

**"Remitting Trans-local Governance:
Diaspora Associations as Vehicles for Deepening Democracy"**

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A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Sociology at Brown University

Providence, Rhode Island

May 2012

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank José Itzigsohn, my mentor and my friend. His guidance and support throughout the years are beyond measure. But mostly, I would like to thank him for always encouraging me to delve head first into this beautifully complex world, to work through the puzzles and embrace the unexpected turns, and above all for inspiring me to stay curious. I would also like to thank Katrina Burgess for always asking the right questions and having the right answers. My dissertation would have been incomplete without her direction, passion, and patience. And, to Gianpaolo Baiocchi, whose advice on my research design and “boxes” critically shaped my thinking and analysis. To the members of the HTAs and the communities in Pasaquina, Intipucá, Chapeltique, and Chinameca who made my research possible, they opened their homes and hearts to me and have taught me more than they could ever imagine. To Greg Elliott and Hilary Silver whose insightful comments helped me become a better scholar. To my fellow cohort members and future colleagues, they have been my most invaluable resources. They have kept me thinking and learning and striving to do better and without their friendships these past few years would have been unfathomable. To the brilliant faculty in the department who helped build my foundation in sociology inside and outside of the class room. To Muriel Bessette, Joan Picard, and Karl Dominey who have always gone the extra mile and whose kindness and support have been unwavering since my first day at Maxcy. Most importantly to my parents, my greatest teachers whose lessons will always be my compass, they have taught me to reach for the stars without fearing the fall, to pursue a life defined by gratitude, purpose, and love, and to always believe in the promise of a new day. Nothing in my life would have been achievable or meaningful without them. And, last but not least, to Olivia, my 5AM sidekick who has earned her PhD in loyalty.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
 CHAPTER 1	
Framing the Study: Concepts and Design	1
I. Introduction	1
II. The Literature on Democratic Deepening	2
III. What are HTAs?	8
IV. El Salvador in Context	11
V. Research Design: Questions, Variables, and Hypotheses	17
VI. Typology of Trans-local Governance	21
<i>Type 1. Participatory Governance</i>	23
<i>Type 2. Exclusionary Governance</i>	26
<i>Type 3. Blocked Governance</i>	29
<i>Type 4. Vacuous Governance</i>	30
VII. Study Relevance and Contributions	31
 CHAPTER 2	
Case Selection and Methodology	35
I. Introduction	35
II. Case Selection and Background	36
III. Data Sources and Data Collection	46
IV. Variable Operationalization	49
<i>Operationalizing Linkage: Projects and Social Ties</i>	49
<i>Operationalizing Democratic Deepening</i>	54

V.	Data Analysis	58
VI.	Conclusion	61

CHAPTER 3

The Case of Comité Pro-Mejoramiento Cantón Piedras Blancas: Juntos Hacemos la Diferencia	63
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I.	Introduction	63
II.	The Municipality: Time of the Cowboys	64
III.	The Democratic Climate (2004-2009): Abandoned and Disenfranchised	68
IV.	Comité Pro-Mejoramiento Cantón Piedras Blancas: Coming Together as One	71
V.	Comité Piedras Blancas' Linkages with the Hometown Community	80
VI.	Comité Piedras Blancas' Linkages with the Local State	87
VII.	Comité Piedras Blancas as a Trans-local Governance Actor: Equal Partner	89
VIII.	Migrant Politics: An Apolitical Guise	94
IX.	Conclusion	98

CHAPTER 4

The Case of the Fundación Unidos por Intipucá: Democracia en Pañales	99
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I.	Introduction	99
II.	The Municipality	100
III.	The Democratic Climate (2004-2009): Promising but Fragile	106
IV.	Fundación Unidos por Intipucá: The "In" Crowd	110
V.	Fundación Unidos por Intipuca's Linkages with the Local State	115
VI.	Fundación Unidos por Intipucá's Linkages with the Hometown Community	121

VII.	Fundación Unidos por Intipucá s a Trans-local Governance Actor: Governance Actor: Opportunistic Elites	124
VIII.	Migrant Politics: Negative Politicization	127
IX.	Conclusion	129

CHAPTER 5

The Case of Comité Pro-Mejoramiento de Chapeltique: El Pueblo Unido Jamás Será Vencido **130**

I.	Introduction	130
II.	The Municipality: From Dodging Bullets to Dodging Cars	131
III.	The Democratic Climate (2004-2009): Frustration and Anger	136
IV.	Comité Pro-Mejoramiento de Chapeltique: Los Hermanos Lejanos, Ciro Andrade y el FMLN Te Invitan...	147
V.	Comité Pro-Mejoramiento de Chapeltique's Linkages with the Hometown Community	153
VI.	Comité Pro-Mejoramiento de Chapeltique's Linkages with the Local State	157
VII.	Migrant Politics: Positive Politicization	159
VIII.	Comité Pro-Mejoramiento de Chapeltique as a Trans-local Governance Actor: Grassroots Activists	164
IX.	Conclusion	166

CHAPTER 6

The Case of Comunidad Unida de Chinameca: The Charity and the Counterfactual **168**

I.	Introduction	168
II.	The Municipality: Ojalá que Llave Café	169
III.	The Democratic Climate (2004-2009): Apathy and Resignation	173

IV.	Comunidad Unida de Chinameca: Beer, God and the One-Man Show	178
V.	Comunidad Unida de Chinameca's Linkages with the Local State	185
VI.	Comunidad Unida de Chinameca's Linkages with the Hometown Community	190
VII.	Comunidad Unida de Chinameca as a Trans-local Governance Actor: Isolated Philanthropist	197
VIII.	Migrants Politics: Avoidance Strategy	199
IX.	Conclusion: Si Se Enseña a Pescar...	203

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion: Why Do Some HTAs Succeed and Others Fail at Deepening Democracy? 205

I.	Introduction	205
II.	Typology Revisited	206
III.	The Politics of HTAs	212
IV.	Underlying Mechanisms: Social Capital and the Use of Politics	217
V.	Beyond HTAs and El Salvador: Broader Research and Policy Implications	221
VI.	Conclusion	228

BIBLIOGRAPHY 231

APPENDICES 238

I. Glossary of Spanish Terms and Acronyms 239

II. List of Models and Tables 241

Models

1.1.	Research Design	20
1.2.	Typology of Trans-local Governance	22

7.1	Typology of Trans-local Governance (Revisited)	208
	<i>Tables</i>	
2.1.	The Four Case Studies	36
2.2.	Case Comparisons	38
2.3.	Interview Details	47
2.4.	Archival Data	53
2.5.	Interview Data	53
2.6.	Operationalizing Democratic Deepening	55
3.1	Projects Undertaken by Comité Pro-Mejoramiento del Cantón Piedras Blancas, Pasaquina (1998—2010)	78
4.1.	Key Projects Undertaken by Fundación Unidos por Intipucá (1986—2005)	112
5.1.	Projects Undertaken by Comité Pro-Mejoramiento de Chapeltique (1998—2010)	149
6.1.	Projects Undertaken by Comunidad Unida de Chinameca (1998—2010)	183
	III. Maps	242
1.	Political Map of El Salvador	243
2.	Department of La Unión	244
3.	Department of San Miguel	245
4.	Municipality of Pasaquina	246
5.	Municipality of Intipucá	247
6.	Municipality of Chapeltique	248
7.	Municipality of Chinameca	249
8.	Pasaquina's Urban Center	250
9.	Intipucá's Urban Center	251
10.	Chapeltique's Urban Center	252
11.	Chinameca's Urban Center	253
	IV. Interviewee Questionnaires	254

1.	Hometown Associations (HTAs)	255
2.	Local State Officials	261
3.	Community Leaders	269

CHAPTER 1

Framing the Study: Concepts and Design

I. Introduction

Civic associations are the backbone of democracy, as they provide a fertile foundation for civil society to flourish and affect social change. In marginalized corners of the global South, civic associations are particularly vital as mediums through which to open up new spaces for citizen participation and empowerment. However, civic associations may also nurture negative manifestations of civil society, which erode democracy by manipulating power and widening the wedge of inequality. This dissertation explores the conditions under which civic associations in the global South effectively deepen democracy and the conditions under which they fall short of the democratic ideal. In order to do so, this study is theoretically and empirically framed around transnational civic organizations called migrant hometown associations (HTAs). In brief, HTAs are transnational civic associations comprised of migrant diaspora who reside in the same host city and who intervene collectively in their hometowns of origin in order to implement local development agendas. In particular, this dissertation uses empirical data from four HTAs with hometowns located in El Salvador and with a migrant diaspora based in the Washington DC metropolitan area. It reveals that HTAs are dynamic actors, which impart both positive and negative implications for democratic

deepening. Their impact on democratic quality is determined by the degree of linkage, which they are able to nurture with their respective local states and communities in the hometown. In order to explore variations in these linkages, this dissertation examines the practices, values, and institutions of governance which exist in each hometown and how the HTA has affected them. Governance practices, values, and institutions are important because they describe the means by which state, civic and community actors come together and ultimately the underpinnings of the process of democratic deepening. Thus, this dissertation elaborates a typology of trans-local governance¹ in order to capture variations in HTA-local state-community relations and to tease out its nuanced mechanisms for the process of democratic deepening. Dissertation findings reveal that as a result of these relationships, HTAs are uniquely positioned to intervene as innovative trans-local governance actor in which they apply their transnational scope to affect governance practices, institutions and values in the local sphere. Ultimately, it is by engaging as trans-local governance actors that HTAs are able to transform the democratic landscapes of their hometowns for better or worse.

II. The Literature on Democratic Deepening

The transition to and consolidation of democratic regimes in the global South ushered in electoral conceptions of democracy in which formal institutions and

¹ Katrina Burgess currently has several works in progress in which she introduces the phrase “translocal governance” into the literature on the democratizing impact of HTAs. For the purpose of this dissertation, trans-local characterizes an HTA’s unique intervention in the hometown in which it applies its transnational scope to the local sphere. This type of governance cannot be adequately described as transnational alone because it is not a fluid bi-polar exchange in which the HTA also affects governance processes in the host country. Rather, its impact is uni-directional as it is only felt in the hometown of origin. Likewise, this type of governance is not exclusively local because it is fundamentally shaped by its transnational influence.

procedures secure regular, competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage (Diamond 1999). This minimal realization of democracy has worked well to safeguard the liberties and shared interests of elites and other power stakeholders who use their influence to co-opt the institutions and practices of governance. However, electoral democracy has been less successful at protecting the poor, minorities, and other vulnerable segments of the public who are prone to being marginalized or excluded from formal democratic processes. For them, inequality and social exclusion skew the articulation of popular interests and block the exercise of popular sovereignty (Alvarez et al 1998; Fox 1997; Rueschmeyer et al 1992). Thus, a purely electoral conception of democracy is limited and qualifies in Nun's (2003) terms as a "government of the politicians" where the political sphere is usurped by elitest pockets of power in which politicians vie for votes. Ordinary citizens have either no effective means of holding government accountable or are reduced to dependent clients. Newer democracies, in particular, are weak and lack robust channels of vertical integration between states and citizens and these relationships tend to be dominated by patronage and populism (O'Donnell 1999).

Thus, despite the wave of democratization, the practices, institutions, and values of good governance which underpin more inclusive and "deeper" conceptions of democracy remain weak in much of the global South. In fact, democracy should never be viewed as sufficiently strong or fully achieved, as it is a development phenomenon which can always be improved or deepened. "Political competition can be made fairer or more open; participation can be more inclusive and vigorous; citizens' knowledge, resources, and competence can grow; elective officials can be more responsive and accountable;

civil liberties can be better protected; and rule of law can become more efficient and secure” (Diamond 1999:18). Therefore, by way of definition, democratic deepening is the process of governing in which the formal, effective, and substantive dimensions of democracy become mutually reinforcing (Heller 2000). This process of governing is a two-sided coin guided by the economic principle of supply and demand. On one hand, governance entails the state’s capacity to supply effective institutions and instruments of democracy such as free and fair elections, rule of the rule of law, freedom from corruption, and access to information. On the other hand, governance is also evaluated according to the state’s ability to meet the demands of its citizens and protect their liberties. From this perspective, governance requires a commitment to civic participation, citizen rights, social accountability, equity and inclusion. In short, governance requires a commitment to civil society. It is this facet of governance and its implications for democratic deepening that is the focus of this dissertation.

The literature on the “demand side” of democratic deepening has developed a rich theoretical foundation. It is anchored by contemporary normative democratic theory (Cohen and Arato 1992; Habermas 1996; Sen 1999). In addition, it is heavily influenced by theories of deliberation and the public sphere (Avritzer 2002; Emirbayer and Sheller 1999; Fraser 1990; Habermas 1989). In particular, this body of literature identifies four theoretical pillars defining “demand side” deep democracy. First, a deep democracy is buttressed by a robust civil society. Diamond (1999) defines civil society as “the realm of organized social life that is open, voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules.” Civil society is distinct from society in general because it refers only to organized and

collective civic action in the public sphere. In short, a vibrant civil society is a vital pillar of democratic deepening because provides citizens an avenue through which to organize independent of kinship ties, market incentives, or hierarchical state authority. It tempers the power and control of the state by opening up the political system and its processes to a diverse set of actors and interests. Civil society also supplements the role of political parties in articulating and aggregating interests and in stimulating political participation, thereby rendering individuals more effective at assuming their rights and obligations as citizens. In other words, civil society is the organ of popular empowerment and the breeding ground for new issues to be raised and new actors to be mobilized. It is within the organized associations of civil society that democracy's formal institutions and procedures are able to transcend static and narrow conceptualizations. Moreover, civil society is a critical pillar of a deep democracy because the associational networks within it foster patterns of civility which extend beyond procedural formalities to also entail broader principles of social welfare and organization that are necessary for democracy to take root. In a deep democracy, democratic practices and values have spread throughout society, governing not only relations between states and citizens, but also public relations between citizens (Roberts 1998). A robust civil society fosters social capital and nurtures civic life which moves beyond the realm of individual liberalism and incorporates a commitment to social justice at a communal level (Turner 1992; Waltzer 1992; Hawthorn 2001). Civil society is tested by its capacity to produce citizens whose interests at least sometimes reach further than themselves and who look after the political community that fosters and protects their associational networks (Mouffe 1992). Rousseau claims that citizens have a moral responsibility to be politically active and to work towards a

common destiny, not for the sake of a particular end but for the process itself in which individuals can reach their highest capacities as rational actors and moral agents.

The practice of politics is the second theoretical cornerstone of a deep democracy. Formal democracy endows citizens with *de jure* rights and delineates the political community into which individuals become members. But, it is through the active practice of politics that democracy takes on substantive meaning and that individuals are transformed from subjects of the state into high-intensity citizens (Baiocchi 2005; Mouffe 1992; Roberts 1998; Turner 1992). In fact, the process of deepening democracy necessitates the act of becoming high-intensity citizens; otherwise, citizens are reduced to subjects in which their rights are merely exercised as procedural formalities such as voting. The deepening logic of democracy encourages popular sovereignty as a direct method of governance. This does not suggest that democratic deepening is opposed to representation; rather, it calls for governance practices in which popular control is maximized by expanding opportunities for direct citizens input, oversight, and participation and by enhancing state transparency and the accountability of elected representatives to their constituents (Baiocchi 2005; Roberts 1998). This type of civic engagement between civil society actors and elected officials is vital not only to facilitate consultation, but also to ensure constant feedback and negotiation (Heller 2000). In other words, participation enables individuals to share in the responsibility as well as the authority of politics with elected elites and thereby democratizes the practice of governance. Through the practice of politics, subjects become good citizens and, reciprocally, the elites who are constrained to listen and negotiate, become good governors. The process of democratic deepening strives towards the creation and

sustainability of these kind of participatory governance practices and institutions (Nun 2003; O'Donnell 1993; Törnquist 2005).

Third, a deep democracy is conceptualized theoretically around principles of social equity and social inclusion. This calls for an integral and holistic understanding in which democracy possesses not only institutional authority, but also moral legitimacy. For a democracy to possess moral legitimacy, it must entail a commitment to securing the preconditions of freedom and reducing inequality and social exclusion. Pervasive inequalities within society which chip away at the conditions under which citizens can make informed and independent decisions about their own futures and also prevents citizens from accessing and exercising their citizenship rights, in order to expand their capabilities (Sen 1999) and lead dignified lives (Appadurai 2001). The right to associational autonomy and the vitality of civil society is especially important for the poor and socially excluded segments of society because they are the most vulnerable to state-sanctioned coercion and clientelistic incentives (Fox 1997) and the most reliant on the civic sphere as the locus of struggle for hegemony in order to protest against the dominant power (Cox 1999).

The fourth and final pillar of a deep democracy is social accountability. States and their representatives have a responsibility to be transparent and accountable to their constituents, to respond to the demands of their constituents, and protect their constituents' civil liberties. In order to ensure social accountability, constituents, in turn, must have the effective means by which to lobby their concerns and hold their elected representatives responsible. In addition, a democracy which is socially accountable protects constituents' unfettered access to diverse sources of information, including

independent media, which is required in order for their knowledge, resources, and competence as citizens to grow. The mobilization of new information and ways of understanding are vital for the growth and sustainability of a deep democracy, as civil society is the organ responsible for disseminating information and empowering citizens in the collective pursuit of shared interest and values (Diamond 1999).

Most recently, the focus of the literature on democratic deepening has turned to empirical cases which show that deepening democracy is not simply an abstract idealist concept. Scholars, notably Fung and Wright (2003), highlight the importance and fundamental mechanics of building participatory institutions. However, there is a need to better understand the mechanisms underlying institutional design and civil society's engagement. Moreover, participatory budgeting schemes in Porto Alegre, Brazil are popular and important empirical examples, but there is also a need for a more diverse empirical base (Avritzer 2002; Baiocchi 2005; Baiocchi et al 2008).

III. What are HTAs?

This dissertation picks up where the literature on democratic deepening has left off by exploring the mechanisms underlying the process and by broadening the empirical evidence. In order to do so, it employs empirical data from a particular type of civic association called a migrant hometown association (HTA). HTAs are interesting vehicles through which to examine the process by which democracy is deepened in the global South because they are innovative expressions of civil society, which engage in dynamic transnational relationships between migrants and their hometowns of origin. Over the past twenty years, HTAs have emerged throughout the world. In the global North, HTAs

have become popular with migrants in the US and Europe. In the global South, on the other hand, HTAs have become particularly prevalent in Latin America and the Caribbean, especially in Mexico and El Salvador.

HTAs have several important defining features. First, HTAs are expressions of civil society. They are autonomous and voluntary associations which mobilize around collective civic agendas. Second, HTAs are composed of migrants from the same hometown in the country of origin who reside in the same city in the host country. The core group of migrants who forms the HTA typically grows out of social networks which arise during the migration process. For example, HTA members might have been childhood friends in the hometown who reunite in the host country because they work and live together or have mutual acquaintances. HTA members form an executive committee which oversees its activities from their place of residence. In addition to the executive committee in the host country, HTAs are also typically composed of a counterpart committee of residents, friends, and family in the hometown. This counterpart committee works closely with the migrant committee to oversee activities in the hometown. Some counterpart committees are an organized group, which maintains a constant presence in the hometown. Others, however, only come together on an ad hoc basis at the request of the migrants when the HTA has a particular need to be addressed in the hometown. Third, HTAs form for the purpose of contributing to the development needs of their members' hometowns of origin. They have wide-ranging philanthropic agendas and contribute to a variety of development projects. Most projects are infrastructural in nature such as the installation of a potable water system, but HTA also support educational development through scholarships, as well as cultural initiatives such

as the sponsorship of the hometown's *fiestas patronales*. Fourth, HTAs are transnational in organization and operation. The two committees—the executive committee in the migrants' city of residence and the counterpart committee in the hometown—communicate and coordinate activities transnationally through regular phone calls and visits to the hometown. For example, the counterpart committee might identify several development needs in the hometown and communicate them to the migrant committee, which not only makes the final decision about which project to support, but is also responsible for raising the necessary funds. Or, the HTA may receive a direct solicitation from a resident in the hometown and then ask a representative from the counterpart committee to verify and assess the need. The counterpart committee is also typically responsible for project implementation in the hometown. In cases where the HTA does not count with the support of a counterpart committee, migrants assume an active role in the implementation phase upon frequent visits to the hometown. Fifth, HTAs employ grassroots strategies drawing from their dense migrant networks in the host city to garner financial and moral support for projects. For example, typically an HTA raises funds, known as collective remittances, by organizing parties, raffles, or cookouts, relying on the support of fellow migrants to attend and contribute financially to the event. Profits from each event vary greatly from a few hundred to a few thousand dollars depending on the HTA's organization and the community's support for the group. Once all the funds have been collected, the money is remitted back to the hometown to begin work on the project at hand.

The literature on HTAs has grown out of the literature on family remittances and is primarily concerned with the impact and maximization of HTAs' collective

remittances on development (Solimano 2003; Torres 2000). Research on the democratizing impact of HTAs is scarce and is a virtually novel field of study (Burgess 2006; Burgess and Tinajero Forthcoming; Fox and Bada 2008; Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008; Williams 2008). In particular, the literatures on HTAs and deepening democracy have never intersected. Broadening the literature on democratic deepening to include empirical data from HTAs is critical in order to expand the empirical base upon which theory is constructed and to illuminate the mechanisms underlying institutional design. As shall be explored in detail below, this study interweaves the two for the first time through the development of a typology of trans-local governance.

IV. El Salvador in Context

In order to investigate HTAs and their democratizing impacts, this dissertation narrows its theoretical and empirical focus on the US and the Central American country of El Salvador (See APPENDIX III.1). The US is the primary destination for Salvadoran immigrants. Between 1980 and 1990, the Salvadoran immigrant population in the US increased nearly fivefold from 94,000 to 465,000 (Terrazas 2010). According to the US Census, there are currently 1,104,000 Salvadoran immigrants residing in the US who comprise 2.7 percent of the total foreign-born population (Grieco 2010). This number excludes the estimated 570,000 undocumented Salvadoran immigrants, who are believed to comprise 5 percent of the total unauthorized migrant population in the US (US Department of Homeland Security 2008). Over the years, Salvadoran migrants have formed dense social networks, which have given rise to particularly active and dynamic HTAs, rendering El Salvador a uniquely fertile setting in which to study the process of

democratic deepening. HTAs among Salvadoran immigrants in the US began popping up about two decades ago. Since, then they have surged in popularity and can now be found in cities throughout the US. These Salvadoran HTAs display great variation in their level of organizational sophistication and consequently there is significant diversity in terms of the relationships they form both in the US and in their hometowns in El Salvador. In the US, some Salvadoran HTAs adopt formal organizational structures in which members assume well-defined responsibilities and hold specific titles, such as president, vice-president, treasurer and secretary, which are decided through yearly elections. It is not uncommon for these types of HTAs to have regular meetings and maintain careful records and bookkeeping. Others, however, operate with a more lax organizational structure in which members come together and assign responsibilities as needs arise.

The relationships which Salvadoran HTAs develop with their respective hometown communities also vary. Some Salvadoran HTAs work without the support of a counterpart committee and conduct all negotiations among its migrant members, leaving no room for the hometown community in its decision-making processes. Other HTAs choose to work closely with its counterpart committee, carefully coordinating decisions and activities between members in the executive committee in the US and the counterpart committee in the hometown. Others open up their agendas and decision-making processes to include the hometown community at large. These collaborative partnerships can be both formal and informal in nature. In a formal context, the HTA might hold open town meetings during which project identification and selection are deliberated by all members of the community instead of leaving the identification and selection process in the hands of the migrants alone. Informally, an HTA might rely heavily on its social

networks when selecting projects by directly soliciting input of friends, family, and other community members during casual conversation.

Moreover, the relationships which Salvadoran HTAs form with the local state in their hometowns are dynamic and this also makes El Salvador a particularly interesting context for the study of democratic deepening. Although some HTAs have strained relations with their municipal states, others form close partnerships. Partnerships with the local state typically assume a formal nature as they are structured by institutional guidelines. In these partnerships, the HTA and the local state typically pool resources to collaborate on projects. For example, the HTA might propose an idea for a project and contribute some funds, but then rely on the local state to supplement financing and for technical expertise during the implementation phase of the project. These types of arrangements are crucial for allowing HTAs to implement expensive large-scale projects that would otherwise be financially unrealistic for them. Partnerships with the local state are also especially vital in terms of project sustainability, as most HTAs do not have the long-term institutional vision or resources for this (Orozco 2003, 2004; Orozco and Welle 2006). It is important to note, however, that not all HTA partnerships with the local state are formal in nature. Informal relationships with the state such as friendship and political affiliation might also influence the HTA's partnerships with its local state. In addition, some Salvadoran HTAs have even collaborated with the national government of El Salvador. Between 2003-2007, the central government courted HTAs through a transnational development program called Unidos por la Solidaridad, in which it held competitions for projects. For those HTAs which submitted winning proposals, the national government matched its financial contributions towards the project. In general,

the Salvadoran government has been active in strengthening its relationship with its migrant community and has set up personnel in its consulates to cater to HTAs and other diaspora issues. In addition, Salvadoran government officials are in direct contact with many HTAs and invite them to events in El Salvador and the US. Finally, some Salvadoran HTAs have also been successful in forming partnerships with large donor agencies such as USAID, as well as securing occasional corporate sponsorship from Budweiser, Taca Airlines, Banco Agrícola, and others. The diversity of Salvadoran HTAs' relationships renders the country an ideal setting in which to study HTAs because there is great variation in the decision-making processes, the actors involved, and the impacts of those decisions and actors in their hometowns.

El Salvador's history also adds a unique dimension to this dissertation and makes it a particularly interesting backdrop against which to study democratic deepening. Between 1980-1992, the country was ravaged by a civil war, which fragmented civil society and crushed opportunities for civil society actors to participate politically or civically (Foley and Edwards 1996; McIlwaine 1998). During the civil war, Salvadoran social relations were characterized by cynicism and mistrust. However, democratization has opened new windows of opportunity for political participation, especially among migrants (Itzigsohn 2000; Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008). In El Salvador, non-electoral political involvement such as participation in HTAs is particularly popular because the incipient democracy and frail political parties have failed to create formal opportunities for migrants, who constitute more than 20 percent of the Salvadoran population, to participate in electoral politics (Landolt 1999 et al; Menjivar 2000). Thus, HTAs embody a hopeful project for El Salvador's post-war reconstruction process. Through their

relationships with local state and community actors, HTAs create new cross-cutting networks of affiliations, which build the micro foundations for social change. It is through the proliferation of “small groups” like HTAs that civil society thrives, even when large institutionalized civic associations remain dormant (Fine and Harrington 2004). Moreover, through partnerships with the local state, HTAs can promote cooperation, transparency, and accountability, as well as restore tolerance, collaboration, and confidence in the state. At the community level, HTAs can forge cooperative social networks and strengthen bonds of social capital, helping local residents to replace fear and suspicion with trust and solidarity (Landolt et al 1999; Portes and Landolt 2000). Therefore, this study has the advantage of capturing the rebuilding of civil society’s ties with the local state and community in its formative years, after the peace accords, in order to understand how these three actors renegotiate their relationships and redesign their impact on democracy.

Although the signing of the peace accords brought an end to the bloodshed and ushered in formal democracy in El Salvador, political tension in the country is still rife. Today political conflict is played out between El Salvador’s political parties who compete for votes and power. El Salvador has a multi-party political system with four prominent parties: Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA), Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), and Partido de Conciliación Nacional (PCN). Historically, ARENA and the FMLN have been the strongest players in El Salvador’s political arena. ARENA is a right-wing party, which formed in 1981 in response to the military junta that orchestrated the civil war. The FMLN, on the other hand, is a leftist party comprised primarily of those who supported

the guerilla forces during the war. Today in much of El Salvador, politics continues to be a divisive force, especially as it plays out at the local level in the country's poorest and most neglected regions. For example, many communities are polarized because party politics translate into local struggles for power and status in the face of rampant poverty and inequality. Clientelistic ties and practices are prevalent, inciting animosity, competition, and rivalry between neighbors. In addition, political participation and involvement has too often come to be associated with petty conflict and gossip. As a result, collective organization and civic consciousness have been largely suppressed, rendering communities, in O'Donnell's term (1999), "brown spots" characterized by inert civil societies. In short, many citizens have become disillusioned with politics and have stopped believing in it as a force for beneficial social change. Moreover, the tension between ARENA and the FMLN also continues to divide the country along ideological lines. Both parties draw heavily on divisive ideological rhetoric dating back to the civil war, which only serve to perpetuate tensions between right-wing and left-wing factions of society.

Since the brokering of the peace accords, ARENA has dominated the political arena, controlling the presidency and National Legislative Assembly. However, the year 2009 saw a significant shift in the national political scene as the FMLN's presidential candidate, Mauricio Funes, won office for the first time since the party gained legal recognition and power in 1992 with the brokering of the peace accords. This was a crucial moment to seal the FMLN's legitimacy and break from its stereotype as a party represented by anti-government communist guerillas. Therefore, El Salvador's 2009 national and local elections create a vivid and intense backdrop against which to analyze

the way in which HTAs handle remnant political tensions and negotiate their role in local power struggles in order to effectively deepen democracy.²

V. Research Design: Questions, Variables, and Hypotheses

The primary objective of this dissertation is to investigate if migrants through their participation in HTAs deepen democracy in their hometowns of origin and if so under what conditions they are able to do so effectively. The study assumes that HTAs are not homogenous organizations, nor do they have homogenous effects. In other words, some Salvadoran HTAs are more effective at deepening democracy than others. But, why is one HTA more effective than another? What are the different ways in which migrants alter democratic quality in their hometowns of origin? Do HTAs empower their migrant leadership or do they empower hometown residents? What different types of relationships do migrants cultivate with their local states and communities through their participation in HTAs? And, how do migrants use HTAs to negotiate competing power dynamics in the hometown? The purpose of this study is to answer these questions and to reveal the mechanisms which underlie the process of democratic deepening.

In order to answer these questions, the research design is framed around three key issues. First, a sharp distinction is drawn between civil society and community. In this study, civil society is represented by those who are actively organized and engaged in the voluntary associations of the HTA. This typically includes migrants in the executive directorate and members of the counterpart committee composed of hometown residents.

² While the 2009 election serve as an important backdrop for this dissertation, it is important to emphasize that this dissertation does not analyze the party politics which unfolded during the elections or engage the ideological debates between ARENA and the FMLN.

It may also include other organized voluntary associations in the hometown, such as local NGOs. Community, on the other hand, is represented by the hometown residents at large who are not part of the HTA's membership or any other civic association in the hometown. In other words, community is no more than a loose conglomeration of residents who share a geographic jurisdiction. It is only when residents organize collectively and engage civically that they transcend the realm of community and become part of civil society.³ The distinction between civil society and community allows for differentiation among actors and for an analysis into who is being empowered (Evans 2002). Does the HTA only empower migrants and members of its counterpart committee? Does it have a broader effect by strengthening existing civic associations in the hometown or impelling new ones to form? Identifying exactly which actors are empowered by HTAs is important to fully tease out and understand the mechanisms at work. Second, this study unpacks and conceptualizes civil society as a relational actor which functions in conjunction with the state and community. The introduction of community as an autonomous actor in the process of democratic deepening moves beyond the traditional dichotomy of state-civil society relations to present a three-dimensional conceptualization of democracy. Thus, in the study, deep democracy is conceived of as existing along civic, local state, and community spheres. Under this conceptualization, the HTA acts as a medium linking all three spheres, each of which plays an integral role in the deepening of democracy. The HTA provides a robust civic association upon which democracy is rooted. The local state, identified in this study as

³ There is a broad theoretical tradition and literature in the study of community. However, for the purpose of this study, the word community is used only to distinguish between organized and unorganized groups of residents.

the local municipal government or *alcaldía*, provides the institutions for the sustained practice of politics at the local level. The community, on the other hand, provides the necessary collective base and moral legitimacy. Third, this dissertation problematizes the relationship between civil society and democracy. It shows not only how civil society may act as a pro-democratic influence, but also reveals the conditions under which civil society can act as a negative force deteriorating governance practices and perpetuating social exclusion and inequality.


As its central argument, this study proposes that an HTA's ability to deepen democracy depends on its degree of linkage with its local state and community. Linkage is conceptualized as the relationship which the HTA cultivates with its local state and its community. This study hypothesizes that those HTAs which have a high degree of linkage with their local states and a high degree of linkage with their communities are more capable of deepening democracy than those HTAs which have a low degree of linkage with their local states and communities. In other words, linkage is disaggregated into two critical variables: (i) linkage with the local state and (ii) linkage with the community. Both variables are independently necessary, but jointly sufficient for democratic deepening.

Deepening democracy serves as the dependent variable in the study and it is conceptualized according to the four key pillars outlined in the literature reviewed above: (i) robust civil society, (ii) the active practice of politics, (iii) increased social accountability, and (iv) reduced inequality and social exclusion.

The logic of the hypothesis is illustrated in Model 1.1 below. In sum, the HTA acts as a medium linking civil society, the local state, and the community to produce a

three-dimensional conceptualization of democracy. All three actors play an integral role for the deepening of democracy. The study hypothesizes that if the HTA is successfully able to foster a high degree of linkage with the local state AND to foster a high degree of linkage with the community, then democracy is deepened.

Model 1.1 Research Design



The hypothesis elaborated above refers only to an HTA's potential to deepen democracy. However, as stated at the onset, HTAs are not homogenous organizations. Not all HTAs work to deepen democracy in the hometown. In order to capture this variation in HTAs' impact, the dissertation elaborates a typology of trans-local governance, which serves as the guiding conceptual model in the analysis. The typology

grows out of the logic of the original hypothesis and extends it. However unlike the original hypothesis which explicitly addresses only high degrees of linkage, the typology takes into account low variations of linkage between the HTA and its local state and between the HTA and its community. Moreover, it differentiates between actors to show who is being empowered by the HTA. Thus, the typology deconstructs democratic deepening by teasing out the nuanced mechanisms underlying HTA-local state-community relations. As a result of these linkages, HTAs are uniquely positioned to intervene as innovative governance actors in the hometown. It is ultimately by engaging in the process of governance and by transforming governance values, practices, and institutions that HTAs are able to act as vehicles for deepening democracy.⁴

VI. Typology of Trans-local Governance

The typology of trans-local governance is depicted in Model 1.2 below. Trans-local governance cannot be characterized as exclusively transnational (bi-polar) because it is not a fluid exchange in which the HTA affects governance processes in the host country. Nor, is it exclusively local (uni-polar) as it is fundamentally shaped by its transnational influence. Thus, trans-local governance describes the distinct merger in which HTAs apply their transnational scope to affect governance values, practices, and institutions in the local sphere. Each quadrant of the typology represents one of four distinct ways in which an HTA can engage as a trans-local governance actor. In other words, each quadrant represents a distinct link or relationship between the HTA, local

⁴ As explained in the literature review, governance describes the process by which democratic deepening is achieved. A deep democracy is characterized by its ability to foster and sustain good governance processes and structures. Therefore, developing a typology of trans-local governance is an extension of the dependent variable.

state, and community. Each of these also presupposes a distinct implication for democratic quality. The overarching parameters which frame the typology adhere to the three-dimensional conceptualization of democracy explained above. Therefore, in the model below, the local state, which provides the necessary institutions for participation, is depicted along the y-axis. The community, which provides moral legitimacy, is located along the x-axis. Civil society is represented by the HTA itself. The relationships and corresponding trans-local governance types which appear in each quadrant of the typology are reviewed in detail below.

Model 1.2 Typology of Trans-local Governance



Typology of Trans-local Governance

Linkage with the Local State Low High	Exclusionary Governance HTA Role: Opportunistic Elites	Participatory Governance HTA Role: Equal Partners
	Vacuous Governance HTA Role: Isolated Philanthropists	Blocked Governance HTA Role: Grassroots Activists
Linkage with the Community Low High		

Type 1: Participatory Governance

In direct correlation with the original hypothesis, participatory governance is produced by the HTA's high degree of linkage with the local state and community. Here the HTA acts as an "Equal Partner" bringing together civil society, the local state, and the community. In this scenario, both HTA members and residents in the community are equally empowered to act as high-intensity citizens. This trans-local governance type has the most favorable implications for deepening democracy. Here the HTA nurtures civil society and creates dense networks of civic associations through the very nature of its collective mobilization. These micro-level associational networks are the "incubators of civil society" and they provide localized vehicles for participation in public discourse and for the exercise of citizenship (Fine and Harrington 2004). From a Tocquevillian perspective, associational networks like those buttressed by HTAs, are the bedrock of democracy. For Putnam (1994), the chief virtue of civic associations lies in their capacity to strengthen social capital. Through their civic agendas, the HTA socializes participants into the "norms of generalized reciprocity" and "trust" needed for democracy (Portes and Landolt 2000). In short, the HTA strengthens horizontal forms of association, which challenge vertical ones typified by traditional power hierarchies found in marginalized corners of the global South.

Moreover under this governance type, HTAs, by their very constitution and objectives, nurture civic consciousness and foster a sense of community, as argued by Rousseau. They are fundamentally philanthropic organizations oriented towards social justice and altruistic goals. Through their collective remittances, HTAs seek to ameliorate the conditions of freedom and deliver collective social benefits. This is in stark contrast

to family remittances, which provide only private benefits. Under this trans-local governance type, the HTA is an especially important medium by which to foster an inclusive sense of community. It expands the notion of civic consciousness to include the poor and most marginalized groups in the community, who in the context of El Salvador typically live in abject poverty in the outskirts of the municipality or are those who do not receive remittances.

HTAs which engage as equal partners practice politics through the making of claims concerning development deficiencies in the hometown and proposed solutions. They make claims on the community to act collectively around common development needs and they make claims on the local state to step up and take responsibility for the social welfare of their subjects (Fitzgerald 2000, 2008). Through this type of political participation, individuals come to recognize themselves as members of a political community and undergo the process of becoming high-intensity citizens (Mouffe 1992; Waltzer 1992). Moreover, as autonomous associations, HTAs are able to organize in defense of their own interests by assuming ownership over the development process and identifying, designing, financing, and implementing projects.

Moreover, in this scenario, the HTA institutionalizes participatory mechanisms such as open town meetings which provide opportunities for individuals to gather together as equals, argue their preferences, and deliberate to arrive at consensus. Thus, the HTA represents the institutionalization of deliberative publics as explained by Avritzer (2002). Participatory mechanisms and associational autonomy are especially vital in facilitating the inclusion of marginalized groups in local political processes

because they are usually the most vulnerable to state-sanctioned coercion and clientelistic incentives (Fox 1997).

Finally, when approaching governance as an equal partner, the HTA forms mutually collaborative partnerships with its local state, which significantly facilitates social accountability. The HTA is able to negotiate directly with the state and thereby pressure unresponsive municipal authorities for higher standards of accountability and transparency (Burgess and Tinajero Forthcoming; Fox and Bada 2008; Williams 2008). These partnerships allow migrants and hometown residents to break clientelistic chains and effectively engage the state as autonomous, but equal actors. They allow migrants and hometown residents to make demands upon the state and compel authorities to take their interests and priorities into account. In this scenario, the presence of a counterpart committee is important for facilitating HTA-state collaboration, as it lessens the likelihood that local state officials will respond to migrants' demands at the expense of local residents. It also allows local residents to play a role in the management of local resources and it increases the probability that migrants have accurate information about needs in the hometown (Burgess and Tinajero Forthcoming). Moreover, HTA-state partnerships provide institutional structures at the local state level, making more permanent the democratizing effects of HTAs. Also, HTA-state partnerships allow for the negotiation of new roles and responsibilities for both parties. Smith finds that HTAs have the potential to deepen democracy because they "force the state to engage them in new ways" and, in effect, generate "parallel power structures" with the old, traditional regime (RC Smith 1998: 227-28). These partnerships also have the potential to thicken and "politically construct" social capital necessary for association because they allow the

state to provide civil society with positive incentives for collective action (Fox 1996). In short, HTAs have an inherent political and public character. As trans-local governance actors, HTAs which engage as equal partners have the potential to bring about social change by empowering citizens and challenging the existing dominant order and local power structures (Young 1994).

Type 2: Exclusionary Governance

Exclusionary governance is produced when an HTA possesses a high degree of linkage with the local state, but a low degree of linkage with the community. Here, the HTA acts as an “Opportunistic Elite” when intervening as a trans-local governance actor in the hometown. In this scenario, HTAs’ collective remittances are the source of their political power, as it is vis-à-vis their remittances that migrants are able to occupy an elevated position in the municipality’s socio-economic structure (Guarnizo and MP Smith 1998; Portes et al 2007). HTAs may use this newfound power for good and challenge established elites and the status quo of state politics. The HTA can be effective in pointing out where the state has fallen short of its responsibilities and ultimately rendering the local state more transparent and accountable. However, in this scenario, that does not happen, as the HTA exploits its linkages with the local state. Migrants manipulate their newfound authority for their own political advantage and use their participation in HTAs as a strategic political move to uphold high status and power in the hometown, or in some cases even run for public office (Goldring 2004; Landolt et al 1999; Levitt 1997). Or, under this trans-local governance type, migrants might use the HTA to implement private agendas which serve primarily the interests of its members.

For example, migrants might choose to repair only the roadways near the homes of their relatives. The exclusionary governance captured in this quadrant of the typology shows that civil society does not always act as a positive democratic force (Armony 2004; Auyero 2007; Fatton 1995). Thus, in this scenario, Foley and Edwards' (1996) warnings against romanticizing "the civil society argument" materialize. Civil society carries the weight of its history and its pre-existing relations with the state and does not necessarily presuppose benevolent democratic values and practices.

Furthermore, when governing as an opportunistic elite, the HTA develops a low degree of linkage with the hometown community. Consequently, it is socially unaccountable to the hometown community who play no role here. The HTA only empowers its members' citizenship rights and, for local residents, this scenario produces only exclusionary governance values and practices. Kamat (2003) warns that community-based organizations like HTAs that work closely with the state or other donor agencies are at risk of suffering from a "crisis of credibility" because there is a growing disconnect from the poor. Institutional bureaucracy encourages the professionalization of community-based organizations and consequently leads them to adopt neoliberal notions of empowerment guided by a narrow economic and apolitical approach in working with the poor. Thus, community-based democratization becomes more symbolic than substantive, as is the case in this scenario. Moreover, as migrants' social and economic power increases, their views often take precedence over those of hometown residents (Levitt 2001). Thus, the HTA fails to be representative of the community and migrants

come to constitute a new elite in the hometown which reproduces structures of inequality and patronage (Goldring 2002, 2004; Levitt 2001; Portes and Landolt 2000).⁵

In contrast, the local state stands to benefit from forging strong linkages with the HTA. The local state is eager to pool from migrants' remittances and other resources to supplement municipal funds. The local state may use HTA partnerships as strategies which, while responding to real demands from below, serve as institutional channels to regulate and control relationships with migrant civil society and to ensure the continued flow of remittances. In a Foucauldian tradition, these partnerships are a form of governmentality in which power is diffused by the state to transform migrants into "good" self-governing citizens (Corbridge et al 2005). However, although the local state might become more accountable to the HTA as a result of their high degree of linkage, it does not necessarily become more accountable to the community at large. The local states may pay more attention to HTA members and migrant leaders than hometown residents because of the leverage which their remittances afford them (Williams 2008). Although the HTA and the local state are engaged in the negotiation of new roles and responsibilities, these types of manipulative partnerships are not expected to have a positive democratizing impacts because they aggravate social cleavages in the community and fail to nurture broad bonds of association, cooperation, or trust (Fox and Bada 2008; Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008). Moreover, HTA-state partnerships are often limited due to the HTA's lack of capacity in project supervision and a poor understanding

⁵ It is necessary, however, to qualify this critique. While migrants in this scenario do constitute a new elite, they are an elite that emerges out of a process of mobility through migration, not through the inheritance of social status or political power. In this way, the emergence of new HTA-related elites challenges rigid local stratification. So it seems that the local political involvement of HTAs contributes, in part, to more plurality and mobility in local economic and political stratification (Landolt et al 1999; Levitt 2001).

of its role as a public accountability actor (Fox and Bada 2008). Thus, this scenario shows that linkage can have negative manifestations and that a high degree of linkage is not always a good thing, as it risks engendering clientelistic relations between the HTA and the local state.

Type 3: Blocked Governance

Blocked governance is produced by an HTA that has a high degree of linkage with the community, but a low degree of linkage with the local state. In this scenario, the HTA approached governance in the hometown by acting as a “Grassroots Activist”. The community actively practices politics and mobilizes collectively around a common cause with the HTA. However, the HTA is unable to engage the local state or embed itself within it. Consequently, governance is blocked as it cannot transcend the community and fails to link up to the local state and its institutional infrastructure. This type of trans-local governance has frustrated implications for deepening democracy because the civic and participatory values fostered by the HTA-community relations are unable to significantly impact the practice of politics at the institutional level.

In deciding whether or not to enter into partnerships with the local state, HTAs calculate political risk and respond to the political climate wrought by their local states, be it one of collaboration or mistrust. For example, Smith (1998) finds that some Mexican HTAs accept state support despite the diminished autonomy it implies, while others choose to preserve their independence although it curtails their developmental impact. Such evidence shows that HTAs are aware of threats to their political power and the possible undercutting motives of the state. In this scenario, the low degree of linkages

between the HTA and the local state might also be explained as a calculated move on the part of the local state, which prefers to retreat and evade its public responsibilities, leaving the HTA in charge of implementing development strategies and pursuing funding sources. After all, while collective remittances are important contributions, it is important to emphasize that development aid is not the responsibility of the HTA (Goldring 2002).

Type 4: Vacuous Governance

This dissertation argues that those HTAs which engender a low degree of linkage with the local state and a low degree of linkage with the community produce vacuous governance. In other words, the HTA does not foster close ties or collaborative partnerships with either the local state or the hometown community. As previously stated, HTAs are not homogenous organizations and some HTAs may have more public good “spillover effects” than others. And in this scenario, by not engaging with either the local state or community, the HTA has no effect whatsoever on governance practices and values in the hometown. The HTA’s absence as a trans-local governance actor leaves a void in the hometown where governance needs continue to be unfulfilled.

In this scenario, the HTA is unable or unwilling to work with the local state. This strained relation might be due to mistrust, political differences, corruption, or personal vendettas. Or, migrants might insist on working alone because they believe they know best how to design and implement their projects. Moreover, the HTA here is disconnected from and not representative of the hometown community. The community is unempowered, as it does not participate in the HTA’s decision-making processes or activities. The HTA reaches decisions in closed committee sessions, rather than

subjecting their decision making to public deliberation. Moreover, this type of HTA typically does not work with a counterpart committee and therefore ties with the community typically erode because it does not work to foster social capital and bounded solidarity. In fact, it is not uncommon that with the passage of time, the HTA's vision of development and of desirable projects diverges from that of the community. These types of HTAs often begin investing in projects that facilitate the return of their migrant members to the hometown for retirement or vacation. Or, HTAs invest in projects which preserve the hometown of their childhood memories as a way to ease the difficulties of immigrant life. These interests are often in conflict with hometown residents who would prefer to invest in projects that directly address their development needs (Levitt 2001). In short, HTAs in this scenario insist on engaging on their terms and have an inconsistent presence in the hometown because they lack collaborative partnerships with the local state or hometown community. As a result, these types of HTAs often contribute only small-scale deliverable projects, such as gift donations for children during Christmas, which have fleeting effects and amount to little more than charity. Consequently, as a trans-local governance actor, the HTA assumes the role of an "Isolated Philanthropist". This type of trans-local governance has hollowing implications for deepening democracy, as the HTA fails to foster participatory, civic, or inclusive practices with the community or to increase transparency and accountability with the local state.

VII. Study Relevance and Contributions

The principle of linkage examined in this dissertation is generalizable beyond HTAs and El Salvador to include other transnational civic associations throughout the

global South. Thus, dissertation findings conclude that if a transnational civic association is able to build cross-cutting linkages with community and state actors, then democracy will deepen. In particular, findings critically advance knowledge in the literature on democratic deepening, which to date has primarily focused on the importance of building participatory institutions. Dissertation findings, however, reach beyond issues of institutional design to illuminate the complex mechanisms underlying civic engagement and the “micro foundations of civil society”. They inform research linking micro variables to macro discourses about the public sphere (Fine and Harrington 2004). In addition, by broadening the existing empirical data on democratic deepening to include HTAs, findings create a more robust empirical foundation on which to elaborate theory. Moreover, previous case studies of democratic deepening have been criticized for their narrow breadth and for selecting upon the dependent variable. However, this dissertation employs four different HTA cases in order to draw rich analytic comparisons between those instances in which civil society effectively deepens democracy and those in which it does not. It reveals variations in the relationships which civil society cultivates and how these divergent relationships affect the process of democratic deepening. This dissertation unpacks civil society as a relational concept, which engages dynamically with the local state and community. In particular, the typology of trans-local governance developed here allows for a nuanced analysis and theorizes how civil society is positioned vis-à-vis the local state and community to determine who is being empowered and how these distinctions have marked implications for democratic quality. By introducing community as an autonomous actor in the practice of politics, this study also moves the discussion beyond the traditional dichotomy of state-civil society relations to present a three-

dimensional conceptualization of democracy. Furthermore, this dissertation adds to the literature on democratic deepening by problematizing the relationship between civil society and democracy. Project findings show not only how civil society may serve as a pro-democratic influence, but also reveals the conditions under which civil society can act as a negative force perpetuating exclusion and inequality.

This dissertation also contributes towards the theoretical and empirical literature on collective remittances. Previous research has focused on the role of HTAs' collective remittances as economic stimulants for development. However, this dissertation shifts the focus away from their role as economic players and merges the research on HTAs with the literature on democratic deepening. Thus, by looking at them as democratizing agents, this study contributes new critical insight into HTAs' potential for development. Furthermore, the dissertation better illuminates how migrants can engage dynamically as transnational political actors in their hometowns of origin. In order to deepen democracy, HTAs must effectively negotiate their political role within the hometown's competing power dynamics. Findings reveal how migrants, through their participation in HTAs, approach and use politics in order to shape their intervention as trans-local governance actors.⁶

⁶ It is important to underline that this dissertation limits its examination of migrants' political activity to their participation in HTAs, which is only one of many ways in which migrants engage politically in their hometown of origin. This dissertation does not purport to present an in-depth examination into the roles, patterns, or implications of the diverse ways in which migrants engage transnationally in their hometowns' politics. While certain migrant members of the HTAs examined for this study launched political campaigns, the role of those migrants as political candidates and the details of their campaigns are not the focus of this investigation. Rather, the campaigns of individual migrant politicians are only of interest to this dissertation in terms of how they involve HTAs and how they inform on the hometown's democratic climate. In addition, this dissertation focuses exclusively on the effects of migrants' transnational political activity in the hometown of origin and for hometown residents, not for migrants themselves or migrants' lives in the US. For example, this dissertation does not examine how migrant politics differ in the hometown versus the US or how US influences infiltrate into migrants' political behavior or rhetoric in the

Finally, this dissertation's theoretical and empirical contributions are relevant for development policy agendas, which seek to amplify the migration-development link beyond the economic significance of remittances. HTAs are gaining attention in academic and policy circles and are being used as innovative development alternatives through which to implement social change. For example, the Inter-American Development Bank and the US Agency for International Development have launched several projects which engage HTAs in development programs. By illustrating how HTAs effectively engage as trans-local governance actors, findings show that HTAs' potential for local development is much greater than their financial contributions. Moreover, this dissertation contributes to policy directed at improving governance practices and structures. Findings contribute to a solid empirical basis for policy, which aims to empower local actors and incorporate marginalized people into development planning and governance processes. Ultimately, the dissertation draws theoretical conclusions and makes generalizations beyond HTAs and El Salvador to illuminate the mechanisms by which transnational civic associations in the global South can engage effectively as vehicles for democratic deepening.

hometown. The above are all important points for investigation when exploring migrants' transnational politics, but they are tangential to this study and not tackled here.

CHAPTER 2

Case Selection and Methodology

I. Introduction

This chapter presents the methodological blueprint in order to execute the conceptual and theoretical research design of this dissertation. The first section of this chapter introduces the four Salvadoran HTAs, which were selected as case studies for an in-depth examination of the process of democratic deepening. It reviews the four cases in detail and presents a comparison and a justification for their inclusion in this study. The second section of this chapter explores the data sources employed and the data collection process. In short, fieldwork was conducted in both El Salvador and the Washington metro area, where empirical data were collected through semi-structured interviews and archival material. Using this empirical evidence, linkage (the independent variable) and democratic deepening (the dependent variable) are operationalized in detail in section three of this chapter. Finally, the last section reviews the data analysis phase of the methodology, which seeks to establish a correlation between each HTA's intervention and democratic deepening in its respective hometown of origin.

II. Case Selection and Background

This dissertation employs case studies of four Salvadoran HTAs in order to conduct an in-depth analysis of the process of democratic deepening in migrants' hometown of origin. The case selection builds off the theoretical and conceptual framework presented in Chapter 1, as each case corresponds to a quadrant in the typology of trans-local governance. In other words, each case represents one of the four HTA roles and their correlating trans-local governance types. The four participating HTAs are listed in Table 2.1 below:

Table 2.1 The Four Case Studies

Fundación Unidos por Intipucá Municipality of Intipucá Department of La Unión Exclusionary Governance HTA Role: Opportunistic Elites	Comité Pro-Mejoramiento Cantón Piedras Blancas Municipality of Pasaquina Department of La Unión Participatory Governance HTA Role: Equal Partners
Comunidad Unida de Chinameca Municipality of Chinameca Department of San Miguel Vacuous Governance HTA Role: Isolated Philanthropists	Comité Pro-Mejoramiento de Chapeltique Municipality of Chapeltique Department of San Miguel Blocked Governance HTA Role: Grassroots Activists

Each of the four cases is located in the eastern region of El Salvador, specifically in either the department of La Unión or San Miguel (See APPENDIX III.2 and APPENDIX III.3). El Salvador is comprised of fourteen administrative divisions called departments.⁷ The country's fourteen departments are organized into 162 municipalities.

⁷ The migrant community abroad is typically referred to as El Salvador's fifteenth department due to the strong presence they maintain despite their physical absence.

Each municipality is divided into *cantones*, which are broken down further into smaller jurisdictions called *caseríos* also known as communities. Migrants form HTAs to serve the needs of their municipalities of origin and they focus their agendas in the urban center of the municipality, but many also extend their reach to the surrounding *cantones* and *caseríos*.⁸ Three of the four HTAs selected as case studies (those in the municipalities of Intipucá, Chapeltique, and Chinameca) follow this trend and have served all jurisdictions of their respective hometowns. However, unlike the other three cases, the case study of Comité Pro-Mejoramiento Cantón Piedras Blancas does not serve its municipality as a whole, but rather only the *cantón* of Piedras Blancas. Cantón Piedras Blancas pertains to the municipality of Pasaquina, which is located in the Department of La Unión along the border with Honduras (See APPENDIX III.4). Of all four cases, the municipality of Pasaquina is by far the largest in geographic size, measuring 295.28 square kilometers and containing nine *cantones* and eighty *caseríos* (Monografía del Departamento y Municipios de La Unión 1999; Almanaque Municipal 2006). Cantón Piedras Blancas in itself is as large as some of the other municipalities in this study. Thus, Comité Pro-Mejoramiento Cantón Piedras Blancas decided to dedicate its efforts exclusively within the *cantón*. The second case study, Fundación Unidos por Intipucá, also pertains to the Department of La Unión and it serves the municipality of Intipucá as a whole (See APPENDIX III.5). The municipality of Intipucá measures 94.49 square kilometers and has two *cantones* and twenty *caseríos* (Monografía del Departamento y Municipios de La Unión 1999; Almanaque Municipal 2006). Comité Pro-Mejoramiento de Chapeltique, the

⁸ Given this context, “municipality” is used interchangeably with “hometown” in this dissertation, unless otherwise specified, as in the case of Comité Pro-Mejoramiento Cantón Piedras Blancas in Pasaquina.

third case study, serves the municipality of Chapeltique in the Department of San Miguel (See APPENDIX III.6). Chapeltique is the second largest municipality at 103.55 square kilometers with six *cantones* and thirty-two *caseríos* (Almanaque Municipal 2006; Monografía del Departamento y Municipios de San Miguel 2007). Finally, the fourth case, Comunidad Unida de Chinameca, is also located in the Department of San Miguel and it serves the municipality of Chinameca (See APPENDIX III.7). Chinameca is the smallest geographically of the four municipalities at 77.34 square kilometers and has twenty *cantones* and thirty-six *caseríos* (Almanaque Municipal 2006; Monografía del Departamento y Municipios de San Miguel 2007).

Table 2.2 Case Comparisons

	Pasaquina	Intipucá	Chapeltique	Chinameca
Geographic Size	295.28 sq km	94.49 sq km	103.55 sq km	77.34 sq km
Population	23,814	7,738	11,208	22,554
Per Capita Annual Income (USD)	2,081.50	1,883.40	1,924.50	1,797.10
% Remittance Receiving Households	48.6	40.0	48.5	19.4
Life Expectancy (Years)	68.3	71.3	69.3	69.7
Avg. Years of Schooling	3.8	3.1	3.9	5.2

Source: Almanaque Municipal. 2006. San Salvador, El Salvador: Algier's Impresores.

In addition to their location in eastern El Salvador, all four cases share several key criteria, as shown above in Table 2.2. First, all four HTA have hometowns which share high emigration rates. For example, according to their respective municipal governments,

in Intipucá during the 1990s, it is believed that 70-80 percent of the population emigrated and today in Chinameca an estimated one-third of the population resides in the US. Such elevated migration rates, including undocumented migration, make it difficult to accurately calculate population sizes in the four municipalities. Nevertheless, as of 2006, the municipalities of Pasaquina and Chinameca are the most heavily populated at 23,814 and 22,554, respectively. Chapeltique has 11,208 residents, while Intipucá is the least populated with only 7,738 residents (Almanaque Municipal 2006). Despite shared migratory outflows, each municipality has a distinct migration history and pattern. For example, in the municipalities of Chapeltique and Chinameca, high migration rates stemmed primarily as means to flee the violence during the civil war. In contrast, in the municipality of Pasaquina, the exodus of residents was chiefly rooted in the economic crisis, which ensued in the war's aftermath. Moreover, while the civil war accelerated emigration from Intipucá, the municipality already had an established migration tradition dating back to the 1960s. Despite the end of the violence secured by the peace accords in 1992, high rates of out-migration from these four municipalities continue today and are facilitated now by strongly cemented social networks and the search for economic prosperity.

Given such high rates of out-migration, the four HTAs also have municipalities which share high inflows of remittances. The economies in the four hometowns are rural and rely primarily on agricultural production and cattle herding, industries which have suffered dramatically in recent decades. Consequently, remittances have come to supplement household incomes and sustain much of the local economy in the four municipalities. In Pasaquina, for example, 48.6 percent of households receive

remittances, which contribute significantly to the municipality's annual per capita income of \$2,081.50. The municipalities of Intipucá and Chapeltique also share similar economic profiles. They have per capita annual incomes of \$1,883.40 and \$1,924.50, respectively. Moreover, 40 percent of households in Intipucá receive remittances, in comparison to 48.5 percent in Chapeltique (Almanaque Municipal 2006). Chinameca's agricultural economy is slightly more robust than that of the other case studies because it specializes in coffee production, which provides employment opportunities and attracts foreign investments and exports. Chinameca's urban center also enjoys more commercial activity than the other three municipalities. As a result, its economy is less dependent on remittances, as only 19.4 percent of households receive them. However, the municipality's per capita annual income falls to \$1,797.10 in comparison to the other cases, evidence of just how critical remittances have become in El Salvador's rural economies (Almanaque Municipal 2006).

In terms of human development, the four case studies have municipalities, which share similar profiles. According to a 2004 poverty report by El Salvador's Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, the four municipalities rank within 0.60-0.70 on the country's human development index (Almanaque 2006)⁹. Specifically in terms of health care, the vast majority of residents in all four hometowns seek medical care from the municipal *Unidad de Salud*, located in each municipality's urban center¹⁰. Sick residents from the *cantones* and *caseríos* often begin their trek on foot to the *Unidad de Salud*

⁹ The human development index is ranked as follows: Below 0.60 is low; 0.60-0.70 is medium; 0.70-0.80 is medium-high; and above 0.80 is high.

¹⁰ Due to its size, the municipality of Pasaquina has two health clinics, one in the urban center and one in Cantón San Felipe, which is the nearest for residents of Cantón Piedras Blancas.

before sunrise so they can secure their place in the long line before the doors officially open at 7AM. Typically, the *Unidad de Salud*'s one doctor and few nurses are the only licensed medical providers in each municipality. In addition, a handful of *promotores de salud* periodically travel to the *cantones* and *caseríos* to provide basic health services such as children's vaccinations, prenatal check-ups, and basic health education seminars. A few residents with more financial resources, usually supplemented by remittances sent from abroad, are able to visit private doctors in San Miguel, the country's second largest city, which is located about an hour's drive from each of the four municipalities. In short, the four selected municipalities have similar access to and quality of medical care and consequently the life expectancy in each does not vary greatly. For example, in Chinameca the life expectancy is 69.7 years, while residents of Chapeltique live an average of 69.3 years. In Intipucá and Pasaquina, the life expectancy is marginally higher and lower, respectively, at 70.3 years and 68.3 years (Almanaque Municipal 2006). Moreover, in terms of educational achievement, the selected municipalities also share similar profiles. The educational system and curriculum in all four cases is mandated by El Salvador's Ministry of Education. More common than not, the academic curriculum is lax and rural schools suffer from a severe shortage of teachers and dilapidated facilities. There is typically a small primary school located within close walking distance of each *caserío* so children need not walk more than one hour to get to classes. Nevertheless, many children abandon educational pursuits due to work obligations, failed parental support, or lack of financial resources for the purchase of uniforms, books, and supplies. In addition, some students drop out because they view educational achievement as incompatible with their long-term dream to migrate to the US. In fact, in Intipucá,

residents complete only an average of 3.1 years of schooling. Children in Pasaquina and Chapeltique score slightly higher as they achieve 3.8 and 3.9 years of schooling, respectively. In Chinameca, children fair better averaging 5.2 years of schooling (Almanaque Municipal 2006). While primary schools are relatively commonplace throughout the selected municipalities, secondary schools and high schools are scarce, which prohibits the vast majority of children from continuing their studies past the primary level. It is also extremely rare that children be sent to private educational institutions in any of the four cases.

In addition, all four HTAs operate in municipalities which are subject to the same legal and political infrastructure. Each municipality is governed by the *alcaldía* (local state) composed of an *alcalde* (mayor) and his municipal council including a *síndico* (legal representative) and two or more *regidores* (council members). Although the *alcalde* is a publicly elected position, municipal council members are chosen at the sole discretion of the *alcalde* during the campaign season. Prior to election day, candidates for *alcalde* announce who they have selected to serve on their municipal councils and residents vote for the *alcalde* and his council on a single ticket, not unlike the vote for president and vice president in the United States. *Alcaldes* hold office for three years after which they may run for re-election; there is no limitation on the number of terms they may hold. But, the powers of the local government are circumscribed by those of the central government. Moreover, despite their status as elected representatives, municipal officeholders are also limited in certain key areas such as taxation. Although the municipal councils are allowed to suggest local taxes and tax rates, only the National Legislative Assembly has the power to levy taxes. Therefore, all funds utilized by

municipal councils are appropriated and disbursed by the Assembly. The *alcaldía*, however, is responsible for issuing local ordinances and regulations. In addition, among the key duties relegated to the *alcaldía* under El Salvador's municipal code is the holding of *cabildos abiertos* or town meetings at least once every three months. *Cabildos abiertos* give community members an opportunity to meet with local state officials and voice their community's concerns. During *cabildos abiertos*, the *alcaldía* in conjunction with community residents prioritize the municipality's needs and outline the municipal budget. The municipal council is prohibited from acting against the majority opinion expressed at the *cabildos abiertos*. *Cabildos abiertos* are a democratic tradition that date back several decades, but in actuality they are rarely observed by *alcaldías* even though they are required by law. Moreover, the *alcaldía* is responsible for working with local community development associations known as Asociaciones de Desarrollo Comunal or ADESCOs. ADESCOs are formed by community leaders typically at the *caserío* level. Participation in a community's ADESCO is open to all interested residents and leadership positions, such as president, vice president, treasurer, and secretary, are typically achieved through an informal voting process among members. The primary responsibility of the ADESCO is to organize collectively and arrange community meetings at least once a year or as often as necessary in order to discuss local concerns and possible solutions. As independent civic associations, ADESCOs are also responsible for serving as a liaison between the community and the *alcaldía*. The *alcalde* and his municipal council, in turn, are required to meet periodically with representatives of each ADESCO and to consult with them on community concerns, as well as on the appointment of representatives to advisory and other local commissions. In fact, *alcaldías* are also required to grant

personalidad jurídica or legal recognition to ADESCOs, which endow them with legal authority allowing them to work directly with outside agencies and funding sources. However, again in actuality, many *alcaldías* are accused of putting up road blocks preventing ADESCOs from gaining autonomous power, which they perceive as a potential threat to their administrations.

Furthermore, all four case studies share geographic ties. In the US, the four HTAs are based out of the Washington DC metropolitan area, where migrants experience heightened exposure to political environments (Landolt 2008). Early immigration waves from El Salvador into the Washington area began as early as the 1950s and 1960s. However, the mass influx of Salvadoran immigrants arrived in the 1980s as a direct ramification of El Salvador's civil war. Most Salvadoran migrants based in Washington originate from the eastern region of El Salvador, which not coincidentally was the worst ravaged by the civil war. The four HTAs selected as case studies have their hometowns of origin located there. Nevertheless, it is important to note that, in comparison to other municipalities such as Morazán and Chalatenango, none of the four hometowns was a hotbed for political violence or for military or insurgency activism. Upon arrival in Washington, Salvadoran migrants quickly formed dense social and labor networks, which facilitated increased waves of immigration. The granting of temporary protected status by the US government, which is still effective today, also aided Salvadoran migration. Today there are 146,595 Salvadoran immigrants residing in the Washington metropolitan area, excluding the undocumented population. In other words, Salvadoran immigrant constitutes nearly 15 percent of the entire foreign-born population in the area, making them the largest migrant group in the nation's capital. More specifically, Salvadorans

accounted for one of every seven immigrants in the District of Columbia (14.9 percent), one of every 10 in Maryland (10.3 percent), and one of every 12 in Virginia (8.5 percent) (Schifferes 2003; Terrazas 2010). The influence of Salvadorans in the metro area is not only felt in their sheer numbers, but also in their vibrant cultural influence, especially through their business enclaves and ethnic restaurants. Thus, the geographic distribution of the four cases (eastern El Salvador and the Washington DC metro area) is critical because it ensures that all four HTAs share similar contexts of reception in the US and equally troubled histories with their local states and communities in the hometown.

Finally, the four HTAs selected as cases have similar levels of institutional sophistication. All have formed partnerships with the US and Salvadoran governments, US-donor agencies, or other large bureaucracies. In other words, all four selected HTAs possess the know-with-all to establish strong linkages with their local states and communities, as described in Chapter 1. This characteristic is essential because it bars inexperience or lack of organizational capacity from being the explanatory variable accounting for why an HTA is ineffective in forging high degrees of linkages and ultimately deepening democracy.

The four cases were selected based on extensive experience working with Salvadoran HTAs in Washington, as well as through consultation with academics, policy makers, and community organizers who have also worked closely with Salvadoran HTAs and have knowledge of their relationships with their local states and communities. Initially, the case selection process began with a list of all Salvadoran HTAs based out of the Washington metro area. Those which did not fit the basic criteria outlined above were eliminated. Then, in order to narrow the short list, preliminary interviews were conducted

with HTA experts and HTA members in Washington to collect information on the HTAs' relationships with their respective local states and communities. The four HTAs, which best fit the parameters outlined in the typology of trans-local governance, were selected. A strict adherence to the conceptual configurations laid out in the typology might be seen a limitation in the case selection method, as it potentially obscures a grounded theory approach, which allows for more inductive thinking based on empirical findings in the field. However, in this study, the use of such deductive logic reflects a conscious methodological design informed by the literature and applied experience, which serves a valuable and effective tool for exploring embedded theoretical mechanisms.

III. Data Sources & Data Collection

The dissertation's methodological design and data collection scheme were informed by preliminary fieldwork conducted in 2003, which afforded me extensive experience with research methods, practicalities, and expectations within this rural context. This initial fieldwork experience was for an M.Phil. which required an intensive investigation of the municipality of Intipucá. Fieldwork for this doctoral dissertation expands upon this preliminary research to include an additional three municipalities. In particular, doctoral fieldwork was conducted in El Salvador between November 2008—May 2009 and in the Washington D.C. metro area during June—September 2009. Approximately six weeks were spent in each of the four HTA's hometowns.

Archives and semi-structured interviews served as the principal methodological tools in the field and the objective of the data collection phase was to gather empirical evidence concerning each HTA's linkages to its local state and to its community. Upon

arrival at each new research site, municipal and HTA archives were reviewed for the period during which the HTA has been active, which typically spans a total of ten to fifteen years. Hundreds of documents were collected from HTA and local state archives, as well as from schools, health clinics, cultural centers, and other relevant municipal archival sources. In addition to archival records, empirical data was collected from a total of 193 semi-structured interviews. Therefore, approximately 50 interviews were conducted in each of the four municipalities. Three different types of interviewees participated—HTA members, local state officials, and community leaders.

Table 2.3 Interview Details

Municipality	Total Number of Interviewees*	Total Number of Interviews	HTA	Local State	Community Leaders
Pasaquina	68	51	10	4	37
Intipucá	58	48	5	3	40
Chapeltique	71	53	7	4	42
Chinameca	52	41	9	2	30
Total	249	193	31	13	149

- Some interviews were conducted in a group with two or more participants.

For each case study, approximately 10 members of the HTA's executive committee in Washington were interviewed. In addition, the HTA's principal collaborators in the hometown were interviewed in order to obtain a comprehensive view of the HTA's agenda and impact. Furthermore, each municipality's *alcalde* (mayor) was

interviewed, as well as other key informants in the *alcaldía* (local state) such as municipal council members who work directly with HTAs. These five or so interviews shed light on the local state's perspective on its relationship with the HTA and on the municipality's democratic climate. Finally, the third set of interviews was conducted with community leaders. Approximately 35 community leaders were interviewed in each municipality, which includes at least three leaders from each municipal jurisdiction. Community leaders are defined as those actively engaged in the hometown's civic organizations. All *cantones* and *caseríos* have readily identifiable and recognized community leaders, which include primarily members of the ADESCO community councils, local NGOs, educational and health programs, agricultural cooperatives, and community associations in charge of natural resource management like water and mines. Pastors, teachers, health care providers, and successful businesses owners are also typically identified as local leaders in this context. Upon arrival in each municipality, I used archival data and preliminary interviews to compile a list of all civic associations and their members. Interviewees were initially identified from that preliminary research and later using snowball sampling techniques. Moreover, pooling interviewees from all jurisdictions of the municipality was essential in order to obtain a representative sample of the community. In order to understand the HTA's broad impact, it was especially important to talk to community leaders who live outside the urban center because they are usually poorer, more marginalized, and least likely to benefit from the HTA's projects or even local state support.¹¹

¹¹ The exception here is the case of Comité Pro-Mejoramiento Cantón Piedras Blancas, which works exclusively within the *cantón* of Piedras Blancas. Therefore, community leaders from Pasaquina's other *cantones* were not interviewed unless they were relevant to the work of the HTA.

In sum, archives are concerned with capturing those aspects of the HTA's relationships which can be enumerated. They relay the concrete actions and collaborations assumed by the HTA. Interviews, on the other hand, complement the archival data by conveying those aspects of the HTA's relationships which cannot be counted and data which cannot be recorded, such as the perceptions of participants. In other words, interviews are concerned with contextualizing the HTAs' relationships with the local state and community and understanding the processes by which these relationships unfold. Interviews answer the why's in the HTA's story, uncovering why the HTA's relationships are as they are, as interviewees will have the opportunity to elaborate upon the numbers found through archival research.

IV. Variable Operationalization

Operationalizing Linkage: Projects and Social Ties

Using evidence from archives and semi-structured interviews, the linkage variable introduced in Chapter 1 is operationalized through two components: (i) projects and (ii) social ties. Projects, the first component, are critical reflections of the linkage variable because they represent the tangible outcomes of the HTA's relationships to the local state and community. In other words, projects measure the physical manifestation of the HTA's presence in the hometown and what concrete contributions it has made. HTAs which have executed a large number of significant projects are considered to have a higher degree of linkage than those with only a few smaller projects. In other words, an HTA's degree of linkage is measured in part through the number of projects it has contributed towards its hometown. The number of projects to which an HTA is able to

contribute is not necessarily restricted by the HTA's financial resources. This is because HTAs often collaborate with government agencies and external donors, especially on large-scale infrastructural or educational initiatives which cost millions of dollars and far exceed any HTA's budget. Thus regardless of its budget, if an HTA acts alone and does not form linkages, this severely impacts the number of projects which it is able to contribute to the hometown. Therefore, the number of projects to which an HTA is able to contribute is always a reflection of its ability to form strong linkages.

HTA and local state archives contain key documents, which provide important information about the HTA's projects. For example, project reports detail the types and locations of the projects which the HTA has chosen to implement. Budget reports illuminate the HTA's fundraising capacity, how much money it has contributed to public works, and whether the HTA allots resources for project maintenance. Project maintenance is typically neglected and consequently many HTA projects can easily fall into disrepair without partnerships with the local state or community groups which can provide long-term financial backing. Archives also house project schedules which uncover the year each project was implemented, the number of projects initiated versus the number of projects completed, and whether projects were executed in a timely manner. Other archival documents include budget reports, list of collaborators, and meeting agendas and rosters (See Table 2.4 below for a detailed listing of all archival data employed).

Data concerning each HTA's projects are also collected through semi-structured interviews with HTA members, local state officials, and community leaders. Interviews are essential to amplify the archival data. For example, HTA meeting agendas might

reveal that projects are identified and selected during open town meetings, but interviews with community members reveal if residents feel their input is genuinely valued by the HTA or if there is an elite group of power-holders manipulating decision-making processes. Also, while reports found in the archives reveal projects' intended beneficiaries, interviews flesh out which the HTA's projects actually serve and if all community residents are allowed equal access to those public works. Interviews might also reveal types of resources the HTA receives that are not captured through financial records (i.e. labor, equipment, and technical and moral support). Moreover, interviews shed light on the quality of HTA's projects, whether projects are used as intended and whether they have fallen into disrepair.

In addition to projects, the linkage variable is also operationalized through social ties. While projects reveal the *outcomes* of the HTA's relationships with its local state and community, social ties are a critical dimension of the linkage variable because they reveal the *processes* by which these relationships unfold. In other words, an examination of the social ties that the HTA cultivates with its local state and community captures how an HTA's relations came to be as they are. Data on social ties are also collected from archives and semi-structured interviews. An HTA's social ties are measured through partnerships and collaborations with the local state and the community. An HTA which displays both breadth and diversity of collaborators is considered to possess a high degree of linkage and therefore better able to facilitate democratic deepening. Archival documents are important for collecting data on social ties because they uncover the number of times the HTA has acted on its own and the number of times it has collaborated with the local state and community. Archival data also inform about the

formality of the HTA's ties. For example, meeting rosters of HTA fundraisers or events signify social ties with those who collaborate informally, while official project reports indicate those with whom the HTA has formed formal partnerships. Moreover, interviews illuminate the types of ties that the HTA has forged with its local state and community. For example, some partnerships might be bound by purely professional ties between the HTA leader and the *alcalde*, while others might be greatly facilitated because the HTA leader and *alcalde* are old friends or even relatives. Interviews also reveal the quality of the tie and context in which the HTA's social ties are situated. For example, while HTA archives might document numerous collaborators, interviews expand upon the archival data revealing whether those ties are profound or superficial and whether there is a strong or weak degree of trust between the actors. Interviews are also critical for understanding why the HTA's social ties are cooperative or strained, as they reveal if there is a history of hostility between HTA members, municipal authorities, and community leaders due to differences in political ideology, personal rivalry, childhood animosity, etc. Finally, interviews uncover how the HTA negotiates its social ties and relationships with its local state and community.

As elaborated above, the content of the empirical data found in archives and interviews reflects the HTA's projects and social ties. The two tables below (Table 2.4 and Table 2.5) organize these data according to their sources. In sum, archives reveal the following information:

Table 2.4 Archival Data

Types of Documents	Basic Project Information	Partnerships	Types of Resources	Types of Activities & Gatherings
Project reports	# of projects initiated vs. # of projects completed	# of different collaborators (individuals, organizations, etc.)	Financial support	Identification of needs
Budgets	Project cost		Technical support	Project selection
Project schedules	Types of project	# of partnership formed with each collaborator	Moral support	Fundraising
List of collaborators	Intended project beneficiaries	Formal partnerships vs. informal partnerships	Labor and equipment	Project implementation
Meeting rosters and agendas	Project maintenance and quality			Project maintenance

From semi-structured interviews, the following types of data are gathered:

Table 2.5 Interview Data

Types of Interviewees	Type of Tie	Nature of Tie	Processes by which Relationships Unfold
TA: (i) HTA members in the US (ii) HTA members in the hometown	Professional Kinship Friendship	What is the history or context behind the relationships? Is there a strong or weak degree of trust between actors?	How are the relationships negotiated between the three actors? How does the HTA resolve conflicts with the local state and community?
Local State: (i) <i>Alcaldes</i> (mayors) (ii) Municipal administrators (iii) Municipal council members	Membership	Are relationships strained or cooperative between the actors?	How are projects identified and selected? What is the HTA's decision-making process?
Community: (i) ADESCO community council members (ii) Community groups/NGOs (iii) Other local leaders (priests, teachers, health care providers, etc.)		How connected do the actors feel to each other?	Do local state/community actors feel they can freely participate in the HTA's activities? Do local state/community actors feel that their input is valued by the HTA? Whose interests are being served by the HTA?

Operationalizing Democratic Deepening

As shown in Table 2.6 below, democratic deepening (the dependent variable) is conceptualized through the four theoretical indicators introduced in the literature review in Chapter 1: (i) robust civil society, (ii) the active practice of politics, (iii) increased social accountability, and (iv) reduced inequality and social exclusion. Data on these indicators were gathered from municipal archives and interviews for the years between 2004-2009, the five years prior to the fieldwork investigation. These empirical data are used to paint a portrait of each municipality's democratic climate between the years of 2004-2009, which serves as an important foundation upon which subsequent analyses are based. The data illuminate the various democratic elements brewing in each municipality in the five years leading up to the country's mayoral and presidential elections in 2009.

Table 2.6 Operationalizing Democratic Deepening

Robust Civil Society	Active Practice of Politics	Increased Social Accountability	Reduced Inequality& Social Exclusion
(i) Increase in # of civic associations	(i) Increase in civic meetings and public attendance	(i) Increase in public works and programs	(i) Economic indicators (i.e. per capita income and unemployment rates)
(ii) The quality of civic engagement, as revealed through interviews	(ii) Creation of new public spaces	(ii) How often the <i>alcalde</i> holds <i>cabildos abiertos</i> and other civic gatherings	(ii) Social development indicators (i.e. rates of literacy and childhood vaccinations)
(iii) Changes in civic life as revealed through interviews	(iii) Changes in political participation as revealed through interviews	(iii) The <i>alcaldía's</i> accessibility and citizens' access to public information and records	(iii) Distribution of municipal projects and services
		(iv) Process by which citizens levy complaints against the local state	(iv) Interviewee impressions
		(v) The presence of clientelistic ties	
		(vi) Interviewee impressions	

The first indicator of democracy, the robustness of civil society, is operationalized through civic associations. Municipal records reveal the number of registered civic associations (i.e. ADESCOs, water committees, and women's groups) and whether there has been an increase or decrease between 2004-2009. Interviewee impressions also shed light on changes in civic life between 2004-2009. For example, interviews reveal whether existing civic associations are simply nominal or actually active. The presence of a significant number of engaged civic associations throughout the municipality is one indication of a deep democracy.

Second, democratic deepening is conceptualized through the active practice of politics. The practice of politics is operationalized through civic gatherings such as ADESCO meetings and community lectures which educate residents about water

conservation or in which residents mobilize to protest infringements upon their property rights. The practice of politics is measured through increases or decreases in these types of gatherings and the number of residents who attend. In addition, the practice of politics is operationalized through the number of public spaces in the hometown (i.e. town hall, *casa de la cultura*, parks), which are important for deepening democracy because they provide fora bringing residents in the community together who otherwise would not congregate. Archives in the *alcaldía* reveal if there has been an increase in the number of public spaces constructed in each municipality between 2004-2009. This indicator is also assessed from a qualitative perspective through interviewee impressions. For example, interviewees are asked to assess changes in the type and frequency of collective action over the past five years and whether public spaces are in fact used for civic purposes or are simply places where drunks meet at night. Thus, rises in civic participation and increases in the civic use of public spaces signify another indicator deep democracy.

Third, democratic deepening is conceptualized through increased social accountability. In other words, a local state which displays high levels of transparency and accountability to its constituents is considered to be an indicator of a deep democracy. Social accountability is operationalized in part through the *alcaldía*'s public works and programs. Municipal records document the number and type of projects executed by each *alcaldía* between 2004-2009. This third indicator of democratic deepening is also operationalized through the process and frequency by which the *alcaldía* engages its constituents. For example, municipal records show whether and how often the *alcalde* holds *cabildos abiertos*, informal meetings, or other occasions in which he deliberates public issues with local residents. In addition, municipal budgets and

audits, which reveal whether the local state correctly appropriates and manages funds, are another effective measure of the state's transparency and accountability towards its citizens. Archival data are complemented by interviews, which inquire about the process by which citizens can levy complaints against the local state, the presence of clientelistic ties, and whether the *alcaldía* has addressed the community's needs. Moreover, interviews shed light on the *alcaldía*'s accessibility and its willingness to engage constituents and work with community organizations. For example, residents in each municipality are asked the following questions¹²: Are your needs better met by the local state now than five years ago? Do you feel that if the government is not doing what you want you have a way to challenge it? Do you feel you have access to the *alcaldía*? How does the *alcalde* work with the ADESCO and other organizations in your community? If you wanted to see the municipal budget or other records, would be able to?

Finally, reduced inequality and social exclusion is the fourth indicator of democratic deepening. Municipal records, government census, World Bank reports, studies from the United Nations Development Program, and other surveys will be used to measure changes in inequality and social exclusion through economic indicators such as such as remittance inflows, per capita income and unemployment rates, as well as through social development indicators including childhood vaccinations, primary school completion, and adult literacy rates. In addition, municipal records may reveal inequality and social exclusion by showing the distribution of public works and services among all jurisdictions in the municipality. It is important to note that in the context of this study,

¹² Appendix IV contains a complete list of all interviewee questionnaires including HTAs, local state officials, and community leaders.

family remittances play an important role in structuring and defining inequality and social exclusion within in the municipality, drawing a marked divide between those who receive family remittances and those who do not. Furthermore, interviews are also critical here in order to gather impressions about how levels of inequality and social exclusion have fluctuated in the municipality between 2004-2009.

V. Data Analysis

The data analysis phase of the methodology has two primary objectives: (i) to discover if HTAs positively affect democratic quality and (ii) to reveal the conditions and relationships cultivated by HTAs which allow them to do so effectively or ineffectively. To analyze the data qualitatively, worksheets are created which clearly outline the variables and their indicators specified above. The first worksheet organizes and aggregates the empirical data on each HTA's projects and social ties in order to determine whether they have high or low degrees of linkage. In aggregating the data, as stated previously, an HTA which executes a large number of significant projects and displays both breadth and diversity of social ties is considered to possess a high degree of linkage. Cases were systematically selected so that the four HTAs share comparable characteristics and are all equally capable of forming robust linkages with their local states and hometown communities.

The next phase of data analysis establishes the democratic climate in each municipality between 2004-2009, which serves as an important foundation for subsequent analyses. While each of the four respective municipalities has its unique story, they all share key characteristics and present similar democratic playing fields for

the HTA's intervention. Again, a worksheet is developed for each municipality in order to clearly lay out the data collected on the four indicators of democratic deepening: (i) robust civil society, (ii) the practice of politics, (iii) social accountability, and (iv) inequality and social exclusion. Data on the four indicators are aggregated in order to paint a portrait of each municipality's democratic climate between 2004-2009.

Understanding each municipality's democratic climate provides an essential base in order to know the conditions under which the HTA intervened and ultimately what, if anything, changed in the democratic landscape because of the HTA.

In addition, a third worksheet is created for the next phase of the data analysis to determine how each HTA affects the four democratic indicators in its respective hometown. Data are evaluated to answer the following questions: Did the HTA enable civil society to flourish? Did the HTA nurture the active practice of politics? Did it help make the local state more socially accountable? And, did the HTA reduce inequality and social exclusion? The evidence is aggregated to establish whether, given the state of democracy in the hometown between 2004-2009, the HTA positively or negatively affected democratic quality in the hometown. This phase of the data analysis is crucial in order to paint a before-and-after picture of the democratic landscape in each municipality. Here, data from semi-structured interviews are particularly important to establish causation and to control for other potential factors and alternative hypotheses. Interviewees are best able to isolate the effects of the HTA, as they can effectively tease out what aspects of the municipality's democratic climate are independent of the HTA and which are the direct result of the HTA's intervention. For example, in some cases, interviews reveal that the ADESCO in a given community was defunct until the HTA

empowered leaders to mobilize collectively. Interviews also reveal whether the HTA, the *alcaldía*, or some other actor is the driving force behind an increase in the number of open town meetings. Or interviews can reveal that the HTA has exacerbated levels of inequality and social exclusion by implementing projects, which are accessible only to an elite group. As explained in Chapter 1, conducting the field investigation during the height of the 2009 election period created a vivid and intense backdrop against which to examine the role of HTAs in the process of democratic deepening. It allows for an intensified analysis of each municipality's democratic climate. It also provides an ideal setting in which to analyze how HTAs engage local politics and negotiate their role in the municipality's competing power dynamics. The year 2009, however, does not necessarily signify a turning point for the HTA's relations in the hometown. All four HTAs selected as case studies were equally active in their hometowns during this five-year span. In sum, the research design takes as its starting point the local democratic climate in each municipality and then assesses how each HTA intervenes within this context and to what end.

The fourth step in the data analysis phase asks why each HTA has had its unique impact on its hometown's democratic landscape. This step seeks out patterns between the democratic indicators and the linkages which each HTA cultivates with its local state and community. For each case, the worksheets are used to map changes and to track points of intersection between the democratic indicators and the evolution of the HTA's linkages with the local state and community. Simply put, this phase examines the type and nature of the HTA's linkages in those situations in which democratic quality is positively impacted and how they vary from the linkages in those situations in which democratic

quality is negatively impacted. By examining how the variables interplay, this process tracing technique identifies patterns to establish a correlation between democratic quality and the linkages which the HTA is able to cultivate with its local state and hometown community. As shall be explored in the detailed case studies, evidence reveals that the patterns mirror the variations put forth in the hypothesis and informed by the theory. Again in this phase, interview data are critical because they uncover the mechanisms by which each HTA is able to garner, mobilize, and sustain civic participation in order to deepen or hinder local democracy. Interviews also illuminate the process by which migrants, through participation in HTAs, negotiate their role in local politics.

Finally, the last phase of the data analysis uses the typology of trans-local governance presented in Chapter 1 as a conceptual guide in order to locate each HTA within its corresponding quadrant. This allows for a robust comparison of the four cases and develops a comprehensive relational theory of democratic deepening.

VI. Conclusion

Chapter 2 presents a methodological blueprint needed in order to execute the conceptual and theoretical research design for this dissertation. The use of four HTAs as case studies allows for a dynamic and complex examination of the process of democratic deepening. Archives and semi-structured interviews provide insight not only into each HTA's tangible projects and social ties in the hometown, but also into those aspects of the HTA's intervention that cannot be recorded such as hometown residents' perceptions. In addition, empirical data are gathered on four indicators of democracy in order to measure the quality of democracy in each of the four municipalities before and after the

HTA's intervention. In the data analysis phase of the methodology, data are analyzed to determine what, if anything changed in each municipality's democratic landscape because of the HTA's intervention. Points of intersection are mapped between the democratic indicators and the evolution of the HTA's linkages with the local state and community. Next, patterns are identified which reveal the nuanced conditions and relationships cultivated by each HTA, which allows it to effectively or ineffectively deepen democracy. In sum, the methodology presented in this chapter offers a solid foundation for making comparison across cases and ultimately for drawing valid and robust conclusions about the process of democratic deepening.

CHAPTER 3

The Case of Comité Pro-Mejoramiento Cantón Piedras Blancas: Juntos Hacemos la Diferencia

I. Introduction

This first case study presents an in-depth examination of the HTA, Comité Pro-Mejoramiento Cantón Piedras Blancas (Comité Piedras Blancas) in the municipality of Pasaquina. This case study elaborates the original hypothesis introduced in Chapter 2 and illustrates how an HTA successfully deepens democracy by forging linkages with both its local state and hometown community. By disguising its intervention as apolitical, Comité Piedras Blancas craftily negotiates competing power dynamics in the hometown in order to unite the community under a common agenda, while also re-engaging the local state. As a result, as outlined in the typology, Comité Piedras Blancas assumes the role of equal partner when engaging as a trans-local governance actor, embodying their slogan “juntos hacemos la diferencia”¹³. Thus, as an equal partner, the HTA is able to successfully transform the way in which governance is understood and practiced in the hometown, thereby creating the ideal conditions under which to deepen democracy.

¹³ Together we make the difference.

II. The Municipality: Time of the Cowboys

The municipality of Pasaquina is situated in El Salvador's eastern-most corner bordering the country of Honduras and it is one of eighteen municipalities located in the department of La Unión (See APPENDIX III.2). Pasaquina is one of El Salvador's largest municipalities covering 295.28 square kilometers and containing nine *cantones* and eighty-two *caseríos* (See APPENDIX III.4) (Almanaque Municipal 2006; Monografía del Departamento y Municipios de La Unión 1999). Despite the municipality's expansive size, Pasaquina feels desolate. Pasaquina's urban center is small and empty (See APPENDIX III.8). There are only a handful of stores and even though the *alcaldía* recently constructed a new indoor market, the venue is quiet and there are few vendors and even fewer costumers. The urban center is relatively clean and the central park is well-maintained, but it also appears to be largely unused. In front of the park sits the municipality's newly refurbished *alcaldía*. Throughout the day, people trickle in and out of the *alcaldía*, stopping briefly to greet each other. But in general the streets of Pasaquina's urban center are calm. In fact, of Pasaquina's 23,814 residents, only a small percentage resides within the urban center (Almanaque Municipal 2006). The vast majority of the population lives in the rural *cantones* and *caseríos* and travel to the urban center by bus as a day excursion only when necessary. A single unpaved road, sixteen kilometers long, connects the urban center to the majority of the municipality's isolated *cantones* and *caseríos*. The hot sun beats down on the dry dirt road and each passing pick-up kicks up a cloud of thick dust causing the occasional passerby to shield his face. The road is more heavily populated by cattle than people prompting José Navarro, a returned migrant now living permanently in Pasaquina, to aptly describe the

municipality as a place harking back to the time of the cowboys in the US. Horses replace cars, dust balls roll through the fields, and men don cowboy hats and machetes to brace the open range while women primarily tend to the home. Some roads are so poorly maintained that they are only passable on foot. In addition to the deteriorating roadways, there is a severe shortage of public services and resources in Pasaquina's *cantones* and *caserios*. There is dilapidated public infrastructure if any at all, no potable water system, no public lighting, in some communities there is no electricity.

Each *caserío* constitutes a sleepy community where neighbors know each other's names and personal business. Every afternoon the men in each community sit around makeshift tables at the local general store to play cards, while women make *pupusas* on their front porches or walk around town selling *tamales*, three for a dollar. Employment opportunities in Pasaquina remain scarce. Residents of the municipality are primarily employed in informal agricultural work, which produces enough merely for subsistence. Consequently, many men and women have migrated to the US and remittances are received by 48.6 percent of Pasaquina's households (Almanaque Municipal 2006). In general, Pasaquina is characterized by low levels of socio-economic inequality and remittances do not aggravate the situation. Residents respect the efforts and struggles of their migrants and do not look negatively upon those families who do not enjoy the benefits of remittances. Migrants too are conscious of not flaunting their wealth through the construction of ostentatiously homes or conspicuous purchases. Remittances are vital for supplementing household incomes in Pasaquina and consequently the annual per capita income in the municipality is \$2,081.50 (Almanaque Municipal 2006). Yet, despite low levels of inequality, the poverty levels are overwhelming and stifling throughout the

municipality, especially when measured in terms of human development. For example, according to municipal health records provided by the Unidad de Salud, the primary causes of death for children under five years of age are respiratory infections due to the dust storms and diarrhea. In fact, life expectancy in Pasaquina is 68.3 years of age (Almanaque Municipal 2006). There are only two public health clinics in the municipality. One is located in the urban center and it is not accessible to residents in the *cantones* and *caseríos*. The second is located in Cantón San Felipe, but it operates with minimal resources and staff. Often people are turned away because the line is simply too long and those who are fortunate enough to be seen by a doctor complain that they are not given adequate treatment. Very few *caseríos* like Barrancones benefit from a mobile clinic. But, Alfredo Rivas, the former president of the *caserío*'s water committee, explains that situation is still desperate, "We have a big problem with the Unidad de Salud. The doctor comes to Barrancones once a week and the nurse is here only three days a week. In San Felipe the doctor is there everyday, but they only give you a little ointment or a little pill. They don't have anything stronger. In the Unidad de Salud there are no medicines." The municipality also counts with several *promotores de salud* who visit the *cantones* and *caseríos* to perform basic health services, such as health education lectures, prenatal check-ups and vaccination programs. However, given the municipality's sheer size and its bad road conditions, their visits in each community are also irregular and infrequent. Moreover, private health care options or emergency services are not available in Pasaquina.

In terms of educational development, Pasaquina also ranks poorly. Each *centro cantonal* has a primary and a secondary school. However, many *caseríos* are spread so

far apart that it is impractical for many children to walk to the school. In addition, although education is free, associated costs such as uniforms and school supplies are prohibitive for many families. It is also not uncommon for parents to withdraw their children from school in order to contribute to household chores and labor. Even if a child were to complete secondary education, the municipality's only high school located in the urban center which is too far from the more populous *cantones* and *caseríos* for students to travel daily. Consequently, many young residents of Pasaquina do not pursue a high school education and on average achieve an average of 3.8 years of schooling (Almanaque Municipal 2006). Mariana Cruz, a resident of Cantón Piedras Blancas, explains, "There are cases when the parents see that the child is not interested in school so they keep the child at home because they feel they are spending money for nothing, that they are wasting money. Sometimes parents do not send the children to school because they cannot afford it. Given this current economic situation, this year there was a family that could not afford to send their oldest daughter to school because they did not have the money to purchase notebooks. I felt sorry for her when she told me, 'I don't have money to buy the notebooks. My father said he cannot send me to school because we don't have the money for my notebooks and he is going to send only my three younger siblings.' I asked her 'how many notebooks do you need'? 'Six', she said. I spoke to someone who could purchase the notebooks for her and she was so happy. The next day she went to school and she was already on the 9th grade."

III. The Democratic Climate (2004-2009): Abandoned and Disenfranchised

Due to its remote location, Pasaquina was sheltered from much of the aggression caused by El Salvador's civil war. The municipality witnessed only isolated incidents of violence. Moreover, Pasaquina remained relatively unexposed to the bitter ideological rift between right-wing and left-wing factions of society. Marta Ruiz, a school principal in Caserío Candelaria recalls, "We did not live the war here. I have even talked to people here about it and they say 'maybe the soldiers and the *guerrilleros* went by, but we never saw anything.' Of course, we were surprised because we heard news, saw the television, and heard stories. People were surprised and bothered by the stories of the war." Today, the municipality of Pasaquina still seems largely removed from El Salvador's political happenings at the national level and political ideology does not divide the community, nor does it bring people together. In addition, even local party politics rarely reach the *cantones* and *caseríos*, which are tucked away in fields of parched unharvested land. Pasaquina's democratic climate can best be described as abandoned and disenfranchised. The 2009 mayoral and presidential races highlight just how removed the municipality is. For example, party flags which were ubiquitous throughout the country were absent in Pasaquina. Campaign propaganda did not litter the town square and campaign slogans were not shouted in the streets. Residents of Pasaquina were not seen wearing their various parties' red, blue, or green T-shirts, which constituted a uniform for so many in other parts of the country during the elections. In addition, mayoral candidates in Pasaquina were only able to make a couple of appearances in each community, at most, because there is too much physical ground for them to cover. Roads to some *caseríos* are so bad that they diverted their campaigns, gambling that voters there won't make the

effort to find a way to the urban center on election day. Not surprisingly, Pasaquina has low voter turn-out for both local and national elections. Esperanza Méndez, a school principal from Caserío El Mango, explains, "They say that it is not worth it to go out and vote, to give them the vote because they don't help us...People say 'What is the use of going? What is the use of asking for something if they never give us anything?'" Roberto Pérez, another community leader from Caserío El Mango, concurs, "I like to talk to people to see how they feel and they say they do not feel like going to vote because regardless of the winner it is the same for us. Politicians say they will do something and they never do. They just say things to keep their positions. But we also know that the central government does not look out for the needs of the *caseríos*. The one who has to look after the needs of the communities is the *alcalde*. That is why they put them there. But, he doesn't do anything for us."

During non-election years, Pasaquina is equally politically isolated. The *alcaldía* has alternated between ARENA and PDC, right and center-right parties respectively. Although *alcaldes* of various parties have come and gone, little has changed in the municipality's many forgotten *cantones* and *caseríos* and, according to Ricardo Cortes of Caserío Candelaria, "...this place has been punished not only by one *alcalde*, by all of them." Abandonment has become the political norm. Due to the municipality's expansive territory, residents report expecting little from the *alcaldía* and consider it a great success if an *alcalde* implements only one or two projects in their community during his three years in office. Residents rarely interact with the local state and in order to do so they must proactively seek out the *alcalde* or a representative from his *consejo municipal*. In general, the local state in Pasaquina is removed from and unaccountable to

its constituency. By law, *alcaldes* are required to hold annual *cabildos abiertos* in which all residents of the municipality are invited to voice their concerns and prioritize their community's development agenda for the upcoming fiscal year. However, in actuality, they do not. Jesús Castro from Caserío Los Carpúles says, "No, the *alcalde* has never held a *cabildo abierto*. Has come here to hold a meeting or infuse enthusiasm into the community? No, he has never done that." Consequently, local residents have very few practical means by which to keep the local state accountable. To make matters worse, although party politics and ideological debates are removed from the *cantones* and *caseríos*, politics infiltrates the communities in the form of local power struggles. Residents scramble to form clientelistic ties to the local state in order to secure privileges and favors for their families and friends. One such power struggle within the ADESCO in Cantón Piedras Blancas will be examined in detail below.

The lack of local state accountability and transparency has given residents little incentive to organize collectively. As a result, Pasaquina's civil society lays dormant. In the municipality, there are only a handful of civic associations and they are not particularly active. Residents have no medium through which effectively voice concern and pursue action. Fernando Jiménez, a resident from Cantón Piedras Blancas, says, "As an individual I cannot go to the *alcalde* because I am a nobody. I do not represent a committee or anything. I cannot go to the *alcalde* and ask him for a project for my *caserío*. I do not have a voice. In the *alcaldía* I do not have any voice." In part, community organization and civic engagement are inhibited by extreme poverty, especially in the *cantones* and *caseríos*. For example, residents in the *caserío* of El Mango dedicate two hours of their day, once in the morning and once in the afternoon,

just to fetch water from the river for drinking, cooking, and cleaning. In addition, geography hinders community organization as most of the *caseríos* are very isolated and in some cases, such as in Caserío La Costa, it is even difficult to classify them as communities because houses are too dispersed.

IV. Comité Pro-Mejoramiento Cantón Piedras Blancas: Coming Together as One

Comité Pro-Mejoramiento Cantón Piedras Blancas (Comité Piedras Blancas) is one of three HTAs in the municipality of Pasaquina.¹⁴ However, due to the large size of the municipality, it is not feasible for an HTA to service all sectors. Thus, HTAs in Pasaquina benefit primarily their particular *cantón* or *caserío*. Therefore, Comité Piedras Blancas address only the needs of Cantón of Piedras Blancas and its *caseríos*. Of Pasaquina's nine *cantones*, Piedras Blancas is the farthest removed from the urban center, as it is located at the very end of the municipality's main road. Nevertheless, it is also the largest with a population of approximately 4,500 as of 2008 (Alcaldía Municipal de Pasaquina). Comité Piedras Blancas formed in 1996 and it is the oldest and largest HTA in Pasaquina. It was originally founded by José Santos Rivas who was moved to give back to his hometown of origin. In particular, Rivas set his sights on repairing the roadways, which were impassably rocky unless traveling on foot. In fact, at the time, not one of the roads inside Piedras Blancas' *centro cantonal* was paved. Rivas called together Piedras Blancas' tightly-knit migrant community in the Washington DC metro area and relayed his idea. Rivas recalls, "We did the first activity and I even put some money from my pocket for

¹⁴ Due to Comité Piedras Blancas' success, migrants from other parts of the municipality have used it as a model for how to organize collectively and how to intervene in their communities of origin. Today, Pasaquina has two other HTAs in the communities of Agua Agria and El Polvo, which have become successful and positive contributors in their communities. This is one important testament to the Comité Piedras Blancas' wide-reaching implications.

that party. I had some money saved and put it towards that event. But I also got some collaborators; we were about seven. The first activity was a success so we started knocking on doors asking all those from Piedras Blancas for a contribution.”

Rivas initially raised \$5,000 and personally traveled to Cantón Piedras Blancas to purchase the material and contract workers. Upon returning to Washington, Rivas and the key collaborators continued to informally organize parties and other fundraising events to finance the remainder of the project. The HTA initially formed with only this project in mind, but subsequent projects quickly followed given the success of the first. As word of the HTA’s efforts spread, it was met with great enthusiasm among migrants who eagerly volunteered long hours. For example, HTA member, Agustín Martínez, explains his decision to be part of the HTA, “I will talk to you honestly. I lived that life. Did you notice the poverty in that place? If the HTA tells me ‘Agustín, let’s go work to help those people’, I do it with pleasure because I lived that life. When there is work to be done for the HTA, I even postpone the personal things I have to do with my children. When I have to work for the HTA, I tell my children ‘Children, I need this time. Right now I cannot be with you because I am going to dedicate my time to the HTA. There will be time for you later’.” HTA co-president Denys Reyes is motivated by his desire to ameliorate the poverty afflicting his hometown, “Of course, the focus of the HTA is to somehow improve the quality of life in the municipality. So, we are always thinking how we can break that cycle of poverty. For sure, what we would like to do is to somehow improve the standing of living in Piedras Blancas and most importantly break that cycle. Poverty is what our children know best. Sometimes, how can I explain? It is not nice to say, but it is sad to see our children, even when they come to the *casa communal* to use

the computers. It is as if we are telling them ‘you are going to prepare yourself but regardless there is no place for you to work’.” Despite their genuine intentions, HTA members confess that they sometimes face criticisms from those who insist their participation reaps personal benefits. But, one member, Seferino Gutierrez, insists, "We are not people who need Piedras Blancas to be all right because we are already over there [US]. But, we are people of our word and we are committed. We only ask that people [Piedras Blancas] respect the effort we make.”

Under Rivas’ informal leadership, Comité Piedras Blancas continued to grow and incorporated migrants living in the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia. However, in 1999 Rivas relocated to Houston, Texas for personal reasons and the HTA was left under the leadership of William Gutierrez and Denys Reyes. While in Houston, Rivas organized a new chapter of Comité Piedras Blancas. Additional branches also sprung up in Los Angeles and New York. For several years, these various *comités* worked independently to service Cantón Piedras Blancas. However, in September 2002, they decided to organize formally and converge their efforts towards a united agenda. They held a national meeting to develop a common mission statement, to restructure under one umbrella, and to coordinate fundraising activities and objectives. Unfortunately, this new organizational structure soon encountered trouble, as it proved to be too complex and its members lacked adequate experience. Miscommunication and mismanagement led to internal disputes. Consequently, the Los Angeles and New York branches eventually disintegrated and the Washington area *comité* divided into separate Maryland and Virginia chapters. A competitive dynamic eventually came between the Maryland and Virginia chapters as they clashed over which projects to prioritize. In

particular, the Virginia branch did not want to contribute its \$10,000 towards the reconstruction of the park in the *centro cantonal*, while the Maryland *comité* maintains that the project was urgent. The park still remains rundown and it is unknown what became of the \$10,000 raised by the members in Virginia. In 2005, after the rift, the Virginia *comité* dissolved. However, the Maryland branch remains very active and continues to welcome the collaboration of the migrants in Virginia, as well as migrants in other parts of the US. Co-president, Denys Reyes, says, “Virginia made its decision to separate and that is their right. But, I know that tomorrow they will come back because that seed has been planted. They are honest, serious people. Comité Piedras Blancas has its doors open 24/7. In the end, we all eat from the same plate.”

Today the Maryland and Houston chapters are the only remaining branches. The Houston *comité* hosts two events per month. The Maryland *comité* typically organizes one event a month, but it is larger and raises more funds. Nevertheless, learning from previous management errors, the two branches have developed a highly successful cooperative relationship. Between the Maryland and Houston branches, Comité Piedras Blancas currently counts with approximately thirty members who collaborate directly in the *directivas*, as well as countless informal supporters. The Maryland branch continues to operate under the leadership of Gutierrez and Reyes, while Rivas still serves as president of the Houston chapter. The two branches have developed a sophisticated division of roles and responsibilities. For example, one member from each branch is assigned as the *enlace* in order to facilitate communication between the two *comités* and to prevent misunderstanding, hear-say, and rumors. Only the two assigned representatives may communicate with each other about the HTA’s official business and only they can

disseminate information to other members. Members are also elected to serve as *enlaces* to the *alcaldía* and the hometown community. These representatives are the only two HTA members authorized to communicate with the *alcaldía* or hometown community regarding the HTA's official business. For example, although Gutierrez is the HTA's co-president, he is never permitted to speak with the *alcalde* about official HTA business, as this is the responsibility of the elected *enlace*. Other members are assigned additional roles such as treasurer and event coordinator. The HTA's success, in part, results because duties are clearly delineated and each member's specific role is integral to the operation and functioning of the whole. Thus, members display utmost commitment and professionalism because they know exactly what is expected of them and they cannot simply shrug off their responsibilities or assume that another will pick up the slack.

The *comités* in Maryland and Houston come together in May of each year to hold an annual meeting, alternating between the two locations. During the annual meeting, the HTA's progress is assessed, problems and concerns are addressed, and the year's upcoming projects are identified and prioritized. In addition, during the annual meeting, members vote to elect new representatives within the HTA. All decisions are reached through deliberation and anonymous votes. Although Rivas, Gutierrez, and Reyes have always held leadership positions in the *directiva*, but they encourage new members to assume greater responsibilities in order to breathe renovation into Comité Piedras Blancas. In addition to the HTA's internal meetings, the Maryland and Houston chapters travel to Cantón Piedras Blancas to host an annual *cabildo abierto* during which they solicit project suggestions and hear the community's concerns about the projects in place and the HTA's operations. These HTA-sponsored *cabildos abiertos* take place every

February and deliberately coincide with the *fiestas patronales* to ensure high attendance from both hometown residents and migrants who return for the celebrations. Reyes explains, "In the beginning we started with projects that we thought were a priority. Since about two years ago, the focus has been to listen to the community and to support those projects the community requests...[The February meetings] are the time for us to listen to the community. We take note and make decisions based on their suggestions. Their suggestions are the basis on which we coordinate and determine on what projects we will be working on the remaining of the year." The HTA also holds additional meetings if an urgent need or emergency arises. For example, in November 2008, migrants held an urgent meeting with the community to discuss the water problems and solicit suggestions. More than 200 residents attended, as well as the *alcalde* and other members of the *alcaldía*, and the deliberations lasted over two hours. HTA member, Augustín Martínez recalls, "When we went to Pasaquina in November I was impressed with how the whole community was present at the meeting, waiting for us. We held the meeting in the *pista* and when we got there the *pista* was packed. That is when you see that the people are happy and support what we are doing. You should see how beautiful it is to see the happy faces of the children when we donate soccer ball, notebooks, pencils, shoes. You can see happiness in their faces. And all of that encourages us to continue working because the people there even in a small way show their support and trust. I came back full of joy and happiness that the people in Piedras Blancas are supporting us."

During these *calbidos abiertos*, the HTA reports on their accomplishments of the year and presents printed final reports, including detailed budgets, in order to act with utmost transparency. In fact, the HTA maintains meticulous documentation of their

finances, events, projects, and formal collaborations. For example, all HTA meetings are recorded and transcribed for their records, which are neatly stored in their appropriate binders. Meetings begin strictly on-time and the conversation adheres to the topic at hand. When necessary, visual presentations, such as photos of the project's progress, are prepared. Members of Comité Piedras Blancas exhibit steadfast commitment to their community work and contribute of their time and money to participate. Migrants personally fund their participation in the HTA's events and never use the HTA's accounts to pay for HTA-related travel to Piedras Blancas or domestically in the US.

Since its formal re-organization in 2002, Comité Piedras Blancas has executed over thirty projects and has invested over \$250,000 worth of projects in the *cantón* (See Table 3.1). As will be examined in detail below, Comité Piedras Blancas maximized its efforts by forging partnerships with its local state and hometown community, as well as with external institutions such as international NGOs. To date, the HTA's focus has been on building infrastructure in the *centro cantonal*, especially its roadways. Prior to the HTA's intervention, there were no paved roads and only make-shift public spaces in the *centro cantonal*. However, the HTA has paved nearly the whole of the *centro cantonal*. In addition, it constructed a *casa comunal*, which is used for community meetings, computer classes, and even as a projection room to watch movies and national soccer games on a large screen. Comité Piedras Blancas has also financed projects supporting cultural events such as the *fiestas patronales*, which are considered the best in the municipality and draw crowds from around Pasaquina. It has also contributed to educational initiatives such as the donation of computers and school supplies. The overwhelming majority of the projects undertaken by Comité Piedras Blancas benefit the

centro cantonal. In fact, the HTA has only assisted one of the *cantón*'s ten *caseríos*. The rest have been abandoned not only by the HTA, but also by the local state. Consequently, the levels of poverty experienced in the *caseríos* are extreme, even in comparison to the scarcity in Piedras Blancas' *centro cantonal*. Nevertheless, the social and economic disparity between Piedras Blancas' *caseríos* and its *centro cantonal* is not a source of resentment, but rather of pride. Residents in the *caseríos* have heard of Comité Piedras Blancas and are proud of the advancements which migrants have contributed and of the prominence and good reputation they have brought to the *cantón*.

Table 3.1 Projects Undertaken by Comité Pro-Mejoramiento Cantón Piedras Blancas (2003—2008)

	Projects	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
	Total (A – G) (US Dollars)	51,389	103,810	37,700	40,326	2,180	21,500
	A. Culture	--	--	900	--	1,000	1,500
1	Floats, music, raffles, prizes donated for <i>fiestas patronales</i>)	--	--	900	--	1,000	1,000
2	Organized and hosted Mother's Day Celebration	--	--	--	--	--	500
	B. Education	--	810	17,000	18,450	1,000	--
3	Computers donated to <i>Escuela Piedras Blancas</i>	--	810	--	--	--	--
4	Uniforms, shoes, school supplies donated to 72 school children <i>of which: Pan-American Develop. Foundation/Banco Agrícola</i> <i>Local community</i>	--	--	2000 (1,000) (350)	--	--	--
5	School repairs <i>of which: Pan-American Develop. Foundation/Banco Agrícola</i> <i>Local community</i>	--	--	15,000 (10,000) (1,800)	--	--	--
6	Computer Lab in Centro Multi-Usos <i>of which: Local community</i>	--	--	--	1,000 (440)	--	--
7	Computer Lessons (April-October)	--	--	--	2,450	--	--
8	Construction of school science lab	--	--	--	15,000	--	--
9	Table and lab equipment	--	--	--	--	500	--
10	School/sports supplies for Centro Escolar, Caserío El Mango	--	--	--	--	500	--

11	C. Environment: Transportation of trees	--	--	--	350	--	--
12	D. Potable water: Installation of sewerage pipeline	--	--	3,000	--	--	--
13	E. Pavement of several roads <i>of which: Local community</i>	51,389 --	16,200 --	16,800 (3,400)	19,026 (5,300)	--	20,000
	F. Public Spaces		85,800	--	--	180	--
14	Construction of Casa Comunal y Multi- uso <i>of which: Alcaldía</i> <i>Central government</i>	--	85,800 (28,200) (28,200)	--	--	--	--
15	Setting up webpage Server	--	--	--	--	180	--
	G. Religion	--	1,000	--	2,500	--	--
16	25 benches for Catholic church <i>of which: Local community</i>	--	1,000 (415)	--	--	--	--
17	Church rectory repairs	--	--	--	2,500	--	--

Source: Data provided by the Comité Pro-Mejoramiento Cantón Piedras Blancas.

Despite the essential aid that migrants have contributed to Cantón Piedras Blancas, there are still pressing development needs to be addressed. Most urgently missing from Piedras Blancas' *centro cantonal* is a potable water system. Currently, women line up at the community *chorros* at 5AM and hurry to fill up barrels during the few hours twice a week when water is made available. Addressing the water shortage is an imminent objective of the HTA, which has already begun to raise funds for the project and to coordinate details with the *alcaldía* and local residents. Moreover, the HTA has held several discussion and *cabildos abiertos* with the *alcaldía* and community concerning the *cantón's* health issues. There is also no Unidad de Salud in Cantón Piedras Blancas and residents must seek medical care in a neighboring *cantón*, rely on the occasional visit from the *promotor de salud*, or pay for expensive private treatments in a different municipality. In addition, although Piedras Blancas' *centro cantonal* serves as a local hub of activity, there is minimal commerce and only a handful of small general stores can be found. In fact, except for its link with its *hermanos lejanos*, Cantón Piedras

Blancas seems removed from the outside world. There is no internet, negligible cell phone reception, and even newspapers are curiously absent. One resident from Caserío El Mango, Dolores Gutiérrez, says, “Look, let’s put it this way, we are in this God-forsaken place in the middle of nowhere. We do not what is going on. We do not know anything.” Comité Piedras Blancas also hopes to address these issues in the future.

V. Comité Piedras Blancas’ Linkages with the Hometown Community

Residents in Piedras Blancas’ *centro cantonal* initially had a lukewarm reaction to migrants’ organized involvement in the hometown. Although they were pleased by the sight of public works in the *cantón*, they were wary of the HTA’s intentions and their management of funds. Some were also disappointed to learn that the HTA would not be providing financial support for individual residents. In order to begin building up trust and assert its legitimacy, Comité Piedras Blancas felt it was important to work with a counterpart committee in the hometown, which would facilitate in a formal manner the HTA’s relationship with the hometown community. Comité Piedras Blancas approached the *centro cantonal*’s ADESCO to serve as their counterpart committee and to act as the medium directly connecting migrants with local residents. The ADESCO is responsible for communicating the HTA’s agenda to the community during monthly meetings and for overseeing projects. In addition, Comité Piedras Blancas wanted to involve the ADESCO and other interested residents in its decision-making processes. Under this organizational system, the role of the ADESCO is critical and it necessitates an ADESCO that acts as the impartial representative of the community. In theory, this arrangement worked well for all parties involved. However, in practice, the ADESCO in Piedras Blancas’ *centro*

cantonal was initially unable to perform as a transparent and unbiased player in the community. Consequently, the HTA's relationship with the hometown community has had to overcome some big obstacles, which ultimately served to solidify the local support it enjoys today.

An ADESCO has existed in Cantón Piedras Blancas for over a decade.¹⁵ However, at its inception, its primary role in the community was the planning and raising of funds for the *fiestas patronales*. Under the governance of PDC Alcalde Juan Reyes (1997-2003), Pasaquina's ADESCOs gained greater political importance in their local communities. According to Reyes, he utilized ADESCOs to better keep abreast of the needs and concerns of residents living in the municipality's *caseríos*. Alcalde Reyes claims, "During my administration we established an ADESCO in almost every *cantón* and *caserío* and it worked. That was our idea as municipality—to form all those committees. As I mentioned, it worked because that was the beginning of any organization in the municipality and then came the requests to improve the conditions in all communities because there was a lot of citizen participation. The link [to the community] was better with the ADESCOs because they live there and know the pain and suffering of their communities. So the ADESCO would come to the *alcaldía* and tell us what they need." ADESCOs' new role within their communities and their stronger ties to the *alcaldía* gave them heightened prominence. However, Cantón Piedras Blancas like the rest of Pasaquina had been severely neglected and ADESCOs' new status led to their politicization, although their legal charters calls for a strictly apolitical character. This politicization was not along ideological lines; rather, it was a struggle for local power and

¹⁵ In addition to the *centro cantonal*, only two of the ten *caseríos* in Cantón Piedras Blancas have organized an ADESCO (*caseríos* Candelaria and Barrancones). However, neither is active.

prestige. Local residents began to view the ADESCOs as vehicles towards achieving political power within the community and for securing personal favors from the *alcaldía*. Antonio Vásquez, a community leader in the *centro cantonal* explains, "When the elections are over, a government authority like the *alcalde* should treat everyone equally and should forget about political colors and his political flag. But here, the *alcalde* meets very rarely with the entire community. In other words, if you do not belong to his party there is little trust; but if you do belong to his party, there is trust and friendship." Consequently, conflict within the community grew, especially during election years when residents scrambled to align themselves with a mayoral candidate and his political party in hopes of reaping personal benefits upon a win. In stark opposition, the rising tensions surrounding the ADESCO also led many residents to staunchly remove themselves from any local political issues in order to avoid confrontation. These residents became passive and consequently refused to participate in *cabildos abiertos* or any form of community organization directed at the *cantón*'s development because it inherently necessitated politics. Thus, local politics in Cantón Piedras Blancas became a divisive force, which not only polarized those vying for a slice of power, but also created a rift between the *cantón*'s hyper-political residents and its hypo-political ones.

In 2002, during Juan Reyes second term as *alcalde* and as his campaign for re-election was underway, the politicization of the ADESCO in Cantón Piedras Blancas became so extreme that it rendered the committee defunct. The ADESCO was divided between Reyes' PDC supporters and those who supported ARENA's candidate Odir Ramírez. As a campaign strategy, it is common for mayoral candidates to select representatives from each of the municipality's *cantones* to serve as their local

spokesmen. The selected representatives are typically residents with a significant amount of influence in the community and who thus have the ability to sway voters. If the candidate wins, these representatives then constitute the *alcalde's consejo municipal*. However, given the importance of the relationships between the ADESCO and the *alcaldía* in Pasaquina, it is generally understood within the community that these representatives will also assume leadership positions in the ADESCO¹⁶. Therefore, it is to the personal benefit of these representatives to have their mayoral candidate win the election, as they too would gain power at both the municipal and local levels. In order to ensure a win, these representatives use dirty tactics and launch smear campaigns. For example in Piedras Blancas, one side may accuse a family who supports the other candidate of corruption and of stealing from another family in the *cantón*. Thus, municipal elections take on a local and even personal significance which often cement profound political and social rifts in the community.

In 2003, Reyes lost his re-election bid and Ramirez became *alcalde* of Pasaquina. The ADESCO in Piedras Blancas' *centro cantonal* was previously aligned with Reyes and PDC. However, the change of administration meant that Ramírez's chosen *consejales*, Vidal Campos and Efraín Alvarez, assumed they would take over the ADESCO. But, many of Reyes' supporters refused to accept political defeat and dissent quickly grew within the ADESCO and the community at large. In 2004, Campos and Alvarez were ousted from the ADESCO by Reyes' PDC supporters who joined forces and conspired against them to vote them out. Nevertheless, although the ADESCO re-organized as a united front under its former leadership, Campos and Alvarez still served

¹⁶ Positions and responsibilities within the ADESCO are still subject to popular vote. But, it is generally accepted that the members of the *alcalde's consejo municipal* will assume leadership roles.

as the *cantón*'s representatives in the *alcalde's consejo municipal*, as this is a position appointed by the *alcalde* and not voted on by the community. This situation created a power imbalance, which allowed Campos and Alvarez to exact revenge on the PDC-supported ADESCO. Campos and Alvarez blocked the ADESCO's communication with the *alcaldía*, as they did not want it to successfully lobby for projects or gain popularity in the community. In turn, the new PDC-leaning leaders of the ADESCO also did not attempt to forge a relationship with the rival ARENA *alcaldía*. ADESCO leaders and ex-Reyes supporters, Moisés Correa y Concepción Zelaya, claim, "Very well, Alcalde Ramírez said that he was going to help, but he never did. He only deceived us, not only us but the whole community because we represent a community and he did not want to receive us. I do not know why. No matter what you ask of him, he never delivers, nothing." According to Campos, however, Alcalde Ramírez approached the ADESCO on several occasions, but the ADESCO is to blame because they distanced themselves from the *alcaldía* and did not make an effort. As a result of this rift, Piedras Blancas' ADESCO remained stagnant during most of Ramírez's two terms in office (2003-2009).

The political crisis within the ADESCO and community had direct implications for the HTA's ability to carry out its projects. Comité Piedras Blancas was stuck in the middle of the political tensions between the ADESCO and the *alcaldía*. For example, at one point, HTA co-president William Gutierrez was accused of conspiring against Ramírez during his 2006 for re-election campaign because he was photographed with a political rival. Due to the breakdown of communication in the hometown, Comité Piedras Blancas could no longer depend on the ADESCO to serve as its counterpart in the community or as its liaison to the *alcaldía*. Given its inability to work with the ADESCO,

in 2002 the HTA called an emergency meeting in Houston to form an alternative counterpart committee. The new counterpart committee was composed of four independent members of the community, friends and acquaintances who the HTA felt it could trust to manage its finances and remain apolitical. The interim committee served between 2002-2004 until the ADESCO reorganized under a cohesive dedicated leadership. In 2004, despite unresolved political tensions between the ADESCO and the *alcaldía*, Comité Piedras Blancas transferred responsibilities back to the ADESCO because it wished to place power back in the hands of the community's elected representatives and involve the community in its processes. This decision allowed Comité Piedras Blancas to re-enter into direct negotiations with the ADESCO and in doing so it helped maintain a calm political environment and prevent the situation from escalating further. ADESCO leaders, Moisés Correa y Concepción Zelaya, claim, "Ever since we started working again, our relations with the migrants have been excellent. You have already seen Piedras Blancas and all its movement and, in general, that bond between them and us has encouraged the community to help their *cantón* and we feel proud of it." However, in spite of its best efforts, the HTA was unable to mend the relationship between Piedras Blancas' ADESCO and Ramirez's *alcaldía*. As a result, yet again, Comité Piedras Blancas decided to restructure. This time it elected representatives from within its own organization to serve as independent *enlaces* to the *alcaldía* and to the ADESCO in order to facilitate its work and prevent miscommunication. Thus, the HTA assumed the role as unbiased mediator between *alcaldía* and ADESCO and significant projects were implemented in this capacity.

Despite the HTA's inability to repair the relationship between the *alcaldía* and the ADESCO, it did solidify strong linkages with the hometown community at large. Comité Piedras Blancas never lost sight of its belief that its mission and the development of the *cantón* should not be contingent upon political alliances. During a recent meeting in the *centro cantonal*, HTA co-president, William Gutierrez reminded the community, "We have many members and we need to try and leave politics to the side. It's good to have members of various political parties in the ADESCO and in the community. But, egoism impedes us. Our community work is for the welfare of the community, not for supporting politics." As a result of its sensitive and smart political maneuvering, Comité Piedras Blancas gained the trust of the *centro cantonal's* hypo-political residents who once dismissed civic engagement and community development as perpetuating unnecessary conflict and false promises. The HTA channeled sentiments of solidarity into active civic engagement and empowered local residents to organize collectively. Lina Hernández Mariana Cruz, a resident of the *centro cantonal*, says that with the support of the HTA, "people organized themselves here. We saw that there was no support from the *alcalde* so people had to see how to organize themselves as a community." Today Comité Piedras Blancas has developed a highly collaborative relationship with local residents and it is received as a legitimate power player in the hometown. Víctor Reyes, a school principal in the *centro cantonal*, claims, "I tell you, the community has changed a lot because there has been a lot of communication with the migrants and as a community we have worked together with them. Now there is also more collaboration between the migrants and several other community groups, such as church groups from several denominations, sports teams, also with the school. There has been a lot of help from the migrants."

Residents and migrants work side-by-side not only during the project's execution, but also during project identification and design. The hometown community serves as a key actor in the HTA's decision making processes. William Gutierrez and Denys Reyes encourage residents to get involve with the HTA and to criticize its work; if there is no criticism then we are not doing our job well. Recently, local residents have even begun actively collaborating on the HTA's projects by volunteering *mano de obra*, raw materials or money. For example, during the recent road construction projects, residents, especially whose homes were located along the new road, volunteered several days of labor or donated bags of cement in order to cut back the project's cost. HTA member Agustín Martínez says, "That gives us more strength because we see that they are not just waiting for us to give them, but they are also putting their grain of sand in El Salvador." Moreover, Comité Piedras Blancas assumes the state's responsibility and sponsors *cabildos abiertos* during which residents of the *centro cantonal* can voice their development concerns and devise strategic solutions. According to Denys Reyes, Comité Piedras Blancas is conscious of the promises and responsibilities it takes on and of the importance of turning words into deeds, Talk without action is time wasted...leadership is not a position. It is an action. Thus, the debate during the November meeting resulted in the water project proposal, which is current being undertaken.

VI. Comité Piedras Blancas' Linkages with the Local State

Over the years, Comité Piedras Blancas has maintained a mutually respectful relationship with the local state and the two have gradually developed a more collaborative partnership. During Alcalde Juan Reyes' six years in office under the

PDC's flag, Comité Piedras Blancas and the *alcaldía* never collaborated because the HTA was still informally organized and only worked on small scale projects. When ARENA's Odir Ramírez took office in 2003, Comité Piedras Blancas had formalized and was in the position to establish a more collaborative relationship with the *alcaldía*. Unfortunately, however, its efforts were greatly hindered due to the political tensions within the ADESCO, as described above. Although the HTA and the *alcaldía* were never in direct conflict, any potential partnership was hindered because Comité Piedras Blancas was caught in the middle. Eventually, due to its political maturity, Comité Piedras Blancas was able to open some space for collaboration and successfully brokered the re-engagement of the *alcaldía* in the *centro cantonal*. In particular, the HTA coordinated migrants, the *alcaldía*, and hometown residents for the construction of the *casa comunal*. Although the *casa comunal* was Ramírez's only significant project in the *centro cantonal*, it was one of tremendous importance for the community. It serves as the primary public space where *cabildos abiertos* and other community gatherings are held. It also homes twenty new computers donated by the HTA in 2006 which the school uses for technology lessons. Both the HTA and Ramírez report holding each other in mutual admiration and have always provided each other with moral support, even when a formal alliance was not possible. For example, as a sign of good will, Ramírez donated two truck loads of cement for one of the HTA's road projects.

In 2009, Ramírez lost his re-election bid to PDC's candidate, Nelson Urias, who will be in power until at least 2012. Today, with a PDC *alcaldía* and PDC-leaning ADESCO in Piedras Blancas, there is renewed hope in the *cantón* that great deeds can be accomplished working together. Comité Piedras Blancas was eager to begin working with

Urias and promptly arranged a meeting with him to discuss its upcoming agenda and possible areas for collaboration such as the impending potable water project and the construction of a health clinic. During the meeting, one member from Houston explained to Urias, “We are in the best disposition to collaborate. This is our dream as HTA. We are ready to lend a hand. Simply, tell us how you want us to coordinate.” He only asks in turn that the *alcaldía* demonstrates a “serious and responsible commitment.” Urias is equally eager to team up with Comité Piedras Blancas and asks migrant to not lose their vision and trust. Urias elaborates, “We have already had meetings with the HTA organized for Piedras Blancas in the United States and we have agreed that we are going to work together in some projects... We are going to work with all those committees that want to work with us—we are not excluding—we are going to work hand in hand with all the ADESCOs of the municipality.”

VII. Comité Piedras Blancas as a Trans-local Governance Actor: Equal Partner

The case of Comité Piedras Blancas illustrates how HTAs can engage in their hometowns of origin as vehicles for deepening democracy. In Pasaquina, the deepening of democracy is achieved under the union of three key actors: the HTA, the community, and the *alcaldía*. Comité Piedras Blancas provides the vital foundation for the process of democratic deepening because it serves as a bridge linking the community and local state. By cultivating strong linkages with both its local state and the hometown community, the HTA is ideally positioned to intervene as an effective trans-local governance actor. More specifically, Comité Piedras Blancas assumes the role of equal partner. It intervenes as a balanced and objective mediator, not only brokering a working relationship between the

alcaldía and the ADESCO, but also integrating the community as a whole into a larger democratic project.

Petty politics in Piedras Blancas gave rise to high levels of clientelism and led to the breakdown of the community. However, Comité Piedras Blancas overcomes this rift by restoring bonds of social capital and solidarity among residents in the hometown. It calls on residents to reach beyond their individual needs and draws upon residents' moral and civic consciousness. For example, Jesús Castro from Caserío Los Carpúles recalls, "There is a mother who has to carry her child on her back because he has a foot problem. Look, when they [Comité Piedras Blancas] were throwing the gravel to repair the road, I committed myself to buy a truck load of gravel to throw it there because I was sorry for that mother. I pity those poor people who come in rubber boots to take water from here. There are needs here and if you have a little more [resources], then you have to be a humanitarian and have compassion for your neighbor...The migrants I admire the most are those from Piedras Blancas because for them anything is possible. Their unity is their best quality." The HTA unites residents under a common civic agenda and empowers them to assume social responsibility within the community. In fact, invoking the sentiments of John F. Kennedy, Denys Reyes begins every meeting with the words: Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country, as a reminder of the common objective which unites them. Moreover, Comité Piedras Blancas closes every meeting by reciting the HTA's slogan in unison: *Juntos hacemos la diferencia*.¹⁷ Thus, by impelling previously disenfranchised local residents to take up a civic agenda, the HTA inducts the community into the realm of civil society. In other words, Comité Piedras Blancas changes the way governance is understood in the

¹⁷ Together we make the difference.

hometown. It is something that is born within the fabric of the community, not a mandate imposed onto citizens by municipal authorities.

Comité Piedras Blancas not only provides the hometown community with much needed morale, but it also gives residents an institutional structure through which to exercise their civic muscle. Through the HTA's organizational structure, the community is able to access the local state. Local residents in Pasaquina, especially those in rural marginalized communities like Cantón Piedras Blancas, were previously excluded from the local state's political processes. However, Comité Piedras Blancas provides local residents with a vehicle through which to collectively organize, rather than waiting for the ADESCO to re-organize or hoping to be remembered by the *alcalde* in the municipal budget. The HTA also allows citizens to take back the development of their community and set the terms of engagement with the *alcaldía*. Comité Piedras Blancas' decision to integrate the community into its decision-making processes is vital for establishing its legitimacy as a democratizing agent. It renders the HTA a vehicle for the will of the community and not solely an expression of the migrants' vision of development. In other words, the HTA underlines the importance of governance as an inclusive process and actively integrates residents into its practices and institutions. In particular, the HTA-organized *cabildos abiertos* serve important fora for deliberation, which not only bring together diverse actors in the community such as ADESCO leaders, teachers, business owners and religious figures, but also open lines of communication between the community and the *alcaldía*. Local residents use this as an opportunity to discuss public issues, questions of their elected representatives, and strategize a course of action. The hosting of *cabildos abiertos* also allows the HTA to solidify its linkages with local

residents and keep building trust. This creates a collaborative dynamic in which both migrants and local residents assume social responsibility. Thus, by introducing and nurturing governance as a participatory and inclusive process rooted in civic consciousness, Comité Piedras Blancas deepens democracy.

Furthermore, as an equal partner, Comité Piedras Blancas decompresses the political tensions in the *centro cantonal* and reintegrates the ADESCO as a legitimate and representative organization within the community. Comité Piedras Blancas helped ADESCO assume a more prominent role in the community, diverting its attention from petty politics in order to deal with substantial issues of community development. In addition, the HTA re-negotiated the relationship between the *alcaldía* and ADESCO. Comité Piedras Blancas has begun to break the clientelistic bond between the *alcaldía* and the ADESCO, making elective representatives accountable to their constituents and not their political affiliates. In short, as an effective trans-local governance actor, Comité Piedras Blancas depoliticizes the ADESCO. This was a critical contribution in the *cantón* in order to ensure democratic deepening. Without the support of a functioning ADESCO, the community's claims will likely be ignored by the *alcaldía*, as was the case prior to their introduction in the municipality. Today those *caseríos* in Cantón Piedras Blancas, such as Los Chaguities, El Naranjo, La Costa, and El Pasadero, which do not have ADESCOs continue to be the most neglected by the local state.

Finally, as an equal partner in governance, Comité Piedras Blancas plays a pivotal role in increasing the local state's social accountability. Prior to the organized involvement of migrants in the hometown, the *alcaldía* in over twenty years and under various political flags had implemented only two significant infrastructural projects in the

centro cantonal. In 1985 electricity was installed and in 1997 a *salón de baile* was built. During Alcalde Juan Reyes' six years in office, he oversaw the pavement of a small part of the road leading into the *centro cantonal* and the construction of a *parvularia*. Alcalde Odir Ramírez and the HTA had a strong relationship, but they were limited in their joint ventures because of the tension with the ADESCO. Consequently, Ramírez only implemented one project. Nevertheless, under the urging of the HTA, he was actively engaged in the negotiations with the ADESCO and made frequent visits to the *centro cantonal*. As a direct result of its linkages with Comité Piedras Blancas, the local state is more engaged and more accountable to its constituents. Comité Piedras Blancas is also directly responsible for raising the *cantón's* profile in the municipal agenda. *Alcaldías* are more accountable to communities which count with the support of an HTA because they are more likely to finance an HTA-partnered project than an independent one, as it cuts back on costs. Moreover, given their economic resources, HTA members are more likely to be heard by the *alcaldía* and they can readily attract attention to the community's needs. Comité Piedras Blancas is not shy to levy demands on the *alcaldía* and effectively pressures it to keep campaign promises and not forego its commitments. In addition, local residents can rally behind the HTA without the fear of facing personal retaliation from the *alcalde* or other negative repercussions. Comité Piedras Blancas has also worked to make the local state more transparent. Prior to the HTA's intervention, the majority of Pasaquina's residents were not granted access to the *alcaldía's* project records, audit reports, or budget and many did not know it is within their rights to obtain such information. However, the *alcaldía* cannot conceal this information from the HTA, especially regarding joint endeavors and projects related to the *cantón*. In turn, Comité

Piedras Blancas discloses the information to the community in their annual reports. By being transparent itself, the HTA can teach the community what to expect. Thus, as a result of the HTA's intervention in the hometown, the *alcaldía* has become increasingly accountable and transparent, making it a fertile playing field for democratic deepening.

VIII. Migrant Politics: An Apolitical Guise

All HTAs are inherently political actors because their intervention in the hometown necessitates tempering competing power dynamics. However, the way in which an HTA contextualizes itself within the local political framework shapes how it is able to intervene as a trans-local governance actor. Within the context of Cantón Piedras Blancas, partisan politics devolved into local struggles over power and status and they drove a wedge in the community, which impeded social change and collective action. Comité Piedras Blancas assessed this tense political environment and consciously pledged to work in a depoliticized manner when negotiating its intervention in the hometown. In particular, the HTA empowered an interim counterpart committee and later elected *enlaces* to navigate the political conflict. In the case of Comité Piedras Blancas, the approach is decidedly apolitical, but it is precisely by circumventing politics, that the HTA is able to legitimize its role as a power player in municipal politics. This political maturity not only enables the HTA to successfully organize local residents, but also to maintain a relationship with the *alcaldía* without alienating the ADESCO. Seferino Gutiérrez, the HTA's event coordinator, says, "Well, we are hopeful but, as you know, you have to be intelligent enough to know how to manage politics. Now we have great expectations from the new *alcalde* that was elected this year [Urias] because he

committed himself.” By assuming this apolitical guise, Comité Piedras Blancas is effectively able to engage a trans-local governance actor and contribute towards democratic deepening.

In Pasaquina, as a result of HTAs’ intervention, migrants have become legitimate political actors. From the perspective of the local state, the incorporation of migrants is, in its own right, a development strategy in Pasaquina. For example, Alcalde Nelson Urias says that HTAs comprise critical partners in his proposed development plan for the municipality. Urias expands, “The HTA for Piedras Blancas in the United States is not involved in politics. They help their community with their own resources in any way possible and I agree with that. It would be great if the entire municipality would be organized like Piedras Blancas; that would make me very happy. I have always said and I stress that Piedras Blancas is an example to follow and I feel proud every time I go there because when you arrive in Piedras Blancas—you may have the opportunity to see the municipality’s other *cantones*—you realize that Piedras Blancas is the number one *cantón* in Pasaquina. I would like to see the entire municipality with the style of Piedras Blancas. The HTA is so successful because they are well organized.” Alcalde Odir Ramírez too believes that migrants have changed the political landscape in the municipality. Ramírez says, “I think the migrants here impact everything, everything. In my opinion, our migrants are the backbone of this country...I think the participation of migrants is strengthening our politics because as an *alcalde* you look for projects for your municipality. And, if as *alcalde*, one has the capability to look for projects and funding in this country and abroad, it means there will be more resources and more benefits for the community.” The incorporation of HTAs into municipal development agendas also raises

the profiles of these otherwise remote municipalities at a national level. For example, the construction of the *casa comunal*, which was constructed by the joint efforts of the HTA, *alcaldía*, and community members, brought the forgotten *cantón* of Piedras Blancas under a national spotlight. In 2005, President Tony Saca honored the *cantón* with a presidential visit, the first ever to one of Pasaquina's *cantones*, in order to inaugurate the project and commend the three-pronged partnership which led to its construction. Alcalde Ramirez recalls, "I invited Tony Saca, the President, as a gesture of support to the ADESCO that was working at the time in Piedras Blancas. When Tony Saca came there were several development projects being undertaken in Piedras Blancas and I invited him so he can see the organization we have here, and that we wanted to turn it into a model of a *cantón*. That was the idea, that other *caseríos* would see how Piedras Blancas works." *Alcaldías* clearly take advantage of migrants' development aid and use HTAs and their initiatives in order to boost their political capital and status at a national level. In the case of Pasaquina, it is obvious that Comité Piedras Blancas has done far more for the development of the *centro cantonal* than the local state. The HTA recognizes that tending to the development needs of the *cantón* is the *alcaldía's* duty. However, migrants also understand that the *alcaldía* has competing responsibilities in other parts of the municipality. Thus, the HTA refuses to wait idly for the local state to do in the next election period what they can do now. William Gutierrez explains that the HTA will continue to work with or without the *alcaldía's* support, as it has in the past, because migrants have an unwavering commitment to their community work. However, Comité Piedras Blancas maintains that it does not feel like a political pawn of the *alcaldía*, ADESCO, or any other entity. Nevertheless, their ultimate vision will always be the

solidification of a three-pronged collaborative partnership between migrants, the hometown community, and the local state.

Migrants in Pasaquina generally limit their engagement in local politics to their participation in HTAs. In stark opposition to other municipalities, migrants in Pasaquina do not play a decisive political force in electoral politics and they typically do not return to the municipality to vote in local or national elections. Denys Reyes explains, "We have tried to remain outside politics because we do not think that it would be good for the HTA to be identified as ARENA, FMLN or PDC; rather, it's better for us to be completely independent. We also do not get involved to help elect the *alcalde* and the ADESCOs because the truth is that here in Maryland we do not have information to say 'hey we should help elect so and so, that way he can work with us'. We have power, of course, we could influence people and tell them, 'please, vote for such a person, these are the advantages and these are the disadvantages'. But, this is not our mission as an HTA. What we try to do is to keep the doors open to work with whoever the *alcalde* is." In addition, when asked about their political participation in the hometown, members of Comité Piedras Blancas claimed to be disinterested because they are invested in their lives in the US. Although the Comité Piedras Blancas is staunchly committed to maintaining apolitical approach, Gutierrez and Rivas expressed a desire to run for *alcalde* in order to further the HTA's work, if they were to move back to Pasaquina upon retirement. In fact, it is not uncommon for HTA members to consider political careers. However, as shall be explored in Chapters 4 and 5, such politicization carries significant weight with both positive and negative consequences for local democracy. The point here is not to judge whether HTAs should politicize or depoliticize. Rather, it is to underline

that HTAs' democratic impact as trans-local governance actors depends in part on their ability to negotiate local politics in such a way that they brings together the hometown community and local state.

IX. Conclusion

The case study of Comité Piedras Blancas illustrates the potential which HTAs possess as vehicles for deepening democracy. The HTA consciously adopts an apolitical guise in order to rise above petty partisan politics and to navigate political tensions in the hometown. In doing so, it serves a mediator bridging together the local state and the *centro cantonal's* ADESCO, as well as integrating the hometown community into local decision-making processes. Consequently, as a result of these linkages, Comité Piedras Blancas positions itself in the hometown to assume the role of equal partner when engaging as a trans-local governance actor. As such, it transforms the way governance is understood and practiced, thereby creating the ideal conditions under which to deepen democracy.

CHAPTER 4

The Case of Fundación Unidos por Intipucá: Democracia en Pañales

I. Introduction

This chapter examines the case of the Fundación Unidos por Intipucá (FUPI) in order to illustrate how HTAs can have adversarial effects on democratic deepening. FUPI focuses its efforts on building strong linkages with the *alcaldía*; however, this relationship comes at the expense of the hometown community who is disconnected from the HTA and its decision-making processes. As a result, FUPI engages in the hometown as an opportunistic elite, which manipulates the financial power borne through its remittances in order to perpetuate exclusionary governance values and practices. Moreover, in its role as trans-local governance actor, FUPI takes on an overtly politicized stance, carefully aligning itself with the *alcaldía* to safeguard its political and economic interests. This strategy becomes particularly blatant as FUPI has openly supported and financed several mayoral candidates, effectively determining the municipality's political fate. In this case, the HTA's overt politicization is a conscious tactic to usurp the local state and cement its power in the municipality. Thus, as an opportunistic elite, FUPI breeds intimidation, corruption, and division in Intipucá. The HTA ultimately wreaks

detrimental effects on Intipucá's democratic quality, regressing it, in the words of one resident, to a "democracia en pañales".¹⁸

II. The Municipality: Bienvenidos a Intipucá, Welcome to Intipucá City

The municipality of Intipucá is located in the eastern region of El Salvador, at the southern tip of the department of La Unión (See APPENDIX III.2). With a territorial extension of 94.49 square kilometers, Intipucá is the third largest of the four case studies (See APPENDIX III.5). It is located 39.4 kilometers from the municipal capital city of La Unión and about 25 kilometers from the large commercial city of San Miguel. Intipucá is comprised of an urban center, two *cantones* and 13 *caseríos* (Monografía del Departamento y Municipios de La Unión 2006). The sign at the entrance of the municipality reads, "Bienvenidos a Intipucá, Welcome to Intipucá City" (See APPENDIX III.9). Once inside the municipality another sign cautions, "Keep Our City Clean and Beauty. Thanks.[sic]". Some streets signs are in Spanish and English and others have names like William Walker Street, named after the former US ambassador to El Salvador between 1988-1992. A six-foot replica of the Statue of Liberty adorns the front yard of one house. According to resident Luís Vásquez even, "The vocabulary is different...now they say words like...'OK', and 'Bye-bye'...Also, the style of dressing is different. When my sons come they wear shirts different from mine, pants different from mine, some are loose others are tight." In fact, by all appearances, Intipucá's urban center is not dissimilar to a typical suburb in the US. The urban center has no shortage of public goods and services, including potable water, paved roadways, electricity, telephone service, Internet and cable accessibility, and a biweekly trash collection system. Most

¹⁸ Democracy in diapers

striking, however, are the houses which are designed to mimic the facade of a typical American suburban home. This is all evidence that the story of Intipucá is one that is intrinsically tied to its history of migration and remittances.

Intipucá has a longer history of migration and remittances than many other parts of El Salvador. As opposed to other municipalities whose migration wave resulted due to the civil war in the 1980s, emigration from Intipucá began as a reaction against government efforts in the 1960s to increase agricultural production which caused dramatic shifts in land tenure and displaced many rural laborers. In 1967, Sigfredo Chávez was the first Intipucateño to migrate to the US and is affectionately known as “the Christopher Columbus of Intipucá, the man who discovered the North”. More migrants quickly followed in Chávez’s footsteps. This exodus, primarily to the Washington DC metropolitan area, was facilitated by a dense and expansive network. Chávez recalls that the community of Intipucateños grew quickly, “It was a chain. Then, when most of them were here, they brought their families and would give them a place to stay. They found them a place to work and this is how it was done. We would place the women in the restaurants and the men in construction. Those were nice times. There were not people from other *pueblitos* and *caseríos* of El Salvador, us from Intipucá were the only ones here [in the Washington area]. Those were happy times. I would pick them up from the airport and take them to my house.” Migration out of Intipucá intensified in the 1980s as a direct result of the civil war. Although the municipality was relatively sheltered from the violence, residents fled in search of economic prosperity and stability. According to Maria Estrella from Caserío El Amate, “The war did not affect us in terms of human losses, but it affected us economically. For example, when there was no public

transportation, we could not leave Intipucá. Yes, they would stop buses from running in the entire country. But, we did not have any conflict between the *guerrilla* and the government soldiers here.” In addition, some of Intipucá’s school closed due to the war and many young people, especially teenage boys, were encouraged to flee by their parents who preferred that their children risk their lives trying to enter the US illegally, rather than be recruited by either faction. As a result of such high rates of documented, as well as undocumented migration, Intipucá today has relatively few permanent residents, 7,738 residents to be exact (Almanaque Municipal 2006). González (2001) estimates that for every resident in the municipality nearly two others have migrated. In fact, today only a few residents, usually elderly or children, can be seen walking around or stretched out in hammocks on their front porches. Consequently, Intipucá’s urban center is calm and quiet and “the streets have the lazy, empty feel of a permanent holiday” (Gonzalez 2001). It is only when Intipucá’s migrants return for visits during the holidays or the *fiestas patronales* that the city streets come alive.

Intipucá has had a steady stream of emigration throughout the past 40 years, which has led to large inflows of remittances into the municipality. In fact, the US dollar was used as the currency in the municipality even before official national dollarization in 2000, earning Intipucá its reputation as “the city of the dollar”. One estimate indicates that between 1990-1991, the municipality received a minimum of US\$150,000 to US\$175,000 in family remittances (Salinas 1991). Today 40% of households receive remittances, bringing the per capita annual income to \$1,883.40 (Almanaque Municipal 2006). The high influx of family remittances in Intipucá has contributed significantly to an elevated standard of living in the urban center, especially in terms of infrastructural

development. However, this money has not been invested to generate economic growth, as it has primarily fueled consumption and dependency. Consequently, Intipucá's urban center has little commercial activity. There is no municipal market and residents must rely on the one general store, one hardware store, and one pharmacy in town, or travel to San Miguel to do their shopping. There are only two make-shift restaurants, but residents prefer to purchase their *pupusas* and *tamales* from the handful of street vendors which can be spotted in the early mornings and late afternoons.

The effects of migration and remittances have had even worse consequences for the economic stability of Intipucá's *cantones* and *caseríos*. High migration rates over an extended period of time have depleted the rural labor force and have further contributed to the decline in agricultural activity. The income from remittances far surpasses agricultural earnings and therefore many residents prefer to migrate or await remittances rather than toil over the land. And, even for those residents who continue working the fields, the high costs associated with agricultural production today and its limited market mean that they can no longer provide a sustainable income, forcing them to depend on remittances as their main revenue. Julio Velásquez, an agricultural worker from Cantón La Leona, explains succinctly, "If my children don't send me the money, I don't eat." To make matters worse, the economic downturn in the US has significantly reduced the inflow of remittances and as Santos Rivera of Caserío La Agencia notes, "Most people no longer receive remittances here because things in the North are tough. With the decline in remittances there is more poverty in the community. Many people here do not work and without the remittances they have to live from the few crops they harvest like corn." In comparison to the urban center, Intipucá's *cantones* and *caseríos* are particularly

vulnerable to this economic instability because they do not enjoy the same standard of living. Poverty is rampant in Intipucá's rural areas (although not nearly as severe as that which afflicts the municipality of Pasaquina). Intipucá's *cantones* and *caseríos* lack basic necessities. Only a few *caseríos* have electricity and most rely on wells for their water supply. Most roads outside the urban center are dirt, which become impassable in rainy winters. At best, houses are modest made of wood or adobe and in some of the poorest communities are simply slabs of sheet metal propped up by sticks.

In terms of educational development, Intipucueños, on average, receive 3.1 years of schooling, which is the lowest of all four case studies (Almanaque Municipal 2006). Javier Romero, the assistant principal of the municipality's high school, blames remittances in large part for Intipucá's particularly low educational achievement. Romero explains, "When remittances were high, students did not want to study because they relied on that income. When remittances went down, students do not study because they cannot afford to go to school." For those who do value education, remittances are important for alleviating expenses, especially those associated with additional years of study at the high school level. This is especially true for youth in the *cantones* and *caseríos* who face the added challenge of financing transportation costs and overcoming poor road conditions into the urban center. However, for those students who elect to remove themselves from their studies, it is often because they see education as incompatible with the dream of migrating to the US. In fact, some youths are prepared to rescind their professional dreams in El Salvador for the opportunity to work as non-professionals in the US. For example, *bachillerato* student Diana Fernández said she would eagerly give up her dream of studying psychology at university in San Salvador if

she had the opportunity to go to the US and be a store clerk. In addition to the high school in the urban center, there are nine schools, both primary and secondary, in the municipality's outskirts. However, younger students too are often pulled from their early school years because of the expenses or the competing need to contribute to the household income.

Remittances, however, have reaped some important social development benefits in Intipucá, especially in the area of public health. Intipucanos live, on average, 70.3 years, which is the highest of all the case studies. Due to the receipt of remittances, many Intipucanos are able to afford private medical care and expensive prescriptions, which are superior to the treatments provided at the Unidad de Salud. Remittances can be especially important for securing emergency care and transportation to the hospital in San Miguel, which is an hour away, as the Unidad de Salud does not have an ambulance and patients must contract their own transportation or rely on the good will of the *alcaldía* to take a municipal vehicle. However, those Intipucanos who do not receive remittances only have the option of traveling the municipality's one Unidad de Salud located in the urban center. As is the case in Pasaquina, residents, especially those residing in the *caseríos*, must leave early to secure their space in line. José Escobar from Caserío El Icacál, says, "We walk to the Unidad de Salud in Intipucá to receive medical care. We leave the house at 4:30 in the morning so we can get to see the doctor because there is only one doctor and they can see only 30 patients in a day. If we get to the Unidad de Salud late, they will not see us and that means that we made the trip for nothing." Even if a patient manages to be seen by a doctor, many residents complain about the quality of the care provided and in particular about the medications available. The Ministry of

Health provides medication free of charge; however, the available treatments are often scarce and meant for common ailments. Ricardo Beltrán of Caserío El Amate notes, “The Unidad de Salud is not good. If I go today with a headache, they give me a pill. If tomorrow I have a stomach ache, they give me the same pill. They give the same pill for all illnesses. I suppose what is important is that they give you something for the pain, and even then sometimes they do not have anything to give.” If patients are given prescriptions, they are often unable to afford the medication unless they receive remittances. In addition to the Unidad de Salud, the municipality of Intipucá counts with three *promotores de salud* and some *caseríos* have a Red Cross first-aid kit with anti-malaria medication, which is administered by a trained community leader.

III. The Democratic Climate (2004-2009): Promising but Fragile

In the context of Intipucá, the high inflow of remittances has gravely affected socio-economic relations and has increased inequality and social exclusion. While remittances flow into nearly every corner of the municipality, they have produced deep demarcations between receivers and non-receivers. As explained above, this disparity has underscored the inequalities between Intipucá’s urban center and its rural *caseríos*. Efraín Guerra, a political activist from the urban center, explains, “The urban center has almost all the facilities a municipality should have, but some *caseríos* are completely abandoned. Sometimes, there is not even a road to access the community. If someone wants to take a project to those *caseríos*, they are afraid to use those roads because they are so dangerous. So that keeps the *caseríos* isolated from the places where there are more opportunities to learn and improve yourself.” This marked inequality between the urban

center and its rural surroundings has produced an atmosphere of division across the municipality. As a result, Intipunqueños, like residents in Pasaquina, do not generally identify politically along party lines or ideology. Rather, they tend to make political decisions, especially during election periods, based on who they believe will best heed the needs of their communities. *Alcaldes* have often played upon this desperation and inequality and have pitted the urban center and *caseríos* against each other, reinforcing an unhealthy social dynamic of rich versus poor. This tactic works well to solidify an *alcalde*'s political base, but it also perpetuates the message that the development of both sectors is mutually exclusive. Enrique Méndez, Intipucá's *alcalde* between 2000-2009, made a significant break with this tradition. In his three terms in office, despite the fragile democratic climate in the municipality, Méndez made several important and promising strides towards improving the situation.

Under Méndez, Intipucá's *alcaldía* became more socially accountable. Méndez was active in seeking out funding partners within the national government, as well as with international donors. He executed several significant infrastructural projects throughout the municipality and equitably divided municipal funds and resources. In large part, Méndez's success as an *alcalde* was due to his ability to balance the needs of his urban and rural constituents, thereby helping to alleviate inequality in the municipality. In addition, Méndez maintained an open door policy in the *alcaldía*. It was common for community leaders from both the urban center and the *caseríos* to walk into the *alcaldía* and talk freely with the *alcalde* if they had a concern. Moreover, under Méndez, the *alcaldía* regularly submitted project reports and budgets to its donors and El Salvador's Corte de Cuentas. However, Méndez's *alcaldía* also had some major

shortcomings in terms of its transparency. For example, it did not facilitate residents' access to public records and as a result they were kept in the dark. The *alcaldía* was mismanaged and records were not properly filed or preserved, which prevented the *alcaldía* from operating with utmost transparency. In addition, Intipucá's *alcaldía* was not equipped to adequately manage its ever-increasing number of projects and the requisite record keeping.

In addition to disparities between the urban center and the *caseríos*, elevated remittances rates in Intipucá also demarcated the gap between receivers and non-receivers within communities. Consequently, remittances have aggravated the levels of inequality and social exclusion, which have taken a toll on the civic life in Intipucá. As a way to combat social exclusion and nurture civil society, Méndez encouraged the active practice of politics. He held *cabildos abiertos* and also engaged citizens in the municipality's decision-making processes by working closely with the municipality's ADESCOs. He consulted about projects with community leaders and involved them in the implementation phase. In fact, while Méndez was in office, seven of Intipucá's thirteen *caseríos* had ADESCOs. A couple of the ADESCOs were very active and took the initiative on potable water projects and build schools, rather than wait passively for the local state to come around to it. However, despite Méndez's best efforts, most of those ADESCOs only functioned on paper. Many were not actively engaged in the community and many had a hard time attracting new membership. For some local residents, after the initial enthusiasm wore off, they became disenchanted by the drawn-out processes and bureaucracy associated with collective organization. According to José Chávez, member of the ADESCO of Caserío Chichipate, the required time commitment

is also a barrier, “It is not easy to be part of a *directiva*; that is the fear people have. If you are in charge you have to dedicate your time to the *directiva* and there are those people that do not want to abandon their work or for personal reasons do not want to dedicate time to the community.” Or, Intipucqueños do not participate in ADESCOs because they believe will put them at the center of criticism, gossip, or conflict with neighbors. In the words of Blanca Martínez, an ADESCO member in Caserío Chichipate, “A big problem is that people do not like to participate in the ADESCOs or in other committees because people talk and there is too much gossip.” As a result, it is common for the same individuals to serve in the ADESCO year after year, as well as any other civic association in the community (i.e. water committee, church committee, school committee, and soccer committee). High levels of migration also mean that communities have been depleted of their potential leaders who might otherwise be able to inspire collective action and civic awakening. Guerra explains, “I think when you have the opportunity to learn and want to improve yourself that is when the spirit of organization awakens and with that the desire to work for your community. That is what is missing in the *caseríos*—people with a vision of development—but also the local and central governments are responsible.” It is true that Méndez too was to blame. Although he was particularly diligent in his first two terms, his zeal significantly diminished in subsequent years. He stopped holding *cabildos abiertos*, he cut back on regular contact with community leaders, and some residents claim that he only visited their *caseríos* during political campaigns. Thus, all in all, between 2004-2009, Intipucá’s democratic climate can best be described as promising, but fragile. Although Méndez could not undo the entrenched structural damage to the

municipality's social fabric inflicted by remittances, he did strengthen some vital democratic pillars.

IV. Fundación Unidos por Intipucá: The “In” Crowd

The Fundación Unidos por Intipucá (FUPI) formed in 1986 and became the first Salvadoran HTA in the Washington area. The idea for the HTA is attributed to Juan de Dios Blanco, a resident of the urban center, who saw the need to repair the entry road leading into the urban center. Blanco lobbied the *alcaldía* for support, but was unable to secure enough funding to complete the project. As a result, he called on migrant friends and relatives living in Washington, many of whom had already become successful business owners and prominent figures in the Intipucacero community there. Migrants welcomed the opportunity to collaborate and eagerly committed to raising the funds. The first project was a huge success. FUPI president, Abigail Rivera recalls, “We were so pleased with how pretty Intipucá looked. We said to ourselves, ‘If everyone cooperates, then why don’t we keep working for Intipucá?’ Intipucá needed a lot of things.” Thus, migrants set out to formalize FUPI’s organizational structure. FUPI, like Pasaquina’s HTA, adopted well defined responsibilities for its members and members assumed roles such as president, vice-president, treasurer, and public relations specialist. It was also committed to working closely with a counterpart committee in the urban center. FUPI’s counterpart committee was a tightly-knit group comprised of close friends and families from the urban center. The two *comités* maintained close ties through frequent telephone calls and visits to the hometown, particularly at Christmas and for the *fiestas patronales*. Between the *comité* in Washington and the counterpart one in the urban center, FUPI

counted with approximately 20 steadfast members. There is a mutual respect and admiration among members in both *comités* and each is vital to the organization and functioning of the whole. The Washington committee was primarily in charge of raising funds, while the counterpart managed the money and oversaw project implementation. However, the two worked together closely in order to identify and select projects and all decisions pertaining to the HTA were reached through consensus among members. However, FUPI's decision-making processes were limited to its members; input from the hometown community at large was not solicited. Rivera explains, "In order to decide on a project we evaluated the needs. We could select the projects and assign them a priority because we know the needs of Intipucá." This strategy presents a sharp contrast to Pasaquina, where the HTA employed inclusive and participatory practices. Moreover, FUPI too claims to have kept careful records of its expenses. However, unlike the HTA in Pasaquina, it refuses to release such information to anyone outside its membership. In fact, FUPI quickly began to develop a reputation within the hometown as an exclusive club whose membership and good will were limited to Intipucá's wealthy migrants and their closed circle of insiders.

Over 20 years, FUPI maintained an active presence in Intipucá and contributed to countless projects (see Table 4.1 below for a listing of the most important ones). Those projects varied in nature, but with the exception of occasional small-scale donations, the vast majority was limited to the urban center. First and foremost, FUPI is responsible for much of the essential infrastructural development seen in the urban center, especially the roadways. Luís Alfredo Zelaya, a member of FUPI's counterpart committee, comments, "Intipucá has changed a lot. Almost all the streets have cobblestone or pavement. Most of

it was done thanks to FUPI's effort and also Alcalde Enrique Méndez." FUPI also contributed towards the reconstruction of the central park, the Catholic Church, and the Casa de la Cultura, as well as repairs in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1996. The HTA has also made several donations towards educational and health initiatives, such as the donation of an ambulance. In terms of culture, FUPI consistently played a pivotal role in the organization of the *fiestas patronales*, Mother's Day celebrations, and even introduced a new municipal holiday, El Día del Migrante¹⁹. Over the years, FUPI has also reached out to help many individuals in need. For example, it has paid for surgeries and other medical treatments for sick residents, as well as making in-kind donations such as wheelchairs and prosthetics. Despite all FUPI's contributions in Intipucá, migrants never lost sight of its ultimate vision for its hometown. From its inception, FUPI had its heart set on the construction of a large soccer stadium in the urban center and eventually in the sponsorship of its own municipal team. Work on the stadium began in 1987, but for reasons that shall be explored below, the project was not completed until 2003. This stadium was been at the center of FUPI's ongoing power struggle within the municipality and has become emblematic of their role within the hometown.

Table 4.1: Key Projects Undertaken by Fundación Unidos por Intipucá (1986—2006)

	Project	Year	Project Cost (US Dollars)
	A. Sports		
1	Construction of Intipucá Municipal Soccer Stadium** <i>of which: HTA</i>	1987-2003	204,285 (19,998)
	A. Culture		
2	Contributions to <i>fiestas patronales</i> (sponsor transnational queen, floats, music, raffles, prizes, etc.)	1985-2005	N/A

¹⁹ The Day of the Migrant

3	Organized and hosted celebration of the <i>Día del Migrante</i> , March 3	1985-2005	N/A
	B. Education		
4	Computers and typewriters donated to <i>Complejo Educativo Intipucá</i>	1998	6,000
5	Donation of benches for the playground at the <i>Complejo Educativo Intipucá</i>	1999	N/A
	C. Health		
6	Ambulance donated to Intipucá Health Unit	1996	10,000
7	Water pump and TV set for Health Unit	1997	725
8	Laboratory equipment	2005	N/A
	D. Individual Recipients		
9	Donations of food and clothing to Caserío El Esterón after Hurricane Mitch	1996	N/A
10	Medical care and wheelchair for disabled person	1998	8,000
11	Prosthetic arm for disabled person	1999	1,500
12	Donation to a cancer patient	2004	3,000
13	Contributions to Hugo Salinas' Mayoral Campaign	2005	N/A
	E. Infrastructure		
14	Design and pavement of main streets in <i>centro urbano</i> . *	1985	N/A
15	Public lighting in Caserío Santa Juliana	1994	N/A
16	Repairs of infrastructure damaged during Hurricane Mitch	1998	N/A
17	Paving of Martin Lazo and Guarrapuca streets in <i>centro urbano</i> ** of which: HTA	2003-2004	133,616 (6,680)
18	Paving of Ursula Marquez Ave. and 3 streets in <i>centro urbano</i> ** of which: HTA	2003-2004	183,282 (9,164)
	F. Public Spaces		
19	Construction of <i>Casa de la Cultura</i> ** of which: HTA(donated the land)	2003	243,043 (33,539)
	G. Religion		
20	Pews and doors for Catholic church in <i>centro urbano</i>	1985	12,000
21	Construction of pastoral room in Catholic church of the urban center	2004	N/A
22	Donations to build the Catholic Church at El Esterón	2000	N/A
23	Expansion of municipal cemetery in <i>urban center</i> , including walls and gates* of which: HTA(donated the land)	2005	129,539 (4,000)

Source: Data provided by *Fundación Unidos por Intipucá* and the *Alcaldía* of Intipucá.

Notes: * Represents project was financed by HTA and *Alcaldía*.

**Represents project was financed by HTA, *Alcaldía* and Central Government.

1/Financed by HTA/*Alcaldía*/European Union

N/A: Not available

FUPI excelled at raising funds. Even its smallest events were guaranteed to raise at least \$1,000. Larger events like its annual gala could bring in anywhere from \$6,000 to \$10,000. Rivera says, “It was great that each event was full to capacity. The entire Intipunqueño community would attend because we are a united and hard working people.” FUPI also succeed in securing financial support from large corporations like TACA Airlines to sponsor its float for the *fiestas patronales* and to donate tickets for travel to El Salvador. In addition, as shall be explored in detail below, FUPI’s close relationship with the local state augmented its financial portfolio, as FUPI relied on the *alcaldía* and its international donors to supplements its budget. In time, FUPI used its political and managerial savvy to obtain legal 501-C3 status in order to be recognized as a registered nonprofit in the US. As such, the HTA qualified to request donations and was eligible for tax exemptions. This new legal charter allowed FUPI to enter into direct partnership with national and international donors. For example, Rivera recounts, “We worked with the Ministry of Health when we donated the ambulance to the Unidad de Salud. They helped us so we would not have to pay taxes and all of that.” Due to its prestigious ties and big-budget projects, FUPI amassed a reputation as a successful well-organized HTA. Many other migrant communities followed suit and began forming HTAs of their own, often leaning on FUPI for advice and support. Rivera recalls, “They would call me and say, ‘look Abigail, we are from Chinameca or so and so place and we want to get organized. How did you get started’?” And I would tell them to do this and this and this.” In 2006, under circumstances which will be explored below, FUPI formally disintegrated.

V. Fundación Unidos por Intipucá's Linkages with the Local State

Since its inception in 1986, FUPI has prioritized its relationship with the *alcaldía* as a means of achieving its objectives. Juan de Dios Blanco, the man who first planted the seed for FUPI, used the early success of the HTA to generate political capital in the hometown, which translated into enough votes for Blanco to win the *alcaldía* in 1991. Blanco's win secured FUPI's interests within the *alcaldía*. According to FUPI's president Abigail Rivera, whose own husband had also been *alcalde* years prior, "We worked very well with Alcalde Juan de Dios Blanco. We were united with the *alcaldía* and we would tell him 'We have so much money for the project, but we need so much from you'. That is the way we worked together." Blanco contributed to FUPI's agenda by removing any governmental and legal barriers, which might have impeded its work. In particular, in exchange for its support, Blanco granted FUPI municipal land upon which to build the highly anticipated soccer stadium, thereby eliminating FUPI's biggest obstacle in realizing its dream. According to Blanco, the HTA felt they could influence the decisions of the *alcaldía* because "FUPI was sending the money from the United States." In retrospect, Blanco recognizes that FUPI's financial assistance came with a high price. He admits, "I felt trapped like I had to do what FUPI wanted me to do." Criticism against Blanco and FUPI quickly mounted as it became apparent to local residents that the two were engaged in a parasitic relationship.

As a result of the growing dissent, Blanco lost the *alcaldía* in 1994 to Leonidas Caballero. Caballero ran his campaign on an anti-Blanco and anti-FUPI platform. The new *alcalde* expressly halted all of FUPI's involvement in the municipality. He reversed the land agreement for the stadium and even prohibited FUPI from celebrating the *fiestas*

patronales inside Intipucá borders, forcing FUPI to hold its celebrations in another municipality for six years. Rivera remembers, “When Caballero was *alcalde* he wanted to block everything, control everything we did. We did not do anything wrong but Caballero was completely against some of our members.” Zelaya, on the other hand, speculate that jealousy was at the root of Caballero’s opposition, “Caballero was a very humble and poor person and he held a grudge against those [like FUPI’s members] who have money.” During the two terms when Caballero was *alcalde*, FUPI was forced to abandon some projects like the stadium and the central park that required the *alcaldía* support. Despite Caballero’s opposition, however, FUPI did not relinquish its decision to work in Intipucá and undertook smaller private projects independent of the *alcaldía*, such as the refurbishing of the Catholic Church.

Caballero’s rejection fueled FUPI’s determination to gain back control of the *alcaldía*. During the 2000 elections, the HTA targeted who it believed would be the likely winner. His name was Enrique Méndez. FUPI financed Mendez’s campaign and he won the *alcaldía*. Zelaya, a member of FUPI’s counterpart committee, recalls, “FUPI supported Méndez because he was a community leader with credibility. People said that he was a good candidate so we decided to support him. That is what happened, we supported him so he would win.” Another counterpart committee member, Edwin Hernández confirms, “Yes, FUPI did help Méndez to get to the *alcaldía*, though I should not mention this because FUPI was an NGO and what they did was political. An NGO cannot help a politician because it would stop being apolitical”. In return for FUPI’s support, Méndez granted the HTA a new deed to the land in order to resume work on the stadium. Méndez also used *alcaldía* funds to contribute towards construction costs,

allowing the stadium to be completed in 2003. Hernández recalls “Enrique Méndez through the *alcaldía* helped us a lot. The *alcaldía* built some of bleachers in the stadium...he joined the project and with his help we finished the stadium”.

The relationship between FUPI and Méndez worked well during his first of his three terms in office. However, soon thereafter problems arose. Méndez found it increasingly difficult to serve two masters—FUPI with its economic power and the poor communities who depended on the *alcaldía*’s equity. FUPI and Méndez began to disagree about the allocation of funds. In particular, FUPI wanted the *alcaldía* to prioritize its projects, while Méndez felt it more important to invest funds into expensive projects, like potable water systems, in the *caseríos*. Romeo Chávez, the *alcaldía*’s engineer, comments, “We, in the *alcaldía*, had to divert some funds so they would not go to FUPI projects. Of course, we also did what they were asking for to keep them quiet. But we never lost track of our vision which is to bring people in the *caseríos* out of their misery.”

In 2006, FUPI disintegrated suddenly under dubious circumstances. FUPI members insist the HTA disbanded because members were exhausted from so many years of work and they were content that their dream of constructing a soccer stadium had been fulfilled. However, many assumed that break-up came about because Méndez refused to continue to be influenced by FUPI. Nevertheless HTA members, like Efraín Guerra of the counterpart committee, insist that FUPI’s relationship with Méndez was intact until the end, “There was no rupture with Enrique Méndez, no rupture. He let us do anything—that was good.” For Chávez, the *alcaldía*’s engineer, the problem is obvious, “This situation could have been avoided if FUPI had been apolitical as dictated by its

[non-profit status] by-laws. All they had to do was to stay away from politics, refrain from supporting Alcalde Méndez or another candidate. In other words, assume its role as dictated by its by-laws.” Nevertheless, in a drastic turn of events, news of the HTA’s disintegration was soon followed by the announcement that the HTA would be launching one of its key members, Hugo Salinas, in a mayoral campaign against Méndez. Salinas claims that FUPI had genuinely chosen to remove itself from local politics, “When FUPI was first created, it was never considered an organization with political objectives. In time, however, FUPI wanted to get involved in politics. It wanted to take on a political role and it wanted to make decisions to benefit its preferred candidate, but it realized that it was a mistake. We decided unanimously that we will never again get involved in politics. That mistake was amended and we decided that FUPI would not be political, but only a community and social organization.” However, by all accounts, FUPI’s supposed ‘disintegration’ was just another sneaky political tactic to usurp the local state. HTA members tirelessly and enthusiastically supported Salinas financially and morally, even flying down from Washington in droves to vote for him on election day. However, to their dismay, Salinas lost the 2006 elections and Méndez won again. In 2009, Hugo Salinas ran for *alcalde* once more and won. However, this time FUPI curiously denied any involvement with Salinas or his campaign. The HTA denies funding him. It denies supporting him. It even denies caring that he was running. However, rumors suggest otherwise.

FUPI, as an organization, was in fact inactive during the 2009 mayoral elections.²⁰ However, its members still exerted significant political influence in the

²⁰ During the 2009 campaign, Hugo Salinas organized a new HTA call Unidos por el Cambio (UPEC). This HTA is comprised of young Intipunqueño migrants in Washington and second generation immigrants.

municipality and have many economic interests, including the undeveloped stretches of beaches along Intipucá coastline. It is impossible to say with any certainty at this point to what degree Salinas and former FUPI members are conspiring and who or what precisely is involved. However, Salinas' 2009 mayoral campaign was marred by allegations of corruption, fraud, vote buying, and money laundering. In sum, during his campaign, Salinas explicitly expressed his desire to develop Intipuca's beaches in order to attract tourism and economic development. A few run-down hotels already exist and many of FUPI's former members, including Salinas' family, own large lots along the coast.²¹ However, Salinas' beach agenda faces a major obstacle--the *caserío* of El Esterón, which is located at a strategic intersection. The community of El Esterón has existed in this location for over 75 years. However, during the campaign, residents of El Esterón received eviction notices ordering them to vacate their homes because they were situated on public properties and did not possess deeds to their land or other legal proof of ownership²². These notices were signed by Intipuca's municipal judge who residents

According to Salinas, the idea is that UPEC will breath fresh insight and perspective into Intipucá's transnational community development. UPEC does not have a political mandate. But, yet again, this HTA is intrinsically tied to the local state and in particular to Salinas' agenda.

²¹ It is also worth mentioning that Salinas' father was at the center of a banking scandal in Intipucá several years ago. In the early 1980s, Salinas' father and three business associates founded an informal remittance wire service in Washington, known informally as the *banquito*. The *banquito* also allowed undocumented migrants to open checking accounts and savings accounts and offered other financial services that were not made available to them by US banks because of their undocumented status. Trusting in their fellow Intipucanos, thousands of migrants invested their lives' saving in the *banquito*. At its high point, the *banquito* had about 3,000 clients and was handling US\$1 million a week. Salinas' father and his associates used the money to give out loans to friends and family and also to purchase private business ventures and properties in El Salvador. However, preferring to stay free of banking regulations, the men failed to legally register the *banquito* and as a result their investor's funds were never insured. By the early 1990s, the *banquito* could no longer maintain its facade. In order to minimize their personal losses, Salinas' father and his associates simply closed the *banquito's* doors and absconded with approximately US\$7 million dollars of deposits. As a result of the *banquito* crisis, many Intipucanos lost their life savings and because they were undocumented could not take appropriate legal action in the US. Salinas' father declared bankruptcy, but evaded any criminal charges (Pederson 2002).

²² In the context of rural El Salvador, it is highly unlikely that any resident would possess such a document. Moreover, residents are often too poor and uninformed of their rights in order to pursue corrective legal action.

believed has been paid off by Salinas or one of his cronies, along with local police officers. In addition, as a campaign strategy, Salinas selected two local “leaders” to serve on his municipal advisory board. These two men effectively served as Salinas’ spies in the community. To make matters worse, those residents who were most defiant began receiving threats from an American “investor” who had taken up residence in one of the beach’s abandoned hotels. Salinas was often seen socializing with this investor who was also believed to be in some way financing part of Salinas’ campaign. The situation concerning Esterón’s beach took a dangerous turn when the mutilated body of an unknown girl appeared on the beach and when residents witnessed the “investor” suspiciously unloading crates off cargo boats in the middle of the night. Alvaro Portillo, one particularly outspoken and determined resident of Caserío El Esterón explains, "The American wants to intimidate everyone with his money. If I look for help in a person from the community, they refuse because he is American and they are scared. The *gringo* treats us like trash...The most affected are those in this line in front of the beach. In my case, I have already spent \$7,000 in lawsuits and court audiences fighting the charges he makes against me. So I have had to look for a lawyer and sell some of my things to pay for the lawyer. This is the end of the line for El Esterón. Before there were 9 houses [pointing to his street bordering the beach]. Today there are fewer because he keeps pushing us out because he has power, he has money, and he buys people. He paid \$300 to most of the people he pushed out. He offered me \$1,500 because my house is bigger, but I asked him for \$8,000 because I had it appraised by cubic meter and it comes out to \$30,000 only for the house, not including the land...Hugo Salinas and the *gringo* are together in this. When Hugo came to El Esterón, I personally heard him when he said that

if he wins the elections and sits in the *alcalde*'s chair in Intipucá then he is going to kick us all out of here because it is public property. But, Hugo and the *gringo* have obtained deeds [for other public beaches] and I don't know how they did it. This beach is state property. It is public property. I have a document to prove this. But, I do not want to continue fighting and instead I would just prefer to leave this place." It has yet to be seen what will become of Salinas' beach development plans and how, if at all, FUPI's members are involved.

VI. Fundación Unidos por Intipuca's Linkages with the Hometown Community

Despite geographic separation, FUPI developed a highly collaborative relationship with its counterpart committee in the hometown community. This linkage was reinforced by strong bonds of social capital which not only allowed the HTA to seamlessly coordinate events and manage funds transnationally, but also to develop genuine feelings of trust and solidarity. In addition to its counterpart committee, FUPI counted with the support of select friends and family who were loyal to its cause. For example, FUPI supporter Blanca Nery Chávez says, "I tell you, when FUPI asked for help, I and several other persons who were not members of the committee did whatever needed to be done to organize the activities, anything."

However, FUPI's network of solidarity was limited to Intipuca's urban center. It made little effort to extend itself into Intipuca's *cantones* and *caseríos*. Its relationship with the *caseríos* was limited to sporadic donations during natural disasters or the holiday season. Isabel Zelaya, now the director of the Casa de la Cultura, reminisces from her childhood, "When I was a little girl I remember people used to say 'the people from FUPI

are coming. They will come in March.’ ‘Who are they?’ I would ask. When they finally came, they would introduce them and they would bring presents or books or a donation for a poor family that did not have money to send the children to school. They would give them notebooks, schools supplies, or money for uniforms.” FUPI also made several contributions to help individuals and families in urgent need of medical care or facing an unexpected hardship, some of whom resided in the *cantones* and *caseríos*. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of FUPI’s projects, especially its most significant and expensive ones, were concentrated within the urban center. José Chávez, an ADESCO leader from Caserío El Chichipate confirms, “No, FUPI never helped here. FUPI developed projects in the urban center, such as the park, but never in the *caseríos*.” FUPI never invested in the *caseríos* because its members and collaborators all resided in the urban center and shared similar economic interests in its development. For them, FUPI became a vehicle through which to secure these interests. Consequently, FUPI garnered a reputation as an exclusive clique of the rich elites. Former *alcalde* and FUPI co-founder, Juan de Dios Blanco, recalls that people criticized FUPI for being “a closed group of rich people who just want money and power.” It is true that FUPI never opened up its organization to the public. It did not involve the hometown community at large in its decision-making processes, neither through formal *cabildos abiertos* nor through indirect solicitation. Residents could make requests, but it was only members who decided how to prioritize projects and needs. The HTA felt entitled by its financial clout and strong ties to the *alcaldía* and did not seek community support. By excluding the population at large from the decision making process, FUPI isolated itself in a bubble and severed its ties to the larger community. It never formed relationships with community leaders in the

caseríos. Juan Arias, an ADESCO leader from Caserío El Caulotillo notes, “They turned FUPI into something of their own, only for them, only for them, and did not want other people to participate.”

In some instances, FUPI actively discriminated against Intipuca’s poor rural communities. For example, José Gallo, who as a child and teenager vacationed often in Intipucá with his family, remembers, “FUPI only let their friends into the celebrations for the *fiestas patronales*. But, we, the young people from the US, we looked at everybody as ‘normal’. We did not prefer one person over another.” Moreover, many local residents accuse FUPI of using the soccer stadium to discriminate against the poor. Ignacio Padilla, a young resident from Intipuca’s poorest *caserío*, Santa Juliana, claims, “There is a group of migrants in the United States that sends money. But, it does not work for all, not for the entire community, only for some people. For me, FUPI does not work for all because, for example, the stadium is not for all, but only for some, for the ones closest to them. A person has the key and that person decides if you can use the stadium or not. The truth is that when you ask them to let you use the stadium they say no because a certain team is going to use it. There is no access for all...May be, the poorest people are discriminated and there is no union for all sectors of the municipality. In the *caseríos* there is nothing.” After FUPI’s disintegration, former members of the counterpart committee created Asociación Deportiva de Intipucá (ADI) and it has taken responsibility for maintaining the stadium. Most recently, ADI began charging a \$30 per group to use the stadium and tickets to a game cost \$10. Both rates are considered exorbitant for Intipuca’s poorer residents. ADI’s president, Edwin Hernandez, explains, “People wanted access to the

stadium to be free for everyone. But, we do not give it free because we need money to maintain it; otherwise, it will get ruined.”

VII. Fundación Unidos por Intipucá as a Trans-local Governance Actor: Opportunistic Elite

The case study of FUPI serves as an important contrast to Comité Piedras Blancas because it illustrates how HTAs can act as negative forces for democratic quality. In Intipucá, FUPI intervenes as an opportunistic elite which breeds exclusionary governance practices, structures, and values. This case study shows that a strong linkage to the local state alone does not ensure democratic deepening. In fact, as seen here, it can lead to clientelistic ties which prove detrimental for democratic quality. Rather, democratic deepening also requires a bottom-up approach encompassing all sectors of the community. As seen in Intipucá, the community’s exclusion from governance processes may even cause a regression in democratic quality. Prior to FUPI’s intervention, Intipuca’s democratic climate was fragile, but promising. Alcalde Méndez planted important democratic seeds in the municipality. For example, he engaged the *caseríos’* ADESCOs, implemented several important projects, and maintained an open door policy at the *alcaldía*. However, democratic quality in Intipucá suffered as a direct result of FUPI’s intervention. FUPI used the influence and power garnered through its collective remittances to manipulate and usurp the local state. FUPI shamelessly tried to control the local state by manipulating its financial clout and literally hand-picking *alcaldes*. From its inception, FUPI prioritized its relationship with the *alcaldía* as a means through which to realize its objectives. However, problems arose as it became clear that the HTA’s objectives were ultimately to secure the economic and political interests of its members,

even if at the expense of the community at large. In other words, the HTA actively sought out the creation of clientelistic ties with the *alcaldía* in order to exert its power over the municipality.

As a result of its linkage with the local state, FUPI expected the *alcalde* to be personally accountable to it, not to the municipality's constituents at large. FUPI dangled its money and threats of withdrawing its support in front of the *alcaldes* as a way to control public agendas and funds. For cash-strapped *alcaldías*, these offers were initially, at least, too enticing to turn down. Consequently, the *alcaldía* in Intipucá often had to divert funds and projects from the *caseríos*, thereby compromising its accountability to its other constituents, in order to keep FUPI happy. If an *alcalde* like Caballero and Méndez did not prioritize FUPI's interests at the forefront of municipal agendas, then the HTA became resentful and aggressive towards the municipal administration. Moreover, as a result of its linkage with FUPI, the local state also became less transparent to its broader constituents. FUPI itself lacked any transparency. Its members refused to disclose its financing statements or decision-making processes to anyone outside of its inner circle. Inquiries about its activities or its impact on the community were only met with lies or intimidation tactics.

As an opportunistic elite, FUPI also aggravated inequality and socio-economic cleavages within the municipality. FUPI's collective remittances and its development projects served to further demarcate the gap between Intipucá rich and poor. It was clear that those who mattered were the richer residents of the urban center, while the municipality's poorer rural citizens were pushed aside by the HTA. Residents of Intipucá's *cantones* and *caseríos* were not only overlooked in terms of project benefits,

but their very dignity is denied through FUPI's overt discrimination. For example, the soccer stadium is a symbol of FUPI's power and wealth in the municipality. Not only do migrants use it to actively discriminate against Intipuca's poorer residents by restricting its use. But by imposing fees, now they are actively trying to get richer off of the poor. FUPI would have been completely within its rights to build a grand stadium and limit its availability, if it had used solely private funds. However, it used public funds and therefore it should be a project open to the public. To add to the hypocrisy, FUPI justified the use of public money by claiming that the stadium would provide an important social benefit to the community as it would give children a place to play and stay out of trouble. In short, as a trans-local governance actor, FUPI conflated its private interests with its public responsibilities.

FUPI's organizational structure facilitated governance practices which led to the discrimination and exclusion of Intipuca's poor. For example, FUPI's decision-making processes concerning issues such as the identification of needs and the prioritization of projects were made exclusively within the HTA among its members. Local residents had no voice whatsoever in the decisions FUPI made for the municipality or by extension in its outcomes. Consequently, while FUPI did make some important contributions, its projects reflected the needs and ideals of the migrants, not the will of the community at large. FUPI imposed upon the municipality its vision of development. FUPI's exclusionary governance practices not only failed to nurture the active practice of politics, but they actively suppressed it. FUPI intentionally kept local residents uninformed and distant in order to ensure they remain passive and quiet. It exploited the poor's vulnerabilities--their lack of awareness about their rights and their lack of

solidarity. It fostered a culture of intimidation and divisiveness, which paralyzed residents from mobilizing collectively to fight for their rights or for increased accountability or transparency. Consequently, many local residents felt unempowered to confront FUPI, let alone challenge it. In this sense, the case of FUPI is an important example of the negative ramification of social capital. While strong bonds of social capital and trust united FUPI's members, they also led to a breakdown of community in Intipucá for those outside the inner circle.

FUPI's strong bonds of social capital and its finely tuned organizational structure allowed it to become one of the most prominent and prolific HTAs in the Washington area. FUPI was highly engaged in Intipucá and members contributed of their time and money towards countless projects, both big and small. However, FUPI turned an opportunity to deepen democracy in the municipality into a troubled chapter in Intipuca's history. As an opportunistic elite, the HTA used the power and influence of its collective remittances to manipulate and usurp the local state. Moreover, it implemented exclusionary governance values and practices, which broke down community and drove a wider wedge between Intipuca's rich and poor. FUPI leaves behind a legacy of discrimination, corruption, and distrust in the municipality's democratic fabric, which continues to be perpetuated today by Hugo Salinas' *alcaldía*. Thus, as a direct result of the HTA's intervention, Intipucá has regressed, in the word of one resident, to a "democracia en pañales".

VIII. Migrant Politics: Negative Politicization

In stark contrast to Comité Piedras Blancas in Pasaquina, FUPI in Intipucá adopted

an openly politicized agenda when intervening as a trans-local governance actor in its hometown. FUPI's politicization was not in support of a particular political party or ideology. Rather, it was motivated purely by power and greed. In other words, FUPI's decision to take up a political agenda was an explicit strategy in order to secure its economic and political interests. Romeo Chávez, the *alcaldía*'s engineer, claims, "FUPI wanted to have the leading role. Let's not fool ourselves; they were not interested in anything the *alcalde* did if they were not in power." The HTA also uses politics to co-opt governance institutions and practices, which prevents local residents from fully exercising their rights or potentially posing a threat to the HTA's power. Moreover, as a legally registered NGO in the US, FUPI's political affiliations were in direct violation of its apolitical mandate. Since the early 1990s, it skirted around its social and political responsibilities by employing underhanded tactics in order to shamelessly hand-select and finance those who it wished to see in power in the *alcaldía*. Ramón García, an ADESCO leader in Caserío El Carao, gives a candid assessment of FUPI's role in the political life of Intipucá, "FUPI was formed by Intipucá migrants in the United States to improve Intipucá, but they use partisan politics. They choose the *alcalde*. They have the power. When they said, 'let's put Méndez in the *alcaldía*', they did it. Now they say 'we are going to put Hugo Salinas in the *alcaldía*' and they did it. They have the financial power because I noticed that they financed Hugo's campaign and now he will be the new *alcalde* in May. But, they have also done a lot of work for Intipucá because as you can see Intipucá is very developed and that is a big effort." In sum, FUPI uses politics as a tool of intimidation and division in order to control the political destiny of the municipality. Salinas' campaign and proposed development agendas take local politics to

a malignant new level. The case of FUPI illustrates that HTAs can use politics to cause a dangerous blurring of boundaries that leads to clientelism and social exclusion and which ultimately have detrimental effects on democratic quality.

IX. Conclusion

The case of FUPI in Intipucá presents an important contrast to Comité Piedras Blancas in Pasaquina. This case study illustrates how a strong linkage to the local state alone is not enough to deepen democracy. Democratic deepening must be rooted in cross-cutting sectors within the community who actively participate in its governance processes. Otherwise, as seen here, governance becomes an exclusionary practice for the benefit of a select few. Moreover, the case of FUPI shows how a high degree of linkage may possess negative manifestations and lead to clientelism and social exclusion. In Intipucá, as a result of its close relationship with the local state, the HTA intervenes as an opportunistic elite. It manipulates its financial power to push its political and economic interests to the forefront of municipal agendas, thereby usurping the local state. It also exploits socio-economic inequalities and drives a deeper wedge between rich and poor factions of the hometown. Consequently, as a trans-local governance actor, FUPI introduces exclusionary governance values and practices, which ultimately regress democratic quality in the municipality to a “democracia en pañales”.

CHAPTER 5

The Case of Chapeltique: El Pueblo Unido Jamás Será Vencido

I. Introduction

This chapter examines the case of Comité Pro-Mejoramiento de Chapeltique (Comité Chapeltique) and, in stark contrast to Intipucá, this third case study analyzes an HTA's impact democratic deepening when it fosters strong linkages to its hometown community, but fails to solidify a collaborative relationship with its local state. In particular, migrants in the municipality of Chapeltique nurture linkages with the hometown community by forging alliances with other local leaders—the FMLN and the Catholic Church. Through this strategy, Comité Chapeltique assumes the role of grassroots activist when engaging as a trans-local governance actor and adopts as its motto “el pueblo unido jamás será vencido”.²³ Together, the HTA, the FMLN and the Catholic Church, carve out important openings for citizens to re-engage in governance processes and they make significant democratic inroads in the municipality. Moreover, HTA members openly embrace politics as a vehicle for social change and even launch one of their own as a candidate for *alcalde*. However, Comité Chapeltique's efforts towards transforming governance values and practices are ultimately blocked because it is unable to link up to the local state and access its institutional infrastructure. Thus, the

²³ A town united will never be defeated.

chapter concludes that this arrangement of linkages has frustrated implications for democratic deepening.

II. The Municipality: From Dodging Bullets to Dodging Cars

The municipality of Chapeltique, like the other municipalities examined in this dissertation, is located in the eastern region of El Salvador. It is situated in the department of San Miguel about 30 kilometers from the commercial hotbed that is the city of San Miguel (See APPENDIX III.3). Chapeltique is a large municipality and at 103.55 square kilometers it is the second largest of the four case studies (See APPENDIX III.6).

According to the *alcaldía's* records, it is comprised of an urban center, six *cantones* and 32 *caseríos*, which are populated with 11,208 residents (Almanaque Municipal 2006; Monografía del Departamento y Municipios de San Miguel 2007). Chapeltique's urban center has a lively and slightly chaotic ambiance, especially in comparison to Pasaquina and Intipucá (See APPENDIX III.10). The urban center has a bustling market selling food, clothing, and housewares and its streets are lined with small businesses. Vendors selling pirate CDs and DVDs fill the air during the day with music and movies blasting from oversized speakers on every corner. Pedestrians and stray dogs carefully dodge cars and buses, which must pass through the municipality en route to other parts of the department. Red *moto-taxis* abound transporting shoppers carrying bags, hurried students, residents of nearby *caseríos*, or simply those hoping to avoid walking in the blistering afternoon heat. As in the other cases, the urban center is organized around a park. Unlike Intipucá, the central park is not a place where local *bolos* pass out, but where residents congregate to discuss their day or play card games. Facing each other across the park are

the Catholic Church and the *alcaldía*, both occupying prominent and diametrically opposed positions not only in the municipality's geography, but also, as will be explored below, in its political and social relations.

The municipality has primarily an agricultural economy, but as in the other cases, agricultural production has decreased sharply and is no longer a viable means of income. Chapeltique has more commercial activity than either Pasaquina or Intipucá, but it is limited to the urban center; residents in the *cantones* and *caseríos* survive on subsistence agriculture. Moreover, public resources in Chapeltique are scarce both in the urban center and the *caseríos*. Most notably, there is no potable water system in the municipality. In the urban center, residents rely on wells and in the *caseríos* residents make due with river water or rain fall. Roads in much of the municipality are impassable unless on foot and only parts of the urban center are paved. There is public lighting in the urban center, but the scarce public lighting that can be found in the *cantones* and *caseríos* has been installed by the HTA. The urban center does, however, benefit from weekly trash removal service; whereas the municipality's other residents must dump or burn garbage. Most homes in the *cantones* and *caseríos* are extremely modest made of wood or adobe. Homes in the urban center range in size, quality, and style. Nevertheless, regardless of location within the municipality, those homes which are larger, better built, and more beautiful are always the result of remittances.

Chapeltique, like Pasaquina and Intipucá, has a large number of its citizens living in the United States who are affectionately referred to as *hermanos lejanos* in the municipality. In fact, 48.5 percent of households receive remittances bringing the per capita annual income to \$1,924.50, data similar to the previous two cases (Almanaque

Municipal 2006). Like the other cases, remittances have had an indelible impact on the local economy in Chapeltique, not only for recipients but also for non-recipients who benefit from their ripple effect. Pedro Ruiz, a former school director from the urban center, comments, “Chapeltique is known for having industrious and hard working people. So, those who receive remittances have improved their houses and some household amenities. In a way, that has helped others in the community also. For example, I do not receive remittances but I can perform a service needed by those who receive remittances and they pay me with the remittances they receive, so I also benefit.” Remittances are a key source of finance for local households and they have kept residents from falling deeper into poverty. Another resident, Francisco García who works as a *promotor de salud* in the *caseríos*, explains, “In a way, the level of poverty has not increased but has remained the same because remittances have kept the communities afloat and we should be thankful for that. But now that many people are unemployed in the United States, the communities have started feeling the impact and living in poverty.” In addition to their effects on poverty, remittances have also helped ease inequality in the municipality, especially between the urban center and the surrounding *cantones* and *caseríos*. Alfonso Rosales, ADESCO treasurer from the *caserío* of Cacahuera, gives his perspective: “Very few are very poor because most people have relatives in the United States. Due to the remittances everyone is at the same level, they are almost equal. No one is rich.”

There are seventeen schools scattered throughout the municipality, but the urban center has the municipality’s only high school. Uniformed school children are ubiquitous during the week days. However, most of the children who reside in surrounding *cantones*

and *caseríos* are unable to travel to the urban center to complete their education or cannot afford the cost associated with staying in school. Others rescind their education because they marry, get pregnant, or join the labor force. In fact, the average years of schooling for Chapeltique residents is only 3.9 years, which is on par with Pasaquina and Intipucá (Almanaque Municipal 2006). Gloria Bonilla, school director of the Centro Escolar Eliseo Henríquez in the urban center, explains, “There are children especially in first grade who do not come to school because the parents spoil them. Since the child is young the father does not want to wake him up or the father himself does not want to get up and, as a result, he does not bring the child to school. Or else, the child does not want to go to school and stays home and continues getting behind even if we struggle to keep him in school. There is no support from the parents; that is the problem...In Chapeltique, we have children that spend all day selling in the streets, running behind the buses, selling something. We have children whom we ask ‘why didn’t you come to school?’, ‘because, at home, they did not give me anything to eat’, and ‘why didn’t they feed you?’, ‘because there was nothing to eat so I stayed home.’ We have children who come to school on an empty stomach and they pass out here.”

Unfortunately, in terms of health, Chapeltique does not fair much better. The municipality’s only fully equipped Unidad de Salud is located in the urban center, which renders it nearly impossible for most residents in the *cantones* and *caseríos* to reach in case of emergencies. Even for non-emergencies, access to and availability of medical services are limited and many patients must be turned away at the end of the day regardless of the struggle they may have made to get there. One resident in the remote *caserío* of El Picacho claims, “I go to the Unidad de Salud by bus. It comes by at 6:15 in

the morning and returns at 2 in the afternoon. So I have to spend all day going and coming back by bus because I can no longer walk long distances. Before we had the bus, it took me about two hours to walk to the Unidad de Salud.” All *cantones* and *caseríos* are assigned a *promotor de salud*, who focuses primarily on vulnerable populations such as pregnant women, children under 5 years of age, and the elderly. In addition, the Catholic Church of Chapeltique has set up a small clinic which provides free medical services and treatment for those who cannot afford the cost associated with going to the Unidad de Salud. However, the Church’s clinic has very limited resources and only covers a small fraction of the municipality’s medical needs. Unfortunately, the needs in the municipality surpass their capacity, resources, and at times willingness to help. As a consequence, the average life expectancy is only 69.3 years, which again is similar to the previous two cases (Almanaque Municipal 2006).

Chapeltique was more affected by the civil war than the municipalities of Pasaquina and Intipucá, as there was an active insurgency presence which led to greater armed conflict. Although the insurgency attracted some sympathizers to their leftist ideology, residents were often caught in the middle of the violence. One shop owner in the urban center recalls that residents survived those years within the relative safety of their homes, scared to venture out. Nevertheless, many died, killed by stray bullets. Those bullets which missed their targets can today still be seen lodged in walls in various buildings and homes throughout the municipality. Luís Andrade, a member of the agricultural cooperative in the *caserío* of Potosí, recalls, “The armed conflict was very bad here. We felt forced—we were like pinned against the wall—to assume a neutral position. But the truth is that we had to take sides. There was no neutral, it was

impossible to be neutral, that was a lie.” To this day, the civil war has left in its wake a degree of distrust regarding politics and its capacity for social change.

III. The Democratic Climate (2004-2009): Frustration and Anger

In Chapeltique, the democratic climate between 2004-2005 is characterized by frustration and anger. This creates a sharp contrast to the democratic climate in Intipucá, which incites paranoia and hostility and where underhanded tactics run rampant. Chapeltique, on the other hand, is not governed by a politics of fear. In fact, Chapeltiqueños openly reveal their political leanings and criticize the local political administration. They are generally unguarded concerning their political inclinations and opinions. In addition, Chapeltique’s frustration and resentment with politics also presents an important contrast to Pasaquina where politics is removed from the lives of its citizens. Unlike Pasaquina, citizens of Chapeltique have strong opinions regarding politics and they do not express a lack of familiarity with political officials or processes. In sum, residents of Chapeltique are not weighed down by division, fear, or conflict, nor are they isolated and removed from political happenings. Nevertheless, there is a distinct sense of resentment and anger in the air. Chapeltiqueños are fed up and the political atmosphere in the municipality is frustrated and stifled by a lack of hope. According to Mario Mendoza, a political hopeful in the 2009 mayoral race and the director of the Unidad de Salud, “People say ‘no matter who wins I will always be here, nothing will ever change for me, if I don’t work I don’t eat’. People feel indifferent because they have not really seen a good politician.” In fact, few citizens report voting in local or national elections, especially in the urban center, because they no longer believe their vote makes

a difference. Francisco López, the municipality's Catholic priest, estimates, "Over 8,000 persons should vote here, but not even 4,000 actually vote. In the presidential elections, 2,800 persons voted for the FMLN and 1,350 voted for ARENA. About 50 percent of the people votes; that does not include the children and youth that cannot vote. So, that means that there are people who are not interested in social issues." Zoila Beltrán, a young activist in *caserío* Pie de la Cuesta and avid FMLN supporter, further comments, "Sometimes people do not reflect, do not think, do not reason about our conditions. Sometimes they do not go to the urns to vote because they say 'I don't benefit from that, if I don't work I don't eat'; that is their motto or their dilemma. We have many needs in our *cantón* and many people did not go to vote. For example, I was in Chapeltique's urban center and noticed that people in the city need water also, and need it more than we do because three days can go by and they do not get water. And those persons did not go to vote. Also, many people from the *cantones* did not go to vote."

Furthermore, residents of Chapeltique express only disdain for the institution of the *alcaldía* and maintain that no *alcalde* has worked in the community's best interest. Chapeltique's current *alcalde*, José [Chepe] Eustaquio Rivas who is serving his third term in office under the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), has only reinforced residents' anger. Chapeltiqueños readily criticize Rivas and many claim that he has been the municipality's worst *alcalde* in recent history. Rivas is especially unpopular in the *cantones* and *caseríos* which, as in the other two cases, are chronically neglected. Even among Rivas' few supporters, their loyalty is often secured through financial incentives, rather than a genuine loyalty to him or his party's ideology. In fact, Rivas himself is not loyal to a particular party's political ideology, as he switched from PCN to PDC in order

to advance his political career. Moreover, those who work in the *alcaldía* are just paid employees and are not necessarily loyal to the *alcaldía*, the party, or the policies implemented. Employees remain, even with a change of administration, unlike the *alcaldías* in Pasaquina and Intipucá. Rivas is widely accused of maintaining his position of authority by committing election fraud. During the most recent elections of 2009, Rivas was suspected of paying poor residents for votes and of falsifying identification cards for residents of surrounding municipalities whom he bused in on election day to vote for him. For example, Manuel Cásaes, president of the ADESCO and the agricultural cooperative from *caserío* Tamera recalls, “Chepe Rivas is unscrupulous and it was very difficult for another party to win since Rivas was using tactics, such as paying for votes—he bought votes, but also people are ignorant because they give their vote for \$20 dollars.” In a separate allegation from Carlos Romero, ADESCO president from *caserío* Papalones, says, “Don Chepe won the *alcaldía* through fraud. I have information that he brought people from Carolina and they were not few, but many. And here with about 500 votes one can win the *alcaldía* and people say that Rivas brought 800 persons. This is why he won. People do not support him, do not support him.” To worsen the situation, Rivas, by all accounts, has a reputation for being short tempered and explosive, which intimidates residents and prevents them from approaching him. Residents are fearful of him and prefer to let him go unchallenged rather than approach him with a concern or question. According to Padre Francisco López, the municipality’s Catholic priest, “The problem is that Chepe Rivas is kind of stubborn and a male chauvinist and does not accept criticisms from others and wants things to be done his way. So, that is a serious problem. If a person is going to occupy a public office he must govern with ethics and

learn to listen to others, treat others with respect, be accessible to new ideas from other persons... Well, this guy is gun-toting. He uses a gun and if some one says something he does not like, he threatens that person. For example, the other day, I went to a *caserío* and he went by shooting in the air to frighten me.”

The *alcaldía*’s monthly budget, as allotted by the central government, is \$60,000 and expenses are broken down as follows: \$11,000 towards a loan taken out by the previous *alcalde* over six years ago; \$12,250 towards direct expenses including employee salaries and the *alcalde*’s monthly salary of \$1,200; \$1,200 towards electricity and transportation costs such as air conditioning, lights, computers, and cars; and, \$4,000 towards public trash pick-up services. Therefore, approximately \$31,000 are left over every month for projects. Over his past two terms, Rivas’ administration has executed several small projects such as the repavement of roadways. However, there are several reports that Rivas has consistently failed to follow through with ambitious campaign promises. For example, Rigoberto Portillo from *caserío* Singaltique, says, “Well, he had the road scrapped but did not have it paved. That man has done very little in all the communities.” Elena López from *caserío* Alto del Llano, further comments, “We feel let down because he promises a lot but does not do anything. We ask but he does not keep his word.” Most concerning, however, are reports that Alcalde Rivas only executes projects for those communities which vote for him. According to Julio Navarro of *caserío* La Trinidad, “My understanding is that Chepe Rivas already told some communities that while he is in the *alcaldía* they will not receive any help. But there are also other communities like El Rodeo, Santo Tomás, San Jerónimo, and Potosí where he is helping because they voted for him.” Francisco García, *promotor de salud* for *caseríos*

Singaltique, Cacahuera, and Santa Rita says, “Rivas only has the roads scrapped every summer, that is all he does, but in the winter the roads become impassable—one cannot go through that road. We have asked for help repeatedly, but in this period it is even more difficult to get anything because if you did not vote for the party that has Chepe Rivas in power, you do not have the right to any project and that is most unfortunate.” Moreover, Mario Hernández from *caserío* El Picacho says, “Since Rivas first came to office he has said, in general terms, that he does not do projects in the places that have not supported him. And people have been manipulated.” Under Rivas’ administration, large projects which cost hundreds of thousands of dollars, such as installing a potable water system and road construction, have been left by the wayside. And it is precisely on these large scale projects that *alcaldías* such as the ones in Pasaquina and Intipucá opt to forge alliances with HTAs and to seek funding from external donors. However, by not seeking funding and collaboration from outside agencies, Chapeltique’s *alcaldía* avoids being accountable to external auditors and other authorities. Moreover, by not seeking out additional funding and projects, the *alcaldía* lessens its work load. In the meantime, Rivas has undertaken several private business endeavors during his time in public office. Padre Francisco criticizes, “Chepe Rivas has his own personal interests. He has bought land and subdivided it into lots. So, in addition to being *alcalde*, he dedicates himself to managing his personal businesses. Thus, the *alcaldía* projects that should be for the people are mixed up in his businesses.” Residents also report that Rivas is rarely in the *alcaldía* and is often overseeing one of his private projects. Most significantly, he built a private luxury water park or *turicentro* in the municipality. He is often criticized for investing in lavish pools, while residents of Chapeltique do not have drinking water.

According to ARENA's candidate Mario Mendoza, "There is no drinking water but the swimming pools are overflowing." Rivas claims that the *turicentro* serves as a tourist attraction which will eventually boost Chapeltique's economy. This effect has yet to be seen. However, it is known that the vast majority of Chapeltiqueños, most of whom live in the *cantones* and work agricultural jobs, cannot afford the entrance fee of \$4, as they earn on average only \$5 a day.

Rivas' reign over the municipality has taken its toll on community organization and citizen participation. Despite the overwhelming development needs throughout the municipality, residents neither band together nor lobby the *alcaldía* individually to address pressing issues such as water shortages and road conditions. According to Francisca Rodríguez, ADESCO president from *caserío* Santo Tomás, "In the past, people collaborated much more. But today, people do not even want to talk about collaboration. People are demoralized—now they feel that there is nothing we can do. There is no optimism, there is no joy here, just a sort of melancholy and sadness, and like nothing will ever be the way it was." Today many *cantones* and *caseríos* do not have ADESCOs or any other *directivas* catering to community development issues. The few ADESCOs that do exist on paper do not function in practice. Chapeltique, like Intipucá, has come to be characterized by a high degree of individualism, which prevents authentic community from taking root. Whereas this individualism in Intipucá results from a politics of intimidation which pits residents against each other, in Chapeltique collective inertia is due to residents' frustration with local politics which engenders anger and resignation. According to Leonardo Rodríguez, the FMLN's campaign leader in Chapeltique, "We are so used to living in a reality that is oppressive, distressing, and sometimes even

smothering that we have gotten used to survive and have adopted a life style in which we prefer to live like that instead of looking for a change. We have entered the area of conformism and say ‘I prefer to be like this, I am like this, I cannot change, I cannot improve’...Here there is too much negativity inside the people, not only inside them, but also inside me. I see it in me, each time I do not want to do something is because the feeling of hopelessness is more powerful than the desire to do something and to look for a change, to fight. I do not want to view convenience as conformism, but here there are many people who survive on remittances, and also that situation has not allowed them to see beyond their noses.” In short, Chapeltiqueños have stopped believing in politics as a vehicle for change. While such a passive approach seems illogical given the overwhelming needs, past experience has taught citizens of Chapeltique that their efforts are met with hostility by the *alcaldía* or, in the best case, are brushed off as petty complaints. As in the other cases, *alcaldes* in Chapeltique generally have little interaction with their constituents once election season is over. Rivas, in particular, has been especially negligent of his responsibilities to municipal ADESCOs and other *directivas*. Pedro Méndez, a school director in *caserío* El Jote says, “Rivas did not want to work with NGOs and many projects were lost, the development collapsed. What I mean by this comment is that I saw that the communities wanted to work.”

Ciro Andrade, HTA member and the FMLN mayoral candidate elaborates, “In the last 20 years ago, the last thing the *alcalde* wants is to face the people to explain what needs to be done. That is what the people want. Here the *alcalde* thinks that he owns the municipality, the people, and everything. In other words, the *alcalde* decides for everyone, and I do not think that is right. He needs to consult with the people, assemble the people and have a vote in

order to reach a unanimous decision for which the people can feel responsible. If we do a good project, let the people participate in that decision, and if we do something bad, let the people recognize that they are also at fault. That does not exit here.” In some communities such as Los Zelayas and El Jiote, Rivas intentionally impedes their efforts by overwhelming and intimidating citizens, who seek to organize and obtain *personalidad jurídica* for their ADESCOs, with overblown legal jargon and paperwork. Furthermore, residents do not know how to establish contact with outside organizations in San Salvador or abroad which could offer alternative support systems and financing options. Without the support of the *alcaldía* or external organizations, citizens regard collective organization as a futile endeavor.

In 2009, after six years with Rivas in the *alcaldía*, Chapeltique’s political climate reached a boiling point. During to the national and local elections, the municipality experienced a significant shift political identity and consciousness due to the rise to prominence of the FMLN. Since the end of the civil war, the FMLN has been a legitimate, but marginalized political party. Right wing parties in general and ARENA in particular have always assumed the role of political forerunners. However, history changed on March 15, 2009 when Mauricio Funes, the FMLN candidate, was elected president of El Salvador. As election results were announced, the municipality of Chapeltique erupted in celebration. Music, honking horns, and firecrackers all competed for attention as people filled the streets dancing and singing. Citizens chanted: “Nace la esperanza...viene el cambio”²⁴. The emergence of the FMLN’s popularity at the national level has come to redefine Chapeltique’s democratic climate on the local scale. Although the FMLN had always had a relatively strong base of support in Chapeltique, the party

²⁴ “Hope is born...change is coming”.

began gaining important momentum in the years leading up to the 2009 elections. The local FMLN leadership was stirring new excitement and vitality in the municipality. The FMLN's chapter in Chapeltique forged cross-cutting networks in the *cantones* and *caseríos* and, as shall be explored in detail below, it also cemented alliances with the Catholic Church and the migrants in Virginia. Determined to overthrow Rivas from office, the FMLN and its partners mounted a strong campaign in their push to have their candidate Ciro Andrade, a migrant and HTA member, win the *alcaldía*. Propaganda spreading the party's FMLN's slogan, "el pueblo unido jamás será vencido", was ubiquitous around the urban center. Festive parades and local rallies are filled with attentive audiences who, in stark contrast to Intipucá, were there to listen and not simply to receive free T-shirts and drinks. Some FMLN followers in Chapeltique are long standing informed activists devoted to the party's ideology and its civil-war roots. Others' support is based in the Catholic Church's message of liberation theology. Yet, some are simply *fanáticos* who, according to one resident, vote for "any guy wearing a red shirt". However, some Chapeltiqueños are unable to separate contemporary politics from the FMLN's dark past in the civil war and for them Ciro Andrade and other party leaders are just a *guerilleros* in different clothing. Nevertheless, during both national and local elections, the FMLN's platform was that of hope and change and for many citizens of Chapeltique Mauricio Funes and Ciro Andrade embodied that promise.

One reason that the FMLN's campaign was able to plant such deep-seeded roots in Chapeltique is because the municipality is no stranger to political activism, despite the current state of collective mobilization. It used to be a hotbed of civic organization during the civil war, at which time agricultural cooperatives and the Catholic Church played

particularly pivotal roles. This activism has been significantly suppressed in recent years, especially under Rivas' administration. But, the spirit of organization is itching to reawaken in Chapeltique. Today, most of Chapeltique's agricultural cooperatives no longer exist, as they had to comprise their agendas for peace during the formalization of democracy in 1992 when the land reform movement came to a sudden halt and land was divided among each cooperative's associates. However, Chapeltique still has three agricultural cooperatives in the *caseríos* of Singaltique, Tamera, and Potosí. Although they lay essentially dormant, these cooperative are eager to re-ignite collective projects and their members constitute a core base of support for the FMLN and help fuel the invigorated democratic climate brewing in Chapeltique. Manuel Cásares, president of the ADESCO and agricultural cooperative in *caserío* Tamera, explains, "The difference is that those of us who live here in Tamera tell the *alcalde* the truth and he knows that we are not ignorant. Moreover, this community is large and more alert than other communities because of the cooperative system we had before. That helped us because we encountered problems with the government offices and we had to fight them. That also helped us to keep the people in Tamera more involved and socially active than the people in other communities. Singaltique should also have a lot of these characteristics. I told the gentleman from the FMLN committee that we should look for ways to help the communities if the *alcalde* does not do it. The primary person responsible to help the communities is the *alcalde* but if he does not do it, they could help us to organize ourselves and pressure the *alcalde* to do something." In addition to the agricultural cooperatives, the FMLN in Chapeltique benefited from the support of the Catholic Church. During the civil war, the Church played an active role in civic organization in

Chapeltique and today it continues to be an important force for social change. In many communities, church groups are the only *directivas* for which residents actively congregate and participate. Under the leadership of Padre Francisco López, who is also trained as a lawyer, the Church has resurrected its left-leaning roots in liberation theology. It openly invokes parishioners to elevate their spiritual consciousness, which, according to the Church's philosophy, necessitates a commitment towards social justice and political action. Padre Francisco comments, "Since 1994, when father Lázaro came here, the Church started taking on a political leadership role in all its religious services and Biblical teachings. He always talked about the needs of the people and that encouraged us to change. There are many people who are very poor. We have found people living in houses made of plastic and sheet metal. We have found many people sick along the trash dump site in deplorable conditions. The social doctrine of the Church which is profound and all encompassing compels us to think about the common good. And the common good is to look for the good of all those who gather with us in Church and even for those who do not attend." The "spiritual orientation" espoused in sermons and lectures is based on the lived realities of the congregations and make reference to specific situations unfolding in the community. Consequently, Padre Francisco blames the *alcalde* and ARENA for the poverty inflicted upon Chapeltique and El Salvador as a whole. For example, Padre Francisco accuses Dr. Mario Mendoza, the 2009 ARENA candidate for *alcalde* and the doctor at the Unidad de Salud, of exploiting the *pueblo* by forcing patients to purchase medications at his private pharmacy instead of handing out the free medication provided to the Unidad de Salud by the Ministerio de Salud. The Church has acted on these criticisms and has opened its own health clinic, which offers

free services and medications. The Church is undeniably politicized and the previous municipal priest even ran for *alcalde* several years ago. Sermons explicitly engage the political ideologies of the political left and right as they unfold at the local level. Padre Francisco urges his parishioners to fight for their rights as citizens. In an effort to spread this message beyond weekly mass and to those who cannot travel from the *caseríos* to the urban center on Sunday, the Church appoints *delegados de la palabra* in each community. Trained *delegados* primarily hold prayer groups and Bible studies. However, they also discuss issues of social justice within their communities which include community development agendas. Consequently, *delegados* often assume the role of community leaders, although they are only responsible for spiritual guidance and not for fundraising activities or project implementation. According to Dr. Mendoza, the politicization of the Church has alienated politically right-leaning residents, and claims that many of his supporters are forced to go to San Miguel for mass on Sunday. Nevertheless, on Sunday mornings, the Church in Chapeltique continues to attract residents from every *cantón* and *caserío* who hurry to secure a good seat in order to listen to Padre Francisco's sermons.

IV. Comité Pro-Mejoramiento de Chapeltique: Los Hermanos Lejanos, Ciro, y el FMLN Te Invitan...²⁵

According to president Hugo Carballo, the Comité Pro-Mejoramiento de Chapeltique (Comité Chapeltique) formed informally in 1998 with the intention of remitting limited funds to help the Church. Comité Chapeltique began with three core members and was slow to garner support in part because Chapeltique's migrant

²⁵ "The migrant brothers, Ciro, and the FMLN invite you..."

community in Washington has limited resources (financial and otherwise), especially in comparison to the other case studies. Comité Chapeltique's members are diverse in terms of socio-economic status. Some are successful professionals and business owners, while others are unemployed and undocumented. Thus, the founding members began with sporadic small-scale projects such as Mother's Day celebrations, soccer tournaments, and lunches for the elderly. Gradually membership grew and at its peak the HTA counted with approximately ten committed members and numerous supporters, including many migrants from other Salvadoran municipalities.

In 2003, in order to take on a more active role and execute larger projects, Comité Chapeltique began to forge partnerships with external donors, which necessitated an organized effort on the part of migrants in the US and residents in Chapeltique. Thus, the ADESCO in Chapeltique's urban center re-organized to serve as the HTA's *comité de enlace* in the hometown, as migrants could no longer do it all from the US. The ADESCO took responsibility for managing funds locally, overseeing projects, and communicating news. In addition, migrants in the US formalized the HTA, but decided not to adopt a rigid structure like the HTAs in Pasaquina and Intipucá. Aside from the presidency, there are no assigned titles or responsibilities; members assume roles ad hoc depending on the group's needs. Individually members of the HTA have always maintained an active presence in the community and most visit several times a year, even if only for a couple of days. However, collectively as Comité Chapeltique, migrants have an important, but lax presence in the hometown community. Migrants plan projects as needs or financing opportunities arise. While they maintain frequent personal contact with each other, as a group, members meet only when required by a project. This is in stark difference to the

HTA in Pasaquina, which keeps a strict schedule and maintains a sustained presence in the hometown.

Over the past twelve years, Comité Chapeltique has contributed countless small-scale donations in the hometown. Moreover, due to the assistance received from external donors, the HTA has also been able to implement four large-scale projects.

Table 5.1 Projects Undertaken by Comité Pro-Mejoramiento de Chapeltique (1998—2010)

	Project Type	Year	Project Cost (US Dollars)
	A. Sports		
1	Soccer tournaments	Yearly since 2003	N/A
2	Sports Complex of Chapeltique <i>of which: HTA</i> <i>Alcaldía</i> <i>Central government</i>	2005	200,485 (20,000)* (77,393) (103,092)
	B. Culture		
3	Mother's Day Celebration in the schools	Yearly since 2004	N/A
4	Migrants' Day Celebration (<i>centro urbano</i>)	Yearly since 2004	N/A
5	Host luncheon for the elderly (<i>centro urbano</i>)	Yearly since 2004	N/A
	C. Education		
6	Distribution of school packets to several schools	Yearly since 2003	N/A
7	Distribution of school packets to several schools	2005	N/A
8	Construction of bathrooms and classroom in <i>Cantón</i> Los Zelayas school** <i>of which: HTA</i> <i>Banco Agrícola</i>	2005	N/A (3,000) (16,000)
9	Construction of bathrooms, roof repairs in Elizeo Henríquez School, <i>centro urbano</i> **	2006	N/A
10	Construction of classroom to house Science Lab in (<i>Cantón</i> Los Papalones school) **	2007	N/A
	D. Infrastructure		
11	Sewerage pipeline Installation in front of Elizeo Henríquez School (<i>centro urbano</i>)	2007	N/A
12	Street lights installation in several <i>caseríos</i>	2007	N/A

Source: Data provided by the Comité Pro-Mejoramiento de Chapeltique.

Notes: *HTA committed US\$20,000 to the sports complex project but contributed US\$5,000.

**Project financed by HTA, Banco Agrícola, PADF and the local community.

In general, collaborative partnerships between Comité Chapeltique and external donors have positively improved the HTA's organizational capacity and its impact on local development. Although the HTA's relations with the *alcaldía* are severely strained (as shall be explored in detail below), its partnerships with USAID and the Pan-American Development Foundation (FUPAD) were great successes. For example, as a result of these unions, Comité Chapeltique was able to spread its donations to the *cantones* and *caseríos*, which had previously not benefited because projects were limited to the urban center. In addition, although Comité Chapeltique had always prioritized educational endeavors and working with students and teachers, the new partnerships allowed the HTA to contribute more substantial aid such as infrastructural repairs. For projects which receive external funding, Comité Chapeltique must ensure that beneficiaries meet the criteria outlined by the donor organization. Otherwise, project beneficiaries are typically chosen by HTA members as a result of direct solicitation. However, unlike the HTA in Pasaquina, Comité Chapeltique does not sponsor open town meetings to inform residents of upcoming projects, events, or selection guidelines. As a result, some residents, and school directors in particular, express confusion and discontent about the process because they believe they are intentionally being overlooked by the HTA while some are favored. Others are simply unfamiliar with the HTA's work altogether.

Comité Chapeltique's vision of development and community intervention has always been heavily colored by the members' personal politics, as the vast majority ascribe to the FMLN's leftist ideology. HTA president Hugo Carballo plays a particularly critical role in shaping the HTA's political slant, as he and his family actively supported the *guerilleros* during the war and have remained politically active within the FMLN.

Even in his professional life, Carballo, as well as HTA member Ernesto Galeas, work as union leaders and political activists in Virginia. Carballo and Galeas have a great deal of exposure and experience navigating political arenas and have established many high-level political contacts in both the US and El Salvador. This career experience and background greatly facilitate the HTA's work with political and grassroots organization in the hometown. For many years, members of Comité Chapeltique were able to successfully set apart their personal politics from their community work. However, in 2007 the HTA made the decision to officially politicize and work under the banner of the FMLN. In large part, the decision was made due to the HTA's inability to work with Alcalde José Rivas. The fallout from their failed attempt at collaboration, in addition to the *alcalde's* inaccessible personality and the increasing corruption in the hometown, impelled Comité Chapeltique to directly challenge the local state by launching one of their own as a candidate for *alcalde* in the 2009 elections. Migrants teamed up with the FMLN leadership in Chapeltique and conducted a survey in the municipality in which residents selected one of five men as their preferred FMLN candidate for *alcalde*. Ciro Andrade, a migrant living in Virginia and an HTA member, won the survey. Ironically, Andrade was one of the few men in Comité Chapeltique who was not previously a staunch supporter of the FMLN. Nevertheless, Andrade accepted citing that he could not go against the community's will. In addition, he had personal financial incentives to accept the position, as his car dealership and repair workshop in Virginia was suffering due to the recession and he needed to find an alternative career path. Thus, Andrade relocated to Chapeltique a year prior to election day to begin his campaign.

Upon entering Chapeltique, a red and white banner flies above the main road reading, “Los Hermanos Lejanos, Ciro, y el FMLN Te Invitan...”. It is an invitation to a lavish campaign party for all Chapeltiqueños to attend free of charge. The banner leaves no doubt that the *hermanos lejanos* stand with Ciro Andrade and the FMLN, as well as with Mauricio Funes, the FMLN presidential candidate. Comité Chapeltique was very active in their support, donating approximately \$2,000 towards the campaign’s expenses and making several visits to Chapeltique to join Andrade on the campaign trail and to vote for him on election day. In stark contrast, in Intipucá the *hermanos lejanos* did not openly support Hugo Salinas’ candidacy for *alcalde* this time around. There were no banners, no parties, no donations, and no influx of people who traveled to vote for him. However, Comité Chapeltique’s decision to politicize was not without internal backlash, as the HTA lost one of its key members, Germán Alemán. According to Alemán, Comité Chapeltique selected him to serve as the candidate. Alemán had already begun campaigning when he learned that a survey was conducted (in which his was one of the five names listed) and that Ciro Andrade was the winning nominee. Alemán felt betrayed by Comité Chapeltique and the local FMLN leadership. As a result, Alemán turned against Comité Chapeltique and joined forces with José Rivas serving as a member of his *consejo* and helping with his re-election campaign. Alemán says, “Chepe Rivas was aware of the fraud they committed against me and told me ‘why don’t you forget about that and become a member of my *consejo*. Learn a little bit with us about the *consejo* and in case one day you want to become part of this *alcaldía*—the *alcalde*—you already know how this works and people get to know you. If you want, we, ourselves, as

members of the party can nominate you as candidate for *alcalde*'. I liked the idea and I told him 'this is fine', they considered me."

Ciro Andrade, Chapeltique's FMLN leadership, and Comité Chapeltique ran a consistent, fair, and impassioned campaign. As an FMLN candidate, Ciro Andrade adopted a discourse of community empowerment and grassroots activism. "First of all, to be *alcalde* is to serve the *pueblo*, to work for my community, to work for this municipality, to do projects, make commitments and have the people witness that what we do is for the common good, for the benefit of all. I want to lift up the people." Andrade also evokes Marxist language such as *compañero*, *revolución*, and *militante*²⁶. Yet, the local FMLN leadership is careful to distance Andrade's candidacy from memories of the civil war and thus he is constantly referred to as "a person from civil society". Andrade had garnered a broad base of support throughout the municipality and on election night he was favored to win. However, José Rivas and the PDC won re-election for another three years amid rampant reports of corruption and voter fraud. Today Comité Chapeltique is demoralized by its political defeat. It has not disintegrated; however, it has also not forged ahead with any new projects or partnerships. It is simply in hold mode, waiting once again with the rest of Chapeltique for the promise of change to come one day.

V. Comité Pro-Mejoramiento de Chapeltique's Linkages with the Hometown Community

Over the years, Comité Chapeltique made many attempts to establish a collaborative relationship with its hometown community. Initially, it collaborated with

²⁶ *comrade, revolution, and militant*

particular community groups, especially teachers and students, for small scale projects such as Mother's Day celebrations and soccer tournaments. As Comité Chapeltique grew, it began to plan larger projects, secure bigger grants from US donors, and expand its agenda beyond the urban center to include the *cantones* and *caseríos*. As a result, Comité Chapeltique required a formalized base of support in the hometown and it pumped new vitality into the community, motivating the urban center's ADESCO to reorganize and serve as the HTA's *comité de enlace*. Prior to the HTA's intervention, the ADESCO in the urban center had been essentially defunct and had little incentive to organize. However, Comité Chapeltique opened up new possibilities for local change because it was able to secure funding for projects and provided an alternative to working with the *alcaldía*. Moreover, as a result of its projects in the *cantones* and *caseríos*, Comité Chapeltique was also able to stimulate civic participation in otherwise abandoned corners of the municipality. The HTA's education projects successfully brought together teachers, students, parents, ADESCO members, and migrants, as well as residents from the urban center and the *cantones* for a common goal.

The HTA's relationship with the hometown community was facilitated by a genuine camaraderie between members of Comité Chapeltique and ADESCO. Differences in political beliefs never caused friction between the groups, despite the migrants' left-leaning politics. Political and ideological differences were put aside in order to focus on common objectives for the community. In fact, the urban center's ADESCO successfully incorporated residents from all political parties and the relationship between the ADESCO and the HTA remained apolitical. The ADESCO even included members from Rivas' *alcaldía*. However, when Comité Chapeltique decided to

formally politicize, the ADESCO dissolved amicably due to the conflict of interest it presented for many, especially those members who were also employees of the *alcaldía*.

Comité Chapeltique's biggest challenge in terms of its relationship with the hometown community was that, in both in the urban center and the *cantones*, the civic spirit was largely unsustainable and reverted once projects were complete and the HTA retreated. The ADESCO in the urban center organized only to fulfill short-term tasks as needed by the HTA; members did not take the initiative to develop their own projects. The participatory practices introduced in the *cantones* also did not take root because, unlike the HTAs in Pasaquina, Comité Chapeltique did not hand over a sense of ownership to residents or fully engage them in the process.²⁷ Rather, in Chapeltique, civic participation was piecemeal, as residents were assigned specific and limited tasks. Comité Chapeltique alone does not possess the vision or practices necessary to sustain civic enthusiasm and consequently its relations with the hometown community never flourished to their full potential. However, the HTA's role in the hometown community changed dramatically with its decision to politicize because it allowed Comité Chapeltique to multiply its reach and impact within the community by forming alliances with the municipality's FMLN and Church leadership. Comité Chapeltique and the Catholic Church do not collaborate directly per se, but they join together under the political umbrella of the FMLN and its ideological drive towards social justice. In particular, all three have joined forces as a result of Ciro Andrade's campaign. The political trifecta created by Comité Chapeltique, the Church, and the FMLN harbored the perfect storm for deepening democracy in Chapeltique. They serve as activists and

²⁷ It is also worth noting that Comité Chapeltique does not increase inequality or negatively impact social relations, as is the case in Intipucá.

together launched an effective grassroots campaign for social change. For example, the local leadership of the three groups is working on new initiatives for community organization in the absence of the *alcaldía*'s support for local ADESCOs. The new community groups will essentially act like ADESCOs in *cantones* and *caseríos*, which do not have any avenues for civic participation. Using Padre Francisco's legal training, these new groups will be processed to obtain *personalidad jurídica* so that can act independently of the *alcaldía* to secure projects and external funding. As a united front, Comité Chapeltique, the Church, and the FMLN are able to challenge the local state, empower civil society, access financial capital, and tap into political infrastructure and resources at the party level. Thus, in Chapeltique, politics serves as an avenue for social change; it was not a force to be averted as in Pasaquina or a tool of fear as in Intipucá.

Despite election results, this analysis captures the very real potential which Comité Chapeltique unleashed for democratic deepening, as a result of its alliances with the Catholic Church and FMLN. However, unfortunately, Comité Chapeltique's relationship with its hometown community suffered a set back with Ciro Andrade's political defeat. The HTA risked it all and lost big. For the moment, a sense of resentment and anger once again reigns prominent in the community. Not only was the FMLN's political momentum lost, but the *alcaldía* is now more determined than ever to thwart the HTA and Church's efforts. In addition, enthusiasm has waned amongst migrants in the US who have yet to re-launch their planning or fundraising initiatives. Without the institutional support of the *alcaldía*, the HTA cannot implement anything more than small scale projects. And, according to Hugo Carballo, it has become increasingly difficult to find external aid given the economic downturn in the US. As a result, Comité

Chapeltique's presence in the community is now at a standstill. Nevertheless, it vows that its resolve will strengthen once again. And, the Church is resolute in its commitment to social justice and will continue spreading its message. The FMLN leadership too insists it will not give up and will soon begin strategizing for the next election cycle.

VI. Comité Pro-Mejoramiento de Chapeltique's Linkages with the Local State

Since its inception, Comité Chapeltique has had a troubled relationship with the local state and in particular with José Rivas' administration. While the HTA maintained a small scale agenda, the *alcaldía* took little interest in its activities. However, as Comité Chapeltique's agenda and capacity grew, it began to reach out to the *alcaldía*, which was receptive at first. However, a combination of miscommunication, mismanagement, and egoism has since stifled any hope of collaboration between the two. The first sign of trouble erupted as a result of an ambulance donation made by a migrant group based in Los Angeles. The new fully-equipped ambulance fell into disrepair due to the mismanagement of funds and miscommunication and the *alcaldía* was left to assume the expenses. Although the ambulance was not donated by Comité Chapeltique in Virginia, the *alcaldía* was left with a bad impression of migrant intervention in the hometown. Unfortunately, the *alcaldía's* second experience with its migrant community was even worse and this time it did involve Comité Chapeltique. In 2003, Comité Chapeltique and *alcaldía* together applied for and won central government funds for the construction of an *estadio deportivo* or sports complex. The contract states that Comité Chapeltique was to contribute \$20,000 towards the total cost of \$200,485, while the *alcaldía* was to contribute \$77,393 and the central government was to put in the remainder. Comité

Chapeltique, however, did not provide the promised money and again the *alcaldía* had to assume the debt. According to Roberto Sorto, the *alcaldía* believes that the HTA was able to raise the necessary funds, but intentionally left the *alcaldía* to assume the debt. Comité Chapeltique's president, Hugo Carballo, however, tells a very different story: "Prior to getting involved in the sports complex project I talked to the *alcalde*, Chepe Rivas, and mentioned the possibility of getting a project from the central government. I explained to him that if we obtained the project, the *alcaldía* would have to contribute and we would also have to contribute as a committee. I also explained that it would be very difficult for us to raise that amount of money and Rivas told me that we should not worry about that because all they want is to get the project, and we could help them with whatever amount we could. That was the agreement we reached and we did not ask him for anything. At the end, we could only contribute \$5,000 dollars. Later we learned from people who worked in the project that the *alcaldía* did not even spend the total amount given by the government. In other words, the *alcaldía* did not contribute at all. That is the reason why we did not want to continue working with Rivas. I have heard that now Rivas says that we did not contribute any money to the project." The *estadio* continues to be a source of contention in the relationship between the HTA and *alcaldía*, as both parties claim credit for it and neither recognizes the other's contributions.

Since the *estadio* controversy, Carballo says that Comité Chapeltique has approached the *alcaldía* to "work together on some projects, but that has not been possible". From the *alcaldía*'s perspective, it refuses to reengage the migrant community in joint ventures because it considers such collaborations a great financial risk. However, given its role as public officials, it is not in the best interest of the *alcaldía* to close its

doors on the migrant community. Perhaps the *alcaldía* could have provided Comité Chapeltique with guidance on project management and budgeting and the two could have continued to work on establishing mutual linkages, as has been done in Pasaquina. However, most detrimental to the relationship between the HTA and the local state is José Rivas himself. The *alcalde* is ill-tempered, vengeful, and stubborn, and uninterested in nurturing any type of civic participation. The final straw in the relationship was Comité Chapeltique's decision to challenge Rivas directly through Ciro Andrade's mayoral campaign. The two are now at a complete stalemate and are engaged in not only a political battle, but a moral one. Pedro Carballo, a key HTA collaborator in the urban center, assesses, "It seems to me that *Alcalde* Rivas has not understood that the mission of the migrant committees in the United States is to help their communities of origin. He surrounds himself with people who advised him erroneously and he politicizes the help even more. When the migrant committee in Washington sends a contribution to help the poor people of the *cantones* who have so many needs, Rivas views that with suspicion. The *alcalde* thinks that he is losing his authority as head of the community and does not recognize that it is a contribution that he should take advantage of. If the migrants in the United States send help and I am the *alcalde*, I have to support that help, collaborate with them and make the most of that help, but the *alcalde* does not view it in that way, and he thinks that the help is sent with political intentions."

VII. Migrant Politics: Positive Politicization

In comparison to the other cases, Chapeltique offers a unique perspective concerning migrants' approach to local politics and how they can negotiate their

intervention in their hometown's competing power dynamics. In Pasaquina, for example, migrants consciously detached from local politics and framed their work as apolitical. This apolitical approach allowed the HTA to better engage the local state and community and ultimately better deepen democracy. However, migrants in Chapeltique maximized their impact in the hometown by directly and explicitly engaging local politics. Comité Chapeltique used politicization as a vehicle for civic empowerment and for challenging a corrupt local state. In stark contrast, the HTA in Intipucá also openly politicized, but to very different ends. In Intipucá, local politics is a means of conflict and division. Through politicization, the Fundación in Intipucá exploited social tensions and economic inequalities, which proved to be detrimental for democratic deepening. However, the case of Chapeltique serves as evidence that politics does not have to be a dirty word in El Salvador. According to HTA member Ernesto Galeas, Comité Chapeltique has strived to use politics as means of achieving social change, "In Chapeltique there is apathy towards the political system and the popular saying is 'if I don't work I don't eat, and if I vote I don't eat either.' The belief that our political decisions will not impact us is a lie."

It was during the 2009 elections that Chapeltique's *hermanos lejanos* secured their places as authentic political actors vis-a-vis the local state and hometown community. In the case of Chapeltique, migrants' political legitimacy was in large part achieved through their partnership with the local FMLN leadership and the Catholic Church, which solidified their institutional underpinning and collective base, respectively. Migrants, however, added a critical transnational component to the mix, which altered the power dynamics and ultimately transformed the political playing field in Chapeltique. As a result of their decision to politicize the HTA, the *hermanos lejanos*

took a decisive stance against the *alcaldía* and local corruption in a way that residents simply were not able to. Migrants, unlike hometown residents, no longer live under the *alcaldía*'s threat of fear and retaliation. In other words, they had nothing to lose and had the freedom to practice the full extent of their rights as citizens of Chapeltique. Therefore, members of Comité Chapeltique were able to effectively challenge the political status quo and make demands for a more socially accountable and transparent local state. According to Galeas, "For Chapeltique to achieve the development that we—not the committee—but the citizens of Chapeltique want, and to be at the level that we deserve, we need to have a person who is open-minded, proactive and willing to negotiate with people of all political ideologies. That person should be open to the comments and criticisms people will make, at any point in time, when he does not fulfill the obligations he has as *alcalde*, as a public servant of the municipality." Moreover, the *hermanos lejanos* possessed the financial resources to defend and sustain their claims in a political campaign. In short, *hermanos lejanos* injected much needed hope into Chapeltique's political arena.

Despite the physical absence of many *hermanos lejanos*, the very concept of "the migrant" carried important symbolic implications for local politics in Chapeltique. Ciro Andrade's campaign rhetoric elevated the migrant from familiar tourist to transnational citizen, one with a vested interest in the hometown and fully empowered to practice his rights across national boundaries. In campaign speeches, Andrade often invoked images of Chapeltique's transnational *pueblo*, calling residents and migrants to come together in solidarity. Andrade insisted that as *alcalde* "the doors of the *alcaldía* will be open for all Chapeltiqueños", by which he meant both in the hometown and abroad. He also engaged

migrants in non-symbolic ways. During campaign rallies, Andrade would bring on stage those migrants who accompanied him on the campaign trail. In addition, he argued that the *hermanos lejanos* possessed important political capital because they provide the municipality with a human face to US aid organizations. In particular, according to Andrade, members of the HTA would be critical in creating links to donor institutions and for obtaining resources and money. For example, Andrade cited that if elected Comité Chapeltique's first priority would be to purchase heavy-duty construction equipment needed for large-scale infrastructure projects.

The fact that Ciro Andrade himself was a migrant and had an affiliation with Comité Chapeltique was used as a campaign strategy by the FMLN. Previous HTA donations, such as public lighting installed in the *caseríos*, were credited to Ciro Andrade's campaign and cited as evidence of his dedication to his municipality. The local FMLN leadership portrayed Andrade's migrant status as a political asset because he possessed connection to and know-how about funding opportunities in the US. Moreover, Andrade could attract fellow migrant support for local development initiatives and Comité Chapeltique was prepared to work hand-in-hand with Andrade and foster a strong partnership between the HTA and the local state. On a practical level, as a migrant, Andrade was also an attractive candidate for the local FMLN leadership because he could finance much of his own campaign. Andrade invested his personal savings of \$80,000 towards the campaign and was expected to cover ad hoc expenses such as lunches for volunteers. However, it should be noted that occasionally Ciro Andrade's migrant status was also a liability. He was criticized for lacking a genuine knowledge about Chapeltique's needs because he had lived in the US for so many years. Some feared he

would leave the municipality before the end of his term or return to the US for frequent or extended visits. In comparison to other candidates, he also had to work hard to build his reputation in the hometown because many did not know him well. According to one critic, José Vásquez, migrants get involved in politics to obtain the political power that their new money cannot buy. Vásquez elaborates, “They think because things are bad over there they will be better off here so they run for *alcalde*. They migrate like many of us and make their American Dream, but come back and think ‘I am better than you’ because they have more money, speak a little English, and have become whiter because they no longer work under the sun in the fields. We are grateful for migrants because of the remittances they send or else we would be like Nicaragua. But migrants want to show not only that they now have economic power, but political power because they are nobody over there. They look down while the rest look up at them. Now they want both types of power [financial and political].”

Despite both being migrants and members of HTAs, Ciro Andrade of Chapeltique and Hugo Salinas of Intipucá ran vastly different the political campaigns. Salinas exerted much more control over his campaign than Andrade. Salinas was the sole mastermind behind his campaign’s tone, strategy, policies, and promotion. Hugo Salinas received assistance from volunteers who were instructed to execute his orders. Ciro Andrade, on the other hand, worked in close consortium with Chapeltique’s FMLN leadership, which had an established presence in the municipality prior to Andrade’s arrival. Consequently, Andrade relinquished a lot of control over his campaign and at times served as a mere figurehead for the local FMLN leadership’s agenda. Moreover, Andrade’s message was heavily anti-ARENA, “A vote for ARENA is a vote for death, corruption, and poverty”.

The mayoral campaign in Chapeltique underscores a battle between political ideologies, not simply power as was the case in the other municipalities examined. Also, in stark difference, local politics in Intipucá take a dangerous turn in which mayoral candidates attack each other's person with slander and lies. Candidates in Chapeltique rarely criticize each other's character. Also, whereas Salinas conducts a politics of intimidation and capitalizes on community division, Andrade reaches out to his opponents' supporters and welcomes them to the FMLN, creating a discourse of unity under the party. Finally, unlike Salinas, Andrade did not hand out money or gifts during the campaign to win votes; rather, he maintained a strong focus on the FMLN's ideology.

VIII. Comité Pro-Mejoramiento de Chapeltique as a Trans-local Governance Actor: Grassroots Activists

The political trifecta created by Comité Chapeltique, the FMLN, and the Church harbored the perfect storm for deepening democracy in Chapeltique. Although they did not win the mayoral election, the measure of their success is in their ability to impart significant inroads in transforming not only the way governance is understood in the municipality, but also how it is practiced. Together, the HTA, the FMLN, and the Church launched a bottom-up campaign for social change through which Comité Chapeltique defined its role as a grassroots activist in municipality's democratic arena. Prior to politicization, Comité Chapeltique had only tentative linkages within its hometown community, which prevented it from affecting sustained civic participation on its own accord. However, the political umbrella of the FMLN gave the HTA a sound political structure and platform on which to stand. Moreover, through its alliance with the Church, the HTA secured its collective base. The Church's message of social justice and its active

engagement of local residents ensured that the HTA's efforts towards collective organization and consciousness be sustained even in their physical absence. In turn, the FMLN and the Church also depend critically on Comité Chapeltique. As in Pasaquina, migrants in Chapeltique are uniquely positioned in their hometown to challenge traditional power hierarchies and carve out new openings for civic participation. They alter local power dynamics and are not intimidated by the *alcaldía's* scare tactics. Comité Chapeltique also provides local leaders in the municipality with contacts in the outside world, which had previously seemed removed and unattainable. Moreover, the HTA contributes essential financial capital. In short, Comité Chapeltique injected much needed hope and enthusiasm into Chapeltique's stifled democratic climate.

As a grassroots activist, Comité Chapeltique, like the HTA in Pasaquina, evokes at its core a message that governance is a process grounded in civic participation. By nurturing collective organization, the HTA empowers residents to approach governance as an active process and one underpinned by citizens. Moreover, as a trans-local governance actor, Comité Chapeltique is instrumental in challenging the local state to be more transparent and socially accountable. Local residents are encouraged to know their rights and take back the power of politics instead of relinquishing it to a corrupt *alcaldía*. Comité Chapeltique demonstrates that politics does not have to be something to be feared, but it can be a platform for local residents to fight for their rights as citizens and to bring about genuine social change. Ultimately, the HTA helps reverse traditional power inequalities in the municipality and empowers previously excluded local actors to practice the full extent of their rights as citizens. Comité Chapeltique's linkages to the community provide a vital foundation for democratic deepening. However, the HTAs

story is not only one of successes. As a grassroots activist, the HTA is also defined by its inability to link up to the local state. It cannot access the institutional infrastructure needed to sustain the newfound governance structures or make permanent its democratic inroads. Consequently, as outlined in the typology presented in Chapter 1, the HTA's efforts towards improving governance values and practices are blocked. In order to deepen democracy in the hometown, Comité Chapeltique must transcend the grassroots level and also create strong linkages with the local state. Unfortunately, Comité Chapeltique fails to bring together the local state and civil society, ultimately engendering only frustrated implications for democratic deepening.

IX. Conclusion

Prior to the HTA's intervention, the democratic status quo in Chapeltique was characterized by resentment and frustration. During the 2009 elections, Comité Chapeltique injected new vitality and hope into Chapeltique's local politics. The unique interplay between the HTA, the FMLN and Catholic Church nurtured cross-cutting networks within the community which bred a distinctly reactive atmosphere for collective action and civic participation. Through their overt politicization, the HTA was able to solidify its presence in the hometown and open up the democratic playing field to include previously marginalized citizens. Consequently, in this case study migrants engage in politics as a positive force for social change and as a vehicle for improving governance processes. More specifically, as a trans-local governance actor, Comité Chapeltique adopts a bottom-up approach and assumes the role of a grassroots activist. However, as such, it also fails to link up to the local state, without which it cannot access the

institutional infrastructure in order to make permanent its democratic inroads. Thus, when intervening as grassroots activists, HTAs' governance efforts are blocked and ultimately have frustrated implications for democratic deepening.

CHAPTER 6

The Case of Comunidad Unida de Chinameca: The Charity and the Counterfactual

I. Introduction

Over the years, the members of Chinameca's HTA, Comunidad Unida de Chinameca (CUC), have raised funds by making a myriad of *pupusas* and *tamales* and preparing countless plates of *carne asada*. Its barbecues and parties draw in huge crowds from across the Washington metro area. Ten dollars buys not only a full stomach, but also a roof for someone's home or a surgical procedure for a sick child. But, do these charitable donations also deepen democracy or does that come at an extra cost? This chapter tells the story of an engaged, well-intentioned HTA and why, despite its impressive charitable efforts, it has failed to leave a lasting impact in the hometown's democratic landscape. Like the HTA in Pasaquina, CUC has averted an overt political affiliation. However, in stark contrast to Pasaquina, an apolitical approach prohibits the HTA in Chinameca from forming strong linkages with either its local state or hometown community. Consequently, CUC acts as nothing more than an isolated philanthropist, which fails to contribute to something larger than isolated acts of kindness. As a trans-local governance actor, CUC is absent, contributing to a local power vacuum which

ultimately creates hollowing effects of democratic deepening. As seen in the previous case studies, overt political affiliation can have both positive and negative effects of democratic deepening. Positive repercussions depend on whether an HTA assumes an elevated understanding of politics—one rooted in citizenship, not parties. Chinameca’s HTA fails to deepen democracy because it sees only the negative side of party politics and does not move beyond that to harness the power and potential that lie in citizen-based politics. In conclusion, the case of Chinameca is an important counterfactual which shows that an HTA’s real power and value for sustained local development lies in its political weight, not its financial contributions.

II. The Municipality: Ojalá que Llueva Café²⁸

The municipality of Chinameca is situated in the department of San Miguel approximately 30 kilometers west of the city of San Miguel (See APPENDIX III.3). Chinameca is comprised of 20 *cantones*, which are divided into 36 *caseríos* (See APPENDIX III.7). Measuring 77.34 square kilometers, it is the smallest of the four municipalities examined. However, with 22,554 residents, it is also the second most populous of the municipalities after Pasaquina, which is nearly four times larger in geographic size (Almanaque Municipal 2006; Monografía del Departamento y Municipios de San Miguel 2007). However, a vast proportion of Chinameca’s residents live within the urban center, as the municipality’s *cantones* and *caseríos* are not as heavily populated as the other cases (See APPENDIX III.11). Chinameca is the most commercialized of the four case studies. Like Chapeltique, Chinameca’s urban center

²⁸ “Hopefully it rains coffee”: The name of a popular song by Grammy-winning recording artist Juan Luis Guerra.

feels like a small city and is lively and bustling with activity. Inside the urban center, there are a diversity of stores, several restaurants, a few national franchises and even a gas station. Buses and cars fill the air with the smell of gasoline and exhaust as residents commute to work or to run errands in San Miguel. Store owners open their shops.

Campeños head into the fields. Uniformed children walk to school. No one dares cross the street without first looking both ways. And, as in the other municipalities, mornings begin as the ubiquitous *bolos* retire from their evenings' dalliances. However, these *bolos* have a violent demeanor brought on by increased drug use in addition to the alcohol. In general, Chinameca possesses a somewhat unwelcoming atmosphere, which at best feels anonymous. The municipality does not possess a sense of community, neither in the collaborative sense as is the case in Pasaquina, nor in its more sinister manifestation as seen in Intipucá. Rather, Chinameca feels like a loose conglomeration of individuals living within shared geographic jurisdiction. The Casa de la Cultura feigns attempts at bringing people together to celebrate the municipality's history, arts, and culture, but there is a lack of enthusiasm from organizers and participants alike. Municipal holidays such as the *fiestas patronales*, cultural symbols like an *escudo de armas* or indigenous flower, and oral histories of local legends do not hold a prominent place in Chinameca's cultural identity or serve to unite its residents, as they do in the other case studies.

The coolness in the air is not only felt in the municipality's social fabric, but quite literally in its climate. Chinameca has significantly cooler temperatures than the other three case studies. A light breeze replaces the scorching heat. Lush green trees dripping with mangos replace arid fields and patches of dirt. This particularly fertile soil has allowed Chinameca to become one of El Salvador's prime coffee producing areas.

Chinameca has several private coffee plantations, which export directly to major distributors in the US such as Starbucks. Although it has suffered since the civil war, the coffee business produces jobs for many of Chinameca's residents and contributes to a relatively stable local economy. The municipality also houses a large geo-thermal mine which attracts corporate investment and produces some jobs for residents. The municipality's economic and labor diversity also contribute to the fact that interviewees perceive relatively low levels of inequality and social exclusion both within the urban center and between the urban center and the surrounding *cantones*, especially in comparison to the other case studies where the disparities were glaring. Nevertheless, poverty is still pervasive as reflected in the per capita annual income in the municipality is US\$1,797.10. This amount is a little lower than all the other cases, but this is because Chinameca's residents have not felt the same pressure to migrate and are consequently less dependent on remittances to supplement household incomes. In fact, only 19.4% of households receive remittances (in comparison to approximately 45% (Almanaque Municipal 2006)). Despite the relative dearth of remittances, Chinameca's façade and public infrastructure look as developed and cared for as that of major remittance destinations. Streets in the urban center are paved and street signs and signals are posted. Major roads to the outlying *cantones* and *caseríos* are relatively well maintained too, but these are also frequented by foreign corporation accessing their coffee plantations and mines. Homes in the urban center are large and well constructed, although the homes of Chinameca's migrants do not exhibit the ostentatious display of wealth seen in those of migrants in Intipucá and Chapeltique. Moreover, unlike Intipucá, this municipality feels lived in, not like a vacation destination for migrants. Like Chapeltique, Chinameca has

residents of all ages, as its labor force has not been depleted through migration. Men pile into pick-up trucks transporting them to work in the fields, while women typically occupy positions as teachers, shop keepers, and domestics. Another notable difference between Chinameca and the other three case studies is that Chinameca's residents are more educated. Chinameca is known as the city of professors and teachers because this is a popular occupation of its residents, including some university professors who teach in San Miguel. The urban center alone has six schools including the municipal high school. It is not uncommon for students to continue their education at the university level. However, the primary schools in the *cantones* and *caseríos* are still afflicted by major shortages and deficiencies persistent in the other municipalities. Nevertheless, on average, children in Chinameca including those in rural areas receive 5.2 years of education, in comparison to only about 3.5 in the other cases (Almanaque Municipal 2006). Furthermore, in terms of health, the Unidad de Salud in Chinameca's urban center is better equipped than those the other case studies. It has a new infrastructure including a clinical laboratory, X-ray machines, and a computing center. However, as in the other cases, it functions with minimum resources and consequently lacks the air conditioning required to properly maintain this equipment and staff trained to properly operate it, among other shortages. As in the other municipalities, the Ministry of Health provides basic medicine—antibiotics, anti-inflammatories, and pain killers—but these are often insufficient to treat residents' ailments. But, Chinameca's Unidad de Salud has the advantage of being located only ten minutes away from a hospital, which facilitates providing care in urgent cases that the Unidad cannot handle. Nevertheless, there is no ambulance so residents must provide their own transportation. The Unidad in the urban

center provides medical care to 13 of the 20 *cantones* in the municipality. These *cantones* also benefit from eight *promotores de salud* and six midwives. In addition, there are two other health centers in two of the *cantones*, which also have their own *promotores de salud*. However, residents living in the remaining five *cantones* are neglected in terms of health care. All in all, the average life expectancy of residents is 69.6 years, which is on par with the other case studies (Almanaque Municipal 2006).

III. The Democratic Climate (2004-2009): Apathy and Resignation

Chinameca's democratic climate between 2004-2009 is characterized by apathy and resignation. This is in stark contrast to the sense of abandonment found in Pasaquina, the intimidation driving Intipucá, or the resentment seen in Chapeltique. Chinameca is afflicted with many of the same challenges, which persist in the other municipalities examined in this dissertation. But, in Chinameca, local residents have rescinded any illusion that the local state will address their needs. There is a marked indifference and cynicism towards the state of the *alcaldía* in general, not one particular party or *alcalde*. Chinamequenses express a disconnection towards their elected officials, which is reflected in the apathy residents have towards local politics and their involvement in it. First, residents report that there is little transparency and social accountability in the local state. They do not feel they have access to the *alcaldía* and are often turned away when they request information or assistance. The *alcaldía* is also accused of prioritizing its party's interests above the community's needs. According to Luis Molina, a community leader in the urban center and key HTA collaborator, "It is very difficult to change the politicians' way of thinking to believe that they have to help because there is a need and

not because they will gain something or want to be in the spotlight.” Moreover, reports of clientelism are rampant and many residents levy that aid is politicized. For example, Javier Alvarez and Jorge Cruz, ADESCO leaders from Cantón San Antonio, claim, “People are disappointed with the *alcalde*’s politics because they work in line with their political ideology without taking into account the needs of the *cantones*, but only the needs of their parties. This has created a lot of resentment among people and this is why we don’t have a stable municipal government.” Accusations of clientelistic behavior are especially evident in the municipality’s school, as principals often compete to align themselves closely with the *alcaldía* in order to receive favoritism for the school’s needs²⁹. Carlos Fernández, director of the Centro Escolar de Chinameca in the urban center explains, “There are always some schools that are treated favorably by the *alcaldes*. It could be because they belong to the same political party, because they have good relations, or the *alcalde*’s children attend that particular school. Right now, what I am hoping for is that the incoming *alcalde* will help us because his cousin teaches in this school and also one of his council members has his children in this school. I am going to find my way in there because, as you know, we need help.” In one particularly telling example, Liliana Chávez, director of Centro Escolar Alberto Sánchez in the urban center, recalls, “Alcalde Alvarenga helped us with the computer lab, with the bathroom repairs, with the potable water installation, school furniture repairs, and collaborated with the sports teams. It was a great help, not because it was politicized...But, of course, all his children study here, his nephew studies here, Alvarenga himself went to school here. Perhaps I used all these things to my advantage to get him to do some things. Alvarenga’s

²⁹ There are several schools in Chinameca and they are in competition with each other over additional funding from the *alcaldía*, as well as for status and reputation in municipality. This competition and hostility is also evident when school directors compete for projects and assistance from the HTA.

wife was also a member of the school's board of directors. So I feel that he helped for all these reasons—I cannot complain.” Those schools, *cantones*, community organizations, or residents who are not political supporters of the *alcalde* in power report being turned away at the *alcaldía*'s door.

Unlike the other case studies, Chinameca is not captured by political fanaticism and does not have a singular partisan tradition. The *alcaldía* is used to frequent changes, as mayors from all the parties have been equally represented and mayors do not usually get re-elected past their second term. Moreover, in Chinameca, the impending mayoral and presidential elections were not accompanied by ubiquitous political propaganda, party flags or colorful t-shirts, nor were political rallies occasions for impassioned mass gatherings. In general, residents are disengaged from local politics. However, they have few reservations discussing the political climate and speak without fear or hesitation when criticizing the *alcaldía*. For example, Alvarez and Cruz comment, “Whether there is or there is not democracy here depends on how democracy is defined. For example, now you can go to see the *alcalde* and it is your right, but it is up to the *alcalde* to receive you or not and there is nothing you can do. Before, if you went looking for the *alcalde* and they sent you back full of bullets. Before you could not say anything. Now, there is more openness and less fear of things.” Yet, although there is greater freedom of political expression, Chinamequenses still hesitate to get involved politically. They opt to disengage from overt political activities, as well as other forms of collective action. The grassroots movements that were blossoming in Chapeltique are non-existent in Chinameca. José Medina, president of the *comité de agua* in Cantón Las Mesas, who has repeatedly tried to rally his community, finds that his efforts going door-to-door are now

met with “no he is not home” and “no, no he has not returned; he’s out”. Upon countless rejections, Medina laments that, “The interest and love that one has for working for the community must be extinguished”. Moreover, for some, the memory of the war has not faded. Chinameca was particularly turbulent during those years, especially given the municipality’s proximity to the large city of San Miguel. Although the urban center was relatively calm, members of the guerillas and the armed forces would exchange gunfire in the *cantones* during the day and at night they would force coffee plantations to provide them with refuge. Molina recalls, “We do not have in our minds the concept of protesting, of going out to the streets, but what we can do is prepare a manifesto in writing explaining our point of view, that we can do. Remember that we came out of a war, and those of us who survived the war is because we did not have problems with one side or the other. In other words, it is because we did not get involved in those types of activities.” Thus, memories of the civil war continue to affect how politics is practiced in Chinameca, especially when concerning collective mobilization or other visible acts that could be perceived as defiance against the state. Consequently, there are few community organizations in Chinameca. Some *cantones* have ADESCOs, but many are only nominal and those that do function have very limited activities. A couple of *cantones* have active *comités de agua*, which fight to install potable water systems, but these are in the minority. The urban center has a few community organizations such as the Club de Leones (Lion’s Club), Fundación para el Desarrollo de Chinameca (FUNDE), *comités de barrio*, and *directivas* for the schools and the Casa de la Cultura. However, all have very limited agendas in the municipality and none garner notable civic participation or deal with substantive development issues that would require political mobilization on any

scale. In part, the population size and commercialization found in the urban center have dissolved traditional social ties and social capital needed for civic associations to take root. In addition, the lack of support which the *alcaldía* provides to Chinameca's civic associations also gives residents little incentive to participate or organize. *Alcaldes* in Chinameca, regardless of their political affiliation, have a reputation for being unwilling to collaborate with the municipality's community organizations. According to Francisco Medrano, a member of Chinameca's HTA in Virginia, "I suppose, this is a very personal observation, what the *alcalde* wants to show is that he is the only leader and that there are no other leaders". Instead of nurturing existing community organizations, past *alcaldes* in Chinameca have opted to override the authority of local leaders by appointing someone within the *alcaldía* to serve as a councilman to a particular community in order to ensure that the *alcalde's* interests will not be jeopardized. According to Medina, "Most of the time, the municipal governments do not want to work with the ADESCOs because they do not want to be accountable to the communities and they [the *alcaldes*] want to manipulate them. The *alcaldes* expect the ADESCOs to serve their political agenda and the ADESCOs do not comply with that because they are not set up for that purpose. The ADESCOs are established to work for the benefit of their communities, for the development of their communities and not for the benefit of any political party, whatever it may be. But unfortunately, as ADESCO, we cannot pressure the *alcalde* to collaborate because they do not allow us. If you go to the *alcaldía* and you pressure them, then they close the doors on you." All in all, Chinameca's democratic climate is best characterized by its residents' apathetic resignation. The irony is, however, that despite Chinamequenses discontent with past *alcaldes* and their clientelistic behavior, residents

have adopted an indifferent approach to local politics. This indifference is also evident in the lack of civic participation and consciousness due in part to the high degree of individualism and erosion of social capital, which accompanied Chinameca's economic and population growth. Regardless of the cause, Chinameca's *alcaldes* continue to change, but its democratic climate remains the same, while residents opt to stand on the sidelines and go about their daily lives.

IV. Comunidad Unida de Chinameca: Beer, God and the One-Man Show

Chinameca's HTA, Comunidad Unida de Chinameca (CUC), is one of the first HTAs to organize in both El Salvador and Washington, along with the Fundación Unidos por Intipucá. Unlike other HTAs, the idea to establish the CUC originated in Chinameca, not among migrants in the US, at the suggestion of the municipality's Catholic priest Mariano Martínez. One Christmas Eve, in his sermon, Father Martínez appealed to the migrants' generosity and requested their economic support to undertake some important structural improvements in the church. For example, at the time, cinder blocks were used as pews. That evening a group of 18 migrants from Virginia who were in town for the holidays held preliminary discussions about the role which their intervention could play. One migrant in particular, Francisco Castro, was moved by the belief that "unity creates great strength" and took the lead in organizing the HTA. Castro was hesitant to make any promises to Father Martínez and to get involved because "people talk too much", but Martínez reassured him saying that "people talked like that about Jesus Christ because he cured the blind and the mutes and all of that". Castro responded "Father, I am going to try but I cannot guarantee you that I will collect even one cent." Back in Virginia, Francisco

Castro and his friend Francisco Medrano distributed pamphlets and made phone calls, reaching out to other Chinamequenses in the area. On January 10, 1991 about 120 migrants met at Castro's home and CUC was officially established with a key membership of 35 migrants and a board of directors led by Castro himself.

The initiative was received with enthusiasm among the Chinameca's migrant community in Washington, as well as migrants from nearby municipalities. The founding members organized small-scale events held at Castro's home selling *pupusas*, *tamales*, and *carne asada* to raise funds. Word about CUC's work spread among migrants and its membership grew quickly. At the time, this type of activity was innovative and provided an organized way for migrants to simultaneously maintain their social networks in their host city and with their hometown of origin. The first project undertaken was the church renovation, which included the pews, new windows, a new floor, and a retaining wall. Father Martínez administered the funds raised by migrants in Virginia. He had the pews made locally and, at the suggestion of CUC, requested each parishioner to contribute one brick to the project in order to help develop a sense of community ownership and responsibility; however, only a few contributed. Nevertheless, the HTA continued with the project because as Medrano explains, "the people hardly had enough money to eat, to survive and we could see that the situation was very chaotic down there." However, this lack of resident participation would set an unsettling precedent for HTA-community relations, as shall be explored below.

In time, CUC became one of the largest and most active Salvadoran HTAs in the Washington area. Subsequent projects followed quickly and CUC began organizing much larger events and parties, which would fill to capacity its local community center. It was

not uncommon for CUC to raise around US\$5,000 dollars from a single event. At its peak, CUC's financial contributions ranged from approximately US\$16,000 to US\$40,000. A key factor in CUC's growth was Castro's ability to establish a diverse and far-reaching network of collaborators. For example, when Chinameca was hit by natural disasters—earthquakes, floods, mudslides—CUC would appeal to the local Latino community via the Spanish language radio and television stations and receive donations such as roofing materials, which were shipped to reconstruct houses. Moreover, under Castro's leadership, CUC participated in festivals bringing together the greater Latino community in the Washington metro area. For several years, it was an active member of Comunidades Unidas Salvadoreñas (CUS)—an association comprised of 14 Salvadoran HTAs based in the Washington area. In collaboration, CUS hosted large fundraisers bringing in at least 1,200 people and would raise over US\$20,000 to be split among participating HTAs. Castro was also successful in recruiting the sponsorships of local entrepreneurs such as ethnic grocers and restaurants for event funding and donations. Moreover, CUC entered into important partnerships with NGOs which allowed them to amplify the scale of their projects, such as the establishment of computer labs in local schools costing US\$50,000 to US\$70,000. Most significantly, in 1998, due to Castro's persistence and dedication, CUC brokered an enduring partnership with Pilsener and Budweiser, popular Salvadoran and American beers, respectively. In exchange for a financial contribution of US\$3,000 or US\$4,000, only Pilsener and Budweiser would be served at CUC events. Castro explains "Initially, I had to be loyal to Pilsener because they have helped me for a long time by giving money for events. But then, I talked to the gentleman who runs the imports of Pilsener here in the Washington area and he said that

he would not mind if Pilsener and Budweiser became joint sponsors.” Eventually Pilsener was sold and Budweiser got sole sponsorship of all CUC’s endeavors. Paul Kyle, Budweiser’s distributing manager in Northern Virginia, was impressed with CUC’s work and for him Budweiser’s involvement became a personal commitment because “I love the people and I love what they do and the passion for their home country, and the passion for their community. I still maintain my contact with them.” According to Kyle, Budweiser played a pivotal role, “Budweiser donated hundreds of thousands of dollars. I was the driver because I had access to many sources of funds from our regional office at Saint Louis and our local representatives”. Unfortunately, Budweiser’s sponsorship ceased in 2007 when the distributorship was sold. Since then, CUC has been unsuccessful in securing additional funding from other corporate sponsors or has had only limited NGOs partnerships. Thus, in recent years, CUC has been devastated by these severe budget cuts. In addition, CUC was affected by worsening economic conditions in the US. Unlike the members of Intipucá’s HTA who are mostly successful entrepreneurs, CUC’s membership consists mainly of low-income construction workers, with the exception of Castro who owns a successful construction company. Many have lost their jobs or suffered pay cuts, forcing them to stop or diminish their involvement with the HTA. Medrano explains, “There has been a very bad economic recession that has forced some CUC members out of work, some had lost their homes, others even had to go back to Chinameca. So, we cannot tell them ‘look, we need your financial support.’ Instead, we have to go and tell them ‘look, take these \$100 dollars’.” In a final blow, in 2009, Castro was forced to significantly cut back his involvement due to family health problems. Unfortunately, no one has stepped up to replace him as president and the HTA’s

prominence has continued to decline. In fact, today there is no definitive roster of members. Castro says, “We started with X number of persons and now the only ones who work are family and friends”.

As a result of CUC’s decreased membership and activity, it has changed the scope of its work. In the past, CUC has contributed to diverse projects. For example, using the extensive experience of their members who work primarily in construction in the US, CUC has contributed to a large number of infrastructural repairs in the hometown, such as the construction of public bathrooms and other public spaces. CUC has also undertaken several health and education initiatives donating an ambulance to the Red Cross and computer centers to local schools. It also used to collect and distribute Christmas gifts for Chinameca’s children and to organize activities during the municipality’s *fiestas patronales*. Most recently, CUC has focused on assisting individuals in need with the construction of new homes, especially for orphans, the disabled, the elderly, and sick children. Sonia Chávez, a member of CUC’s informal counterpart committee in the hometown, claims that, although in recent years CUC has dramatically scaled back the number of projects it takes on, it still makes significant contributions. Chávez speculates, “Perhaps CUC’s participation in Chinameca is less noticeable now because they have concentrated on helping by building houses. Imagine to build a house it takes \$4,000 or \$6,000 dollars. A lot of money is invested in a few things. So, it is not the same as doing a little project here a little project there for people to say ‘oh, look how much they do’. But yes, they do continue working and helping a lot.” Moreover, unlike the other case studies, CUC has extended its work beyond Chinameca to build houses into neighboring municipalities and to an orphanage in San

Salvador where it has donated approximately US\$16,000 since 2000. Before, the majority of CUC's projects benefited Chinameca and particularly the urban center and its surrounding *barrios* with limited exceptions in the municipality's *cantones*. But Medrano explains that today, "Our charitable work is not exclusively for Chinameca, but extends to almost all of El Salvador. For example, after the destruction caused by the earthquake, we built houses in Sonsonate, in Nueva Guadalupe, in Chirilagua, and in various other towns".

Table 6.1 Projects Undertaken by Comunidad Unida de Chinameca (1998 – 2010)

	Project Type
	A. Culture
1	Donation of ferris wheel tickets during <i>Fiestas Patronales</i> in <i>centro urbano</i> . Sporadically since 1998.
	B. 1 Education: Centro Urbano
2	Centro Escolar Alberto Sanchez: New water tank and bathrooms repair.
3	Parvularia Federico Froebel: Indoor recreation center/jungle gym; toy donations.
4	Centro Escolar de Chinameca: US\$6,000 donation towards computer center. *Funded by HTA/Banco Agrícola/ Pan-American Development Foundation.
	B. 2 Education: Cantones
5	<i>Cantón</i> Copinal 1, Centro Escolar Emilia Calejas: School packets and uniforms given to several students. Extra funds were used to build a school fence.
6	<i>Cantón</i> Cruz 1: School packets and uniforms to several students. Extra project funds went towards a water tank. *Funded by HTA/Banco Agrícola/ Pan-American Development Foundation.
7	All <i>cantones</i> : Donation of 500 school packets in 2007.
	C. Environment
8	Construction of <i>vivero</i> for FUNDE Chinameca. *Funded by HTA/ FUNDE/local donor/ Pan-American Development Foundation.
9	Contributions towards environmental training sessions held in some <i>centro urbano</i> schools. *Funded by HTA/FUNDE/Peace Corps.
10	Donation of trees to several schools, institutions, NGOs, and other organizations throughout El Salvador. *Funded by HTA/FUNDE.
	D. Health
11	Contribution towards construction of Red Cross office.
12	Donation of an ambulance to Red Cross.
	E. Individual Beneficiaries
13	Construction of 14 houses for poor families in the <i>centro urbano</i> .

14	Economic assistance to individuals and families in the <i>centro urbano</i> and surrounding <i>cantones/caseríos</i> .
15	Donation of toys during Christmas for needy children in the <i>centro urbano</i> and surrounding <i>cantones/caseríos</i> . Sporadically.
16	Fundación Padre Vito Guarato in San Salvador: Host party and food donations for orphans and handicapped children. Ongoing for several years.
17	Construction of houses for poor families in Colonia La Luisiana and Colonia Bautista, <i>centro urbano</i> .
18	Foodstuffs donations throughout the <i>centro urbano</i> .
	F. Public Spaces
19	Construction of public bathrooms in <i>Barrio San Juan</i> .
20	Construction of public bathrooms and children's jungle gym in the <i>centro urbano</i> park. *Undertaken in 1995/1996 by HTA/ <i>Alcaldía</i>
	G. Religion
21	Catholic church, Barrio El Calvario: Donation towards furniture and paint
22	Donation to rebuild Catholic church tower after the 2001 earthquake

Sources: Data provided by the *Comunidad Unida de Chinameca (CUC)* and *Fundación para el Desarrollo de Chinameca (FUNDE)*. However, due to the lack of archival records, data are collected piecemeal from informant interviews.

Notes: Projects funded exclusively by HTA unless otherwise specified [*].

Project identification comes through direct solicitation from interested parties.

Poor families without adequate housing, parents of sick children, school directors and others will communicate their need to CUC through letters or mutual acquaintances.

Upon receiving a request, CUC sends a member of its informal counterpart committee in Chinameca to evaluate the need. CUC does not have a strict or defined process regarding project selection, as decisions are made depending on the urgency of the request and funds available. In general, although CUC has an executive committee, its decisions regarding projects, funding, and collaboration are ultimately made by Castro. In effect, CUC is a one-man show and committee members simply execute CUC's activities under Castro's leadership. Unlike the other HTAs examined in this dissertation, there are no regular meetings, no assigned responsibilities, no archival records, and not even a formal counterpart committee in the hometown. The HTA operates in an ad-hoc manner under

Castro's direction. Castro has a singular focus and a large personality, which leaves little room for flexibility or differences of opinion. Nevertheless, this hierarchical organizational dynamic has worked for CUC over the years and has not caused tensions within the HTA, as members are happy to let Castro take the lead and responsibility. Simply put, without Castro's vision, determination, and leadership, CUC would not have accomplished a fraction of what it has done. He is a charismatic and determined individual who works tirelessly and selflessly to deliver for his cause. He not only volunteers his time to CUC, but often hosts events in his home and invests his personal savings when the HTA falls short of its financial goal. It is this drive and passion that fueled CUC's launch, growth, and success. He has received several awards and much public recognition in Washington and El Salvador for his community work. Castro is an honest man and runs the HTA with utmost integrity. His motivation has never come into question. Paul Kyle of Budweiser describes Castro as "a dynamic individual, a big heart, a great person, and an entrepreneur." Moreover, as CUC's president, Castro is a deeply motivated by his religious conviction. Castro sees CUC's mission in Chinameca as doing God's work on earth. Castro proclaims, "We do not do great things, but what we do, we do for the love of Christ. Our strength comes from God. I want to work for Christ. That is my mission."

V. Comunidad Unida de Chinameca's Linkages with the Local State

Since its inception in 1991, CUC has had strained relations with the local state in Chinameca. In the past 20 years, the municipality has seen many *alcaldes* come and go and has also had steadily alternating ARENA and FLMN administrations. Nevertheless,

CUC has been unable to sustain a collaborative relationship with any of them regardless of personality or party flag. Castro claims CUC has never received support or recognition from any of the *alcaldías*. “After the earthquake in Chinameca, we built 25 wooden houses. The *alcaldía* did not even say ‘thank you’. The *alcaldía* has not helped us.” At best, CUC and the *alcaldía* have carried on a mutually indifferent relationship. And, at worst, there has been open animosity where the *alcaldía* has even dismantled CUC’s constructions. At the root of this tension is an underlying egoism on the part of both parties. The *alcaldía* is distrustful of the HTA’s intentions and money. The local state fears that migrants aspire to gain political power and to steal the limelight at the expense of the *alcalde*. However, CUC’s members claim they genuinely have no interest in usurping power in Chinameca as their lives are firmly established in the US. In turn, the HTA has grown suspicious of the *alcaldía*. They do not trust the *alcaldía* to honor contracts, manage funds, or collaborate without self-serving motives. According to Medrano, *alcaldes* want to set the terms of the partnerships in which CUC finances projects, but the *alcaldía* controls and administers those funds.

In short, migrants and the local state engage in an ongoing struggle over power, money, and recognition. As CUC’s relations with the local state soured, it became an increasingly insular organization. In large part, CUC isolated itself because it was being played as a political pawn between outgoing and incoming *alcaldes*. For example, on several occasions, the local community had expressed the need for a public playground where children can safely gather and play. In 2002 CUC, with the consent of ARENA’s Alcalde Ramón Araniva (1994-2000), built a playground in the *centro urbano*’s park. Araniva, who had only provided moral support for the project, took advantage of the

situation and nailed a plaque in the playground which read that it was constructed during his term. However, the subsequent *alcalde*, Juan Osorio (2000-2006) who ran the municipality under both FLMN and PCN party flags, dismantled the playground claiming that the children needed supervision to ensure their safety and that the *alcaldía* did not have the funds to provide for the project's maintenance such as paint. In fact, in Chinameca it is not uncommon for *alcaldes* to demolish or leave in disrepair the projects of their predecessors and several of CUC's projects have fallen subject to these petty political rivalries and egoisms. Moreover, past *alcaldes* have come into conflict with CUC because they accused Castro of being too demanding and too controlling over the management of funds and project execution. Most recently, this conflict played out between CUC and the administration of ARENA's Nelson Alvarenga who was *alcalde* from 2006-2009. Seeing that Alvarenga was the favored candidate to win the *alcaldía* in 2006, CUC eagerly approached him about a potential collaboration to secure his attention and support once in office. CUC explained to Alvarenga that it had negotiated an impressive partnership with an international NGO in order to construct a computer lab for a local school, donate 26 new computers, and provide technology training. According to CUC, Alvarenga agreed to contribute US\$6,000 towards the project and was present for the project's launch, which garnered widespread press coverage. According to Castro, "Alvarenga was announcing on the loud speaker all over town that the *alcaldía* had financed the project and I know because I listened to him". Unfortunately, this agreement was made during Alvarenga's campaign and was never signed in an official contract as Alvarenga was not yet in office. Once the cameras were gone and the campaign was over, Alvarenga defaulted on his word and left CUC to cover the expenses, which it did by

canceling the construction of three homes for families in need. This would not be the first time that an *alcalde* has tried to ride on the coattails of CUC's hard work. From Medrano's perspective, "The *alcaldes* use our projects as political propaganda and that is like a slap in the face for us. That is not good for us because they say 'in our period we did such project'. But they did not do that project; they simply gave the permit to do the project for the benefit of the people. The Comunidad Unida de Chinameca gave the money and paid the workers." However, Alvarenga retorts that he never signed a contract and was under no obligation to support the project. He also contests that CUC did not honor its promise to give adequate recognition to the *alcaldía* in the local newspapers. He elaborates, "The migrants did not take into account the *alcaldía* and did not give it any recognition, nothing. I was very clear with them." In addition, Alvarenga inaccurately claims that El Salvador's *Corte de Cuentas* would not have approved public funds to be invested by the *alcaldía* in matters pertaining to the Ministry of Education. According to Alvarenga, CUC is responsible for the poor relations with the *alcaldía* because migrants fear that collaboration with the *alcaldía* will benefit the *alcalde*'s position in the community at CUC's expense. Alvarenga claims, "If the migrants help the *alcalde*, they think that he is going to score points with the people or the people would think he is good, so they want to do it all themselves. It has always been like that. They were never able to work with the municipality, as far as I can remember they never could."

Regardless of their differences, Alvarenga acknowledges that CUC is an important and beneficial organization for Chinameca, but says that it needs to change its approach regarding the local state. In Alvarenga's words, "They need to stop being selfish and trust

that here there are also people who can help them, like the *alcaldía*. Or else they could set up their own committee to verify the needs.”

Alvarenga lost his re-election bid in 2009 and Chinameca’s current *alcalde* is the FMLN’s Francisco Cubillas. Upon entry into the *alcaldía*, Cubillas admitted he knew little about CUC, but vowed to maintain an open-door policy towards all migrants interested in contributing to Chinameca’s development. Privately, Castro supported Cubillas’ bid because he wanted to see a change in the *alcaldía*, “We already know that Alvarenga is no good. We need to take a chance with the other one.” Nonetheless, Castro is not hopeful that the relationship between CUC and the *alcaldía* will improve under Cubillas’ administration because “Cubillas is not accessible”. Furthermore, Castro insists that Cubillas must also take initiative to seek funding. Castro declares, “I will work with Cubillas, but he has to come looking for me because he is the one who would look good, not me. I do not have any political ambitions or anything. I will continue doing what I can. We will see how we do it. We will sell *pupusas*. We will organize dances and we will raise funds to help those children.” Cubillas, in turn, claims, “In the case of the HTAs, I will have an open door policy. I will talk to them and try to reach an understanding to see what projects they can help with and how I could act as a facilitator for those projects. I would like to be some kind of facilitator without having to manage their funds because in the long run that leads to distrust on the part of the *hermanos lejanos*.” To date, Cubillas and CUC have not collaborated on any projects.

VI. Comunidad Unida de Chinameca's Linkages with the Hometown Community

Unfortunately, CUC's relationship with its hometown community has also suffered some setbacks.³⁰ Unlike the other HTAs examined in this dissertation, CUC worked without a formal counterpart committee for many years.³¹ Initially the HTA relied on relatives and friends to assist in project selection, implementation, and management of funds. For example, Isabel Castro, Francisco's sister, played a pivotal role in the beginning. She elaborates, "I have collaborated with CUC when they went to inaugurate houses and when they distributed notebooks. I have helped them to the best of my ability, going to buy and distribute food to the disabled children in San Salvador with the help of my sister Elsi." This organizational decision to work without a formal counterpart committee established a pattern in CUC's relationship with the hometown community, which continues to reap negative ramifications. It is true that there is an absence of civic participation in Chinameca. However, the other HTAs examined in this dissertation have also faced similar situations in their hometowns and worked around these constraints to rally civic engagement. The HTA in Pasaquina, for example, eagerly involves hometown residents in its decision-making and activities, while the HTA in Chapeltique opts to forge cross-cutting alliances with other local leaders. CUC, on the other hand, does nothing, as it continues to work without a formal counterpart committee or seek alternative structures of support within the hometown. This decision closes off

³⁰ Despite its strained relations with Chinameca's hometown community, it is important to note that CUC developed ties with fellow migrants across the US. In fact, CUC inspired migrants in other parts of the US to form HTAs serving the municipality. Three others based in New York, Los Angeles and San Francisco, have also been active over the years, although not to the same extent as Virginia's migrants. They have attempted collaboration many years ago, but these relations also failed from the onset due to poor communication and lack of organizational capacity.

³¹ Only occasionally did CUC collaborate with neighborhood committees (*comités de barrio*) to support a particular activity, typically related to the *fiestas patronales*.

CUC from the larger community and allows migrants to isolate themselves and communicate only with those in their inner circle. It keeps the community at arms-length and engages it only as beneficiaries. According to Roberto Chávez, a school director who has considered collaborating with the HTA, CUC needs to be more transparent. In Chávez's words, "In general terms, I believe that the hand of the organized resident in the United States is seen and felt here. The goal is to make crystal clear what is being done. Perhaps what has been lacking in the Comunidad Unidos de Chinameca is selling the image of what it does and how it has been doing, but in a transparent and clear way. Here they have done a good job, small things—given support to the church, toys, notebooks to some children. But since one is not aware of the magnitude of the activities they carry out in the United States one cannot judge." CUC was an early HTA success story in part because it effectively cultivated social networks and nurtured bonds of social capital among migrants in Virginia. However, it fails to apply these same principles to its intervention in the hometown and consequently does not establish a meaningful partnership with local residents. Local residents have no way of understanding how the HTA works, its agenda, accomplishments, or limitations. In turn, CUC has limited knowledge of the hometown, its social networks, and its greatest necessities.

Furthermore, CUC's organizational structure promotes an arrangement in which residents are not encouraged to feel ownership over projects because they are removed from the process. Chinameca's residents simply submit a request and wait to receive a donation. Consequently, the HTA receives countless solicitations per year from individuals looking for some sort of aid. In some cases, these pleas are legitimate. But in others, they are shameless requests for hand-outs. Most surprising perhaps is the refusal

of local residents to collaborate on projects, which benefit them directly. For example, CUC has constructed several private homes for needy families, but not once has a family offered to contribute money, material or even part-time labor towards the construction of their own home. Sonia Chávez, one of CUC's supporters, comments, "It is ironic that everyone in this town likes to be helped, but they want everything free. No one wants to give anything in return. They want others to build a house for them, but they do not even want to move the materials, to carry a bucket of water, or to go buy a cement bag."

CUC's donations to local schools have also been met with apathy by teachers and parents. For example, the local elementary school requested CUC's support in building three classrooms and repairing the roof. CUC was willing to take on the project, but asked parents and teachers to raise a minimal contribution. No one even feigned an attempt at organization and it immediately became apparent that the school did not want CUC's help; rather, it wants CUC to do all the work. This is not an isolated incident as CUC has experienced similar reactions from schools who have asked for donations including computers, bathrooms, and new classrooms. In fact, many school directors are unaware of the donations made by CUC to their school if they were gifted during prior to their term. This signifies that migrants' contributions are forgotten and not valued. This lack of collaboration and appreciation is particularly striking in comparison to Pasaquina and Chapeltique where parents and teachers are eagerly motivated to help their respective HTAs once presented with the opportunity to receive aid. Moreover, it is not unheard of that Castro be asked for money out of his pocket when he returns to Chinameca for visits. In one particularly presumptuous situation, one family who had already received a new home from CUC further insisted that Castro personally pay them a monthly stipend. CUC

supporter Luis Molina recalls, “The lady took it as an obligation and that means that there are people here who abuse of such situations.” This dynamic inevitably sets up CUC to behave as nothing more than a charity or welfare organization. Moreover, ultimately, it demarcates the lines between “us” (hometown residents) and “them” (migrants), which reinforces a social wedge in the hometown, rather than bringing the community together.³²

CUC’s history with Chinameca’s Red Cross is emblematic of its tense relationship with its hometown community. Initially, CUC and the Red Cross had a good working relationship. Former Red Cross president, Francisco Rodríguez recalls, “When I was the Red Cross president, I spoke to Mr. Francisco Castro of the Comunidad Unidos de Chinameca. ‘Don Chito’, he told me, ‘you can count on us; we are going to start helping you’. We worked well with Paquito [Castro]. He considered me like a brother and I did the same. Every year in August, he would come down with the committee, and would bring the CUC-elected queen during the *fiestas patronales* to go out into the streets and show off their float. On Red Cross Day, our organizations would go out to the streets with their float and ours.” Between 1989-2003, CUC made several donations to the Red Cross including the purchase of an ambulance and 45 percent of the financing towards the construction of its headquarters. However, CUC’s relationship with the Red Cross ended abruptly in 2003. The Red Cross committee had promised to temporarily lend CUC 3,750 *colones* needed to paint the church. However, the Red Cross committee (against Rodríguez’s wishes) did not honor its commitment and instead offered Castro only 2,500 *colones*. Rodríguez claims, “Immediately, the man [Castro] got upset, stood

³² Nevertheless, it is also important to note that, despite this estranged relationship, neither CUC or Castro are the subject of great criticism in the hometown. For example, there is no talk of *desconfianza* regarding the management of funds, as is prevalent in the other case studies.

up and said ‘I hope you benefit from that money’. He did not say good-bye, nothing. He just left with the people that came with him. ‘I will see how I solve this problem,’ he told me.” This incident prompted Francisco Rodríguez to resign as the Red Cross’ president. Rodríguez explains, “When Francisco Castro left, I told them: ‘Comrades, what a way to repay this man, what an embarrassment in front of this man who has done so much for us, what a way to pay him back. I hope you enjoy that money. I am also leaving. Don’t come looking for me because you will not bring me back.’ For me that was a terrible embarrassment. I retired from the Red Cross and after that Francisco Castro came to celebrate the *fiestas patronales* with the floats of another *barrio*.” Francisco Castro and Francisco Rodríguez were distanced for a while, but have since reconciled. However, CUC never worked with the Red Cross again. This situation is telling of the reasons for which CUC’s relations with the hometown community sour. At the core, there is insufficient separation between CUC as an organization and Francisco Castro as its leader. Despite his good intentions, Castro’s strong character and personal scorn have cost another relationship. This type of personalization of the HTA’s work prevents it from maintaining as a priority the interests of its organization and beneficiaries above the personal politics and grievances of its members. In stark contrast to the cases of Pasaquina and Chapeltique in which strong ties of social capital unite communities, here ties based on social capital obscure personalization and professionalism.

After its rupture from the Red Cross, CUC began collaborating with another community organization, the Fundación para el Desarrollo de Chinameca (FUNDE). FUNDE is relatively new to the municipality and has yet to gain legal NGO status. Nevertheless, it has acted as CUC’s informal counterpart committee since approximately

2004. In fact, FUNDE originally formed at CUC's insistence because one of the HTA's sponsors required it to have a counterpart committee in the hometown in order to receive funding. The funding was for a one-year, renewable project, which promoted sustainable ecological development.³³ Thus, Castro's relatives and close friends formed FUNDE with a strictly environmental mission. The project called for FUNDE, with CUC's assistance, to establish a *vivero* (nursery), which cultivates a variety of trees and plants to be transplanted throughout the municipality in order to promote environmental regeneration. It also called for FUNDE to conduct workshops in Chinameca's local schools to educate students about the challenges facing Chinameca's ecosystem and sustainable solutions. As part of their arrangement, CUC serves as FUNDE's representative in US and handles negotiations with US-based NGOs. CUC also makes donations, albeit limited, to FUNDE to help cover its administrative costs. In general, CUC has served as a critical facilitator for FUNDE, especially in its beginning stages. FUNDE, in turn, serves as the HTA's informal counterpart committee in Chinameca, which involves evaluating solicitations from local residents, managing funds locally, and overseeing project implementation. FUNDE's treasurer, Sonia Chávez, says, "We inform them about everything and they see the evidence. I tell you even if we are just a few members, we try to be very responsible in that respect." The relationship between the two organizations is mutually beneficial, but not mutually collaborative. In other words, they use each other for logical assistance, but they are autonomous organizations, which do not involve each other in their respective decision-making processes. Although FUNDE acts as CUC's informal counterpart in Chinameca, this partnership does not serve to integrate the HTA into the

³³ FUNDE's environmental program has been a success and funding has been renewed each year since its initiation.

hometown community or make it a more inclusive or participatory organization.

According to Sonia Chávez, “I think it would be advantageous to CUC to have an independent solid group to whom the community and individuals could direct their requests for help.” FUNDE serves merely as CUC’s logistical right hand in the hometown. Moreover, in the hometown there is much confusion about FUNDE’s role in the community and its relationship with CUC. On the one hand, it acts as CUC’s informal counterpart committee. But more importantly, it has its independent agenda, which includes maintaining the *vivero*, transplanting trees throughout the municipality, and organizing educational environmental workshops and activities with local schools.

Unfortunately, however, FUNDE, like CUC, is seen by many as an exclusive club. This has had negative ramification for FUNDE, as it suffers from low community participation and poor attendance at its events. Gerardo Hernández, FUNDE’s project coordinator says, “People believe that our small group owns FUNDE and nothing can be further from the truth. FUNDE is open to everyone. In fact, everyone can get involved.” The lack of transparency concerning FUNDE and CUC relationship has also caused some tensions within the community as residents are unclear as to each organization’s roles and functions and under what circumstances they join forces. Hernández explains, “Unfortunately, when we have our events people do not collaborate with us because they just come to ask for things. Sometimes, we do not give anything to certain people because we only help those who truly need it. Sometimes, people get upset with us because we don’t give them anything.” In particular, a rivalry and resentment has developed among beneficiaries, especially school directors, because it is not clearly explained to them why some receive assistance and other do not. At the moment, FUNDE

is still a young organization. It is still finding its niche within the community and learning how to negotiate its role and responsibilities. Unfortunately, thus far, it has lacked the strategic vision needed to think outside the box in order to generate greater enthusiasm among local residents. Nevertheless, through its workshops and involvement with students, FUNDE has the potential to integrate itself into the hometown community in a way that CUC is not able to accomplish. FUNDE offers a process towards social change, not a hand out, which ultimately is capable of having a broader and more sustainable impact for the community's democratic landscape.

VII. Comunidad Unida de Chinameca as a Trans-local Governance Actor: Isolated Philanthropist

This case study serves as an important counterfactual, which illustrates how an HTA's failure to cultivate any linkages with either its local state or hometown community results in hollowing implications for democratic deepening. Due to the absence of linkages, CUC positions itself as an isolated philanthropist when intervening as a trans-local governance actor in the hometown. As examined above, CUC's relationship with the local state is currently at a stalemate due to a lack of communication, egoism, and petty rivalries. Moreover, CUC is removed from its hometown community. It is uninspired to engage or organize the community and only engages local residents as beneficiaries, not as participants or collaborators. CUC never even organized a formal counterpart committee and, although its collaboration with FUNDE is promising, it too is static and limited in nature. Thus, the municipality's civil society continues to lay dormant as it lacks citizens with the vision and capacity to lead. Moreover, by keeping the hometown community at arms-length, CUC inadvertently

reinforces class divisions between wealthy migrants (givers) and poor local residents (receivers), ultimately driving a wider wedge in the hometown community, rather than bringing people together. As a result of CUC's isolation from the local state and community, it has positioned itself as a charity or welfare organization in the hometown. As a charity, CUC's mission is driven by providing for the immediate needs of the municipality's most vulnerable residents. It measures success through finite and tangible objectives such as the completion of specific projects. Paul Kyle, Budweiser's representative who worked closely with CUC, recalls, "There were many projects I was involved with over the years, but they were not to raise money to create something sustainable in Chinameca, like making products to sell them in the market. Rather, they were to send the money to Chinameca for a charitable endeavor. Most of my experiences with CUC and most of our endeavors were only charitable in nature." CUC members too acknowledge that the HTA plays a primarily philanthropic role in the municipality and hold no reservations about its mission. For example, CUC member José Cruz explains, "If someone asks for help, we send it. We build homes for those who do not have a roof over their heads. To those who cannot afford their medicines, we send money. In other words, they are all gifts." According to Castro, CUC would welcome participation, but as a charity it would never ask beneficiaries to participate or contribute. However, it should not be overlooked that it is also far easier and more efficient for CUC to coordinate among its members than involve other parties, especially given the HTA's hierarchical organizational structure and decision-making practices. Community participation is a process which requires deliberation, foresight, and patience. These are values which would require CUC to measure success in terms of a more comprehensive development

agenda or process. As it stands, once the donation has been delivered or a project completed, the HTA considers its objective accomplished. There is no larger democratic project, no discourse of lifting up social consciousness, empowerment, or solidarity. Nor does it seek to influence the local state to be more transparent or socially accountable. Although well-intentioned, CUC's position sharply contrasts that of the HTAs in Pasaquina and Chapeltique, which explicitly aim to strengthen civil society and nurture an active practice of politics. While CUC's philanthropic endeavors may temporarily alleviate poverty or affect other indicators of local economic development, they do not leave any implications for democratic deepening, either good or bad, and therefore this case serves as an important counterfactual. As a trans-local governance actor, CUC is absent. It has a vacuous, non-existent effect on the way in which governance is understood and practiced in the hometown and leaves a void in the hometown where governance needs continue to be unfulfilled. Consequently, as a trans-local governance actor, CUC has hollowing implications for democratic deepening. Thus the case of Chinameca demonstrates that an HTA's ability to deepen democracy depends unequivocally on the cooperation and participation of local state and community actors.

VIII. Migrants Politics: Avoidance Strategy

The case of Chinameca also serves as an important counterfactual because it illustrates how an HTA fails to effectively negotiate its political weight in the hometown and the consequences of this. For better or worse, the other three HTAs examined in this dissertation managed to successfully negotiate their political roles in the hometown and create linkages with the local state and/or the hometown community. Some did so by

adopting an overt political agenda as in the municipalities of Intipucá and Chapeltique, while others assume an apolitical guise as in the case of Pasaquina. However, by taking on the role of an isolated philanthropist, the HTA in Chinameca fails to negotiate its position within the hometown's competing power dynamics. It merely retreats and avoids political encounters. Consequently, CUC forfeits its political power by choosing to act independently. The case of Chinameca illustrates that without a political dimension and without linkages an HTA fails to contribute more than isolated acts of kindness, which offers only ephemeral development solutions. Although CUC did successfully forge robust linkages in the US with different corporate sponsors and other HTAs in its early years, it did not apply the same principles of social networks and social capital to its intervention in the hometown and consequently does not mature as a trans-local governance agent. This case study also shows that an HTA's real power and impact for development lies in its political weight, not in its financial contributions. The act of donating money or financing projects is not what distinguishes an HTA as a unique transnational vehicle for development. In fact, most Salvadoran HTAs, not just CUC, operate within this scope and consequently limit their role in the hometown to that of a benefactor who at best delivers ephemeral solutions for poverty. It is much more difficult for an HTA to take on and execute a comprehensive development agenda in which attitudes and practices of governance are tackled. But, it is also much more meaningful for local development. This dissertation proposes that HTAs are uniquely positioned to have more significant impact on local development than that which is borne through the financial weight of their remittances alone. The importance of collective remittances for development lies in their political power. As a result of their remittances, HTAs can carve

out new and vital openings in their hometowns' democratic landscapes and can insert themselves as legitimate power players in local politics. They can do this effectively because they possess the social capital and local knowledge to forge dynamic and resilient linkages. However, the case of Chinameca confirms that without these linkages, an HTA has no effect on governance ideals or processes, and ultimately its value is no different than any other transnational charity or NGO. It merely leaves in its wake a power vacuum, which has been filled by a steady stream of eager politicians who work to maintain the democratic status-quo.

Unlike the cases of Intipucá and Chapeltique, CUC's members have diverse political affiliations and as a result the HTA has never galvanized its mission under a particular political flag. According to Molina, CUC does not politicize its aid for the community or FUNDE because "They have always collaborated with the people who need help and they have done it regardless of their political tendencies—the only requirement is to be human and to have a great need." Moreover, in stark contrast to the other cases, migrants in Chinameca do not figure prominently into local political campaigns. Migrants in Chinameca do not get involved in hometown politics, nor do politicians seek their support. According to Medrano, the frequent shifting of political administrations in Chinameca poses a challenge because "Any political party can govern the municipality. But if CUC supports a particular party at a given time, then when another party gets into power they would turn their back on CUC." Therefore, CUC's leaders (like those in Pasaquina's HTA) make a conscious decision to reject overt political affiliation and intervention. However, in stark contrast to Pasaquina, an apolitical approach hinders CUC. Pasaquina takes an apolitical stance in order to forge

new relationships and patterns with its local state and hometown community, whereas CUC uses it to justify its isolation. Castro recognizes that CUC paid a high price to keep its political autonomy because other HTAs like that in Intipucá which maintained close political ties with the *alcaldía* obtained much more support from the local state. Castro explains, “All the time we raised much more money than the Fundación Unidos por Intipucá [FUPI], but they beat us because they had a direct contact with the government. They were self-declared ARENEROS and we were not.” According to Castro, FUPI even obtained the title of *ciudad* for its municipality without meeting all the legal requirements. Castro explains, “Intipucá is not a *ciudad*, but FUPI obtained that title by political means.” Nevertheless, despite its tense relationship with the local state, CUC like the HTA in Intipucá has cultivated a particularly active political profile on El Salvador’s national level and in the US. CUC’s president, Francisco Castro, in particular has maintained close ties to the El Salvador’s presidential office, the embassy in Washington, and US political organizations, which have applauded CUC’s contributions to the Salvadoran community in the US and in the hometown. In his final words regarding CUC’s approach to politics, Castro says, “I want what benefits the people, not what benefits the party. If I were *alcalde*, I would govern with a different vision. To be a politician, you basically have to be rich and a crook. I want to work for Christ; that is my mission.” Ultimately, as evidenced through the other case studies, an HTA’s power as a trans-local governance actor depends on how it understands and negotiates politics. When an HTA is able to transcend a static conception of politics based in parties and procedures and move towards one rooted in citizenship and empowerment, then it can engage as a

successful trans-local governance actor. However, CUC fails to understand these distinctions and therefore is unable to harness its full political potential in the hometown.

IX. Conclusion: Si Se Enseña a Pescar...³⁴

The case study of Chinameca serves as an important counterfactual. It illustrates how an HTA's failure to cultivate any linkages results in vacuous repercussions for local governance processes, which also ultimately have hollowing effects for democratic quality. CUC fails to foster linkages with either its local state or hometown community. It essentially stands on the shoulders of one man and operates within a closed circle of members. Therefore, CUC has opted out of negotiating its role within the hometown's competing power dynamics. Consequently, the HTA has forfeited its political power and acts as nothing more than an isolated philanthropist in the hometown. CUC's role as an isolated philanthropist prohibits it from evolving a long-term vision or strategy for development or from maximizing the impact of its intervention. Furthermore, HTAs which engage as isolated philanthropists are absent as trans-local governance actors in their hometowns and have vacuous effects on local governance. In order to affect governance ideals and practices, CUC would need to approach its development work as a process, not in terms of individual projects. It would also need to forge linkages which simultaneously buttress state structures and empower local residents. Or else, while its donations may help to alleviate poverty, they amount to little more than isolated acts of kindness. In sum, the case study of Chinameca illustrates that an HTA's real power and value for sustainable development lies in its political weight, not in its financial

³⁴ "If you teach a man to fish..."

contributions. This case shows that if used properly, HTAs are uniquely positioned to make a difference because they possess the social capital and local knowledge to forge dynamic and resilient linkages and to harness the power and potential that lies in citizen-based politics. Without these linkages, however, HTAs act as nothing more than isolated charities with hollowing effects for the deepening of democracy.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion: Why Do Some HTAs Succeed and Others Fail at Deepening Democracy?

I. Introduction

Using evidence from four HTAs in El Salvador, this dissertation tells a larger story about how transnational civic associations throughout the global South can rekindle hope for democratic deepening by transforming local governance values and practices. In short, dissertation findings highlight the conditions under which democratic deepening succeeds and those under which it fails. This chapter summarizes these findings in four main sections. The first section of this chapter revisits the typology of trans-local governance in order to review the principle of linkage and its implications for governance. The section builds upon the conceptual and theoretical parameters introduced in Chapter 1 and reviews the details from each case study to paint a more concrete, empirically grounded picture. Second, this chapter draws four conclusions concerning the politics of HTAs and the various factors shaping HTAs' intervention as governance actors in the hometown. The third section of this chapter identifies social capital and the use of politics as the two mechanisms underlying an HTA's ability to foster high degrees of linkage with its local state and hometown community. The final

section draws several conclusions about the broader impact of the dissertation findings. Findings contribute to several gaps in academic and policy research and are generalizable beyond HTAs and beyond El Salvador to illuminate the mechanics underlying the relationship between transnational civic associations and democratic deepening in the global South.

II. Typology Revisited

This dissertation concludes that HTAs are in fact innovative vehicles through which democracy can be deepened. But, why do some HTAs succeed at deepening democracy and why do others fail? Evidence from the four cases studies presented in this dissertation shows that the answer depends on the arrangement of the linkages which an HTA is able to establish with its local state and hometown community. In other words, HTAs which foster high degrees of linkage with their local states and with their communities more effectively deepen democracy than those which engender low degrees of linkage. Thus, there can be significant variations in the degree of linkages which an HTA establishes. High degrees of linkages are characterized by strong, cooperative relationships. Low degrees of linkage, on the other hand, are characterized by weak ties in which there is little to no collaboration between the HTA and the local state and/or the hometown community.


The linkages which HTAs establish position them as mediators between local state and community actors. Through its development agendas, the HTA is able to intervene as a facilitator bringing together these disparate actors for the purpose of deliberation and not just for the parlaying power. Consequently, they have the potential to

intervene as particularly effective governance actors in the hometown because the process of governance by its very definition requires strong and mutually reinforcing ties between local state, civil society, and community actors (Heller 2000; Roberts 1998; Turner 1992; Waltzer 1992). In particular, HTAs assume unique roles as governance actors in which they apply a transnational scope to the local sphere, rendering their impact distinctly trans-local. This type of governance cannot be adequately described as transnational alone because it is not a fluid bi-polar exchange. Rather, its impact is uni-directional as it is directed towards the hometown of origin. Likewise, this type of governance is not exclusively local because it is fundamentally shaped by its transnational influence. Evidence from these four Salvadoran case studies finds that HTAs introduce diverse practices, institutions, and values when engaging as trans-local governance actors. As good governance actors, they create platforms for civic engagement, open up local decision making processes to be representative of the community as a whole, and implement practices which render the local state more socially accountable and transparent. However, as agents of bad governance, HTAs can exploit their linkages and manipulate their financial and political leverage for their own gain, even at the expense of the wider community. Thus, at their worst, HTAs can reinforce clientelistic ties, promote corruption, aggravate socio-economic cleavages, and erode participatory structures.

Variations in HTAs' governance processes are explained by the patterns of linkages which the HTA develops with its local state and community. In other words, an HTA's linkages dictate its capacity for transforming governance ideals and practices in the hometown. In order to tease out HTAs' varied implications for governance, this

dissertation elaborates a typology (see Model 7.1), which identifies four distinct roles through which HTAs participate as trans-local governance actors: equal partners, grassroots activists, opportunistic elites, and isolated philanthropists. Each role cultivates a particular governance style and each bears dramatically different consequences for democratic deepening in migrants' hometowns of origin. This typology was introduced in Chapter 1 along conceptual and theoretical lines. Below the typology is revisited, this time reviewing the details from each case study to paint a more concrete, empirically grounded picture.

Model 7.1 Typology of Trans-local Governance (Revisited)



First, as shown in the case of Pasaquina, an HTA can intervene as a trans-local governance actor by assuming the role of equal partner. This type of trans-local governance actor cultivates strong and collaborative linkages between the HTA, local state, and hometown community, ultimately unifying all three actors in a democratic triumvirate. The HTA in Pasaquina successfully engages the otherwise negligent local state not only through the financial incentives of their partnerships, but also through concerted efforts to restore trust and communication. It also mediates political tensions between the warring factions within the ADESCO and between the ADESCO and other hometown residents. The HTA in Pasaquina rallies diverse actors together under shared development objectives and invokes a sense of civic duty and pride among local residents and government officials. Ultimately, it is by engendering an atmosphere of participation that the HTA in Pasaquina is able to successfully instill good governance practices and deepen democracy. It redefines the meaning, practice and institutions of governance for local residents to be more inclusive and participatory, as well as enhancing the terms of social accountability and transparency to which the local state subscribes.

Second, HTAs also engage as trans-local governance actors, albeit as counterproductive ones, by adopting the roles of opportunistic elite. For example, in the case of Intipucá, the HTA acts as an opportunistic elite, which forges strong linkages with the local state, but weak ties to the hometown community. The HTA in Intipucá is an important case study because it illustrates how high degrees of linkage are not necessarily beneficial for democratic deepening. In Intipucá, the HTA has historically maintained strong linkages with its local state and by working together it has been able to contribute to several significant development projects to the hometown. However, the small group

of tightly-knit migrants uses their money and influence to form clientelistic ties to the local state. The HTA in Intipucá effectively usurps the local state, wangling changes of administration and most recently aiding one of its founding members, Hugo Salinas, to secure the title of *alcalde*. Moreover, through the manipulation of politics and power, this HTA alienates, marginalizes, and intimidates members of the hometown community who interfere with or do not share its interests. Thus, the HTA engages in the hometown as an opportunistic elite which harbors an exclusionary form of governance. This coercive governance tactic represent a failure for democratic deepening, as local residents are hindered from openly and fully exercising their rights as citizens without the threat of retaliation and as the local state is marred by allegations of fraud, coercion and corruption.

Third, HTAs may develop strong linkages with the community, but fail to link up to the local state, as is the case in Chapeltique. In this scenario, HTAs assume the role of grassroots activists when engaging as trans-local governance actors. In Chapeltique, the HTA uses grassroots efforts to shore up support in the hometown community. Through the creation of an alliance with the FMLN and the Catholic Church, the HTA cultivates strong ties which reach directly into the municipality's most abandoned communities. Together they invigorate civil society and drum up citizen participation. However, the HTA fails to link up to the local state either through negotiations with the current *alcalde* or through Ciro Andrade's mayoral campaign. As a result of its skewed linkages, the HTA has frustrated implications for deepening democracy. The good governance practices which the HTA managed to establish within the community are blocked by an impassable local state. Without the support of the state's institutional infrastructure, there

can be no sustainable change to combat pervasive social inequality and exclusion or to make permanent the inroads made towards civic engagement. In sum, as grassroots activists, HTAs can only provide the social foundation for better governance, which falls short of a sustainable impact for democratic deepening.

Fourth, HTAs can assume the role of isolated philanthropists when intervening as trans-local governance actors, as in the case of Chinameca. In the municipality of Chinameca, the HTA assumes no part in the process of cultivating linkages with either the local state or hometown community, thereby isolating itself and engaging as nothing more than a charity organization. Over the years, Chinameca's HTA and local state have burned bridges due to a lack of communication, egotism, and political disagreements. The HTA is unable to engage the local state and consequently has no effect on ensuring the local state meets its measures of accountability or transparency towards its constituents. In addition, the HTA is uninspired to engage or organize the hometown community, which continues to lay dormant as it lacks citizens with the vision and capacity to lead. Rather, the HTA's involvement with local residents is limited to ephemeral acts of kindness and to the technical assistance provided to Funde Chinameca's funding proposals. Thus, Chinameca's HTA is removed from the municipality. Consequently, as a trans-local governance actor, it has a vacuous, non-existent effect on local governance and leaves in its absence a vacuum, which has been filled by a steady stream of eager politicians. In short, this case serves as an important counterfactual illustrating how the absence of linkages has hallowing implications for democratic deepening.

III. The Politics of HTAs

Initially, migrants' presence in their hometowns of origin was felt primarily through their remittances. Over the years, as migratory patterns were cemented and as travel and communication were facilitated through improved technology, migrants' engagement in their hometowns has become increasingly frequent and dynamic. The emergence of HTAs represents one innovative way through which migrants can get involved. Migrants use HTAs to engage in diverse aspects of hometown life. In particular, migrants' participation in HTAs serves as a doorway into hometown politics. Consequently, HTAs have begun to intervene in local politics with a marked fervor and have begun to redefine their roles in the hometown. The dissertation draws four key conclusions concerning the politics of HTAs.

First, migrant intervention through organized collective action like that required by HTAs is inherently political. Due to the very nature of their work, all HTAs must eventually confront the local state and community and choose to either engage or disengage them. These interactions are necessarily political because they require tempering power relations and negotiating collaboration. Second, dissertation findings uncover that in and of itself, the intervention of individual migrants in local politics does not necessarily have significant effects on democratic quality in the hometown. But, organized migrant involvement, both through partisan and non-partisan means, is capable of having very real and significant consequences for the deepening of democracy. Evidence finds that, for better and for worse, HTAs can redefine democratic landscapes and shift power dynamics among local state and civic actors.

Third, evidence from this study shows that the root of migrants' political power originates from their remittances. Migrants are turning the economic power garnered through the weight of their financial contributions into political capital and leverage, which is not enjoyed by the vast majority of local residents. Collective remittances represent a multiplication of that power, as HTAs create an ideal platform upon which migrants can express their collective voice and interests. Through HTAs, migrants can use the money not only to finance political campaigns and causes, but also to raise their profile within the local state's agenda, as well as to garner support among residents in the hometown. Moreover, collective remittances have the capacity to be channeled into initiatives that positively affect governance practices, notions of citizenship, and democratic quality in migrants' hometowns of origin. To date, remittance research has focused only on their economic impact for local development (Torres 2000; Solimano 2003). However, this dissertation offers a pivotal shift away from this focus and argues that previous studies have overlooked perhaps their most valuable and sustainable significance for development, as tools for democratic deepening. For example, in the case of Pasaquina, remittances serve as a financial medium making it possible for migrants to solidify and legitimate their presence in local politics. They use this newfound power to broker and harness new linkages between the local state and the hometown community. Likewise, in the case of Chapeltique, remittances serve as important instruments of governance because they endow migrants with the economic and political authority with which to make claims against the local state. In particular, remittances allowed the HTA to finance and implement their own development agendas and electoral campaign, placing pressure upon the local state to be more transparent and socially accountable.

Similar efforts by local residents failed because they lacked the financial backing, and therefore the political force, to follow through with their claims. Moreover, in both cases, remittances grant migrants an invitation into privileged networks within El Salvador's central government, as well as with international aid donors, who have taken an interest in exploiting remittances' development potential. Such high-level ties have critical implications for successfully instituting and disseminating new governance practices. If effective, these external institutions can fortify, mediate, and legitimate amateur linkages between migrants, the local state, and the hometown community to foster more equitable, participatory, and socially accountable policies. However, findings from the dissertation also show that collective remittances and HTAs can have negative implications for democratic deepening. In the case of Intipucá, for example, the HTA manipulates the power bestowed by their remittances in order to erode good governance processes. They shift class structures and power dynamics, creating a new cadre of elites among HTA members who gradually usurp political power in the hometown. This situation has detrimental implications for local governance, creating a democratic climate motivated by fear, conflict, and exclusion. Furthermore, the case of Chinameca serves as evidence that the influx of remittances alone does not affect governance practices unless they are consciously tied to a larger democratic project engaging the local state and hometown community. The HTA in Chinameca only uses remittances to finance charitable causes. Consequently, migrants' efforts amount to no more than isolated fleeting donations, leaving neither a sustained nor a significant impact on the hometown's democracy. Thus, findings reveal that remittances' development impact is ephemeral if it does not reach beyond the particular project to create and sustain new governance practices and

institutions. In sum, findings from the four cases show that remittances have complex and important consequences for the democratic climates of their hometowns, which have been overlooked by previous studies. By examining collective remittances and HTAs as vehicles for democratic deepening instead of exclusively looking at them as economic stimulants, this dissertation contributes new critical insight into their potential for sustainable development.

Fourth, while all HTAs are inherently political, dissertation findings also reveal that not all HTAs approach politics in the same way. Each HTA must learn to negotiate its role within the competing power dynamics of the hometown. In fact, evidence from El Salvador shows that HTAs carefully and consciously strategize their political agendas and intervention. HTAs tailor their intervention to the particular circumstances and democratic climates in their hometowns and consciously weigh whether to adopt an openly politicized or an apolitical approach. Some engage directly in electoral political practices. Others, however, disguise the political nature of their work or choose to avoid party politics altogether in favor of participating in non-partisan ways. For example, in the municipalities of Pasaquina and Chinameca, migrants frame their HTA work as apolitical and avoid association with political parties, events or even rhetoric. However, although both municipalities adopt a similar approach towards local politics, this strategy yields vastly different results for the HTAs. In Pasaquina, migrants' decision to frame their intervention as apolitical is precisely what allows the HTA to better navigate tensions between the local state and community without being dragged into petty conflicts. By framing their intervention as apolitical, the HTA asserts its authority as a governance actor which bases its legitimacy on valid citizenship claims, rather than petty

partisan politics. In stark contrast, in Chinameca the HTA's decision to avoid politics altogether means that it is unable to stimulate collective organization in the community, as this is inevitably a political act. Moreover, the HTA also uses its aversion to politics as a justification for disengaging the local state. In short, Chinameca's HTA fails to recognize the value which politics can hold as a vehicle for garnering civic support or improving local state transparency and social accountability. This strategy stagnates any real attempt at social change and renders the HTA's efforts nothing more than isolated acts of charity. On the other hand, an HTA's decision to openly politicize can have equally mixed results for democratic deepening, as is evident in the contrasting cases of Intipucá and Chapeltique. HTAs in both municipalities openly embraced politics and even launch one of their own members as a candidate in their respective mayoral elections. However, the decision to politicize produces vastly different consequences in each municipality. In Chapeltique, politics is embraced by migrants as a positive force for social change. Migrants band together with the FMLN and Catholic Church and redefine politics as an institution rooted in civic participation, not one appropriated by politicians or parties. It is by adopting an overt political stance that the HTA is able to formalize its position as trans-local a governance actor in order to effectively challenge the corrupt local state and organize the community. In contrast, in Intipucá, migrants' engagement in local politics has adverse consequence, as Hugo Salinas' campaign and the HTA's support of it is the source of increased conflict, divisions, and corruption in the municipality. In this case, the HTA openly adopts a political affiliation, but only as a means to co-opt the local state and secure its hold on local power. This manipulation of politics also comes at the

expense of the hometown community who are further marginalized and reduced to clientelistic schemes.

IV. Underlying Mechanisms: Social Capital and the Use of Politics

In each of the four cases, each HTA has its own particular story and set of characters which facilitate the linkages it is able to foster with the local state and hometown community. For example, in some cases, effective linkages are fostered because there is a genuine camaraderie among the actors. In other cases, the three actors genuinely share altruistic interests or perhaps even political affiliations. Or, partnerships might be formed because actors want to take advantage of the monetary incentive to collaborate on projects or want to gain personal recognition for their involvement. On the other hand, linkages might fail due to opposing political persuasions, power struggles, egoism, complacency, or lack of organization and communication among actors. Regardless of each case's particularities, the dissertation finds there are two common denominators which define the type of linkage an HTA is able to form. In particular, this dissertation concludes that an HTA's use of social capital and its use of politics serve as the mechanisms underlying its ability to cultivate linkages and ultimately to deepen democracy.

First, evidence from Salvadoran HTAs shows that HTAs which make significant inroads towards deepening democracy, as in Pasaquina and Chapeltique, do so because they effectively transform social capital into social change. Social capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms, which not only shape connections among individuals, but also hold them together. In other words, social capital refers to the norms

of reciprocity, solidarity and trust inhering within a social network (Coleman 1988; Putnam 2000). When HTAs are able to root linkages in generalizable trust and bounded solidarity, they intervene as a legitimate governance actor in the eyes of community members and local state officials. In order to create a more fertile foundation for governance practices to blossom, they must use social capital to straddle micro and macro level institutions. Ideally, at the micro level, an HTA like the one in Pasaquina forges strong intra-community ties within the HTA, as well as inter-community ties between the HTA and other civic associations in the hometown. At the macro-level, the HTA must form a synergistic relationship with the local state without compromising its organizational integrity, thereby enabling it to effectively pressure the *alcaldía* for increased social accountability and transparency. When the HTA can harness these complimentary dimensions of social capital, it can successfully intervene as a trans-local governance actor because it has embedded itself in the hometown, while also retaining its autonomy (Woolcock 1998; Woolcock and Narayan 2000). In Chapeltique, the broken trust between the HTA and the local state (albeit warranted on the part of the migrants) prevents the HTA from nurturing social capital at the macro-level and therefore stifles any efforts towards democratic deepening. Striking a social capital balance is critical, not too much or too little. Too much social capital, as in the case of Intipucá, can be manipulated to erode community structures, which are ultimately detrimental for democracy (Foley and Edwards 1996; Portes and Landolt 2000). The HTA in Intipucá uses its social networks and ties to forge strong linkages to the state local, but it does so by creating an exclusionary clique and by cementing clientelistic ties with the local state. Too much social capital can also create “amoral familism” where an HTA suffers from an

“excess of community”, which discourages productive interaction with those outside the network, restricts members’ individual expression and advancement, causes free-riding on community resources, or negates beliefs concerning the possibility of advancement through individual efforts. Social capital, therefore, must not necessarily be “maximized”, rather it should be “optimized” to address each specific context (Woolcock 1998; Woolcock and Narayan 2000). Finally, the case of Chinameca serves as an important counterfactual because the HTA’s inability to tap into its social capital paralyzes its efforts and renders it defunct as a trans-local governance actor. In this scenario, “amoral individualism” and self-interest permeates the hometown community, preventing the HTA from creating cohesive social networks.

Moreover, in addition to its use of social capital, dissertation findings show that an HTA’s understanding and use of politics serve as the second mechanism underlying its ability to foster linkages. More specifically, the use of politics does not describe whether or not an HTA openly politicizes or takes an apolitical approach. Rather, it describes the HTA’s ability to distinguish between elite-based and citizen-based politics and ultimately to merge them, adopting both the institutional and civic components of democracy. The political violence of El Salvador civil war has been quelled and, in its place, formal democracy has ushered in regular and fair elections and has erected stable political institutions. These formal structures and procedures provide the institutional foundation for democracy without which citizens would not have the functional means by which to put their rights into practice. However, in the name of democracy, too often the politics of politicians is conflated with the politics of civil society (Alvarez et al 1998; Fox 1997; Nun 2003; O’Donnell 1999; Rueschmeyer et al 1992). In much of El Salvador, partisan

and electoral politics have failed to achieve the ideals lauded by the tenants of a deeper democracy. They continue to be more often than not a cause of increased division and conflict rather than a source of hope and social change. Too often they have devolved into a struggle for power among elites to the exclusion of ordinary citizens and this type of elite-based politics has overseen a growing disconnect between politicians and their constituents. Initially, many Salvadoran HTAs, including the four examined in this study, pursued their development agendas in narrow political terms. They emphasized primarily linking up to the hierarchical institutions of democracy, as opposed to its social processes and structures on the ground. Popular state and corporate sponsored development programs such as Unidos por la Solidaridad catered to this notion and readily appealed to HTAs who were impressed by the newfound attention which big government lavished on them. This focus on parties, institutions, and politicians opened channels for migrants to connect to the state which is a vital pillar for democratic deepening. Migrants gained direct access not only to local officials in their municipalities, but also to higher levels of influence even including the presidency. However, while these kinds of programs played an important role in helping HTAs better organize and execute their agendas, they also created a breeding ground for corrupt power-hungry migrants like those in Intipucá. The case of Intipucá is important because it shows how elite politics can pervert governance and reap hazardous consequences for democracy. The HTA erodes democratic quality because it employs as its mechanism elite politics which breed conflict, egoism, and corruption, then linkages are weak and democracy suffers.

Those HTAs, as in the municipalities of Pasaquina and Chapeltique, which successfully and positively impact democracy are the ones which see past the elitest

partisan politics and use politics to bridge the local state and community. They aim to ratify governance processes, institutions, and practices by harnessing a citizen-based understanding of politics. Citizen-based politics understands democracy as a governance process, which prioritizes inclusion and engagement as the backbone to its electoral and legislative systems. Moreover, politics based in civic participation and rights are a critical component for democratic deepening because they ensure that the social structures of democracy are strong in order to uphold its institutions (Baiocchi 2005; Heller 2000; Mouffe 1992; Roberts 1998; Törnquist 2005). Thus, if an HTA is able to harness the power of citizen-based politics, then they act as a catalyst for deepening democracy. Finally, the case of Chinameca again serves as an important counterfactual because it shows just how important it is for an HTA to engage local politics in one way or another if they aim to affect democratic quality in their hometowns. Otherwise, an HTA has vacuous effects on local governance with negligible implications for democratic deepening.

V. Beyond HTAs and El Salvador: Broader Research and Policy Implications

Forces of globalization have forced local communities, like those examined in this study, to vie for control over scarce power and resources from external donors and central government agencies. As a result, economic inequality and social disparity have risen, especially in rural community where economic and political power is traditionally inherited and overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of a few. Thus, the global challenge for democratic deepening lies in developing institutions and processes that are more responsive to the needs of ordinary citizens, including the poorest and most

marginalized. Efforts towards affecting democratic deepening are typically housed as part of larger social development agendas and more specifically policies appear under the aegis of good governance programs. There also exist targeted initiatives directed at nurturing community driven development and stimulating citizen empowerment. No matter the label, democratic deepening is now recognized as a pillar of sustainable development among policy makers and has transcended the realm of theory and academia to become a pressing policy objective. Thus, more countries and aid organizations than ever before are now working on designing and implementing policies which improve governance practices, processes and institutions.

Dissertation findings are generalizable beyond HTAs to include other transnational civic associations operating in local contexts throughout the global South. By applying the principle of linkage, findings help illuminate the conditions under which other transnational civic associations can effectively influence governance processes and ultimately affect democratic quality. In particular, this dissertation merges grounded empirical data with rich theoretical analysis and makes several key contributions towards policies designed to strengthen the voice and participation of stakeholders in governance processes. First, robust civic associations have always been considered the cradle of democracy in normative theory (Avritzer 2002; Cohen and Arato 1992; Habermas 1996; Hawthorn 2001; Putnam 1994; Turner 1992; Waltzer 1992). However, policy has too often dismissed them as conjectures designed to sooth idealist persuasions without adding any real substance. Nevertheless, dissertation findings show that HTAs do in fact have very real repercussions for democratic quality. Moreover, findings show that the governance structures which HTAs foster are not just a set of static institutions and

practices. Rather, they are dynamic organisms rooted in the linkages between the local state, community, and civil society. This trilogy of actors serve as democracy's life force and their relationship can be shaped and changed. Thus, democratic deepening is not just an abstract concept; policies can be put into place which either build up strong linkages or annul bad ones.

To date, policies directed at democratic deepening have placed heavy emphasis on the importance and mechanics of building participatory institutions for democracy (Fung and Wright 2003). As a result, steps towards decentralization have been widely adopted, which have opened up room for new development players and possibilities, especially at the local level. Local actors can now play a more significant role in the development decisions of their communities and municipal governments. However, there is a need to move away from issues of project design and to develop a more rigorous analytic agenda. Experts have yet to fully understand how to attract and encourage civic participation in the first place once decentralized measures and institutions have been established (Binswanger-Mkhize, de Regt, and Spector 2010). Dissertation findings reach beyond issues of institutional design and inform on the mechanisms which make civic engagement tick to uphold governance practices. HTAs are particularly useful empirical vehicles through which to expose these mechanisms because they effectively tie micro variables to macro discourses about the public sphere. By broadening the existing data on democratic deepening to include HTAs, findings create a more robust empirical basis for better understanding civil society as both a theoretical concept and as an applied instrument. Findings reveal that linkages must underlie governance institutions and those linkages need to be founded on social capital and the use of citizen-based politics. These set

of findings also stress that effective governance schemes cannot turn a blind eye to local politics, as the process of democratic deepening cannot occur in an apolitical bubble. In attempts to circumvent messy political dealings, many policies have produced cookie-cutter prescriptions which neglect to take into account local context and power dynamics and therefore fail to produce sustainable results. Findings show that HTAs and other transnational civic associations will inevitably confront the political context in which they operate and need to negotiate their role within it if they hope to meaningfully affect democratic quality. In fact, findings reveal that HTAs consciously tailor their intervention in order to best address the local circumstances.

In addition, previous governance programs have encountered significant challenges resolving conflicts between community and local state actors who compete over power, resources, and control. The management of funds has proven to be a particularly sore point of tension (Binswanger-Mkhize, de Regt, and Spector 2010). Evidence from this dissertation shows that HTAs are aptly positioned to intervene in order to facilitate communication and mediate conflicts through the creation of strong linkages which maximize social capital and nurture citizen-based politics. Moreover, pilot projects have been relatively successful at mobilizing communities around an isolated project. But, these programs too often fall short of their stated goal of sustainable democratic deepening because they fail to alter the social fabric needed to sustain civic participation after the project's budget has been exhausted (Binswanger-Mkhize, de Regt, and Spector 2010). Here too dissertation evidence is useful because HTAs maintain their presence in the hometown and therefore illuminate how civic engagement can be

sustained and how institutions can be strengthened in the long-term in order to make efforts towards democratic deepening more permanent.

Previous case studies of democratic deepening have been criticized for their narrow breadth and for selecting upon the dependent variable. However, this dissertation employs four different HTA cases in order to draw rich analytic comparisons between those instances in which civil society effectively deepens democracy and those in which it does not. As a result, the dissertation problematizes the relationship between civil society and democracy and does not treat civil society as a panacea for democracy. Rather, evidence from Salvadoran HTAs also exposes the conditions under which civil society can act as an anti-democratic force perpetuating exclusion and inequality, findings which are equally important to understand when designing governance programs.

Furthermore, this dissertation illuminates an important distinction between civil society and community, where civil society describes organized voluntary associations and community refers to a loose conglomerate of individuals who come together with no unified civic objective. When communities organize and engage collectively, they enter the realm of civil society. Community alone is not enough to deepen democracy because it lacks organized citizen participation. But, civil society organizations also need the community in order to effectively deepen democracy because it provides a broad base of support and moral legitimacy. Thus, community and civil society engage in a mutually beneficial relationship for democratic deepening. This distinction between community and civil society moves the theoretical discussion beyond the traditional dichotomy of state-civil society relations to present a three-dimensional conceptualization of

democracy in which community behaves an autonomous actor. This nuanced approach unpacks civil society as a relational concept, which engages dynamically with the local state and community. Moreover, it allows for a deeper analysis of who is being empowered because, as shown in the case studies, the empowerment of civil society does not necessarily produce positive democratic effects for the community at large, nor does it necessarily make the local state more accountable or transparent. This distinction is not only theoretical, but is also policy relevant. If policy prescriptions fail to make this distinction then they run the risk of operating only at the level of either the community or civil society, in which case its effects will be unsustainable because it does not transform the social fabric in order to instill long-term civic participation. Policy must work at the level of civil society if it hopes to leave lasting implications for democratic deepening. In other words, successful policy must empower communities to organize and join civil society. Dissertation findings demonstrate under which conditions this can be achieved, as HTAs have shown that they are dynamic vehicles through which to integrate unorganized communities into voluntary civic associations via the strengthening of citizen politics and the nurturing of social capital.

This dissertation also draws conclusions about the role of the local state in the process of democratic deepening. Governance policies tend to examine separately the roles of the state and of civic actors. Typically, policies which focus on the local state highlight the rule of law, improved accountability and anti-corruption measures. On the other hand, governance policies which focus on civic actors tend to look at building participatory institutions and grassroots empowerment initiatives. However, this separation presents problems as both the state and civil society are integral components to

sustainable democratic deepening. Dissertation findings resolve this tension by adopting a holistic approach in the analysis. In addition, evidence from HTAs found in this dissertation can teach policy makers how to better implement decentralization policies. Effective decentralization policies should not only strengthen top-down relationships and institutions, but also improve the communication and civic participation needed for downward accountability towards citizens. However, the latter has proven difficult to shape and monitor. Nevertheless, dissertation findings reveal the conditions under which strong public-private partnerships can be built with the support of an HTA or other mediating transnational civic association. Through these partnerships, the local state has the potential to dynamically engage its constituents and create linkages on the ground.

Finally, another challenge facing governance policies today is the need for a better understanding of how to scale up efforts to construct a multi-dimensional process of democratic deepening, which would also make projects more attractive for big budget funding (Binswanger-Mkhize, de Regt, and Spector 2010). Previous examinations have concentrated on how these processes evolve at local and the national levels. Dissertation findings, however, contribute a unique perspective by examining how efforts towards democratic deepening link up and unfold on a transnational scale. HTAs represent an innovative and complex manifestation of associational life and they are evidence of just how rich the tapestry of democracy can be, even reaching beyond geographic boundaries. Dissertation findings show that HTAs possess various roles, approaches, and effects for local governance, which have distinctive implications for democratic deepening. HTAs' patterns of governance are, in part, shaped by their unique ability to simultaneously occupy positions as both insiders and outsiders within the hometown. As insiders, HTAs

are rooted in the community and therefore are able to readily drum up and capitalize on social capital and local networks. They also have a vested civic interest in the development of their hometown, unlike removed government and international donors. It is this genuine altruism and solidarity that propels many migrants to organize HTAs and intervene in the first place. As outsiders, on the other hand, HTAs have the financial capital to back their citizenship claims and effectively pressure the local state. In addition, unlike hometown residents or political officials, HTAs are not so vested in the hometown that are easy prey for the fear tactics of local despots, nor do their members' personal livelihoods rely local struggles for power. Thus, as a result of their transnational nature, HTAs are ideally situated to engage as good governance actors and practice politics in terms of citizenship without falling into the traps laid out by traditional elite politics in the hometown.³⁵ By exploring this intersection of governance research with the study of international migration, dissertation findings contribute critically to policy which employs civil society organizations to shape social change across national borders.

VI. Conclusion

HTAs are not limited to El Salvador or even Latin America. Migrants across the globe, including notable example in Africa and Asia, are transforming their remittances into political power and organizing as transnational agents of change in their hometowns of origin. The principle of linkage examined in this dissertation holds true regardless of geographic location and is generalizable beyond HTAs to include other transnational civic associations serving communities in the global South. Thus, if a transnational civic

³⁵ Of course, under less than ideal circumstances, HTAs like the one in Intipucá can also use their unique position within the hometown to pervert governance.

association is able to build cross-cutting linkages across community, civic, and state lines, then democracy will deepen. However, critics will charge that HTAs and similar civic associations are limited in number or are merely isolated examples. Skeptics will say that they are too small and too localized to make a significant difference. And, in fact, HTAs are not the magic bullet needed to address the world's governance or development challenges. They are small. They are local. But, their impact reverberates and they provide a fertile foundation for civic engagement necessary to sustain social change on a larger scale because ultimately the process of democratic deepening is one which is rooted in the formal and informal institutions of governance. Transnational civic associations like HTAs, big or small, plant the seeds from which future civic empowerment takes root. In a world in which many civil societies in the global South are crushed under the weight of globalization, corruption, and petty politics, HTAs remind us that local actors can lift themselves up. At their best, they illustrate for us the conditions under which the relationship between community, civil society, and the state sparks and unfurls. They show us how people can come together despite personal differences, political affiliation, class divides, and even national borders to build a coalition of solidarity and progress. However, of all the lessons which HTAs teach us, perhaps the most important is in the capacity and possibility of hope, in the belief that change is possible. HTAs represent the scattered pockets of hope where the gap narrows between the promise of democracy's ideals and the blows dealt by its flawed reality. In many corners of the world, struggles for democracy are being waged and won. These are struggles not simply for membership and rights as citizens. Rather, they are struggles where ordinary men and women implore the right to lead dignified lives in which they

can develop their capabilities and in which they are free to reach towards a better tomorrow (Appadurai 2001; Sen 1999). It is not too late to create, in the words of Gabriel García Márquez, “A new and sweeping utopia of life, where no one will be able to decide for others how they die, where love will prove true and happiness be possible, and where the races condemned to one hundred years of solitude will have, at last and forever, a second opportunity on earth.” (Gabriel García Márquez, *The Solitude of Latin America*, Nobel Lecture, 8 December 1982). Thus, if only in a small way, HTAs and their counterparts throughout the global South have begun to carve out openings, offering up this second chance.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

GLOSSARY OF SPANISH TERMS AND ACRONYMS

ADESCO	Asociación de Desarrollo Comunal (Community Development Association)
ADI	Asociación Deportiva de Intipucá (ADI)
Alcalde	Mayor
Alcaldía	Local state/Office of the mayor
Arquitecto	Architect
ARENA	Right-wing political party (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista)
Bachillerato	High school
Banquito	Small bank
Barrio	Surrounding neighborhood within the municipality's urban center
Bolos	Salvadoran slang for drunkard
Cabildos Abiertos	Open town meetings
Campesinos	Peasants
Cantón	Municipal jurisdiction within a municipality
Carne Asada	Grilled meat/barbeque
Casa Comunal	Community house or center
Casa de la Cultura	Cultural center
Caserío	Legal term for the smallest municipal jurisdiction/ a community
Centro Cantonal	Center of the cantón
Centro Urbano	Urban center
Chorros	Pumps
Ciudad	City
Colones	El Salvador's currency prior to dollarization in 2001
Colonia	Surrounding neighborhood within the municipality's urban center
Comité	Committee
Comité de Agua	Water committee
Comité de Barrio	Neighborhood committee
Comité de Enlace	Counterpart committee
Compañero	Comrade
Consejal Municipal	Municipal council
Corte de Cuentas	Court of accounts
CUC	Comunidad Unida de Chinameca
CUS	Comunidades Unidas Salvadoreñas
Delegados de la Palabra	Delegates of the word of God
Desconfianza	Distrust

Directiva	Directive or executive committee
Enlace	Liaison
Escudo de Armas	Code of Arms
Estadio Deportivo	Sports complex
Fanático	Fanatic
Fiestas Patronales	Patron saint festivities
FISDL	Fondo de Inversión Social para el Desarrollo Local (Social Investment Fund for Local Development)
FMLN	Left-wing political party (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional)
FUNDE	Fundación para el Desarrollo de Chinameca (Foundation for the Development of Chinameca)
FUPI	Fundación Unidos por Intipucá
Gerente	Manager
Guerillero	Guerilla soldier
Gringo	Slang for an American
Hermanos Lejanos	Endearing term for migrants/ literally translated as distant brothers
HTA	Hometown association
Ingeniero	Engineer
Mano de Obra	Manual labor
Militante	Militant
Ministerio de Educación	Ministry of Education
Ministerio de Salud	Ministry of Education
Moto taxi	Small taxi powered by a motorcycle engine
PADF	Pan American Development Foundation
Parque Central	Central park
Parvularia	Kindergarten
Personalidad Jurídica	Legal charter
PCN	Right-wing political party (Partido de Conciliación Nacional)
PDC	Right-wing political party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano)
Promotor de Salud	Health promotor employed by the Unidad de Salud
Pueblo	Hometown or community
Pupusa	Pupusa, a traditional Salvadoran dish
Revolución	Revolution
Salón de Baile	Dance hall
Tamales	Tamales, a traditional Salvadoran dish made of cornmeal
Tesorero	Treasurer
Turicentro	Tourist center
Unidad de Salud	Health Services Unit
Vivero	Plant nursery

APPENDIX II

LIST OF MODELS AND TABLES

Models

- 1.1. Research Design
- 1.2. Typology of Trans-local Governance
- 7.1 Typology of Trans-local Governance (Revisited)

Tables

- 2.1. The Four Case Studies
- 2.2. Case Comparisons
- 2.3. Interview Details
- 2.4. Archival Data
- 2.5. Interview Data
- 2.6. Operationalizing Democratic Deepening
- 3.1 Projects Undertaken by Comité Pro-Mejoramiento del Cantón Piedras Blancas, Pasaquina (1998—2010)
- 4.1. Projects Undertaken by Fundación Unidos por Intipucá (1985—2005)
- 5.1. Projects Undertaken by Comité Pro-Mejoramiento de Chapeltique (1998—2010)
- 6.1. Projects Undertaken by Comunidad Unida de Chinameca (1998—2010)


APPENDIX III

MAPS

1. Political Map of El Salvador
2. Department of La Unión
3. Department of San Miguel
4. Municipality of Pasaquina
5. Municipality of Intipucá
6. Municipality of Chapeltique
7. Municipality of Chinameca
8. Pasaquina's Urban Center
9. Intipucá's Urban Center
10. Chapeltique's Urban Center
11. Chinameca's Urban Center


APPENDIX III.1

POLITICAL MAP OF EL SALVADOR (By Departments)



Source: Almanaque Municipal. 2006. Guillermo Noubleau (ed). San Salvador, El Salvador: Algier's Impresores.


APPENDIX III.2 MAP OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LA UNION



Source: Monografía del Departamento y Municipios de La Unión. 1999. San Salvador, El Salvador: Centro Nacional de Registros, Instituto Geográfico Nacional.

APPENDIX III.3


MAP OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SAN MIGUEL



Source: Monografía del Departamento y Municipios de San Miguel. 2007. San Salvador, El Salvador: Centro Nacional de Registros, Instituto Geográfico Nacional.

APPENDIX III.4

MAP OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PASAQUINA



Source: Monografía del Departamento y Municipios de La Unión. 1999. San Salvador, El Salvador: Centro Nacional de Registros, Instituto Geográfico Nacional.

MAP OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF INTIPUCA



APPENDIX III.6


MAP OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF CHAPELTIQUE



Source: Monografía del Departamento y Municipios de San Miguel. 2007. San Salvador, El Salvador: Centro Nacional de Registros, Instituto Geográfico Nacional.

APPENDIX III: MAP 7

MAP OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF CHINAMECA



Source: Monografía del Departamento y Municipios de San Miguel. 2007. San Salvador, El Salvador: Centro Nacional de Registros, Instituto Geográfico Nacional.

APPENDIX III.8


MAP OF PASAQUINA'S URBAN CENTER



Source: Monografía del Departamento y Municipios de La Unión. 1999. San Salvador, El Salvador: Centro Nacional de Registros, Instituto Geográfico Nacional.

APPENDIX III.9

MAP OF INTIPUCA'S URBAN CENTER



Source: Monografía del Departamento y Municipios de La Unión. 1999. San Salvador, El Salvador: Centro Nacional de Registros, Instituto Geográfico Nacional.


APPENDIX III: MAP 10

MAP OF CHAPELTIQUE'S URBAN CENTER



Source: Monografía del Departamento y Municipios de San Miguel. 2007. San Salvador, El Salvador: Centro Nacional de Registros, Instituto Geográfico Nacional.

APPENDIX III.11 MAP OF CHINAMECA'S URBAN CENTER



Source: Monografía del Departamento y Municipios de San Miguel. 2007. San Salvador, El Salvador: Centro Nacional de Registros, Instituto Geográfico Nacional.

APPENDIX IV

INTERVIEWEE QUESTIONNAIRES

1. Hometown Associations (HTAs)
2. Local State Officials
3. Community Leaders

APPENDIX IV.1

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR HOMETOWN ASSOCIATIONS (HTAs)

I. Questions about Life in the United States

1. Cuál es su ocupación?
What is your occupation?
2. En una escala de 1 a 10, qué tan bien habla usted el inglés? 1 es muy mal y 10 es muy bien.
In a scale of 1 to 10 how well do you speak English? 1 is very poorly and 10 is very well.
3. Cuál es su nivel de educación?
What is your level of education?
4. Cuando usted está en los Estados Unidos, cuánta interacción tiene usted con gente que no sea salvadoreña o hispana? Se relaciona de forma regular y frecuente?
When you are in the United States, how much interaction do you have with people who are not from El Salvador or Hispanic? Do you interact with them regularly and frequently?
5. Cuál es la naturaleza de esta interacción (amigos, colegas del trabajo, etc.)? Por ejemplo, cuántos amigos tiene usted que no sean salvadoreños o hispanos? En cuántas actividades participa donde la gente no sea salvadoreña o hispana?
What is the nature of that interaction (friends, co-workers, etc.)? For example, how many friends do you have that are not Salvadoran or Hispanic? In how many activities do you participate in where people are not Salvadoran or Hispanic?
6. Cuál es su estado migratorio en los Estados Unidos?
What is your legal status in the United States?
7. Si usted es ciudadano de los Estados Unidos, usted vota en las elecciones?
If you are a United States citizen, do you vote in the elections?

8. Cuan de cerca sigue la política de los Estados Unidos como las elecciones presidenciales?
How closely do you follow US politics such as the presidential elections?
9. Qué valores o prácticas democráticas ha aprendido usted en los Estados Unidos?
What values and democratic practices have you learned in the US?
10. Usted cree que a través de su participación en el comité de migrantes ha logrado transferir los valores democráticos que usted ha aprendido en los Estados Unidos a su comunidad de origen? De ser así, de qué manera lo logró?
Do you think that through your participation in the HTA you have been able to transfer to your hometown community the democratic values you learned in the United States? If so, how did you accomplish that?
11. Qué factores le impiden transferir esos valores democráticos de una forma más efectiva?
What factors prevent you from transferring those democratic values more effectively?
12. Cuando usted maneja su carro en los Estados Unidos, usted para su carro en las luces rojas aun cuando es muy tarde en la noche y no hay otros carros a su alrededor?
When you drive your car in the United States do you stop at the red light even if when it is late at night and there are no other cars around?
13. Usted maneja su carro de la misma manera cuando está en El Salvador? Por qué sí o por qué no?
Do you drive your car in the same way when you are in El Salvador? Please explain why.
14. Cómo describiría la manera en que usted se siente acerca de su persona cuando vive en El Salvador en comparación a como se siente con la vida que lleva en los Estados Unidos?
How would you describe the way you feel about yourself when you live in El Salvador compared to how you feel about your life the United States?
15. Tiene planes de jubilarse en los Estados Unidos o regresar a El Salvador?
Do you plan to retire in the United States or go back to El Salvador?

II. Questions about the HTA's History and Activities

1. Cuándo, cómo, y por qué se organizó el comité de migrantes? Cuántos miembros hubo al inicio y cuántos miembros hay actualmente?

When, how, and why was the HTA organized? How many members were there in the beginning and how many are there now?

2. Cómo se identifican y seleccionan los proyectos? La comunidad local participa en el proceso de selección y/o implementación de los proyectos? De ser así, cómo?
How are the projects identified and selected? Does the hometown community participate in the project selection and/or implementation? If so, how?
3. Su comité tiene miembros de todas las jurisdicciones del municipio o son todos ustedes originarios de la misma comunidad?
Does your HTA have members from all the jurisdictions of the municipality or are all members from the same hometown community?
4. El comité sirve a todas las jurisdicciones de la municipalidad de forma igual o los sus esfuerzos concentrados más en una parte que en otra? Por qué?
Does the HTA serve all jurisdictions of the municipality equally or are the efforts concentrated more in one area than in another? Why?
5. Según el comité, cuáles son las tres prioridades para el desarrollo del municipio?
According to the HTA what are the three top priorities for the development of the municipality?
6. Por qué quiso usted formar parte del comité de migrantes?
Why did you want to participate in the HTA?
7. Cree usted que a través de su participación en el comité de migrantes pudo ayudar a adelantar el desarrollo de su comunidad de origen?
Do you think that through your participation in the HTA you could help to advance the development of your hometown community?

III. Questions about the Political Environment

1. En base a lo que usted ha visto, cómo piensa que la política local en El Salvador difiere de la política en los Estados Unidos?
Based on your observations how do you think local politics in El Salvador compare to politics in the United States?
2. Yo he notado que en El Salvador la política puede convertir a los amigos en enemigos, pero no entiendo la razón. Por qué se da esa situación?

I have noticed that in El Salvador politics can create animosity between friends, but I do not understand why. In your opinion, what brings about such a situation?

3. La situación de enemistad y antagonismo debido a la política se da en su comunidad de origen? Esto retrocede al tiempo de la guerra civil?
Has your hometown community experienced situations of animosity and antagonism due to politics? Does it go back to the time of the civil war?
4. Es la gente en su comunidad de origen muy aliada a un partido político y su ideología?
Are the people of your hometown community affiliated to a particular political party and its ideology?
5. Con respecto al voto para alcalde, la gente de su comunidad de origen vota en base al partido político o en la personalidad de los candidatos?
Concerning the vote for alcalde, do people in your hometown community vote based on the political party or on the personality of the candidates?

IV. Questions about the HTA as Political Actors

1. Cree usted que los comités de migrantes son políticos o apolíticos?
Do you think HTAs are political or apolitical?
2. Cómo responde usted cuando la gente dice que los comités de migrantes se meten mucho en la política local de El Salvador?
How do you answer when people comment that the HTAs get too involved in local politics of El Salvador?
3. Por qué quiere involucrase en la política de su lugar de origen si usted ya no vive ahí?
Why do you want to get involved in the politics of your hometown if you no longer live there?
4. Por qué mejor no invierte su tiempo y esfuerzo en la política local de los Estados Unidos donde usted vive?
Why do you not prefer to invest your time and effort in the local politics of the United States where you live?
5. En su opinión, los migrantes, ya sea como individuos o a través de su participación en el comité han cambiado el ambiente político y/o la dinámica del poder en su lugar de origen?
In your opinion, have migrants, as individuals or through their participation in the HTA, changed the political environment and/or the dynamics of political power in their hometown?

6. Cómo describiría usted la relación del comité de migrantes con la alcaldía de su lugar de origen? Existe un ambiente de colaboración o de tensión?
How would you describe the relationship of the HTA with the alcaldía of your hometown? Is there collaboration or tension?
7. Cuál es la razón de esta situación? Si ha habido un cambio en la relación, qué produjo ese cambio?
What is the reason for this situation? If there was a change in the relationship, what brought about that change?
8. Tengo la impresión que típicamente hay una lucha de poder entre los comités de migrantes y sus alcaldías. Está usted de acuerdo? De ser así, por qué piensa usted que eso sucede?
I have the impression that typically there is a power struggle between the HTAs and their alcaldías. Do you agree? If so, why do you think this happens?
9. Usted tiene conexiones con políticos Salvadoreños en altos cargos en San Salvador y en la embajada o consulado de los Estados Unidos?
Do you have connections to high level Salvadoran politicians in San Salvador and in the Salvadoran Embassy in the United States?
10. Usted tiene conexiones con políticos de los Estados Unidos? De ser así, cómo se desarrollaron estos lazos?
Do you have connections to United States politicians? If so, how did these links develop?
11. De qué manera la participación en los comités de migrantes da a los migrantes cierto poder en la política local de su lugar de origen?
In what way does participation in HTA empower migrants in local politics of their hometown?
12. Los miembros del comité de migrantes y sus colaboradores participan en el proceso electoral en El Salvador—en las elecciones para alcalde como en las elecciones nacionales?
Do HTA members and its collaborators participate in the electoral process in El Salvador—the local elections as well as the national elections?

V. Questions about the HTA as Community Actors

1. En su opinión, es su comunidad de origen unida o dividida? Por qué es así?
In your opinion, is your hometown community united or divided? Why?

2. Tiene el comité de migrantes una base de apoyo amplia en la comunidad de origen?
Does the HTA have a strong base of support in the hometown community?
3. Hay personas en la comunidad de origen que han criticado al comité de migrantes? De ser así, por qué les critican?
Are there persons in your hometown community who criticize the HTA? If so, why?
4. De qué manera su participación en el comité de migrantes ha influenciado la opinión de su comunidad de origen acerca de usted?
How has your participation in the HTA influenced the opinion your hometown community has about you?
5. Usted piensa que como resultado de su participación en el comité de migrantes, la gente de su comunidad de origen lo trata con más respeto?
Do you think that due to your participation in the HTA your hometown community treats you with more respect?
6. Usted piensa que como resultado de su participación en el comité de migrantes, su comunidad de origen ahora lo critica más, etc.?
Do you think that due to your participation in the HTA your hometown community criticize you more, etc.?

APPENDIX IV.2

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR LOCAL STATE OFFICIALS

I. Questions about Relations between the Alcaldía and the HTA

1. Tiene conocimiento acerca del comité de migrantes de este municipio? De ser así, cuál es su opinión de esa directiva?
Do you have knowledge about this municipality's HTA? If so, what is your opinion about this HTA?
2. Ha trabajado la alcaldía con el comité de migrantes en algún proyecto? De ser así, cuales proyectos?
Has the alcaldía ever worked in a project with the HTA? If so, which projects?
3. Tuvo la alcaldía dificultades al trabajar con el comité de migrantes? Los migrantes son accesible? Es fácil hablar con ellos?
Did the alcaldía encounter any difficulties working with the HTA? Are the HTA members accessible and easy to talk to?
4. Usted acuerda cómo trabaja el comité de migrantes? Cómo seleccionan los proyectos? En su opinión, toman en cuenta las opiniones de la comunidad de origen para seleccionar y/o implementar los proyectos o el comité decide por su propia cuenta?
Do you remember how the HTA operates? How are the projects selected? In your opinion, does the HTA take into account the opinion of the hometown community in the project selection/implementation or the HTA decides unilaterally?
5. Cómo describiría usted la situación actual entre la alcaldía y el comité de migrantes? Si recientemente ha habido un cambio en las relaciones, a qué se debe ese cambio?
How would you describe the current relationship between the alcaldía and the HTA? If there has been a recent change in the relationship, what was the reason for that change?
6. Si nunca ha existido una relación entre la alcaldía y el comité de migrantes es debido a diferencias personales o a tensiones/divisiones políticas?

If a relationship between the alcaldía and the HTA has never existed is it due to personal differences or political tensions/divisions?

7. En su opinión cuál sería la relación ideal entre la alcaldía y el comité de migrantes?
In your opinion, what would be the ideal relationship between the alcaldía and the HTA?
8. Usted considera que el alcalde entrante puede desarrollar un plan de trabajo para el municipio sin considerar el rol del comité de migrantes?
Do you think the incoming alcalde can put together a plan for the development of the municipality that does not take into account the role of the HTA?
9. Si usted fuera elegido/re-elegido como alcalde, estaría dispuesto a trabajar con el comité de migrantes? De ser así, quisiera que la alcaldía manejase los fondos asignados a los proyectos realizados en conjunto?
If you are elected/re-elected to the alcaldía would you be willing to work with the HTA? If so, would you want the alcaldía to manage the HTA funds allocated to joint projects?

II. Questions about the HTA as Political Actors

1. Usted cree que los migrantes organizaron la directiva influenciados por su afiliación política o se hubieran organizado sin importar sus ideologías políticas?
Do you think the migrants' political affiliation influenced their decision to establish the HTA or they would have done it regardless of their political ideologies?
2. En su opinión el comité de migrantes es político o apolítico? Por qué?
In your opinion is the HTA political or apolitical? Why?
3. Usted cree que el comité de migrantes interfiere en la política de este municipio? De ser así, en su opinión, esto sucede en todos los municipios que tienen comités de migrantes o es una característica particular de este municipio?
Do you think the HTA interferes in the politics of this municipality? If so, in your opinion, does it happen in all municipalities that have HTAs or is it a characteristic of this municipality?
4. Cómo respondería usted si alguien dice “Pero si los migrantes ya no viven aquí por qué se están metiendo tanto en nuestra política local? Cuáles son sus verdaderos motivos”?

How you would respond to someone who says “But the migrants no longer live here why do they get so involved in our local politics? What are their real reasons?”

5. En su opinión, el comité de migrantes está aumentando o disminuyendo las tensiones políticas y/o las divisiones en el municipio?
In your opinion is the HTA increasing or decreasing the political tension and/or divisions in the municipality?

III. Questions about the HTA as Community Actors

1. Considera que la directiva de migrantes está trabajando bien con las comunidades de este municipio o tienen sus propios intereses?
Do you think the HTA is working well with the communities of this municipality or they have ulterior motives?
2. En su opinión, de qué manera podría el comité de migrantes servir mejor los intereses y necesidades del municipio?
In your opinion, how would the HTA better serve the interests/needs of the municipality?
3. Usted cree que los migrantes, ya sea de manera individual o a través de su participación en el comité de migrantes, han influenciado el ambiente político y las dinámicas del poder en el municipio?
Do you think that migrants, either individually or through their participation in the HTA, have influenced the political environment and the dynamics of power in this municipality?
4. En su opinión el comité de migrantes influenció de alguna manera a las comunidades de este municipio para que comiencen a organizar sus directivas cívicas y establecer sus ADESCOs, comités de agua, etc.
In your opinion, did the HTA influence the communities of this municipality to organize their civic groups and establish their ADESCOs, water committees, etc.?
5. Usted cree que quizás en una alguna comunidad de este municipio digan “ah si los migrantes se organizaron, nosotros también podemos organizarnos”?
Do you think that perhaps in a community of this municipality people would say “if the migrants got organized, we can also get organized.”?

IV. Questions about the Political Environment

1. Por qué quiere usted ser alcalde? Por qué quiere usted ser reelegido para otro período?
Why do you want to be alcalde? Why do you want to be re-elected for another period?
2. Solicitó usted el apoyo del comité de migrantes para su campaña política?
Did you request the support of the HTA for your political campaign?
3. Como alcalde de este municipio cómo respondería usted a las personas de este municipio que dicen, por ejemplo "El alcalde solo ayuda a los de su partido o a los del centro urbano."?
As alcalde of this municipality, how would you answer the people of this municipality who say, for example, "The alcalde helps only those who belong to this party or the people in the urban center."?
4. Son siempre los mismos grupos o personas las que critican a la alcaldía?
Is it always the same group/s of people or the persons who criticize the alcaldía?
5. Cuáles serían sus tres prioridades de su administración si usted es elegido/re-elegido como alcalde?
What would be the three top priorities of your administration if you get elected/re-elected to the alcaldía?
6. La alcaldía ha gestionado ayuda de organizaciones internacional o de ONGs en años anteriores? Cuál es su postura al respecto para el futuro?
Has the alcaldía sought/managed aid from international organizations and ONGs in the past? What is your position on this issue for the future?
7. La política local en este municipio y en particular las campañas políticas para alcalde tienen que ver más con (i) la personalidad de los candidatos, (ii) la ideología de sus partidos políticos, (iii) dinero gastado en las campañas políticas, (iv) fraude, etc.? Se observa las mismas características en otros municipios?
Do local politics in this municipality and in particular the campaigns for alcalde have more to do with (i) the personality of the candidates, (ii) the political ideology of their parties, (iii) money spent on the campaigns, (iv) fraud, etc.? Are the same characteristics evident in other municipalities?
8. Me he dado cuenta que en la campaña para alcalde que se está llevando a cabo ahora, se hacen ataques personales, insultos y acusaciones entre los candidatos. Es esto típico de este municipio o de esta campaña o esto sucede en otros municipios del país también? Cuáles son las razones?

I have noticed that in the current campaign for alcalde there are a lot of personal attacks, insults and accusations between the candidates. Is this typical of this municipality or this campaign or it also happens in other municipalities around the country?

9. Durante las campañas políticas para alcalde en este municipio, se realizan debates entre los distintos candidatos dónde la gente pueda escuchar las diferencias entre los planes de gobierno propuestos por los candidatos, hacerles preguntas, y preparase mejor para dar su vote?
During the campaigns for alcalde in this municipality, do candidates hold debates to discuss the issues so people can listen to their proposed plans for government, ask questions, and get better prepared to cast their vote?
10. Cuántos eventos ha realizado usted en los caseríos/centro urbano durante su campaña para alcalde? Qué actividades se realizan durante estos eventos?
How many campaign events have you held in the caseríos and how many in the urban center? What activities take place during these events?
11. En caso de haber un candidato para alcalde que sea migrante se ha observado que él haya incorporado prácticas en su campaña política que aprendió al vivir en los Estados Unidos? De ser así, cuáles prácticas?
In case a candidate for alcalde is a migrant, have you noticed whether he has incorporated into his campaign any practices he may have learned while living in the United States? If do, what practices?
12. Por qué la gente se cambia de partido político a menudo? Parece que la gente aquí se cambia de partido por conveniencia. Es por el poder, por el dinero, porque les cae mal el candidato? Hay alguna otra razón?
Why do people change political affiliations often? It seems that people here change political party when it is to their advantage. Is it because of power, money, because they dislike the candidate? Is there another reason?
13. Usted cree que la gente cambia a menudo de partido político en todos los municipios de El Salvador o eso es algo particular qué pasa en este municipio?
Do you think people throughout the municipalities of El Salvador change their political affiliation often or is it something particular to this municipality?
14. En general, la gente en este municipio habla libremente de sus ideologías políticas, candidato preferido, y de su voto en las elecciones para alcalde, o son temas personales que prefieren no discutirlos en público? Why?
In general, do people in this municipality talk openly about their political ideologies, their favorite candidates, and how they voted in the elections

for alcalde, or do they consider these issues personal and prefer not to discuss them in public? Why?

15. Cree usted que ahora a la gente de este municipio le gusta mostrar los colores políticos, ponerse las camisas de su partido político, etc. más que antes y sin temor o reservas?
Do you think nowadays people in this municipality like to show publicly their political colors by wearing the shirts of their political party, etc., more than in the past and, without fear or reservations?
16. En su opinión, la política divide a las comunidades, a los ADESCOS, y a otros grupos cívicos de este municipio? En este municipio existen antagonismos, enemistades entre la gente debido a diferencias políticas?
In your opinion, do politics cause division in the communities, the ADESCOs and other civic groups in this municipality? In this municipality is there evidence of antagonism and animosity between persons due to political differences?
17. El voto para un alcalde en este municipio es basado más en el partido político o en la persona (candidato)?
Is the vote in this municipality based more on the political party or the person (candidate)?
18. Qué porcentaje de la población vota en las elecciones para alcalde y presidente del país?
What percent of the population of this municipality votes in the elections for alcalde/president?
19. En su opinión hay en esta municipalidad un partido político más fuerte?
In your opinion is there a strongest political party in this municipality?
20. Me han dicho que en este municipio todo es politizado. Está usted de acuerdo? Por qué?
I have been told that everything in this municipality is politicized. Do you agree? Why?
21. Tienen los residentes de este municipio acceso a los documentos de la alcaldía como el presupuesto municipal, etc.? Se proporciona la información solicitada sin problema?
Do residents of this municipality have access to the alcaldía documents such as the municipal budget, etc? Is the information requested made available without difficulty?

V. Questions about Community Organization/Participation

1. Cuándo se llevó a cabo el último cabildo abierto en este municipio?
When was the last open town meeting held in this municipality?
2. Qué tipo de reuniones sostiene el alcalde con la comunidad en este municipio? La alcaldía realiza consultas populares? Cómo describiría la participación ciudadana en las decisiones que toma la alcaldía en este municipio?
What type of meetings does the alcalde hold with the community in this municipality? Are there popular consultations/surveys? How would you describe citizens' participation in the decisions of the alcaldía?
3. Si el alcalde no realiza cabildos abiertos o consultas populares, cuáles son las vías a través de las cuales la comunidad puede comunicarse con el alcalde?
If the alcalde does not hold open town meetings or popular consultations what avenues are available to the community to communicate with the alcalde?
4. Qué tipo de apoyo brinda la alcaldía a las comunidades de este municipio para que formen sus ADESCOs, sus comités de agua, etc.?
What type of support does the alcaldía offer the communities of this municipality to organize their ADESCOs, water committees, etc.?
- 5.Cuál sería el role de las ADESCOs en su administración?
What would be the role of the ADESCOs in your administration?
6. Usted considera que las comunidades del centro urbano y/o las del área rural de este municipio son bien organizadas? Hay alguna comunidad en particular que resalte por su organización?Cuál y por qué?
In your opinion are the communities in the urban center and/or the communities in the caseríos well organized? Is there a particular community that excels in organization? Which one and why?
7. En su opinión, por qué las comunidades de este municipio no organizan mejor sus ADESCOs para poder manejar por si mismos sus proyectos y así influenciar el desarrollo de sus cantones/caseríos?
In your opinion, why do communities in this municipality not organize their ADESCOs more efficiently so they could manage their projects and influence the development of their cantones/caseríos?
8. En su opinión la comunidad de este municipio es unida o dividida? En este aspecto, cómo se compara la situación en las comunidades del centro urbano con las de los caseríos?

In your opinion is the community in this municipality united or divided? In this respect, how does the community in the urban center compare to the communities in the caseríos?

9. En términos de colaboración/participación comunitaria cómo se compara la reacción de la comunidad a (i) proyectos solamente de la alcaldía, (ii) proyectos solamente del comité de migrantes, y (iii) proyectos conjuntos (la alcaldía, el comité de migrantes y posiblemente otros donantes? Qué tipo de colaboración (dinero, mano de obra, ninguna, etc.) proporciona la comunidad a estos proyectos?

In terms of community collaboration/participation how does the community react to projects undertaken (i) only by the alcaldía, (ii) only by the HTA, and (iii) jointly by the alcaldía, HTA and possible other donors? What kind of collaboration (cash, labor, none, etc.) does the community provide to the projects?

APPENDIX IV.3

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMMUNITY LEADERS

General

I. Questions about the HTA

1. Tiene conocimiento del comité de migrantes?Cuál es su opinión de esa directiva?
Do you have knowledge about the HTA? If so, what is your opinion about this committee?
2. De cuál de los proyectos que realizó el comité de migrantes se benefició esta comunidad?
Which HTA project benefited this community?
3. Esta comunidad ha colaborado de una manera formal con el comité de migrantes? De ser así, cuántas veces, quiénes fueron las personas involucradas y qué proyectos se llevaron a cabo? De no ser así, cuáles fueron las razones?
Has this community ever collaborated formally with the HTA? If so, how many times, who were the persons involved and what projects were undertaken? If not, what were the reasons?
4. Esta comunidad tiene voz en la identificación y/o implementación de los proyectos del comité de migrantes? De no ser así, cuáles son las razones?
Does this community have a voice in the identification and/or implementation of projects undertaken by the HTA? If not, explain why not?
5. Esta comunidad participa de una manera informal en las actividades y eventos organizados por el comité de migrantes? De ser así, cómo participan? Si no participan, cuáles son las razones?
Does the community participate informally in the activities and events organized by the HTA? If so, how do they participate? If not, explain why not.
6. Qué tipo de apoyo ha brindado esta comunidad al comité de migrantes (por ejemplo, apoyo financiero, técnico, moral, mano de obra, herramienta

y equipo)? *What type of support has this community provided the HTA (for example, financial, technical, or moral support, labor, tools and equipment)?* 7. Alguna directiva o miembro de esta comunidad ha solicitado en alguna ocasión la ayuda del comité de migrantes para solventar alguna necesidad comunal o personal? De ser así, cómo reaccionó el comité de migrantes? El comité de migrantes tomó en cuenta las opiniones de los solicitantes?

Has a committee or member of this community ever requested the help of the HTA to solve a community or personal need? If so, how did the HTA react? Did the HTA take into account the opinion of petitioners?

8. Los miembros del comité de migrantes son accesibles? Se puede hablar con ellos libremente sobre las necesidades que tiene este caserío/centro urbano?
Are the HTA members accessible? Is it possible to have an open dialogue with them about the needs of this caserío/urban center?
9. El comité de migrantes ha tenido un efecto favorable o adverso en la desigualdad entre los miembros de esta comunidad?
Has the HTA had a favorable or negative impact on inequality among the members of this community?
10. Existen vínculos fuertes o relaciones estrechas entre los miembros del comité de migrantes y esta comunidad? De ser así, cuál es la naturaleza de esas relaciones?
Are there strong links or close relationships between the HTA members and this community? If so, what is the nature of those relationships?
11. Han habido conflictos de interés entre los miembros del comité de migrantes y esta comunidad? De ser así, cuáles fueron esos conflictos y cómo se manejaron?
Has there ever been a conflict of interest between the HTA members and this community? If so, what were those conflicts and how were handled?
12. Cómo describiría la relación entre el comité de migrantes y esta comunidad? Por ejemplo, es la relación difícil, conflictiva, cooperativa, o no existe una relación?
How would you describe the relationship between the HTA and this community? For example, is the relation difficult, conflictive, collaborative, or non existent?

II. Questions about Community Organization/Participation

1. Qué directivas o grupos cívicos existen en este caserío/centro urbano? Por ejemplo, existe un ADESCO, directivas de las escuelas, grupos de la iglesia, directivas de football, cooperativas particulares, etc.?
What committees or civic groups are there in this community? For example, are there ADESCO, school committee, church groups, soccer committee, private cooperatives, etc.?
2. En qué año se estableció cada uno de estos grupos comunitarios?
In what year was each of these community groups established?
3. Cuántos miembros hay actualmente en cada uno de estos grupos comunitarios? Cuántos miembros habían cuando se formó cada uno de ellos?
How many members are there currently in each of these community groups? How many members were there at the time each of these groups was established?
4. Con qué frecuencia se reúne cada uno de estos grupos comunitarios y cuántas personas asisten a las reuniones?
How often does each of these community groups meet and how many personas attend the meetings?
5. Tiene conocimiento de algún ADESCO, directiva en esta comunidad que ha dejado de existir? De ser así, cuándo dejó de existir y por qué motivos?
Do you know about a particular committee in this community that no longer exists? If so, when was it dissolved and why?
6. Qué influencia ha tenido el comité de migrantes en las directivas de esta comunidad? Por ejemplo, el comité de migrantes ha motivado o ha desalentado la participación cívica de esta comunidad?
What influence has the HTA had on the civic groups in this community? For example, has the HTA encouraged or discouraged civic participation in the community?
7. Por qué piensa usted que la gente de esta comunidad no participa del todo/o no participa más en las directivas comunitarias?
Why do you think the people in this community do not participate at all/or do not participate more in the community groups?
8. En los últimos 10-15 años, ha habido un aumento o disminución en el número de personas que les gusta colaborar para la comunidad? A qué se debe este cambio?

In the last 10-15 years has there been an increase or decrease in the number of persons who like to collaborate with the community? What are the reasons for this change?

9. En su opinión, es esta comunidad unida o dividida? Por qué?
In your opinion, is this community united or divided? Why?
10. Cómo describiría la situación en este municipio durante la guerra civil?
How would you describe the situation in this municipality during the civil war?
11. Qué efecto tuvo la guerra civil en la unión o división de los miembros de esta comunidad?
What impact did the civil war have on the unity or division of the members of this community?
12. Cómo describiría la situación en este caserío durante el Huracán Mitch? Qué efecto tuvo el Huracán Mitch en la unión o división de los miembros de esta comunidad?
How would you describe the situation in this caserío/urban center during Hurricane Mitch? What impact did Hurricane Mitch have on the unity or division of the members of this community?
13. Por qué colabora usted como líder comunitario?
Why do you collaborate as community leader?
14. Cree usted que a través de su participación en las directivas puede influenciar un cambio para su comunidad? Por qué sí o por qué no?
Do you think that through your participation in committees and community groups you can bring about a change for your community? Why?
15. Quiénes son los líderes en su comunidad, cómo se les elije y cómo se les cambia?
Who are the leaders in your community, how are they elected and how are they changed?
16. En este caserío/centro urbano hay muchas personas de las cuales escoger líderes comunitarios?
In this caserío/urban center are there many persons from whom to choose community leaders?
17. Cuáles son las características que la comunidad busca en sus líderes?
What characteristics does the community look for in its leaders?

18. Qué función desempeñan los líderes comunitarios de este caserío/centro urbano?
What are the functions of the community leaders of this caserío/urban center?
19. Los migrantes juegan algún rol especial en esta comunidad? A los migrantes se les considera líderes comunitarios?
Do migrants have a special role in the community? Are migrants considered community leaders?
20. Con qué frecuencia hay reuniones comunitarias en este caserío/centro urbano para discutir temas de interés público? Desde qué año tienen estas reuniones? Cuánta gente de la comunidad asiste a estas reuniones?
How often are there community meetings in this caserío/urban center to discuss issues of public interest? In what year did these meetings start? How many people from the community attend these meetings?
21. Además de las reuniones mencionadas anteriormente, hay otros tipos de reuniones como, por ejemplo, reuniones organizadas por ONGs, por los promotores de salud, el Ministerio de Educación, el Ministerio de Salud, etc.? Dónde y con qué frecuencia se sostienen estas reuniones? Cuánta gente asiste a esas reuniones?
In addition to the meetings mentioned above, are there other types of meetings in this community, such as meetings organized by NGOs, promotores de salud, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health, etc.? Where and how often are those meetings held? How many people attend those meetings?
22. Han habido manifestaciones comunitarias en este caserío/centro urbano en los últimos 10 años? De ser así, quién las organizó, por qué razón y cuándo?
In the last 10 years, have there been community protests in this caserío/urban center? If so, who organized them, when and why?
23. Dónde se reúne la gente en este caserío/centro urbano? Cuáles son los espacios públicos? En qué año se construyó cada espacio público?
Where do people assemble in this caserío/urban center? What are the public spaces? In what year was each of these public spaces built?

III. Questions about the Political Environment

1. Cómo describiría la cultura política en esta comunidad?
How would you describe the political culture in this community?

2. En el caso de la política local, hay un partido político que es más fuerte en este caserío/centro urbano?
Regarding local politics, is there a political party that is the strongest in this caserío/urban center?
3. Qué porcentaje de esta comunidad vota en las elecciones para alcalde y qué porcentaje vota en las elecciones nacionales y por qué?
What percent of this community votes in the elections for alcalde and what percent votes in the national elections and why?
4. Además del voto, cómo practican sus derechos de ciudadano las personas de esta comunidad?
In addition to the vote, how do the persons in this community practice their citizens' rights?
5. La gente de este caserío/centro urbano sabe a qué partido político pertenecen los otros miembros de la comunidad?
Do people in this caserío/urban center know the political affiliation of other community members?
6. La política local está estructurada de acuerdo a algún partido político, ideología política, la personalidad de un individuo, o algún otro factor? En qué se basa su voto para alcalde?
Are local politics structured according to a political party, political ideology, the personality of an individual, or some other factor? What is your vote for alcalde based on?
7. Cómo se manifiesta la política en las directivas, en los grupos comunitarios, en la escuela y en la iglesia de este caserío/centro urbano?
How are politics manifested in community groups, in the school, and in the church in this caserío/urban center?
8. A las personas de esta comunidad les gusta hablar sobre la política o ese es un tema sobre el cual prefieren no platicar? Por qué?
Do persons in this community like to talk about politics or is it a subject they prefer not to discuss? Why?
9. La política divide a esta comunidad? Cómo y por qué?
Do politics cause divisions in this community? If so, why and how?
10. Cada cuánto el alcalde o algún representante de la alcaldía visita esta comunidad? Y con qué propósito vienen?
How often does the alcalde or a representative of the alcaldía visit this community? What is the purpose of these visits?

11. Cuántas veces al año la alcaldía organiza cabildos abiertos en este caserío/centro urbano? Qué porcentaje de su comunidad asiste a los cabildos abiertos? Si la gente no asiste, explique la razón.
How many times a year does the alcaldía hold open town meetings in this caserío/urban center? What percent of the community attends the open town meetings? If people do not attend, explain why not.
12. Durante los últimos 10-15 años ha habido un aumento o disminución en el número de residentes de este caserío/centro urbano que asisten a cabildos abiertos? De ser así, a qué se puede atribuir este cambio?
In the last 10-15 years has there been an increase or decrease in the number of residents of this caserío/urban center that attend the open town meetings? If so, what could this change be attributed to?
13. Además de los cabildos abiertos, cuáles son las otras vías a través de las cuales la comunidad puede comunicarse con la alcaldía?
In addition to open town meetings, what are the other means through which the community could communicate with the alcaldía?
14. La gente se siente cómoda hablando con el alcalde o es un poco tímida?
Do people feel comfortable talking to the alcalde or are they shy and timid?
15. En su opinión, existe la necesidad de una mejor comunicación entre la comunidad y la alcaldía?
In your opinion, is there a need for better communication between the community and the alcaldía?
16. Si la comunidad tuviera un problema, cómo pudiera presentarlo a la alcaldía? Cómo ha respondido el alcalde cuando ha ocurrido algo así en el pasado?
If the community had a problem, how could it bring it to the attention of the alcaldía? How has the alcalde responded to this type of situation in the past?
17. Si la alcaldía estuviera haciendo algo que a la comunidad no le gusta, cómo pudiera tratar de cambiar la situación? Qué vías de comunicación existen para que la comunidad presente sus quejas?
If the alcaldía was doing something the community does not approve of, how could the community try to change the situation? What channels of communication are there for the community to present its complaints?
18. El alcalde ayuda más a sus amigos y caseríos/centro urbano afiliados a su partido político o ayuda a todas las comunidades por igual?
Does the alcalde help more his friends and those communities affiliated to his political party or does he help all communities equally?

19. Si una persona de esta comunidad quisiera ver el presupuesto municipal u otros documentos, pudiera ir a la alcaldía, pedir la información y que se la den sin ningún problema?
If a person from this community wanted to see the municipal budget or other official documents, could he/she could go to the alcaldía, request the information and get it without a problem?
20. El alcalde actual ha hecho más para esta comunidad que los alcaldes de los últimos 10-15 años? Por qué sí o por qué no?
Has the current alcalde done more for this community than the alcaldes of the last 10-15 years? Explain why.
21. Si el alcalde ha estado en el poder por más de un período, cómo se compara el período actual con los períodos anteriores? Ha mejorado su desempeño como alcalde con el tiempo?
If the current alcalde has been in office for more than one term, how does his performance during this term compare to previous terms? Has his performance as alcalde improved over time?

IV. Questions about Households

1. Cuántos hogares hay en esta comunidad?
How many households are there in this community?
2. Cuántos hogares o qué porcentaje de hogares de esta comunidad tienen migrantes? De esos hogares, cuántos o qué percentage reciben remesas?
How many households or what percent of households in this community has migrants? Of those, how many households or what percent of households receive remittances?
3. Qué porcentaje de esta comunidad está entre las edades de 20-50 años?
What percent of this community are between the ages of 20 to 50?
4. Qué tipo de impuestos/tasas pagan los hogares de esta comunidad a la alcaldía cada mes y a cuál es el monto?
What type of taxes/fees do households of this community pay to the alcaldía per month and how much?
5. Cuál es el ingreso promedio de un hogar en esta comunidad, incluyendo las remesas?
What is the average household income in this community including remittances?

6. Cuál es el salario promedio en la comunidad? Cómo han cambiado los salarios en los últimos 10-15 años? Cómo se comparan los salarios en esta comunidad con los del resto del municipio?
What is the average salary in this community? How have salaries changed in the last 10-15 years? How do salaries in this community compare to the rest of the municipality?
7. Cuántas horas al día trabaja la gente de esta comunidad?
How many hours per day do people in this community work?
8. Hay más o menos pobreza en esta comunidad en comparación a 10-15 años atrás? A qué se debe este cambio?
In comparison to 10-15 years ago, is there now more or less poverty in this community? What are the reasons for this change?
9. Qué impacto ha tenido la rebaja en las remesas que se ha experimentado en años recientes en el nivel de pobreza de esta comunidad?
How has the decline in remittances in recent years impacted the level of poverty in this community?
10. Cómo ha cambiado la desigualdad en esta comunidad en los últimos 10-15 años? A qué se pueden atribuir estos cambios?
How has inequality changed in the last 10-15 years in this community? What are the reasons for those changes?
11. Cuáles son las tres necesidades más graves en esta comunidad? Hace 10-15 años cuáles eran las tres necesidades más importantes?
What are the three most important needs in this community? What were the three most important needs 10-15 years ago?
12. Cuántos tiendas/negocios hay en este caserío/centro urbano? Qué tipo de negocios hay? En qué año se abrió cada uno de estos negocios y usaron remesas para abrir dichos negocios?
How many stores/businesses are there in this caserío/urban center? What type of business are those? In what year did they open and did they use remittances to open them?
13. Cuáles son las tres ocupaciones principales para los *hombres* y las mujeres en este caserío/centro urbano? Ha cambiado el tipo de ocupación en los últimos 10-15 años?
What are the three main occupations for men and women in this caserío/urban center? Has the type of occupation changed in the last 10-15 years?

14. La situación de trabajo ha mejorado o empeorado en los últimos 10 años? Ahora hay más gente empleada o desempleada? A qué se deben estos cambios?
Has the situation regarding work improved or gotten worse in the last 10 years? Are there now more people employed or unemployed? What are the reasons for these changes?
15. Qué pasan haciendo los desempleados de esta comunidad (buscando trabajo, ayudando en la casa, emborrachándose, cometiendo delincuencias)?
How do the unemployed persons of this community spend their time (looking for work, helping around the house, getting drunk, committing crimes)?
16. Hay transporte público para llegar desde aquí al centro urbano (i.e. escuela y la Unidad de Salud)?
Is there public transportation to get from here to the urban center (school, alcaldía, Unidad de Salud)?
17. Cuántas escuelas hay en este caserío/centro urbano y de que nivel son? Usted sabe en qué año se fundó la escuela?
How many schools are there in this caserío/urban center and what level are they? Do you know in what year they were founded?
18. Qué porcentaje de niños en esta comunidad trabaja? Qué porcentaje de niños estudian?
What percent of children in this community work? What percent of children go to school?
19. Qué porcentaje de los niños esta comunidad termina la escuela primaria? De éstos, qué percentage continua estudiando?
What percent of children in this community finishes primary school? Of this, what percent continues studying?
20. Cuales son las principales razones por las cuales los niños de esta comunidad abandonan los estudios?
What are the main reasons children of this community drop out of school?
21. Cuántos centros de salud hay en este caserío? Es la Unidad de Salud buena y suficiente para las necesidades de este caserío/centro urbano?
How many health centers are there in this caserío/urban center? Is the Unidad de Salud good and enough to meet the needs of this community?
22. A dónde va la gente de esta comunidad a recibir atención médica? Hay mucha gente que va hasta San Miguel o La Unión?

Where do people from this community go to receive medical care? Do many people go to San Miguel o La Union?

23. Qué otro tipo de atención médica existe en este caserío (i.e. promotoras de salud, enfermera local, doctor privado, curandera, remedios caseros)?
Is there another type of medical attention available in this caserío/urban center (promotor de salud, local nurse, private doctor, healers, home remedies)?
24. En este caserío/centro urbano se usa más remedios caseros o medicinas de la farmacia? Por qué?
Are home remedies or pharmaceuticals more commonly used in this caserío/urban center? Why?

Health Providers

I. General Questions about Health

1. En qué año se fundó esta Unidad de Salud?
In what year was the Unidad de Salud founded?
2. Cuántos doctores y/o enfermeras trabajan en la Unidad de Salud?
How many doctors and nurses work in the Unidad de Salud?
3. En su opinión, cuáles son las tres prioridades más importantes para el desarrollo del municipio? Y específicamente en términos de salud?
In your opinion what are the three top priorities for the development of this municipality? And specifically in terms of health?
4. Cómo han evolucionado las causas de mortalidad en niños y adultos de este municipio en los últimos 10-15 años? Por qué?
How have the causes of death in infants and adults of this municipality evolved in the last 10-15 years?
5. Cómo han evolucionado las tasas de mortalidad en adultos y niños de este municipio en los años 1995-2008? Por qué?
How have longevity rates for adults and infants evolved in this municipality during the years 1995-2008? Why?
6. En términos de grupos de la población por edad, cuáles son los grupos de este municipio que menos atención médica reciben? Por qué?
In terms of population by age groups, what groups in this municipality receive the least medical care? Why?

7. Cuáles caseríos de este municipio son los más excluidos en términos de atención médica?
Which caseríos of this municipality are the most excluded in terms of medical care?
8. Cuánto cuesta recibir atención en la Unidad de Salud? La mayoría de gente paga?
How much does one have to pay to receive attention at the Unidad de Salud? Do most people pay?
9. En su opinión cuánta gente en este municipio no va al centro de salud porque no tiene los recursos para pagar?
In your opinion, how many people in this municipality do not go to the Unidad de Salud because they do not have the resources to pay?
10. Qué porcentaje de las mujeres embarazadas recibe atención prenatal?
What percent of pregnant women receives prenatal care?
11. Dónde va la mayoría de residentes de los caseríos/centro urbano de este municipio a recibir atención médica?
Where do most residents of the caseríos/urban center of this municipality go to receive medical care?
12. Qué porcentaje de los residentes de los caseríos/centro urbano de este municipio busca atención médica en la ciudad más cercana como, por ejemplo, San Miguel?
What percent of residents of the caseríos/urban center of this municipality goes to the nearest city, such as San Miguel, to receive medical care?

II. Questions about Migration and Health

1. Han tenido los migrantes un impacto en la salud en esta municipalidad?
Have migrants had an impact on the health in this municipality?
2. Los migrantes han transferido prácticas o valores sobre la salud que han aprendido en los Estados Unidos?
Have migrants transferred practices or values about health that they learned in the United States?
3. Los migrantes han transferido información sobre nuevas enfermedades así como tratamientos que han aprendido en los Estados Unidos?
Have migrants transferred information about new diseases as well treatments that they learned in the United States?

4. De qué forma se reflejan estos valores y prácticas en el tratamiento que reciben sus pacientes?
How are these practices and values reflected in the treatment of your patients?
5. Qué impacto han tenido en la salud las remesas familiares enviadas a este municipio en los últimos 10-15 años?
What impact have family remittances sent to this municipality in the last 10-15 years had on health?
6. Qué impacto ha tenido la desintegración familiar ocasionada por la migración de los últimos 10-15 años en la salud en este municipio?
What impact has family disintegration brought about by migration in the last 10-15 years had on health in this municipality?

III. Questions about the HTA

1. Tiene conocimiento del comité organizado por migrantes de este municipio en Washington, DC, Estados Unidos?
Do you know about the HTA organized by migrants from this municipality in Washington, DC, United States?
- 2.Cuál es su opinión de ese comité de migrantes? Alguna vez ha solicitado la Unidad de Salud la ayuda del comité? De ser así, cuál fue la reacción?
What is your opinion about the HTA? Has the Unidad de Salud ever requested the HTA's help? If so, how did it respond?
3. Se ha beneficiado la Unidad de Salud de alguno de los proyectos realizados por el comité de migrantes de este municipio?
Has the Unidad de Salud benefited from any of the projects undertaken by the HTA in this municipality?
4. Ha realizado el comité de migrantes algún proyecto exclusivamente para beneficio de la Unidad de Salud de este municipio? De ser así, quién tuvo la iniciativa (el comité de migrantes o la Unidad de Salud)?
Has the HTA undertaken a specific project for the benefit of the Unidad de Salud of this municipality? If so, who had the initiative (the HTA or the Unidad de Salud)?
5. Si usted pudiera trabajar con un comité de migrantes, cuáles serían las tres prioridades principales en las cuáles se enfocaría?
If you could work with an HTA, what would be the top three priorities you would focus on?

6. La Unidad de Salud tiene voz en la identificación y/o implementación de los proyectos del comité de migrantes en este municipio?
Does the Unidad de Salud have a voice on the identification and/or implementation of projects undertaken by the HTA in this municipality?
7. Participa la Unidad de Salud en las actividades del comité de migrantes de este municipio? De ser así, cómo?
Does the Unidad de Salud participate in the activities of the HTA of this municipality? If so, how?
8. Los miembros del comité de migrantes son accesibles? Puede hablar con ellos libremente sobre las necesidades de la Unidad de Salud?
Are the HTA members accessible? Can you talk to them openly about the needs of the Unidad de Salud?
Are the HTA members accessible? Can you talk to them openly about the needs of the Unidad de Salud?

IV. Questions about Community Organization/Participation

1. Qué directivas y/o grupos comunitarios existen para beneficio de la Unidad de Salud de este municipio?
What committees and/or community groups exist to benefit the Unidad de Salud of this municipality?
2. En qué año se organizaron esas directivas y con cuántos miembros? Cuántos miembros existen ahora? Cuántas personas van a las reuniones?
In what year were those committees organized and with how many members? How many members do they have now? How many people attend the meetings?
3. Alguna de estas directivas ha dejado de existir? De ser así, cuándo y por qué?
Have any of those committees disintegrated? If so, when and why?
4. En su opinión, hay suficiente participación comunitaria en las directivas de este municipio para salud y otras áreas?
In your opinion, in this municipality, is there enough community participation in committees on health and other areas?
5. Por qué piensa usted que la gente no participa más en las directivas o asociaciones comunitarias relacionadas con la Unidad de Salud?
In your opinion, why do people not participate more in the community groups related to the Unidad de Salud.

6. En su opinión, la guerra civil impactó de alguna manera en la unidad y/o división entre los miembros de la comunidad de este municipio?
In your opinion did the civil war have an impact on the unity and/or division among the community of this municipality?

V. Questions about Relations between the Unidad de Salud and the Alcaldía

1. La alcaldía ha realizado algún proyecto para la Unidad de Salud? Cuál y en qué año?
Has the alcaldía undertaken a project for the Unidad de Salud? If so which project and in what year?
2. La alcaldía proporciona algún tipo de apoyo a la Unidad de Salud? De ser así, qué apoyo?
Does the alcaldía provide any kind of support to the Unidad de Salud? If so, what support?
3. Desde que comencé mi investigación he observado que la política infiltra todos los aspectos de la vida e instituciones Salvadoreñas. Cómo se manifiesta la política en los asuntos de la Unidad de Salud?
Since I started my research I have noted that politics infiltrate all aspects of life and institutions in El Salvador. How does politics manifest in the matters of the Unidad de Salud?

VI. Data Requested from the Unidad de Salud for 1995-2008

1. Población total según grupos de edad.
Total population by age groups.
2. Población total urbana y rural según grupos de edad.
Total urban and rural population by age groups.
3. Población total urbana y rural, según grupos de edad, y por cantón.
Total urban and rural population by age groups and by cantón.
4. Población total por género.
Total population by sex.
5. Número de partos para el municipio y por cantón/caserío.
Number of births in the municipality by cantón/caserío.
6. Número de defunciones por cantón/caserío, y por grupos de edad.
Number of deaths in the municipality by cantón/caserío and age groups.

7. Número de vacunas administradas por la Unidad de Salud por cantón/caserío.
Number of vaccinations administered in the municipality by the Unidad de Salud by cantón/caserío.

School Principals and Teachers

I. General Questions about Education

1. Cuántas escuelas hay en este municipio/centro urbano/caserío y hasta que nivel llegan?
How many schools are there in this municipality, in the urban center and in the caseríos and up to what grade do they go?
2. Cuál es la edad promedio de los estudiantes que terminan la primaria y de los que terminan el bachillerato en el municipio/centro urbano/caserío?
What is the average age students complete elementary school and high school in this municipality/urban center/caseríos?
3. Cuáles son los tres motivos principales por los cuáles los estudiantes abandonan los estudios?
What are the three main reasons students drop out of school?
4. Tasa de alfabetización para el municipio para los años 1995 al 2008
What is the literacy rate for the municipality for the years 1995-2008?

II. Questions about Migration and Education

1. Han tenido los migrantes un impacto en la educación en este municipio? Hay algún caserío donde el impacto ha sido mayor? De ser así, por qué?
Have migrants had an impact on the education in this municipality? Is there a particular caserío where the impact is greater? If so, why?
2. Los migrantes han transferido prácticas o valores (buenos y/o malos) sobre la educación que han aprendido en los Estados Unidos?
Have migrants transferred practices or values (good and/or bad) about education that they learned in the United States?
3. Los migrantes han transferido información sobre nuevos métodos de aprendizaje que han aprendido en los Estados Unidos?
Have migrants transferred information about new learning methods and tools that learned in the United States?

4. De qué forma se reflejan estos valores y prácticas en la enseñanza que reciben los alumnos de esta escuela?
How are these practices and values reflected in the teaching imparted to the students at this school?
5. Qué impacto han tenido en la educación las remesas familiares enviadas a este municipio en los últimos 10-15 años?
What impact have family remittances sent to this municipality in the last 10-15 years had on education?
6. Qué impacto ha tenido la desintegración familiar ocasionada por la migración de los últimos 10-15 años en la educación de este municipio? Hay algún caserío en particular en el cual el impacto haya sido mayor? De ser así, por qué?
What impact has family disintegration brought about by migration in the last 10-15 years had on education in this municipality? Is there a particular caserío where the impact has been greater? If so, why?

III. Questions about the HTA

1. Tiene conocimiento del comité organizado por migrantes de este municipio en Washington, DC, Estados Unidos?
Do you know about the HTA organized by migrants from this municipality in Washington, DC, United States?
- 2.Cuál es su opinión de ese comité de migrantes? Alguna vez ha solicitado la escuela la ayuda del comité? De ser así, cuál fue la reacción?
What is your opinion about the HTA? Has the school ever requested the HTA's help? If so, how did they respond?
3. Se ha beneficiado esta escuela de alguno de los proyectos realizados por el comité de migrantes de este municipio?
Has this school benefited from any of the projects undertaken by the HTA in this municipality?
4. Ha realizado el comité de migrantes algún proyecto exclusivamente para beneficio de esta escuela? De ser así, quién tuvo la iniciativa (el comité de migrantes o la escuela)? El HTA tomo en cuenta las opiniones de la escuela?
Has the HTA undertaken a specific project for the benefit of this school? If so, who had the initiative (the HTA or the school)? Did the HTA take into account the input from the school?
5. Si usted pudiera trabajar con un comité de migrantes, cuáles serían las tres prioridades principales en las cuáles se enfocaría?

If you could work with an HTA, what would be the top three priorities you would focus on?

6. Esta escuela tiene voz en la identificación y/o implementación de los proyectos del comité de migrantes en este municipio/centro urbano/caserío?
Does this school have a voice on the identification and/or implementation of projects undertaken by the HTA in this municipality/urban center/caserío?
7. Participa esta escuela en las actividades del comité de migrantes de este municipio/centro urbano/caserío? De ser así, cómo?
Does this school participate in the activities of the HTA in this municipality/urban center/caserío? If so, how?
8. Los miembros del comité de migrantes son accesibles? Puede hablar con ellos libremente sobre las necesidades de la escuela?
Are the members of the HTA accessible? Can you talk to them openly about the needs of the school?

IV. Questions about Community Organization/Participation

1. Qué directivas y/o grupos comunitarios existen para beneficio de esta escuela?
What committees and/or community groups exist to benefit this school?
2. En qué año se organizaron esas directivas y con cuántos miembros? Cuántos miembros existen ahora? Cuántas personas van a las reuniones?
In what year were those committees organized and with how many members? How many members do they have now? How many people attend the meetings?
3. alguna de estas directivas ha dejado de existir? De ser así, cuándo y por qué?
Have any of those committees disintegrated? If so, when and why?
4. En su opinión, hay suficiente participación comunitaria en las directivas de este municipio/centro urbano/caserío para la educación y otras áreas?
In your opinion, is there enough community participation in the committees in this municipality/urban center/ caserío concerning education and other areas?
5. En su opinión por qué la gente no participa más en las directivas o asociaciones comunitarias relacionadas con la escuela de este municipio/centro urbano/caserío?

In your opinion, why do people not participate more in the community groups related to the school in this municipality/urban center/caserío?

6. En su opinión, tuvo la guerra impactó de alguna manera en la unidad y/o división entre los miembros de la comunidad de este municipio/centro urbano/caserío?

In your opinion did the civil war have an impact on the unity and/or division among the community of this municipality/urban center/ caserío?

V. Questions about Relations between the School and the Alcaldía

1. La alcaldía ha realizado algún proyecto en esta escuela? De ser así, que proyecto y en que año?
Has the alcaldía undertaken a project in this school? If so which project and in what year?
2. La alcaldía tiene alguna interacción formal con esta escuela?
Does the alcaldía have a formal interaction with this school?
3. La alcaldía proporciona algún tipo de apoyo a esta escuela? De ser así, qué apoyo?
Does the alcaldía provide any kind of support to this school? If so, what support?
4. Le gustaría que la escuela tuviera más comunicación con la alcaldía?
Would you like the school to have more communication with the alcaldía?
5. Si la escuela tiene una necesidad a quien recurre para pedir ayuda?
If the school has a need to whom do you go for help?

VI. Questions about Education and the Political Environment

1. En las escuelas se habla abiertamente sobre la política o ese es un tema privado del cual no se platica? Por qué?
Are politics discussed openly in the school or is it a private matter about which you do not talk about? Why?
2. Se discute la política en clase como parte del material didáctico?
Are politics discussed in the classroom as part of the curriculum?
3. En qué grado se comienza a hablar de política en esta escuela?
In what grade do you start discussing politics in this school?

4. Usted cree que es importante votar en las elecciones? Por qué? Se habla en clase sobre la importancia del voto?
Do you think it is important to vote in the elections? Why? Is the importance of voting discussed in the classroom?
5. Qué dinámica se usa en una clase típica de cívica o ciencias sociales? Por ejemplo, el profesor a habla más que los alumnos? Los estudiantes memorizan las lecciones? Los estudiantes pueden expresar sus ideas libremente aunque no estén de acuerdo con los demás?
What dynamic is used in a typical Civics or Social Studies class? For example, does the teacher talk more than the students? Are the students asked to memorize the lessons? Can the students express their opinions and ideas openly even if the others are not in agreement?
6. En su opinión, el voto para alcalde se basa en el partido político, la personalidad del individuo, o en algún otro factor?
In your opinion the vote for alcalde is based on the political party, the personality of the candidate or another factor?
7. Desde que comencé mi investigación, he observado que la política infiltra todos los aspectos de la vida e instituciones Salvadoreñas. Cómo se manifiesta la política en los asuntos de esta escuela?
Since I started my research I have noted that politics infiltrate all aspects of life and institutions in El Salvador. How does politics manifest in the matters of this school?
8. Usted tiene conocimiento (más o menos) a que partido político pertenecen los profesores y padres de familia de los alumnos de esta escuela?
Do you know the political affiliation of teachers and parents of the students that attend this school?
9. La política causa divisiones entre los profesores y estudiantes de esta escuela?
Do politics cause division among teachers and students of this school?
10. En su opinión, la política divide a la gente de este municipio/centro urbano/caserío? Cómo y por qué?
In your opinion do politics cause division among the residents of this municipality/urban center/caserío? How and why?

VII. Data for 1995-2008 Requested from Schools Interviewed

1. (i) Cuántos estudiantes terminaron el sexto grado cada año? (ii) Cuántos se graduaron del bachillerato cada año? (iii) Cuántos ingresaron a la universidad cada año?
(i) How many students finished the 6th grade each year? (ii) How many students finished high school each year? (iii) How many students went on to college?
2. (i) Cuántos estudiantes ingresaron al séptimo grado cada año? (ii) De estos estudiantes, cuántos vinieron de los caseríos (identificar los caseríos)?
(i) How many students entered 7th grade each year? (ii) Of these students, how many came from the caseríos (identify caseríos, if possible)?
3. (i) Cuántos de los estudiantes que se graduaron del bachillerato vinieron de los caseríos (identificar los caseríos)?
(i) How many students from the caseríos graduated from high school?
4. La información solicitada anteriormente, esta disponible por genero (hombres/mujeres)? Qué otro tipo de información hay disponible por género?
Is the information requested above available by sex (boys/girls)? What other information is available by sex?