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SUBJECT: The Brazilian Christian Democratic Party

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SUMMARY

The Brazilian Christian Democratic Party (PDC) is a medium-sized, moderately reformist party, which bases its strength principally on the more highly-educated groups in the relatively urbanized center-south. It is much more of a Brazilian political phenomenon than it is part of an international Christian Democratic movement. The PDC in Brazil is not identified as a church party. Depending on local conditions, PDC politicians have identified themselves with conservative or progressive parties, using the tactic of fluid electoral alliances to attain success according to Brazil's proportional representation system. In some states, the PDC label has been used by opportunists as a convenient electoral vehicle, but in others, notably Paraná, São Paulo and Guanabara, the PDC has developed a solid party organization which is increasingly emphasizing its separate identity. In São Paulo, the PDC belonged to electoral coalitions which elected two governors; in Paraná, the present governor is a pedecista. The present national political leaders of the PDC have many good qualities--they support democratic reforms, appear to be relatively honest and morally upright--but they seem to lack the necessary forcefulness to give the party national prominence. One of the most critical problems for the Brazilian PDC is to find or create successful national leaders. The PDC's ideological underpinnings make the party a near-novelty on the Brazilian political scene, and the party's beliefs appear to be closely in line with the aspirations of a good many Brazilians. These beliefs,

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as expressed in the party platform by the current moderate leadership, especially since the influence of a radical left wing has diminished sharply, are, in large part, in consonance with United States policy and the Alliance for Progress. The PDC leadership supported the March revolution that deposed President João Goulart. The party is officially "independent" of the government, but in practice supports it. The party's position vis-a-vis the military is believed to be good. The PDC's links with auxiliary organizations--students, labor, international CD groups--are generally in their formative stages, often hindered by legal prohibitions, and are of practically no influence within the party. A PDC government in Brazil would probably be left of center, but still acceptable to the United States. Without a dynamic national leader or a vigorous national leadership, the PDC appears incapable of becoming a major party that can elect a President. The Brazilian PDC appears to have significant possibilities for achieving these goals, but the party will have to resolve its leadership problem and the problems created by an upcoming electoral and political party reform.

BACKGROUND, GROWTH, AND POLITICAL TIES

Perhaps it is most important to begin an explanation of the Brazilian Christian Democratic Party (PDC) with a caveat: The PDC in Brazil is far more of a Brazilian political phenomenon than it is part of an international Christian Democratic movement. The major Brazilian political parties (the PSD and the PTB) were created by Brazil's dictator, Getulio Vargas, or in opposition to him (the UDN). This division of politicians and political parties in favor of or against the Vargas tradition is still basic in Brazil. Most of the smaller parties, however, escaped this categorization because of regional, personalist, historical or ideological underpinnings. The position of the PDC on the Brazilian political scene, with a ready-made doctrine attractive to the Brazilian electorate which does not require candidates to make the pro- or anti-Vargas option (synonymous with pro- or anti-administration), is fundamental to understanding the party's growth.

The PDC label has often served opportunists as well as those who believe in the Christian Democratic movement, but it has not become identified as a church party. Especially while the party was still very small, the PDC was used as a convenient vehicle for election by those who wished to avoid identification for or against the state administration or those who felt their chances of election under Brazil's proportional representation system were better with a small party. This opportunistic use of the PDC occurred often in the North and Northeast of Brazil (Amazonas, Ceará, Paraíba, Pernambuco), perhaps because of the oligarchical nature of many northern state administrations. In some cases constant use of the PDC label helped the party grow roots among the electorate. For example, in Paraíba,

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Governor Pedro Gondim was elected with PDC support and, even though he only uses the PDC label for reasons of state politics, the party feels he has helped stimulate it in the state. In others, the PDC became identified to the voter as just another label of convenience.

The most common electoral tactic of PDC candidates has been to form coalitions or alliances with larger parties, in order to elect a few officials on the coattails of the larger party's vote. With the PDC's increased electorate, it became a kind of force de frappe and somewhat desirable for those alliances. This helps explain how the PDC, registering a vote of only .29 percent of the electorate in the 1962 congressional elections, was able to seat 20 federal deputies or nearly 5 percent of the lower house. Earlier, in 1958 the PDC registered a vote of 2.28 percent of the electorate, but it only landed 7 federal deputies. Apparently PDC members decided in the interim that alliances were more profitable.

These alliances have also contributed to one of the most serious internal weaknesses of the Brazilian PDC. PDC candidates, depending on local conditions, have allied with other parties all across the ideological spectrum. In some states (e.g. Amazonas), the PDC tends to be thought of as linked to the situationist (until the revolution) Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), while in other states it is identified with the conservative National Democratic Union (UDN). In other instances, the PDC's alliances appear to be solely for agglomerating enough electors to put some members of the coalition in office. In some states, where the PDC seemed to be registering early significant growth, such as in Minas Gerais, it became absorbed by its larger allies.

The PDC's position with respect to the other major parties and the Brazilian electoral system thus permitted the PDC to register gains--both false and real--in the last twenty years. Because of the inaccuracy of statistics, perhaps the most certain indicator of the PDC's increase is the number of elected officials. The following table of candidates elected by the PDC in elections since 1945 gives some idea of the party's growth: (The source for this election information is the official publications of the Supreme Electoral Court. It does not take into account the fairly common practice of switching party labels.)

<u>Election Year</u>	<u>Federal Deputies</u>	<u>Federal Senators</u>	<u>State Deputies</u>
1945	2		2
1947	2		5
1950	2		14
1954	2		27
1958	7		30
1962	20	1	75

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PDC REGIONAL STRENGTH

Federal Deputy (and Monsignor) Arruda Camara of Pernambuco accounts for one of the PDC's federal deputies in every election listed above. Generally taken as the founder of the Brazilian PDC, he has emphasized the Christian element in the party's doctrine, taking as his public duty the defense of conservative Church interests in Congress. In spite of Arruda Camara's personal prestige, the PDC has not become a significant political force in Pernambuco, nor has his position become influential within the party. Indeed, Arruda Camara's elections are a good example of how lightly party labels are generally taken in Brazil: He has often used the UDN ticket to get elected, but always switched to the PDC label once in Congress.

The PDC has always had a scattering of representatives from the North and Northeast of Brazil, but it is from the more urban center-South region, where it has appealed to middle-class and professional elements in the society, that the party has had its most solid growth. The PDC has, since 1945, had an increasing vote in São Paulo, a consistent representation in Guanabara (the old Federal District), and a recent spectacular success in Paraná.

In São Paulo, the PDC has been fortunate enough to become identified with such successful public figures as Janio Quadros¹ and Carvalho Pinto, even though these politicians shunned strict PDC ties. This identification has no doubt helped shape the party's image as moderately reformist, responsible, and an attractive alternative to the decadent major parties. The PDC's major competitor in São Paulo has been the personalist and venal Social Progress Party (PSP). Since both parties are medium-sized and nationally known, and because the PSP label still carries the vestiges in some states of its leader Adhemar de Barros' former populist position, the PDC and PSP have often competed for votes. But it is in São Paulo, where Adhemar is presently Governor, that the PDC and PSP have met head on. Taking the long view, and even considering the highly personalist nature of São Paulo politics, the PDC appears to be gaining. The PDC's growth in São Paulo also appears to be solid. There is a broad base of mayors, city councilmen and state deputies supporting the party's six federal deputies. The reasons most often given for the PDC's success are the party's organizational work, firmer ideological position, and its identification with successful candidates. If the PDC could again find an attractive candidate, it is very possible it could elect the Governor of Brazil's wealthiest and most important state, thus putting the party in line for electing the President.

The most serious division the PDC has yet had to face has also come out of São Paulo. A left-wing Catholic movement found expression in some energetic, young PDC demagogues. The movement appeared

¹He left the PDC when the party refused to support him as its 1954 gubernatorial candidate.

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to open the PDC to communist infiltration. The violent methods preached by some of its extreme elements reminded one of the Chinese Communist line or Leonel Brizola's preachings while its main ideological stream held to increased socialization of the national economy, ultra-nationalism and anti-Americanism. Two of the extreme, Brizola-like leaders of this movement in the PDC, Paulo de Tarso and Plinio de Arruda Sampaio, were elected federal deputies in 1962 on the strength of it. These deputies also headed up the group that wrote the left-wing party platform at the 1963 PDC convention. Although these two have had their mandates canceled and their political rights suspended for 10 years by the revolutionary government, the movement they represented within the PDC is by no means dead. (De Tarso and Sampaio even continue to exert some influence from their exile in Chile, where they are employed by the Frei government.) There has appeared, however, a solid reaction from within the PDC against this extreme leftism which has brought the party back in succeeding statements to a moderate center-left position. The ideological difference between the old and new guard promises to be the key issue at the next national convention.

In Guanabara, the PDC has not registered much growth in relation to the other parties, but has been able to hold its own, usually electing one or two federal deputies and some state deputies. The PDC has been working on the formation of party cadres in Guanabara in the last year, using experience gained in Paraná. Party stalwarts are hopeful of a success in the gubernatorial race similar to that registered in Paraná, but so far no striking candidate has appeared.

The election in 1960 of Ney Braga as Governor of Paraná marked the first time that a governor had been elected with the PDC as the principal party on the coalition (the PDC was allied with the tiny PL). The Vice Governor, Afonso Camargo Neto, was also elected on the same ticket. The event called national attention to the PDC--"the fastest growing party in Brazil". PDC representation in the state assembly jumped from three to twelve deputies; in the chamber of deputies, from one Paraná PDC deputy (Ney Braga) to four. The party showed continued growth in December, 1964 municipal elections, and it is already claiming that the next statewide elections will show that the PDC is presently the largest party in Paraná. The PDC's electoral success has been due to the personal support Ney Braga has developed in the state and to the carefully prepared party organization and campaign managed by Afonso Camargo Neto. The PDC in Paraná represents a slightly left-of-center position in close consonance ideologically and organizationally with the international CD movement. For example, one of the federal deputies elected from Paraná is Jose Richa, who is also national President of the Christian Democratic Youth (JDC).

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In general, it appears that the PDC (where it has constituted itself as a true party rather than as an electoral service) has gone after the urban vote like other parties, using the near novelty in Brazil of its ideological basis to appeal to more highly-educated groups. Where it has been able to create some party organization, such as in Paraná, São Paulo and Guanabara, the PDC has then embarked on expanding its operations to labor and student groups. These auxiliary groups are, in most states, in embryonic form only.

THE PDC AND ELECTORAL REFORM

Some form of an electoral and political party reorganization, including a reduction in the number of parties, is expected to be approved in 1965. Under all formulas being discussed, it appears the PDC will survive. Some PDC leaders have entertained the idea of amalgamating the PDC with some other party, perhaps compromising ideology for electoral gain. Ney Braga, for example, has suggested the Christian Labor Party (PTC) as a possibility. Others have set out to collect members of smaller parties which are certain to be abolished. At any rate, a thorough party reorganization means that all parties in Brazil, and especially the PDC (because it stands between the large and small parties), are at the crossroads. Although the PDC record indicates continued growth, it may be in a different form, depending on the decisions of the party leaders this year and the showing the party makes in the next elections.

PRESENT NATIONAL LEADERSHIP

The present PDC national political leadership is good in many respects, but it appears to lack the forcefulness and unity necessary to impose itself on the national scene. Crusty 67 year-old veteran Marshal Juarez Tavora (PDC Federal Deputy from Guanabara) is presently serving as Transport and Public Works Minister. The party considers his appointment as more of a token of President Castello Branco's friendship and confidence than as PDC participation in the present government. Paraná Governor Ney Braga seems perpetually to have his eye on a nomination for President or Vice President, but this longing is generally considered to be personal ambition thinly covered by an altruistic desire to further the interests of the party. São Paulo Deputy Franco Montoro, former Labor Minister under Goulart and presently a candidate for mayor of São Paulo, is attractive to many PDC members, but is nationally stigmatized as opportunistic and vacillating in his varying left-of-center stances. For former São Paulo Governor Carvalho Pinto, the PDC appears ready to lend its support for whatever office he chooses in hopes he could give the party national prominence. As for lesser leaders, Paraná Vice-Governor Afonso Camargo Neto is earning a reputation as a party workhorse and

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would probably be supported by the party in an attempt for the governorship. If he had the full support of the PDC and Ney Braga, he would be a powerful contender, but not enough is known about him to judge what type of governor he would make. PDC Chamber floor leader Euclides Triches (Rio Grande do Sul) is a very responsible and well-connected deputy, but he appears to be more of a behind-the-scenes man than a national leader. The one PDC senator, Arnon de Melo (ex-Governor of Alagoas) uses the party label as an electoral device and is not considered a leader in the party. Thus the PDC, like other parties in Brazil, is casting about for the right national leader and set of circumstances, in hopes that it will be catapulted to success.

THE PDC PROGRAM

The PDC program, which first became identified as an important national party program after the 1963 convention, has been going through a series of changes, evolving from a far-left platform to a moderate center-left one. Although a radical program was approved at the March, 1963 convention (São Paulo's A-370), the program as actually released in June, 1963 (São Paulo's A-384) was considerably more moderate. The statement of principles released after the January, 1964 extraordinary convention (Brasilia's A-102) was even more moderate. Looking back, it appears that the party, at a time when it had attained national attention, was temporarily captured by a small group of extremists who did not represent the majority of the PDC. Although the PDC had taken steps to restrict its far-left flank, the revolution and the sanctions it meted out to leftist subversives, also had the effect of strengthening the more conservative PDC leadership. Pedecistas farther to the left than the line set by present PDC President Ney Braga exist, especially among the younger members, but they do not appear to be as radical or as effective as the former group. Those PDC members who are farther to the left than the present leadership are expected to provide healthy debate at the next PDC convention, scheduled for March, 1965, objecting to the trend to the right. Their strength within the party will again be measured at that time.

Most of the specific issues that have been party platform fodder for years have been approved since the March revolution, so the PDC's platform, like that of other parties, is currently dated. The party, however, has supported the moderate and responsible reforms of the Castello Branco administration, many of which have been in close agreement with the PDC's program. Thus the administration-proposed agrarian reform by constitutional amendment which permits expropriation of large unworked landholdings for social need and allows the government to repay the owners in public bonds was supported by the PDC. In the same fashion, the PDC has supported: 1) a bank reform

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establishing a central bank, 2) tax reforms to eliminate privileges and tighten up the collection process, 3) a housing plan to provide houses to lower income groups and 4) various bills concerned with education, to stimulate school construction and to limit student group political activity, with the latter bill splitting the PDC's vote. Other notable issues on which the PDC has taken a position and which may soon come up for a decision are administrative reform (the PDC stands in favor of elimination of patronage and carefully-directed planning) and electoral reform (the PDC would like stricter rules to combat the influence of money and corruption in elections, and advocates district voting, immediate counting of the votes at the polls and extension of the franchise to illiterates). The platform, as it stands, still contains some left-wing elements, such as preventing foreign banks from operating in the country with public deposits, but in actual practice, the PDC has supported more moderate versions of the reforms.

In addition to its opinions on these current issues, the PDC has also put out an idealistic, semi-mystical and constantly-revised statement of ideology and principles. The keynote of these declarations is "communitarian solidarity, which proposes to constitute a society of really free men, linked by ties of justice and fraternity". The community is to be the most important element in the society and the state is to be restricted to those activities which cannot be performed by individuals or the community, but state intervention in economic affairs, even on a monopolistic basis, is foreseen where it is judged to be for the common good. The family is to be strengthened by preventing divorce and providing it with material means for its existence. "Communitarian" property holding is the ideal and corporations are to be democratized to the extent that each worker holds an equal share. Man, according to the PDC ideals, is created in the image of God, is a rational being whose destiny transcends the historical process, and who, within this conception, has the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Comparing its philosophy with other political philosophies, the PDC rejects "capitalism and neo-capitalism which maintains the primacy of capital /rather than labor/ in the economic process", as well as "communism and marxism, materialistic and totalitarian doctrines which subordinate all political, economic and social life to the State which, in its turn, is the instrument of a single party dominated by a new class". In short, the PDC is in favor of a society directed toward the well-being and self-realization of each of its members, limited by the necessities of the common good. This philosophy, which admits broad variations in practical application, appears to be closely in line with the aspirations of a good many Brazilians. The fact that it has an acceptable philosophy makes the PDC different from other parties in Brazil.

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THE PDC AND THE GOVERNMENT

The PDC leadership supported the March revolution which deposed President Goulart. A majority of its members voted for President Castello Branco in the indirect election in April. The PDC formed part of the government majority in Congress until October, when it decided to move to an "independent" position. The purposes of the decision were twofold: the party did not want strict identification with the government during an unpopular austerity phase and it wanted to assert a separate identity vis-a-vis the UDN in Congress and in various municipal elections, notably in Paraná. The PDC has also apparently made a policy decision that it can now strengthen itself by running its own candidates wherever the party organization makes it possible. The party still supports the government in practice, and some individuals in the PDC are close to present leaders. There are some indications that the PDC is attempting to become officially endorsed by the present administration as "the party of the revolution", even exchanging some basic tenets for national preeminence. At present, however, the effort is just another example of the large dose of opportunism in the Brazilian PDC.

THE PDC AND THE MILITARY

The moderate wing of the PDC is not known to be anti-military. In fact the party contains a high percentage of retired officers. Mention has already been made of Army Marshal Juarez Tavora. Governor Ney Braga and Chamber leader Euclides Triches are both retired Army colonels. Although little is known about PDC acceptance in the armed forces, it is believed that the PDC's moderate reform program combined with its image as a morally "clean" party (especially after the extirpation of the radical elements) has appreciable appeal among the military.

THE PDC AND THE CHURCH

The PDC has not become identified in Brazil as a church party. In a general sense, the papal encyclicals, especially Pacem em Terris, have had an influence within the party. Other parties have also used the encyclicals, but PDC leaders use them more as guidelines for their program. Similarly, there is general interest in the Ecumenical Council, which is only slightly more specific in the PDC. On most controversial church issues, such as birth control, the PDC seeks to avoid taking an official position. Individual PDC members, of course, speak out freely on these issues. On less controversial issues, the PDC does appear to lend general support to the Catholic Church position. While the church is predominantly conservative in Brazil, there are a number of indications a liberal trend, which favors involvement in current social problems, is developing. The PDC

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position is at present parallel to the trend. Closer ties, for example in the rural labor organization field, may develop in the future, but they are now for the most part tacit and through intermediary groups.

THE PDC AND ORGANIZED LABOR

The PDC, or any other political party in Brazil, is not directly active in labor organizations or training programs because such activity is forbidden by law. Where connections do exist between the PDC and a particular labor organization, it is through the individual sympathies of the members for both entities. This may occur, for example, in the rural union labor organizations being created by Padres Melo and Crespo in the Northeast, especially Pernambuco. CLASC operated in Brazil before the revolution through the church-linked Círculos Operários, labor training and organizing groups. In some cases, especially in São Paulo, CLASC-affiliated unions abetted communist infiltration in the union movement, and some PDC members were involved. When CLASC opposed the revolution and the Círculos Operários supported it, the two parted and CLASC lost most of its influence in the country. In effect, the Círculos Operários have filled CLASC's sphere of influence. The Círculos Operários, however, are closely identified with the church and almost not at all with the PDC. A roundabout link with the PDC may come through foreign, especially German, support for the Círculos. The Círculos Operários are not anti-American, they cooperate with ORIT, and they participate in AIFLD programs. Although in practice it may appear to be a technicality, the PDC as a party does not participate in labor programs, AIFLD or other, but individual members can and do. One such up-and-coming PDC member/labor leader is Romulo Marinho, President of the National Federation of Telegraph Workers and the National Confederation of Communications and Publicity Employees. He is also a substitute federal deputy from Guanabara.

THE PDC AND STUDENTS AND INTELLECTUALS

Most young PDC members in student groups belong to the Christian Democratic Youth (Juventude Democrata Crista-JDC) and/or the University Catholic Youth (Juventude Universitaria Catolica-JUC). The JDC has more PDC members but is a weak organization. The JUC is stronger, but has fewer pedecistas. Both are radical and are attracted by the violence-preaching Popular Action (Ação Popular-AP). The radicalness of the JDC was at a peak during the period Paulo de Tarso was Education Minister under João Goulart. With the revolution and exile of Paulo de Tarso, JDC has retained much of its radicalness, but has lost a good deal of its effectiveness. The JDC has practically no influence on party decisions. This is partially because of the weakness of the link between the JDC and the PDC: Young JDC leaders

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do not necessarily "graduate" to the PDC. It is also because of the real ideological gap between the party leadership and the youth wing. The separation between JDC and PDC members extends to nearly all views--on the revolution, the military, the church, the United States, etc. Given these circumstances, and the polarization of student groups due to the revolution, the PDC is not presently encouraging its youth wing, and support for it is beginning to drop off. The Christian Democratic movement does maintain a training and indoctrination program for students and others who are interested in entering the PDC. It is called IDEC--Information on Christian Democracy (Informações de Democracia Cristã). Those who enroll in the two-week courses are given rudimentary instruction on the international and Brazilian Christian Democratic movements, running meetings, etc. It is not known how many have been through an IDEC course, but it is only in its beginning stages.

The most prominent PDC intellectual in Brazil is, without doubt, the Catholic writer Alceu Amoroso Lima, who is equally known by his pseudonym of Tristão de Athayde. He, along with Eduardo Frei, was one of the signers of the Movement of Montevideo (MDM) in 1947. The objective of the MDM was to provide coordination for a Latin American Christian Democratic movement. Lima is still an active PDC leader, writing in newspapers and journals, sitting as a member of many boards and committees, and usually emphasizing the international nature of the CD movement. He is a member of the Brazilian Academy of Letters.

INTERNATIONAL LINKS OF THE PDC

The Christian Democratic movement maintains contacts with all or nearly all of the international Christian Democratic organizations. Students go to Chile for meetings, labor leaders meet in Caracas, party workers or deputies attend Christian Democratic conclaves in West Germany or Italy, all without having an appreciable effect on the functioning of the party. Although the travel and meetings may be stimulating, especially when the West German or Italian parties pick up the tab, the interests and attentions of the PDC are turned inward. The PDC politicians are interested in whatever will help the party grow, thus making their personal ambitions easier to realize. For this reason, Frei's victory in Chile has especially interested the Brazilian PDC. Pedecistas immediately capitalized on the victory to claim that Christian Democracy is the wave of the future. Many PDC leaders have visited Chile to study the victory more closely. The Brazilian PDC recognizes the Chilean PDC's success, but it is unlikely to look to it for leadership. Rather, they would like to apply whatever they can to gain more votes for the Brazilian PDC.

The moderate PDC leadership is not known to harbor enmity toward the OAS. In fact, Alceu Amoroso Lima once served as Director of its Section of Cultural Cooperation.

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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US

The moderate reformist program of the PDC largely parallels the objectives of the Alliance for Progress. The PDC program published after its February, 1964 convention specifically endorsed the Alliance. The official party philosophy, which objects to the "economic domination" inherent in capitalism, would, in practice, probably be expressed in a more watchful and restrictive attitude toward the operation of American and other foreign business in Brazil, and a PDC government would probably be somewhat nationalistic on this point. Although there might be some tendencies toward a "third force" or neutralist position in a PDC government, indications are that it would be committed to defending democracy against communism. The PDC student wing, as described above, is anti-American and would probably push for even more restrictions on American business and for a "third" position than the bulk of the party, but unless its influence grows markedly, it would not sway the national leaders. The growth of a moderately reformist PDC into a major political force in Brazil would probably meet the aspirations of a large part of the Brazilian electorate and would still probably be acceptable to the United States.

Growth of the PDC would provide a rallying point for the non-communist left, which is at present splintered, ineffective and without leadership. Most other left-wing parties are highly personalistic and have begun to decline with the disappearance of their founders. The PTB, presently considered to be the major party on the left, unites conservative landowners and urban leftists in a headless, amorphous agglomeration. It would probably be in the interests of the United States to see the PDC take over on the non-communist left rather than leave the field to the PTB which, under Goulart, showed unprincipled opportunism.

Most of the present national PDC leaders appear to be well disposed toward the United States. Nearly all of the political leaders, at one time or another, have spent some time in the U. S., many on leader grants. The Embassy, Consulates and specialized missions, all maintain regular contact with PDC leaders. Moderate leaders in all fields have been identified and encouraged.

CONCLUSIONS

The PDC appears to have significant possibilities for becoming a major political force in Brazil. It has an excellent record of growth during a period when nearly all other parties remained stagnant or declined. The Brazilian PDC's characteristics--its idealism and ideology combined with its up-dated organization, its pragmatism and opportunism--give it a broad appeal and defined position in many

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varied situations. Aside from the Communist parties, it is the only existing political party which appears capable of providing the average Brazilian with a sense of mission, as demonstrated by its active recruiting program. Its attractiveness as an alternative to the decadent major parties may have increased since the revolution because the deep changes brought about by the revolutionary administration have altered, and promise to alter even more, the fundamental structures on which the major parties are based. The major parties, however, have control at present and can be expected to do everything in their power to maintain it. The PDC might be able to win control away from the major parties, but to do it, the party will have to present successful candidates, in addition to maintaining its attractive ideology and program and an efficient organization. The PDC's critical problem, and Brazil's, is finding, or developing, those future leaders who can make it great.

For the Ambassador:



Robert B. Bentley
Third Secretary

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