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INFO : AmEmbassy, Rio de Janeiro

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF
INTER AMERICAN AFFAIRS
JUL 1 1963

FROM : AmConsulate, Curitiba

DATE: June 26, 1963

SUBJECT : Comments by Parana Leaders of the Christian Democratic Party on National and State Events

REF :

FILE
No Action
ARA:LA/BR
R. Burton

SUMMARY

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On a trip in the Acting Governor's car on June 6, he and the PDC legislative assembly leader gave their frank views on the coming presidential election and state matters. They believe that Kubitschek will win the presidency and that if Governor Braga accepts Kubitschek's offer to be his running mate that they will be an unbeatable team. They claimed that Dantas could be a strong opponent but his as yet publicly undisclosed serious affliction with cancer will eliminate him as a candidate. On the state scene, they believe that federal PTB Senator Amaury Silva will win the governorship if the PDC and UDN do not join forces behind a mutually accepted candidate. They downgraded the seriousness of military plotting against President Goulart and stated when the chips are down the military would do nothing to interfere with the democratic processes and would only temporarily step in to prevent a leftist takeover.

During a trip in the company of Acting Governor Agostinho Rodrigues, who is also President of the Parana State Legislature and Antonio Rueppel, Legislative Leader of the PDC (Christian Democratic Party - Partido Democrata Cristão) the following observations were made and agreed upon by the two concerning state politics:

GROUP 4

Declassified at 3 year intervals.

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Drafted by:

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Contents and Classification Approved by:

AWFeldman

Clearances:

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1) Parana, which has no Vice Governor, will undoubtedly have such a position by the end of 1963. The Legislative Assembly has the project under study and will favorably vote on it before December, 1963. The person who will be selected for that position will be Col. Italo Conti, Secretary of Public Safety and an intimate friend and collaborator of Governor Ney Braga.

2) Governor Braga's split with the PTB is a real one and in their opinion is irreconcilable on the state level. The Governor firmly believes that he is strong enough to carry out his policies without PTB support.

3) They are convinced that Governor Braga will not initiate any changes in his cabinet since it consists wholly of persons in whom he has full confidence. As for UDN participation in the cabinet, Governor Braga has made it clear that he will not replace any of his Secretaries by UDN members. (Changes in staffing will only be made if a Secretary resigns for personal reasons.) The UDN is believed to have decided not to push any more for participation in the cabinet because of the Governor's firm decision and because his term is more than half over.

4) Concerning the Parana gubernatorial election in 1964, they believe that Federal Senator Amaury Silva of the PTB (Brazilian Labor Party - Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro) is a real threat to PDC retaining the governorship. The only way he can be defeated is by the continued coalition of PDC and UDN (National Democratic Union - União Democrata Nacional) parties. They consider Amaury Silva a treacherous person as far as Governor Braga is concerned since he gives the Governor overt lip service but is clandestinely against him.

Their comments on the national scene were concerned mainly with Parana's role.

1) Acting Governor Rodrigues stated that his electoral strength lies with the military and ex-military in Parana. His belief is that the military in Brazil will not make a real effort to seize the federal government unless and until there is evident proof that the President or some extremist group is going to attempt a coup. His belief is that this action will be taken only as a moderating influence and that the government would quickly be turned over to civilians again. He believes that the so-called revolt among sergeants and some officers is mainly window dressing and the trend is grossly exaggerated by the press. He stated that the military in Parana would not become involved in any such adventure unless it was obvious that such action is necessary to preserve the union.

2) They claimed to have reliable and confidential information about Minister of Treasury San Thiago Dantas. Dantas is supposed to be a very sick man suffering from cancer who knows that he is dying. Despite this, he has such courage and a feeling of moral obligation that he is driving himself on his job. They believe that he is the only hope the PTB has of winning the 1964 presidential election and that Braga and Dantas would make a good team if Dantas would run, which they now doubt.

3) They discussed the Governor Adhemar de Barros candidacy for President and concluded that he has little chance. They stated that there was some talk of a Governor Lacerda - de Barros ticket with some agreement that Lacerda could resign after serving part of his term to permit de Barros to step up. They agreed that Lacerda is too controversial a person to win the election even though he is one of the best of the possible contenders.

4) They believe that Senator Juscelino Kubitschek has the best chance of being elected president. They also stated that he could win the election without PTB backing and that the split between him and President Goulart and the PTB party is a deep and serious one. They believe that the UDN will support Kubitschek and that if Governor Ney Braga accedes to Kubitschek's twice repeated invitation to be his running mate, they will make an unbeatable team. Despite Governor Braga's often expressed antipathy for Kubitschek, they believe he will accept the offer even though it may force him to renege on previous critical statements made about the Senator and ex-president.

5) They lamented the fact that ex-Governor Carvalho Pinto was not more of a politician because in their opinion he would make a very good president.

COMMENT

Both men spoke frankly and the Reporting Officer was impressed by their unquestioned loyalty to Governor Braga. It also became apparent to him that even though these two men are by necessity his close collaborators, they really do not have any firm knowledge of the Governor's intentions. He evidently tells them what they will need to know to support his position but as for active participation in the formulation of his future political role, they are as much in the dark as the rest. Their advantage is that they perhaps can read his intentions from comments he may make to them. An inner political council working on the Governor's future has not as yet become evident and the Governor is playing the game by holding his cards close to his chest.

The information about Dantas is supposed to have come from

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one of his intimate friends and this is the first report of his illness that has come to the Consulate's attention.

Acting Governor Rodrigues expressed relief that he would not have to be acting much longer since he wanted to return to the Legislative Assembly. He stated that he did not want to run for governor since he much preferred the give and take of the Legislature. He was also pushing to have a Vice Governor appointed since this would save him from losing about one year of his term should Governor Braga resign to run for a national executive office. If Governor Braga resigns, Rodrigues would have to assume the governorship and he would thereby have to renounce his deputyship. Thus when the election in 1964 selected a new governor, Rodrigues would be without a job and would have to wait one year to run again. This thought was not to his liking at all.

Both men expressed delight at having this intimate session and volunteered to bring about a closer relationship between the Legislative Assembly and the Consulate. The first step in this program is a visit by the Reporting Officer to the Legislative Assembly to be followed by a reception to be given by him in honor of all the state deputies. They indicated that this would provide an opportunity to meet some of the deputies who are critical of the U.S. but who could yet be won over by a frank discussion such as was had on the trip.

Arthur W. Feldman
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American Consul

cc: Mr. Joseph S. Henderson, Consul General, Rio de Janeiro
Brazil Desk, Washington, D.C.

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