often rooted in other established organizations, whose “leaders [...] can be called upon to lend their prestige and organizing skills to the incipient movement”. In addition, “it may well be that established leaders are among the first to join a new movement by virtue of their central position within the community” (McAdam 1982:47). Because of the lack of indigenous organizations in Heinersdorf, leadership developed differently in the IPAHB. In its early days, the IPAHB was very much an acephalous group, without a defined leadership structure. In such a collective,

Power and authority tend to be distributed among a council of wise and able men, of whom one is recognized to be just a bit more able than the others. He is *primus inter pares*. The concept of ‘first among equals’ [...] is a type of group interaction that maintains genuine egalitarianism while utilizing individual initiative and leadership capacity. It also has built-in controls over attempts to usurp authoritarian power. (Gerlach and Hine 1972:35)

While this may be the tendency of grassroots organizations at the start, there remains a need for “key leadership actions” (Aminzade et al. 2001:152). Such actions may be task-oriented or people-oriented, ranging from motivating participation and commitment to developing strategy and tactics. In the course of the mosque debate and beyond, the choices of actions and their effects demonstrate that leadership matters for the IPAHB.

As previously mentioned, the community of Heinersdorf was fractured and undeveloped at the time the news first broke of the planned mosque construction. The only leaders in the village were the pastor of the village church and the principal of the local school, and while both initially took strong positions against the mosque, neither would emerge as a leader in this case. The principal quickly pulled back from the fray, and though the pastor remained adamant in his stance, neither his superiors nor his congregation were fully supportive of his taking an active role in the matter (Roth, Denis. Personal interview. 8 April 2008). The IPAHB thus developed initially without a single person in a strong leadership position. In line with its arguments about democracy, the group opted for a structure that allowed everyone a voice and a vote. Members elected an executive council that served for one-year terms. The council dealt with the media and determined agendas for meetings, but decision-making power remained with the members themselves. This would soon change as an unexpected leader emerged. Erich Zimmerman, despite being a politician and a non-Heinersdorfer, proved to be an invaluable asset for the IPAHB. It was in fact his skills as a politician and the perspective he offered as a non-Heinersdorfer that differentiated Zimmerman from other members and ultimately ushered him into a leadership position.

As the debate progressed, people began to warm up to Erich Zimmerman, the Berlin assemblyman who had received a lukewarm welcome at the Heinersdorfer Klug in the early days of the mosque debate. Himself a veteran of a previous citizens' initiative in the 1990s, Zimmerman spoke with community leaders—the local pastor and the school principal—about the growing interest in a citizens' initiative against the mosque

construction and wrote an open letter to the community encouraging participation in the debate (Zimmerman, Erich. Personal Interview. 16 April 2008). Although the IPAHB voted against his official membership in the group due to his position in the Berlin House of Representatives, and although his party did not have a firm position against the mosque, Erich remained an interested and active advisor to the group. He regularly attended meetings and participated in the various protest actions. With regard to strategy and task-oriented actions, he provided insights into the political process and offered input with regard to specific protest actions. Zimmerman's political status was evidence of eastern adaptation as discussed in Chapter Three. As an easterner, he learned to play by the rules of western politicians and, with his years in politics, he had particular knowledge and experience that set him apart from others in the IPAHB and gave him authority in the group. People-oriented actions were also part of his leadership abilities. A polished public speaker "with the voice of a [DJ] on a classical radio station" (Gutsch 2011:44), Erich was always on the list of speakers at IPAHB demonstrations and he served as master of ceremonies at its annual summer festival. Members of the IPAHB respected his dedication, particularly as his party remained fractured with regard to the mosque.

Zimmerman's stature in the IPAHB rose when he became a victim of anonymous intimidation efforts. First, he received a threatening letter as well as photos of him as a private citizen—accompanying his 10-year-old son to school and visiting the grave of his recently deceased infant son. Then, at the height of the mosque debate, someone threw a Molotov cocktail through the window of his bedroom, causing a small fire in the

house. His courage in the face of these events endeared him to the members of the IPAHB, who began to see him as one of their own.

Borough council members and colleagues of Zimmerman questioned the motivations behind his involvement in the mosque debate. Many viewed his actions as strategy, that he was “taking advantage of the situation for purely personal gains” (Ebertz, Simon. Personal interview. 27 March 2008). Despite others’ hesitations, the IPAHB found itself as dedicated to Zimmerman as he was to the IPAHB and, after all, according to Ina, “one hand washes the other” (Thull, Ina. Personal interview. 22 November 2007). It was, however, Zimmerman, and not the CDU, that the members considered to be “very important to the IPAHB” (Christlieb, Georg. Personal Interview. 6 December 2007). As Zimmerman’s position in the group solidified, he attempted to change this, and to bring the CDU to the IPAHB. Zimmerman helped to arrange support for its “Perspectives for Heinersdorf” conference; the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, a think-tank affiliated with the CDU, sponsored the event. He invited IPAHB members to talks and discussions with notable figures in the CDU who had expressed strong positions with regard to integration. On one occasion, Elli, Nathalie and Ina joined Erich in attending a talk by a former CDU chairman, later recounting to the group his “touching ” and “gripping” remarks (IPAHB Meeting. Personal observation. 12 March 2008). Gerald was also in attendance, filming the event. The IPAHB viewed the film at a subsequent members’ meeting; at its conclusion, they broke out in applause (IPAHB Meeting. Personal observation. 26 March 2008).

The leadership that Erich Zimmerman provided to the IPAHB kept the group relevant and engaged. Though members disliked and distrusted political parties, they simultaneously felt legitimated by the fact that an elected official from a major political party was on their side. Members learned both about the political system in general and the issue of integration in particular, expanding their knowledge base and vocabulary. They learned how to deal more effectively with the media, often seeking outlets that were further from the area to present their account of events. The group also engaged in networking, going beyond local resources to more far-reaching areas of possible support. These tools further established the IPAHB's position in Heinersdorf and ensured that it had a future beyond the mosque debate.

CONCLUSION

The rise of the IPAHB has presented a puzzle given the current literature on post-communist civil society and marginalization. With its shared experiences in the GDR and lack of indigenous organizations or leaders, the community of Heinersdorf seemed destined to stand aside and, without much organized opposition, watch the mosque construction. Quite the opposite took place—villagers created the IPAHB, which not only challenged the plans for the mosque construction with great fervor but also became an advocate for the community, speaking with constituents, identifying problems and conveying them to the local government.

The IPAHB was able to establish itself and maintain an active membership for three main reasons. First, the group was able to capitalize on the initial reactions of the

community and bring the Ossi identity to the fore. By encouraging suspicion of the government, using the notion of democracy, and also playing up Ossi pride, the IPAHB helped to solidify the group's identity. Second, in their myriad meetings and protest actions, IPAHB members rediscovered a sense of community that they had lost after reunification. Third, the emergence of Erich Zimmerman as a leader in the group provided the IPAHB with information and skills that they otherwise would not have. These factors come together to explain the 'success' of the IPAHB.

7: CONCLUSION

On the night of October 16th, 2008, the Ahmadiyya congregation opened the doors of its Khadija Mosque on Tiniusstraße in Heinersdorf (Appendix 1.28). The land, which was previously the location of a sauerkraut factory, was the home of a new, 1.6 million Euro mosque with a 12-meter-high minaret. A two-day celebration closed the street and necessitated more than one hundred police officers to patrol the area. The mayor of Berlin and the vice president of the Bundestag were two of the more than 300 guests at the evening reception. The next day, the leader of the international Ahmadiyya community, who had traveled from London to attend the opening ceremonies, led Friday prayer for more than 600 followers; the television channel 'Muslim TV Ahmadiyya' broadcast the events for Ahmadi around the world (Strauss 2008). These celebrations were not without detractors—the IPAHB led about 200 people in protests outside the mosque and vowed to monitor the mosque and alert the police or the government to suspicious occurrences. Though the number of demonstrators dwindled from the 3500 in June 2006, the IPAHB had established itself in the years since that first demonstration and was prepared to assume a greater role in the community. It was no longer simply a citizens' initiative against a mosque, far from it.

LOCAL POLITICS IN AN EASTERN GERMAN VILLAGE

The inaugural year of the IPAHB featured a whirlwind of events centered on the Ahmadiyya community's mosque plans. Though the mosque was initially the primary focus for the group, the IPAHB's experiences with villagers during the open office hours and also in discussions amongst members themselves, led the IPAHB to reconsider its objectives. The group had discovered the frustration in the community and realized that it could play a larger role in the future of the village. Moving beyond the mosque issue, the IPAHB made efforts to establish itself as a community-oriented citizens' initiative. After "Perspectives for Heinersdorf," the IPAHB created an agenda that included road reconstruction to improve traffic patterns and preventing the closure of the streetcar that connected Heinersdorf with Pankow's downtown area. It planned for repaving footpaths, and building new playgrounds. The group wanted to build a youth center in the village and establish a cultural institute, which might host historical or art exhibitions. It also invited suggestions for renovation ideas for the old water tower, a landmark that had been empty since before reunification. In short, the IPAHB's focus not only shifted rather drastically, but its role within civic life expanded, further encouraging engagement among Heinersdorfers.

The IPAHB believed that it could act as a liaison between Heinersdorfers and their representatives in the local government, encouraging the villagers' continued engagement in politics. The group was confident that its reputation in the community would make it a force that the local government would have to recognize and that it could be an active advocate for Heinersdorf.

The IPAHB did not just keep its focus inwards on Heinersdorf. Markus Kallenberg and others were in contact with other anti-mosque groups, not only offering advice but also discussing the possibility of establishing a larger union of similarly motivated groups throughout Germany. One such group was Pro-Köln in Cologne, which already had ties to groups in Belgium and Austria, demonstrating the potential for an international association of such groups. While increased connections were desirable, however, some anti-mosque groups were much more extreme in their language and goals. The extremism that the IPAHB once questioned and strived to avoid became more appealing to a number of members.

The different directions taken by two groups of IPAHB members caused a fissure in the organization as members found themselves in disagreement over the group's future. One faction was encouraged by the strides that the IPAHB had made as a citizen's initiative and saw much to be done in Heinersdorf. With its ear to the ground, the IPAHB could continue to work to improve social and structural conditions in the village. A second faction was also encouraged by the strides that the IPAHB had made as a citizens' initiative, but viewed them as an indicator that the IPAHB should join together with anti-mosque groups and enter the political realm. As a political party, the IPAHB had a chance to garner protest votes from the many frustrated voters, according to these members, and this was the only to truly effect political change. The IPAHB appeared to arrive at a crossroads—it could choose to diversify its themes while remaining focused locally on Heinersdorf, or it could choose to focus on the mosque theme as part of a greater anti-Islam community.

For its part, the borough council expressed a renewed—or entirely new—interest in the village of Heinersdorf. The village had finally gotten on the borough council’s radar, though not in the way many would have hoped. The BVV nominated Heinersdorf for designation as a district for restoration and rehabilitation. With such a designation would come additional funding and attention to the particular needs of Heinersdorf. It also began to address the traffic problems in the village with promises for a new street construction plan in the near future. The government appeared to be attempting to make up for lost time, and to make up for the disruptive years of the mosque debate.

The government-supported Workshop for the Future continued its activities after the end of the mosque debate as well. It created the *Nachbarschaftshaus*, a neighborhood center that offered various courses and social events. It hosted political roundtables and organized a village festival as well as a quarter-marathon. The ZWK also organized participants into various working groups dealing with such local issue areas as sports, parks, and transportation.

Now a few years after the conclusion of the mosque debate, it is clear that the political engagement that began with it continues. The IPAHB awakened citizens and brought them together under a common goal. From its beginnings as an acephalic, grass-roots initiative, the IPAHB developed into a more experienced formal organization. It forced the government to recognize not only the villagers of Heinersdorf but also their potential for mobilization and action. It brought attention to the needs of the village and inspired civic participation for the betterment of the village’s future, this against the

historical backdrop of a “forgotten” village. Heinersdorfers began to remake their own history in a sense—or, at the very least, claim a stake in it. Even without the IPAHB, there is sufficient potential in the community for continued engagement.

MARGINAL BUT NOT POWERLESS

The political and social atmosphere in Heinersdorf, and eastern Germany more broadly, at the time of the mosque debate had its origins in the reunification. Easterners had for decades yearned for reunion with the West, but the realities of reunification were not at all what they had envisioned. West Germany approached reunification more like annexation, claiming East German territory and installing western institutions without consideration of those already in place. This type of unidirectional imposition characterized the reunification process and had far-reaching effects—on the economy, politics, social interactions and identities. Dynamics of marginalization emerged among easterners and westerners, strengthening over time and resulting in eastern mistrust of westerners and western political parties and in eastern perceptions of inequality. Such was the case in Heinersdorf when its citizens founded the IPAHB.

That the IPAHB was a sustained grassroots citizens’ initiative provides a puzzle for the literature on civil society and marginalization. Existing arguments raise doubts about the development of civic engagement in a post-communist, marginalized society. Scholars of civil society in post-communist societies argue that civil society is very weak in post-communist countries, with explanations targeting the legacy of communism and

the effects of the post-communist transition. Marginalization scholars declare the need for indigenous organizations and leaders in order for mobilization. In the case of the IPAHB, three internal factors, conditioned by the external environment, provide an explanation for the puzzle: an identity forged during and after the transition, new informal networks that harkened back to a time before reunification, and an emergent leader helped to cement the organization for a number of years.

The first two factors of the explanation are factors that, according to the post-communist civil society literature, would prevent civic engagement. By identifying these factors as enabling as opposed to disabling civil society, this explanation calls for a reexamination of their role in the development of civic engagement.

First, the Ossi identity resulted from the unique post-communist transition of eastern Germany. The complete institutional transfer from West to East did not prevent the development of civic engagement, as the literature predicts. Instead, it led to the development of dynamics of marginalization and a growing Ossi identity; this marginalization and increased consciousness in turn empowered the IPAHB. The Ossi identity, characterized by resentment and mistrust of westerners, was channeled into the IPAHB's opposition to the borough council and the plans for the mosque. The IPAHB used the Ossi identity not only as a motivational and mobilizing device but also to clearly identify the organization's opponent.

The second factor that helps explain the lasting nature of the IPAHB was the connections that it fostered between members. Informal networks, of the sort that typified East German society before 1989, disintegrated in the years after reunification.

By reestablishing these connections, and in some ways reinvigorating them, the IPAHB filled a void in the social and political lives of its members and created a satisfied and solid base, dedicated to the group's goals and to one another. The role of the informal connections suggests not only that some legacies of the communist past may be useful in igniting civic engagement but also the possibility of a different type of post-communist civil society.

This analysis lends further weight to the case for the power of informal networks, entering into the debate between political institutions and civil society. While Huntington notes the primacy of political institutions in the development of 'civicness' and a sense of community (1968), Putnam emphasizes central role that associations and civil society play in the creation of community (1994; 2000). This study reveals burgeoning civic engagement despite the disconnect between institutions and society, thus supporting Putnam's exposition of civil society.

Leadership is the final factor that explains the persistence of the IPAHB. The literature on marginalization does identify the need for leadership in the mobilization of marginalized groups; however, this leadership is typically a prerequisite. In the case of the IPAHB, leadership was necessary for the continuation of the group, but absent when the group was initially created. In Erich Zimmerman, the IPAHB found a leader from the East who had the trust of the group, but who also was a politician and member of government, and who knew how to engage with the issues. He was not exactly indigenous as the marginalization literature would suggest is necessary, but also not exogenous. It follows that marginalized groups may not, in fact, need indigenous

leaders for mobilization; a leader that can relate to the marginalized group and gain acceptance from it is sufficient and a leader that is able to understand and engage the opposition could be advantageous for the group.

The key role of leadership in this case also offers a contribution to the literature on collective action, which has generally overlooked the effects of leadership as a central component in explaining variations in collective action (Aminzade et al. 2001:128). The importance of Erich Zimmerman's leadership in the IPAHB came to the fore in recent months, when he left the group to pursue his own interests. The IPAHB's membership became split on the main cause of the group, with half endorsing a local perspective focused on Heinersdorf and the other half supporting a perspective that extended beyond the village. It was the latter theme that Erich Zimmerman championed, ultimately taking his leadership from the IPAHB and establishing a national political party. The IPAHB has struggled to find its way since then, and it remains unclear what its future may hold.

The lessons of this analysis extend beyond the literature and include implications for domestic politics in Germany. The marginalization that provided such fodder for the IPAHB is a theme that receives little attention from policymakers. Additional efforts to level the playing field and erode negative stereotypes could lead to more cohesion in general. Further, positive aspects of GDR culture and society could be emphasized as inspiration and possible avenues for the development of more fervent associations. The IPAHB also illustrates a disconnect between eastern constituents and their representatives, which could be viewed as a divide between easterners and western

political parties. More attention to eastern perspectives and interests would help to develop an understanding of how parties could begin to shrink the gap between eastern and western platforms.

CONCLUSION

The IPAHB offers an example of a group of citizens, without any blueprints for action, which established a sustained citizens' initiative. But it exemplifies more than this. The movement that emerged with a focus on a single-issue and solely as an opposition group morphed into an organization with a multi-issue platform and a more proactive stance. Instead of simply waiting to react to the government and reject its plans—which Heinersdorfers had done in the past—the IPAHB took charge, identifying concerns in the community and working to lobby the government on behalf of the residents of the village. The IPAHB proved itself to be marginal, but not powerless.

APPENDIX 1: IMAGES

SYMBOLS OF OSTALGIE



1.1 The Ampelmann (photo courtesy of PickleDeliCircus.com)



1.2 The Trabant (photo courtesy of thebulletproofpatriot.com)

HEINERSDORF



1.3 Heinersdorf, village center (photo by Sebastian Wallroth)




1.4 Heinersdorf, village church (photo courtesy of heinersdorf-oeffne-dich.de)

FLYERS FROM THE MOSQUE DEBATE



1.5 "No to the Mosque in Pankow!" NPD flyer, March 2006



1.6 "No Mosque in the Village!" Anonymous flyer, March 2006



1.7 Pankow Network Against Racism, Antisemitism and Extreme Right Violence Newsletter, July 2006



1.8 "Stop the Racist Mob!" Antifa flyer, July 2007

IPAHB DEMONSTRATIONS



1.9 "Who says yes to the Ahmadiyya, says no to democracy," IPAHB demonstration, June 2006 (photo by Wolfgang Wenzel)



1.10 "Against Right and Left Extremism," IPAHB demonstration, June 2006 (photo by Wolfgang Wenzel)



1.11 IPAHB demonstration, June 2006 (photo by Wolfgang Wenzel)



1.12 IPAHB demonstration, June 2006 (photo by Wolfgang Wenzel)




1.13 IPAHB demonstration, June 2006 (photo by Wolfgang Wenzel)

OTHER IPAHB PROTEST ACTIONS



1.14 IPAHB banner launched into the air above their information stand, July 2006 (photo by Wolfgang Wenzel)



1.15 IPAHB postcard protest in a Pankow shopping center, February 2007 (photo by Wolfgang Wenzel)



1.16 "20,000 Citizens say 'No' to the mosque," IPAHB members at an open office hours with the mayor of Pankow, March 2008 (photo by Wolfgang Wenzel)

HEINERSDORF ÖFFNE DICH!



1.17 Billboard of counter-initiative, 'Heinersdorf Open Your Minds!', November 2006 (photo courtesy of heinersdorf-oeffne-dich.de)

IPAHB SOCIAL GATHERINGS




1.18 Heinersdorfers at the summer festival, sponsored by the IPAHB, August 2006 (photo by Wolfgang Wenzel)



1.19 Heinersdorfers at the second annual summer festival, sponsored by the IPAHB, August 2007 (photo by Wolfgang Wenzel)



1.20 Invitation to the Children's Festival, sponsored in part by the IPAHB, June 2007



1.21 Invitation to the IPAHB Christmas Celebration, December 2007

Heinersdorf „Land unter“



Wir laden ein zu einer

Bürgerversammlung

am 20. Mai 2008

19:00 Uhr

Ort: Vereinshaus der KGA „Familiengärten“
Blankenburger Strasse 45 (gegenüber vom Eiscafé)

Eingeladen wurden:

- Hr. Bergfelder, Senatsverwaltung f. Ordnung, Gesundheit u. Verbraucherschutz
- Matthias Köhne, Bürgermeister von Pankow
- Holger Kirchner, Stadtrat für Öffentl. Ordnung
- Herr Schütze, BA Pankow, Amt f. Umwelt u. Natur
- Verband Deutscher Grundstücksnutzer, VDG

Moderation:

- René Stadtkewitz, Mitglied d. Abgeordnetenhauses v. Berlin



Interessengemeinschaft Pankow-Heinersdorfer Bürger e.V

1.22 Invitation to community meeting about flooding problems, May 2008

Was gibt es Schöneres, als ein

Grillfest

Die  lädt alle ein zu einem geselligen Grill- und Fußballfest

am 21. Juni

ab: 16:30 Uhr

in die Timiusstrasse 9-11

Wir bieten an:

- Bratwürste und deftige Schweinesteaks
- Limo für die Kleinen und Frischgezapftes für die Großen
- die aktuellsten Informationen
- jede Menge Gute-Laune-Musik

Und das alles zu kulantem Preisen.

Sie wollen das Viertelfinalspiel nicht verpassen und sehen wer Deutschlands Halbfinalgegner wird? Kein Problem !



Wir zeigen das Spiel auf Großleinwand.

Wir freuen uns auf Sie !



1.23 Invitation to an afternoon of grilling and World Cup soccer, sponsored by the IPAHB, June 2008



1.24 Invitation to the third annual Heinersdorf Flea Market, sponsored by the IPAHB, September 2009

VILLAGE ISSUES



1.25 Example of Heinersdorf's flooding problems (photo by Wolfgang Wenzel)



1.26 One of Heinersdorf's playgrounds (photo by Wolfgang Wenzel)



1.27 Heinersdorf's footpaths in disrepair (photo by Wolfgang Wenzel)

THE COMPLETED MOSQUE



1.28 Khadija Mosque completed, October 2009 (photo by Wolfgang Wenzel)

REFERENCES

Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama'at. (2006, March 30). "Moscheebau in Pankow-Heinersdorf." Flyer. Berlin.

Aminzade, Ron, Jack A. Goldstone, and Elizabeth J. Perry. (2001). "Leadership Dynamics and Dynamics of Contention." In Ron Aminzade, Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry, William H. Sewell, Jr., Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, eds. *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 126-154.

Aminzade, Ron, Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry, William H. Sewell, Jr., Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, eds. (2001). *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Anderson, Benedict. (2003 [1983]). *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso.

Anderson, Jeffrey J. (2010). "The Federal Republic at Twenty." *German Politics and Society* 28, no.2: 17-33.

Antifa. (2006, July). "Den Rassistischen Mob Stoppen!" Flyer. Berlin.

Armony, Ariel C. (2004). *The Dubious Link: Civic Engagement and Democratization*. Stanford, CA: Stanford California Press.

Arndt, Stefan (Producer) and Becker, Wolfgang (Director). (2004). *Goodbye Lenin!* [Motion picture]. Germany: Sony Pictures Classics.

"Aufstand gegen Moschee." (2006, April 1). *Berliner Kurier*, p. 14.

Baer, Hans. (1998). *Crumbling Walls and Tarnished Ideals: An Ethnography of East Germany Before and After Unification*. Lanham, New York, Oxford: University Press of America, Inc.

Barker, Peter. (2004). "The Party of Democratic Socialism as Political Voice of East Germany." In Mike Dennis and Eva Kolinsky, eds. *United and Divided: Germany since 1990*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 55-67.

Barnes, Samuel H. (2006). "The Changing Political Participation of Post-Communist Citizens." *International Journal of Sociology* 36, no. 2: 76-98.

Barth, Fredrik, ed. (1969) *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. Longrove, IL: Waveland Press.

Becker, Howard S. (1991 [1963]). *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance*. New York: The Free Press.

Bedolla, Lisa Garcia. (2007). "Intersections of Inequality: Understanding Marginalization and Privilege in the Post-Civil Rights Era." *Politics & Gender* 3 no. 2: 232-248.

Beinhold, Dirk (Producer) and Fiebeler, Carsten (Director). (2004). *Kleinruppin Forever*. [Motion Picture]. Germany: Senator Film.

Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology* 26: 611-639.

Berdahl, Daphne. (1999). *Where the World Ended*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press.

Berman, Sheri. (1997a). "Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic." *World Politics* 49, no. 3:401-429.

Berman, Sheri. (1997b). "Civil Society and Political Institutionalization." *American Behavioral Scientist* 40, no. 5: 562-574.

Bernhagen, Patrick and Michael Marsh. (2007). "Voting and Protesting: Explaining Citizen Participation in Old and New European Democracies." *Democratization* 14, no. 1: 44-72.

Bernhard, Michael. (1996). "Civil Society After the First Transition: Dilemmas of Post-Communist Democratization in Poland and Beyond." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 29, no. 3: 309-330.

Bernstein, Mary. (1997). "Celebration and Suppression: The Strategic Uses of Identity by the Lesbian and Gay Movement." *American Journal of Sociology* 103, no. 3: 531-565.

Bernstein, Mary. (2005). "Identity Politics." *Annual Review of Sociology* 31, no. 1: 47-74.

Boje, Claus (Producer) and Haußmann, Leander. (Director). (1999). *Sonnenallee*. [Motion picture]. Germany: Delphi Filmverleih Produktion.

Borneman, John. (1991). *After the Wall: East Meets West in the New Berlin*. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Bunce, Valerie. (2003). "Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience." *World Politics*. 55, no 2: 167-192.

Brady, Henry E. and David Collier, eds. (2004). *Rethinking Social Inquiry*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Bunzl, Matt. (2003). "Between Anti-semitism and Islamophobia." *American Ethnologist* 32, no. 4: 499-508.

Burnett, Simon. (2007). *Ghost Strasse: Germany's East Trapped Between Past and Present*. Montreal, New York, London: Black Rose Books.

Calhoun, Craig. (1994). *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity*. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Campbell, Donald T. (1975). "'Degrees of Freedom' and the Case Study." *Comparative Political Studies* 8, no. 2: 178-193.

Chambers, Simone and Jeffrey Kopstein. (2001). "Bad Civil Society." *Political Theory* 29, no. 6: 837-865.

Christlieb, Georg. (2008). *Heinersdorf 'Land Unter'*. Retrieved November 2009, from <http://ipahb.de>

Cohen, Cathy J. (1999). *The Boundaries of Blackness: AIDS and the Breakdown of Black Politics*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Collier, David, Henry E. Brady and Jason Seawright. (2004). "Critiques, Responses, and Tradeoffs: Drawing Together the Debate." In Henry E. Brady and David Collier, eds. *Rethinking Social Inquiry*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 195-227.

"Court to Decide on East German Case." (2010, April 14). *Der Spiegel*. Retrieved July 12, 2010, from <http://www.spiegel.de>

Crotty, Jo. (2003). "Managing Civil Society: Democratization and the Environmental Movement in a Russian Region." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*. 36: 489-508.

Dalton, Russell J. and Willy Jou. (2010). "Is There a Single German Party System?" *German Politics and Society* 28, no. 2: 34-52.

Daly, Mary and Hilary Silver. (2008). "Social Exclusion and Social Capital: A comparison and critique." *Theory and Society* 37: 537-566.

Dennis, Mike. (1993). *Social and Economic Modernization in Eastern Germany from Honecker to Kohl*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Dennis, Mike. (2000a). "Perceptions of GDR Society and its Transformation: East German identity Ten Years after Unity." In Chris Flockton, Eva Kolinsky, and Rosalind Pritchard, eds. *The New Germany in the East: Policy Agendas and Social Developments since Unification*. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 87-105.

Dennis, Mike. (2000b). *The Rise and Fall of the German Democratic Republic, 1945-1990*. Harlow, England: Longman.

Dennis, Mike and Eva Kolinsky. (2004). "United and Divided: Germany since 1990. An Introduction." In Mike Dennis and Eva Kolinsky, eds. *United and Divided: Germany since 1990*. New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1-16.

Dennis, Mike and Eva Kolinsky, eds. (2004). *United and Divided: Germany since 1990*. New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1-16.

Dettmar, Markus, Barbara Hardinghaus, and Andreas Wassermann. (2010). "Kaufhaus des Ostens." *Der Spiegel*. 45: 70-74.

Diamond, Larry. (1999). *Developing Democracy*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Diamond, Larry. (2000). "Introduction." *Journal of Democracy* 11, no. 1: 5-10.

Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds. (1996). *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, 2nd ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

"Die Ahmadiyya und ihre Berliner Moschee." (2008, October 14). *Der Tagesspiegel*. Retrieved November 1, 2008, from <http://www.tagesspiegel.de>

Diewald, Martin, Anne Goedicke, and Karl Ulrich Mayer, eds. (2006). *After the Fall of the Wall: Life Courses in the Transformation of East Germany*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

"Eine Mochee direkt an der Autobahn." (2006, March 6). *Berliner Zeitung*, p. 32.

Ekiert, Grzegorz. (1996). *The State against Society: Political Crises and Their Aftermath in East-Central Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Fagan, Adam. (2005). "Taking Stock of Civil Society Development in Post-Communist Europe: Evident from the Czech Republic." *Democratization* 12, no. 4: 528-547.

Fetzer, Joel and Soper, J. Christopher. (2005). *Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fish, M. Steven. (1998). "Democratization's Requisites: The Postcommunist Experience." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 14, no. 3: 212-247.

Flockton, Chris, Eva Kolinsky, and Rosalind Pritchard, eds. (2000). *The New Germany in the East: Policy Agendas and Social Developments since Unification*. London and Portland: Frank Cass.

Foley, Michael W. and Bob Edwards. (1996). "The Paradox of Civil Society." *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 3:38-52.

Foner, Nancy and Richard Alba. (2008). "Immigrant Religion in the U.S. and Western Europe: Bridge or Barrier Inclusion?" *International Migration Review* 42, no. 2: 360-392.

Freeman, Jo. (1973). "The Origins of the Women's Liberation Movement." *American Journal of Sociology* 78, no. 4: 792-811.

Friedman, Debra and Doug McAdam. (1992). "Collective Identity and Activism: Networks, Choices and the Live of a Social Movement." In Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, eds. *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 156-173.

Friedman, Yohanan. (1989). *Prophecy Continuous: Aspects of Ahmadi Religious Thoughts and Its Medieval Background*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Gaventa, John (1982). *Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Gellner, Torsten. (2006, April 1/2). "Mob gegen Moschee." *Die Tageszeitung*, p. 6.

George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. (2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Geremek, Bronislaw. (1996). "Civil Society Then and Now." In Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds. *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, 2nd ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 241-250.

Gerlach, Luther and Virginia Hine. (1970). *People, Power, Change*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

Giugni, Marco. (1999). "How Social Movements Matter: Past Research, Present Problems, Future Developments." In Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly, eds. *How Social Movements Matter*. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, xiii-xxxiii.

Giugni, Marco, Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly, eds. (1999). *How Social Movements Matter*. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.

Goedicke, Anne. (2006a). "A 'Ready-Made State': The Mode of Institutional Transition in East Germany After 1989." In Martin Diewald, Anne Goedicke, and Karl Ulrich Mayer, eds. *After the Fall of the Wall: Life Courses in the Transformation of East Germany*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 44-64.

Goedicke, Anne. (2006b). "Firms and Fortune: The Consequences of Privatization and Reorganization." In Martin Diewald, Anne Goedicke, and Karl Ulrich Mayer, eds. *After the Fall of the Wall: Life Courses in the Transformation of East Germany*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 89-115.

Gordon, David and Peter Townsend, eds. (2000). *Breadline Europe: The Measurement of Poverty*. Great Britain: The Policy Press.

Grix, Jonathan (2000). "Recasting Civil Society in East Germany." In Chris Flockton, Eva Kolinsky, and Rosalind Pritchard, eds. *The New Germany in the East: Policy Agendas and Social Developments since Unification*. London and Portland: Frank Cass, 266-281.

Gutsch, Jochen-Martin. (2011, January 3). "Der Deutsche Geert". *Der Spiegel* 1: 44-51.

Habermas, Jürgen. (1975). *Legitimation Crisis* (Thomas McCarthy, Trans.). Boston: Beacon Press.

Hengst, Björn and Michael Kröger. (2010, August 31). "Ostdeutsche fremdeln mit der Bundesrepublik" *Der Spiegel*. Retrieved March 20101, from <http://www.spiegel.de>

Henry, Laura A. (2006). "Shaping Social Activism in Post-Soviet Russia: Leadership, Organizational Diversity, and Innovation." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 22, no. 2: 99-124.

Hofer, Arthur, Lempert, Emmo, Wachs, Friedrich-Carl. (Producers) and Schlöndorff, Volker. (Director). (2000). *Die Stille nach dem Schuß*. [Motion picture]. Germany: Arthaus Filmverleih.

Howard, Marc. (1995). "An East German Ethnicity? Understanding the New Division of Unified Germany" *German Politics and Society* 13, no. 4: 49-70.

Howard, Marc Morje. (2003). *The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hunt, Scott A., Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow. (1994). "Identity Fields: Framing Processes and the Social Construction of Movement Identities." In Enrique Larana, Hank Johnston, and Joseph R. Gusfield, eds. *New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 185-208.

Huntington, Samuel. (1968). *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

IPAHB. (2007). *Perspektiven für Heinersdorf*. Retrieved November 2009, from <http://ipahb.de>

IPAHB. (2008a, June). "Was gibt es Schöneres, als ein Grillfest". Retrieved November 2009, from <http://ipahb.de>

IPAHB. (2008b, November 3). *AG-Schichtenwasser Informiert*. Retrieved November 2009, from <http://ipahb.de>

IPAHB. (2009a, April 6). *AG-Schichtenwasser Informiert*. Retrieved November 2009, from <http://ipahb.de>

IPAHB. (2009b). *Heinersdorfer*. Retrieved November 2009, from <http://ipahb.de>

Jaraus, Konrad H. (2010). "The Federal Republic at Sixty: Popular Myths, Actual Accomplishments and Competing Interpretations." *German Politics and Society* 28, no. 1: 10-29.

Jors, Inka. (2003). "East Germany: Another Party Landscape." *German Politics* 12, no.1: 135-158.

Katznelson, Ira. (1981). *City Trenches: Urban Politics and the Patterning of Class in the United States*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Klandermans, Bert, Hanspieter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow, eds. (1988). *From Structure to Action: Social Movement Participation Across Cultures*. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 197-271.

Klaussen, Jytte. (2005). *The Islamic Challenge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kolinsky, Eva. (2002). "Party Governance, Political Culture and the Transformation of East Germany since 1990." In Stephen Padgett and Thomas Poguntke, eds. *Continuity and Change in German Politics: Beyond the Politics of Centrality? A Festschrift for Gordon Smith*. London and Portland: Frank Cass, 169-83.

Kopecky, Petr. (2003). "Civil society, uncivil society and contentious politics in post-communist Europe." In Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde, eds. *Uncivil Society? Contentious politics in post-communist Europe*. London and New York: Routledge, 1-18.

Kopecky, Petr and Cas Mudde, eds. (2003). *Uncivil Society? Contentious politics in post-communist Europe*. London and New York: Routledge, 1-18.

Kopstein, Jeffrey and Daniel Ziblatt. (2006). "Honecker's Revenge: The Enduring Legacy of German Unification in the 2005 Election." *German Politics and Society* 24, no. 1: 134-147.

Kostovicova, Denisa, (2006). "Civil society and post-communist democratization: Facing a double challenge in post-Milosevic Serbia." *Journal of Civil Society* 2, no. 1: 21-37.

Kröhnert, Steffer, Iris Hoßmann and Reiner Klingholz. (2008). *Die Demografische Zukunft von Europa: Wie sich die Regionen verändern*. Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag.

Larana, Enrique, Hank Johnston, and Joseph R. Gusfield, eds. (1994). *New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Letki, Natalia. (2004). "Socialization for Participation? Trust, Membership, and Democratization in East Central Europe." *Political Research Quarterly* 57, no. 4: 665-679.

Levitas, Ruth. (2000). "What is Social Exclusion?" in David Gordon and Peter Townsend, eds., *Breadline Europe: The Measurement of Poverty*. Great Britain: The Policy Press, 357-383.

Lichbach, Mark I. and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds. (1997). *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lijphart, Arendt. (1971). "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method." *The American Political Science Review* 65, no. 3: 682-693.

Lomax, Bill. (1997). "The Strange Death of 'Civil society' in Post-Communist Hungary." *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 13, no. 1: 41-63.

Maier, Charles S. (1997). *Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Mayer, Karl Ulrich. (2006a). "After the Fall of the Wall: Living Through the Post-Socialist Transformation in East Germany" In Martin Diewald, Anne Goedicke, and Karl Ulrich Mayer, eds. *After the Fall of the Wall: Life Courses in the Transformation of East Germany*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1-28.

Mayer, Karl Ulrich. (2006b). "Society of Departure: The German Democratic Republic." In Martin Diewald, Anne Goedicke, and Karl Ulrich Mayer, eds. *After the Fall of the Wall: Life Courses in the Transformation of East Germany*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 29-43.

McAdam, Doug. (1982). *Political Process and the Development of the Black Insurgency 1930-1970*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

McAdam, Doug. (1986). "Recruitment to High-Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom Summer." *American Journal of Sociology* 92: 64-90.

McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds. (1996). *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. (2001). *Dynamics of Contention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McAdams, A. James. (2002). "What Remains? The Political Culture of an Unlucky Birth." *German Politics and Society* 20, no. 2: 26-42.

McAdams, A. James. (2010). "The Last East German and the Memory of the German Democratic Republic." *German Politics and Society* 28, no. 1: 30-41.

McFalls, Laurence. (2002). "Political Culture and Political Change in Eastern Germany." *German Politics and Society* 20, no.3: 75-92.

Melucci, Alberto. (1989). *Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Mendelson, Sarah E. and T. P. Gerber. (2005). *Local Activist Culture and Transnational Diffusion: An Experiment in Social Marketing among Human Rights Groups in Russia*.

Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C.

Meyer, David. S. (2002). "Opportunities and Identities: Bridge-Building in the Study of Social Movements." In David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett, eds. *Social Movements: Identity, Culture and the State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3-24.

Meyer, David S., Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett, eds. (2002). *Social Movements: Identity, Culture and the State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Modood, Tariq. (2004). "Muslims and the Politics of Difference." *Political Science Quarterly* 74: 100-115.

Morris, Aldon D. (1992). "Political Consciousness and Collective Action." In Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, eds. *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 351-373.

Morris, Aldon D. and Carol McClurg Mueller, eds. (1992). *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

"*Moschee im Dörfli Nee!*" (2006, March). Flyer. Berlin.

"*Moschee Wut!*" (2006, April 1). *Berliner Zeitung*, p. 3.

Mushaben, Joyce Marie. (2010). "Be Careful What You Pray For: Employment Profiles among East and West Germans." *German Studies Review* 33, no. 3: 565-578.

Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands. (2006, March 3). "*Bald Pariser Zustände? Nein zur Mochee in Pankow!*" Flyer. Berlin.

Oberschall, Anthony. (1973). *Social Conflict and Social Movements*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Oberschall, Anthony. (2003). "Opportunity and framing in the Eastern European revolts of 1989." In Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds. (1996). *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 91-121.

Offe, Claus. (1991). "Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East-Central Europe." *Social Research* 58, no. 4: 865-892.

Padgett, Stephen and Thomas Poguntke, eds. (2002). *Continuity and Change in German Politics: Beyond the Politics of Centrality? A Festschrift for Gordon Smith*. London and Portland: Frank Cass.

"*Pankow Bleibt Deutsch!*" (2006, April 7). Flyer. Berlin.

Pankower Netzwerk Gegen Rassismus, Antisemitismus und rechte Gewalt. (2006, May 2). "*Das Pankower Netzwerk*." Flyer. Berlin.

Pichler, Florian and Claire Wallace. (2009). "Social Capital and Social Class in Europe: The Role of Social Networks in Social Stratification." *European Sociological Review* 25, no. 3: 319-332.

Plett, Steffen. (2006, March 11). "*Anwohner wollen Moschee in ihrem Kiez verhindern*." *Berliner Morgenpost*. Retrieved 25 March 2006, from <http://morgenpost.berlin1.de>

Putnam, Robert D. (1994). *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Putnam, Robert D. (2000). *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Raiser, Martin, Christian W. Haerpfer, Thomas Nowotny, and Claire Wallace. (2001). *Social Capital in Transition: A First Look at the Evidence*. London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Ritter, Reinhard (2006, March 22). "*Einladung*." Flyer. Berlin.

Ritter, Reinhard (2006b, May). "*Bürgerbrief*." Flyer. Berlin.

Robnett, Belinda. (2002). "External Political Change, Collective identities, and Participation in Social Movement Organizations." In David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett, eds. *Social Movements: Identity, Culture and the State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 266-285.

Rochon, Thomas R. and David S. Meyer. (1997). *Coalitions and Political Movements: The Lessons of the Nuclear Freeze*. Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner.

Rose, Richard. (2001). "How People View Democracy: A Diverging Europe." *Journal of Democracy* 12, no. 1: 93-106.

Rose-Ackerman, Susan. (2001a). "Trust, Honesty, and Corruption: Reflection on the State-Building Process." *European Journal of Sociology* 42: 526-570.

Rose-Ackerman, Susan. (2001b). "Trust and Honesty in Post-socialist Societies." *Kyklos* 54, no. 2-3: 415-443.

Rueschemeyer, Marilyn. (1998). "The Social Democratic Party in Eastern Germany: Political Participation in the Former GDR After Unification" Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Marilyn Rueschemeyer, and Bjorn Wittrock, eds. *Participation and Democracy East and West: Comparisons and Interpretations*. Armonk, New York and London: M. E. Sharpe, 99-131.

Rupnik, Jacques. (1996). "The Post-Totalitarian Blues." In Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds. *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, 2nd ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 365-377

Savage, Timothy. (2004). "Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing." *Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 3: 25-50.

Schneider, Peter. (1983). *The Wall Jumper: A Berlin Story*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Schwartz, Michael and Shuva Paul. 1992. "Resource Mobilization versus the Mobilization of People: Why Consensus Movements Cannot Be Instruments of Social Change." In Morris, Aldon D. and Carol McClurg Mueller, eds. *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 205-223.

Scott, James C. (1985). *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Scott, James C. (1990). *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Silver, Hilary. (2006a). "From Kreuzberg to Marzahn: New Immigrant Communities in Berlin." *German Politics and Society* 24, no. 4: 95-121.

Silver, Hilary. (2006b). "Social Exclusion." *Encyclopedia of Sociology*. Oxford: Blackwell, 4411-4413.

Silver, Hilary. (2010). "The Social Integration of Germany Since Unification." *German Politics and Society* 28, no. 1: 165-188.

Silver, Hilary and S. M. Miller. (2003). "Social Exclusion: The European Approach to Social Disadvantage." *Indicators* 2, no. 2: 1-17.

Snow, David A. and Robert D. Benford (1988). "Ideology, Frame Resonance and Participant Mobilization." In Bert Klandermans, Hanspieter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow, eds. *From Structure to Action: Social Movement Participation Across Cultures*. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 197-271.

Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. (1986). "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movements Participation." *American Sociological Review* 51: 464-481.

Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands. (2006, April 3). "Erklärung des Kreisvorstandes der SPD Berlin NordOst zum geplanten Moschee-Neubau in Berlin Heinersdorf." Flyer. Berlin.

Staab, Andreas. (1998). *National Identity in Eastern Germany: Inner Unification or Continued Separation?* Westport, CT: Praeger.

Stern, Fritz. (2006). *Five Germanys I Have Known*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Strabac, Zan and Ola Listhaug. (2008). "Anti-Muslim Prejudice in Europe: A multilevel analysis of survey data from 30 countries." *Social Science Research* 37, no. 1: 268-286.

Tarrow, Sidney (1992). "Constructing Meaning Through Actions." In Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, eds. *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 174-202.

Tarrow, Sidney. (1998). *Power in Movement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thull, Ina. (2008). *Zum Verkehrskonzept Heinersdorf*. Retrieved November 2009, from <http://ipahb.de>

Tilly, Charles. (1998). *Durable Inequality*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Tilly, Charles. (1999). "From Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements." In Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly, eds. *How Social Movements Matter*. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 253-270.

Tocqueville, Alexis. (1969 [1835]). *Democracy in America*. Trans. George Lawrence, Edited by J. P. Mayer. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Anchor Books.

Yoder, Jennifer. (2010). "The Integration of Eastern German Political Elites since 1989." *German Studies Review* 33, no. 3:549-564.

Valentine, Simon Ross. (2008). *Islam and the Ahmadiyya Jama'at*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Walker, Martin. (2006). "Europe's Mosque Hysteria." *The Wilson Quarterly* 30, no. 2: 14-22.

Walsh, Edward and Rex Warland. (1983). "Social Movement Involvement in the Wake of a Nuclear Accident: Activists and Free Riders in the TMI Area." *American Sociological Review* 48: 764-781.

Weiss, Konrad. (1990, February 19). "Der Heimat Verlust schmerzt." *Der Spiegel* no. 8: 27.

Whittier, Nancy. (2002). "Meaning and Structure in Social Movements." In David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett, eds. *Social Movements: Identity, Culture and the State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 289-307.

Wir Sind Pankow! (2007, January). "Entwurf Erklärung." Flyer. Berlin.

Zald, Mayer N. (2003). "Culture, ideology, and strategic framing." In Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds. (1996). *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 261-274.

Zald, Mayer N. and John D. McCarthy. (1987). *Social Movements in an Organizational Society*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.

Zimmerman, Erich (2006, March). "Geplanter Bau einer Moschee in Heinersdorf." Flyer. Berlin.

Zuckerman, Alan S. (1991). *Doing Political Science: An Introduction to Political Analysis*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

