

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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FM AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1083 PRIORITY
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EXDIS FOR SECRETARY AND VAUGHN

REF: DEPTTEL 744 *me*

1. I APPRECIATE COMMENTS REFTTEL. WE HAVE TAKEN LINE INDICATED IN BOTH HIGH AND MIDDLE LEVEL CONTACTS AND WILL SO CONTINUE. I AM CONCERNED, HOWEVER, AT LAST SENTENCE REFTTEL WHICH APPEARS CONSTRUCTIVE POWER CONFLICT AS ESSENTIALLY CIVIL-MILITARY IN CHARACTER. IN FACT, HARD LINE INCLUDES SOME INFLUENTIAL CIVILIANS MORE RADICAL THAN ALMOST ANY OFFICERS, AND MODERATE LINE INCLUDES A VERY LARGE SEGMENT OF OFFICER CORPS.

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MODERATION IS IN FACT TRADITIONAL BASIC STANCE OF GREAT BULK OFFICERS. ADVENTITIOUS FACTORS WE HAVE REPORTED TEMPORARILY ALTERED THIS BALANCE. ONE OF OUR PRIME CURRENT EFFORTS IS TO RESTORE IT. WE WANTED TO USE GENERAL JOHNSON'S VISIT TO THIS END.

2. MAIN PURPOSE THIS MESSAGE IS TO RAISE WITH YOU ONCE AGAIN

WHAT SEEMS TO ME THE PARADOXICAL AND COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE CONTRAST BETWEEN OUR PUBLIC AND OUR PRIVATE POSTURE ON THE CURRENT BRAZILIAN SITUATION. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, BY HOLDING TO LINE THAT SECOND INSTITUTIONAL ACT IS PURELY DOMESTIC POLITICAL AFFAIR, WE TEND TO GIVE IMPRESSION INSIDE BRAZIL, IN REST OF LA, AND IN US ITSELF THAT WE CONDONE OR EVEN APPLAUD WHAT HAS BEEN DONE. MEANWHILE WE ARE PRIVATELY TAKING A CONTRARY LINE, BUT TO BE EFFECTIVE THE WORD HAS TO BE QUITE WIDELY SPREAD. WE CANNOT EXPECT INTELLIGENT JOURNALISTS NOT TO SMELL THIS CONTRAST. I LEARNED YESTERDAY THAT NATHAN MILLER OF BALTIMORE SUN HAS COTTEN WIND OF WHAT HE CONSTRUES AS CONFLICT BETWEEN DEPARTMENT AND EMBASSY: SINCE HE HAS GRUDGE AGAINST BOTH HE IS LIKELY

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-2- 1083 NOVEMBER 9, FROM RIODEJANEIRO.

TO PLAY THIS UP IN EMBARRASSING MANNER.
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3. ESSENCE OF PUBLIC LINE I BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE TAKING IS (A) REGRET THAT GOB FELT IT NECESSARY TO ASSUME SUCH FAR-REACHING EXCEPTIONAL POWERS, (B) HOPE FOR MODERATION IN THEIR USE, (C) HOPE FOR MAINTENANCE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRAM INCLUDING STABILIZATION, DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM, AND (D) HOPE FOR PROGRESS TO CONSTITUTIONAL NORMALITY IN EARLY FUTURE.

4. IN THAT CONTEXT, PUBLIC AS WELL AS PRIVATE JUSTIFICATION FOR AID MAINTENANCE IS THAT IT CONTRIBUTES TO BOTH (C) AND (D). OUR PUBLIC STANCE ON AID AT MOMENT IS SIMPLY THAT IT CONTINUES, AGAIN GIVING IMPRESSION THAT WE FEEL NOTHING HAS HAPPENED IN BRAZIL TO OCCASION CONCERN. BUT PRIVATELY WE HAVE TAKEN DECISION TO DELAY SCHEDULE ON 1966 PROGRAM LOAN NEGOTIATING INSTRUCTION. ON THIS LATTER POINT, I BELIEVE THAT THE PREVIOUS SCHEDULE SHOULD BE REESTABLISHED PROMPTLY, FOR REASONS SET FORTH IN EMBTEL 1053.

5. WHILE BEST TIME FOR ASSUMING PUBLIC STANCE OF TYPE SUGGESTED IS NOW LONG SINCE PAST, I BELIEVE SOME SORT OF PUBLIC INDICATIONS OF THAT SORT WOULD STILL BE MOST USEFUL, PREFERABLY BEFORE YOUR DEPARTURE FOR RIO OR AT A MINIMUM IN BACKGROUND PRESS DISCUSSIONS DURING CONFERENCE.

GP-3 GORDON
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