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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
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OSD	USIA	NSA
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 17-5 BRAZ-CAN

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

1964 MAY 15 AM 8 47

INFO : Montreal
Rio de Janiero

RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : USUN

DATE: May 18, 1964

SUBJECT : Antonio Houaiss, Former Minister
Plenipotentiary in Brazilian UN Mission

REF :

Houaiss was recently transferred to the Brazilian Consulate in Montreal. We thought it might be worthwhile for USUN to compile our impressions of him, particularly in view of the mention in past biographic reports of his alleged Communist affiliations.

Houaiss was an influential, respected figure at the United Nations during his assignment which began in June 1960. During his four years here he was promoted from First Secretary, to Counsellor, to Minister Plenipotentiary. He is highly regarded by the younger officers at the Brazilian Mission.

Well-informed on UN issues, Houaiss has dealt not only with colonial and trusteeship questions and the work of the Security Council, but has also played a leading role in the work of the Working Group of Twenty-one on the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations. He appeared to play a significant advisory role to the Brazilian AMB in the SC. He was one of the few IAs who participated actively in the work of the Fourth COMITE, serving as that COMITE's rapporteur during the 16th GA. There he frequently worked to moderate Afro-Asian demands into such form that they could obtain support of the IAs and Western Europeans.

In the Working Group of 21, Houaiss took the lead among the developing countries in formulating a special scale of assessments for the financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations and displayed great technical skill in this respect. He also appeared to be fully aware of the political implications of such a scale and particularly of the legislative problem facing the United States in connection therewith.

GP-1. Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

INR/CS/BR Info noted
RM/R File TRS

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The scale which he developed was one more favorable to the United States than other members of his group -- and indeed of the developed country group -- had suggested, and it will probably serve as the basis of future negotiations on the special scale.

Houaiss has been cooperative and usually sympathetic to reasonable proposals. He is approachable, polite and forthcoming. One of the UN press corp, John McVane, who represents, among other papers, the Brazilian paper, O Globo, expressed his surprise recently that Houaiss would have received another assignment since in McVane's view Houaiss was a "known Communist". If Houaiss is a Communist we have noticed nothing in his behavior here to so indicate. An intellectual with an agile mind and fertile imagination, Houaiss is anything but dogmatic in his approach to problems. He has displayed a willingness to face each problem on its own ground and not on the basis of preconceived ideas. Last December when Oman was being debated in the Fourth COMITE, he and several African delegates held firm against Arab demands which were supported strongly by Communist nations. The Arabs were forced to compromise and accept a reasonable RES largely because of this initiative.

Houaiss is at times very critical of the Communists and says he considers himself a close follower of former President Juscelino Kubitschek whom he identifies as anti-Communist. He says he would expect to be recalled to act as an adviser if Kubitschek were ever re-elected.

Houaiss's transfer came quite suddenly after the changes in Brazil. We presume it resulted from this and no doubt because he would be presumed not to be in sympathy with the new government. To what degree he supported "neutralistic" tendencies in the last government we do not know, but we presume he may have done so.

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