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The Risk Contract of War: Offense and Defense in the Adapted Mind

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Abstract:
Offensive and defensive warfare represent two major, recurrent, and distinct forms of coalitional violence; yet, the direct effects of these two types of warfare on decision-making and motivation have been surprisingly ignored by both social and life scientists. I argue that humans possess distinct psychological adaptations, built by natural selection, that regulate behavior and motivation in offensive and defensive coalitional aggression. I review previous and current literature regarding the evolution of warfare in humans, and I develop a theoretical framework – the “risk contract of war” – for explaining the operation of psychological heuristics in warfare. I conducted two rounds of experiment-based surveys with an undergraduate population at a major university. Findings from these studies suggest that human decision-making in warfare conforms to a logic predicted by evolutionary theory regarding the regulation of behavior in the context of coalitional aggression. Experimental evidence for ‘separate psychologies’ of offense and defense presented herein forms the foundation for mapping an evolved psychology of warfare, and contributes to debates on the causes of war and the security dilemma in international relations.
Notes:
Thesis (Ph.D. -- Brown University (2012)

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Citation

Lopez, Anthony C., "The Risk Contract of War: Offense and Defense in the Adapted Mind" (2012). Political Science Theses and Dissertations. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library. https://doi.org/10.7301/Z0NG4NZQ

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