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RM/R	REP	AF
1		
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NEA	CU	INR
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID
G	S/S	S/P
1	27	1
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
5	10	3
OSD	USIA	NSA
16		3
		WSC
		6

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TO : Department of State

1964 APR 13 PM 2 55

 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS
 BUREAU OF
 INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
 APR 13 1964

 RM/AN
 ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
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APR 11 1964

FROM : AmEmbassy RIO DE JANEIRO

DATE: April 9, 1964

SUBJECT : Conversation with Luiz Alberto Bahia

REF :

Enclosed is a memorandum covering a conversation between the reporting officer and Luiz Alberto Bahia, Chief Editorialist on the Jornal do Brasil and Political Editor of Visao.

Of particular interest is Bahia's belief that Juscelino Kubitschek is likely to be the main political beneficiary of Goulart's overthrow.

For the Ambassador:



 John Keppel
 Counselor for
 Political Affairs

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FORM DS-323

Drafted by: POL:JKeppl/rstp

 Contents and Classification Approved by:
 DCM - Minister Mein

Clearances:

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 RMR FILES
 JUNE 9, 1964

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A-1213, 4/9/64
Enclosure
Page 1 of 2
Rio de Janeiro

M E M O R A N D U M O F C O N V E R S A T I O N

Participants: Luiz Alberto Bahia, Chief Editorialist on Jornal do Brasil and Political Editor of Visao

John Keppel, Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs

Place: Maison de France Restaurant

Date: April 7, 1964

I lunched with Bahia on April 7, the first time I had seen him since "the revolution". While the future was full of difficulties and complications, Bahia said, one should remember that what one was talking about now were future dangers and not imminent disaster of the kind we had been staring in the face a while ago.

Bahia said that he had been at least partly responsible for Kubitschek's acceptance of the Castello Branco candidacy. He had called on him and argued with him at length as to why he would be in an excellent position under a Castello Branco regime. He said Kubitschek had wound up by seeing his point and agreeing with him.

Bahia said he did not like Kubitschek. He hated him in fact. But he was going to try to make himself one of Kubitschek's advisors now since Kubitschek was going to be the main beneficiary of the revolution and would have it in his power to do either substantial harm or substantial good. It was of key importance, Bahia said, that the people who had to one or another degree sympathized with Goulart should have a "loyal opposition" inside Brazil to which to look for leadership. Kubitschek could and should fill this role. Otherwise, Bahia said, the "argentinization" of Brazil would result, with a conflict between the trade unions and the military and a substantial proportion of the population hoping and working for the return of Goulart.

Before the revolution, Bahia said, he had expected Lacerda soon after the UDN convention to start trying to generate some sort of appeal to the left. Lacerda had, for example, got in touch with Ferro Costa. Now, Bahia said, he was not sure what Lacerda would do. Lacerda was, however, obviously concerned about his position and even his candidacy now that Magalhaes Pinto had added to his

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CONFIDENTIAL

A-1213, 4/9/64
Enclosure
Page 2 of 2
Rio de Janeiro

moderacy the luster of being one of the principal heroes of the revolution. This, of course, explained Lacerda's rapid flip-flop in suddenly agreeing for postponement of the UDN convention.

There might be some danger, Bahia said, that the military and Lacerda would not want to permit elections in 1965 if it looked likely that Kubitschek would win or to permit him to take office if he did win.

In discussing Kubitschek's possible role, I emphasized the importance of Kubitschek's making any appeal that he chose to to the left in terms other than those which the Goulartists had used in the past and of not trying to appeal to the "povo" by buying items off the communist shelf. Bahia agreed and said that a whole new type of pragmatic appeal, in concrete terms of wages, prices, housing, etc., should be developed.

The key thing, he said, for the new government to do would be to raise agricultural production as much as possible since if food were available at reasonable cost there would be no real trouble.

We also discussed electoral reform at some length, Bahia saying that he did not favor the institution of electoral districts but he thought party primaries supervised by the electoral courts would do a lot of good. As things stood now, the rich and powerful could often determine who the candidates would be while supervised primaries would make the selection of party candidates a much more real contest. The crucial thing, Bahia said, was for the average man to feel that there was some one in Congress to whom he could look to represent his point of view. This, by and large, he said, was not true now, a fact which made the situation dangerous.

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