

**INCOMING TELEGRAM**

*Department of State*

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By Q. Fuda NARA Date 6/5/96

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Control: 7447  
Rec'd: October 9, 1963  
11:08 p.m.

FROM: Rio de Janeiro  
TO: Secretary of State  
NO: 787, October 9, 6 p.m. (Section I of II)

LA/BR

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**PRIORITY**

**ACTION PRIORITY DEPARTMENT 787, INFORMATION PRIORITY BRASILIA 116, SAO PAULO 30, RECIFE 91, POLAD/USCINCSO 82**

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Following represents attempt 1) to discern roles and motives of various parties in most recent phase of crisis, i.e. that involving Goulart's abortive request for state of siege and abortive attempt to arrest or kill Lacerda, and 2) to try to assess their significance for probable further development of situation.

**I. Roles and Motives.**

**Lacerda:** Motives in giving LA TIMES interview probably included at least three elements: 1) Thought that early showdown in Brazilian crisis was preferable to further unarrested political and economic deterioration; 2) worry that US and others help to Brazil in debt rescheduling might take enough heat off regime to permit such unchecked further deterioration; and 3) desire to deflate growing mystique around Jair as "strong man" with growing support in all sectors, left center and right and to force him into siding clearly with Goulart or with traditionalist-centrist opinion in armed forces.

**Goulart:** Has long wanted extraordinary powers and drastic action against Lacerda. It would have been much easier to get extraordinary powers permitting action against Lacerda and Adhemar if Goulart could have waited until December 15 when Congress

scheduled to  
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scheduled to recess. Decision to go ahead with some sort of action immediately was probably due to two factors 1) growing sense of desperation at deterioration of own position and 2) thought that arms cache investigation and Lacerda LA TIMES interview might create climate permitting immediate action. There seems to have been some confusion as to whether direct illegal action was to be taken against Lacerda or whether action against Guanabara Governor should be delayed until extraordinary powers had been obtained from Congress. Original plan may well have been for simple direct action, with "state of siege" plan substituted -- or added -- in view of possible reaction in country to illegal action and in view of strong "legalist" traditions in armed forces. In state of siege proposal Goulart probably hoped to keep armed forces in line through their ostensibly enhanced role. He probably hoped to get left to go along by promising 1) drastic action against Lacerda and Adhemar, 2) not to infringe activities of leftist organizations and unions, and 3) to appoint siege administrators acceptable to left.

Jair: WARMIN does not appear to have played strong hand attributed to him by press, but seems to have played role of Jangista, probably however somewhat apprehensive one. He may have been responsible for idea that state of siege should be requested as setting for or in addition to action against Lacerda, although other members of Goulart team such as Jurema or Oliveira Brito may have been proponents this viewpoint. In military ministers statement on Lacerda interview with LA TIMES and in agreeing to have state of siege request appear to come from military, Jair did not consult own Chief of Staff or other high ranking generals and thus now may become discredited in eyes of traditionalists in armed forces. Goulart set Jair and other military ministers up as fall guys in case siege request backfired and in due course may offer them up to public as expiatory sacrifices.

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FROM: Rio de Janeiro  
TO: Secretary of State  
NO: 787, October 9, 6, p.m. (Section II of II)

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Communists: Were, of course, in favor of direct Goulart action against Lacerda but were not willing to pay price of state of siege to get it. They feared that 1) under pressure of public opinion and/or opinion of traditionalist officers in armed forces state of siege powers might be used against them, or 2) Jango himself might be tempted to use said powers gently against left to keep it responsive to his leadership. Communists rapidly mobilized bodies (e.g. UNE) controlled by them against state of siege proposal. Their influence, both directly exerted and as major element in Goulart's change of heart, was important in swinging CGT into line.

Supporting evidence for these statements in addition to that already reported will be forwarded soonest by appropriate means.

II. What Happens Now?

Here we are on less firm ground.

Goulart: His idea is probably 1) to rid himself of as much blame for recent events as possible, 2) look as respectable as possible for interim although continuing to emphasize need for "basic reforms", 3) promise Brizola, extremist nationalists and Communists full

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Communists full and clear turn of Government forward left and drastic action against Lacerda, etc., but 4) try to persuade them why such action during congressional recess (assuming Congress does not remain in session to block such possibility).

Communists: They will probably keep pressure on Goulart to maintain their improved hold over him arising from the large role they played in deflecting him from his intentions and from their success in controlling bodies to whose leadership Goulart also pretends. At same time they will probably generally go along with President's desire to avoid too much boat rocking for time being since they too might drown if boat swamped. They want 1) to keep Jango in presidency and 2) to get him to let them accomplish own purposes of penetration, propaganda and pre-conditioning of state in socialist-authoritarian direction. They do not want Goulart 1) to fall or 2) to acquire wide authoritarian powers unless their control over him and armed forces becomes assured (unlikely in near future in latter case).

UDN: May well be precipitator of next phase of crisis through effort to fix responsibility on Goulart for his bid for extraordinary powers and/or attempted drastic action against Lacerda. UDN attack on Goulart may have considerable resonance among PSD and other moderate elements which have suffered disaffection from government as result of its recent maneuvers. If UDN attack on President promises success, Goulart in desperation might decide once again to seize initiative without waiting for congressional recess. Brizola apt to be inciting pressure on Goulart while Communist leaders can be expected to show some caution.

There are obviously many other participants in situation. Their actions, or actions on part of those we mention above different from those we have forecast, could obviously lead situation to develop in any one of number of different directions.

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Department will note slight difference in evaluation of role of military ministers during recent phase between this message and Brasilia's telegram 51 which refers to "hurdle of military tutelage". Our evaluation is based on evidence Brasilia had not yet seen.

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