

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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LIMDIS

1. SAN TIAGO DANTAS LUNCHEd PRIVATELY WITH ME FRIDAY AND EXPANDED RATIONALE FOR HIS BROAD FRONT PROGRAM IN FOLLOWING TERMS.
2. FRUSTRATED STATE OF SIEGE REQUEST LAST OCTOBER HAD LEFT TWO MAJOR RESIDUES. ON ONE HAND, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS MORE SHARPLY DIVIDED AND HOSTILE THAN ANY OTHER TIME IN GOULART REGIME. AT SAME TIME, FAR LEFT FORCES, CONCERNED WITH WEAKNESS AND DIVISION DEMONSTRATED IN STATE OF SIEGE EPISODE, WERE MAKING MAJOR NEW EFFORT FOR UNITED LEADERSHIP AND PROGRAM AT THAT TIME, BRIZOLA HAD UNCONTESTED LEADERSHIP OF LEFT, AND BEGAN MAJOR CAMPAIGN FOR TAKING OVER GOVERNMENT THROUGH MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENTS. DANTAS CONSIDERS BRIZOLA'S BID FOR FINANCE MINISTRY DEADLY SERIOUS, AND BELIEVES THAT UNDER UNITED LEFt WING PRESSURE GOULART HAD BEEN READY TO GIVE BRIZOLA AT LEAST INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE MINISTRY AND QUITE POSSIBLY FINANCE. IN MIDST BRIZOLA CAMPAIGN, DANTAS RECEIVED MESSAGE FROM MUTUAL ACQUAINTANCE ASKING HIM CONSULT SOME ELEMENTS BUSINESS COMMUNITY TO ASSURE THEM THAT IF BRIZOLA MADE FINANCE MINISTER, HE WOULD HELP THEM BY DRASTIC ACTION AGAINST FOREIGN COMPETITORS. (DANTAS REMARKED PARENTHETICALLY THAT SOME OF MY SUPPOSED FRIENDS WERE MORE RECEPTIVE TO THIS LINE THAN I MIGHT EXPECT.)
3. DANTAS BELIEVED THAT BRIZOLA IN ANY CABINET POSITION WOULD MEAN RAPID MOVE TOWARD VIOLENCE AND DESTRUCTION CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER. HE IS CONVINCED THAT GOULART DISLIKES, FEARS, AND DISAGREES WITH BRIZOLA, WHOM HE REGARDS AS PRINCIPAL COMPETITOR FOR POPULAR LEADERSHIP. GOULART'S FAILURE ATTACK BRIZOLA DIRECTLY, EITHER IN SPEECHES OR BY SHUTTING DOWN RADIO MAYRINK-VEIGA OR STIFLING MOVE FOR ORGANIZING CONSPIRATORIAL GROUPS OF ELEVEN, RESULTS NOT FROM AGREEMENT BUT FROM FEAR BRIZOLA WILL CAPTURE LEFT LEADERSHIP, LEAVING GOULART WITHOUT ANY POPULAR SUPPORT BASE SINCE HE NOW DESPAIRS OF SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT FROM CENTER OR RIGHT.

Referred to RMR

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4. IN EARLY DECEMBER, THEREFORE, FEELING AN URGENT NEED TO BLOCK BRIZOLA, DANTAS APPROACHED GOULART TO URGE ON HIM THAT RENEWAL OF DIALOGUE WITH CONGRESS STILL POSSIBLE ON BASIS WHICH WOULD GIVE GOULART SUBSTANTIAL LEGISLATIVE REFORM ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND MAINTAIN HIS ROLE AS POPULAR LEADER. GOULART FEARED THAT THIS WOULD MEAN TAKING ON LABEL OF CONCILIATOR AND SELLER-OUT TO REACTION, WHICH BRIZOLA COULD EXPLOIT. DANTAS COUNTERED BY SUGGESTION SECURING ADHERENCE COMMUNIST PARTY AS A SORT OF "CERTIFICATE OF LEFTNESS," WHICH WOULD MAKE BRIZOLA OPPOSITION INEFFECTUAL. GOULART DOUBTED POSSIBILITY WINNING OVER PCB, BUT AUTHORIZED DANTAS TO TRY. DANTAS THEN BEGAN NEGOTIATION WITH PRESTES, AND FOUND LATTER EQUALLY PERSUADED BOTH PERSONAL AND PROGRAMATIC ERRORS BRIZOLA. PCB, SAID DANTAS, WANTS INFILTRATION AND NOT VIOLENCE, AND FEARS OWN DESTRUCTION IN WAKE OF BREAKDOWN SOCIAL ORDER AND UNFORESEEABLE TYPE CONSEQUENT DICTATORSHIP.

5. CONCESSIONS TO PCB IN PROGRAM WERE FOUR: (A) LEGALIZATION PARTY, (B) VOTE FOR ILLITERATES AND ELIGIBILITY SERGEANTS

FOR ELECTIVE OFFICE, (C) FOREIGN EXCHANGE MONOPOLY, AND (D) COFFEE EXPORT MONOPOLY. DANTAS SUCCEEDED IN MODERATING LATTER TWO.

6. GOULART THEN ASKED DANTAS TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITY SECURING BRIZOLA'S ADHERENCE, WHICH DANTAS REFUSED TO DO PERSONALLY BUT ASKED ARRAES TO DO. ARRAES FOUND BRIZOLA INTRANSIGENTLY OPPOSED. DANTAS THEN SOUGHT OUT KUBITSCHKEK, ARGUING WITH HIM THAT HIS ESSENTIAL NEED WAS HOLDING OF ELECTIONS. QUESTION OF GOULART'S SUPPORT FOR JK WAS OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE AND COULD BE WORKED ON AT SUBSEQUENT TIME PHASE. DANTAS SAYS KUBITSCHKEK ACCEPTED AND HAS CONTINUED TO WORK WITH HIM IN EVOLUTION AND SELLING OF PROGRAM.

7. DANTAS SAID NET EFFECTS TO DATE OF THIS EFFORT HAD BEEN POSITIVE IN THREE RESPECTS: (A) BRIZOLA'S POSITION AS LEFT LEADER GREATLY WEAKENED AND GOULART NO LONGER GIVING ANY THOUGHT TO PUTTING HIM IN CABINET; (B) GOULART AGAIN ACTIVELY DIALOGUING WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS PTB AND PSD; AND (C) REAL PROSPECT SOME SORT OF LEGISLATIVE REFORM ACTION.

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8. AS TO FUTURE, HOWEVER, DANTAS DID NOT ALLEGE GREAT CONFIDENCE IN PROSPECTS IMPLEMENTATION HIS PROGRAM. WITHIN PSD ESPECIALLY, HE FORESAW, THERE WOULD BE SOME GROUPS UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO LEGALIZATION PCB AND OTHERS UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO ANY FORM AGRARIAN REFORM. HE ALSO RECOGNIZED, AND EVEN BOASTED, THAT VOTE FOR ILLITERATES WAS OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE TO GET THROUGH, SINCE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT REQUIRED, BUT DESCRIBED IT PURELY AS A PROGRAMATIC POINT FOR SECURING PCB'S SUPPORT.

9. DANTAS DID NOT TRY TO DEFEND EFFORT AGAINST MY OBSERVATIONS ON HISTORY DISASTROUS EFFORTS FOR UNITED FRONTS WITH COMMUNISTS IN WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE, DANGERS MAKING COMMUNIST INFILTRATION RESPECTABLE AND SECURING CONSTANTLY GREATER CONCESSIONS, ETC. NOR DID HE REJECT POSSIBILITIES OF GOULART TURNING TO SOME FORM OF "WHITE GOLPE" PROGRAM BACKED BY ARTIFICIAL MASS MEETINGS AND EVEN PLEBISCITE. HE ALSO AGREED THAT VOTING POWER OF FAR LEFT FAR LESS THAN NOISE CREATING POWER, BUT SAID THEIR ABILITY TO EXERT SOCIAL PRESSURES THROUGH STRIKES AND AGITATION WAS VERY LARGE COMPARED TO THEIR NUMBERS, PARTICULARLY SINCE GOULART'S DESIRE MAINTAIN POPULAR LEADERSHIP LABEL WOULD ALWAYS KEEP HIM FROM TAKING SUPPRESSIVE ACTION. NEVERTHELESS, HE FELT THAT SEVERAL MONTHS HAD BEEN GAINED AND INTENDED CONTINUE TRYING HIS BROAD FRONT LINE FOR AS MUCH ADDITIONAL TIME AS POSSIBLE. HE ENDED EXPOSITION BY SAYING HE HAD NO FEARS WHATEVER IF COUNTRY CAN BE GOT SAFELY TO ELECTIONS, BUT HAD REAL FEARS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN COMING MONTHS.

1. COMMENT: IN EMBASSY'S STRATEGIC STAFF REVIEW THIS EXPOSITION FRIDAY AFTERNOON, SOMEONE REMARKED THAT DANTAS PROGRAM CAME DOWN TO SAVING COUNTRY FROM BRIZOLA IN ORDER TURN IT OVER TO COMMUNISTS. WHILE OVERSTATED, THIS OBSERVATION TOO CLOSE TO TRUTH FOR COMFORT. WE NOW REVIEWING OVERT AND COVERT STRATEGY FOR STEPPING UP RESISTANCE TO COMMUNIST ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL INFILTRATION IN KEY SECTORS AND WILL HAVE RECOMMENDATIONS SHORTLY. GP-3. GORDON

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