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SEP 3 - 1965

1965 SEP 2 PM

RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
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SEP 1 1965

DATE: August 31, 1965

TO : Department of State

INFO : RIO DE JANEIRO, BRASILIA

FROM : Amcongen SAO PAULO

SUBJECT : Future State and Federal Political Developments, As Seen By One Sao Paulo Observer

REF :

Dr. José Nabantino Ramos, Professor of Economics and well-known political observer predicts "continuismo" of President Castello Branco and victory for former Governor Carvalho Pinto in the Sao Paulo gubernatorial race.

Niles W. Bond
Minister Consul General

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation

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Drafted by:

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Contents and Classification Approved by:

William L. Wight, Jr.

Clearances:

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Dr. José Nabantino Ramos
William L. Wight, Jr., Deputy Consul General, Sao Paulo

Place : Sao Paulo

Date : August 27, 1965

Subject : Future State and Federal Political Developments, As
Seen By One Sao Paulo Observer

Presidential Prospects

Dr. Ramos, an interesting and provocative informant, recalled our conversation of May 3, 1965, in which he named Castello Branco and Carvalho Pinto as the only two possibilities for next President of Brazil. He now wished to revise that prediction--Castello Branco was the only possibility. President Castello Branco had done himself harm, Ramos said, by not being more farsighted as a political strategist. Many of his present and past difficulties and political crises might easily have been avoided, had he anticipated political developments. As a tactician, Castello Branco managed to overcome the problems one by one at the last moment, but thereby harmed his image with the people. The present government of Brazil was a military government, however, and Castello Branco still enjoyed the support of the vast majority of the Army. He thought only one percent of the Armed Forces favored Carlos Lacerda; only 5-10 percent of the Armed Forces were "hardliners" who might cause difficulties.

Dr. Ramos is firmly convinced, despite President Castello Branco's denials, that the President has given under-the-table support and encouragement to members of Congress who have put forth various schemes for continuismo through indirect elections. Ramos is convinced that the President is purposely operating in this rather cynical manner, in order not to lose support among idealistic elements of the Armed Forces. There was really nothing else he could do, since to permit Carlos Lacerda, Adhemar de Barros, or any of the other presidential candidates to take office would be unthinkable, and disastrous for Brazil. Dr. Ramos considers it would be a miracle if direct elections were held in 1966 as scheduled. He is predicting indirect elections in Congress which will continue Castello Branco in office. If not Castello Branco, there are other possibilities such as Minister Costa e Silva, or possibly Bilac Pinto. He hoped it would not be Bilac Pinto, a man who has many good personal qualities, but who is anti-American. (He cited various examples to support this opinion, such as Bilac Pinto's com-

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Enclosure to
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Sao Paulo

plaint that he had been slighted by Under Secretary Mann during the latter's visit to Brasilia with Senator Fulbright.)

He considered Carlos Lacerda and Janio Quadros the two greatest dangers to Brazil--because both were unpredictable, mentally unbalanced, and yet popular with the people.

He had great respect and admiration for the personal qualities of Marshal Lott, whom he considered a better man than Castello Branco. He didn't believe him to be a Leftist, but a strong man who would throw out the Leftists and Communists if he came to power. However, Ramos considers it better for Brazil for Lott to be out of the electoral picture--because Lott would cause great internal friction and, worse yet, would divide the Armed Forces.

Gubernatorial Prospects in Sao Paulo

Dr. Ramos still considers former Governor Carvalho Pinto the best candidate, with the best prospects of winning. Herbert Levy had no chance and might withdraw from the race to throw his support to Carvalho Pinto. The only combination which might defeat Carvalho Pinto would be an Adhemarista-Janista ticket. Although possible, this was a difficult and unlikely prospect. He said he had talked recently to Carvalho Pinto and had urged him to stay in the gubernatorial race; he had suggested that Carvalho Pinto not become a presidential candidate unless President Castello Branco personally requested him to run as the government's choice.

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