

AIRGRAM

(Departmental and Foreign Service)

POL 14 Braz

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
		5
E	P	IO
	1	2
L	FBO	ICA
		12
	S/P	S/S
	1	27
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
		5
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
5	10	3
OSD	USIA	NSA
16	8	3
		NSC
		6

A-139

NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

TO : Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS1964 APR 21 AM 9 10
APR 21 1964RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

APR 18 1964

APR 17 1964

FROM : Amembassy BRASILIA Office

DATE: April 15, 1964

SUBJECT : The 1965 Presidential Race: March 1 - April 15, 1964

REF :

SUMMARY

The fall of João Goulart and the election by the Congress of Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco as President of Brazil, turned the 1965 Presidential race upside down. However, one aspect of it seems more stable than before: with the departure of Goulart the main threat to the peaceful holding of the 1965 election has disappeared. Now it seems certain that the elections will be held and whoever wins will take office on January 31, 1966, barring a degeneration of the revolutionary forces into a military dictatorship, not at all a likely prospect.

Juscelino Kubitschek's ties to Goulart and his alleged attempts to make political capital of the revolution may make him the object of investigations that could hurt him electorally. On the other hand, he is rid of two important political problems that have been bedeviling him--the possibility that Goulart might deny him PTB support and/or that Miguel Arrais would compete with him on the Left. Carlos Lacerda, ironically, has been denied his most effective touchstone with the departure of Goulart. Lacerda will try to use Kubitschek as a substitute target. For the first time, how-

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ OutFORM DS-323
11-61

Drafted by:

POL: HWeiner: avh

Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL: RWBean/JKeppel

Clearances:

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND959000

RMR FILES
JUNE 9, 1964

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2
Airgram A-139
Brasilia Office

ever, Lacerda supporters can be confident that their man will be allowed to take office if elected. Ademar de Barros' chances seem to have been unaffected. Magalhães Pinto's courage and decisiveness in being the first to stick his neck out in the revolution have brought him back into contention.

\$

Juscelino Kubitschek early in the month of March announced his support for the moderate Aniz Badra agrarian reform bill, but as the Goulart Administration grew louder in its opposition to the bill, Kubitschek made no further reference to it. In Belo Horizonte on the 6th, he told a PSD meeting that he favored amendment of the Constitution to permit re-election of the President, "even if it means the re-election of João Goulart." He said he had been silent on the subject while President since he could have been accused at that time of being the prime beneficiary. On the 9th, a Kubitschek meeting in São Paulo with Carvalho Pinto, lead to press speculation that JK was seeking a strong Vice Presidential running mate. Both denied that this was discussed.

When Goulart's inflammatory speech in Rio on the 13th brought forth Carlos Lacerda's plea for a joint stand against the President by all Presidential candidates, Kubitschek refused to go along. He said on the 16th that his public record had been one of continual and unchanging support of democracy and constitutional government, but he said the principal enemy of Brazilian democracy is the "status quo" which he said he intends to change peacefully. Kubitschek in this situation acted in consonance with two basic points of his general strategy: 1) to avoid breaking with Goulart, at the same time indicating dissatisfaction with Goulart's radical turn; 2) to paint Lacerda as an extremist, ex-Communist, undeserving of being entrusted with the Presidency. These tactics he ~~developed~~ developed further at the PSD's national convention on March 19-21, which officially nominated him the party's 1965 Presidential candidate (A-126). He implied, without mentioning him by name, that Lacerda lacked the credentials to lecture anyone on democracy. He also cautioned Goulart that he would support "the flag of reforms but not reform of the flag," and said the PSD would support an agrarian reform amendment only if it respected property rights. Goulart was reported as satisfied with the Kubitschek stand. He was quoted as saying "It was the maximum he could extract from the PSD." The official Communist paper Novos Rumos said on March 27, "Kubitschek's reactionary

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND959000

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 3
Airgram A-139
Brasilia Office

nature has been unmasked." JK ended the month with no laurels as a prophet: on the 30th in Belo Horizonte he said "The President cannot carry out a golpe, nor can one be carried out against him."

On March 31, with the revolution breaking out, Kubitschek issued a statement calling for the "reestablishment in its total purity of discipline and hierarchy in the armed forces. There is no legality without the armed forces being completely united and respected." The statement, however, seemed to put Kubitschek outside the camp of those completely committed to Goulart's overthrow. It closed with the appeal "There is still time to save peace and legality, reestablishing the discipline and the hierarchy, for love of country, countrymen, and God." When the roundup of suspected leftists began after the success of the revolution, JK was among the first to call for moderation. In the few days preceding the April 11 election by the Congress of the interim President, Kubitschek delayed until April 10 before publicly declaring himself in favor of Castelo Branco. Behind the scenes, he appeared to be waiting to see if the PSD and PTB might not unite behind the candidacy of General Kruel.

Are Kubitschek's chances better or worse than they were before? His role in the revolution was a controversial one, and is likely to become an issue in the campaign. His opponents will say that he was a supporter and a partner of Goulart and that he cynically tried to turn the revolution to his own political benefit. It is not improbable that there will be investigations going all the way back to Kubitschek's Presidency attempting to show a) relations with Goulart; b) corruption. On the other hand, two of Kubitschek's political apprehensions--that Goulart might throw the support of the PTB to another candidate, and/or that Miguel Arrais might be the independent candidate of the Left--have been disposed of. If he can weather the post-revolutionary storm, he seems to have a good chance of marshalling a formidable political array in his support.

Carlos Lacerda made two political trips in the early part of March. March 1 found him in Salvador at a conference of state governors, and on March 7 he was in Curitiba for talks with Paraná Governor Nei Braga. In Rio on the 13th, while Goulart was holding his rally in the Praça Cristiano Ottoni,

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NN0959000

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4
Airgram A-139
Brasilia Office

Lacerda made a tour of Guanabara public-works projects. On the 15th, referring to Goulart's speech, he made public an appeal he had directed to Kubitschek and Ademar de Barros for all candidates for the Presidency to unite "in defense of the institutions, of Congress, of the Constitution, and above all of national security." His language, however, was far from apolitical and was doubtless considered insulting by Kubitschek. Lacerda said "His [JK's] political alliance [in 1955] created the monster which today wants to devour Brazil." On the 17th, Lacerda pressed Kubitschek further, asking in the press, "Does he believe that the President is practicing democracy by serving the Communist Party?"

On the 18th, Lacerda granted an interview to Jornal do Brasil in which he said that Goulart had gone outside the law by attempting to govern by decree. He said "Goulart is a fascist in the service of Communism"...How long can the Communists and our army have the same Commander-in-Chief?" He said Kubitschek was mistaken if he believed Goulart would ultimately support him in order to defeat Lacerda. What Goulart wants to do, said Lacerda, is defeat both Kubitschek and Lacerda and to cancel the 1965 elections if he can. The same day he made public a letter he had sent to all state Governors calling for "a union of all those interested in the defense of liberty, including the liberty to disagree. If you judge me unworthy of formulating this appeal, ignore the origin and consider the contents: a call to the conscience of each democrat, a supreme effort to defend our betrayed and menaced country."

On the 20th, Lacerda conferred in São Paulo with Ademar de Barros and announced their agreement to stand together against Goulart. The next day, at a series of rallies in the interior of São Paulo, he said "Goulart is the official orator at Communist rallies and in his spare time he is President of the Republic." He repeated his call for national unity against Goulart.

On the 24th he continued on to Belo Horizonte, where he lunched and conferred with Governor Magalhães Pinto, the first serious meeting the two had had in several months. They announced that in regard to the current situation, they were in "general agreement". Back in Rio on the 25th, Lacerda announced that the Communist Party had a detailed plan to take power, utilizing

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NND959000

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 5
Airgram A-139
Brasilia Office

Goulart and Brizola. Goulart was to use executive decrees against Guanabara, São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul. If the reaction to this drive were relatively weak, it would be smashed by General Assis Brasil. If it were strong, Goulart would pretend to flee to the south, while a military junta friendly to him took power, crushed resistance, closed Congress and then recalled Goulart to power, presumably as a puppet of the Communists.

Lacerda obviously played an important role in rallying public opinion against Goulart's offensive, and his part in the military phase of the revolution was dramatic. Yet it is questionable whether his presidential chances are as good now as they were before the revolution. Without Goulart in the Presidency, Lacerda lacks a suitable target for his acid oratory. Before, it seemed that the vastness of Goulart's incapacity helped project a contrasting, and therefore favorable, image of his chief critic, Lacerda. Now Lacerda will shift his sights to Kubitschek, but it remains to be seen whether the new target will be as easy. Another Lacerda problem is the substantial boost in Magalhães Pinto's stock as a result of the revolution. It was inevitable that the UDN Convention scheduled for April 11 be postponed indefinitely. Not only is an early UDN candidacy unnecessary, it is improbable that the party would now pick Lacerda over Magalhães as readily as it would have a month ago. In Lacerda's favor is the fact that for the first time the electorate knows that a vote for Lacerda will not be a wasted vote. Heretofore many doubted that Lacerda would take office even if elected; that doubt is now gone.

Ademar de Barros' reaction to the March 13 Rio rally was, in his own words, "depression, from the first speaker to the last, with fear for the future and fright of tomorrow." He described Brazil as "the country where Generals engage in politics, Senators shoot at each other, and the President preaches revolution." He scorned the idea of federal intervention in São Paulo, saying "the agitators don't want civil war, especially since they know they'll get the worst of it." He said he favored impeachment of Goulart by the Congress. On the 17th, meeting with mayors in the interior, he urged resistance to any expropriation attempts by SUPRA. By mutual agreement with Lacerda, designed to avoid public competition, both stayed away from the March 19 giant anti-Goulart rally in São Paulo. On a TV program

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND959000

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 6
Airgram A-139
Brasilia Office

on the 20th, Ademar said he did not believe the armed forces were behind Goulart. He predicted that the 13th "was the last time that representatives of the armed forces would appear at a rally to guarantee the President's safety." Following his joint statement with Lacerda, Ademar conferred in Porto Alegre with Governor Ildo Meneghetti on the 23rd and told the press that their points of view vis-a-vis the Goulart drive were identical. He said the Government's economic policies, which were stimulating runaway inflation, would if unchecked divide Brazil into an agglomeration of small republics within a few years. Predicting that the elections of 1965 would be held, he said, "I doubt that João Goulart will preside over them, because we cannot continue under the present agitation." On a TV program on the 26th in São Paulo he denied that he was plotting against Goulart but said that an attack on Congress by the Administration should be treated by every citizen as an attack on his own home.

In the post-revolution period, Ademar belongs to the "hard-line" group with regard to purging leftists. While it seems possible that he has earned some influence in the new government, his 1965 chances do not seem substantially improved. His electorate still seems to overlap considerably with that of Lacerda's.

Magalhães Pinto spent the early part of March trying to avert the consequences of the April 11 UDN Convention, which was considered certain to nominate Lacerda. He talked several times of taking a leave of absence from the Governorship to campaign in other states, but did not do so. March 12, back from a three-day trip to Rio, he told political correspondents in Belo Horizonte that he was in the Presidential race to stay. On the 9th, he had cut a strong tie to the Left by accepting the resignation of Jose Aparecido as one of his State Secretaries. On the 18th he met in São Paulo with Paraná Governor Ney Braga and Carvalho Pinto to issue a joint statement "in defense of democratic institutions." In a blunt speech on the 20th, which was almost a preview of his March 30 declaration of independence from the federal government, he sharply criticized Goulart's political offensive, saying "A revolution from the top is nothing more than a golpe; we are ready to fight against a golpe."

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NND959000


CONFIDENTIAL

Page 7
Airgram A-139
Brasilia Office

Magalhães" courage and decisiveness in taking the first and irrevocable step in the revolution have boosted his political stock substantially. From having been down and out as a presidential candidate, he is now very much in the race. If he can maintain his momentum, he could compete on the Left with Kubitschek--on the grounds that Kubitschek is tainted by his connection to Goulart--and with Ademar and Lacerda on the Right on the grounds that Brazil does need a program of democratic reforms.

Of the other candidates, Carvalho Pinto's prospects, never very bright, appear somewhat dimmer, but not so dim as those of Miguel Arrais, jailed on the island of Fernando de Noronha.

For the Ambassador:



Robert W. Dean
Counselor of Embassy

CONFIDENTIAL

7004
DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND959000