

Latino Leadership in City Hall

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

In January 2011, Sabina Matos began her term as the first-ever Latino City Councilmember for Providence, Rhode Island's Ward 15.¹ Matos and her family emigrated from the Dominican Republic in 1994, and she became a citizen in 2005. After running unsuccessfully for the city council in 2006, Matos defeated opponent, Josephine DiRuzzo, a 28-year incumbent and white woman, in 2010. When asked why she was motivated to run for office, Matos explained that there was "not a connection between the person representing the ward and the people living in my neighborhood." Matos's ward, located on the western edge of Providence, is diverse, transitioning from a traditionally immigrant neighborhood of Italian-Americans to a growing community of Latinos. Even among Latinos the ward is diverse – with Matos estimating the Latino population being of roughly 40% Dominican, 30% Guatemalan, 20% Puerto Rican, and 10% Mexican and other origins. Providence's Ward 15 represents one of many areas nationwide with a growing, diverse Latino population and new Latino leadership.

The evolution and maturation of Latino communities creates new questions for urban politics in America. What role will ethnicity play in the leadership behavior of Latino city councilors, like Councilwoman Matos? How will Latino elected officials

¹ The terms Hispanic and Latino can be used interchangeably. In this dissertation, I will primarily use the term, Latino. I use the term to collectively refer to individuals in the United States of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, or other Hispanic backgrounds. In addition, I use the term Latino to refer to both genders.

develop their styles of leadership and representation as elected officials in City Hall?
What efforts will they make to connect with the Latino community? What role will
political and community factors play in shaping Latino leaders' actions?

Nationwide, the number of Latinos serving in elected office is increasing. Latinos' electoral success signifies the rapidly changing political climate of urban America. Latinos hold elected offices at all levels of government – totaling now over 5,000 Latino elected officials nationwide. In 1973, the first count of Latino officeholders found that in the six states with the largest Latino populations there were a total of 1,280 Latino officials (Lemus 1973). From 1973 to 1996 there was an increase of approximately 2,500 Latino elected officials. Additionally, over the last decade, according to National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO), there has been a 37% increase in the total number of Latinos serving in elected office – from 3,743 in 1996 to 5,129 in 2007. In 2010 there were 5,740 Latino elected officials nationwide (NALEO 2010).

Considering their virtual exclusion from government as late as the 1950s, Latinos' presence in elected office today is an astonishing achievement. Latinos now hold considerable influence in cities like Miami and San Antonio and growing influence in other cities across the country, both large and small. Although the number of Latino elected officials still lags their explosive population growth, their expanding presence indicates important changes in the electoral and political landscape. As the number of Latinos in elected office continues to expand, researchers will increasingly turn their attention to Latinos' political and leadership behavior. How will this new set of leaders

behave? What factors will shape their behavior? Scholars must understand these changes in American politics for the 21st century.

Understanding Ethnic Leadership

One of the most significant changes in contemporary American politics is the increasing number of minorities now serving in political office in the post-Civil Rights era. However, many of the theoretical models and assumptions on minority leadership behavior are based primarily on African Americans' entry into politics. It was expected that given the shared history of slavery and racial discrimination, African American elected officials should act on behalf of their community (Dawson 1994; Canon 1999; Haynie 2001; Mansbridge 1999; Tate 2003; Whitby 1997; Williams 2000). For the most part this was true. With the first election of Black mayors, like Richard Hatcher of Gary, Coleman Young of Detroit, and Maynard Jackson of Atlanta, many expected them to act as advocates to voice the concerns of the black community.

Yet, African American leaders have not always been homogenous in their leadership behaviors despite African Americans' closely linked nature as a group. As James Q. Wilson details in *Two Negro Politicians: An Interpretation* (1960), Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. (D-NY) differed significantly from Representative William Dawson (D-IL) despite the two being the only Black Congressmen until 1955. While Powell was viewed as a strong advocate for Blacks, his colleague Dawson was not seen as such. Both were Democratic Representatives in the House from majority Black districts, yet their actions as leaders differed. Wilson explains that their political leadership styles differed not because of personal, individual choices

but due to the constraints of the different local political systems and organizations supporting each of them.

Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. was elected in 1944 to represent Harlem in the U.S. House of Representatives. Prior to his election, Powell was the pastor of Abyssinian Baptist Church and a community activist. New York City's Tammany Hall machine had weakened by the 1940s so Powell built a personal base of political support through the church and other black community members. He served for 12 terms as a U.S. Representative. Powell's political role was a function of his ties in the Harlem community and at Abyssinian Baptist Church. Powell was viewed as a strong, vocal advocate for the Black community and an unapologetic crusader for civil rights. He embodied his constituents' aspirations and was expected to speak frequently and publicly about race relations and discrimination. Wilson details how Powell relied on intangible appeals to encourage support in the community.

William Dawson was elected from Chicago to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1942. Dawson joined the Democratic Party in Chicago as part of the Cook County Democratic machine. As an insider of the party organization, Dawson relied on tangible rewards of patronage and favors for political support. Unlike Powell, Wilson explains that Dawson found that rhetoric did little to advance his position. Dawson was more moderate than Powell on racial issues and shunned publicity on the issue. Dawson's leadership style was shaped by the Chicago Democratic machine, which prioritized tangible rewards in exchange for support and encouraged him to remain quieter than Powell on race issues.

Wilson contrasts Dawson and Powell to show the influence of local political systems on the styles of leadership and forms of representation available to minority politicians. For both Powell and Dawson, the political outcomes available to them as leaders of the Black community were largely limited at the time. As such, Wilson argues that the means – the political styles of the leaders – become all-important. To understand political leaders' behavior, Wilson points us to look beyond the racial or ethnic identity of the elected official or simply his or her voting record. Wilson encourages a deeper examination of the conditions that develop the politicians' representational styles as leaders.

As Latino leaders increasingly gain elected office in different cities across the U.S., there are opportunities for closer examination of their leadership and the conditions that shape it. In many cities, Latino elected officials are relatively new to office. What conditions will shape the leadership styles of new Latino elected officials, like Councilwoman Matos? Other cities have a longer history of Latino political involvement or have a broader history of minority group participation. Do Latino leaders behave differently in these cities? Some cities with Latino leaders have reform styles of government; other cities have different governing arrangements. Will the different political and community factors shape Latino elected officials' behaviors? Will Latino elected officials emerge as ethnic representatives from political systems more like Dawson's Chicago or Powell's New York? Or are the political and community conditions new or different for Latino leaders today, given some of the changes since the Civil Rights era?

Latinos in the U.S.

In 2003, Latinos passed African Americans to become the largest minority group and one of the fastest-growing groups in the country (Segura and Rodrigues 2006). There were 50.5 million Latinos residing in the United States in 2010, making up 16% of the 308.7 million U.S. residents (U.S. Census Bureau 2010).² Yet, Latinos as a group in America are diverse, both in their national origins and histories. While over half of Latinos trace their ancestry from Mexico, Latinos also come from over 20 places, including Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic, as well as other Central and South American countries (U.S. Census Bureau 2010). Among Latinos, there are other experiential differences as well - due to class status, culture, physical traits, and other factors. Given the heterogeneity of Latinos in the United States, it is unknown what influence ethnicity will have on their leaders' behaviors. It is not guaranteed that Latino elected officials will mobilize as advocates of such a diverse community.

The diversity of Latinos is compounded by the different experiences of the national origin groups, as well as differences within these groups in the United States. All groups became involved at different points in American history, like the Hispano descendants of the late 1500s in New Mexico or the Cuban refugees in Miami of the 1960s. Likewise, the conditions of the national origin groups' involvement with the United States varies, between groups and even within groups as newer immigrants continue to arrive. Will these differences in the histories of Latino communities impact the behavior of different Latino leaders?

² In addition, there are approximately 3.7 million residents of Puerto Rico, a Caribbean U.S. territory. This dissertation will not include Latino local elected officials serving in Puerto Rico.

Moreover, Latinos have increasingly settled across the country in cities with different political contexts. Since the Italian and Irish immigrants came to power in places like New York and Chicago in the 19th and early 20th centuries, cities have undergone massive changes and reforms to varying degrees. Latinos no longer primarily settle only in the southwest but now can be found in many major cities across the country. The Latino population in non-traditional destinations continues to grow. Latino communities within cities are increasingly diversifying, as Latino communities mature and new Latino immigrants arrive. How will these new communities, with their different histories, governing arrangements, and contexts, shape the actions of Latino local elected officials?

With the diversity and varied histories of Latinos in the United States, Latinos generally lack the sense of identity that African Americans share. There is debate among scholars over the concept of “Latino,” and some question the usefulness of a pan-ethnic term (Beltrán 2010). Latinos as a group lack a common historical experience to define their history and development in the United States. Traditionally scholars find that Latinos tend to self-identify based on their national origin, although this too may be changing (de la Garza et al. 1992; Oboler 1995). More recent work at the mass level is finding a more fluctuating identity of national origin and pan-ethnicity (Fraga et al. 2010).

Since Latinos generally lack the strong shared connection of African Americans, it may be surprising to find Latino elected leaders mobilized as advocates of the broader Latino community. Yet, models of minority group representation based on African Americans’ entry into politics predict their ethnicity will influence their leadership

behavior. Yet, the role that ethnicity will play in their leadership style is shaped by their local social and political contexts, like New York City for Powell and Chicago for Dawson. This presents an interesting puzzle for scholars to explore: Will local Latino leaders serve as advocates of the Latino community in their cities? If so, what conditions will shape Latinos' leadership style? What conditions may lead some Latino elected officials to act more like Representative Adam Clayton Powell and be a leader of their community? Given the diversity of Latinos, how will they define their political interests? What approach will Latino leaders take in representing Latino interests?

There is little research and agreement about the magnitude and impact of Latinos in elected office among scholars. Beyond assessing the number of Latino elected officials and the factors that impact their likelihood of being elected (e.g. Pachon and DeSipio 1992; Welch 1990; Alozie and Manganaro 1993), scholars are only recently beginning to explore these questions of leadership behavior and representation for Latino elected officials. What local conditions influence elected officials to be leaders and representatives of Latino interests? Is there agreement among the leaders over what those Latino interests might be? Is it fair to assume that Latino elected officials will parallel the path of African American elected officials? The answers to these questions are not yet clear.

Previous research on Latino elected officials has focused primarily on state legislatures and Congress (Rouse 2013; Casellas 2010; Welch and Hibbing 1985; Hero and Tolbert 1995; Kerr and Miller 1997), although there are a few studies of Latinos on school boards (Shah 2006). Most of the literature examines the conditions favorable for the election of a Latino elected official (Barreto 2010; Casellas 2010). Those looking at

the behavior of Latino elected officials typically focus on state or congressional Latino representatives and assess Latino leadership based on roll call votes or ideology and partisan scores (Hero and Tolbert 1995; Kerr and Miller 1997; Welch and Hibbing 1985; although see Geron 2005; Takash 1993). Although scholarship has examined the local conditions that may influence the election of a Latino public official, no work has paid significant attention to what role the local factors may play in influencing Latino elected officials' actions.

According to the 2010 NALEO directory, almost a third of all Latino elected officials in the United States serve as city council members or mayors. Yet, most scholarship examines only the few Latino elected officials in higher levels of office. The omission of local Latino elected officials from the scholarship is due, in part, to the difficulty of data collection across cities. Scholarship at the state and national level primarily relies on roll call votes, which cannot be replicated at the local level. Comparable roll call votes of Latino elected officials are not available across cities. As such, the existing studies of local Latino leaders are limited to analysis in single city or in a few cities. While these studies offer important insights into the dynamics of a particular city, it may be difficult to generalize patterns. More attention to a larger and more diverse array of cities and local Latino elected officials is needed.

Additionally, a focus on local Latino elected officials is needed because local politics is different than politics at the state and national level. Research illustrates the persistence of racial divisions in local politics. Local elections show stark divisions in the voting preferences of whites and Blacks. In light of the changing racial landscape of cities and their elected officials, will the racial divide extend to other groups such as

Latinos? Latino voters have demonstrated the potential for racial solidarity in mayoral races when a Latino is on the ballot. However, given the wide array of experiences among Latinos, it remains questionable whether they will form a cohesive group with articulated interests. Will race and ethnicity be salient in Latinos' expanding roles in local contests?

In urban politics, intergroup relations tend to be governed by the allocation of public services. Different features of the local context can shape the competition over a range of social, political, and economic resources. Prior work shows that this competition may develop into conflict when racial or ethnic tensions escalate in the local political arena. If racial and ethnic group divides tend to define the urban electorate, will we see strong advocates emerge as leaders for Latinos? When access to resources and leadership of the city is at stake, what leadership style will local Latino elected officials use?

Research Question

The focus of my dissertation is on Latino leadership behavior and the conditions that influence it. Specifically, I focus on the following research question: *Under what conditions do local Latino elected officials act as a voice and advocate for the Latino community?* Central to this question, I ask: do local Latino elected officials view themselves as representatives of a largely Latino community? What differences, if any, do we see between local Latino elected officials? What do they, as leaders, view as their role in representing their ethnic community? As a diverse community with weak ties, how does this vary under different conditions? What local factors influence their behaviors as elected officials?

This research speaks broadly to issues of political leadership, along with issues of political incorporation, representation, and minority politics. The dissertation aims to help us understand how local Latino elected officials relate to the local Latino community and in what way their ethnicity influences their behavior as candidates and as officeholders. My work will further develop our general understandings of elected officials' political leadership roles in representing a community.

Understanding Minority Leadership

For the first time in many American cities' history, large numbers of non-white, voluntary immigrants constitute a significant presence. Today's newcomers face the challenge of figuring out their role in American political life. However, this is hardly a new challenge for many American cities, which experienced previous waves of European immigrants, African Americans and others before. How will today's elected officials act as leaders in their cities? Will their actions in power parallel the behavior of prior groups' leaders? Drawing from research on urban politics and minority political participation, we can examine how Latino elected officials may behave in elected office, based on how prior groups took their place in American cities.

Minority groups begin their participation in politics through a process understood as political incorporation. Most scholars conceptualize incorporation as a continuum of many possible stages, typically ranging from participation in non-electoral and electoral politics to representation of group interests through elected office. The literature shows that minority groups have sought different paths towards political incorporation, with their leaders using a variety of strategies. For all groups, to achieve the goal of political incorporation, scholars explain that the political system must fully embrace the group's

members and their views and interests. The highest form of incorporation occurs when a group has an opportunity to influence government policy through group representatives committed to its groups' interests. Browning, Marshall and Tabb define full political incorporation as "the extent to which group interests are effectively represented in policy making" (Browning et al. 1984).

This literature builds from the basic idea of representative democracy. It presumes that once in elected office, group leaders promote and protect the interests of their constituents. Elected officials will act on the behalf of their groups. Typically, scholars analyze the representativeness of elected officials by describing their representation in two forms: descriptive and substantive. Descriptive representation focuses on the extent to which elected officials mirror their constituents. Scholars assessing descriptive representation look only at the characteristics of the population and the elected officials. In the cases of Representatives Powell and Dawson, both provided descriptive representation in the U.S. House of Representatives for their Black constituencies. But, descriptive representation does not take into account that their actions as House Representatives were different. The concept of descriptive representation is limited, as it does not examine any of the representatives' behaviors as an elected official.

Many of the arguments for increased descriptive representation are based on the expectation that increased descriptive representation will lead to increased substantive representation. Substantive representation is defined by Pitkin as "acting in the interests of the represented in a manner responsive to them" (Pitkin 1967). Substantive representation is typically harder for social scientists to observe and translate from empirical evidence. In order for scholars to say an elected official substantively

represents his or her constituents, there must be obvious congruence between the elected official's actions and their constituents' needs and interests. The underlying assumption is that there is a cohesive or unified group with determined group interests that an elected official ought to serve.

To understand both forms of representation, scholars primarily look at outcomes. For descriptive representation they often calculate the number of representatives from a group in comparison to the group's population. They tend to ask: what factors led to the election of a group member? For substantive representation, scholars examine how responsive a representative's actions are to the needs and demands of the constituents.

Much of the literature's assumptions and theoretical models of minority representation are based primarily on African Americans' incorporation into American political life. Given the shared history of slavery and racial discrimination that African Americans endured, it was expected that their elected officials would act on behalf of their community. Scholars such as Whitby (1997), Cannon (1999), and Haynie (2001) found a strong link between descriptive and substantive representation for African Americans elected officials representing African American interests (for an alternative view, see Swain 1993).

However, no other group in American history has faced the same levels of racial obstacles and inequalities in politics that African Americans have worked to overcome. Although historically, racial discrimination has made the incorporation process difficult for a number of minority groups in the United States, the levels of discrimination challenging African Americans may be a unique experience. As a result of this experience, Dawson (1994) argues, African Americans have a strong sense of a racially

linked fate between themselves and members of their racial group and use a “black utility heuristic” in their decision-making process. For Latinos, there are notably weaker levels of pan-ethnic group consciousness. Therefore, Latino elected leaders may not behave as advocates of the Latino community in the same way African Americans have been found to do so. The local conditions that shaped the behaviors of Black representatives may influence Latino leaders in different ways. These important differences challenge the scholarship to reexamine our expectations of how minority elected officials behave in office on behalf of their group.

Returning to the literature gives us new opportunities to explore how Latino elected officials may act based on how identities of other groups shaped the actions of their elected officials. Although most of the racial and ethnic scholarship up until recently examines the African American experience, there is an additional, older literature describing the earlier waves of European immigrants and their involvement in politics. This literature points to a different set of expectations for Latino leadership behavior, based on the pluralist model developed from the experiences of European immigrants in the early 20th century.

Robert Dahl’s classic study of New Haven politics in *Who Governs?* (1961) develops the pluralist model of politics. His work asks, “In a political system where nearly every adult may vote but where knowledge, wealth, social position, access to officials, and other resources are unequally distributed, who actually governs?” His work depicts the experiences of the waves of European immigrants to New Haven as they sought to achieve political power. Although Dahl’s answer has been subjected to numerous criticism and revision (e.g. Connolly 2005; Erie 1988; Hero 1992; Stone 1989;

Wolfinger 1965), his description of the evolution of political leaders in New Haven nonetheless remains valuable for understanding the stages through which a political leaders' behavior may evolve.

Dahl finds immigrants began to see themselves as part of a cohesive ethnic group facing similar challenges as foreigners in a new country. Similar to the mobilized identity of African Americans, immigrant groups in New Haven rallied to politics through the formation of an ethnic group identity. Dahl argues that the political incorporation of European immigrants was set in motion with the emergence of ethnic politics.

Dahl hypothesizes that the immigrant groups passed through three stages on the gradual way to assimilation. First, members of the group are "low in status, income, and influence" (1961). They primarily rely on others for leadership, but some may hold minor or limited positions. Local political parties played an important role in this process, mobilizing and socializing immigrants to the political process. Parties utilized ethnic politics to appeal to immigrants, gaining their loyalty by courting them to register to vote and fielding ethnic candidates for some positions for mostly symbolic recognition.

Dahl's pluralist model of ethnicity and politics predicts a linear process from ethnic pluralism, to acculturation, to assimilation. In the second phase of Dahl's model, the group achieves higher levels of socioeconomic status. They gain their own political influence with higher levels of office, no longer solely dependent on other incumbent or party leaders. Ethnic candidates are still able to appeal to all strata of the group members, as group members retain a strong tie to their ethnic origins. Ethnic group politics is mostly symbolic and non-reformist in nature.

In the final third stage, members of the immigrant groups are highly heterogeneous socio-economically. In this last phase, ethnic politics dissolves. Dahl writes, “To these people, ethnic politics is often embarrassing or meaningless” (1961, 35). Dahl understands ethnic group identity to be a temporary, evolving boundary in politics. Immigrants move into the middle-class and become assimilated into the larger culture. Class cleavages trump ethnic loyalty in political importance for both group members and their leaders. The assimilation process causes the importance of ethnicity in politics to wane. Over time, Dahl explains, the desire for ethnic candidates representing ethnic group demands diminishes.

However, it is not clear whether Dahl’s assessment of ethnic politics for the largely European, white immigrants of the early 20th matches the experiences of other minority groups in politics. For example, Dahl was unable to account for New Haven’s anomalous political trajectory of African Americans, who had not achieved political representation in New Haven by the 1950s, despite several generations of settlement in the city. Dahl bracketed their exceptional experience as due to a delay from racism and optimistically projected that African Americans would eventually achieve political success and representation in similar manners of the other immigrant groups of New Haven.

Dahl’s prediction for African Americans’ political incorporation failed to account seriously for the racial obstacles and inequalities faced by African Americans. While early European immigrant groups also suffered from blatant discrimination, eventually they were accepted as white and incorporated into politics and society (Ignatiev 1995; Jacobson 1998; Richards 1999; Roediger 2005). African Americans’ push for political

participation, with the Civil Rights Movement and racial upheaval of the 1960s, did not mirror the earlier immigration groups' patterns described through the pluralist model. A number of scholars detail African Americans' experiences and outline their route to political representation (Dawson 1994; Morris 1986; Pinderhughes 1987; Reed 1986; Tate 1994; Walton 1985). Together, these studies present an alternative model to pluralism for minority group representation, based on the experiences of African Americans to elect their own leaders.

Although both European immigrants and African Americans mobilized through the formation of a group identity, the development of that identity and the rest of the process for African Americans, however, bears no similarities to Dahl's pluralist account of ethnic politics. Disenfranchisement prevented African Americans from relying on many of the conventional forms of political participation and required collective action on a larger scale. Unlike the previous immigrant groups, political parties did not readily court the African American vote (Frymer 1999).

As part of their politics, African Americans tend to be more likely to challenge the established political status quo with calls for reform and redistribution (Dawson 1994; Pinderhughes 1987). Additionally, their political success did not translate into steady socioeconomic improvements for their group. Over time, group identity among African Americans does not decline, as it did among the immigrant groups Dahl observed. Pinderhughes (1987, 20) summarizes the differences in experiences between the groups: "Race unlike ethnicity is so distinct as to make the process of political integration considerably more difficult for African Americans than it was for European immigrants."

The contrast between the two groups' experiences in politics leads to the question: How will new, non-white groups develop their identity in politics? Are the early experiences of European immigrants still applicable to later groups? Cities have changed dramatically since their arrival. Is the African American experience an anomaly in United States history? For groups today, it may be that the reforms of the Civil Rights movement, such as the 1965 Voting Rights Act and other anti-discriminatory remedies, have changed the process for political incorporation so much that neither experience may fit. Moreover, new groups' leaders may differ in other important ways not yet fully understood.

As the number of Latino elected officials rapidly increases, scholars have new opportunities to explore how Latino elected officials will behave in a variety of positions nationwide. While scholarship has initially examined Latino leaders at the state and national level, I propose that research should pay closer attention to elected officials at the local level, given the rich history of scholarship on minority group politics in urban politics. For Latinos, it is not yet clear how their leaders will represent their group. Will Latino elected officials at the local level behave as Latino leaders in different cities across the country? What factors will shape their behavior as leaders? What will lead them to mobilize as a racial or ethnic leader, like Representative Powell? Do political systems and organizations like Representative Dawson's in Chicago still exist today? How will the lack of a pan-ethnic group identity impact Latino leaders?

Methodology and Data

To begin to address some of these questions, I utilize a mixed-methods approach focusing on local Latino elected officials' behavior across the country from multiple

perspectives. I begin with national focus; I collected and examined data through an original telephone and online survey of local Latino elected officials' backgrounds, contexts, beliefs, and actions. Additionally, two local-level case studies of Latino elected officials in New England rely on qualitative research to provide additional context to the national findings and provide a perspective on Latino leadership from the eyes of the community.

This dissertation looks at the local level of Latino elected officials to capture more of the diversity in the Latino experience. Since there is no data for roll call voting at the local level, and there are questions in the literature regarding what a Latino interest might look like, I approach individual Latino local elected officials themselves to assess their commonalities and differences. The results from the survey look at three categories of variables: political context, community context, and individual traits to see if they may affect when or how a Latino local elected official mobilizes as an ethnic representative. The national perspective of different Latino local elected officials is complemented by case studies of Providence, Rhode Island and Hartford, Connecticut to provide more detail to the political and community variables that may influence a leader's behavior and an alternative perspective on Latino interest and leadership by the community members. Together the data will look at what conditions influence Latino local elected officials to mobilize as ethnic representatives.

Overview of the Dissertation

In Chapter One, I have outlined the minority representation and leadership behavior literature and established my research question and agenda. Under what conditions will Latino local elected officials serve as representatives for their

community? Will their leaders' behaviors and actions look similar to any of the prior groups that have sought entry into city politics?

In Chapter Two, I discuss the Latino political experience in the United States and using data from my national survey of Latino local elected officials, I describe the current status of Latino elected officials. I examine more closely the construction of a Latino identity among a diverse population. I detail the methodology of my original national survey. Using data from the survey, I present descriptive statistics of the cities of the Latino local elected officials who participated.

In Chapter Three, I further examine the results from my national survey of Latino local elected officials. I present a demographic profile of the survey participants. I examine findings such as their prior involvements in community activities and experiences of discrimination. I inspect what factors shape their pan-ethnic identity and sense of linked fate. I also assess what shapes their campaign activities and outreach for Latinos.

In Chapter Four, I present results from my national survey regarding the Latino local elected officials' policy positions and policy actions. I examine a series of policy positions relating to local immigration concerns, a topic considered to be a top issue for Latinos. I also report Latino local elected officials' policy concerns for their local Latino communities and their top three policy issues they have worked on as public servants.

In Chapters Five and Six, I detail the two case studies I completed in Providence, Rhode Island and Hartford, Connecticut. In the two cities, I consider the history of the Latino communities and their participation in politics. I present findings from interviews

with local community leaders and journalists regarding the top policy issues for Latinos in their community and their views on local Latino leaders.

In Chapter Seven, I conclude with a comparison of the Latino mayors of Providence and Hartford. I end with an assessment of my findings from the case studies and national survey.

CHAPTER TWO

Latino Groups and Latino Leaders

Latinos are one of the fastest-growing groups and now the largest minority group in the United States.³ The Latino population grew from 14.6 million in 1980 to 22.4 million in 1990 and to 35.3 million in 2000.⁴ At the turn of the century, Latinos passed African Americans to become the largest minority group in America, making up 12.5% of the U.S. population. In the 21st century, the Latino population continues to rapidly expand. The Latino population grew 43% in the last decade, accounting for more than half of the total U.S. population growth. By 2010, 50.5 million Latinos resided in the United States.⁵

Estimates project between 25 to 30% of the United States' population will be of Latino descent by the year 2050. Their growth is fueled both by high birthrates among Latinos in the country and continued immigration from Latin America, South America, and the Caribbean. Their explosive growth over the last three decades has led to an increasing curiosity about what this may mean for American politics. Speculation frequently arises over whether Latinos will coalesce as a group and exert clout in the

³ Unless otherwise specified, all demographic data from this chapter comes from the decennial census conducted by the United States Census Bureau.

⁴ The growth rate and prediction may even be higher as the data may undercount the Latino population, as some Latinos are non-citizens who may wish to avoid contact with government officials.

⁵ In addition, there are approximately 3.7 million residents of Puerto Rico, a Caribbean U.S. territory.

American political system. One result of their growth is already evident: more Latinos serve in elected office than ever before.

In this chapter, I discuss Latinos' experiences across the United States and Latinos serving in local elected office in cities nationwide. I begin by broadly examining the formation of Latinos as a group in American politics. Next, I begin constructing a better understanding of Latino elected officials at the local level from data created through a national directory and original survey of Latino local elected officials. The increasingly complex, multi-ethnic political context of Latino leadership provides opportunities for new perspectives on long-standing racial and ethnic questions of American politics. I detail my research design and methodology and present descriptive statistics of the cities in which Latinos in local elected office serve.

Latino Demographics

Who are Latinos in the United States? Latinos are now 16.3% of the total U.S. population. The largest contributor of the dynamic Latino population growth is an increase of Latinos born in the United States, rather than the arrival of new immigrants. With a median age of 27 (compared to the national average of 37 years old), according to the 2008 – 2010 American Community Survey, Latinos are young. Thirty-four percent of Latinos are under age 18, compared to only 20% of white, non-Hispanics. Native-born Latinos make up 62.5% of the total Latino population. Of foreign-born Latinos, approximately 25% are U.S. citizens. While the population growth in the 1980s and 1990s was driven mostly by immigration, the trend of a growing U.S.-born Latino population is expected to continue.

Counting the Latino Population

The U.S. government began counting segments of the Latino population in 1930 when the Census Bureau reported 1.4 million people of Mexican ancestry. However, it was not until the 1970s that the Census began counting Latinos systematically. The 1970 long-form Census identified 9.1 million persons of Spanish origin. In 1976, Congress passed Public Law 93-311, which mandated the use of a self-identified question for individuals of Spanish origin on censuses and surveys.⁶ Since 1980, the Census counts Latinos through self-identification.⁷ The Census asks individuals to respond whether they are Hispanic or not and if they are, to indicate their family's country of origin. Figure 2.1 is a reproduction of the 2010 Census question on Hispanic origin.

Insert Figure 2.1 about here

Latinos in America trace their family heritage to a number of different countries in Latin America, South America and the Caribbean (see Table 2.1). According to 2010 Census figures, 63% of Latinos are of Mexican ethnic origin, representing 31.8 million people and growing 54% from 2000. Approximately 9.2% of Latinos are Puerto Rican, increasing 36% from 3.4 million in 2000 to 4.6 million in 2010. The Cuban population is 3.5% of all Latinos and grew 44%, from 1.2 million to 1.8 million. Also, 2.8% of Latinos, or 1.4 million are Dominican. These four groups together account for about 75% of the Latino population in the U.S. Sizeable segments of the Latino population also traced their ancestry to a range of other countries across Central America (7.9%) and South America

⁶ Public Law 94-311 remains the only law in the history of the United States that requires the enumeration of a specific ethnic group (for a more detailed description and discussion of the evolution of Census measures of race and ethnicity, see Nobles 2000; Skerry 2000; Snipp 2003).

⁷ There have been slight changes to the wording and ordering of the Hispanic question on the Census form between 1980 and 2010.

(5.5%). Of the other Central American Latinos, those of Salvadoran origin are the largest group at 1.6 million, followed by Guatemalans (1.0 million) and Hondurans (633,000). Among the South American Latino population, those of Colombian origin are the largest group at 909,000, followed by Ecuadorians at 565,000, and Peruvians at 531,000. The latest Census numbers reveals the variety within the Latino population by national origin groups.

Insert Table 2.1 about here

Diversity of Latinos

The diversity of Latinos is compounded by the different experiences of each of the national origin groups. There is not a single entry point into the United States political system that defines Latinos' history. Some Latinos trace their heritage to the end of the Mexican-American War in 1848 with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (Barrera 1979; Gutiérrez 1995). Others of Mexican heritage date their family ancestry back further, such as the Hispano descendants of the late 1500s in New Mexico. More recent Mexican immigration began with the Bracero labor program of the 1940s and continued after the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. (Massey et al. 2003). In the last four decades, 12 million immigrants came to the United States from Mexico (Passel et al. 2012). The U.S. involvement with Mexico and its border is long-standing and complicated (for a discussion of the implications of these complications, see Smith 2011).

Puerto Ricans and Cubans largely arrived in the United States beginning in the 20th century. Latinos from Puerto Rico have been linked to America since the Spanish American War at the end of the 19th century. Puerto Rico is now considered a commonwealth of the United States, and Puerto Ricans enjoy U.S. citizenship status.

Since the 1917 Jones Act, thousands have migrated from the island to New York City and other mainland cities (Fitzpatrick 1971; Rivera-Batiz and Santiago 1997; Rodríguez 1991; Sánchez Korrol 1994). For Cuban Americans, the oppression of the Batista dictatorship and rise of Fidel Castro were the impetus for many to flee Cuba for the United States. Cubans arriving later chose to emigrate as part of the freedom flights in the 1960s and 1970s and the Mariel boatlift beginning in 1980 (Thomas 1998; Garcia 1996).

Other national origin groups did not begin arriving in significant numbers to the United States until more recently, as immigration dramatically increased as a result of the 1965 immigration reform. The U.S. Latino population now arrives in the United States from twenty different countries. Since 2000, the Dominican population in the United States has grown nearly 85%; likewise, the Guatemalan population increased considerably by 180% between 2000 and 2010. During the 1980s and 1990s, civil wars and civil strife forced many people from El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala to seek refuge in the United States (Zolberg et al. 1989; Coutin 2000; Hamilton and Chinchilla 2001).

The different historical experiences of the national origin groups reflect the variety of conditions of the groups' involvement with the United States. Many members of the different national origin groups migrated to the U.S. for various reasons. Some came for jobs or economic opportunities in the states; others arrived to escape civil unrest and violence in their own countries. Certain Latinos arrived with citizenship or protected status, but some crossed the border without any promise of citizenship. While some Latinos came to the U.S., others argue that the U.S. came to them with the expanding U.S. border. In addition, many Latinos were born in the U.S. with families who have

multiple generations of American citizens.

Among Latinos more broadly, there are important experiential differences as well, due to continuing migration and generation status, class status, education level, gender, language skills, sexual orientation, and other factors. For example, education levels differ greatly between native-born and foreign-born Latinos. While half of native-born Latinos have completed an associate's or bachelor's degree, only a quarter of foreign-born Latinos have such a degree (Motel 2012). Spanish proficiency also varies among the different generations of Latinos. More than 90% of foreign-born Latinos can speak and read in Spanish, but less than half of third-generation Latinos can speak Spanish proficiently (Taylor et al. 2012). Important differences may also occur among individuals who trace their heritage to the same country. For example, Cubans who entered the U.S. in 1980 were much poorer and less educated compared to the first Cuban exiles who were mostly well-educated, middle-class, and professional (Calderón 1992). As Suarez-Orozco and Paez (2002) note, "The Latino population is a highly heterogeneous population that defies easy generalizations."

Where Latinos Live

Insert Table 2.2 about here

Changes are also occurring in where Latinos choose to live in the United States. Most Latinos live in states with large, long-established Latino communities. Those of Mexican descent live mostly in the Southwest, in California, Texas, and Arizona. Cubans primarily reside in Florida, with smaller numbers living in New Jersey and California. Puerto Ricans tend to live in New York, Florida, and New Jersey. However, since 1990 the concentration of Latinos in these states has declined. Seventy-six percent of all

Latinos now live in nine states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, New Mexico, New Jersey, New York and Texas (see Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2). The same nine states were home to 81% of Latinos in 2000 and 86% of Latinos in 1990.

Insert Figure 2.2 about here

Latinos' presence is growing throughout the United States and expanding beyond traditional Latino destinations. The 2010 Census reports that 41% of Latinos lived in the West; 36% in the South; 14% in the Northeast and 9% in the Midwest. The Latino population grew in all regions of the United States between 2000 and 2010, with some of the highest growth rates in the South. In the last decade, the Latino population more than doubled in many southeastern states, a new destination for many Latino immigrants (Marrow 2011). The Latino population in South Carolina, for example, increased 148%, from 95,000 in 2000 to 236,000 in 2010. Key swing states, such as Colorado, Nevada, and Virginia, now have a sizeable population of Latinos. A third of all states (17) have at least a half-million Latino residents, and in over half of the states (27) Latinos are now the largest minority group.

At the national level, Latinos are the majority of the population in 82 of the 3,143 counties in the United States, up from the 50 counties where they were the majority in 2000. Many counties with major metropolitan areas have a large number of Latinos, such as in Los Angeles County (4.7 million Latinos) and Miami-Dade County (1.6 million Latinos). Latinos' share of the population exceeded the national population average of 16% in 429 counties (14% of all counties) in the 2010 Census. Three counties in Texas – Maverick, Starr, and Webb – have the largest percentage of Latinos with 95.7%. In 912 counties (30%), the Latinos population doubled in size from 2000 to 2010.

Large metropolitan areas have traditionally been the receivers of minorities in the United States, beginning with the earlier waves of European immigrants and continuing with African American migration to northern cities. Like other immigrants who came to America in the past, Latinos live in many U.S. cities. In 2010, 47% of the nation's Latinos lived in 10 metropolitan areas (see Table 2.3). Nine of these metropolitan areas had over a million Latinos.

Insert Table 2.3 about here

In most metropolitan areas Latinos have a sizable presence. Latinos comprise more than 10% of the population in 49 of the 100 largest metropolitan areas. Latinos now outnumber African-Americans in 191 of the 366 metropolitan population centers in the nation, up from 159 metropolitan areas in 2000. Now Latinos are the largest minority group in metropolitan areas like Chicago, Grand Rapids, and Atlantic City. The Latino population growth is growing in many metropolitan areas; between 2000 and 2010, Latinos doubled in population in 107 metropolitan areas.

Insert Figure 2.3 about here

Latinos in different metropolitan areas trace their heritage to a number of countries. While Mexicans are the dominant Latino national-origin group overall in the United States, in some of the metropolitan areas Mexicans are not the largest group. Mexicans are over half of the Latino population in only 62 of the top 100 metropolitan areas. As Figure 2.3 shows, most Latinos in major cities live with other Latinos of multiple national origin groups. Even in cities where Latinos with Mexican heritage are the largest group, a sizeable number of other Latinos with different heritages exist.

Latinos and Group Identity

Given the diverse experiences of Latinos across the United States, some scholars question the concept of a “Latino” group (e.g. Beltrán 2010). The terms “Hispanic” and “Latino” are socially constructed in the United States and Latino immigrants arriving from different countries may feel little in common with each other or those already in the U.S. (Padilla 1985; Jones-Correa and Leal 1996). Unlike African Americans whose linked fate is based on their shared history of slavery and racism (Dawson 1994), it is questionable whether Latinos have a common or shared culture or history to construct a group identity (Schmidt et al. 2000). The lack of a cohesive identity may make it difficult for a clear Latino political agenda to emerge.

Despite ancestry rooted in more than 20 countries, there are characteristics Latinos share that may provide a basis for a common identity – such as the Spanish colonial influence in their home countries and overlapping cultural bonds of language and religion. The Spanish empire in Latin America, the Caribbean, and the southwestern U.S. left a lasting legacy of colonialism and oppression for descendants of these areas. The history of domination, struggle and liberation could create an underlying psychological attitude for Latinos similar to the enduring American ethos that emerged from the Revolutionary War (Barreto 2010) or the experiences of African Americans as a result of the legacies of slavery (Dawson 1994).

The Spanish influence in the area also provides a majority of Latinos with a common cultural heritage based on linguistic and religious ties (Garcia 1997, 2011). While not all Latinos are completely fluent in Spanish, particular those in later generations, a recent report from a Pew Hispanic Center survey shows that 82% of Latino

adults speak Spanish. Moreover, almost all (95%) believe it is important for future generations of Latinos to continue to speak Spanish as well (Taylor et al. 2012). Also, many Latinos share a common religious tradition – more than two-thirds are Roman Catholics (Suro et al. 2007). These shared traits may serve as a foundation on which some believe that Latinos can build a communal identity.

Traditionally, scholars find that Latinos tend to identify primarily based on their national origin (de la Garza et al. 1992; DeSipio 1996; Oboler 1995). The 1989 Latino National Political Survey, the first nationally representative, large survey of Latinos in the United States, found that only one in five Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans felt culturally similar to other Latinos, and even less felt similar politically (de la Garza et al. 1992). The Latino National Political Survey revealed that the three main groups overwhelmingly preferred to identify first on the basis of their national origin. A pan-ethnic identity was second and a somewhat elastic identity – found to be not a core identity but an addendum (Jones-Correa and Leal 1996; see also Padilla 1985; Itzigsohn and Dore-Cabral 2000). Latinos mostly relied on their families’ national origin heritage for their ethnic identity.

Evolving Identity

The nature of identity among Latinos may be changing, however. A more recent national survey of U.S. Latinos, the Latino National Survey (LNS) fielded in 2006, shows Latinos choose to identify themselves in various ways beyond their national origin. Latinos were asked if they identify with their country of origin as well as “Hispanic or Latino,” and as “American.” The survey reveals that Latinos today exhibit much higher levels of pan-ethnicity than in the 1989 Latino National Political Survey (see Figure 2.4).

Scholars examining LNS results show that the process of accepting a pan-ethnic identity may differ by group and experience; for example, Cubans are the least likely to identify with a pan-ethnic label (Silber-Mohammed 2012; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010). Overall, Latinos respondents were more likely to accept pan-ethnic labels, suggesting that Latino identity is changing.

Insert Figure 2.4 about here

The evolution of a Latino identity over the past 20 years could be due to any number of factors. The trend towards both a pan-ethnic and American identity may indicate a larger process of cultural assimilation for Latinos. Assimilation scholarship, developed from the experiences of European immigrants, predicts the demise of ethnic identities as group members overcome discriminatory barriers and become incorporated into the main society through changes in socioeconomic status (Dahl 1961; Gordon 1964). Despite worries by some that Latinos will remain culturally and linguistically isolated in the U.S. (Huntington 2004), trends indicate Latinos are becoming incorporated in American life and values (de la Garza et al. 1996).

The construction of Latino group identity takes place within the larger, racial context of the United States. The path that Latinos must navigate is largely shaped by the political experiences of both previous immigrant groups and African Americans. As members of a large immigrant group and as members of a minority group, how Latinos will fit into the American political experience is still not clear. As an immigrant group, Latinos face a struggle between striving to assimilate into the mainstream while seeking to maintain some of their culture and ties to their home countries (Jones-Correa 1998). The experience of discrimination among Latinos may be an additional hurdle in their

assimilation process, leading the general Latino population to be less likely to adopt an American identity (Golash-Boza 2006; Schildkraut 2005). The process of assimilation and its consequences for identity for Latinos may likely be different than the earlier experiences of immigrants (Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Alba and Nee 2003).

Race and Ethnicity for Latinos

Insert Figure 2.5 about here

The established “White” and “Black” racial constructs in the U.S. do not suggest an obvious place for Latinos to fit into (Omi and Winant 1994). Due to different phenotypes and racial histories of the Caribbean, Latin American and South American countries, Latinos may identify as white, Black, Native American, or something other. According to the Census, Latinos can be of any race (see Figure 2.5).⁸ When asked to self-identify racially, the plurality of Latinos have chosen white over the last three decades. Latinos may be following the path of previous immigrant groups who over time came to be considered as white Americans and a part of mainstream America (Jacobson 1998; Ignatiev 1995; Roediger 2005; Warren and Twine 1997; Yancey 2003). As the American racial order evolves, Latinos may adapt by choosing not to identify as white or Black, but as a new and meaningful category themselves (Bonilla-Silva 2004; Duany 2005; Segura and Rodrigues 2006; Stokes-Brown 2012; Hochschild et al. 2012).

⁸ In 1980 and 1990 Censuses, a respondent first chose a racial category, then declared if he or she were Hispanic, in addition to the chosen racial category. In 2000, the Hispanic question came first and changed the instruction wording adding the term “Latino” and also allowed for individuals to select one or more race categories (see Masuoka 2011; Williams 2008). The 2010 Census added, “For this census, Hispanic origins are not races” to clarify the differences between the racial category question and Hispanic question.

Facing bias and limited socioeconomic and political mobility, Latinos may choose to instead view themselves as part of a racialized minority (e.g. Skrentny 2002). Similar to other minority groups, some Latinos have endured up to two centuries of discrimination, neglect, and exclusion in the United States. However, with the diversity of the Latino population, these experiences may not affect all Latinos equally. Most Latinos face serious hurdles in the assimilation process and lack the opportunities that previous immigrant groups benefitted from. For example, Latinos continue to have lower median household incomes (\$40,914) than whites (\$55,747) and similarly, a higher poverty rate (23.32%) than whites (9.96%). The unemployment rate for Latinos (11.5% in 2011) is significantly higher than the unemployment rate of whites (7.9) ("The Latino Labor Force in the Recovery" 2012). Also, Latinos are now more likely to be living in highly segregated cities, concentrated in disadvantaged neighborhoods (Timberlake and Iceland 2007). Residential segregation of Latinos may indirectly depress the political participation of Latinos (Pearson-Merkowitz 2012; Rocha and Espino 2010).

Latino elites may be able to influence Latinos' participation in U.S. politics. Like the general population, Latino elites and organizations also differ widely, particularly in terms of the political agendas and identities (Marquez 2003). Many of the major Latino policy research and advocacy organizations, such as the League of United Latin American Citizens, the National Council of La Raza and the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials, work to organize on issues that unite the Latino communities and to speak with a pan-ethnic voice (Marquez 2003; DeSipio 2006).⁹ Contentious debate over immigration policy mobilize Latino leaders and activists to work

⁹ The exception is the Cuban American National Foundation, which has prioritized issues of importance to those primarily of Cuban background (DeSipio 2006).

to unite the Latino community (Silber-Mohammed 2012; Barreto et al. 2009). Elites may also draw on their shared identity to mobilize Latinos to become involved in politics (Abrajano 2010; Baik et al. 2009; Barreto 2007, 2010; Leighley 2001; McConaughy et al. 2010; Nuño 2007; Padilla 1985). Latino elites likely play an important role in shaping Latino politics and establishing a Latino political agenda.

Research Design

Drawing on the literature of Chapter One and Chapter Two, this study hypothesizes that there are three categories of variables that influence whether a Latino local elected official may mobilize as an ethnic representative: their political context, community environment and individual traits. As Wilson argues in his examination of African American leaders, Adam Clayton Powell and William Dawson, the local community and political characteristics of New York City and Chicago shaped both of their leadership styles as Black leaders. Similarly, Dahl assesses the evolution of immigrant leaders' ethnic behavior to be a function of the changes in the immigrant community's traits. Likewise, I expect local Latino elected officials' behavior as ethnic representatives to be conditioned by their backgrounds, communities and political institutions.

In Table 2.4, I detail the list of conditions I expect to influence the role that ethnicity plays in the leadership behavior of Latino local elected officials.¹⁰ Given some of the unique circumstances of Latinos I detailed previously in the chapter, these conditions may shape the ethnic leadership behavior of Latinos in different ways than it did for African American and other immigrant group leaders. I describe the personal,

¹⁰ This list is not to be considered the exhaustive list of all factors influencing leadership behavior.

political and communal factors and my expectations in greater detail later in this chapter and in the following two chapters.

Insert Table 2.4 about here

To explore whether Latinos are acting as ethnic representatives when elected to office, I look primarily at three areas of evidence of ethnic leadership: their campaign activities, beliefs about leaders and behavior as representatives. I explore local Latino elected officials' ethnic leadership from two original sets of data. In Chapter Three and Chapter Four I present results from a national survey of 129 Latino local elected officials. Chapter Five and Chapter Six supplement the survey research with analysis from community interviews in two case studies in the New England region – Providence, Rhode Island and Hartford, Connecticut. The two cities have different Latino demographics and have experienced varying degrees of Latino leadership over time. The case study methodology is outlined in Chapter Five. The remainder of this chapter explores the construction of the national directory and survey of Latino local elected officials. I present descriptive statistics on the cities Latino local elected officials serve to determine the representativeness of the survey's population and to begin exploring the different political and community traits that may influence local Latino elected officials' leadership behavior.

National Directory and Survey

In order to fill a gap in the existing literature, I constructed a new dataset on Latino local elected officials built from telephone and online surveys conducted with Latino elected officials at the local level nationwide. The national survey allows a number of foundation questions to be answered on the nature of local Latino leaders. For

example, does the Latino elected official population mirror the heterogeneity of the general Latino population in the United States? In what kinds of communities do they serve? How long have Latino leaders been in office? How many Latinas serve in office? The survey also explores more substantive questions concerning Latino leadership behavior. Do Latino local elected officials have a sense of linked fate between themselves and other Latinos? Do their campaigns specifically target Latino voters? Do they support policies that the broader Latino community supports? I describe the survey in greater detail in the remainder of this chapter and use the survey to explore questions of identity and representation in Chapters Three and Four.

The survey instrument was designed to cover a broad range of information, given the lack of prior research on local Latino elected officials. To develop questions, I relied heavily on previous scholars' survey and interview questions on the general Latino population and minority elected officials. I included survey questions from the Gender and Multicultural Leadership Survey (Sierra et al. 2007) and the Latino National Survey (Fraga et al. 2006). I also modified questions from two sets of in-person interview questions with Latino local elected officials (Casellas 2010; Rouse 2013).

Directory

The directory of Latino local elected officials is drawn primarily from National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO) Educational Fund's 2010 directory. Annually, NALEO publishes a comprehensive list of Latino elected officials throughout the United States in different levels of office. This directory is generally released during the summer of the directory year (i.e. the 2010 directory was released in the summer of 2010). NALEO's directory contains only those officials who

were in office as of January of the directory year. NALEO's directory includes contact information, with the mail addresses, telephone numbers, and e-mail addresses (when available) of Latino officials. Previous scholars have relied on NALEO's directory to provide counts of Latino elected officials and to compile similar contact lists (e.g. Casellas 2010; Shah 2006).

Insert Table 2.5 about here

According to the 2010 NALEO directory, there were 5,739 Latino officials at various levels of government – from members of the U.S. Congress to members of local Water District Boards (see Table 2.5). The directory sorts officials by seven layers of office: Federal Representatives, State Officials, County Officials, Municipal Officials, Judicial/Law Enforcement Officials, School Board Members, and Special District Officials. At the directory municipal office level, there were 1,707 Latino officials. Approximately 30% of all Latino local elected officials serve in municipal positions, the second largest position of office (behind school board members). This level of office included Latino officials in the positions of Mayor and Councilmember, as well as positions such as Clerk and Treasurer. Since cities maintain different styles of local government and use different titles for their local elected officials, I defined individuals as “local Latino elected officials” from the NALEO database with the following titles: Alderman/Alderwoman, Board Member, City Commissioner, City Representative, Councilmember, Councilor, Mayor, Mayor Pro-Tem, Trustee, and Vice-Mayor.¹¹ Using

¹¹ I also included in the local Latino elected officials directory any officials from consolidated City-County governments. San Francisco is the only city with such a type of government, which has Latino elected officials. NALEO lists San Francisco separately under County Officials. I included the two Latino Board of Supervisors serving in office in 2011 in my directory.

these titles, the directory contains 1,660 Latino officials. There are 250 Mayors, 121 Mayor Pro-Tem, 37 Vice Mayors, and 1,252 Councilmembers.¹²

These 1,660 Councilmembers and Mayors govern in cities of all sizes: from Los Ybañez, Texas, with a population of 32 to New York City, with a population of 8,391,881. Since cities of such different sizes face different types of issues and concerns, I added population data from the 2010 U.S. Census to control for size of the cities. I limited the directory to Latino local elected officials in cities of 50,000 or more.¹³ From the directory, there were 361 Latino local elected officials in cities with a general population of 50,000 or more, which represents 22% of local Latino elected officials.

I confirmed each elected official in the beginning of 2011 (ending March 1, 2011) to review NALEO's directory and to identify any changes from those who were reported in the 2010 directory. Through verification of city websites, phone calls to city halls, and e-mails to elected officials themselves, 53 individuals were eliminated from the dataset because that they were no longer in office or they were not of Latino or Hispanic background and mistakenly included in the directory. During this process, I also identified 53 individuals to add to the directory. The majority of these individuals succeeded the previous elected official who was listed in NALEO's 2010 directory or were newly elected in a city that already had at least one Latino local elected official.

To include additional Latino local elected officials who may have been missed by NALEO's count, I also checked all cities in the United States with a population of 50,000

¹² From here on, I use the terms Latino local elected officials, Latino elected officials, Latino representatives, or Latino Councilmembers and Mayors, to simplify discussion.

¹³ From here on, I use the term city to refer to any city with a general population of 50,000 or more, as according to the 2010 Census. Future research should explore the smaller cities and towns with a population of less than 50,000 that have Latino local elected officials. It is beyond the scope of this project, however.

or more that had a Latino population of at least 25%. According to the 2010 Census, there are 230 cities in the United States with a Latino population of 25% or more.¹⁴ Through verification by city websites, phone calls to city halls, local media accounts, and e-mails to elected officials themselves, I added 33 additional individuals from 27 cities to the directory. This created a final March 2011 directory of 394 Latino local elected officials.

I reviewed the directory again in the beginning of 2012, to account for any changes in elected officials between March 2011 and January 2012. I used the same method for verifying the directory as the March 2011 verification. Through this I identified 36 elected officials who were no longer in office. Of the 36 no longer in office, 21 were replaced by another Latino elected official. A total of 17 Latino local elected officials were elected to new positions. Nine cities that already had at least one Latino in the directory gained another Latino in an elected position. Eight officials were elected in cities that did not previously have a Latino elected official in the March 2011 directory. As of January 20, 2012, the directory included 396 Latino local elected officials.

Method of Contact

Due to the small number of Latino local elected officials, I contacted the entire population to survey, without any sampling. From April 2011 through April 2012, I conducted telephone and online surveys with Latino local elected officials from the directory. A pilot survey was administered to the first 10 respondents drawn from the population of Latino local elected officials serving in cities with a population of 76,000

¹⁴ Lorain, Ohio with a Latino population of 25.2% to Huntington Park, California with a Latino population of 97.1%.

or less.¹⁵ I personally conducted all telephone surveys with the participants. If the elected officials or their staff indicated that they would only participate via online, an online survey, which was a mirror copy of the telephone survey, was provided to the participant to complete online via an online survey platform.

Elected officials were contacted by e-mail first and then by telephone and asked to participate. Elected officials, with e-mail contact information found either through the NALEO directory or online through their city websites, were sent an e-mail introducing the research project and myself.¹⁶ The e-mail invited them to contact me by phone or e-mail to participate. A follow up e-mail was sent to the Latino local elected officials. Elected officials were contacted by telephone a total of three times. I used phone numbers found either through the NALEO directory, online through cities' websites, through social media contacts or from numbers provided by individuals at city hall. A series of two final e-mails with an online link to the survey were completed in March 2012.

Latino local elected officials completed 129 surveys, which was a response rate of 32.7% from the original directory of 394 Latino local elected officials. Only eight respondents refused to participate. The primary reason given for refusal was that the elected official was too busy to complete the survey. The majority of Latino elected officials who did not participate did not respond via e-mail or telephone. Ninety-one elected officials participated in the survey by telephone. Thirty-eight of the participants, or approximately 30% of participants, opted to take the survey online. The average

¹⁵ Due to the limited number of Latino local elected officials, I include some data collected from the pilot survey. The pilot survey included the majority of questions in the final survey. A copy of the pilot survey is available by request to the author.

¹⁶ In some cases, individual city council member's e-mail addresses were not available, but a central e-mail address for the city clerk or city assistant was listed and used instead.

survey length for online was approximately 25 minutes and by phone was approximately 30 minutes.

Where Latino Local Elected Officials Serve

As of March 2011, 178 cities have at least one Latino elected official.¹⁷ The 394 Latino local elected officials serve in cities of various sizes, populations, and characteristics. In this section, I describe the demographic details of the different cities represented by Latino local elected officials, looking both at community and political traits. I compare Latino local elected officials from the directory to the 129 survey respondents. I provide descriptive statistics of the cities and states in which they serve in office, looking at their geographic location, city size, council features and population demographics. In following chapters, I examine whether these traits influence their behavior as ethnic leaders.

According to the 2010 Census, 705 cities in the United States have a general population of 50,000 or more – Hoboken, New Jersey with a population of 50,005 to New York City with a population of 8,175,133. Latinos are mostly urban dwellers. Although recently many small towns have seen an increase in the number of Latino immigrants (Lay 2012; Marrow 2011), Latinos generally live in cities. The average Latino population for U.S. cities is 22%, compared to the overall national average of 16%.

¹⁷ Three cities lost their single Latino representative by January 2012. Eight cities gained a single Latino elected official by January 2012. Discussion of cities and demographic data in this section pertains to the original directory, completed March 2011.

Population Traits of Cities with Latino Leaders

The Latino population in most cities in the United States is still relatively small. Thirty-seven percent of cities have a Latino population of less than 10%, and Latinos are the majority of the population in only 72 cities nationwide. Latino local elected officials serve in 178 cities – a quarter of all U.S. cities. The cities with a Latino local elected official have a higher Latino population average (45%) compared to the 527 cities without a Latino elected official, which have an average Latino population of 14%.

Insert Table 2.6 about here

Cities with a larger general Latino population are more likely to have a Latino representative. As Table 2.6 shows, 186 cities have a Latino population of 30% or more, a threshold population some may expect as necessary for a group to achieve representation.¹⁸ In 133 of those cities (72%), there is at least one Latino elected official. However, 53 cities have a Latino population of 30% or more and do not currently have a Latino representative in local government.¹⁹ In 11 cities, the Latino population exceeds half of the city's population, and yet, there is not a Latino local elected official in office.²⁰

¹⁸ This demographic percentage is dependent on the type of elections cities hold – that is, whether the election of their Mayor and Council are at-large or ward/district based. A city with a lower overall percentage of Latinos may have ward or district elections and thus may have a larger percentage of Latinos concentrated in an area. Unfortunately, city's ward or district lines do not consistently match Census boundaries to allow for analysis in this project.

¹⁹ The lagging representation of Latinos in cities may be due to the nature of the general Latino population. The population count includes those who are usually ineligible to vote in local election, such as those under the age of 18 or those who are non-naturalized immigrants. Much of Latino growth in population in the last decade is due to high immigration rates and birth rates. Using the Voting Age Population by Citizenship and Race (CVAP), in the 178 cities with Latino representation, Latinos average 33.1% of the cities' population, lowered from the Latino population average of 45.5%.

²⁰ Two of these cities had a Latino elected official in office by January 2012.

Ten of these 11 cities without Latino representation are in California, with three in Central California and seven in Southern California, and the final city is in Texas.

Insert Table 2.7 about here

Latino local elected officials serve in cities that vary in population, although most are elected in small to medium-size cities as Table 2.7 shows. Does the size of the city matter for Latino leaders' behavior? For example, Latinos in smaller cities may face different issues; do their leaders to report different policy concerns? Sixty-one percent of all Latino local elected officials serve in cities of 150,000 or less, such as Colton or Las Cruces. At the other end of the spectrum, 20% of all Latino local elected officials serve in large cities over 300,000. These cities include some of the major metropolitan areas in the U.S., such as New York City, Houston, Miami and Los Angeles. The cities of survey respondents likewise range in population size from small to large cities. Sixty-five percent of survey respondents serve in small to medium-size cities; and 20% of survey respondents serve in large cities whose population is over 300,000.

Regional Traits of Latino Leaders

The 2010 directory reports that Latinos serve in local office in 178 cities in 25 states; Respondents to the survey serve as in local office in 98 cities in 17 states (see Table 2.7). The overwhelming majority of Latino local elected officials are in states that are considered traditional Latino states. The traditionally Latino states of Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York and Texas account for 149 of the cities with Latino representation and 330 of the Latino local elected officials in the directory. The same percentage (84%) of survey respondents serve in the traditionally Latino states as those from the directory. Does the history of Latinos in these states lead

not only to their success in their election but also to different behaviors in their ethnic leadership?

Insert Table 2.8 about here

A smaller number of Latino local elected officials serve in states that are not traditional destinations for Latinos. Only three of the 394 Latino officials in the directory were in new destination states. As Table 2.8 shows, the southeastern region of the United States has a high rate of Latino growth in population, but Latinos have not yet achieved local political representation in the cities of these states.²¹ The best example of this is in South Carolina, where despite having the largest Latino growth rate from 2000 to 2010, Latinos do not serve in elected office in any cities in the state. Fifteen percent of local Latino elected officials in both the directory and survey are elected in states other than those traditional or new destination states. Over half (34) of those Latino local elected officials in the directory were in three states in southern New England: Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. How will Latino leaders in these states behave? For example, will leaders in these states, which lack the long-standing history of Latinos, have different experiences of group identity than those in more traditional destination states? Northeastern states tend to have partisan and district elections, as a legacy of the political machines of the late 18th and early 19th century. Will these institutional factors change the leadership behavior of local Latino elected officials?

Insert Table 2.9 about here

Almost half (184 or 46%) of all Latino local elected officials live in the West (see Table 2.9). Most live in the Pacific region, primarily in cities in California – like the

²¹ Latinos are also settling now in smaller cities, which suggests future research should additionally examine local Latino leaders in cities with a population of less than 50,000.

larger cities of San Francisco and Los Angeles as well as many smaller cities like El Monte and Santa Cruz. The second most common region for Latino local elected officials was the South, with 107 (27%) Latino elected officials. However, the overwhelming majority of Latino leaders live in just two states in the South: Texas and Florida. Of those 107 Latino local elected officials, 78 live in Texas and 26 live in Florida. A fifth reside in the Northeast (82) in cities like New York City, Hartford, Providence, and Lawrence. Five percent (21) live in the Midwest, mostly in Chicago or other cities in Illinois. The breakdown of survey respondents is mostly equivalent to the directory in terms of Latino elected officials' regions, with the exception of the Midwest, where the directory contains a slightly higher percentage (5%) than the survey does (2%).

Political Traits of Latino Leaders' Cities

The average number of elected officials per city for those cities in the directory with a Latino local elected official is 7.59, as shown in Table 2.10.²² The most common number of elected officials in each city is five. Fifty-nine cities (of which 51 are in California) have only five local elected officials for their city. Twenty-nine percent of Latino local elected officials (116) in the directory serve in cities with only five elected members. The size of the council could influence the nature of Latino leaders' behaviors. Those who serve on smaller councils may not be able to limit their appeal to just the Latino community and may have to seek coalitions in different ways than those on larger councils. The next most common number of elected officials was seven, with 41 cities and 92 Latino local elected officials in the directory. For survey respondents, the most

²² Number of elected officials is determined by the number of Councilmembers plus Mayor, in cities where the Mayor serves separately from the Council. This average excludes the three cities with the largest number of elected officials: New York, Chicago, and New Haven. The average with those cities is eight.

common number of elected officials on the council was also five and seven, respectively 26% and 29%.

Insert Table 2.10 about here

The majority of Latino local elected officials in the directory and survey serve on city councils where Latinos are the minority of the elected officials (see Table 2.11). One quarter (98) of the directory were the only Latino local official elected in their city. A third of survey respondents are the only Latino local elected official in their city (36%). Those serving in cities as the only Latino leader may act differently in those cities with more than one Latino elected official. Of the Latino local elected officials who took the survey, their city councils ranged from 5.56% to 100% Latino, with an average of 37.52%.

Insert Table 2.11 about here

Racial and Ethnic Demographics of Cities with Latino Leaders

Just over half (51%) of the directory's Latino local elected officials serve in cities that have a general population that is majority Latino (see Table 2.12). These 201 Latino officials serve in 61 cities, approximately a third of the cities in the directory. Acting as an ethnic representative is likely different for Latino leaders who serve in majority Latino cities compared to those who serve in cities where Latinos are the minority. Forty Latinos (10%) in the directory are elected in cities with a majority white population. In all but seven cities with a white majority, Latino local elected officials serve as the only Latino in elected office in their city. Ten Latinos (3%) serve in seven cities that have an Asian or Black majority. The survey respondents mirror the directory's Latino local leaders – with

47% serving in majority Latino cities; 10% in majority white cities; and 3% in majority Asian or Black cities.

Insert Table 2.12 about here

The final third of the directory's Latino local elected officials (143) serve in positions in 77 cities where there is no one racial majority. Of these Latino local elected officials, two serve in cities where Asians are the largest group; 19 serve in cities where Blacks are the largest group; 75 serve in cities where Latinos are the largest group; and 47 serve in cities where whites are the largest group. A similar percent of survey respondents (40%) serve in cities without a racial majority, with most of those respondents also serving in cities where Latinos are the largest group. The nature of the city's demographics may influence Latino leaders' behaviors in their campaign activities and leadership beliefs.

Insert Table 2.13 about here

The majority of Latino elected officials (69%) are in cities where one Latino national origin group constitutes a majority (50% or more) of the overall Latino population. Most of the cities where Latinos are locally elected are cities with Latinos who are primarily of Mexican heritage. Over 70% of all Latino local officials are elected in cities with a majority population of Mexican descent. Ten percent serve in cities where the Latino population is primarily Puerto Rican. Sixty-three (16%) Latino local elected officials serve in 26 cities without one majority national origin group. Likewise, survey respondents primarily are elected in communities with origins in Mexico (67%). Another 12% of survey respondents serve in Puerto Rican Latino communities. Like those in the directory, 16% of Latino elected officials who took the survey serve in cities without a

single national origin group as a majority in the Latino population. Will the different communities' backgrounds influence the ways in which Latino elected officials act as ethnic representatives?

Conclusion

Latino local elected officials serve in a variety of cities throughout the United States. The respondents to my original survey of Latino leaders closely mirror the general Latino local elected officials population, as shown through demographic statistics available from the directory. The data from national survey allows for a richer understanding of who Latino local elected officials are and how they behave as ethnic representatives. With a growing and diversifying mass Latino population, a better understand of who represents them is important for understandings of Latino politics in the United States. In Chapters Three and Four, I present findings from the survey to expand our knowledge of Latino local elected officials and to explore whether their different individual traits and political and community contexts influence their campaign activities, leadership beliefs and representation behavior as ethnic leaders.

Figure 2.2 – States' % U.S. Total Latino Population




Figure 2.3 – Top Ten Metropolitan Areas for Latinos by National Origin






Figure 2.4 – Multiplicity of Identities Among Latinos²³



²³ Cells are percentage of group members expressing “somewhat” or “very strong” identity from the Latino National Survey (Fraga et al. 2006)

Figure 2.5 – Racial Composition of Latino Population, 1980 – 2010²⁴



²⁴ Logan (2004) provides details of how each of these categories was constructed. The data comes from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses Public Use Microdata Samples, or PUMS. The 2010 data comes from calculations by author from 2010 Census data.

Table 2.1 – Latino Population by National Origin 2000-2010

Ethnic Origin	2000		2010	
	N	%	N	%
Mexican	20,640,711	58.5%	31,798,258	63.0%
Puerto Rican	3,406,178	9.7%	4,623,716	9.2%
Cuban	1,241,685	3.5%	1,785,547	3.5%
Dominican	764,945	2.2%	1,414,703	2.8%
Central American ²⁵	1,686,937	4.8%	3,998,280	7.9%
South American	1,353,562	3.8%	2,769,434	5.5%
Other	6,211,800	17.6%	4,087,656	8.1%
Total	35,305,818	100%	50,477,594	100%

²⁵ Central American excludes Mexican.

Table 2.2 – Latino Population in Largest Latino States

State	Latino Population	
	N	%
California	14,013,719	37.6%
Texas	9,460,921	37.6%
Florida	4,223,806	22.5%
New York	3,416,922	17.6%
Illinois	2,027,578	15.8%
Arizona	1,895,149	29.6%
New Jersey	1,555,144	17.7%
Colorado	1,038,687	20.7%
New Mexico	953,403	46.3%

Table 2.3 – Top Ten Metropolitan Areas for Latino

Metropolitan Area	Latinos	
	N	%
Los Angeles, CA	5,700,862	44%
New York, NY	4,327,560	23%
Miami, FL	2,312,929	42%
Houston, TX	2,099,412	35%
Riverside, CA	1,996,402	47%
Chicago, IL	1,957,080	21%
Dallas, TX	1,752,166	28%
Phoenix, AZ	1,235,718	30%
San Antonio, TX	1,158,148	54%
San Diego, CA	991,348	32%

Table 2.4 – Study Variables

Political Context

First time a Latino is in the position
Style of election – Ward/District or At-Large
Partisan election
Length of time in office
Number of local elected officials
Number of Latino local elected officials
Governing coalition in city

Community Context

Percentage of Latinos in electorate
Active/mobilized Latino constituency
National location
Immigrant history of city
Socioeconomic status of Latinos in jurisdiction
Racial and ethnic composition of jurisdiction
Constituents' ideology
Size of city
Presence of Spanish-language media

Individual Traits

Immigrant status
National origin background
Income
Education
Party membership
Spanish language abilities
Gender
Age
Prior involvement in community activities
Experience of discrimination
Sense of Latino group identity

Table 2.5 – Latino Elected Officials, 2010 NALEO Directory

Level of Office	N	%
Federal Representatives	24	>1%
State Officials	252	4%
County Officials	563	10%
Municipal Officials	1,707	30%
Judicial/Law Enforcement Officials	874	15%
School Board Members	2,071	36%
Special District Officials	248	4%
Total	5739	100%

Table 2.6 – United States’ Cities Latino Population

% Latino population	Total U.S. Cities		U.S. Cities with a Latino Local Elected Official (LLEO)	
	N	%	N	%
0 – 10% ²⁶	258	37%	5	3%
11 – 20%	162	23%	15	8%
21 – 30%	99	14%	25	14%
31 – 40%	74	11%	41	23%
41 – 50%	40	6%	31	17%
51 – 60%	25	4%	19	11%
61 – 70%	14	2%	10	6%
71 – 80%	17	2%	16	9%
81 – 90%	9	1%	9	5%
91 – 100%	7	1%	7	4%
Total	705	100%	178	100%

²⁶ Categories were created based on Census population percentages rounded to the second decimal place.

Table 2.7 – City Population Size

City Population Size	Directory LLEO		Survey LLEO	
	N	%	N	%
50,000 – 100,000	177	45%	68	53%
100,000 – 150,000	64	16%	15	12%
150,000 – 200,000	35	9%	12	9%
200,000 – 250,000	30	8%	7	5%
250,000 – 300,000	6	2%	0	0%
300,000 – 350,000	15	4%	4	3%
350,000 – more	67	17%	23	18%
Total	394	100%	129	100%

Table 2.8 – U.S. States

	State	Directory LLEO		Survey LLEO	
		N	%	N	%
Traditional Latino States	Arizona	11	3%	4	3%
	California	145	37%	50	39%
	Florida	26	7%	12	9%
	Illinois	15	4%	2	2%
	New Jersey	27	7%	5	4%
	New Mexico	13	3%	6	5%
	New York	15	4%	5	4%
	Texas	78	20%	24	19%
	Total	330	84%	108	84%
New Destination States²⁷	Alabama	0	0%	0	0%
	Arkansas	0	0%	0	0%
	Delaware	1	>1%	1	1%
	Georgia	1	>1%	0	0%
	Kentucky	0	0%	0	0%
	Maryland	0	0%	0	0%
	Mississippi	0	0%	0	0%
	North Carolina	0	0%	0	0%
	South Carolina	0	0%	0	0%
	South Dakota	0	0%	0	0%
	Tennessee	1	>1%	1	1%
	Virginia	0	0%	0	0%
	Total	3	(1%)	2	(2%)
Other States	Alaska	0	0%	0	0%
	Colorado	11	3%	2	2%
	Connecticut	18	5%	4	3%
	Hawaii	0	0%	0	0%
	Idaho	0	0%	0	0%
	Indiana	2	1%	1	1%
	Iowa	0	0%	0	0%
	Kansas	2	1%	0	0%
	Louisiana	0	0%	0	0%
	Maine	0	0%	0	0%

²⁷ States with double the national average of % Latino growth from 2000 to 2010. The national average was 43%.

	State	Directory LLEO		Survey LLEO	
		N	%	N	%
Other States (cont.)	Massachusetts	11	3%	4	3%
	Michigan	0	0%	0	0%
	Minnesota	0	0%	0	0%
	Missouri	0	0%	0	0%
	Montana	0	0%	0	0%
	North Dakota	0	0%	0	0%
	Ohio	1	0%	0	0%
	Oklahoma	0	0%	0	0%
	Oregon	1	0%	0	0%
	Pennsylvania	5	1%	4	3%
	Rhode Island	5	1%	3	2%
	Utah	1	0%	0	0%
	Vermont	0	0%	0	0%
	Washington	1	0%	1	1%
	West Virginia	0	0%	0	0%
	Wisconsin	1	0%	0	0%
	Wyoming	1	0%	0	0%
	Total	61	15%	19	15%

Table 2.9 – U.S. Regions

Region	Division ²⁸	Directory LLEO		Survey LLEO	
		N	%	N	%
Northeast	1 – New England	35	9%	11	9%
	2 – Mid-Atlantic	47	12%	14	11%
Midwest	3 – East North Central	19	5%	3	2%
	4 – West North Central	2	1%	0	0%
South	5 – South Atlantic	28	7%	13	10%
	6 – East South Central	1	>1%	1	1%
	7 – West North Central	78	20%	24	19%
West	8 – Mountain	37	9%	12	9%
	9 - Pacific	147	37%	51	40%

²⁸ These are defined by the U.S. Census as: Division 1 (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT), Division 2 (NJ, NY, PA), Division 3 (IN, IL, MI, OH, WI), Division 4 (IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD), Division 5 (DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV), Division 6 (AL, KY, MS, TN), Division 7 (AR, LA, OK, TX), Division 8 (AZ, CO, ID, NM, MT, UT, NV, WY), and Division 9 (AK, CA, HI, OR, WA).

Table 2.10 – Number of Elected Officials

# of Elected Officials in City	Directory LLEO		Survey LLEO	
	N	%	N	%
5	116	29%	34	26%
6	15	4%	8	6%
7	92	23%	38	29%
8	28	7%	10	8%
9	36	9%	12	9%
10	39	10%	10	8%
11+	68	17%	17	13%
Total	394	100%	129	100%

Table 2.11 – Number of Latino Local Elected Officials

# of LLEO in City	Directory LLEO		Survey LLEO	
	N	%	N	%
1	98	25%	47	36%
2	56	14%	22	17%
3	45	11%	13	10%
4	68	17%	25	19%
5	45	11%	7	5%
6	12	6%	1	1%
7	35	9%	8	6%
8	16	4%	1	1%
9	8	2%	2	2%
10	19	5%	3	2%
Total	394	100%	129	100%

Table 2.12 – Racial Composition of City

Racial Composition in City	Directory LLEO		Survey LLEO	
	N	%	N	%
Majority % Latino	201	51%	61	47%
Majority % White	40	10%	13	10%
Majority % Black	4	1%	1	1%
Majority % Asian	6	2%	3	2%
No Majority	143	36%	51	40%
Total	394	100%	129	100%

Table 2.13 – National Origin Composition of City

National Origin Composition in City	Directory LLEO		Survey LLEO	
	N	%	N	%
Majority % Mexican	270	69%	87	67%
Majority % Puerto Rican	39	10%	15	12%
Majority % Cuban	8	2%	1	1%
Majority % Dominican	7	2%	3	2%
Majority % Central American	1	>1%	0	0%
Majority % South American	1	>1%	0	0%
Majority % Other Latino	5	1%	2	2%
No Majority	63	16%	21	16%
Total	394	100%	129	100%

CHAPTER THREE

Latino Leaders' Backgrounds, Campaigns and Leadership Beliefs

San Antonio Mayor Julián Castro delivered the keynote speech at the 2012 Democratic National Convention as the first Latino ever to speak in a primetime slot. He spoke proudly of his family's immigrant background. Castro grew up with his grandmother who left Mexico as an orphan at the age of six and with his mother who fought for civil rights in the Chicano movement in Texas in the 1970s. Castro, and his twin brother, Joaquín, went to Stanford and Harvard Law School and returned to San Antonio to enter politics at a young age.²⁹ At 26, Julián won election to San Antonio's City Council representing District 7, and in 2005 he narrowly lost a bid for mayor in a runoff. He was elected as mayor in 2009 and reelected in 2011 with over 80% of San Antonio's vote. Mayor Castro credited his success to the women who helped raise him: "My grandmother never owned a house. She cleaned other people's houses so she could afford to rent her own. But she saw her daughter become the first in her family to graduate from college. And my mother fought hard for civil rights so that instead of a mop, I could hold this microphone."

At age 38, Castro is the mayor of the seventh-largest city in the United States and has emerged as one of the most recognizable Latino leaders in the Democratic Party with

²⁹ Castro's brother, Joaquín, was elected in 2002 to the Texas House of Representatives and served five terms representing the 125th District. In 2012, he won election as U.S. House Representative for Texas's 20th Congressional District.

speculation that he may be the first Latino President one day. In many ways, Castro embodies the successful life as a Tejano, a Texan of Mexican descent. His grandmother sent him and his brother to school every day with the blessing “Que dios los bendiga” (May God bless you), but he grew up speaking English. After he became mayor, he began taking Spanish lessons from a tutor. And unlike his mother who identifies as Chicana, Castro says, “I consider myself Mexican-American, both parts of that phrase.” Castro explains, “I generally don't like labels. I have benefitted from those who came before me who went through a civil rights struggle to give us the opportunities they never had” (Pilkington 2012).

On the day he moved into the mayor’s office in city hall, Castro hung a campaign poster from his mother’s 1971 run for city council (Jarboe Russel 2010). At 23, Maria del Rosario “Rosie” Castro was one of four Latinos on the "Committee for Barrio Betterment" slate for city council. Although her slate lost, their success in the Latino precincts helped MALDEF (Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund) argue for the need for single-member districts for Latino voters (Rosales 2000). Rosie Castro went on to become a long-time community organizer and former chair of the Bexar County La Raza Unida party, a Chicano political party. However, unlike his mother who took on a role as an activist, Castro says that today he feels no pressure to mediate ethnic tensions in San Antonio (Jarboe Russel 2010). As mayor, Castro has sought to cultivate a broader electoral appeal, focusing recently on Pre-K 4 SA, a 2012 ballot initiative which approved a one-eighth of a cent increase in the local sales tax to fund full-day pre-kindergarten. Castro’s agenda beyond ethnic politics prompted a 2010

profile in *The New York Times* to brand him as “The Post-Hispanic Hispanic Politician” (Chafets 2010).

Does Mayor Castro embody a new generation of Latino leadership? Is he representative of Latino local leaders today? In San Antonio, where the Mexican-American population is about 60 percent of the city and several generations old, Castro’s lack of Spanish fluency may not be unusual; however, in other Texas cities like El Paso, Laredo or Brownsville, Latino leaders would be limited without the ability to speak Spanish. Furthermore, Mayor Castro emphasizes his family’s ethnic story as part of a larger narrative of the American dream. Is his experience of assimilation similar to other Latino local elected officials?

What role does ethnicity play in the campaign strategies and leadership beliefs of other local Latino elected officials? This chapter presents the first systematic account of Latinos serving as city councilors and mayors across the country. Using data from my original survey of Latino local elected officials, this chapter examines in more detail who they are. I examine the local Latino elected officials’ demographics, backgrounds, campaign activities, and leadership beliefs. Building on the previous chapter, I begin by presenting descriptive statistics of the local Latino leaders’ personal traits and their political and community contexts. Then, I utilize the survey results to examine whether a sense of national origin or pan-ethnic linked fate exists among local Latino elected officials and if so, what factors produce greater amounts of both types of linked fate. Finally, I turn to their leadership behaviors during campaigns. I look at their most recent campaigns for their current position: What kinds of Latino campaign activities do they engage in? I examine whether their backgrounds and contexts shape their ethnic

leadership behavior during their campaigns. I conclude with a discussion of who they are and what shapes their roles as Latino leaders.

Latino Leadership: Demographics and Context

Like the general Latino public, Latino leaders are diverse. In this section, I present results from the Latino Leadership Survey detailing the backgrounds and contexts that shape Latino leaders. In discussing their demographics, I offer points of comparison to the general Latino population and other elected officials if the data is available. A greater understanding of who the Latino city councilors and mayors are, and in what contexts they serve, will help us understand their different styles of leadership.

Personal Traits

Sixty-seven percent of survey participants were Latino men.³⁰ In comparison, the 2010 Directory from NALEO reports that 68% of the local Latino elected officials were male. In higher office, men are also more numerous, although only slightly: 70% of Latino state legislators and 71% of the Latino members of Congress were male. Overall, Latino elected officials tend to be male, although a slightly larger percentage of Latinas serve in local elected offices than in higher offices. A higher number of Latinas are in office than females in general, at least at the state and national level where data is available; in 2010 only 16.8% of the U.S. Congress and 24.5% of state legislatures were female (CAWP 2013). This is a continuation of a trend that other scholars have likewise observed for Latina elected officials (Takash 1993; Montoya et al. 2000).

³⁰ I follow the tradition established by Hardy-Fanta (1993) is using the terms “Latino men” to refer Latino males and “Latinas” to refer to Latina females when distinguishing Latinos based on gender.

The ages of the Latino local elected official survey participants ranged from 22 to 76 years old, with an average age of 47. Data is not available to compare the ages of the survey respondents to other local elected officials or Latino elected officials in other levels of office. In comparison to the average age of Congress members and State legislators, Latino elected officials are younger. The average age of members of the 111th Congress was 58 years old. The average age in the House of Representatives was 57 and 63 in the Senate (Manning 2010). The average age of a State legislator is 56 (NCSL). It is likely, however, that local elected officials, of all racial and ethnic backgrounds, are younger than Congressional and State level elected officials given the nature of advancement in political careers. It may be that Latino local elected officials are particularly young since the general Latino community tends to be younger than others in the U.S. According to the 2010 American Community Survey, 34% of Latinos are under age 18, compared to only 20% of white, non-Hispanics (Motel 2012).

Most of the Latino local elected officials who completed the survey reported high family income. Seventy-four percent reported their family's income of \$75,000 or higher. Income data is unavailable for comparison to other elected officials. Among the general Latino community in the United States, Latino local elected officials are wealthier. Approximately half of all Latinos in the U.S. in 2010 reported a family income of less than \$40,000. In comparison, only seven percent of Latino local elected official respondents had a household income of \$50,000 or less.

In addition to being wealthy, Latino local elected officials survey respondents are also highly-educated. Nearly half (49%) had a college degree or higher degree. Over 90% of local Latino elected officials had some college experience, including associate's

degrees and college classes. According to the Census, only 36% of Latinos in the general population had some college experience.

Race and Ethnicity

Measuring race is complicated for Latinos. As discussed in Chapter Two, the U.S. Census considers Latinos not to be a separate race, but rather an ethnicity. In the survey, I asked Latino local elected officials to identify their race, following the Census' method of providing the standard list of races and including the same options of filling in some other race and choosing more than one race. The majority (82%) of Latino local elected officials opted to list their race in the "some other race" category and elected to list their race by national origin (i.e. "Puerto Rican") or as Latino or Hispanic. Nearly a fifth of these respondents listed another race as well, primarily white. The next most common response was white, with 22% of Latino local elected officials choosing the white category, although nearly half of these respondents also identified as the some other race category. The other racial categories were not chosen at high rates: Black or African American (4%), American Indian or Alaska Native (2%), Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander (0%) and Asian (1%). The variety of response to the Census racial category illustrates the debate over whether Latino heritage ought to be considered a race or an ethnicity. The 2006 LNS found that 51% of Latinos felt that Latinos make up a distinctive racial group in America (Fraga et al. 2006).

Insert Figure 3.1 here

The Latino local elected officials who took the survey were primarily from the three largest Latino groups in the U.S. in 2010: Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans.³¹ Figure 3.1 shows the national origin backgrounds of the Latino local leader survey respondents in comparison to the general Latino public from the 2010 U.S. Census. Seventy-seven (60%) of the Latino local elected officials were of Mexican heritage, roughly equivalent to the 63% of the general Latino population that is Mexican or Mexican-American. Puerto Ricans and Cubans were the next largest national origin groups, with 18 (14%) Latino local elected officials from Puerto Rico and eight (6%) from Cuba. The percentage of Latino local elected officials who are Puerto Rican and Cuban was slightly higher than the general Latino population, which is 9% Puerto Rican and 3.5% Cuban. This may be due to both groups' length of time in the U.S. and their special status as citizens (Puerto Ricans) or preferential citizenship process (Cubans).

An additional ten (8%) chose not to link their families' history to another country – explaining instead that their family had been in the United States for such a long time they did not consider their family to be from anywhere else or that they considered themselves as only Latino. This does not match exactly with the U.S. Census designation of “Other,” which combines those who identify as Spanish with others who reported Latino, Hispanic or other general terms. Given that the two respondents to the survey who selected Spain were both immigrants, I choose to include them in the other national

³¹ Latino subgroups are frequently referred to by the nationality of their family origin. In this context, I am referring to both native and foreign-born members of the subgroup. For example, Mexicans should be understood to include Mexican-Americans.

origins category rather than the general other category which tends to indicate those whose families have been in the U.S. for a long time.

Sixteen (12%) Latino local elected officials' family ancestries from other countries – Colombia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Panama, Peru, Venezuela, Spain, and Portugal. I include the two Spanish respondents and one Portuguese respondent since I opted to allow for self-identification as Latino for the survey. Dominican local elected officials were the largest in this group, with five Dominican respondents. Two other local elected officials included in this category reported family heritage from two Latino countries: a Cuban-Mexican and a Puerto Rican-Dominican.

One group missing from the survey results was Latinos with Salvadoran heritage. Although Salvadorans recently passed Cubans to become the third largest Latino group in the U.S. in 2011 with 3.8% of the Latino population, many Salvadorans in the U.S. are foreign-born and migrated after 1990 (Hugo Lopez and Gonzales-Barrera 2013).³² It is not possible to verify whether or not there were any Salvadorans in local office in 2010; although given their relatively recent immigration status as a group, it is likely the number of Salvadoran local elected officials is small but likely to grow as the community matures.

Insert Figure 3.2 here

As Figure 3.2 shows, 71% of the Latino local elected officials were born in the mainland U.S. An additional 8% were born on the island of Puerto Rico (which means

³² There is no other data that reports national origin breakdown for local Latino elected officials to my knowledge. Salvadorans primarily live in California, Texas, New York, Virginia, and Maryland. Future research could look to these states to examine if Salvadorans serve in local office. For example, both Maryland and California have had state legislators who are Salvadoran.

over half of all the Puerto Rican Latino local elected officials were born on the island).³³ Twenty-one percent were born in other countries. Of the 27 foreign-born Latino local elected officials, 12 were born in Mexico, five in Cuba and nine in other countries. Many consider the immigrant experience to be a central feature of Latinos as a group: nearly 40% of Latinos are foreign-born. Local Latino elected officials served in cities where, on average, 35% of the Latino population in the city was foreign-born. It is not surprising that a smaller percentage of the local Latino elected officials are foreign-born compared to the general Latino population in the U.S., given the citizenship requirements to become an elected official. The percentage of Latino elected officials born in the U.S. is likely to grow, as the number of Latinos born in the United States now out-paces the number of Latino immigrants.

The immigrant experience helps shape the socialization and political process of a group and its members. Prior scholarship suggests that ethnic attachments to the immigrant group weaken as immigrants assimilate into the larger American society. Dahl (1961) explains that as later generations of immigrants settle over time in the U.S. they lose interest in ethnic politics and no longer demand ethnic leadership. However, the Latino immigrant experience may be different, as scholars observe the ways Latinos continue to maintain ethnic identities and communities (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Traditional patterns of assimilation predict that nativity will play a role in Latinos' leadership style: foreign-born Latino local elected officials will be more likely to engage in ethnic leadership behaviors than native-born Latinos, although the expectation is less certain.

³³ Unless noted, I use foreign-born or immigrant to mean those born outside of the U.S. and Puerto Rico.

Insert Figure 3.3 here

Most Latino local elected officials (58%) reported they could carry on a conversation in Spanish very well. However, that percentage was lower than the 84% of LNS Latino respondents who indicated they could carry on a conversation very well (see Figure 3.3).³⁴ In general, most Latinos are Spanish-dominant, but the use of English increases with successive generations. A 2012 Pew Hispanic survey found that nearly all Latinos felt it is important for future Latino generations to continue to speak Spanish (95%) and that it is also important for Latino immigrants to learn English to succeed in the U.S. (87%).

Only six (5%) Latino local elected officials reported that they could not carry on a conversation at all in Spanish; seventeen (13%) could only carry on a conversation in Spanish just a little. This suggests that some local Latino elected officials have assimilated, at least to a degree in terms of language; however, the results from the Pew Hispanic survey indicate that these Latino local elected officials might want to emulate Mayor Castro and take Spanish lessons to bolster their appeal to fellow Latinos.

Nearly 80% of the Latino local elected officials reported experiencing discrimination based on their Latino race or ethnicity. Like other minorities in the U.S., Latinos have been subject to a history of discriminatory practices such as exclusion, separation and exploitation over the history of the U.S. Previous research shows that the experience of discrimination can foster group consciousness and motivate participation in politics on behalf of the group (Miller et al. 1981; Dawson 1994; Padilla 1985; Schildkraut 2005).

³⁴ The question is replicated from the 2006 Latino National Survey.

Latinos traditionally have had lower levels of perceived discrimination than African Americans. Data from the 1989 Latino National Political Survey showed that only 28% of Latinos reported direct experiences of discrimination (de la Garza et al. 1992). A third of participants from the 2006 Latino National Survey indicated one instance in which they had been “unfairly treated” (Fraga et al. 2006). Analysis of the LNS data reveals a problematic trend: perceptions of being treated unfairly actually increased for Latinos in later generations in the U.S. Fifty-two percent of fourth generation Latinos experienced being treated unfairly, compared to only 28% of first generation Latinos. Other research also shows an increasing number (61%) of Latinos agreeing that discrimination against Latinos is a major problem, with some reporting increases in discrimination as a result of the on-going immigration reform debates (Hugo Lopez et al. 2010). The higher rates of discrimination reported by local Latino elected officials may be an indication of the overall trend of increasing perceptions of Latino group discrimination: local Latino elected officials may have a heightened awareness of discrimination due to their involvement in the community and roles as elected officials. For Latino local elected officials who have suffered from discrimination, their ethnicity may play a larger role in their style of leadership.

Prior Community Involvement

Wilson (1960) points out in his case studies of Adam Clayton Powell and William Dawson that their involvement in the different community groups of New York City and Chicago helped shaped their leadership behavior as Black U.S. Representatives. Powell’s activities in his church and the Harlem community encouraged racial advocacy while Dawson’s involvement in the Democratic political machine of Chicago did not. In order

to examine what community activities Latino leaders are involved in and how their participation may influence their leadership behavior, I asked the Latino local elected officials how involved they were in different community activities prior to election to their current position.³⁵

Insert Figure 3.4 here

Most leaders reported some involvement in politics prior to their election (see Figure 3.4). Seventy percent said they were moderately or very active in political parties. Likewise, the same percentage said they were moderately or very involved others' political campaigns.³⁶ The percentage of those who were very involved in others' political campaigns was slightly higher than those who were very involved in political parties. Almost a third reported no involvement or low levels of participation in both political parties and others' political campaigns.

In general, the influence of political parties in local politics has declined in many cities. The local party machinery that Wilson and Dahl describe in Chicago and New Haven no longer exists in many cities; nor do political parties engage immigrants in the same way that Dahl observed in the early 20th century. The rate of decline has varied by city; the Democratic machine stayed strong in Chicago for Dawson, while it declined in New York City. By the time Powell began his political career, Tammany Hall had already lost clout, leading Powell to develop resources instead at his church and in Harlem. Many Latinos serve in cities with reform structures, designed in part to dislodge

³⁵ I asked respondents to rank their prior involvement in various groups on a scale from 0-10, with zero indicating no involvement with such a group and ten indicating a high level of participation in the group. For this section, I explain their levels of involvement as low (0-3), medium (4-6) or high (7-10). In the rest of the dissertation, I preserve the 0-10 scale.

³⁶ The level of participation in the two activities was correlated, with .7395.

the control of immigrant political machines and limit the influence of immigrant and low-income voters (Banfield and Wilson 1963; Karnig and Welch 1980). Eighty percent of Latino local elected officials were elected in non-partisan elections and 48% serve in at-large positions. Latinos elected to local office in partisan elections are primarily located in the Northeast, in states like Connecticut and Rhode Island where party machines managed to maintain power longer.

Political parties today do not commit the same resources to cultivate political participation in local politics as in the past. Thus, it is not surprising that some elected officials reported low levels of prior activity in political parties. This finding suggests that Dahl's understanding of the process of ethnic leadership and incorporation of earlier immigrant groups does not explain the process today for Latinos and their leaders. Dahl explains that in order to court immigrant voters, political parties selected the first political leaders for immigrant groups. With over a third of Latino local elected officials reporting low prior involvement in political parties, it appears ethnic leadership for Latinos today does not always emerge from political parties.

Dahl also notes that another function of parties was to develop ethnic loyalty. Parties mobilized immigrant voters by encouraging them to register and vote in exchange for social services, job opportunities, or symbolic recognition. However, as others have shown, parties never truly engaged in the broad outreach that Dahl characterizes; for example, Irish politicians reserved the limited number of machine resources largely for their own group (Erie 1988). Moreover, the supply of rewards to distribute in cities is even more limited today. Latino elected officials may not be able to behave in a similar

way that other immigrant politicians and Representative Dawson could with opportunities for political patronage.

It may be that involvement in others' political campaigns replaces some of the organizational structure previously provided by local political parties. By participating in other political campaigns, Latino local elected officials can secure resources (both tangible and intangible) for their own elections. The involvement in other campaigns may shape their leadership behavior. Reliance on other elites, who are not necessarily Latino, for electoral support may discourage Latino local elected officials from seeking to mobilize the Latino community or acting as a leader on the groups' behalf. In this way, participation in others' political campaigns may be similar to the previous experiences of Dawson with Chicago's Democratic Machine.

Insert Figure 3.5 here

While Powell and other African American civil rights leaders began their advocacy through the church, many of the early Latino civil rights leaders, like César Chávez and Dolores Huerta, created advocacy organizations related to their employment, particularly among those in the farm labor movement in the 1960s. I asked survey respondents how involved they were with labor unions and other business or professional organizations, as shown in Figure 3.5. The majority (60%) of Latino local elected officials reported little or no involvement in labor unions.³⁷ More of the Latino local elected officials reported some involvement in other business or professional organizations.³⁸ Based on the high household incomes reported by most of the Latino

³⁷ Organized labor has been beset in recent years with declining membership.

³⁸ Their prior involvement in the two groups was lowly correlated, with .1782.

local elected officials it may be fair to assume that most are not labor workers.³⁹

Although previous Latino civil rights leaders emerged from as workers from the labor movement, modern Latino local elected officials are not primarily from a labor background.

Insert Figure 3.6 here

Religion and community play an important role in Latino culture. While many Latinos are active in their faith, most are Catholic, which is a largely hierarchical religious organization with only limited opportunity for leadership development among its parishioners. Shown in Figure 3.6, Latino local elected officials reported different levels of activity with religious groups: 32% reported low levels of activity and 44% reported high levels. However, even high levels of participation may not shape Latino local elected officials' leadership styles in the same way Powell's leadership was shaped through his role as Pastor of Abyssinian Baptist Church. Activities with community and neighborhood organizations may develop Latino leadership instead. The majority (80%) of Latino local elected officials were active in these organizations.

Insert Figure 3.7 here

Two types of community organizations in particular may develop Latino advocates to be elected leaders: Latino-specific community organizations and groups involved with the advocacy of civil rights. Participation in these types of groups may encourage a leadership style that emphasizes ethnicity. Over half of the Latino local elected officials were highly active in Latino groups in their community, and most (70%) reported some level of involvement in Latino groups. Latino local elected officials were

³⁹ Occupation was not asked of the Latino local elected officials on the survey.

less active in civil rights organizations, though. Forty-five percent indicated that they had little involvement with civil rights groups. Participation in the two groups is correlated (0.6177). Those Latino local elected officials who were highly active in civil rights organizations were also highly involved in Latino organizations; however, not all those who were active in Latino organizations were active in civil rights organizations. This may be a personal choice; for example, a Latino may want to be involved in a social club of Latinos but not desire to join an advocacy-type organization, or it may be that civil rights organizations are less common today for Latino communities.

Community and Political Context

The demographics and resources of their community may also shape how ethnicity influences a Latino local elected official's role as a leader. Slightly over half of Latino local elected officials represented a geographic district in their city.⁴⁰ The calculation of demographic data for districts is complicated, as districts rarely align with Census tracts. To understand their communities, I use instead a combination of citywide data from the Census and the self-reporting of Latino local elected officials. I asked all of the Latino local elected officials who participated in the survey to report different characteristics of their constituents. While their reporting may be less accurate than Census measures, it provides a useful alternative measure and perhaps an even better understanding of who the Latino local elected officials view as their constituents.

I expect that the largest influence of whether local Latino elected officials will provide outreach for Latinos or consider themselves leaders of a Latino community to be the number of Latinos they represent. Most Latino local elected officials have a sizeable

⁴⁰ Four Latino local elected officials serve in districts with two representatives.

number of Latino constituents in their jurisdiction. Only 11% of Latino local elected officials estimated the Latino constituents to be less than 30% of the population. Latino local elected officials reported an average Latino population in their jurisdictions of 55%. Those elected officials in citywide positions reported an average Latino population of 52% and those in districts reported an average Latino population of 60%.⁴¹ Seventy five percent of Latino local elected officials in districts reported a Latino population of 50% or more, compared to half of those who were elected citywide.

Approximately five percent of Latino local elected officials served in primarily Latino cities, where Latinos made up 90% of the population or more, according to the 2010 Census. If these cities had different Latino national origin groups, we could see leadership based on national origin rather than Latino pan-ethnicity. However, most of these cities comprise of Latinos who are of primarily one national origin: four Mexican-dominant and one Cuban-dominant cities.

In cities where Latinos are the majority overall in the city, it is likely that other elected officials will also be Latino. In the cities with a Latino population of 90% or more, Latinos made up all of the city council and mayor. When a large portion of the elected officials is also Latino, Latino local elected officials may view their leadership roles differently. Although they likely still have campaign outreach for Latinos, given the high percentage of Latinos in their cities, attitudes about leadership or policy may be

⁴¹ Two-thirds of the Latino local elected officials in citywide positions underestimated the size of their city's Latino population, according to 2010 Census. The average Latino population is 56% for those in citywide positions. Most were only slightly off from the Census calculation, although a quarter of the elected officials were off by 10% or more. The largest under-reporting was off by 30%.

different. In these cities, ethnicity may no longer play an important role in shaping their behavior and may be replaced by other factors, such as class, gender or other concerns.

Latino Community Resources

Most Latino local elected officials served in cities where they had at least one Spanish media outlet: 80% said there was a Spanish newspaper or television or radio station that covered the local news in Spanish. News media is shown to influence what issues individuals view as important and how they think about those issues (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Spanish-language media may help the Latino pan-ethnic identity in the U.S. (Levine 2001). Data from the 2006 LNS survey shows that Latinos who watch Spanish-language news daily are more likely to identify with a pan-ethnic label (Fraga et al. 2006). Spanish-language media may also play a role in shaping a Latino political agenda; for example, Spanish-language media is more likely to cover immigration in a favorable manner (Abrajano and Singh 2009; Branton and Dunaway 2008). The presence of local news coverage in Spanish may encourage Latino local elected officials to develop a more ethnic leadership strategy and also provide outlets for contact with Latino constituents.

Sixty percent of Latino local elected officials said there was an active Latino organization in their city concerned with Latinos' engagement and representation in politics. These organizations can play a significant role in politics, as voters take electoral cues from trusted organizations or leaders. Efforts to get out the vote in local elections are increasingly important since the weakening of the party system (Green et al. 2003). For Latinos, in particular, participation in Latino organizations can mobilize Latino voter turn-out (Diaz 1996; Hritzuk and Park 2000).

Political Traits

Seventy percent of Latino local elected officials said that they were not the first Latino elected to their position. A majority (64%) also served with another Latino as city councilor or mayor of their city. This indicates that most of the Latino local elected officials serve in cities with at least some history of other Latino political leaders. Thirty percent were either the first Latino elected official or did not know if there had been a prior Latino elected official in their position.

Insert Figure 3.8

Most of the Latino local elected officials had prior experience with politics before they ran for office, but many were newcomers to political office, as Figure 3.8 shows. Half of the Latino local elected officials surveyed were in their first term in office. A third were in their second term in office. Only 30% said their position had term limits. Less than a third of Latino local elected officials said they held an elected office prior to their current position.

Insert Figure 3.9 here

Most (73%) of Latino local elected officials identified that they were Democrats. Sixteen percent of Latino local elected officials were Republicans; 11% were Independents or members of a third party. Aside from Cubans, Latinos have traditionally preferred the Democratic Party (Alvarez and Garcia Bedolla 2003). As Figure 3.9 shows, of the different national origins, local Cuban Latino elected officials had the largest percentage of Republicans. Some evidence shows that Latinos become less Democratic as they become more incorporated in American society and politics (Hero et al. 2000). I

find that 85% of those local Latino elected officials born outside of the U.S. were Democrats, compared to 70% of those born in the U.S.

All of the Republican local Latino elected officials were voted into office in non-partisan elections. Past efforts by the Republican Party to symbolically appeal to Latinos have shown some success in states like Texas, but Republicans use of anti-immigrant messaging to mobilize their existing base has also alienated Latinos (Cain et al. 1991; Segura et al. 1997; Fraga and Leal 2004). Although 70% of Latino local elected officials noted that the majority of their constituents in their jurisdictions tended to be Democrats, they characterized their constituents as ideologically diverse, ranging from the majority of constituents being very liberal to conservative. Seven percent of the Democrats reported they served in jurisdictions with primarily Republican voters or in jurisdictions of mostly conservative voters (26%).

Latino Linked Fate

It has been nearly 40 years since the Census Bureau began utilizing the terms “Hispanic” or “Latino” to categorize individuals in the U.S. who trace their heritage to various Spanish-speaking countries. However, there is still not widespread embracement of the labels. In general, Latinos consistently prefer to identify based on their family’s national origin, explaining that they are “Mexican” or “Cuban” (Jones-Correa and Leal 1996). In a 2011 Pew Hispanic survey, only about one-quarter of Latinos say they primarily identify as “Hispanic” or “Latino” (Taylor et al. 2012). As a term, “Latino” refers to a broad set of groups from a number of countries with diverse immigrant experiences, both in their families’ home countries and in the U.S. (de la Garza et al. 1992; DeSipio 1996). When the Pew Hispanic survey asked if Latinos in the U.S. share a

common culture, only 29% agreed, while 69% thought Latinos in the U.S. have many different cultures.

A considerable academic debate continues over whether Latinos see themselves as an identifiable, cohesive group with shared political interests, and if so, what the basis of that commonality is for Latinos. Some scholars contrast the lack of cohesion of Latinos' identities to those of African Americans, who tend to share a strong perception of group consciousness and remain politically homogenous as a group. Theories of group consciousness and linked fate help to explain minority group behavior. Members of a minority group who share a strong sense of linked fate believe that their individual fates are tied to other racial or ethnic group members. Members of a racial or ethnic group may choose to prioritize the needs of the group over their own self-interest in politics (Miller et al. 1981; Conover 1984).

For African Americans the shared historical experience of slavery and marginalization in the United States developed their sense of linked fate. Dawson describes linked fate as a black-utility heuristic: by understanding their group's status to be directly linked to their own status, Blacks pursue their individual goals through the common goals of the group. Perceptions of linked fate remain persistent and widely-held among Blacks, despite the growing socio-economic polarization of the group.

Scholars have recently explored whether a similar construction of group consciousness and linked fate may exist for Latinos and other groups in the U.S. (Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Masuoka 2006). Some suggest that a Latino group identity may develop from their shared characteristics: Latinos share a language, a religion, and history of Spanish colonialism in their families' home countries (Oboler 1995; Sanchez

2006). Experiences of discrimination and marginalization in the U.S. may also mobilize Latinos not only to embrace pan-ethnic labels but also to act collectively, as shown by Latinos' response to anti-immigration legislation (Silber-Mohammed 2012; Barreto et al. 2009).

Sanchez and Masuoka (2010) explore the existence of linked fate among Latinos and analyze what factors determine its formation. They use LNS data to explore the role of distinct features of Latinos, like their diversity, nativity, assimilation and marginalization, to see if Latinos perceive an individual-based linked fate and national origin-based linked fate with other Latinos. Sanchez and Masuoka find some evidence of a "brown-utility heuristic," but suggest it may be only temporary as Latinos integrate into broader American society. Based on their study on Latino linked fate among the general Latino population, I explore whether similar dynamics influence local Latino elected officials' sense of linked fate. Latino elected officials with a higher sense of linked fate may be more likely to mobilize as ethnic candidates and ethnic leaders.

Method

I use data from the Latino Leadership Survey to assess local Latino elected officials' individual perceptions of national origin and pan-ethnic linked fate as two dependent variables. Survey respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement from 0 to 10 for two statements: "What happens to other Latinos affects what happens in my life and how I view politics" and "What happens to other [ethnic subgroup] affects what happens in my life and how I view politics." In the analysis, positive coefficients indicate stronger perceptions of linked fate.

Sanchez and Masuoka explore a slightly different set of questions from the LNS data for their analysis of linked fate: “How much does your ‘doing well’ depend on other Latinos/Hispanics also doing well?” and “How much does [ethnic sub-group] ‘doing well’ depend on other Latinos/Hispanics also doing well?” Their first question measures linked fate at the individual level, and second question measures linked fate for the national origin group. Given my survey population of local elected officials, my questions are more explicit in their connection of the political dynamics of group consciousness and linked fate. Additionally, both of my questions focus on the individual-level perceptions of elected officials’ linked fate with other members of their national origin group and Latinos more broadly. The results for individual-based Latino linked fate are best for comparison to Sanchez and Masouka’s findings.

Insert Table 3.1 here

I explore the determinates of local Latino elected officials’ linked fate based on the similar independent variables considered by Sanchez and Masuoka and other scholars of linked fate and group consciousness. They identify four dimensions of importance: socio-demographic, psychological, immigration, and race. I exclude their race category, which includes the variables of skin color and race of friends, since I did not include those questions.⁴² I include socio-demographic (income, gender, age), psychological (discrimination experience), and immigration (nativity, Spanish language ability, national origin) measures. With the geographic data available in my dataset, I additionally add a set of community context variables I expect may influence both Latinos in general and

⁴² For Sanchez and Masuoka’s analysis, skin color and Latino friends were significant and positive for national origin based linked fate but not for individual-level Latino linked fate.

local Latino elected officials (presence of local Spanish-media, percent Latino in the city, city's relative median Latino household income, diversity of ethnic subgroups). An explanation for how these variables are measured is available in the Appendix. In Table 3.1, I present my expectations for the predictors, based on Sanchez and Masuoka's findings for the general Latino population.

Linked Fate Analysis

In the survey, 75% of local Latino elected officials reported a high level of linked fate with their fellow national origin group members. A similar number (73%) of local Latino elected officials reported a high sense linked fate with Latinos in general. This is comparable to the levels of Latino linked fate of those from the Latino National Survey.⁴³

Insert Table 3.2 here

Table 3.2 provides the results of the two models of individual and community-level factors that affect linked fate with Latino and national origin members. Unlike Sanchez and Masouka's findings for Latinos and linked fate, I do not find evidence of relationship between assimilation and linked fate among the local Latino elected officials. Sanchez and Masuoka found that Latino linked fate is highest among Latinos who are Spanish-dominant or recent immigrants. They also find that perceptions of Latino linked fate decline with greater levels of income. In examining these factors for local Latino elected officials, I do not find a significant relationship between the local Latino elected officials' nativity and Spanish fluency and sense of linked fate. I also do not find a difference in perceptions of linked fate between local Latino elected officials with an

⁴³ A full breakdown of the linked fate variables in comparable categories to Sanchez and Masuoka's dependent variable is available in Figure 3.10.

income of \$75,000 or more in comparison to those with a lower income.⁴⁴ The only socio-demographic variable of influence for local Latino elected officials' linked fate is that females are more likely to have greater perceptions of national origin linked fate than men.

I find that Mexicans and Puerto Ricans were less likely to agree that what happens to other Latinos affects what happens in their lives and how they view politics, in comparison to Latinos from other national origin backgrounds. Sanchez and Masuoka also find that Puerto Ricans have a lower perception of linked fate. I also found that Latinos who said their families had been in the U.S. for a long time had a lower sense of linked fate. For local Latino elected officials' linked fate with fellow national origin members, I find that Cuban local elected officials are more likely to hold strong perceptions of national origin based linked fate.

The linked fate models examined do not indicate that there is a relationship between the community context of local Latino elected officials and their perceptions of their linked fate. Neither the presence of local Spanish language media nor the size of the Latino community in their cities had a significant correlation with their sense of linked fate. I find that like their individual income, the relative level of the city's Latino median income does not influence local Latino elected officials' linked fate. The only community-level variable that reaches statistical significance is whether or not a local Latino elected officials' city had a national origin group that made up the majority of

⁴⁴ Income is measured in this model as those who reported an income of \$75,000 or more (1) in comparison to those making less than \$75,000 (0). I also ran these models with income measured as a categorical variable with values of > \$25,000 (1), \$25,000-\$49,999 (2), \$50,000 – \$74,999 (3), and \$75,000 + (4). Only two local Latino elected officials had an income of less than \$25,000 and six had an income of less than \$50,000 so I collapse those categories to create the dummy variable.

Latinos in the city. I find that the lack of a majority national origin group increases the perception of linked fate for local Latino elected officials with other Latinos of the same national origin background but has no effect on pan-ethnic linked fate.

Sanchez and Masuoka surprisingly find that the personal experiences of discrimination are not significantly correlated with an individual sense of Latino linked fate. According to scholars of Black group consciousness, the shared experiences of discrimination are a critical component of the high levels of linked fate found among African Americans. I find similar results to those examining Black linked fate. Among local Latino elected officials, discrimination has a significant influence on Latino and national origin linked fate. Unlike for the general Latino population, discrimination plays an important role in shaping local Latino elected officials' linked fate.

The results of these models show that local Latino elected officials' perceptions of linked fate are more similar to traditional explanations of linked fate for Blacks than those for Latinos. For Blacks, linked fate is a result of shared discrimination experiences and is persistent, regardless of income. Likewise, I find that local Latino elected officials' sense of linked fate with other members of their national origin and Latinos in general is significantly influenced by the experience of discrimination. This suggests that Sanchez and Masouka's prediction that Latino linked fate may only be temporary for Latinos as they assimilate may not be entirely correct. It may be conditioned on the levels of discrimination experienced in the assimilation process. The Latino National Survey data shows that the number of Latinos reporting experiences of being treated unfairly increased from first-generation immigrants to later-generation Latinos. Sanchez and

Masouka's analysis does not include an interaction term to account for this potential relationship between discrimination and generation.⁴⁵

The different role discrimination plays in local Latino elected officials' linked fate may also indicate a change in discrimination patterns since the collection of the Latino National Survey data in 2006. More recent surveys report a growing perception among some Latinos of group discrimination, particularly in response the immigration reform debates (Hugo Lopez et al. 2010). The strength of the relationship between discrimination and local Latino elected officials' linked fate may be a product of these trends. Many of the local Latino elected officials participating in the survey reflected some degree of assimilation: all spoke English fluently, all were American citizens, and most had high incomes. Yet, many reported personal experiences of discrimination. Perhaps discrimination played an increasingly large role in their group consciousness given their perspective as elected officials. For local Latino elected officials, the experience of discrimination shapes their group identity, which is considered to be a necessary precondition for group-based collective action.

⁴⁵ It is also unclear from Sanchez and Masouka's article how they calculate their variable "Discrimination Experience." The 2006 LNS asked a battery of questions about personal experiences with discrimination. LNS respondents were asked about "the way other people treated you in the U.S." and if the respondent had been "unfairly treated" in four scenarios: being fired or denied a job or promotion, being treated poorly by the police, being discouraged from moving into a neighborhood, or being denied service at restaurants or stores. The survey also asks how much they agree with the statements: "Poor people can get ahead in the U.S. if they work hard" and "Latinos can get ahead in the U.S. if they work hard." The difference in the findings may be due to difference in question wording. My survey question is based on the way Pew Research Hispanic Center tends to word their discrimination question. I ask: "Have you or a family member experienced discrimination because of your racial or ethnic background, or not?"

Campaign Activities

When deciding who to elect as their leaders, voters tend to rely on short cuts to make their vote choices. Early scholarship stressed the role of candidates' policy positions and partisanship in voters' evaluations of candidates (Downs 1957; Campbell et al. 1960). However, with the diminishing role of political parties, elections are more often candidate-centered (Wattenberg 1998). To appeal to voters, savvy candidates understand the importance of symbolic politics (Popkin 1991). Similar to Dahl's (1961) conception of the ethnic politicians campaigning in Italian and Irish neighborhoods, candidates today may use symbolic racial or ethnic appeals during campaigns to target groups of voters.

Candidates tend to be selective in deciding which voters to mobilize and generally concentrate most of their efforts on likely voters (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Latino voter turnout traditionally lags other racial and ethnic groups, creating a large disparity between the size of the Latino population and potential power of Latino votes (Uhlener et al. 1989; DeSipio 1996). Scholarship shows that outreach efforts, particularly recruitment appeals by fellow Latinos, can have a positive and significant effect on Latino turnout (Ramírez 2007, 2005; Michelson 2003; Shaw et al. 2000). Candidates and parties have increasingly paid attention to Latino voters in political campaigns, through efforts like Spanish-language campaign advertisements (Abrajano 2010).

Latinos are also more likely to vote if someone asks them or when a Latino candidate is on the ballot. For Latinos, scholars have found support for the "minority empowerment" thesis which suggests racial minorities are more likely to participate in politics when a minority candidate of their racial group is running for office (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Barreto 2010). For example, Barreto, Villarreal, and Woods (2005) find

high-density Latino precincts in Los Angeles had higher turnout as a proportion of registration when a Latino candidate was in the election.

Although most of the attention on Latino candidates focuses broadly on whether their presence on the ballot mobilizes turnout, some scholarship also suggests Latino candidates conduct outreach efforts to mobilize Latino voters as well (Leighley 2001). In an examination of five Latino mayoral candidates, Barreto (2010, 22) emphasizes the role of Latino politicians' outreach: "...the candidate is the key link to motivating group behavior." Barreto looks at five Latino candidates in races in Los Angeles, Houston, New York and San Francisco and finds they all employed ethnic campaign strategies. All of the campaigns had a Latino vote strategy, endorsements from other Latino leaders, and Latino campaign managers and consultants. The Latino candidates "put more energy and respect into mobilizing Latino communities" (Barreto 2010, 41). The five Latino candidates canvassed in Spanish, held Latino-based events and advertised bilingually through mailers and ads. Barreto (2010, 62) describes their campaign approach as "nuestra comunidad" (our community) and concludes that, "Latino candidates quickly cultivated a strong sense of shared community and linked fate with Latino voters."

Barreto also notes that in his interviews the Latino candidates or campaign managers shared similar ideas such as: "a Latino agenda is the American agenda" and "I did not run as a Latino; I was a candidate that happened to be Latino." However, Barreto treats these remarks by the campaigns as cursory, weighing heavily on other evidence for their ethnic campaign activity. This may be problematic, however, for gaining a full understanding of the nature of local Latino politicians' campaigns. These statements may be indicative of other approaches to campaigning that local Latino elected officials may

employ in their elections. Barreto looks only at five mayoral races, all unsuccessful candidates and all in major cities. Given the diversity of local Latino elected officials and their differing local contexts, more analysis is needed.

Furthermore, other analyses do not confirm the outreach Barreto reports for one of his five cases: the 2001 Los Angeles mayoral race. Wright Austin and Middleton examine Antonio Villaraigosa's 2001 campaign in Los Angeles and find Villaraigosa modeled his campaign strategy after former Los Angeles mayor, Tom Bradley, the city's first African American mayor (Wright Austin and Middleton 2004). Bradley developed a coalition of support through a primarily deracialized campaign strategy. Wright Austin and Middleton characterize Villaraigosa's campaign as also deracialized. They point out that Villaraigosa faced criticism in the primary from Latino community leaders, including fellow Latino mayoral candidate Xavier Becerra, for neglecting the Latino community and its needs. Wright Austin and Middleton (2004, 287) explain, "Although Villaraigosa desired a substantial turnout among Latinos, he failed to devote a lot of time to mobilizing them out of the fear that voters of other races would perceive him as a Latino candidate rather than a candidate for all people." Likewise, a 2001 *Los Angeles Times* article contradicts Barreto's finding of increased Latino outreach by Villaraigosa through Spanish-language advertising. The reporter remarks, "Neither Villaraigosa nor Hahn [his 2001 opponent] sees Spanish-language radio as a rich outreach tool. They have both appeared on various shows, or called in, but they have not spent one advertising cent to reach the listeners" (Calvo 2001).

Further research is necessary to assess whether local Latino politicians utilize an ethnic campaign strategy or if some may use deracializing campaign strategies to

deemphasize their Latino ethnicity. Messages of Latino group consciousness can play an important role in increasing Latinos' political participation, so Latino politicians running a deracialized campaign risk losing the mobilization effect for Latinos voters (Stokes-Brown 2003). The candidate and campaign statements Barreto heard in his interviews, along with difficulties with his analysis and limited sample of Latino politicians, suggests more evidence is needed to understand whether Latino local politicians use deracialization campaign strategies.

A deracialized strategy guides the issues candidates stress, their mobilization tactics and the style of their campaigns. Prior research on deracialization looks primarily at the campaigns of Black politicians. In order to recruit multiracial support, Black candidates may be encouraged to emphasize widely-appealing social issues and a race-neutral programs (Wilson 1990; Hamilton 1973). Black mayoral candidates tend to use deracialized campaign tactics when competing against white candidates in largely white cities (e.g. Perry 1991). By using deracialized campaign strategy, Black candidates try to project a nonthreatening image and avoid public appeals aimed at to the Black community (McComick and Jones 1993).

Less attention has been paid to whether Latino candidates systematically utilize similar deracialized strategies. However, the existing case study analyses of local Latino campaigns all find some evidence of efforts by Latino candidates to deracialize their campaigns. Underwood (1997) investigates the campaigns of Latino candidates for the city council elections in Los Angeles and finds evidence of their deracialized campaigns. Additionally, analyses of the former mayoral campaigns of San Antonio's Henry Cisneros and Ed Garza and Denver's Frederico Pena reveal the success Latinos have had in using

deracialized campaigns to build viable coalitions for political victory (Muñoz Jr. and Henry 1990). They promoted themselves as “candidates for the people” rather than just “Latino candidates.” They each downplayed their Latino heritage and avoided explicit discussions of “Latino issues,” but still received high turn-out and support among Mexican American voters. “Although he [Frederico Pena] did not campaign as a Mexican American candidate and his identity did not play a role in his campaign, it was obvious that he was a Mexican American to the people of his community” (Muñoz Jr. and Henry 1990).

What kind of Latino voter outreach is generally used by local Latino elected officials? Do they provide ethnic signals or cues to Latino voters? Is it dependent on context, as it is for Black candidates? Prior research of individual Latino campaigns points to contradictory answers to these questions: Barreto’s analysis indicates strong patterns of ethnic campaign styles, while others’ research suggests Latino candidates make strategic choices to use deracialized strategies to appeal to other voters or because ethnic outreach is not necessary to mobilize Latino voters. Using research from the Latino Leadership Survey, I am able to explore whether local Latino elected officials provide outreach to appeal to Latinos and if so, what influences their decisions to do so.

Method

To explore the ethnic leadership styles of local Latino elected officials during their campaigns, I use data from the Latino Leadership Survey on local Latino elected officials’ campaign outreach to Latinos. Following Barreto’s expectation of a *nuestra comunidad* campaign strategy for the Latino elected officials, I asked survey respondents whether they conducted various mobilization efforts for Latino voters in their most recent

campaigns. The survey results included whether they had written campaign materials available in Spanish, canvassed in Spanish, advertised their campaign through Spanish-language media, held Latino-based campaign events, had a Latino campaign manager, or received endorsements from other Latino leaders in their community. I also asked how often, if at all, they discussed their families' immigration stories.

Insert Figure 3.11 here

Unlike Barreto's *nuestra comunidad* analysis of the five Latino mayoral candidates who lost their elections in Los Angeles, Houston, New York, and San Francisco, I do not find that all of the local Latino elected officials engaged in Latino campaign outreach (see Figure 3.11). Only a little over half of local Latino elected officials advertised in Spanish, and less than half had a Latino campaign manager. Seventy-two percent had bilingual written materials available for voters in Spanish. Over 80% canvassed in Spanish and received other Latino leaders' endorsements. Local Latino elected officials varied in how often they mentioned their families' immigration stories in the campaign: 24% said they discussed it frequently, but 36% said they never discussed it or did not consider their families to have immigration stories. Twenty-two percent said they discussed their immigration stories sometimes, and 18% said not often or rarely.

Insert Table 3.3 here

To understand what factors influenced their outreach to Latinos, I examine a number of hypotheses drawn from the literature on deracialization, assimilation, and prior community involvement. I also assess whether the different aspects from the diversity of Latino experiences influence their ethnic campaign strategies. Table 3.3 lists the expected

relationship from these theories.⁴⁶ I look at each of the six activities individually through models of logistical regression with robust standard errors. I also create a composite based on the number of Latino outreach activities they did and examine what factors influence the amount of Latino outreach they conducted in their most recent campaigns.

Insert Table 3.4 here

Table 3.4 examines whether local Latino elected officials conducted campaign outreach in Spanish. I find similar relationships in both the Spanish advertising and Spanish written material models. As expected, a larger percent of Latino constituents positively influences the use of Spanish ads and campaign material. Similarly, having a Latino in office prior to their election encourages the use of Spanish outreach. Local Latino elected officials who are incumbents were less likely to use Spanish advertising, but being an incumbent had no statistically significant relationship on using Spanish written materials or canvassing in Spanish.

Insert Figure 3.12

I do not find much evidence that assimilation, at either the community or individual level, influences their use of Spanish outreach in their campaigns. There do seem to be differences between the different national origin groups of local Latino elected officials. The analysis is limited, however, due to the small sample size of local

⁴⁶ Ideally, the analysis would include the race of the local Latino elected officials' opponent or opponents in their campaigns. In races with a white opponent, are Latino candidates more likely to run a deracialized campaign, as the deracialization literature would predict? However, the different local electoral systems make it difficult to distinguish opponents in this analysis. For example, in at large elections where the top five candidates with the most votes win election: who should be considered the opponent? Future research ought to examine the role of opponents' race or ethnicity by limiting analysis to specific types of elections, such as mayoral races, where opponents are more easily identifiable.

Latino elected officials who are not Mexican and modeling errors when including all groups. To allow for some broad analysis, I exclude Mexicans and collapse the category of Puerto Rican and Cuban with the other national origin groups. I also include separately the group with Latinos who said their family had been in the U.S. for a long time. The models show that local Latino elected officials who declined to identify a national origin background, saying instead their family had been in the U.S. for such a long time, were less likely to canvass in Spanish, be endorsed by Latino leaders or have a Latino campaign manager. To explore these differences more, I show in Figure 3.12 the differences between the national origin groups in terms of their level of Latino outreach activity. Only 20% of local Latino elected officials with families that had been in the U.S. for a long time engaged in three or more activities, the lowest of all the subgroup backgrounds. In looking at assimilation theory variables, I also find that in the case of endorsements from other Latino leaders, a higher socio-economic status of the Latino community led to an increase in the probability of local Latino elected officials receiving endorsements (see Table 3.5). I expect this may not be a function of assimilation but rather the development of community-based resources. It may be that as the Latino community's socio-economic status relatively improves, there is more possibility for individuals to take on leadership roles, which would lead to more leaders able to give endorsements.

Insert Table 3.5 here

Surprisingly, the local Latino elected officials' sense of Latino linked fate had no statistically significant relationship with any type of Latino outreach. Barreto found the mayoral candidates he interviewed all had a strong sense of shared community and linked

fate with Latino voters, which in turn, led them to mobilize Latino voters. My finding suggests Latino linked fate does not operate in this way for local Latino elected officials generally. It seems that Latinos approach their campaign style as a strategic decision based on getting elected rather than one devoted solely for the benefit of Latino voters. Additionally, I do not find any statistically significant differences between Democratic and Republican local Latino elected officials in their ethnic campaign activity. I also do not find a role between Spanish fluency and Latino outreach, even for the outreach efforts in Spanish. It is likely that as candidates, the few local Latino elected officials who lack Spanish fluency may be relying on other members of their campaign or friends and family to help.

Local Latino elected officials' approach to campaigning was shaped also by their prior activity in different community and political groups. I find that local Latino elected officials with higher levels of involvement in Latino organizations provide more Spanish outreach in the forms of advertisement and written campaign materials. In contrast, those with higher levels of prior involvement in other political campaigns were less likely to do Spanish outreach. As suggested earlier in the chapter, with the decline of political party involvement in local elections, involvement in others' political campaigns may have replaced some of the political relationships and resources previously depended on through political parties. Local Latino elected officials with resources developed from other elected officials and community politicians may not need to mobilize Latino voters to secure success in their election. The results also indicate the different nature of being involved in political parties and being involved in other people's campaigns. Unlike political participation in other people's campaigns, prior involvement in political parties

encouraged local Latino elected officials to have Spanish campaign ads, hold Latino campaign events and have a Latino campaign manager.

The models also reveal an interesting gender dynamic in the campaign strategies of local Latino elected officials. Latinas were less likely to receive endorsements from other Latino leaders in the community. Latinas were more likely to use Spanish media and written materials to advertise to Latino voters. These findings match prior Latina scholarship, which stresses the importance Latinas place on participatory politics (Hardy Fanta 1993).

Insert Table 3.6

In Table 3.6, I look at the levels of Latino outreach conducted by the local Latino elected officials by combining the previous six Latino outreach efforts into a scale from 0 to 6. In general, I find similar results to the previous models of outreach. The percentage of Latinos in the local Latino elected officials' jurisdiction is positively related to the amount of Latino outreach they conducted. A prior history of other local Latino elected officials also encouraged the amount of campaign outreach directed at Latinos. Some individual-level traits likewise influenced the level of ethnic campaign cues. Local Latino elected officials who were involved prior to their election with political parties and with Latino organizations were more likely to try to mobilize Latinos. The results also suggest differences among the national origin groups. Latinos who said their family had been in the U.S. for a long time used fewer Latino campaign efforts than those who were of Mexican heritage. At the community level, the only significant influence on the level of Latino campaign outreach was if there was a local Spanish media station that covered the local news in Spanish.

Taken together, these findings suggest local Latino elected officials employ different campaign strategies in different contexts. Unlike Barreto (2010), I find that not all local Latino elected officials employ a *nuestra comunidad* approach to their campaigns in their outreach efforts. The models indicate that in some scenarios, local Latino elected officials may instead run deracialized campaigns. The analysis also indicates that the ethnic campaign outreach efforts are part of a strategic decision of the candidate and campaign. Beyond implications for the election, the question remains whether the use of a deracializing campaign strategy also indicates Latinos may have a deracialized governance approach.

Conclusion

Local Latino elected officials like Villaraigosa and Castro represent only some of the Latinos serving in local office in cities across the country. This chapter reveals the diversity of local Latino elected officials. The Latino Leadership Survey explains who are the Latinos serving as city councilors and mayors. A clearer portrait of local Latino elected officials helps us assess who they are and how their backgrounds and contexts may influence their leadership styles and beliefs.

I find that local Latino elected officials match the heterogeneity of the general Latino population in some ways. While many are of Mexican heritage, there also a number of Puerto Rican, Cuban, and other Latinos of different national origin backgrounds, including some who no longer consider themselves to have a national origin background or family immigrant story. Some local Latino elected officials are naturalized citizens as first-generation Americans. Most Latino leaders speak Spanish, but in comparison to the general Latino population, they have a lower degree of Spanish

fluency. The majority are Democrats, but I do not find any differences between Democratic and Republican local elected officials' ethnic leadership behavior in their campaigns. Unlike the general Latino population, many report high levels of income. Yet, surprisingly, they have more personal experiences of discrimination than previous surveys of Latinos in general report.

Their perceptions of discrimination helped shape local Latino elected officials' linked fate. As in the case of African Americans, the experience of discrimination raised the group consciousness of local Latino elected officials. This finding differs from limited existing scholarship on Latino linked fate. It suggests, however, that discrimination may be playing a new or increasing role for Latinos, even among those considered to be more assimilated. Alternatively, it could indicate a different perspective unique to those Latinos involved in politics.

I find that local Latino elected officials participated in a range of different activities before running for office. Unlike previous Latino leaders, few had experience in labor unions. Approximately half were highly involved in Latino-based organizations. Many were involved in politics as well, either through political parties or other people's political campaigns. My analysis reveals that the Latino elected officials' prior involvements helps to explain their behavior as candidates. Like Powell and Dawson, the organizations from which local Latino politicians emerged helped shape their ethnic leadership styles in their campaigns. Furthermore, their prior involvement in political activities suggests there may be important differences between prior immigrant groups' political experiences and Latinos today. In light of the decline of political parties, some local Latino elected officials seem to have turned to developing relationships with other

politicians to secure resources outside of the Latino community in order to get elected. Unlike prior immigrant groups, I found little evidence of assimilation influencing their group consciousness or ethnic leadership in campaigns.

Latino politicians approached their campaigns in a strategic ways. Not all ran ethnic campaigns; some had more Latino outreach than others. The decision to provide outreach to Latino voters was shaped by the local context of the campaign and the individual backgrounds' of the politicians.

Figure 3.1 – National Origin Backgrounds




Figure 3.2 – Nativity




Figure 3.3 – Spanish Fluency




Figure 3.4 – Prior Levels of Activity in Politics




Figure 3.5 – Prior Levels of Activity in Employment-related Organizations




Figure 3.6 – Prior Levels of Activity in Religious and Community Groups




Figure 3.7 – Prior Levels of Activity in Ethnic Organizations




Figure 3.8 – Term in Office




Figure 3.9 – Partisan Identification by National Origin




Figure 3.10 – Linked Fate




Figure 3.11 – Latino Campaign Outreach




Figure 3.12 – High Level of Latino Campaign Outreach by National Origin Group




Table 3.1 – Expectations for Local Latino Elected Officials’ Linked Fate

	Theoretical Expectations
	Latino Linked Fate ⁴⁷
<u>Socio-Demographic</u>	
Income	-
Female	-
Age	
<u>Psychological</u>	
Experience of Discrimination	
<u>Immigration</u>	
Foreign-born	+
Spanish Fluency	+
Mexican	-
Cuban	-
Puerto Rican	-
Family in U.S. for Long Time ⁴⁸	
<u>Community⁴⁹</u>	
Presence of Spanish Language Media	+
% Latino	+
Latino Median Household Income	-
No Ethnic Subgroup Majority	+

⁴⁷ Predictions for the Socio-Demographic, Psychological and Immigration categories for Latino linked fate are from Sanchez and Masouka’s findings of significant relationships among the Latino public for individual-level Latino linked fate. An empty cell indicates that they did not find a significant relationship.

⁴⁸ Excluded category is members of other national origin groups.

⁴⁹ I include the additional community level measures, which are not present in Sanchez and Masouka’s analysis. Theoretical predictions are my own based on literature previously presented in the dissertation.

Table 3.2 – Latino Local Elected Officials Linked Fate

	Latino Linked Fate		National Origin Linked Fate	
<u>Socio-Demographic</u>				
Income	-0.511	(0.509)	-0.489	(0.451)
Female	0.750	(0.480)	0.996*	(0.479)
Age	-0.00104	(0.0204)	-0.0128	(0.0229)
<u>Psychological</u>				
Experience of Discrimination	2.466**	(0.673)	2.121**	(0.694)
<u>Immigration</u>				
Foreign-born	0.199	(0.659)	0.533	(0.647)
Spanish Fluency	0.177	(0.274)	0.234	(0.291)
Mexican	-1.877**	(0.709)	-0.0435	(1.101)
Cuban	-0.481	(0.799)	1.933 ⁺	(0.990)
Puerto Rican	-1.874*	(0.785)	0.250	(1.011)
Family in U.S. for Long Time ⁵⁰	-1.651 ⁺	(0.947)		
<u>Community</u>				
Spanish Language Media	0.0194	(0.602)	-0.0177	(0.613)
% Latino	0.00503	(0.0146)	-0.0120	(0.0143)
Latino Median Household Income	-0.0375	(0.0289)	-0.0336	(0.0275)
No Ethnic Subgroup Majority	0.169	(0.600)	1.218 ⁺	(0.679)
Constant	8.966**	(2.752)	8.083**	(2.830)
<i>N</i>	123		110	
<i>R</i> ²	0.251		0.283	

Standard errors in parentheses
⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

⁵⁰ Excluded category is members of other national origin groups for both variables. Those who answered that their Family had been in the U.S. for a long time were not asked about National Origin linked fate.

Table 3.3 – Expectations for Latino Campaign Outreach

	Theoretical Expectations
	Latino Campaign Outreach Efforts
<u>Deracialization</u>	
% Latino in Jurisdiction	+
Prior Latino in Office	+
Incumbent	+
<u>Assimilation</u>	
% Foreign-Born Latinos	+
Latino Median Household Income	-
<u>Prior Community Involvement</u>	
Political Parties	-/+
Others' Political Campaigns	-
Latino Groups	+
<u>Other</u>	
Presence of Spanish Language Media	+
Spanish Fluency	+
Other National Origins	+
Family in U.S. for Long Time ⁵¹	-
District	+
Latino Linked Fate	+
<u>Controls</u>	
Income	
Age	
Female	

⁵¹ Excluded category is Mexican ancestry.

Table 3.4 – Predictors of Campaign Outreach in Spanish

	Spanish Ads		Spanish Written Materials		Canvass in Spanish	
<u>Deracialization</u>						
% Latino	0.0467**	(0.0157)	0.0554**	(0.0196)	0.00237	(0.0206)
Prior Latino in Office	1.519 ⁺	(0.902)	1.958 ⁺	(1.160)	1.492 ⁺	(0.897)
Incumbent	-1.289 ⁺	(0.614)	0.288	(0.725)	0.140	(1.055)
<u>Assimilation</u>						
% Foreign-Born Latinos	-0.00647	(0.0301)	-0.0245	(0.0263)	0.0128	(0.0317)
Latino Income	-0.0131	(0.0301)	-0.0254	(0.0333)	-0.0043	(0.0428)
<u>Community Involvement</u>						
Political Parties	0.353*	(0.166)	0.229	(0.142)	0.0995	(0.188)
Latino Groups	0.208 ⁺	(0.124)	0.485**	(0.151)	0.185	(0.122)
Others' Political Campaigns	-0.299 ⁺	(0.153)	-0.373 ⁺	(0.194)	0.0152	(0.166)
<u>Other</u>						
Spanish Language Media	2.240*	(1.121)	1.726	(1.056)	-0.821	(0.976)
Spanish Fluency	0.283	(0.407)	0.476	(0.463)	0.547	(0.430)
Other National Origins	2.812**	(0.984)	0.892	(1.020)	0.916	(1.075)
Family in U.S. District	-0.393	(1.049)	-2.256	(1.517)	-3.135*	(1.491)
Latino Linked Fate	-1.026	(0.766)	0.0739	(0.868)	2.293 ⁺	(1.094)
	-0.785	(1.176)	2.013	(1.231)	1.120	(1.292)
<u>Controls</u>						
Income	0.184	(0.328)	0.196	(0.368)	-0.325	(0.459)
Age	-0.00943	(0.0350)	-0.0828*	(0.0379)	-0.0118	(0.0506)
Female	2.513**	(0.979)	2.945*	(1.248)	0.890	(1.251)
Democrat	-0.170	(0.816)	0.368	(0.959)	0.890	(1.251)
Constant	-6.232*	(3.033)	-4.026	(3.777)	-2.329	(3.353)
N	103		112		103	

Standard errors in parentheses
⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 3.5 – Predictors of General Latino Campaign Outreach

	Endorsed by Latino Leaders		Latino Campaign Events		Latino Campaign Manager	
<u>Deracialization</u>						
% Latino	0.0182	(0.0197)	-0.00914	(0.0148)	0.0570**	(0.0167)
Prior Latino in Office	0.875	(0.858)	0.853	(0.737)	0.297	(0.733)
Incumbent	0.669	(0.729)	0.623	(0.614)	0.0492	(0.534)
<u>Assimilation</u>						
% Foreign-Born Latinos	0.0142	(0.0256)	-0.00651	(0.0205)	0.00083	(0.0203)
Latino Income	0.0892 ⁺	(0.0493)	-0.0383	(0.0290)	0.0393	(0.0313)
<u>Community Involvement</u>						
Political Parties	0.0883	(0.178)	0.318*	(0.135)	0.299*	(0.133)
Latino Groups	-0.163	(0.168)	0.0491	(0.0952)	0.111	(0.0915)
Others' Political Campaigns	0.270	(0.171)	-0.229 ⁺	(0.138)	-0.188	(0.139)
<u>Other</u>						
Spanish Language Media	-0.974	(0.860)	1.048	(0.682)	1.090	(0.828)
Spanish Fluency	-0.539	(0.389)	-0.159	(0.307)	-0.349	(0.354)
Other National Origins	2.338*	(0.978)	1.787*	(0.783)	0.702	(0.745)
Family in U.S.	-6.009**	(1.810)	-1.263	(1.217)	-1.769*	(0.843)
Linked Fate	1.845	(1.730)	0.191	(1.052)	-0.689	(1.094)
District	2.090*	(0.894)	0.274	(0.642)	0.00871	(0.663)
<u>Controls</u>						
Income	-0.371	(0.430)	0.357	(0.276)	0.741*	(0.292)
Age	-0.0294	(0.0509)	0.00383	(0.0265)	-0.00668	(0.0268)
Female	-2.245*	(1.017)	0.357	(0.630)	0.595	(0.652)
Democrat	0.437	(0.889)	0.343	(0.667)	0.852	(0.642)
Constant	-5.778	(4.863)	-1.093	(2.811)	-11.17**	(3.288)
<i>N</i>	103		103		103	

Standard errors in parentheses
⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 3.6 – Predictors of Level of Latino Campaign Outreach

	Latino Campaign Outreach	
<u>Deracialization</u>		
% Latino in Jurisdiction	0.0237**	(0.00709)
Prior Latino in Office	0.486 ⁺	(0.271)
Incumbent	0.113	(0.279)
<u>Assimilation</u>		
% Foreign-Born Latinos	-0.00232	(0.00958)
Latino Median Household Income	0.0131	(0.0141)
<u>Community Involvement</u>		
Political Parties	0.135*	(0.0620)
Latino Groups	0.0935*	(0.0439)
Others' Political Campaigns	-0.0779	(0.0600)
<u>Other</u>		
Spanish Language Media	0.692*	(0.327)
Spanish Fluency	0.0869	(0.151)
Other National Origins	1.300**	(0.298)
Family in U.S. for Long Time	-1.092*	(0.481)
Linked Fate	0.178	(0.512)
District	0.213	((0.285)
<u>Controls</u>		
Income	0.218*	(0.109)
Age	-0.00366	(0.0131)
Female	0.521	(0.317)
	0.314	(0.289)
Constant	-2.297	(1.524)
<i>N</i>	97	
<i>R</i> ²	0.641	

Standard errors in parentheses
⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

CHAPTER FOUR

Representing Latino Interests

In 2006, Escondido, California, located in San Diego County, was known as the “city without pity” for undocumented or illegal immigrants (Jenkins 2008).⁵² Escondido’s city council passed a number of anti-immigrant measures – ordinances calling for the suspension of business licenses for owners who hired undocumented or illegal workers, fines for landlord who rented to undocumented or illegal tenants, and for the police to partner with federal immigration agents for driver’s license checkpoints. Escondido, like other cities across the United States, approved local measures to deal with issues concerning immigrants, given the lack of immigration reform at the federal level.

The ordinances in Escondido sparked fury within the city’s growing Latino community. In the prior decade, the number of Latinos in Escondido grew from 36% to 49% of Escondido’s 144,000 residents. Yet, their representation in city hall lagged. The first Latino to serve in elected office since Escondido’s incorporation in 1888 was elected

⁵² In this chapter, I use the terms undocumented and illegal together in regard to individuals living in the United States without proper immigration status. A number of commentators and organizations prefer the term undocumented or unauthorized rather than illegal, explaining the term illegal to be derogatory and legally incorrect (Downes 2007; Martin 2010). However, at the time of the survey research, the AP Style book and many news outlets advocated the use of the term ‘illegal immigrant’ when referring to anyone who “resides in a country in criminal or civil violation of immigration law” (Christian et al. 2012). I utilize the terms together to reflect the divide in the discussion at the time regarding immigrants in the U.S. who are without proper immigration status.

only in 2008.⁵³ Olga Diaz, a Mexican-American and liberal Democrat, first ran for office in 2006 and succeeded in her second attempt in 2008 to be elected to one of the five at-large positions on the council. “Just by winning I completely changed the tone of every conversation we have on council,” Diaz said. “...I displaced one of those three votes which I contend held the city hostage on those issues [regarding immigration] for a long time” (Florido 2009). As a member of the council, Diaz introduced resolutions to rescind Escondido’s punitive immigration ordinances and condemn Arizona’s strict immigration enforcement law, SB 1070 (Garrick 2010). But Diaz has also consciously resisted becoming known as just the ‘Latino representative’ or ‘Latino advocate’ on the council. She emphasizes her election “was the result of a broad base of supporters that included young people, firefighters, and fiscal conservatives who had grown disenchanted with the previous council's spending plan” (Florido 2009) and prefers to think her 2008 victory “transcended ethnicity” (Lau 2008).

Diaz is one of many Latino elected officials serving in different cities throughout the United States. Her experiences, along with the nearly 400 Latino local elected officials in cities through out the United States, can help answer important questions concerning representation and leadership in Latino communities. What policies do Latino elected officials promote in City Hall? This chapter investigates the leadership behaviors of Latino local elected officials, like Councilwoman Diaz, by focusing on the nature of their policy advocacy and representation. In the following sections, I discuss the

⁵³ Interestingly, there seems to be consensus among the Escondido media outlets that Elmer Cameron, elected for one term in 1992, should not count as the first Latino elected official, since he did not acknowledge his Mexican-American heritage (Jenkins 2004).

literature's theoretical models and assumptions concerning minority representation and present results from an original national survey of Latino local elected officials.

From data in the survey, I consider first whether or not there is there consensus among Latino elected officials on local issues relating to immigration. Immigration is frequently considered to be the top issue on Latino policy agendas. Although it is presumed that Latinos support a liberal approach to immigration policy, this is not always true. For example, some Latinos, particularly those who had been in the United States longer, supported Arizona's controversial immigration law passed in 2010, SB 1070 (O'Dowd 2010). Other Latinos, such as Puerto Ricans who are already U.S. citizens, may not share an interest in immigration policy. While scholarship on Latino attitudes towards immigration policy is limited, research shows that different individual and community conditions shape Latino attitudes towards immigrants. It is unknown whether these same conditions shape the leadership attitudes and behaviors of Latino elected officials. Moreover, less attention has been paid to local efforts to enact different immigration policies, and no research has explored what factors may affect elected officials' behaviors towards these local policies. Will more conservative Latino elected officials or those whose families have been in the U.S. for a longer time support anti-immigrant policies? Will Latino elected officials from cities in states that border Mexico be more or less willing to support pro-immigrant measures? Will Latinos elected from a district or in a partisan election behave differently on policy positions such as local immigration measures than those running in at-large, non-partisan elections?

After examining Latino elected officials' leadership behavior on the issue of immigration, I gage whether immigration is actually the major policy issue that Latino

elected officials see facing Latinos at the local level. From Latino local elected officials' answers to open-ended questions in the survey, I explore what issues Latino local policy-makers define as the most important in their careers in City Halls across the country. Will they advocate policies directly or solely dealing with immigration or Latinos? Are Latino-specific policies a priority in their political agendas? Or do they see their success defined through a variety of policy areas? Scholars have not yet explored this area of local Latino politics. These questions are important as scholars consider the growing role of Latinos in elected office in cities across the U.S. and seek to understand their leadership behavior through policy advocacy.

Minority Representation

There is a voluminous literature within the field of representation examining minority elected officials' presence and behavior in office. To assess the relationship between minority groups and their elected officials, scholars often rely on Hanna Pitkin's classic work, *The Concept of Representation* (1967), which defines representation by its multiple dimensions: formal representation, symbolic representation, descriptive representation, and substantive representation.⁵⁴

Many studies evaluate racial or ethnic representation through descriptive representation by calculating the number of group members in office within an elected body. Pitkin (1967) explains that descriptive representation "...depends on the representative's characteristics, on what he *is* or *is like*, on being something rather than doing something." Descriptive representation focuses on the extent to which elected officials mirror their constituents' traits. For example, descriptive representation for racial

⁵⁴ In this chapter, I primarily discuss only two of Pitkin's forms of representation – descriptive and substantive representation.

or ethnic minorities occurs when members of the racial or ethnic group elect legislators that share similar race, ethnicity, or national origin as themselves.

Some scholars resist calls for descriptive representation based on shared group membership alone. “In political terms, what seems important is less what the legislature does than how it is composed” (Pitkin 1967). The membership of representatives in a particular group does not necessarily indicate how those representatives behave on behalf of the group. Critics of descriptive representation argue that the personal characteristics of a legislator may not influence legislators’ behaviors (Pitkin 1967; Thernstrom 1987; Swain 1993; Pennock 1979). Pitkin (1967) explains:

It [descriptive representation] is irrelevant insofar as representing involves no action at all but only characteristics; in that case representing is not something that any one man can do well or badly... there is no room within such a concept of political representation for leadership, initiative, or creative action.

Pitkin contends that descriptive representation ought not matter as long as the actions of the legislators reflect the interests of their constituents. Likewise Swain argues (1993),

Descriptive representation of blacks guarantees only black faces and is, at best, an intangible good; substantive representation is by definition real and color blind. Substantive representation can be measured by a politician’s performance on indicators such as voting and casework.

Swain suggests that shared racial identity is not the only, or even the best, indicator of a representatives’ behavior for the benefit of the racial group. The election of minority members is not enough; representation should be evaluated on behaviors in office that an elected official can be held accountable for, such as his or her voting record. For Pitkin, Swain, and others, the presence of minority representatives in elected office does not guarantee that minority elected officials will be group advocates.

Proponents of descriptive representation argue, however, that in most circumstances minority elected officials are the most qualified to represent on behalf of their group.⁵⁵ Williams (2000) writes, “What members of [marginalized] groups share is the experience of marginalization and the distinctive perspective on matters of public policy that comes of that experience.” While recognizing that some group representatives may be preferable to others, most advocates suggest that the election of a representative from a group means there will be an elected official to advocate for the group.

Thus the calls for increased descriptive representation are partly predicated on the expectation that elected officials with a shared group background will behave in a certain way as leaders for that group; that is, descriptive representation will lead to a subsequent increase in substantive representation. Substantive representation is defined as “acting in the interests of the represented in a manner responsive to them” (Pitkin 1967). In order for a representative to substantively represent his or her constituents, there must be a general congruence between the representative’s behavior and the citizens’ interests. The premise is that representatives who share traits with their group are more likely to be advocates of their groups’ interests and policy preferences. Pitkin notes that representatives “must not be found persistently at odds with the wishes of the represented without good reason in terms of their interests, without good explanation of why their wishes are not in accord with their interests” (Pitkin 1967). Responsive representatives

⁵⁵ Moreover, others claim that descriptive representation provides for minority groups additional normative benefits that are not dependent on the representatives’ behaviors (Dovi 2002; Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Williams 2000). Their presence can separately have symbolic value – to both counteract injustices towards minority groups and enhance the legitimacy and trust of democratic institutions. Minorities in elected office can increase the engagement of minority members in the political process and decrease feelings of political alienation (e.g. Banducci et al. 2004; Barreto et al. 2005; Gay 2002; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Rocha et al. 2010).

must work to enact laws and implement policies that meet the needs or demands of those they represent.

Pitkin's conceptualization of both descriptive and substantive representation has produced a generation of literature that is immense and varied. Scholars have extensively analyzed whether minority elected officials act on behalf of their groups looking primarily at African Americans and female elected officials and generally find that the race and gender of an elected official positively influences their leadership behavior on behalf of the group. African American representatives are both more supportive and more likely to introduce policies of concern to African American interests like civil rights or discrimination policies (Lublin 1997; Whitby 1997; Canon 1999; Haynie 2001; Tate 2003). Similarly, female representatives express more women-friendly attitudes, work to advance policies that benefit women, and vote for legislation that will help women (Norton 1999; Reingold 2000; Carroll 2001; Swers 2002). Scholars also find that minority elected officials in local office, more so than those at the federal level, produce substantive policy output effects such as in hiring of educators, police officers, and civil servants (e.g. Browning et al. 1984; Eisenger 1980; Fraga et al. 1986; Dye and Renick 1981; Mladenka 1989).

Less scholarly work looks at the Latino elected officials and the role ethnicity plays in their leadership behavior. Furthermore, the existing results are mixed – leaving it open for debate whether Latino elected officials will act as group representatives in the same ways as African American and female leaders. The growth of Latinos throughout the United States has led to an increased number of Latinos serving in elected office,

raising the question: What role will their ethnicity play in Latino elected officials' behavior in office?

Both Dahl (1961) and Wilson (1960) explain that the leadership behavior of prior immigrant and African American elected officials depended on the mobilization of a shared group identity. In the case of New Haven, Dahl observed immigrant groups coalescing over shared experiences and political parties capitalizing on immigrants' group identity to secure the groups' loyalty. Over time, as the immigrants assimilated, their group identity and political demands faded. Wilson observes how the African American group identity and desire for policy advocacy was shaped through the local political community and institutions. However, for Latinos, no single institution, event or experience establishes a strong history for Latinos to build a shared identity for politics. The lack of a cohesive identity may make it difficult for a clear Latino political agenda to emerge. For Latinos, given their community's diversity and relatively weak levels of pan-ethnicity, it may be surprising to find Latino elected leaders with an organized policy agenda for Latinos.

The early scholarship on Latino elected officials' behaviors differed in its findings.⁵⁶ Welch and Hibbing (1984) examine conservative coalition scores in a study of U.S. House members from the 93rd to 96th Congress, with the expectation that Latino elected officials would be more liberal than Anglo elected officials. They find evidence that both Latino representatives and non-Latino representatives with large Latino constituencies tend to vote more liberally than other members of Congress. Hero and Tolbert (1995) disagree with Welch and Hibbing's findings; instead, they find that there

⁵⁶ The Latino representatives in the early studies on Latino representation were limited to Latino elected officials who were likely almost all of Mexican-American descent.

was no significant difference between Latino representatives and non-Latino representatives in the 100th Congress when using Southwest Voter Research Initiative (SWVRI) scores, which analyze the interests of Mexican-Americans. However, using the same data as Hero and Tolbert, Kerr and Miller (1997) dispute their findings by questioning the methodological choice of SWVRI scores and the use of the 100th Congress alone. Kerr and Miller find evidence that Latino members of Congress do behave distinctly from other members of Congress and that Latinos receive direct substantive representation from Latino legislators.

Subsequent scholarship has investigated the role that party and ideology play in understanding how Latino representatives behave in office. For example, Knoll (2009) uses a scorecard from the National Hispanic Leadership Agenda and finds that among members of the 108th Congress, Democrats and those from majority-Democratic districts or states best represent Latinos. Latino members of Congress were not more likely to win positive NHLA ratings than the rest of their colleagues. However, others find that Latino legislators behave as Latino group representatives, although their partisanship and ideology are important in shaping their behavior as well (Lublin 1997; Griffin and Newman 2007). Scholars have increasingly noted the difficulty in disentangling legislator and district characteristics when assessing substantive representation (Juenke and Preuhs 2012; Grose 2005; Whitby and Krause 2001).

More recent work has moved beyond Congress to analyze the nature of Latino elected officials in different levels of government. Most scholarship on Latino city councilors and mayors tends to focus on circumstances surrounding their election rather than their behavior in office (Alozie and Manganaro 1993; Trounstein and Valdini 2008;

Hero 1987, 1990; Bullock III and MacManus 1990; Welch 1990). At the state level, Latinos legislators tend to work on interests related to the broader Latino community, policies such as education, health, or bilingual services (Bratton 2006; Fraga et al. 2007). Latino state representatives are also able to block certain pieces of legislation, which would harm the Latino community and prevent backlash against Latinos (Preuhs 2007, 2005; Santoro 1999). Additional work finds Latino school board members have a positive effect on educational outputs for Latino students (Leal et al. 2004; Shah 2009; Fraga et al. 1986; Ross et al. 2010; Rocha and Wrinkle 2011).

As more attention is focused on Latino leaders' behavior in office, some have noted the difficulty in identifying what should or should not be a Latino issue, given the diversity of the Latino community. For African Americans, scholars focus on issues dealing with civil rights, discrimination, poverty, unemployment, education and crime because these issues disproportionately affect African Americans (e.g. Haynie 2001; Tate 2003). Latinos lack the relative homogeneity of African Americans, which leads to questions over what issues may constitute a Latino political agenda. Relatively little work has examined Latino interests – instead most presume that Latino interests are related to the areas of education, immigration, healthcare, and employment (Bratton 2006; Fraga et al. 2007; Rouse 2013). Bratton (2006) notes that even on these issues typically considered Latino issues, Latino state representatives varied by state, and their behavior was far from uniform.

Scholarship is increasingly noting the distinctions among Latino legislators and their leadership behavior. Rocca, Sanchez, and Uscinski (2008) show that certain socioeconomic characteristics, such as education and gender, play a significant role in

how Latino congressional members vote. Knoll (2009) finds that the district's poverty level may influence Latino elected officials' behavior. Casellas (2010) also notes the differences in leadership behavior between Latinos serving in professionalized legislatures and those in citizen legislatures. Garcia et. al (2008) observe the additional obstacles Latina legislators in state and local politics in Texas must overcome. Taken together, these studies suggest two important findings: first, Latino elected officials vary in their leadership behavior and second, scholars who wish to understand the representative behavior of Latino elected officials need to analyze the personal attributes of legislators themselves, as well as the differing political and social contexts in which they serve.

The debate in existing research suggests more research is necessary on Latinos in elected office. Scholars should pay attention to how personal and contextual factors shape the leadership behavior of Latino elected officials. The existing scholarship on Latino leadership behavior in office, with its focus primarily on Congress and state legislatures, has little to say about the dynamics of local representation and Latino leadership behavior, even though 30% of all Latino elected officials are elected to municipal positions. This limitation prevents scholars from observing patterns of behavior not present at the state or national level. A national examination of local Latino elected officials' behaviors, particularly those relating to policy advocacy, is a new avenue of research for scholars interested in these topics.

While the data relating to Latino leadership behavior may provide new insights into the way ethnicity shapes leadership behavior, it also presents a significant difficulty: data across cities is difficult to obtain and meaningfully compare. Roll call voting data,

which scholars traditionally use to assess substantive representation for different groups, is more easily available at the national and state levels (for a review, see Cameron et al. 1996; Grose 2005). The use of roll call data, however, may be problematic given that scholars must presume what Latino interests are in order to select roll call votes.⁵⁷ Prior local research tends to assess minority leadership in single cities or sets of cities (e.g. Hero 1987; Muñoz and Henry 1986; Geron 2005). Research on Latino leadership at the local level that seeks comparison across a large number of cities requires new approaches in data collection. While attaining data at the city level is difficult and time consuming, it provides valuable information (Marshall et al. 2011).

In sum, there exists both a theoretical and empirical puzzle to be further explored for local Latino leadership. First, on the theoretical side, the theories of minority representation based on the experiences of other prior groups in the United States may not apply to Latino elected officials. The theories might need updating or expanding. Latinos may not approach representation as a monolithic group like African Americans, nor may Latinos have an easily identifiable set of interests to represent. There may be important differences between local Latino representatives' advocacy as ethnic leaders, given their different personal backgrounds and community contexts. Second, there is an opportunity to expand data collection to examine Latino leadership at the local level in a wider variety of cities across the country. To further explore these issues, I present findings from my national survey of local Latino elected officials.

⁵⁷ Others have noted this difficulty as well and are now exploring alternative measures of substantive representation, such as committee membership and proceedings, floor speeches, and constituent communications to explore patterns within minority representation (Bratton 2006; Minta 2011; Grose 2011; Wilson 2009; Butler and Broockman 2011; Gamble 2007; Rouse 2013).

Analysis of Latino Policy Behavior

In this chapter, I present results from the Latino Leadership Survey regarding the different policy positions and actions of the Latino local elected officials. Using survey data from local Latino elected officials, I explore the questions: What is a Latino interest at the local level? Do Latino elected officials have an identifiable or unique set of local policy interests? Do Latino elected officials act as group representatives for their Latino community?

To answer these questions, I begin by examining Latino elected officials' support for city involvement in immigration concerns, considered to be a pressing issue for many Latinos. In the first part of my analysis, I examine survey results for the Latino local elected officials on a series of policy positions relating to local immigration concerns. I present results indicating their support or opposition for each proposal and examine what factors influence their support or opposition for both immigrant-friendly and immigrant-hostile policies. Then, I discuss the elected officials' observations of the policy concerns of their local Latino communities and what they report as the three most important local policy issues they have worked on as elected officials in their cities.

Local Immigration Policies

With nearly nine million new immigrants entering the U.S. over the last decade, the nation is experiencing a level of immigration similar to the early 1900s (see Table 4.1). In 2010, approximately 13% of the U.S. population was born outside the U.S., and if trends continue, by 2050, scholars expect nearly 20% of U.S. residents to be foreign-born (Passel and Cohn 2008). Today, nearly 40 million U.S. residents are foreign-born. Although the United States is historically a nation of immigrants, immigrants today arrive

from more places than ever before. Partly as a result of changes to U.S. immigration laws dating to the 1960s, the majority of immigrants now come from Latin America and Asia, unlike prior immigrants who originated mostly from Europe (Tichenor 2002).

Insert Table 4.1 about here

Immigrants today are increasingly settling in cities and states beyond the traditional destinations of previous waves of immigrants. As communities change, some experience anxiety both over the scale of immigration and immigrants' increasing ethnic diversity. Confronted with an absence of a comprehensive immigration policy at the national level, many states and municipalities have enacted their own immigration-related proposals to deal with increasing immigrant populations. Some of these local ordinances impose restrictions aimed at the undocumented or illegal immigrant populations, such as Escondido's fine for landlords who were found to have rented to illegal or undocumented immigrants. A number of the anti-immigrant policies currently face legal challenges, leaving it unclear what role cities or states should play in enforcing punitive immigration measures. Other cities have considered policies designed to welcome and integrate immigrants into their community, such as language policies that allow encourage accessibility to different city services for immigrants through the assistance of translators.

Due to the growth in the number of immigrants from Mexico and other Latin and South American countries, the Latino population has become a central focus in the current immigration debate in the United States. Immigration is frequently perceived as a Latino issue, although it is not just an issue facing Latinos or even all Latinos. Hero and Preuhs (2007) explain, "Because immigration to the United States over the last generation is so heavily from Latin America, and Mexico in particular, policies regarding

‘immigrants’ may be viewed effectively as policies regarding ‘Latinos’.” Latinos in California, for example, mobilized in response to Proposition 187, a 1994 state ballot initiative to withhold services from undocumented or illegal immigrants and require public servants to report any suspected individuals to Immigration and Naturalization Services, which was perceived as an anti-Latino policy (Pantoja et al. 2001).

Conventional wisdom suggests Latinos, and their leaders, support immigrant-friendly policies and oppose anti-immigrant policies. Latinos share an ethnicity with the majority of immigrants coming to the United States today. Many Latinos also have family and friends who are immigrants, both documented and undocumented (Sanchez 2011). However, the diversity of Latinos and their different historical experiences may lead some to support more nativist, anti-immigrant policies. While generally Latinos support more liberal immigration policies than whites, some Latinos support a restrictionist or conservative approach to immigration. This underscores a problem in thinking about how Latino leaders should behave – what is the best way for Latino leaders to represent a group with different interests on issues like immigration?

It is unknown what immigration policies Latino local elected officials would support or oppose in their cities. Cities have adopted a variety of approaches to local immigration policy. Given the large-scale increases in the size of the Latino population in recent years in cities across the United States it is important to consider what local Latino elected officials think about the issue of immigration. Although many Latinos have a personal connection to the immigration issue, there may be variation in attitudes about immigration among Latino elected officials. Do variations on local immigration policies exist? And if so, what are the determinants of Latino leaders’ attitudes?

In the next part of this section, I detail the immigration policies used in the survey to assess local Latino elected officials' leadership behavior. Since no roll call data on immigration policy is available at the local level, I presented survey respondents with a series of seven hypothetical immigration policies to consider in their role as elected officials as proposals for their cities.⁵⁸ Each policy proposal was drawn from a real policy or attempted policy in a city in the United States. The survey respondents indicated their level of support or opposition to the immigration policies using a 0 to 10 scale. Three policies are immigrant-friendly; four policy proposals are immigrant-hostile. I scaled the local Latino elected officials' responses to create the immigrant-friendly policy proposals position variable and the immigrant-hostile policy proposals position variables.⁵⁹ I detail each of the policies in the scales below.

Immigrant-friendly Policy Proposals:

Language Access

Proposal: City agencies should provide services in a variety of languages to help non-English speaking clients.

Although there is no official language of the United States, English is the de facto national language. However, according to the Census, of the 281.0 million people aged 5 and over in the U.S., 55.4 million people (20%) typically spoke a language other than

⁵⁸ The policies were presented to the survey respondents as hypotheticals to consider. Respondents were asked to consider the policies as if the proposals were being presented to their city with the possibility to adopt.

⁵⁹ These questions could be capturing attitudes relating to other immigrants who are not Latino, as well. Given that Latinos are the largest immigrant group in the United States and the subject of much media discussion in terms of immigration, I expect Latino immigrants to be highly salient in Latino local elected officials' consideration of these policies.

English at home. Approximately 24.5 million individuals ranked their conversational ability in the English language as below “very well,” indicating at least some need for English assistance. Many immigrants face challenges in learning English. Yet, only a few cities have enacted policies to support individuals with limited English proficiency. Oakland, San Francisco, and Philadelphia were the first cities to adopt language access ordinances in 2001. Since then, other cities, such as Minneapolis, New York City, Seattle, and Long Beach, have adopted similar measures. Advocates stress the need for fair access to government services for immigrants and those with limited English ability, while opponents tend to resist the associated costs of providing translation services. Many local governments lag in providing multilingual access to community services.

Non-Citizen Voting

Proposal: Non-citizen, legal or documented immigrants should be allowed to vote in school board elections if they have children in the public schools.

Until the 1920s, 22 states and federal territories permitted noncitizen voting in local, state and federal offices, and noncitizen immigrants held elected offices in cities (Hayduk 2004). In many areas, voting rights were not tied to nativity until anti-immigrant, nativist passions flourished in the 1920s and led to the disenfranchisement of immigrants (Aylsworth 1931; Raskin 1993). More recently, non-citizen suffrage has been adopted or considered in several cities.⁶⁰ Immigrants are allowed to vote in municipal

⁶⁰ Noncitizens may vote in local elections if their state allows it. For example, in Massachusetts, the cities of Amherst, Cambridge, and Newtown have passed ordinances allowing for noncitizen voting but the state legislature has not approved it. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 made it a federal crime for a noncitizen to vote in a federal election. Other countries, such as Finland and

elections in Takoma Park and other towns in Maryland and in school board elections in Chicago.⁶¹ The issue of immigrant voting in local elections has been considered by other cities in the last decade, including San Francisco, New York City, and Washington D.C. (Swarns 2004).

The survey's policy proposal was modeled after San Francisco's ballot initiatives to amend their city charter to allow non-citizens to vote in school board elections. In the 1982 decision *Plyler v. Doe*, the Supreme Court guaranteed all children, regardless of immigration status, the right to public education. Over half of Latino school children have at least one parent who is an immigrant, and in San Francisco at the time of Proposition D, one in three public school students had an immigrant parent ("Children of Immigrants Data Tool" 2012; Coll 2010). Latinos frequently list education as their top area of concern (Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000). Without the ability to vote, advocates argue that many Latino parents do not have a voice on important education matters. San Francisco's ballot initiative, known as Proposition D, lost 54 to 46% in November 2010, and a similar measure in 2004 lost by a tighter margin of 51 to 49%.

Municipal Photo Identification Cards

Proposal: Cities should offer municipal photo identification cards available to all residents, regardless of immigration status.

A limited number of cities have begun issuing municipal cards, intended to ease the lives of undocumented or illegal immigrants who lack photo identification. Advocates

Sweden, allow resident aliens to vote in local elections, and a few countries, such as New Zealand, Uruguay, and Chile, allow resident aliens to vote in national elections.

⁶¹ New York City also allowed noncitizen voting for school board elections up until the elimination of school boards in 2003.

support access to government-issued photo identification cards so immigrants may seek medical treatment, cash a check, or pick up mail packages. A small number of cities, like San Francisco and New Haven, issue photo identification cards for city residents, without questioning the immigration status of applicants. While the city cards do not grant legal residency or establish the right to work, proponents suggest that the cards help integrate undocumented or illegal immigrants into their communities. New Haven Mayor John DeStefano said that the city's 'Elm City Resident Card' was a "fundamental acknowledgement of an individual's worth and dignity" (Costantini 2011). Since the introduction of the program in 2007, New Haven has issued almost 7,500 identification cards to residents of the community.

Support of Immigrant-Friendly Policies

Insert Figure 4.1 about here

Local Latino elected officials generally supported immigrant-friendly policies but varied on their level of support for different policies, as shown in Figure 4.1. A majority of local Latino elected officials supported the language access policy proposal but were divided on the issues of non-citizen voting and municipal photo identification cards. Language access for city services received high levels of support from Latino local elected officials – with 46% indicating total support and 80% expressing general support. Latino local elected officials were less enthusiastic about the proposal of non-citizens voting in school board elections: only a quarter (25.4%) reported the highest level of support. Results show they were divided on the issue, with another quarter (27.8%) of local Latino elected officials expressing a high level of opposition to non-citizen voting. Latino local elected officials were similarly divided on the proposal of municipal photo

identification cards for their cities. Over half (55.7%) leaned towards supporting the policy, but almost a quarter (23%) were in total opposition of a policy of photo identification cards in their city.

Immigrant-Hostile Policy Proposals:

Landlord Fines

Proposal: The city should fine landlords who rent to illegal or undocumented immigrants.

Hazelton, Pennsylvania, a small former coal-mining town in central Pennsylvania, passed the “Illegal Immigration Relief Act” in 2006. According to Mayor Louis J. Barletta, the ordinance aimed to make Hazelton “one of the most difficult places in the United States for illegal immigrants” (Preston 2006). The policy financially punished landlords who rented to illegal or undocumented immigrants and enabled the city to send repeat offenders to jail. Other cities, like Escondido, have considered or passed similar ordinances, but many of these cities have since rescinded the anti-immigrant rental policies or decline to enforce the measures.⁶² The legality of these ordinances is still unclear, as challenges to the laws make their way through the courts in different districts.⁶³

⁶² Escondido, California, Riverside, New Jersey, Farmers Branch, Texas, Valley Park, Missouri rescinded similar housing ordinances, after legal challenges.

⁶³ Respondents were asked to consider the hypothetical immigrant proposals as if they could potentially be adopted in their city, regardless of legality.

E-Verify

Proposal: All private companies with city contracts should be required to use systems that screen their employees' immigration status.

Several municipalities, and a number of states, passed laws both requiring and prohibiting the use of E-Verify, an electronic system for employers to verify their employee's authorization to work. The program compares an employee's Employment Eligibility Verification Form I-9 to government records. Originally established as Basic Pilot in 1997, E-Verify is a free program operated by the Department of Homeland Security in partnership with the Social Security Administration. Federal government agencies and contractors and employers in states like Alabama and Arizona must use E-Verify. Other states, like California, have sought to block municipalities from mandating the use of E-Verify. In 2010, the Denver city council passed an ordinance, similar to the survey proposal, which required businesses bidding on city contracts to use E-Verify to validate new employee employment eligibility (Ingold 2010). Critics of the E-Verify policy claim the program is costly and inaccurate, and some point out the difficulties it poses to businesses, particularly within the agricultural industry.

Local Police Involvement in Immigration Enforcement

Proposal: In routine patrols, local police should be allowed to inquire about a person's citizenship status.

Although immigration law enforcement is primarily considered to be limited to federal authorities, some cities, counties and states have directed their local law enforcement to join federal authorities in investigating citizenship status concerns. For example, in 2008, the Police Department in the city of Phoenix signed a 287(g)

Memorandum of Agreement with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to train and deputize local officers to investigate an individual's immigration status.

In contrast, other cities argue that immigrant communities should not see local officers as a part of immigration enforcement. Some cities explicitly prohibit officers from questioning individuals for the sole purpose of checking immigration status, such as Los Angeles Police Department's Special Order 40. Policies prohibit police involvement with immigration enforcement to prevent negative repercussions on relationships between the police and the immigrant community, fearing that individuals will not report crimes or come forward with information. Baltimore Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake signed an executive order in 2012 to bar the use of city funds, resources, and personnel from investigating or questioning an individual's immigration status (Morello and Lazo 2012).

While some cities have passed policies banning the police from asking questions regarding immigration status, other cities and states have encouraged police involvement in immigration matters. In 2006, the city council of Costa Mesa, located in southern California, approved a policy to give police the authority to enforce federal immigration law (Esquivel and Barboza 2010). The debate over the role of local law enforcements in immigration enforcement continues with recent events such as the Supreme Court's ruling to uphold the state law enforcement provision in Arizona's 2010 immigration law and the indication by the Obama administration that it will phase out 287(g) agreements (Liptak 2012).

Secure Communities

Proposal: The city's law enforcement should provide immigration authorities access to fingerprints for people who have been detained or arrested.⁶⁴

Secure Communities is an immigration enforcement program launched in 2008 under President Bush and expanded by President Obama to identify immigrants in U.S. jails who are deportable under immigration law. During the booking process, participating jails must submit the fingerprints of detained or arrested individuals to immigration databases. If fingerprints match, ICE agents determine if immigration enforcement action is required. Secure Communities has been activated in 1,049 local law enforcement agencies in 39 states (Preston and Semple 2011). Not all cities support the use of the federal program in their communities: for example, San Francisco's Sheriff Michael Hennessey objected to Secure Communities, arguing the program would have a "chilling effect" on the willingness of individuals to work with local law enforcement ("Immigration Bait and Switch" 2010). Places like San Francisco, the District of Columbia, and Arlington County, Va., sought to opt out of Secure Communities, but it has been unclear at times whether localities could decline to participate in the program.

Support of Immigrant-Hostile Policies

Insert Figure 4.2 about here

Like local Latino elected officials' response to the immigrant-friendly policies, Latino local elected officials generally opposed immigrant-hostile policies but expressed

⁶⁴ This policy proposal was added to the survey after the Pilot questionnaire was completed, given the news coverage Secure Communities received in the spring of 2011, regarding whether cities could or could not opt out of the program. This mostly accounts for the difference in non-responses when compared to the other immigration policies.

some mixed views on a few policies. As shown in Figure 4.2, most (92.8%) would oppose a policy in their city requiring fines for landlords found to rent to illegal or undocumented immigrants. Similarly, nearly all (89.8%) Latino local elected officials opposed a policy allowing the police to check immigration status of individuals during routine patrols. In contrast, less than half (44.4%) of respondents were generally opposed to mandating an E-Verify policy for their cities, but 34.1% were in support and nearly 20% were neutral towards such a policy. Likewise, Latino local elected officials were mixed in their support and opposition for a policy like Secure Communities. Half (50.9%) opposed local law enforcement sharing fingerprints with federal immigration authorities but nearly a third (31.3%) supported the policy.

What Shapes Latino Leaders' Immigration Policy Attitudes?

Given the differing levels of support and opposition to both immigrant-friendly and immigrant-hostile policies, I turn next to analyzing what factors influence Latino local elected officials' leadership positions on the issue of immigration. What influences the leadership behavior of Latino local elected officials to mobilize as potential advocates for immigration-friendly policies or as defenders opposing immigrant-hostile policies? Because prior research on Latinos and their attitudes towards immigration policy is limited, I rely on additional literature about the general population's attitudes towards immigration policy and literature relating to representation to explain Latino local elected officials' behaviors dealing with immigration policy.

Variables and Hypotheses

I discuss key variables and hypotheses from the scholarship and present results from multivariate analyses of the Latino elected officials' immigrant-friendly and

immigrant-hostile policy positions. I identify three sets of variables that may influence Latino local elected officials' leadership views on local immigration policy: Personal Attributes, Social Context and Institutional Traits.

Personal Attributes

American Assimilation: Scholars have found that whites or Anglos tend to support more restrictionist immigration policies than Latinos, but over time, the differences between the two groups diminish as Latinos become more assimilated into American society (Branton 2007; Binder et al. 1997; Rouse et al. 2010; Knoll 2012; Hood et al. 1997; de la Garza and DeSipio 1998; Cain and Kiewet 1987; Alvarez and Butterfield 2000). Latinos born in the U.S. and those more integrated into the U.S. retain fewer cultural ties with immigrants and are more likely to support immigrant-hostile policies (Binder et al. 1997). This complements Dahl's understanding of immigrant assimilation. I expect Latino political leaders who are more assimilated will be less likely to mobilize as immigrant advocates. While there are many dimensions of assimilation, for this analysis, assimilation is measured simply as whether an individual is foreign born or not.⁶⁵ I expect Latino local elected officials who are born in the United States will be less likely than those who are immigrants to support immigrant-friendly policies and oppose immigrant hostile policies.

Linked Fate and Cultural Affinity: Scholarship notes that the level of group awareness and group affinity among Latinos influences their opinion (Sanchez 2006).⁶⁶

⁶⁵ I ran the models with an additional measure of assimilation with the variable of Spanish fluency, which is found to decline in later generations, but I did not find any significant results. This model is available from the author.

⁶⁶ Conversely, racial and ethnic prejudice also influences immigration attitudes. Native-born Americans who believe in certain negative stereotypes – stereotypes that racial and

Similar to the assimilation process, Latinos with weaker attachments to other Latinos are less inclined to support immigrant-friendly policies (de la Garza et al. 1991; Hood et al. 1997; Branton 2007; Knoll 2012). Scholars have also examined this among the general population, as the cultural affinity hypothesis – that is, those who share cultural attributes with immigrants will have stronger pro-immigrant sentiments (Espendshade 1995). Many of the recent immigrants to the United States are Latinos, and much of the immigration debate that is negative involves Latinos. Latino leaders may wish to avoid the difficulties anti-Latino rhetoric and stereotyping would bring to their community. Likewise, those elected officials who had been previously involved in Latino organizations may be more aware of immigration concerns. I expect Latino local elected officials with higher senses of cultural affinity to support immigrant-friendly policies and oppose immigrant-hostile policies.

National Origin Background: As noted in previous chapters, intra-group differences among Latinos are frequently based on country of origin. Not all Latinos share the same status as immigrants – for example, as citizens Puerto Ricans can freely travel to the United States, and many Cubans legally immigrated to the United States with the status of political refugees. Scholars usually find Latinos with Mexican heritage have more favorable views on immigration-friendly policies (Rouse et al. 2010; Branton 2007). Likewise, I expect Latino local elected officials whose families are of Mexican descent to be more supportive of immigrant-friendly policies and oppose immigrant-hostile policies.

ethnic group members are lazy, willing to commit crime, or lack of intelligence – are more likely oppose pro-immigrant policies. The issue of stereotyping was beyond the scope of this project.

Partisanship: An individual's party preference is one of the most consistent predictors of American political attitudes (Erickson and Tedin 2005). Republicans are more likely to support stricter immigration policies than are Democrats (Citrin et al. 1997; Citrin et al. 1990; Frensdreis and Tatalovich 1997). I expect local Latino elected officials who are Democrats to be more likely to support immigrant-friendly policies and less likely to support immigrant-hostile policies.

Socio-demographic Controls: I control for two of the standard socio-demographic variables – including sex and education.⁶⁷ Although women tend to have more liberal policy views than men on most issues (e.g. Swers 2002), women in general tend to have a more restrictionist view on immigration policies (Burns and Gimpel 2000). However, among Latinas, evidence is mixed (Hood et al. 1997; Binder et al. 1997; Branton 2007). Higher levels of education are linked to more conservative immigration policy preference among Latinos, which contrasts from education's opposite effect on white's immigration attitudes (Hood et al. 1997; Miller et al. 1984).

Social Context

Social Contact: The effect of a high number of immigrants living nearby is contested in the literature. Two competing hypotheses have emerged: social contact and group threat. The contact hypothesis argues that increased interracial interaction between groups will lead to more positive attitudes (e.g. Allport 1954; Jackman and Crane 1986; Sigelman and Welch 1993). There is mixed evidence for the hypothesis in terms of immigrant contact – for example, Hood and Morris (1997) show that living near and

⁶⁷ I ran the models with the additional socio-demographic measures of age and income, and I did not find any significant results. I choose to exempt these controls, given the elected officials tended to be older and wealthier than the general Latino public, as shown in Chapter Three. Models with these additional controls are available from the author.

having contact with immigrants made individuals more open to immigrant-friendly policies, while Hood and Morris (1998) find increased contact with undocumented immigrants makes it less likely for individuals to have positive attitudes towards immigration. To measure social contact, I include the percent of foreign-born Latinos in the city.

Group Threat: The alternative to the social contact hypotheses is the heightened intergroup contact or group threat hypothesis (e.g. Glaser 1994). Based on an older literature examining white-Black racial relations, the group threat hypothesis expects that as a community diversifies, the dominant ethnic or racial group fears it will lose its existing social, political, and economic power (Blalock 1967). In the context of immigration, a growing number of immigrants may increase economic competition, particularly within the lower wage job market. Some evidence supports this hypothesis among the general population (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Espenshade 1995) but less so for Latinos specifically (Hood et al. 1997; Rouse et al. 2010). To examine this hypothesis, I include a measure of the elected officials' Latino median household income in their city from the U.S. Census. This variable is calculated as a percentage of the city's overall median household income. To capture those elected officials serving Latino communities with a low socio-economic status, I segregate the variable: including those with cities that have a Latino median household income less than the average (86%) of survey respondents' cities' Latino median household incomes. I expect local Latino elected officials in cities with a lower Latino economic status will be less supportive of immigrant-friendly policies and less likely to oppose immigrant-hostile policies.

Latino Community Economic Status: In looking at the socio-economic status of a community, alternative scholarship suggests that a higher socio-economic status for a city's Latino population may discourage Latino local elected officials from supporting friendly immigration policies and opposing hostile policies. Dahl predicts that as an immigrant group's socio-economic status improves and the group members assimilate, they will no longer desire elected officials to act as ethnic advocates. To examine this hypothesis, I include a measure of the city's Latino median household income for those with cities above the average (86%) Latino median household income.

Institutional Traits

Type of Jurisdiction: The role of electoral structure is long debated in the literature on representation. For descriptive representation, most agree that single member districts increase the number of African Americans elected (e.g. Karnig 1980; Davidson and Korbel 1981; Engstrom and McDonald 1981; Welch and Karnig 1978; but see also Sass and Mehay 2003) and in some cases Latinos (Welch 1990; Polinard et al. 1994; Leal et al. 2004; Shah 2010). Less work has focused on linking electoral structure directly to issues of substantive representation. Do at-large elections force minority elected officials to appeal more broadly or consider policy positions of other groups, particularly in cities where Latinos are not the majority? Meier et al. (2005) find that minority school board members elected in ward-based elections were associated with the hiring of more minority administrators to the school district. Following their findings, I expect Latino local elected officials elected from districts or wards to be more supportive of immigrant-friendly policies and less supportive of immigrant-hostile policies.

Type of Election: Early research shows Republicans benefitted from nonpartisan elections (Lee 1960; Hawley 1968); however that bias may have been mitigated from demographic and political changes in urban cities over time (Welch and Bledsoe 1986). The Latino community has historically voted Democrat (DeSipio 1996; Garcia and de la Garza 1977; de la Garza et al. 1992). I expect nonpartisan elections may give a slight advantage to candidates who are Republicans and thus, tend to oppose immigrant-friendly policies and support immigrant-hostile policies. However, in the survey results, 23 of the 25 (92%) Latino local elected officials who had partisan elections were Democrats, so I am unable to test this and omit this variable.

Constituent Demographics: I include whether a Latino local elected official reported his or her jurisdiction to have a majority of conservative constituents. I also include their reported percentage of Latino constituents.⁶⁸ I expect Latino local elected officials in conservative jurisdictions are more likely to oppose immigrant-friendly policies and support immigrant-hostile policies. I expect those with a larger percentage of Latino constituents will be more liberal on immigration policy concerns.

Dependent Variables

The two dependent variables considered are created from the immigration-friendly policy proposals and immigrant-hostile policy proposals. The variables were created from adding the respondents' level of support for the seven policies explored above: language access, non-citizen voting and municipal photo identification cards for the immigrant-friendly policy proposals dependent variable; and landlord fines, E-Verify, local police's involvement in immigration enforcement and Secure Communities for the

⁶⁸ A more in-depth explanation of how these measures were calculated can be found in Chapter Three.

immigrant-hostile policy proposals dependent variable. The immigrant-hostile variable was flipped to allow for ease of comparison; a positive relationship indicates support for immigrant-friendly policies and opposition to immigrant-hostile policies. I created two summated scales from the seven policies and divided the scales so both range from 0 to 1.⁶⁹

Immigrant Policy Attitude Results

To understand the personal, social, and institutional factors of local Latino elected officials' support for immigrant-friendly policies and opposition to immigrant-hostile policies, I include two models of linear regression with robust standard errors, as shown in Table 4.2 with Models 1 and 2. In Model 1, I present results of the predictors for support of immigrant-friendly policies, and in Model 2, I present results of the predictors for opposition to immigrant hostile policies.⁷⁰ Full summary statistics on the variables of interest are available in the Appendix.

Insert Table 4.2 about here

The results show a strong, statistically significant relationship between Latino local elected officials' sense of linked fate or group consciousness with other Latinos and their views on immigration. Those elected officials who more strongly agreed with the statement, "What happens to other Latinos affects what happens in my life and how I view politics," were more supportive of immigrants. In both models, the linked fate variable has the largest coefficient. I had expected that prior activity in a Latino group or

⁶⁹ The immigrant-friendly policies scale has a Cronbach Alpha score of 0.7234, and the immigrant-hostile policies scale has a score of 0.7129, which indicates reliability to the scales. Confirmatory factor analysis verified that these variables hang together on two constructs.

⁷⁰ Analysis of residuals and other diagnostic checks led to the exclusion of four outliers in Model 1 and three outliers in Model 2.

organization, which also captures a sense of Latino cultural affinity, to positively influence their immigration policy positions. However, I do not find a significant relationship between prior involvement in Latino groups and immigration advocacy. The models also show no significant relationship between the immigrant-status of local Latino elected officials and their support for immigrant-friendly policies or opposition to immigrant-hostile policies. These findings suggest that Latino local elected officials who have internalized a personal connection to other Latinos, regardless of their social circumstances of being an immigrant or being involved in Latino organizations, tend to be more liberal on local immigration policy concerns.

Both models also demonstrate the strong role partisan identification plays in shaping local Latino elected officials' positions on immigration matters for their communities. Democrats were more likely to support immigration-friendly policy and oppose immigrant-hostile policies. This finding on the role of partisanship is particularly striking, given that the majority of local Latino elected officials are chosen in non-partisan elections. I do not find that being elected from a district influences local Latino elected officials' immigration attitudes.

Beyond partisanship and linked fate, the two models show different factors influence local immigration policy, depending on the nature of the policy. The individual traits of the local Latino elected officials influence their positions on immigration-friendly policies but do not impact their opposition to immigrant-hostile policies. Consistent with prior scholarship that finds Latinos with higher levels of education tend to be less likely to support immigration, I find that local Latino elected officials who have a college degree or more are less likely to support immigrant-friendly proposals. I also

find that Latina local elected officials are more supportive of immigrant-friendly policy proposals.

Unlike previous findings on national origin differences, I find that Latino local elected officials with Mexican family heritage are less supportive than Latinos from other national origin backgrounds. The national origin of the local Latino elected officials does not seem to influence their opposition of immigrant-hostile policies. To further examine the role of national origin on support for friendly policies, I include an interaction term for Mexicans who were born in the U.S, shown in Model 1a in Table 4.3. This model reveals that the negative relationship is due to local elected officials with Mexican heritage who were born in the United States. This finding suggests that there may be an assimilation process occurring at least within the Mexican-American population of local Latino elected officials.

Insert Table 4.3 here

The demographics of their constituents and their cities also influences local Latino elected officials' positions relating to immigration. For immigrant-friendly policies, their support was weakened if they reported to represent an area where the majority of their constituents were conservative or somewhat conservative. However, having a majority of conservative constituents did not influence their opposition to immigrant-hostile policies.

Looking more at the constituent demographics, Model 1 shows an unexpected relationship between local Latino elected officials' support for immigrant-friendly policies and their self-reported percentage of Latino constituents in their jurisdiction. The relationship is negative, although small and statistically weak: as the percentage of Latino

constituents goes up, their support for immigrant-friendly policies goes down slightly. I only find this relationship for support for immigrant-friendly policies, not for opposition to immigrant hostile policies.

A closer look at this variable reveals the relationship between the Latino constituency percentage and support for immigrant-friendly policies is not completely linear and is overall weak. When the interaction of Mexicans born in the U.S. was added in Model 1a, the relationship was no longer significant but still negative. Model 2b breaks down the Latino constituency to compare those with a majority Latino constituency to those without. Model 2b finds that local Latino elected officials in jurisdictions where Latinos do not make up 50% of the constituents are more supportive of immigrant-friendly policies than those with a majority of Latinos. This observation of a decline in support among local Latino elected officials in higher percentage Latino jurisdictions may be due to the small *N* in the survey. It happens that four out of the five respondents with the lowest scores on the immigrant-friendly scale are elected officials are in the 60 – 75% range. Looking at those cases along with the other low-scoring respondents, I find all are Republicans or Independents. As the number of local Latino elected officials grows, future research can explore this issue further with larger datasets.

The local Latino elected officials' opposition to immigrant-hostile policies was shaped by their social context. I found that local Latino elected officials with a higher percentage of foreign-born Latinos in their cities were more likely to oppose immigrant-hostile policies, as predicted by the social contact hypothesis. Their city's percentage of immigrants did not influence their support for immigrant-friendly policies, however. In Model 2a in Table 4.4, I include an additional variable to examine whether the positive

influence contact with immigrants may also be related to the growth rate of the city's immigrant population in recent years. In Model 2a, I included a calculation of the percent change in the number of immigrants in each local Latino elected officials' city from 2000 to 2010, from data from the U.S. Census. I did not find any relationship: Latino local elected officials from cities whose immigrant groups grew larger from 2000 to 2010 were no more likely to oppose to immigrant-hostile policies than those with a smaller immigrant growth rate in their cities.

Insert Table 4.4 here

I did not find evidence that the socio-economic status of the Latino community influenced a local Latino elected officials' support or opposition to immigration policies. The group threat hypothesis predicts that local Latino elected officials in jurisdictions with a low Latino socio-economic status will be less supportive of immigrant-friendly policies and less likely to oppose immigrant-hostile policies due to labor market competition. I do not find support for this. I also do not find evidence to confirm Dahl's understanding of immigrant group assimilation and expectations for their leaders. He predicts that once an immigrant group's socio-economic status improves, relative to the larger community, immigrants become more assimilated and less interested in ethnic concerns, like immigration. Given that the data is longitudinal, it cannot examine the change in socio-economic status in one community over time. However, none of the models seem to indicate a difference between local Latino elected officials with Latino communities with a higher socio-economic status and those with lower socio-economic status Latino communities.

Overall, I find that immigration policy advocacy among Latino leaders is influenced by a combination of individual and contextual factors. A higher sense of Latino linked fate and a Democratic partisan affiliation strongly influenced local Latino elected officials to support immigrant-friendly policies and oppose immigrant-hostile policies. Individual traits, like their gender, education, and national origin, influenced their support for immigrant-friendly policies but did not influence their opposition to immigrant-hostile policies. Latinas were more supportive of immigrant-friendly policies, while those with higher education and a Mexican national origin were less supportive. Interestingly, the individual process of assimilation did not seem to influence the elected officials' policy advocacy, except for in the case of Mexicans born in the United States who were less supportive. Additionally, the overall assimilations of the Latino community, as measured by their socio-economic status, also did not influence immigration policy attitudes of local Latino elected officials. Social contact with immigrants, although not necessarily through specifically Latino organizations, led local Latino elected officials to be less likely to support immigrant-hostile policies.

Latino Local Elected Officials' Policy Accomplishments

With significant public attention focused on Latinos and immigration, one might assume immigration to be the keystone in a larger Latino political agenda. Latinos' participation in immigration marches and protests shows their willingness to unify behind a common political priority and to engage politically to bring about a desired change (Barreto et al. 2009). However, beyond immigration, are there other issues that Latinos as a group identify and define as part of their political agenda? What might a Latino

political agenda at the local level look like – particularly given that immigration is typically considered as part of the federal domain?

Building a Latino political agenda at any level of government requires a consensus among Latinos, particularly Latino leaders, on important issues. However, Latino leaders represent a heterogeneous group, with different histories and backgrounds. As Chapter Two details, the diversity of Latinos cannot be overstated. Latinos vary widely in terms of their national origin, generational status, Spanish fluency, and many other experiential differences. Latinos, as a group, share only a few commonalities as a basis for a political agenda. Their heterogeneity may complicate any efforts to define Latino interests and create a Latino political agenda.

Scholars typically delineate group interests in two ways: either by identifying issues that disproportionately effect group members or by identifying issues that group members self-identify as important. For women, these issues tend to be issues dealing with reproduction and the family, as well as issues relating to the gender gap, such as healthcare, employment and education. For African Americans, group interests generally include issues of civil rights, unemployment, poverty, and public safety. For Latinos, lacking a shared group history and culture, it is more challenging to assess what group interests may be and how a Latino political agenda may be defined.

To see what a Latino political agenda at the local level looks like, I asked the Latino local elected officials what their top three policy accomplishments as elected officials were. I then coded their open-ended responses into different policy categories. Table 4.5 reports the aggregate results of their answers.

Insert Table 4.5 about here

The top five policy accomplishments for Latino local elected officials were in the policy areas of Planning and Development, City Finances, Public Safety, Housing, and Education. These top policy areas are issues Latinos typically rank as important in polls. In the 2006 Latino National Survey, almost 19% ranked the economy and jobs as the top issue important to Latinos; 9.1% ranked education and public schools top; and 3.8% ranked crime and drugs as the top issue important to Latinos.⁷¹ We can see that there is overlap between Latino leaders' policy accomplishments and the issues that Latinos consider important for their community.

Moreover, some of the top policy accomplishment areas are also issues that disproportionately affect Latinos. While issues like the economy or housing are cross-cutting issues, they are also issues where Latinos are especially impacted. For 2011, the unemployment rate for Latinos averaged 11.5%, compared to white unemployment at 7.9%. When Latinos mentioned Planning and Development, they frequently mentioned their efforts for economic development and explained to me that their district needed new “zoning laws to allow for more business,” and that they were working at “making the city more business-friendly.” More economic development may translate into more or better jobs for Latinos. Similarly, for housing, foreclosure remains a disproportionately significant problem for Latinos. They face a foreclosure rate of 11.9%, higher than that of Blacks (9.8%) or whites (5%). Housing was mentioned by 26 Latino leaders – citing their efforts to increase “affordable housing” through different measures such as tax abatements or inclusionary housing ordinances. Latino leaders seemed to focus on policy

⁷¹ It is not surprising necessarily that education was not listed more often, given that many local policies regarding education are under the purview of school boards instead of city councils.

areas that were not only important to the entire city but also important to the Latino community.

Additionally, Latino leaders considered their top policy accomplishments in areas expected for city councilors and mayors to consider important. City finances and economic development are traditional policy areas for local elected officials. Moreover, the focus on city finances is likely due to the financial situations many cities face in the current economic recession. Latino leaders were mindful of this fact when they discussed their budgets. As one Latino leader explained, his top policy accomplishment was “budget policy - the driest and most boring but drives everything – can’t sort things out if you don't have the money in place.” Another explained that he “believe[d] in having a strong economic environment – must have the fiscal responsibility to balance the budget.” A Latina city councilmember noted, “We are a pay-as-you-go city. We don't spend money that we don't have hoping it will come. We have adopted financial policies that keep us solvent.” City budgets and finances were important to Latino leaders as a first priority to allow them to provide other service for their cities.

In discussing their top policy accomplishments, Latinos leaders rarely mentioned Latinos directly. Some mentioned how certain broad, citywide issues would affect Latinos. For example, one leader mentioned that by focusing on the city budget he could ensure “the allocation of resources for programs that are important to the Latino community” and another mentioned dealing with regulations on the selling of food as an important part of Latino culture; however, these were more exceptions than the norm. While Latinos were not explicitly mentioned, Latino leaders did discuss policies important to diversity and civil rights. For example, ten Latino leaders mentioned hiring

for city contracts, citing the need for local businesses and minorities to have preference in city contracts. A small number of Latino local elected officials also mentioned civil rights, in particular labor or workers' rights.

Latino leaders also rarely mentioned immigration policies as their top policy accomplishments. Immigration issues were mentioned only ten times. One leader mentioned the establishment of a municipal identification card for immigrants and another mentioned his opposition to a car impounding initiative that would have targeted undocumented immigration. Additionally, some mentioned their efforts to pass symbolic city council resolutions opposing Arizona's strict immigration law, SB 1070. Also related to immigration, language access was mentioned three times; one leader pointed out his efforts to develop "a language access ordinance for the police department on the 911 line." While some Latino leaders noted immigration issues in their policy accomplishments, it was not one of the most frequently mentioned issues. This is likely due to the fact that immigration is typically handled at the national level. However, as earlier discussion in the chapter shows, there are local policies, both pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant, that local Latino elected officials could pursue.

Conclusion

This chapter explores what role ethnicity plays in shaping the behavior of Latino elected officials in local office in cities across the United States. Immigration is a policy area closely associated with Latinos. With the survey data, I am able to move beyond understanding how the general public feels about immigration issues and provide a way to see how Latino elected officials view immigration policies. Additionally, I provide one of the first understandings of attitudes towards local immigration policies. Overall, I find

that local Latino elected officials tend to support immigrant-friendly policies and oppose immigrant-hostile policies in their communities, however not all do and their attitudes vary in levels of support or opposition. The results allowed for a plethora of explanations for their different leadership behaviors in regards to immigration policy to be explored. I find that their advocacy for pro-immigrant policies and opposition to anti-immigrant policies is largely determined by their sense of linked fate with other Latinos and partisan identification. The individual traits of local Latino elected officials can also shape their leadership behavior in regards to supporting friendly immigration policy. The social context of their cities also can influence their attitudes on immigration: for example, I find those serving in cities with a larger number of immigrants are more likely to oppose immigrant-hostile policies but are no more likely to support immigrant-friendly policies. Results from the chapter also show that Latino elected officials reported their top policy accomplishments in local office to be related to issues of planning and zoning and city finances. Their discussion of policy accomplishments reveals that although many would support immigrant-friendly policies and block immigrant-hostile policies in their cities, they do not tend to see immigration as a top policy priority. These findings suggest that a Latino political agenda is defined broadly by Latino local elected officials to include community-wide issues like city budgets, economic development and public safety that tend to disproportionately affect the Latino community.

Figure 4.1 – Support of Immigrant-Friendly Policies




Figure 4.2 – Support of Immigrant-Hostile Policies




Table 4.1 – Foreign-Born Population 1850 – 2010

	Number of immigrants	% of U.S. Population
1850	2,244,602	9.7
1860	4,138,697	13.2
1870	5,567,229	14.4
1880	6,679,943	13.3
1890	9,249,547	14.8
1900	10,341,276	13.6
1910	13,515,886	14.7
1920	13,920,692	13.2
1930	14,204,149	11.6
1940	11,594,896	8.8
1950	10,347,395	6.9
1960	9,738,091	5.4
1970	9,619,302	4.7
1980	14,079,906	6.2
1990	19,767,316	7.9
2000	31,107,889	11.1
2010	39,955,854	12.9

Source: Migration Policy Institute 2012

Table 4.2 – Latino Leaders on Local Immigration Policies

	Model 1	Model 2
	Support for Immigrant-Friendly Policies	Opposition to Immigrant-Hostile Policies
Born in U.S.	-0.0746 (0.0570)	0.0759 (0.0607)
Latino Group Activity	0.000445 (0.00666)	0.00402 (0.00641)
Linked Fate	0.315** (0.0729)	0.186* (0.0904)
Mexican	-0.0896* (0.0417)	-0.0318 (0.0429)
Democrat	0.230** (0.0489)	0.169** (0.0682)
Female	0.0976* (0.0425)	0.0318 (0.0441)
College Degree +	-0.128** (0.0359)	0.0469 (0.0455)
% Latino Foreign Born	0.000954 (0.00156)	0.00400* (0.00186)
Latino Community SES - Low	-0.00172 (0.00343)	-0.000559 (0.00359)
Latino Community SES - High	-0.00182 (0.00282)	-0.00163 (0.00299)
District	-0.0278 (0.0391)	0.00391 (0.0459)
% Latino Constituency	-0.00177 ⁺ (0.000965)	0.000570 (0.00108)
Conservative Constituency	-0.164** (0.0457)	-0.00399 (0.0516)
Constant	0.697* (0.280)	0.314** (0.263)
<i>N</i>	113	102
<i>R</i> ²	0.579	0.329

Standard errors in parentheses
⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 4.3 – Latino Leaders’ Support for Immigrant-Friendly Policies

	Model 1a		Model 1b	
	Support for Immigrant-Friendly Policies		Support for Immigrant-Friendly Policies	
Born in U.S.	0.0450	(0.0647)	0.0338	(0.0626)
Latino Group Activity	-0.00173	(0.00665)	-0.00160	(0.00656)
Linked Fate	0.323**	(0.0709)	0.325**	(0.0685)
Mexican	0.0939	(0.0874)	0.0939	(0.0854)
Democrat	0.232**	(0.0468)	0.210**	(0.0488)
Female	0.0973*	(0.0402)	0.105**	(0.0388)
College Degree +	-0.114**	(0.0343)	-0.122**	(0.0369)
% Latino Foreign Born	0.00185	(0.00148)	0.00198	(0.00144)
Latino Community SES - Low	-0.00176	(0.00331)	-0.00161	(0.00321)
Latino Community SES - High	-0.00200	(0.00271)	-0.00187	(0.00264)
District	-0.0343	(0.0383)	-0.0189	(0.0397)
% Latino Constituency (LC)	-0.00158	(0.00102)		
Conservative Constituency	-0.161**	(0.0434)	-0.166**	(0.0449)
Mexican*Born in U.S.	-0.238*	(0.0980)	-0.239*	(0.0952)
0 – 25% LC			0.132 ⁺	(0.0813)
25 – 50% LC			0.0995*	(0.0479)
Constant	0.584*	(0.273)	0.461 ⁺	(0.260)
<i>N</i>	113		113	
<i>R</i> ²	0.604		0.621	

Standard errors in parentheses
⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 4. 4 – Latino Leaders’ Opposition to Immigrant-Hostile Policies

	Model 2	
	Opposition to Immigrant-Hostile Policies	
Born in U.S.	0.0754	(0.0624)
Latino Group Activity	0.00295	(0.00632)
Linked Fate	0.185*	(0.0917)
Mexican	-0.0310	(0.0434)
Democrat	0.167*	(0.0703)
Female	0.0236	(0.0493)
College Degree +	0.0409	(0.0474)
% Latino Foreign Born	0.00401*	(0.00190)
Latino Community SES - Low	-0.000452	(0.00360)
Latino Community SES - High	-0.00152	(0.00300)
District	0.00397	(0.0468)
% Latino Constituency	0.000372	(0.00116)
Conservative Constituency	0.000884	(0.0539)
% Δ in Immigrants 2000 – 2010	-0.0460	(0.0855)
Constant	0.436	(0.364)
<i>N</i>	101	
<i>R</i> ²	0.315	

Standard errors in parentheses
 + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table 4.5 – Top Three Policy Accomplishments of Latino Local Elected Officials

	#1	#2	#3	Total
Planning and Development	17	21	11	49
City Finances	21	8	11	40
Public Safety	10	12	12	34
Housing	10	10	6	26
Education	7	6	7	20
Environment	5	7	5	17
Taxes	5	5	3	13
Community Outreach	0	4	8	12
Infrastructure	4	5	3	12
Jobs	6	3	3	12
Hiring for City Contracts	2	3	5	10
Health	5	4	1	10
Immigration	6	3	1	10
Transportation	2	4	4	10
Parks and Recreation	3	2	4	9
City Employees	4	3	1	8
Youth	2	2	4	8
Beautification	0	2	4	6
Rights	4	1	1	6
Electoral	1	0	5	6
Language Access	0	2	1	3

CHAPTER FIVE

Latinos in Providence

Latinos have made great strides in electoral politics across the country, and New England is no exception. Hartford, Connecticut elected its first Latino mayor, Eddie Perez in 2001, and Providence, Rhode Island elected its first Latino mayor, Angel Taveras, nine years later in 2010. There are notable differences, however, between the presence of Latinos in these two New England cities. Hartford boasts a larger population of Latinos (43.4%) who are primarily Puerto Rican, while Providence has a slightly smaller percentage of Latinos (38.1%) who are more multi-national, with Dominicans, Puerto Ricans, and a growing population of Guatemalans. While Hartford has a longer history of Latino city councilors, both cities provide two good cases to explore Latino leadership in City Hall.

In this and the following chapter, I examine the Latino communities and their leaders in Providence and Hartford. Drawing on data from interviews, the media and U.S. Census, I explore the state of the Latino community and the behavior of their Latino leaders. In both chapters, I focus primarily on four questions: What are the top issues for Latinos in each community? How unified are Latinos in Providence and in Hartford? Who are the Latino leaders in the communities? Who are their Latino local elected officials, and what policies do they pursue? Case studies of Providence and Hartford

allow me to investigate how the formation and evolution of their Latino communities influence their Latino leaders' behaviors today.

In the spring of 2013, I conducted hour-long interviews with Latino community leaders and journalists in Providence and Hartford. I conducted 27 interviews in Providence and 20 interviews in Hartford. I identified Latino community leaders through a variety of sources, including Spanish and English-language media, community organizations and social media. Interviewees and others knowledgeable about politics in Hartford and Providence recommended additional individuals for me to interview. I also identified journalists who covered local politics in both mainstream and Spanish-language media to interview. Interviews were conducted primarily in person and in English. Those participating were guaranteed anonymity so that they could freely discuss their community without any fear of repercussion.

In this chapter and the following chapter, I discuss Providence and Hartford respectively. In both chapters, I provide a description and history of each city and its Latino community. Then I present results from my interviews exploring my four central questions. I conclude with summary of what each of these cities can teach us about Latino communities and their Latino leaders. In the dissertation's conclusion in Chapter Seven, I compare and contrast Providence and Hartford's Latino leadership in light of the national survey results and offer a final assessment on the nature of local Latino leadership behavior.

Providence

Founded in 1636 by Roger Williams and other religious exiles from the Massachusetts Bay colony, Providence is the capital city of Rhode Island. It is the third

largest city in New England with a population of 178,042 in 20.5 square miles.⁷²

Providence grew around its navigation and commercial economic interests, with its manufacturing industry growing rapidly after the Revolutionary War. Some of the largest manufacturing plants in the country could be found in Providence, including Brown & Sharpe, Nicholson File and Gorham Silverware. Providence's manufacturing, textile, and jewelry industries attracted many Irish, French Canadian and Italian immigrants in the 19th and 20th century (McLoughlin 1986). By the end of the 19th century, more than 60% of the city was foreign-born. Portuguese, Poles, Jews, Cape Verdeans, and African Americans joined them, and by 1920 the city grew to over 225,000 residents.

Like many New England cities, Providence suffered a number of challenges through most of the 20th century. The Great Depression and a hurricane in 1938 hit the city hard. Its manufacturing and textile centers closed as cheaper labor and improved transportation led many companies to seek newer plants in the suburbs and in the South. Neighborhoods like Olneyville, home to Atlantic Mills and other textile-related businesses, were devastated. The city's troubles grew further as many, including Irish immigrants, moved to the suburbs in the 1950s and 1960s, and the city's population declined from a high of 250,000 residents.

Since the 1970s, the city's leaders, along with the downtown business elite, have worked to revitalize the city as a "Renaissance City" and the "Creative Capital." Providence redeveloped its river walk and downtown area, leveraging federal funds to attract private business investment (Rich 2000). With the conversion of the Jewelry District to the "Knowledge District" the city hopes to attract companies in the health,

⁷² All demographic data, unless otherwise specified comes from the 2010 U.S. Census and 2011 3-year American Community Survey.

technology and art sectors. Providence is now known for its fine dining, large downtown mall, numerous art galleries, and scholarly pursuits of five colleges, including Brown, Rhode Island School of Design and Johnson and Wales (Orr and West 2002). While the city has experienced some success in these endeavors, Providence continues to struggle with high unemployment and poverty rates because of the recent economic recession and foreclosure problems.

Latinos in Providence

Beginning in the mid-19th century and increasing in the decades following, Latinos began settling in Providence. Unlike other New England cities, Providence never had a large established Puerto Rican population prior to settlement of other Latino groups. Starting in the 1920s, a small number of Puerto Ricans arrived in south Providence for the harvest season. They stayed and were joined by others from New York City and Connecticut. Colombians arrived in nearby Central Falls in the 1960s where they were recruited to work in the remaining textile mills. Dominicans came to Providence beginning in the 1970s, with many arriving first in New York City and moving north for employment opportunities. Other Colombians, Guatemalans, and Salvadorans joined those Latinos in Providence as their home countries experienced violence and strife.

Inset Table 5.1 here

The number of Latinos in Providence expanded rapidly in the last 30 years. Today there are 67,835 Latinos in the city, up 30% from 2000. The Latino community in Providence is one of the most diverse Latino communities in the country with sizeable populations of Dominicans, Puerto Ricans, Guatemalans, Mexicans, and Salvadorans (see

Table 5.1). Providence has the largest proportion of Dominicans in the country (Itzigsohn 2009). The Latino community is the largest group (38.1%) in the city, followed by whites (37.6%), Blacks (13%)⁷³ and Asians (6.3%). While the number of Latinos grows, non-Hispanic whites continue to leave the city, evidenced by a 40% reduction in the number of whites from 1990 to 2010. Whites remain the second largest group, however, given the relatively small size of the Black community in the city. The African American population in Providence has grown gradually from being 3% of the city in 1950. Providence is a “majority minority” city where Latinos are the largest group and are ethnically diverse.

Providence’s Latino community is located primarily on the western and southern sides of the city. The main economic artery for the Latino community in Providence is Broad Street where there is a number of Latino-owned businesses. Latino small businesses have grown from 31 in 1997 to 2,999 in 2007 (Spitzer and Carbonell 2012). Despite this positive trend, Latinos in Providence are struggling economically, particularly with the recent economic recession. Thirty-four percent of Latinos in Providence live below the poverty line. The neighborhoods in Providence in which Latinos have settled confront some of the toughest problems in the city such as lack of access to quality healthcare, education and employment.

Like other Latinos nationwide, Latinos in Providence are young but maturing. The median age of Latinos in Providence is 25.5 years old, up from 23.1 years old in 2000. Thirty-five percent of Latinos in Providence are under 18 years old. Latinos’ young

⁷³ Providence’s Black community is small, but like Latinos, also diverse. Some Blacks trace their heritage back centuries and others’ families came during the great black migration from the south to northern cities. The community also includes black immigrants from Cape Verde, Liberia, and Nigeria.

age, combined with the dwindling number of whites in the city, makes it likely that Latinos will remain the largest segment of residents in Providence for some time to come. Besides their age, another notable characteristic of the Latino population in Providence is the percentage of Latinos who are foreign-born; nearly half of Providence's Latinos were not born in the United States, and of those who are foreign born, 28% are naturalized citizens. Roughly one-third of Latinos in Providence were born in Rhode Island.

One indicator the Latino impact on Providence is their growing participation in politics. Latinos emerged as successful in the political arena in Providence beginning in the late 1990s. Eight Latinos ran for office between 1987 and 1997 (Uriarte 2006). In 1998, the Rhode Island Latino Political Action Committee was formed to promote the community's interests and engagement in politics. The first Latino politician, Luis Aponte, was elected to Providence city council in 1998. Miguel Luna joined him on the council in 2002. Latinos in Providence marked a watershed year in 2010 with the election of two additional city councilors, Sabina Matos and Davian Sanchez, and the election of the first Latino mayor in Providence, Angel Taveras.

Providence Government

There are 15 city councilors in the city, one from each of the city's wards. There are four majority Latino wards in Providence: Wards 8, 9, 10 and 15. The city council currently has four Latinos, one African American and ten whites. Latino city councilors represent three of the four majority Latino wards. Wilbur Jennings, an African American, represents the other majority Latino ward, Ward 8. The fourth Latino on the council, Davian Sanchez, represents Ward 11, a majority Black district with a sizable Latino

population. From the election of the first Latino in 1998 to today, there have been six Latinos on the Providence city council (see Table 5.2).

Insert Table 5.2 Here

The mayor and city councilmembers are all members of the Democratic Party. Of the city's 100,253 active registered voters, 60,627, or 60%, are Democrats (Jackvony 2013). The city is largely Democratic. The last Republican on the city council was in 1990; the last independent was a member of the Green Party who served from 2003 to 2007. Of the seven Latinos who have been elected to local politics in Providence, all have been Democrats. Given the dominance of Democrats in Providence, the most important election is the Democratic primary.

Providence has a long history of ethnic leadership, with years of Irish and Italian elected officials. The Irish came to power in the 1920s, replacing the white Yankees who had governed Providence (Cornwell 1960). The Irish built a strong Democratic political machine. In 1940, charter revisions created a strong-mayor system of government in Providence. Vincent "Buddy" Cianci, the grandson of Italian immigrants, ended the Irish's control in Providence City Hall with his election as mayor in 1974. Under Mayor Cianci, Latinos first gained recognition in the Mayor's office when he created the "Office of Hispanic Affairs" in 2001. Cianci initially disregarded the Latino community in Providence because "Hispanic don't vote," but later reversed his position, citing the growing role of Latinos in the community (Smith 2001). After Cianci left office in 2001 as a result of his conviction of racketeering conspiracy, David Cicillini, an openly gay state legislator of Italian and Jewish descent, courted Latinos to win election as mayor in

2002. When Cicillini ran for the House of Representatives in 2010, Angel Taveras won election to become the first Latino mayor in the city of Providence.

After their election in 2010, Taveras and the four Latino city councilors were confronted immediately with the realities of the city's fiscal crisis that Mayor Taveras likened to a "Category 5 Hurricane" (Donnis 2011). The mayor and the city dealt with a multi-million budget shortfall by negotiating pension reform, raising a car tax, closing schools, and requesting payments from tax-exempt organizations.

In the following sections, I turn to interviews with community leaders and journalists to discuss the issues facing Latinos in Providence, the status of the Latino community, and their leaders.

Top Issues to Latino Community

Inset Table 5.3 here

When asked to consider the issues of most importance to the Latino community in Providence, both community leaders and local journalists primarily named local issues common to many urban areas, with education and the economy as the top two issues. Table 5.3 presents a list and frequency of issues mentioned in the interviews. A number of leaders mentioned that there were in fact many issues facing Latinos in Providence. One leader said, "We try to get involved in local politics. Housing, healthcare, create more jobs. There are so many issues." Many framed the community's concerns as common issues facing many families. "They [Latinos] know: I need to make money, to buy a house, to get the kids in school." The priority Providence community leaders placed on the issues of education and the economy is consistent with national Latino public opinion polling data where Latinos tend to place the economy, education and

health care as the top three issues they are most concerned about (Lopez and Gonzalez-Barrera 2012).

Community members frequently mentioned that coping with the effects of the economic recession was a top priority for most Latino families. A number of Latino leaders and journalists mentioned a dearth of well-paying, low-skilled jobs available for the workforce. They described how this is a consequence of Rhode Island's declining manufacturing industry. "If you look at the migration trends of Latinos arriving in Rhode Island, the vast majority of Latinos were drawn by the prospect of decent paying, low-skill employment. And after that dried up in the 90s, there hasn't been anything to replace that...." Another leader expressed her concern that economic plans for the city and the new jobs being created did not take into account Latinos' needs:

I see a disconnect in conversations that are happening and Latino participation in economic development. I will be in a room where they are talking about the Knowledge District or the Jewelry District [in Providence] and how we're going to develop all that new land and I'm pretty much the only Hispanic in the room. That disconnect about conversations that are happening about plans for the city and what's happening in the community is really of concern.

Without job opportunities, some worried that Latinos would leave Providence for other communities with better job opportunities and pointed to examples: "...we see quite an exodus in the Dominican community from Providence to Charlotte and Miami in the past five years because of the economic crisis." Many Latino leaders pointed out the need for job creation and workforce development for both the Latino community and state as a whole.

Interviewees also listed education as a concern for the Latino community in Providence. Many community leaders expressed frustration and disappointment at the educational disparities for Latino children. An activist noted that despite Latino children

making up the majority of children in Providence public schools, the achievement gap between Latinos and non-Latinos is widening. The achievement gap draws concerns because “you have a city dependent on the growth of that population.” Another community leader pointed to the high drop-out rate and wondered whether those few Latinos who graduated from high school and college would return to Providence. A few mentioned that local Latino politicians, particularly Latino elected officials, seemed focused on the education issue for the community. One journalist explained, “When I think of Latino leaders in the state, education comes right to mind. Mayor Taveras talks a ton about how important it was to him.”

In discussing the issues of the economy and education, the interviewees compared Latinos to other groups in the city in their issues and challenges. “I think that the issues that matter to Latinos in Providence are the same that matter to anyone living in the city of Providence.” One Latino leader pointed out that there had been a shift within the community, as more Latinos in the city came to recognize that Providence was their new permanent home.

I have seen a shift in mentality from neighbors and friends from around the 80s. Everybody thought they were coming in temporarily to work and go back home and so that desire of going back did not allow them to establish roots here—not just learning English, but understanding, this is my home. But now the same families that used to talk about going back have come to understand that is not a realistic idea and begun to root themselves here.

Other leaders brought up issues related to the immigrant experience of adapting to a new community, but few mentioned the challenges of immigration status, which is frequently perceived as the top issue for many Latinos. One journalist remarked, “Immigration is important but there’s so much more than that. Can I get a job? Can my kids get an education?” A Latino leader explained why this might be the case for Latinos

in Providence: “[The] East Coast is more Dominican and Puerto Rican, or at least it was... most people who came to east side [of the country] already have a legal way of getting in.”

A few did mention immigration as a challenge, particularly for the growing Central and South American populations in the city who were more likely to be undocumented. When asked whether immigration was a national or local issue for these immigrants, a community leader explained that it was a local issues because it was “the question of whether undocumented immigrants hang in the shadows below the radar or are they comfortable interacting with formal institutions.” For those few leaders who mentioned immigration, they saw the solution to the issue more at the state level, mentioning state-level policies such as E-Verify and driver’s licenses.

In the interviews, the top issues were broadly described as issues relating to quality of life in the city. The majority focused on issues of education and the economy rather than mentioning problems like public safety, discrimination, or political access. Many of those interviewed stressed the interrelatedness of the challenges for the Latino community Providence. As one community leader put it, “What I feel is most important is unemployment and the educational gap. From there it all trickles down. If you don’t have a good education, you don’t have a good job; you can’t pay bills and you will go into foreclosure.” Some pointed out the long-lasting impacts of educational and economic challenges for the community. One longtime leader and activist explained, “Given the dearth of educational opportunities, it’s hard for me to see where the leaders of the future are going to come from and how prepared they are going to be to assume that leadership.”

Unity Among Latinos

Although Latinos sometimes bond over a shared language and common experiences in their home countries, scholars of Latino politics often note that the diversity in nationalities, immigration status, and tenure in the community may limit the ability of Latinos to develop a panethnic community identity (Jones-Correa and Leal 1996; Masuoka 2006; Beltrán 2010). I asked interviewees how unified they felt Latinos were on the issues they previously described as important to the Latino community and if they saw any divisions among Latinos in the city. In Providence, the majority of community leaders and all of the journalists said that the Latino community is unified on many of the issues. They expressed that Latinos, as a whole, face the same challenges and share the same desires. As one observer in Providence described, “Everything is for the betterment of the Latino community. And everything is for empowering everybody. Everybody wants to be middle class. Everybody wants the same thing.” Many conveyed similar views, echoing how Latinos, particularly at the elite level, unite regardless of national origin or generation on issues of importance to the Latino community. A strong sense of a panethnic identity and unity seems to exist among Latinos in Providence.

Only four of the community leaders interviewed questioned whether there was a unified Latino community in Providence. Each expressed a desire for more unity among Latinos. One community leader vented, “We need to unify ourselves! Instead of identifying myself as a Dominican, a Puerto Rican, a Colombian, we need to identify ourselves as Latino. When we actually work together, we will be able to get more and accomplish what we are working for!” Two long-time political activists lamented that there used to be more unity. Leaders also suggested that any differences among Latinos

today were more perceived by members of the community than real differences, and all four pointed out the potential for commonality over shared interests. Even among the more critical community leaders, there was optimism for the potential of unity in Providence politics for Latinos.

The small size of Rhode Island and the concentrated number of the Latinos in the city contributed to unity of the Latino community in Providence. One community leader said that because of the concentration of Latinos in certain areas in the state and city, Latinos live together and work together. While clasping his hands, he explained, “Once you learn about one another – brothers and sisters.” Others agreed, highlighting how Latinos born here have gone to school together, mingled socially and married among national origin groups. Some pointed out how they understood the strength in numbers from a united Latino community. Another community leader explained, “We’re a small community. [There is a] strong understanding that... no community has enough of a critical mass. If we are divided we are very, very weak; if we are united we are very, very strong.”

The unity within the Latino community also stemmed from the poor economy in the state of Rhode Island. Community leaders mentioned that all Latinos face the challenges of unemployment and a lack of well-paying jobs. One Latino leader put it succinctly: “In general, everyone wants jobs.” In 2011, Providence’s metropolitan area had the highest Hispanic unemployment rate in the nation, 23.3%, compared to a national average of 11.5% (Austin 2011). Many Latinos worked in the areas of the economy hit hardest by the economic recession, in sectors such as manufacturing and low-wage labor.

Community Organizations and Unity

The economic recession also influenced the political capacity and unity of Latinos in Providence. A few leaders mentioned that although Latinos equally face the challenge of the poor economic situation in the state and city, this challenge hindered their ability to come together. This is in contrast to what Padilla (1985) finds among Mexican-Americans in Chicago who observed social action and panethnic consciousness grew as a result of social inequality. Instead of creating unity, the economic situation in Providence fostered a lack of unity among Latinos.

A community leader in Providence described the impact of the recession on Latinos and their potential for unity: “We are predominately lower middle class. We are affected most by the recession - going through hard times. I need to get what's mine; I need to feed my family; I need to do what's right for us. So given such disparity, sometimes it is hard to think about what is better for everyone.” Another political activist explained, “The big wedge that makes all the differences much more apparent is the economic situation. When people are busy trying to live, there's not a lot of desire to talk about abstract issues.” He went on to say that, 10 to 15 years ago, when the economy was better, people were more willing to be active and participate.

Community leaders commented Latino organizations used to be stronger in Providence and Rhode Island. One leader pessimistically pointed out that, “Eight years ago, there was much more organization. We had CHisPA [Center for Hispanic Policy and Advocacy], Progreso Latino, International Institute, Rhode Island Coalition for Immigrants and Refugees, [and] RILPAC. But as those organizations have declined, so has leadership and any sense of opinion about anything.” Others similarly voiced concern

that Latino organizations may be in decline and worried what their loss would mean socially and politically for Latinos in Providence.

Community leaders in Providence explained that the Latino organizational decline occurred from a lack of leadership, failure to develop new leaders, funding problems due to the recession, inability to develop beyond its volunteer capacity and too much of a focus on service rather than policy or advocacy. One Latino leader questioned, “Who are we preparing to take the next step?” She continued, “These people don't want to let go. As [another community leader involved in RILPAC] said, ‘We have to stop recycling.’” This may relate to the issue many Latino leaders raised concerning education in the state, with the growing achievement gap and fear that those Latino children who succeed will leave the state. Some voiced disappointment that by holding onto power, these leaders alienated younger leaders from wanting to become active on behalf of the Latino community. None of those interviewed pointed to a specific leader or group of people who were holding on to power. However, a few seemed optimistic about the future, with the new RILPAC leadership elected in March 2013 as well as the increasing statewide role of the Latino Policy Institute at Roger Williams University.

Latino organizations, particularly RILPAC, were instrumental in creating unity in Providence as Latinos first began to organize in the mid to late 1990s. Many credited RILPAC and the organization's first President, Dr. Pablo Rodriguez, in their efforts to maintain diversity among its leaders and to speak on behalf of Latinos broadly. RILPAC has had nine Presidents in total – there have been two Puerto Ricans, five Dominicans, one Honduran and one Colombian. The Board of Directors has been likewise diverse, with leaders from these national origin groups as well as Peruvians and Argentinians. As

a result, the leaders have purposely focused on being a Latino organization, rather than an organization serving only one national origin group. One former leader of RILPAC described, “What is unique about Rhode Island compared to other places I have lived is that you do have a concerted effort by leadership to talk about a Latino agenda, Latino issues.” Similarly, one of the early leaders on RILPAC’s Board of Directors explained that the goals of the leaders at the organization’s founding always involved inclusion among different Latino groups.

It was clear from the interviews that Latino community leaders were contemplating the future goals for RILPAC and other Latino organizations in the city and state. Many credited RILPAC’s past efforts to mobilize voters and support the election of Latino candidates. Looking forward, some hoped RILPAC would commit to increasing community engagement, particularly among younger Latinos and beyond just elections. Others wished for RILPAC to evolve beyond a volunteer organization and hire a professional staff, to allow for more of a role in advocating policy at the local and state level. A few expressed a desire for the Latino Policy Institute to disseminate more research and information about Latinos in the state. The discussion surrounding the Latino organizations in the interviews revealed concerns of Latino leaders in Providence: What role should the Latino community take beyond elections and should the Latino community in Providence speak with one voice?

Interestingly, none of the interviews brought up the endorsement process of RILPAC, a time when one might expect issues of unity among Latinos to arise. RILPAC is a non-partisan organization with open membership in the community. The organization invites candidates to submit responses regarding issues such as education, economic

development and civil rights and complete candidate interviews with members of the organization. Afterwards, RILPAC members vote to support candidates who address and represent the interests of Latinos. During elections, the organization also organizes public debates and conducts public outreach. RILPAC's goals are described as twofold:

- A. To endorse candidates who support issues benefiting Latinos and other individuals from urban communities while raising awareness on issues and/or candidates that could adversely impact the Latino community; and
- B. To ensure that elected officials, political leaders and candidates have a broad understanding of the concerns and priorities among Rhode Island Latinos (Donnis 2008).

Through its endorsement process, RILPAC seeks to educate political leaders about the needs of Latinos throughout the state and to endorse candidates who can best advocate for those needs.

Members of RILPAC explained to me that starting with first endorsements in 1998, they sought to be fair in their evaluations of candidates. Although it is likely that members sometimes disagree over candidates, the endorsement process has not created any lasting divisions among the community leaders. Their endorsements in previous elections reflect the thoughtfulness of the process the leaders emphasized. In a majority Democratic state, they tend to endorse Democrats, although they have endorsed members in other political parties. In some races, they endorsed non-Latino candidates instead of Latino candidates. For example, in 2010, RILPAC endorsed a longtime African American activist, Joseph Buchanan, for Providence's City Council Ward 10 position, which represents a primarily Black district with a number of Latinos, instead of Davian Sanchez, a young Latino (Gómez 2010).

As one of the founders of the organization explained the organization's choices: "La genética, no hace la política" (genetics does not make politics). RILPAC also endorsed Latino challengers to Latino incumbents, like their 2010 endorsement of Hamlet Lopez Jr. instead of incumbent Councilman and former State Representative Leon Tejada in Providence's Ward 8 election. A few leaders complimented RILPAC members' self-awareness in understanding that the organization did not speak for all Latinos nor guarantee candidates the Latino vote. Their commitment to finding the best candidate, evaluated by the organization's standards, seemed to limit the potential for discord among Latinos active in RILPAC during election time.

Divisions Among the Community

A number of community leaders suggested that most of the divisions they observed within the Latino community occurred generally right after elections and may increase in the future as more Latinos run for office. Some worried that the success of RILPAC and certain Latino candidates in elections may lead to future divisions, particularly along national origin lines. As one activist noted, "So we got Latinos elected, and then the community in my opinion, became fragmented." One example of fragmentation, noticed by community leaders, was some level of resentment towards Dominicans' success in elections, as "It is always a Dominican getting elected." Some heard others express fear that Dominican elected officials, particularly Mayor Taveras, would only help Dominicans in the city. For Latinos who were not Dominican, after the Mayor's election, there were "mixed emotions - one hand, excited there's a Latino, but then feel taken for granted because he only cares about Dominicans."

Most of the Latino community leaders, even those not of Dominican heritage, positively attributed Dominicans' electoral success to Dominicans' interest in politics. Two leaders both remarked that if an observer were to go to Broad Street, the main commercial area for Latinos in Providence, and walked up on three Dominican men talking on the corner, they would be discussing one of the three Dominican national sports: baseball, dominoes or politics. As one put it, "In the DR, politics is a national sport. Politics is one of the few mechanisms in which a poor person can escalate the economic ladder. They bring that idiosyncrasy here." Others emphasized that Dominicans were successful because of their entrepreneurial spirit. "Because Dominicans had less traditionally, that engenders more aggression, more drive, more fierceness towards the process."

Other leaders observed that the drive and success of Dominicans had the potential of alienating other groups. "There's a lot of pride, a lot of passion, when it comes to Latin people. And I think sometimes those things get in the way." Another leader, who is not Dominican, explained the cultural differences more starkly, "People from Central America - very calm, soft spoken, easy to get along. People from Dominican Republic, Puerto Rican - very aggressive." Others likewise contrasted Dominicans' approach to politics to the different priorities and histories of other groups.

The different homeland and immigrant experiences of the various national origin groups in Providence contributed to the different approaches to politics according to those interviewed. Some leaders noted that Puerto Ricans were less interested and organized than Dominicans, potentially due to their privilege of already being citizens. According to them, the benefit of citizenship made Puerto Ricans less enthusiastic about

politics in Providence. Among Central Americans, several commented that they were more likely to be undocumented and less concerned with putting down roots in the community. As one Latino leader put it: “A Guatemalan may say, ‘I am going to work here three years top, get myself a pickup truck, save a little money and that's it. Not worry about legal status.... Here to work, to work, to work - going to die working.’” As the Central American population continues to grow in Providence, it is unclear whether they will continue to view themselves as a more migrant community. It remains to be seen whether they will come to view Providence as their new home as Dominicans in Providence came to realize in the 1980s, as one community leaders described, and if that view will lead them to be more engaged in the politics of the city.

Additionally, experiences in their home countries led some of those from Central and South America to be skeptical of politics. A political activist explained, “Other groups are dragging [a] bitter taste from [their] homeland. In [home country], politics equal oppression; politics means getting whacked. When I started to get involved in politics, my parents were like, ‘What are you doing? You need to get a real job!’”

Some expressed disappointment that a few Latinos expected politics to lead to similar types of patronage based on their home countries’ political system. “[A] smaller core of people saying, ‘Ok, so how can I help out a politician so that I can land a job, or I can land a job for someone else?’ Kind of like reverting to the old Latin American patronage model.” Leaders particularly pointed out one Latino community member who has privately criticized Mayor Taveras, saying they believed he was dissatisfied with the mayor only because he did not receive a position in the administration. This expectation

of patronage from politics worried some that potential future leaders would not be as inclusive as previous efforts by Latino leaders in the community.

However, one Latino leader said she welcomed the differences between groups, explaining that it was ethnic pride and an element of human nature. Despite these differences and obstacles, most Latino leaders felt unified as a community. She pointed out that many Latinos from different groups had recently worked to elect James Diossa, whose family is Colombian, as mayor of nearby Central Falls, Rhode Island. Another community leader explained the differences between groups as “healthy competition” and an idea that “Hey, I can do it better. Let me do it myself.” Different groups based on national origin also tend to recognize and support other Latinos, evidenced by the Dominican organization, Quisqueya en Acción, Facebook post congratulating Tomás Ávila, a Honduran, for receiving the 2013 Quetzal Award from The Guatemalan Center of New England.

With the success of 2010 in working together to elect Mayor Taveras and four Latino city councilors, many leaders are now looking forward to what the future of unity will be for Latinos in Providence. Two potential points of division that leaders did not note in the interviews were differences based on generational status or political ideology. Given that the majority of Latino elected officials and candidates in the state are Democrats, the lack of political ideology as a wedge was not surprising. The second generation of Latinos, those who were mostly born in Rhode Island, is in their thirties and early forties. As they continue to assume leadership roles and think more about the future of young Latinos in the city, generational differences may emerge. As the Latino community matures, and as Latinos continue to arrive from different backgrounds, these

might impact the unity of Latinos in Providence. However, given the economic situation for both Providence and the state of Rhode Island, Latinos may remain unified in their challenges and on their top issues.

Who are the Leaders?

Community leaders shared their optimism over the leadership of the Latino community in Providence. When asked to name who they saw as the leaders of the community, many began by complimenting the current state of leadership. One leader explained, “I really do see leadership at every single level.” He went on to express the openness of the system: “anyone who gets engaged can easily be a leader.” A few noted how Latino leaders were increasingly growing up in Providence: “A lot of young people grown here in the state. You are seeing less of the leaders that are coming from the outside.”

Interviewees named a number of individuals as leaders of the community and named a diverse set of people. Despite the large and diverse number of those mentioned as leaders, there was a large degree of consensus among those interviewed on who the Latino leaders were in Providence. They named Latinos from a variety of different sectors of the community, beyond those elected in politics. The named leaders also reflected the diversity of the Latino community in Providence, including both male and female leaders, leaders from different national origins and some Latinos who identify as Black or Afro-Latino. Many commented there could be more opportunities for leaders to emerge: “Never too much leadership... Leadership takes many forms.”

They identified leaders primarily in a few sectors in the community in Providence: those in civic and nonprofit organizations and local politics. Many pointed to

Dr. Pablo Rodriguez, the first President of RILPAC and founder of Latino Public Radio, as the “godfather” of the Latino community in Providence. They also named individuals involved with different Spanish language media outlets, such as Victor Cuenca at the newspaper Providence en Español and Tony Mendez with Poder 1110 WPMZ Radio. Many leaders also named others active in RILPAC and the community, such as Melba de Peña, former executive director of the Democratic Party, Victor Capellán, Superintendent for Central Falls High School and Doris De Los Santos, Director of Development and Community Strategies for Providence Public Schools. Others named additional leaders who had served in Latino organizations and nonprofits in the city. In addition, some interviewees also noted that the women in the community who were child-care providers were also leaders of the Latino community in Providence. One leader cited their strong social network, explaining that it was the fastest way to distribute information in the community. “No one would call them a leader, but they are a leader.”

Community leaders were more divided whether to consider different business leaders as leaders of the Latino community. Some explained that they did not think of business leaders as leaders of the community because many of the businesses that Latinos owned in the city were still relatively small. One community leader pointed out that there were no Latino CEOs of large companies in Providence. Others explained that most business leaders tended not to want to take additional roles as leaders of the community. "The most successful Latinos in RI stay as far off the radar as possible." One gave the example of the owner of Armando & Sons Meat Market, as a successful Latino who avoided involvement in politics and a role as a leader in the community. One business entrepreneur, Tomás Ávila, was mentioned through his activities in the Latino

community and RILPAC. Also missing in the discussion of Latino leaders were the religious leaders in the community. Only one community leader interviewed mentioned religious leaders in the community as leaders for the Latino community but did not name any specific leaders.

Most all of those interviewed in Providence pointed to the Latino elected officials as leaders of the Latino community. As one community member explained, "When you are an elected official, you are by default a leader." A majority of those interviewed listed four of the Latino elected officials as leaders of the Latino community: Mayor Angel Taveras, Councilmember Sabina Matos, State Senator Juan Pichardo and State Representative Grace Diaz. A smaller number of community leaders and journalists mentioned Councilmember Luis Aponte as well. None volunteered the other two Latinos currently on the city council, Councilmember Carmen Castillo or Davian Sanchez, as leaders of the Latino community.⁷⁴

Mayor Angel Taveras

Most of those interviewed listed Mayor Taveras as "the" Latino leader for the city of Providence. Many explained that he was the obvious leader, since he had the power of being the first Latino mayor for the city. Mayor Taveras was elected in 2010 at age 40.⁷⁵ Taveras, the son of Dominican immigrants, was born in Brooklyn, New York and grew up in the south side of Providence, raised by his single mother. During his mayoral campaign, he frequently pointed out that he went from "Head Start to Harvard,"

⁷⁴ State Representative, Anastasia Williams, was also omitted as a leader of the Latino community. Representative Williams, a Panamanian woman, has represented Providence since 1992 when she was the first Latino elected in Rhode Island.

⁷⁵ I supported Mayor Taveras's campaign efforts with a small donation to attend a campaign event in 2010.

graduating from Harvard University and Georgetown Law School (*About Angel* 2010). After opening his own law firm, Taveras was appointed by his predecessor, Mayor David Cicilline, as judge of the city's Housing Court in 2007. Previously, Taveras ran unsuccessfully for Rhode Island's House of Representatives 2nd District in 2000.

In 2010, Taveras won a four-way Democratic primary carrying 11 of the city's 15 wards. Taveras defeated two established Italian American politicians, long-time city councilor John Lombardi and State Representative Steven Costantino, as well as perennial candidate Christopher Young. Taveras's campaign formed a coalition of strong Latino and minority support in the southside of the city and support from white liberals from the wealthier East Side neighborhood (Orr and West 2007; Orr and Nordlund 2013). This was a similar electoral strategy used by Mayor Cicilline. Taveras won the general election with 82% of the vote and broke the longtime political hegemony of Irish and Italian mayors in Providence. Prior to his election, whites and Blacks were less optimistic about the city's future under Mayor Taveras (Filindra and Orr 2012). However, over the course of his time in office, his poll numbers have risen, with a 63.7% approval rating (Nesi 2013). He is expected to run for Governor of Rhode Island in the 2014 election.

Nearly all community leaders praised Mayor Taveras in his work for the Latino community and for the city as a whole. Many pointed out how he is a role model for the Latino community. One community leader explained that the mayor was a "legitimate" leader because "he worked hard and he went to Harvard. And honestly, that impresses anybody." Others described that he is viewed as "someone who has made it" and that he "completely changed how Latinos have been seen in the state for the longest time."

In describing Mayor Taveras's leadership, some mentioned his history in both the Latino community and more broadly in Providence. They explained that Taveras did not come from an organizing background: he was described as "behind-the-scene type person" who has "always been involved one way or another" but his primary focus was on his legal career. As one said, "Way back when, he ran for Congress. He lost that race. However, he came out as a leader. Then he went under the radar for a while – quiet – and then he resurfaced."

None of the interviewees criticized his connections to the community or personal financial success. One Latino put it directly: "We can't criticize when we have a successful Latino because we want them all to be community organizers." Another pointed out that his successful legal career afforded him the opportunity to stop working while campaigning and personally loan the campaign money. "The folks who get involved politics who aren't economically independent – it creates a real hurdle for them to have real leadership." Many community leaders praised his professional success and ties to different communities he developed through his work as a lawyer. "He wasn't just the Latino candidate in the race. He was also the East Side candidate in the race."

A majority of those interviewed indicated that Mayor Taveras understood the responsibility he had as leader of Providence. Some noted his role as important to the future of Latinos in politics in Providence. "He has the understanding that because he is the first Latino mayor, everyone has been focused on him. And because of the work he does, it is going to affect the possibility of electing another Latino mayor." They also indicated that they had high expectations for him in the office. One community leader said that Latinos are "harder on him because he is one of them."

Latino community leaders mentioned that his role required him to not just be a leader to Latinos but they expected him to be a leader to all in the city. He is “not just the mayor of Latino community, but of all communities. He is the mayor.” Others agreed, with one community leader saying, “It's about putting out a candidate that can relate with any constituent.” Journalists also complemented the Mayor’s ability to connect to different communities throughout the city.

According to those interviewed, Taveras’s leadership to the city was evident in his handling of Providence’s fiscal crisis. When asked to name Taveras’s top policy initiative or program, the majority of those interviewed listed the budget crisis he inherited upon assuming office. One leader described this by saying that Taveras’s “number one policy would be fiscal responsibility – making sure the city’s books are in order, and we are not going into bankruptcy.” Community leaders mentioned in addition to financial responsibility, the mayor was concerned primarily with public education and economic development, the issues the majority listed as most important to Latinos in Providence.

Latino Councilmembers

Four Latinos serve on Providence’s city council: Luis Aponte, Carmen Castillo, Sabina Matos and Davian Sanchez. Of the current four Latino city councilors, most of the interviewees only listed one or two of them as leaders of the Latino community. There seemed to be an understanding among community leaders that the members of the city council did not have much capacity to become leaders. One person pointed out that they are only a part-time council, and another blamed the nature of ward elections: “They tend to get a very narrow-minded perspective because they need to get a handful of

people happy to get reelected.” Others echoed this sentiment, with some adding the same desire for city councilors, like the mayor, to become community-wide leaders. A community leader said,

I see them all as leaders but they are individual leaders in their wards. In that context, their leadership is great. What I am hoping is that they see themselves not only as Latino leaders but leaders of their community, the city of Providence.

Councilmember Sabina Matos was praised, like Mayor Taveras, as a highly-regarded leader in the Latino community.⁷⁶ Councilwoman Matos emigrated from the Dominican Republic to Providence in 1994. Through her position at New Roots Providence at the Providence Plan and her involvement in the Latino community through a variety of organizations, Matos was considered very well-connected to the community. She was active in RILPAC and graduated from the group’s Latina Leadership Institute in 2003. One community leader said, “Sabina has been training to be a leader for a long time.” Matos won election as city councilor in Ward 15 in 2010 in her second attempt at office, defeating a white incumbent, Josephine DiRuzzo who had been in office for 28 years.

Matos was described as "the most dedicated one on the council." She “moved very fast in having a presence and commanded the respect that a councilwoman should.” One community leader praised her work on the Finance Committee for the council. Many expressed their admiration for her dedication to her ward through her efforts to improve the quality of life in her ward’s struggling neighborhoods. “She is really taking on the revitalization of Olneyville - a really challenging task.” Another community leader praised Matos’s commitment to her constituents: “One of the things that she is doing that

⁷⁶ I have a personal relationship with Councilmember Matos and have supported her campaign efforts.

I like is that she goes out and walks the streets. You need your constituents to feel comfortable asking you questions, asking you what's going on.” Some community leaders mentioned Councilmember Matos as the next potential candidate for mayor after Mayor Taveras, particularly if she is able to broaden her appeal to other parts of the city like the mayor did. “I see a great future for her,” added one leader.

A few community leaders also mentioned Councilmember Luis Aponte as a leader of the Latino community in Providence, particularly within his Ward 10 neighborhood in South Providence. Aponte, a Puerto Rican, first ran in 1994 at age 31 but lost by less than ten votes in the Democratic primary to incumbent councilmember John Rollins, an African American. Aponte ran again in 1998, and in the primary, he defeated former State Representative George Castro, an African American with Cape Verdean ancestry, to win the open seat. Most acknowledge the importance of his election as the first Latino on the city council and long-term history in the Latino community through organizations like CHisPA and Juanita Sanchez Multi Service Center. Some also mentioned his leadership through advocacy work in the area of low-income housing. A few community leaders also mentioned his ties to the African American community in Providence: the chairwoman for his first two elections was African American city councilor Balbina Young, his ex-wife is African American, his children are biracial, and African Americans make up a significant portion of his ward.

However, some questioned whether Councilmember Aponte had been in office for too long. Community leaders expressed frustration with Aponte by saying, “It starts to get routine, and you become less responsive” and “His time has really passed. He is a really good person and everything, but he is stuck.” Aponte last faced a serious electoral

challenge in 2006, narrowly beating Pedro Espinal by 15 votes. He was not challenged in the Democratic primary in 2010. One community leader blamed the ward system of government in Providence: “If you can keep 300 people happy, you can be an elected official for life.”

Given his length of time on the council, some were unsure why Aponte had not advanced in position. After the 2010 election, some leaders said they expected him to seek the position of Council President, which he did not. Community leaders expressed frustration at his inaction. “If you had asked me 10 years ago who was going to be the first Latino mayor, I would have thought it was Luis.” A few wondered whether the unexpected passing of fellow Latino Councilmember Miguel Luna in 2011 and personal financial and family troubles limited Councilmember Aponte’s ambitions.

The other two Latino city councilors, Councilmembers Davian Sanchez and Carmen Castillo, were not mentioned by any of the Latino community leaders or journalists as leaders of the Latino community. When asked why they were not mentioned, interviewees commented, “You are right, I completely forgot about them” and “I don't hear their names at all.” Some explained that both Sanchez and Castillo were new to the council having only recently been elected. One interviewee noted, “I'm a little hesitant about the inexperience they have. I wish them well.”

Sanchez, who was born in Providence to Puerto Rican and Dominican parents, was elected in 2010 when he was only 21 years old. “He just woke up one day and decided I'm running. He doesn't come from a political family that has been involved.” Sanchez was the only Latino in the four-way Democratic primary race to replace retiring city councilor, Balbina Young, an African American first elected in 1988. He won 35%

of the vote in the primary and 70% of the vote in the general election to become the councilmember for Ward 11. Another community leader explained that “Davian won the lottery” in his election, benefiting from a Latino surge of voters who came out to elect Mayor Taveras.

Two interviewees mentioned moments where they thought Sanchez was either arrogant or naive: when he did not opt to go through RILPAC’s endorsement process in his election and when he declined, according to a community leader, to translate his words to Spanish at a press conference he held. Although Sanchez is new to the council, most were not optimistic about his future. One community leader said, “To the extent that he has a half-Dominican, half-Puerto Rican family, he had the ability to do great work bringing young people from diverse backgrounds together to make change. He has failed by all measures.” Another explained that Sanchez is “completely missing in action and making questionable judgment calls.” A few reluctantly complimented Sanchez’s withdrawal of support for a youth curfew ordinance he suggested. They mentioned his willingness to listen to constituents and community leaders who opposed the curfew idea (Pina 2012).

Councilwoman Castillo won a special election for the vacant Ward 9 council seat in November 2011 after Miguel Luna passed away unexpectedly of a heart attack a few months earlier. Castillo was born in the Dominican Republic and came to Providence in the 1990s with her three daughters as a single mother. Castillo, a room attendant in Providence’s Omni Hotel (formerly the Westin Hotel), helped organize a boycott of the hotel in 2010 and is a union steward and member of the executive board for UNITE HERE Local 217.

Union support was instrumental in her election, with volunteers from across the region helping her canvass, phone bank and fundraise. Castillo faced challenges in the Democratic primary, with the Luna family, Councilmember Matos and State Senator Pichardo supporting a more established community organizer and African American woman, Rochelle Lee. With the endorsement of the local SIEU, State Representative Grace Diaz and Councilmembers Aponte and Sanchez, Castillo won the six-way race with 358 votes. She edged out Rochelle Lee, who captured 312 votes and Hector Jose, a perennial candidate, who had 302 votes. She easily won the general election, with over 75% of the vote.

Community leaders did not volunteer Castillo's name when asked to name leaders in the Latino community. When asked about her, many responded that they saw her more as a leader with the unions. Some expressed concern over her ties to the unions, with comments such as, "I feel like she was put in there by the union and she is just going to do whatever the unions do." Most interviewees pointed out how little time she has served in office. Others hoped she would grow into the position and become a vocal progressive advocate for social justice like her predecessor, Miguel Luna, once was. However, a few questioned her ability to navigate the political process, commenting on her lack of English fluency and lack of initiative in authoring policy and outreach to the community.

Latino community leaders in Providence emphasized that they considered the leaders of their community to be those with history and experience in the community. While all expressed that they and other Latino voters had great pride in having Latinos in political office in Providence, they indicated that they had high expectations for those Latino leaders to deliver outcomes for the community.

“I believe we as Latinos have to be smart. I know there is a movement to get Latinos, to get Latinos, to get Latinos. So we can make a statement, so we can get power. But I would say, you know something, at one point we have to become more mature and not elect people not only because they are Latinos but because they are going to represent the needs of us.”

Conclusion

Beginning in the 1990s, the Latino community in Providence unified with political success unlike the experience of groups before them. Unlike the predictions of traditional theories of assimilation, Latinos did not become successful in Providence after going through the process of acculturation and acceptance (Alba and Nee 2003; Gordon 1964). As they settled, Latinos did not gradually come to experience less discrimination, residential isolation or social exclusion in Providence. Latinos did not wait for the generations-long process of incorporation that previous newcomer immigrants underwent to become politically active. Latinos in Providence also did not become mobilized by racial inequality in the same way others in nearby Boston or Hartford were mobilized (Hardy-Fanta 1993; Cruz 1998; Jennings 1984; Uriarte 1993). The timing of their arrival and growth in Providence occurred after most of the urban struggles of the 1960s and 1970s. The “War on Poverty” service programs and organizations that trained Black and Latino leaders in other communities were largely unavailable by the time Latinos in Providence settled due to cuts in federal funding.

As the Latino population exploded in Providence in the 1990s, the presence of Latinos was evident. However, the Latino community is one of the most diverse in the nation, with large numbers of Dominicans, Puerto Ricans, Guatemalans and other groups. This diversity among Latinos could pose a barrier to community unity and organization and could dilute their political strength. As evidenced by RILPAC, leaders and

organizations in Providence harnessed the community's diversity into a broader Latino strategy to secure benefits for the entire community.

The economic situation in Providence may limit the continuation of Latinos' success in Providence. The further decline in funding available to service organizations has weakened the organizations that helped create the panethnic Latino unity in Providence. Some community leaders also commented that the poor economy has disincentivized group political mobilization, as individual Latinos must focus on surviving and providing for their own families. The leaders of the Latino community are participating in discussions on how best move forward to encourage political participation and leadership development in the community while facing economic hardships.

The persistence of poverty and lack of job opportunities is an important concern to Latino community leaders in Providence. Improvements in education and work opportunities, along with quality of life issues, are key policies for the advancement of Latinos in the community. Community leaders credited Mayor Taveras, Councilwoman Matos and Councilmember Aponte as working on these issues in the midst of a challenging financial time for Providence.

In the short time since their political mobilization in the late 1990s, Latinos have experienced political success with the election of four Latino city councilors and a Latino mayor. The success has primarily been limited to Dominicans, the group that community leaders see as the most engaged in politics in Providence. Given the organization of the council into wards, the residential segregation of Latinos and the dominance of Democrats, it is likely that Latinos will increasingly challenge each other in city council

elections. Some of these challenges have already occurred, such as Pedro Espinal's challenge to Aponte in 2006 and Gonzalo Cuervo's challenge to Miguel Luna in 2010. While the scenario of national-origin based campaigns among Latinos in these races is possible and perhaps unavoidable on some level, community leaders in Providence express interest in finding the best candidate for the job. Frustrations over Councilmembers Sanchez and Castillo's lack of leadership ability and action on the council may lead to Latino challengers in the next election. Among Latino community leaders, there is a desire for Latino leaders to be not only effective leaders in their community, but also leaders for the entire city. As Latinos in Providence mature and grow, it remains to be seen whether Latino leaders can continue to cultivate this spirit of unity and dedication to the community.

Table 5.1 – Top Five Latino National Groups in Providence, 2010

National Origin	Population	Percentage
All Latinos	67,835	
Dominican	25,267	37.2%
Puerto Rican	14,847	21.8%
Guatemalan	11,930	17.6%
Mexican	3,188	4.7%
Salvadoran	1,503	2.2%

Table 5.2 – Latinos in Local Office in Providence

	Position	Years in Office	Party	National Origin
Current				
Luis Aponte	City Council, Ward 10	1998 – present	Democrat	Puerto Rican
Sabina Matos	City Council, Ward 15	2010 – present	Democrat	Dominican
Davian Sanchez	City Council, Ward 11	2010 – present	Democrat	Dominican and Puerto Rican
Carmen Castillo	City Council, Ward 9	2011 – present	Democrat	Dominican
Angel Taveras	Mayor	2010 – present	Democrat	Dominican
Previous				
Miguel Luna	City Council, Ward 9	2002 – 2011, passed away	Democrat	Dominican
Leon Tejada	City Council, Ward 8	2006 – 2010, lost primary	Democrat	Dominican

Table 5.3 – Top Community Issues for Latinos in Providence

Issue for Latino Community	Number of People Who Mentioned Issue
Employment/Economic Issues	16
Education	16
Housing	6
Immigration	4
Health	4
Budget	1
Taxes	1
Safety	1

CHAPTER SIX

Latinos in Hartford

Connecticut's capital city, Hartford, is the state's fourth largest city with 124,775 residents within the city's 18 square miles. Settled in the early 17th century, Hartford's founder, Reverend Thomas Hooker, proclaimed, "The foundation of authority is laid, firstly, in the free consent of the people" (Rossiter 1952). In the 19th century, the city flourished with a wealth of commercial innovation and activity. The city's economy boomed with industries such as insurance, publishing, munitions and manufacturing. Hartford became known as the "Insurance Capital of the World," as agencies developed from private businessmen insuring merchant vessels coming through Hartford on the Connecticut River.

By the late 19th century, Hartford was the wealthiest city in the United States (De Avila 2012). Hartford's prosperity enticed others to the city. From 1870 to 1920, the city grew rapidly from 42,015 to 138,035 residents.⁷⁷ Large numbers of immigrants, including Irish, Germans, Scandinavians, Russian Jews and Italians, arrived from New York City. By 1890, 27.2% of the city was foreign-born. Southern Blacks also began to settle in Hartford as part of the Great Migration from the rural South.

The city's infrastructure and housing stock failed to keep pace with the growing population, and poor living and sanitary conditions plagued the newcomers'

⁷⁷ All demographic data, unless otherwise specified, comes from the U.S. Census. For current data, I use the 2010 U.S. Census and 2011 3-year American Community Survey.

neighborhoods. By 1900, a report on tenement housing concluded that, “Hartford with a population of only 79,850 has for its size the worst housing conditions in the country” (DeForest and Veiller 1903). However, the city’s strong economy buoyed Hartford through the 1940s. Plentiful jobs in the nearby tobacco fields and the booming manufacturing industry during WWII attracted others, like the West Indians and Puerto Ricans, to settle in Hartford. The city’s population peaked in 1950 at 177,397.

After WWII, Hartford experienced a variety of setbacks, economic problems and demographic changes. Businesses, including Colt Manufacturing Co. and Pratt & Whitney, relocated to nearby cities, moved out of state, or simply closed their doors. Many of Hartford’s white residents fled the city to nearby suburbs (Clavel 1986). As a result of white flight, between 1950 and 1980, Hartford’s population dropped by 40,000 residents (Backstrand and Schensul 1982). Substantial Black and Puerto Rican populations arrived at the beginning of Hartford’s swift decline. From 1950 to 1970, Blacks increased from 7.2% of the population to 27.9% of the city. By 1970, about 20,000 Puerto Ricans lived in the city (Cruz 1998).

Tensions escalated between the leaders of the city’s successful corporate sector, known as the Bishops, and the increasing number of racial and ethnic minority residents. In 1960, the city embarked on “one of the largest programs of urban redevelopment ever undertaken by an American municipality” (Weaver 1982) and destroyed much of the low-income housing in the center of the city to create the commercial development, Constitution Plaza. As a result, many of the remaining Italian immigrants left the city, and Blacks relocated to the North End neighborhoods where they were joined by the increasing number of Puerto Ricans.

Hartford went from being one of the nation's richest cities at the end of the 19th century to one of the poorest cities by 1970 (McKee 2000). Racial change, persistent inequality and discrimination erupted in violence in Hartford in the late 1960s, as it did in other cities across the U.S. (Spilerman 1970). In August of 1969, rumors that the Comancheros, a white motorcycle gang, assaulted a Puerto Rican man started riots among Puerto Ricans in the city. Additional incidents around Labor Day, including the police shooting of a black youth and a *Hartford Times* article in which a fireman demeaned Puerto Ricans as "pigs," ignited further violence in both the Puerto Rican and African American communities. The riots unified Puerto Ricans with a goal of seeking recognition from the city (Cruz 1997).

The white business community reacted negatively to the explosive growth of Puerto Ricans in the city. Urban renewal displaced many Puerto Ricans, and some moved southwest of downtown to create their own community in Frog Hollow around Park Street. In 1974, the Bishops developed a covert plan, known as the Hartford Process, to limit further Puerto Rican migration to the city and contain Puerto Ricans to neighborhoods in designated areas. After the plan was leaked to the media, Puerto Ricans mobilized a successful protest forcing the city to abandon the plan (Cruz 1997).

Hartford continued to deteriorate during the second half of the 21st century. The city's economy further worsened as its tax base eroded with the loss of a number of insurance companies, including CIGNA and Traveler's Insurance. Hartford's downtown lost retail and entertainment attractions, like the closure of the G. Fox department store and departure of their professional hockey team, the Hartford Whalers, in the 1990s. In the late 1990s, schools declined to the point that the state interceded and took them over

(Burns 2002). A rising crime rate landed Hartford on a list of the most dangerous cities in the country (Burgard 2004).

Despite efforts to rebrand Hartford as “New England’s Rising Star” and millions of dollars spent in downtown revitalization efforts, Hartford experienced a very limited renaissance that has ignored the city’s poorer neighborhoods. In 2011, the median household income for the city was \$28,736, much lower than Connecticut’s median household income of \$69,243. Despite living in the third richest state in the country, a third of Hartford’s residents live below the poverty line. Many of Hartford’s residents continue to face difficult challenges of poverty and lack of opportunities.

Latinos in Hartford

Hartford is a majority-minority city with Latinos comprising the largest group (43.4%) in the city. African Americans account for 35.4% of the city’s population, and 15.8% of the city’s residents are white. Among its Latinos, Hartford is primarily Puerto Rican, with 78% of Latinos in Hartford identifying as Puerto Rican (see Table 6.1).

Insert Table 6.1 here

The initial Puerto Ricans, former workers at tobacco facilities in smaller towns and rural villages in Puerto Rico, arrived in Hartford in the 1940s. Their employers recruited them to move to Connecticut to fill the need for low-skilled labor after restrictions limited European immigration (Glasser 1997). Seasonal workers and other Puerto Ricans who migrated in the Gran Migración (Great Migration) in the mid-19th century from the island settled in the city. The agricultural industry near Hartford soon declined in the 1960s, as farmland became more valuable for suburban development. However, Puerto Ricans continued to arrive to the city seeking better employment

opportunities than those available on the island of Puerto Rico. Other Puerto Ricans moved from New York to join family and friends already settled in the less crowded and more affordable city (Anderson 1970).

Puerto Ricans organized and built resources in community-based groups and agencies. Early groups, like the San Juan Center (started in 1956), Spanish Action Coalition (1967) and Puerto Rican Parade Committee (1963), affirmed Puerto Ricans' ethnic identity and encouraged Puerto Rican activism. These organizations developed additional advocacy organizations and programs, like La Casa de Puerto Rico, Teacher Corps, Connecticut Association of United Spanish Administrators, Hispanic Health Council and Connecticut Puerto Rican Forum. The Catholic Church, community agencies and baseball leagues developed additional social networks and trained Puerto Rican leaders in the community (Cruz 1997).

During the 1960s, the number of Puerto Ricans in Hartford tripled. Puerto Ricans also began to organize politically through groups like the Puerto Rican Democrats of Hartford. The turbulent summer of 1969 brought visibility to the collective needs of the growing number of Puerto Ricans in Hartford. Additional events in the 1970s such as the Hartford Process's plan and the publication of racist jokes in a local magazine would further mobilize Puerto Ricans in Hartford (Cruz 1997). Puerto Ricans did not act monolithically, however, and Puerto Rican political groups proliferated.

The Democratic Party appointed a Puerto Rican, Mildred Torres-Soto, to city council for the first time in 1979.⁷⁸ In subsequent elections, the Democratic Party

⁷⁸ African Americans in Hartford achieved political representation earlier than Puerto Ricans. 1955, Hartford elected John Clark, its first African American city councilor. In 1981 Hartford elected the first Black mayor, Thirman Milner, in New England. Milner

developed a racially based quota system for their slate of endorsed candidates to balance the interests of whites, Blacks, and Puerto Ricans in the city. Although they were successful in achieving political representation, Puerto Rican elites frequently disagreed over their candidates, strategies and ideologies. Efforts to unify under a Puerto Rican Political Action Committee in the mid-1980s achieved success but later dissolved over personal conflicts and ideological differences. Puerto Ricans continued to be elected, and their growing numbers in the city led to the election of the first Puerto Rican mayor, Eddie Perez, in 2001.

While Puerto Ricans today make up two-thirds of the Latino community, other Latino groups have increased and their presence is now more visible in the city. The city's Latino population evolved from 87% Puerto Rican in 1990 to 78% Puerto Rican in 2010. Peruvians, Dominicans and Mexicans have joined Puerto Ricans in Hartford. Hartford's Peruvian community is small, but also dates back to the 1950s and 1960s. Peruvians formed their first social club in 1966 and held a public celebration of "Señor de los Milagros de Nazarenas" (Lord of Miracles, an annual religious Peruvian tradition in October) for the first time in 1968. The Peruvian consulate opened a branch office in Hartford in 2002 (Zielbauer 2003). The Dominican and Mexican populations have grown more recently and now are approximately the same size of the Peruvian population in Hartford (see table 6.1). The growing diversity of Latinos in Hartford reflects the national trend of increasing diversity among Latinos.

retired in 1987 and endorsed then-State Representative Carrie Saxon Perry for the position; she won, becoming the first Black female mayor in a large city in the United States. Mayor Mike Peters, a white firefighter with Italian family heritage, defeated Perry in 1993 and served until his retirement 2001.

Latinos in the city today are young: the median age for Hartford Latinos is 28, and 32% of the Latino population is under age 18. They are also mostly lower income. The median household income for Latinos in the city is \$23,163. Forty-one percent of Latinos in the city live below the poverty line. Most of the Latinos in Hartford are native born (83%), unsurprising given that Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens.⁷⁹ Of the small foreign-born Latino population in Hartford, 38% are naturalized citizens.

Of the approximately 54,000 Latinos in Hartford, only a third are estimated to be registered voters (Pazniokas 2013). Nonetheless, Latinos have taken their place in Hartford's city hall. Since 2001, Hartford has had two Puerto Rican Mayors: Eddie Perez and Pedro Segarra. A number of Latinos, all Puerto Ricans, have served on the city council since the 1980s. Currently there are three Puerto Ricans on the council: Alexander Aponte, Raúl De Jesús, Jr. and Joel Cruz, Jr. (see Table 6.2).

Insert Table 6.2 here

Government

Hartford's city council, known as the Court of Common Council, has nine members elected at-large in partisan elections. Under state statute, the city must have minority party representation as part of their at-large representation on the City Council. With nine members on the Council, two-thirds of the council seats are reserved for Democrats, as the majority party, and the remaining three are open for minority parties (Hassett 2010). Hartford is a predominantly Democratic city. In 2008, the most recent data available from Hartford's Registrar Office, the city had 36,140 registered

⁷⁹ The U.S. Census uses the term native born "to refer to anyone born in the United States, Puerto Rico, a U.S. Island Area (American Samoa, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or the U.S. Virgin Islands), or abroad of a U.S. citizen parent or parents" (Bureau).

Democrats, 2,138 Republicans, 11,398 unaffiliated voters and 78 voters that are classified as “other.”⁸⁰

Democrats in Hartford are organized through the Democratic Town Committee (DTC). The DTC is made of seven geographically based assembly districts. Elections to the town committee are held every two years in early March.⁸¹ In the 2012 election, 152 individuals ran for 66 seats on the DTC; Only 3,551 (12.69% of registered party voters) voted in the election (Carlesso 2012b). The members elected to the DTC hold a caucus to endorse a slate of candidates for the Democratic primary prior to each election. However, the exact process of the caucus is unclear to the public; the caucus’s website is mostly bare and does not seem to have been updated since 2010, and local observers describe the process as confusing and alienating (Provost 2011). The endorsement of the DTC is incredibly powerful: “... endorsed Democrats are all but assured success at the polls. And so the town committee is the de facto electorate, the board of directors that makes all management choices for Hartford” (Carmiel 2006). The low voter registration and participation rate in Hartford bolsters the power of the DTC. For example, in the 2007 mayoral election, only 43,595 of Hartford’s 87,500 voting-age residents were registered to vote, and only 31.8% actually voted (Curry 2007).

Dating back to the early 1980s, the DTC generally balances its endorsed slate by race as part of an unwritten rule based on race and ethnicity. Known locally as the 2-2-2

⁸⁰ “Other” includes registered members of the Working Family Party.

⁸¹ The party holds a caucus of all eligible registered members of the party approximately two months before the election to select candidates for the DTC. Those selected at the caucus are the endorsed candidates, which range from 8-13 members per district. If there are petitioning candidates (which must be a slate of at least 25% of the seats in the assembly district) they must secure signatures of at least 5% of the district’s registered party voters.

system, the DTC traditionally endorses two whites, two African Americans and two Latinos (Cohen 2010). Members of the community have divided opinions over the benefits of the system, with some critics suggesting the need for more Latino seats and others advocating the abandonment of the system completely. There are currently two Latino Democrats on the city council: Alexander Aponte and Raul Raúl De Jesús, Jr.

The third Latino, Joel Cruz, Jr. on the council is a member of the Working Families Party. The legal requirement for three minority party seats on the Council has encouraged the development of numerous third parties over the years. For example, the People for Change party, a progressive, dissident faction of the Democratic Party, was formed in 1987. The party, which included Latino community organizer, Eugenio Caro, won two of the minority seats in 1987 and 1989 and all three in 1991. In 1993, the party lost all of its seats as three Republicans were elected, and it dissolved in 1994. More recently, the Working Families Party is the primary minority party in Hartford. The Working Families Party elected two candidates, including Puerto Rican Luis Cotto, for the first time to the council in the 2007 election. In 2011, the Working Families party ran a slate of four candidates for the council and won control of all three minority position seats on the council. The fourth candidate, Working Families member and Puerto Rican Joel Cruz, Jr., replaced Luis Cotto, after he resigned in the summer of 2012 when his family moved (Carlesso 2012a).

Prior to 2002, the position of Hartford's mayor was largely ceremonial. In 2002, after frustration with the lack of accountability in City Hall, voters approved a charter revision, and the city adopted a strong mayor system. This eliminated the city manager position and gave increasing power to the mayor, placing him or her in charge of all of

the city departments. The mayor's salary also increased from \$30,000 to \$105,000 and the term length changed from two to four years for both the Mayor and Council (Hassett 2010).

Hartford elected Eddie Perez, a champion for charter reform, in 2001 to become the first Latino mayor in Hartford and New England. Perez was born in Corozal, Puerto Rico, and his family moved to New York City and then to the North End of Hartford. After a difficult childhood where he was involved in a local street-gang, Perez became a community organizer (Stanton 2006). In 1989, Trinity College hired Perez as the director, and later associate vice president, of community relations. Perez led the \$110 million construction of the Learning Corridor, a 16-acre campus of four public magnet schools in Frog Hollow developed by a public-private partnership including Trinity and Hartford Hospital. Perez was elected as mayor in 2001 with more than 70% of the vote and was easily re-elected in 2003 to a four-year term under the new city charter that strengthened the mayor's powers.

When he was elected in 2001, the *Hartford Courant* editorial staff (2001) predicted that Perez's biggest problem "may be the spoils-seekers on the Democratic Town Committee, who can be expected to beat a path to his door seeking favors or delivering threats." The prediction proved true: Perez became engulfed in a political scandal after state criminal investigators accused him of accepting deeply discounted home renovations from a city contractor and trying to extort a developer into paying \$100,000 to a political ally, Abraham Giles. Despite the investigation, Perez won re-election in a six-way race in 2007. Perez resigned in 2010 following his conviction of five felony counts (Kovner 2010). Council President, Pedro Segarra, also a Puerto Rican,

assumed the Mayor's position after Perez's resignation. Only expected to finish Mayor Perez's turn initially, Segarra decided to run again in 2011 and was re-elected with more than 70% of the vote.

Top Issues to the Latino Community

Insert Table 6.3 here

I asked the Latino community leaders what they considered the major concerns of the Latino community in Hartford (see Table 6.3). The community leaders primarily pointed to two issues as interrelated: education and economic opportunities. One community leader responded, "Education is one of the huge issues we are dealing with and because of educational levels, and lack of it, that causes others: being unable to get jobs and retain jobs, to be able to make enough money to survive, to be able to support their families, to be able to compete with the work force." Another community activist said, "Employment opportunities—that's the basis for everything; then education, housing, those kinds of issues come and come easier if they have employment."

Interviewees mentioned issues of education slightly more frequently than employment issues. Some mentioned the education gap, comparing Hartford to the rest of Connecticut: "In comparison to the state, Latino student population in Hartford is the worst. They have the highest education gap in the country." One leader pointed out that the education gap for Latino children was particularly troubling. "The biggest issue for Latinos is the educational gap. The academic achievement gap in Connecticut is the worst in the nation, but when we really delve deep and look at specific populations, the biggest gap is affecting Latino children." Others mentioned the overall poor quality of the education system in Hartford: "All kids going to Hartford public schools have

experienced less than the best quality education. Education is key of you want to progress at any point.”

Community leaders also expressed concern over the lack of economic opportunities in Hartford for Latinos. One community leader put it simply, “They [Latinos] don’t get good jobs. They don’t make good money.” Another pointed to the long-term impact of unemployment: “You know the joke that the best social welfare program is a job. To be without a job and unable to feed your family is devastating, and it’s something that regenerates itself from generation to generation. You can’t get out of poverty.” Of the nine interviewees who mentioned jobs, none discussed any causes or specific details as to why Hartford lacked economic opportunity.

Some leaders mentioned additional issues in the community, such as housing, health and safety. These quality of life issues could be solved, according to a few interviewees, if the economic and education situation improved. “If we had people getting livable wages and kids getting a good education, we could deal with the housing; we could deal with whatever else that is affecting our community.” Another explained that these issues were really all interrelated and very important to Latinos:

When I talk to other city leaders about education, usually the thing it comes back to is the community—housing in the community, safety in the community. There needs to be a community development boom in Hartford which really recognizes that which Latinos hold dear and that is the sense of *comunidad* (community).

Four leaders also commented on the lack of civic engagement of Latinos. “There is definitely a big level of apathy... they don’t see the direct value of why they should attend [political meetings].”

In responding to the question of the top issues for Latinos in Hartford, some community leaders immediately focused on the nature of Latinos as a group in Hartford.

Some began by explaining the history and dominance of Puerto Ricans: “Hartford is known as a Puerto Rican town.” Being a primarily Puerto Rican community changed the importance of issues, according to one community leader. “The issue probably that you will hear in other parts of the country of immigration being the top issue... To Puerto Ricans it is an issue of employment and economic opportunity.” Occasionally, when asked about Latinos, interviewees would respond by using “Puerto Rican” in place of “Latino.” This matches research that demonstrates many prefer national origin identifiers rather than panethnic terms (Segura and Rodrigues 2006; Jones-Correa and Leal 1996).

Others felt it was necessary to explain the demographic changes of the Latino community in Hartford. “In the 22 years I’ve been here, it has changed a lot in Hartford. In 1989 most Latinos were Puerto Rican... the demographic has changed in the last 20 years and we see a lot of Central American and South American people.” One community leader noted, “I think there’s a lot of identity crises” about the terms Latino and Hispanic.

A few community leaders also questioned whether Latinos are enough of a cohesive group in Hartford to have common issues:

You have a very conflicting experience among Latinos who are prominent and have come up through the ranks and have gotten a lot from this country and then you have the everyday Latino who is probably struggling to keep a job and keep their family stable in one location and getting a good education.

Another leader pointed to the issue of education and said, “I think it’s an issue in different ways to different populations of Latinos so it’s not the same story to everyone. It’s a very diverse group of Latinos.”

Unity among Latinos

The large majority of Latinos in Hartford are Puerto Rican. Given their shared cultural heritage, I expected to find some degree of unity among Latino leaders in Hartford, at least among those of Puerto Rican heritage. I also anticipated their unity would be tempered by the different generational and socioeconomic statuses within the Puerto Rican community. Finally, I did not expect the growing presence of Dominicans, Mexicans and Peruvians in the city would influence Latino leaders' overall sense of unity, given these groups' relatively small size.

Most community leaders and observers reported that they did not feel there was a sense of unity among Latinos in Hartford, even within the Puerto Rican community. They did note that it was "mostly a Puerto Rican identity" in the city, albeit a divided one. They answered, "I don't see them very unified at all" and "We're fractured. We're not unified." Some noted that although they did not see an overarching sense of unity, "You have pockets of individuals who are working together." One leader explained that it was difficult not to have divisions "even within our own communities."

Leaders expressed disappointment in the lack of unity among Latinos in Hartford. "I believe the divisions are not constructive in any shape or form." Another interviewee said, "Now that I talk about it and verbalize it - it is kind of sad." They blamed personal conflicts among elites for the divisions among the Latino community. "I see a lot of divisions. ... There were power struggles that have divided the leadership in the Puerto Rican community in the Hartford area for many years." Another interviewee was critical of others in the community, saying, "People have their own agenda. They are motivated by their own self."

Some mentioned that they felt there was a stronger sense of unity in the past: “We are not as unified as we once were... Now, the individual is facing the fight alone.”

Another leader related his personal experiences: “I came here 30 years ago. I remember that the community was much more unified. I think it has to do with everything that was going on.” He explained that the community had worked together for bilingual education and the betterment of the community through their nonprofit organizations. “It was a real close, structured way of how to get things done, and they did things as a group.”

History of Unity?

Many of those interviewed in Hartford noted that to understand Puerto Rican politics, one must understand the legacy of Maria Colón Sánchez, known as the la madrina (the godmother) of Hartford Puerto Rican politics. She came to Hartford from Puerto Rico in 1953 with only an eighth grade education. From her small news and candy store on Albany Avenue in the North End, she became an organizer in the community. She was Treasurer of the Puerto Rican Democratic Club of Hartford and was elected as the first Puerto Rican on the Democratic Town Committee. In 1969, Sánchez led communications with the community, city officials and police after the Comancheros riots (Ubiñas 2001).

Sánchez became known for her advocacy for bilingual education in Hartford schools, and beginning in 1973, she served 16 years on the Hartford Board of Education. She helped co-found a number of important community organizations and non-profits including La Casa de Puerto Rico, The Society of Legal Services, the Spanish American Merchants Association and Community Renewal Team. One interviewee referred to these groups as “the anchors of the community.”

For the rest of her life, Sánchez served as a community advocate but faced difficulties working within the Democratic Party. In 1979, despite support from the DTC, Hispanic Democratic Reform Club and the mayor, she was passed over for election to the City Council for another Puerto Rican. In 1988, an African American State Representative and DTC member, Abraham Giles, helped oust Sánchez from her position on the town committee. In the following Democratic primary, the Puerto Rican community successfully mobilized to defeat Giles and elect Sánchez. She held her seat until she passed away on November 25, 1989.

Today, Hartford's Latino community leaders revere Sánchez as la madrina. She is honored with an elementary school and street named after her and a star on the city library's Walk of Fame. Interviewees praised her work in the community: "Maria Sánchez was the one that opened the doors for all of us." They pointed out her skill in unifying the community, saying, "There is something about Maria Sánchez and that is, that she cared and she mobilized... She united people." One interviewee explained that she believed the political fighting present today in Hartford started the day after Sánchez died. Others doubted the ability for another leader like her to emerge: "We don't have a Maria Sánchez. The community has become too diffuse for one person to be the leader. It is all broken down and segmented: by class, by areas of interest, by geography."

Reporter Tom Puleo at the *Hartford Courant* wrote in 1997 that Sánchez had become "an almost mythical figure, someone who in death became larger than life" (Puleo 1997). In my interviews, I noticed a similar nostalgia for Sánchez and the earlier Puerto Rican community. The interviewees' recollections of Sánchez as the idolized leader of a unified community up until her death did not entirely match the historical

record of the communities' development, documented by Cruz in *Identity and Power*. While Sánchez was the matriarch of the Puerto Rican community and a tireless advocate for Puerto Ricans, there were divisions within Puerto Rican community.

Cruz describes the progress of the Puerto Rican community as, paradoxically, a function of its factionalism rather than its unity. Different groups proliferated but personality conflicts and scarce resources limited their effectiveness. However, the “multiple initiatives, false starts, flashes in the pan, and so on” sustained the momentum of Puerto Ricans' organizing efforts (Cruz 1998). Incidents like the 1969 riots and protests against the leaked memo of the Hartford Process united the community, but the unity tended not to last (Cruz 1997). Infighting, personality conflicts and organizational issues debilitated most of the groups.

As Puerto Ricans' focused their activities on the electoral process, Cruz's analysis shows that the community's differences, not their unity, continued to propel their advancement. In the 1970s, some, like Maria Sánchez, worked through the Democratic Party to broker with the machine boss, Nick Carbone, for Puerto Rican representation. Others, primarily younger Puerto Ricans, worked outside the party system to form leftist protest groups. The Puerto Rican Socialist Party, run by José La Luz and Edwin Vargas, combined “el orgullo Boricua” (Puerto Rican pride) with criticisms of unequal wealth and power. In 1977, community leaders formed a short-lived, nonpartisan political action committee to support Vargas's independent campaign to challenge Carbone. Another Puerto Rican, Eugenio Caro, formed a protest group, the Committee of 24, as a response

to continued discrimination against Puerto Ricans in the 1970s.⁸² Through these efforts, the partisan, organizational and ideological differences among Puerto Ricans worked to their favor to put multiple points of pressure on Carbone to eventually fill a vacant Democratic city council seat with a Puerto Rican in 1979.

Four Puerto Ricans sought the appointed position, including Maria Sánchez and Edwin Vargas. The community did not rally around Sánchez for the position. A Puerto Rican community forum was held to recommend a candidate: Vargas received 157 votes; Mildred Torres, 100; Andrés Vázquez, 17 and Sánchez, 15. Carbone supported Mildred Torres, and at a press conference Vázquez and Vargas withdrew their candidacies in support of Torres and Caro's Committee of 24 endorsed Torres.⁸³ Although Sánchez received the endorsement of the DTC's selection panel, the mayor and another Latino group, the Hispanic Democratic Reform Club, Carbone's control of the council meant that Torres became the first Puerto Rican to the council over Sánchez (Cruz 1998).

Sánchez was a committed advocate for the community and held considerable power in parts of the Puerto Rican community, particularly among those Puerto Ricans in her North End neighborhood. However, as the 1979 appointment to the city council shows, there was not always a sense of Puerto Rican unity around her efforts, unlike what those interviewed recalled. As Cruz documents, moments of unity or cohesion among Puerto Ricans happened when they, as a group, faced exogenous challenges. However, the unity did not last. The history of Sánchez and the 1979 council appointment shows that Puerto Ricans mobilized in different ways with a shared desire to increase

⁸² Both organizations dissolved by the end of the decade due to personal and ideological infighting.

⁸³ The four of them had previously worked together under Vargas's 1977 city council challenge to Carbone.

community resources, but when they were forced to compete for the scarce resources available, internal disagreement arose.

Competition over scarce resources was noted by some community leaders as reasons for factions among Latinos in Hartford today. “When you are unable to grow the pie, then the infighting begins for whatever crumbs it is you can pull away.” Another leader said, “Because there are so many issues, and there are few resources - I think everyone is pulling and pushing in different ways.” She went on to explain that the competition for resources “could be healthy, but it seems in the Hispanic community because we are competing for so little, it becomes unhealthy.” Another leader noticed this problem particularly among the service agencies in the community, “Those organizations have lost a lot of their luster... constantly competing for the same dollars so they each get less.”

Puerto Rican Organizations

Many of “the anchors of the community,” the organizations Sánchez helped found, no longer exist in Hartford. A number of the interviewees pointed to the decline of these organizations as another reason for the lack of unity and participation among Puerto Ricans, and Latinos, in Hartford. These community agencies, expanded through state and federal funds, provided important services and resources for advocacy in the community. Unlike earlier in the community’s history, when groups proliferated, these organizations have not been replaced. For example, La Casa de Puerto Rico, a prominent social service and advocacy agency founded from the Spanish Action Coalition, no longer exists. La Casa de Puerto Rico “was the voice of the Latino community” (Pionzio 2005). La Casa was instrumental in different community organizing efforts and lawsuits against the city

but the organization closed after significant financial difficulties. One community leader expressed frustration at the closing of La Casa, questioning how an organization so important to the community was allowed to close with a Puerto Rican mayor governing the city.

The Puerto Rican Political Action Committee of Connecticut, which rose to prominence in the mid-1980s, dissolved in the 1990s. In the 1985 election, African American politicians maneuvered to remove Nancy Meléndez, the Puerto Rican city councilor, from the Democratic slate so that they could control an additional seat. Latino community leaders united to save Meléndez's seat, and their effort's launched the Puerto Rican Political Action Committee of Connecticut.⁸⁴ The PAC unified those community leaders who had been previously divided: Mildred Torres, Edwin Vargas, José La Luz, Eugenio Caro and Maria Sánchez. The PAC successful worked through the Democratic Party and independent People for Change Party to campaign for the election of additional Puerto Ricans in subsequent elections.

The death of Sánchez in 1989 and the resulting fight over who would fill her seat in the state legislature began PRPAC's decline. PRPAC declined to campaign for either of the Puerto Rican candidates seeking to fill Sánchez's seat, fearing that splitting the Puerto Rican vote would lead to defeat by Abraham Giles, the African American candidate. Edwin Garcia lost to Edna Negrón in the election and later complained to the *Hartford Courant* in 1994 about the role of the PAC: “[The PAC's] attitude is that we are a client population, the indigenous Puerto Ricans who grew up in the barrios, that we are

⁸⁴ Cruz notes that Vargas previously in 1984 criticized Meléndez, arguing that a Puerto Rican who worked for a large corporation could not represent the interests of the community (Cruz 1998).

not intelligent enough to make our decisions that affect our life and progress... Their politics is exclusion and not inclusion. They have their little country club” (Lipton 1994). Garcia launched a personal, political battle against PRPAC and ran again in 1994 for State Representative, with the support of mentor and friend Caro, to defeat Vargas's candidate Luis Davila.

PRPAC and the Puerto Rican community further splintered and the organization eventually dissolved after a number of incidents in the 1990s. Vargas alienated himself by running an unsuccessful all-Puerto Rican council slate in 1993 that finished last in the Democratic primary and led to charges against Vargas for violating election law (Williams 1994). State Representative Juan Figueroa, elected along with Sánchez, left the legislature after three terms and left Hartford (Puleo 1997). Representative Garcia’s abrasive personality and confrontational leadership style isolated him from other Latino leaders, but he remained popular among Latinos with the support of powerful Frog Hollow political operative, Ramon Arroyo. Arroyo and Garcia feuded with other Puerto Ricans in the city, notably with Deputy Mayor Francis Sanchez who accused them of being “bums on the street” (Noel 1996; Puleo 1997). Arroyo was also a controversial figure in the community after his 1992 arrest for patronizing a prostitute (Puleo and Kranhold 1996). Caro accused Garcia of disgracing the Latino community, and after numerous legal problems, Garcia eventually resigned after corruption conviction (Puleo and Tuohy 1997).

The decline of PRPAC, according to community leaders interviewed, left a scar on the Latino community’s capacity for unity and action. Caro explained to the local paper, “[The PAC] got in the hands of a few and a few let the organization collapse, and

the organization was used for different purposes rather than for the goals and objectives stated in the beginning” (DeJesus 1998). Journalist Tom Puleo described the status of the community by the mid-1990s: “What remains is a family feud run amok, a struggle between those few with power in city hall and those who control the streets. The battle cry for both sides: I’m more Puerto Rican than you” (Puleo 1997). One community leader explained that this created an ugly side to Latino politics in Hartford, creating “the politics of people – whether somebody had a difficult experience with somebody fifteen years ago and they still hold a grudge. There’s no way they will agree on any issue.” Some community leaders noted that many of the personal conflicts between many Latino leaders today date back to this time period.

In an examination of Latino and Black interests in local governments across Connecticut, Burns (2006) finds that community organizations can play a powerful role in raising awareness and responsiveness to their groups’ interests. However, Burns finds that the community organizations must be unified to have an impact. Despite a large presence of community and neighborhood groups in Hartford, he finds there was still was little responsiveness to Latino and Black interests, even from minority elected officials. This suggests that the presence of Latino elected leaders in Hartford is not enough, and the decline of the existing organizations suggests only future trouble for the Latino community in Hartford.

Other Divisions Among the Community

Latino community leaders noted the generational differences among Latinos today, particularly for those Latinos in the second and third generations who are doing financially well. A community leader explained, “I think there are some of us who have

been here for a very long time in terms of generationally and are doing very well. My personal opinion is that many of us who are doing well, third generation, are highly disconnected from our community.” One interviewee demonstrated a frustration with the differing circumstances of members of the Latino community:

It’s really hard when something happens that’s not positive because when it happens it’s all over the media. Whether it’s a robbery or a murder or whatever, it seems to be no matter what ethnic community, it’s just splattered all over the paper. It’s like, ‘Hey, first of all, I don’t know them, and it has nothing to do with me.’ So I’m always like, “Why did it that have to be a Latino that did that?” Because I think sometime it just tarnishes or taints the image of all of us who are out there working and trying to do good things for our community.

According to one community leader, there are “many conflicting experiences among Latinos who are prominent, who have come up through the ranks, really gotten a lot from the community and then you have the every day Latino who is struggling to get a job and keep their family stable in one location.”

A few community leaders mentioned that they moved out of Hartford to West Hartford or other nearby suburbs. One leader, who was considering moving to the suburbs for better schools for his young son, explained that moving out of the city was something many Latinos considered. He remarked, “If you really care, you find a way to get the hell out.” A 2002 *New York Times* article on Hartford’s troubles likens the move of wealthier minorities to the suburbs to the white flight that began in the 1950s: “Now, the residential exodus continues, with middle-class blacks moving to north suburban Windsor and Bloomfield and second-generation Puerto Ricans, Peruvians and Colombians expanding into Wethersfield and other towns south of Hartford” (Zielbauer 2002). Another leader pondered what the Latino flight from the city meant: “So now as a

Puerto Rican I can go to the suburbs. I can have my white picket fence. But what happens to all those people still in Hartford?”

The final point discussed by most of the community leaders, when asked about unity among Latinos in Hartford, involved the changing demographics of the community.

There isn't a monolithic Latino community and especially more so now. When you take a look at the Latino community in the 70s and 80s, you were really talking about a huge predominance of Puerto Rican communities. There was much more commonality, in terms of culture, what they were coming from, what they had experienced in their own childhood before they came here. Now you have a much more mixed immigrant community. You have a growing Mexican community, a growing Peruvian community, a growing Ecuadorian, Salvadoran, Dominican...

The interviewees differed on the impact of the new Latino groups. A few mentioned how the Puerto Ricans paved the way for the new groups. “I see Puerto Ricans as the people who opened doors so that the others can come after them and take advantage of the struggles we had to go through.” Some indicated tension between the newer groups and Puerto Ricans.

If I decide I'm going to open a Colombian club, nobody cares. ‘Oh, that's wonderful...the Colombians opened a club.’ If I say we want the Peruvian Democrats of Connecticut, nobody has a problem. ‘Oh yeah, the Peruvian Democrats of Connecticut.’ If somebody says, we want the Dominican Bodegueros Association for the Small Grocery store. ‘Oh, the Dominicans created a bodegueros [association].’ Everybody applauds that. But if you try to open something that is Puerto Rican anything, ‘Oh! You are divisive! Why don't you call it Latino!’

Most seemed accommodating of the changes: “The population is changing, we have to accept it, we have to be ready for it, we have to work with it.” The Puerto Rican Parade in 2013 showed evidence of acceptance of the evolution of Latino demographics in Hartford. The parade’s theme was “Tradición Boricua, Evolución Latina.” The 2013 theme broadened the parade’s celebration to include both Puerto Rican and Latino culture

and included a Latino delegation to the traditional Puerto Rican Grand Marshall, Godmother and Godfather (Kenefick 2013).

Who are the Leaders?

When asked who are the leaders of the Latino community, many interviewees expressed their disappointment in the struggle for leadership in Hartford. They listed leaders primarily in elected office and the nonprofit sector. But they often noted that there was not a singular leader in the city. One interviewee explained, “I'm not sure there is one [leader], I guess. I struggle with that because there's a lot of good people doing good work. I believe it is more of a group effort when it comes to leadership, although that group itself is divided... I can't point to that one Latino person and say – that's our person.”

In discussing the Latino leaders they identified, most of the interviewees expressed that they wished the group of leaders acted more effectively on behalf of the community. “There is a need for not more, but for better quality community leadership... someone who understands how to make an impact, knowledge of how things work.” Some questioned their commitment to their role as leaders for the Latino community: “What we have - they are already burned out.” One leader, active since the 1970s, said, “In terms of civil rights, and human rights, and trying to organize Latinos as a community, I haven't seen that in a long time.” Another criticized, “The ones who are in those positions may think they are representing the community but they are not.... not representing us well or not pushing for our issues.”

The more critical interviewees suggested that some, if not all, of the Puerto Rican elected officials in Hartford did not truly represent the Latino community. They

questioned the elected officials' connections to the average, low-income Latino living in Frog Hollow. One activist explained: "My litmus test is - do I go down Park Street and see any leaders eating?" He continued,

I don't agree [with] a lot of their policies. Because it is not really benefiting my community - the Hispanic community - which I'm 100% here advocating for our people. I don't agree with certain policies, certain politics that benefits. People that think because you have a Latino, that the Latino [community] is going to be better. That's not the case.

Another community leader agreed and said, "Why would I say I want a Puerto Rican in that seat, just to have a Puerto Rican, if the Puerto Rican doesn't lift a finger? That's not going to do anything for us." Interviewees complained that many of the elected officials seemed more interested in gaining power than serving the Latino community: "In my opinion, much of the political elite in Hartford have a Puerto Rican agenda that involves securing their own status within the state or Hartford and this politics is in direct conflict with the needs of the Latino and Puerto Rican community."

Most interviewees pointed to at least one of two reasons for the poor Latino leadership situation in the city. One community leader described both reasons, explaining that the fault is "partly the institutions and partly the people and their dispositions to the work." Most mentioned the closed nature of politics in Hartford, particularly within the Democratic Town Committee. "It is a party system, and it's a small group of people who control the levers." Another leader explained, "They protect their own; they protect their turf. Those that tend to have power don't want to give up that power."

The interviewees partly blamed the current struggle for leadership as a result of the endorsement process of the DTC and those involved in it. "The process of getting elected is a very closed door, behind the scenes, smoke filled room type of environment."

Community leaders pointed to hostile feuds between former Mayor Perez and Roman Arroyo and his wife, State Representative Minnie Gonzalez for control of the DTC. They explained that many members of the DTC have personal connections to certain elected officials or the government. The Yankee Institute, a Connecticut think tank, found in 2010 that “32 of the Committee’s 69 members (46 percent) have government jobs or draw taxpayer-funded pensions” (Ubiñas 2010). Interviewees mentioned that Representative Gonzalez still exerted a great deal of control over the DTC and characterized that control as negative for the broader community. “The process is not easy. It is very frustrating for a lot of people.”

Community leaders said that the frustration with the politics of the city pushed many away from participating. One interviewee explain, “It’s such an ironic thing - if we have a mayor that is Hispanic and city councilors, three who are Hispanics – why would Hispanic people not attend these meetings?” Other leaders mentioned the low voter turn out in elections. One community leader explained the problem of low participation:

When you can win an election pretty easily in terms of just the number of votes needed, just because so few people vote, then those who remain continue to turn out the vote and end up owning the vote. So until you have others who are as willing to turn out the vote, not much is going to change because if you want to get elected and you can’t turn out the vote yourself, you have to go to them and ask them to turn out the vote for you."

As a result of the process and the personalities of those involved, interviewees explained that voters are apathetic; new leaders are not developed, and the ones who are in office may be beholden and only concerned with their own interests.

Current Latino Leadership

Some community leaders mentioned the current mayor of Hartford, Pedro Segarra, as a leader, but there was not consensus regarding his role in the community.

Segarra was born in Maricao, Puerto Rico, and his family moved to the Bronx in New York City when he was seven. At age 15, Segarra escaped pressures to join a gang and moved to Hartford alone in 1975 (Carlesso 2010). Segarra began his education at Greater Hartford Community College and went on to receive his advanced degrees in social work and law. He is the city's first openly gay mayor; Segarra and his husband live in the West End, Hartford's most affluent neighborhood. Prior to becoming mayor, Segarra served as corporation counsel and served on the city council after his appointment in 2006 and election in 2007. Segarra was President of the city council and became Mayor after former Mayor Eddie Perez resigned in June 2010 following his conviction of five felony charges, including bribery and extortion.

While initially Segarra set out to only serve out the remainder of Perez's term, he ran for reelection in 2011. Segarra won the DTC's endorsement after Governor Malloy encouraged Segarra's strongest challenger, an African American political newcomer and lawyer, Shawn Wooden, to drop out of the race (Carlesso 2011). Edwin Vargas challenged Segarra, accusing Segarra of being more interested in his public persona as mayor than the actual administration of city hall (Cohen 2011). Segarra beat Vargas with 71% of the vote in the Democratic primary and easily won the general election against three petitioning candidates.

One interviewee described Mayor Segarra as "the highest, most visible leader in the community." Others also pointed to him as a leader of the Latino community given his position as mayor. A few interviewees were enthusiastic about his leadership; one complimented him by saying that he is "very approachable, very down to earth." When compared to former Mayor Perez, Segarra was described as more of a "listener" with a

“laid-back leadership style.” One community leader commented that she “would like for him to take more of a leadership power and make decisions. He wants to be nice with everyone.”

Some of interviewees questioned the mayor’s efforts in the Latino community. The interviewees were divided on how well the mayor related to Latinos, particularly low income Latinos. One person explained that the Mayor did not need to explicitly advertise his relationship with the Latino community and said,

I think it depends on the situation and depends on the event. I think if he is at a Puerto Rican organization or a Puerto Rican event, the Spanish comes out and he is more likely to try to connect to the group, as opposed to speaking at a more general event. I don't think he is as explicit about it. It depends on the crowd.

A few interviewees stated that they thought the Mayor represented his West End neighborhood where only a few middle and upper class Latinos live. “Pedro has a constituency he responds to - the West End – the white, middle-class and upper-class.”

Another leader agreed:

I'm not sure he emerges as a figure that really inspires the community. Most people don't see him as relating. I mean, he relates to the community in the sense that he'll go take a picture with a group of Latinos and he'll go to a couple of activities - this and that - but he represents more of a group of people in the West End of Hartford.”

Others questioned what the mayor had done on behalf of the Latino community in Hartford. “I'm not certain how their work [Mayor Perez and Mayor Segarra] has systemically improved the lives of low and middle income people in the city.”

Community leaders said that the mayor’s top policy concerns were the budget and downtown development. A few leaders mentioned his additional interests in education and blight in the city. One interviewee explained, “There's a lot of expectations when you have a Hispanic mayor, especially a Puerto Rican for the Puerto Rican people, but when

you continue with the same struggles, the same needs, you get frustrated.” The same interviewee later mentioned, “Me personally, I prefer to have a white mayor. I get more for my people. They put more interest in our community. And they don't have to be careful, to be blamed or to be labeled.”

Few leaders mentioned any of the three current city councilors by name when asked who they consider to be the leaders of the Latino community. When asked more specifically whether they viewed the Latinos on the city council as leaders of the Latino community, some agreed but others were not sure or disagreed. Interviewees pointed out the current Latino city councilors have not been in office long: “Most of them are too new to assume a leadership role.” They explained that the city councilors are “still new and learning the process.” One leader commented, “They don't get the exposure. And I would bet you...that few of them could be named by any Joe or Jane on the street.”

Councilmember Alex Aponte is the longest serving Latino Democrat currently on the city council. Aponte, who is Puerto Rican, was born in New Britain, Connecticut and is a lawyer. He has his own law practice in Hartford and previously served as corporation counsel in New Britain and Hartford. He was appointed to the city council in 2010 to fill Pedro Segarra's council seat after he became mayor. The appointment to fill the vacant seat became a political fight among the Democratic councilmembers, as they viewed the appointment as the swing vote in the race for council president (Spencer 2010).

Interviewees did not seem to have a strong opinion about Aponte's leadership in the Latino community. A few interviewees complimented his work as an attorney; one explained that he is "methodically thoughtful, a brilliant attorney." Another mentioned

that he had been around the community longer than other Latino city councilors: “He knows some of the older politics.”

Councilman Raúl De Jesús, Jr. is the other Democrat on the city council. De Jesús, who is Puerto Rican, was born and raised in Hartford and lives in Parkville, one of the city’s smallest neighborhoods, with a diverse, working class demographic. He received some national attention when he ran for mayor in 2007 at age 20 (Stuart 2007). He also sought the vacant seat that Aponte filled. He was elected in 2011, filling the second Latino Democrat seat on the endorsed slate. The interviewees commented only that he was very young and eager to be elected. De Jesús has received a small amount of media attention recently after dissenting on the 2013-2014 budget and when internal emails showed top city administrators questioning his mental health after he raised concerns regarding a deal, signed by Mayor Segarra, selling the Spanish American Merchant's Association a building for \$1, who sold it the same day to Hartford Hospital for \$500,000 (Carlesso 2013b; Buchanan 2013).

Councilmember Joel Cruz, Jr. is a Working Families member on the city council. Also Puerto Rican, he was born and raised in Hartford. He is a former Marine and ordained pastor, living in the South End, a former Italian immigrant neighborhood. He was appointed to the council to fill Luis Cotto’s seat in mid-2012 after Cotto moved with his family to the Boston area. Cruz ran as the fourth candidate for Working Families party in 2011; he was the tenth highest vote getter in the election. Two interviewees were enthusiastic about Cruz. “He is going to be a great leader. He has more of an outreach, build-a-relationship background.” Another interviewee agreed that Cruz had potential as

a leader: “I participated in Cruz's election campaign a few years ago and thought he was a great new voice to the scene.”

Interviewees explained that there was not a cohesive Latino agenda that any of the elected officials in City Hall were working towards. “There isn't an agenda that guides decision making vis-à-vis the needs of our community.” Most saw the city council as too weak to promote an agenda. “Their job is to check the mayor. They don't really have their own priorities.”

Some interviewees described a sense of complacency in Latino politics and among leaders in Hartford today. One interviewee questioned the commitment and understanding of the current Latino leaders: “If you are one of those fortunate folks that have reached that level where you can make a difference... you forget how you got there.” A long-time community activist explained, “You used to fight for things. Things got okay but never great. But you won something. So you are waiting for the next generation to fight, not for rights, but for quality of life. But they aren't fighting for it.”

Conclusion

Hartford's founder, Thomas Hooker, boldly proclaimed in the 1600s that government must answer to the people. Elected officials must protect and promote the interests of their constituents. Yet, interviews with Latino community leaders in Hartford raise questions of whether elected officials in Hartford today are living up to this ideal. Despite the explosive growth of the Latino population since the 1950s and three decades of Latino elected officials, community members expressed frustration and discontent with the current state of politics among Latinos in Hartford.

Latinos in Hartford first achieved political representation in 1979 and reached a pinnacle with election of a Latino mayor in 2001. Yet their ascent to representative success occurred in the midst of Hartford's decline. Hartford went from one of the wealthiest U.S. cities to one of the poorest and experienced only pockets of limited revitalization. Hemmed in by wealthy suburbs, Hartford's growing inequalities and tax burdens limited the city's capacity to serve the interests and demands of its residents.

Latinos in Hartford shouldered many of the challenges resulting from Hartford's decline. Community leaders noted the high unemployment rates and poor academics as top concerns to Latinos in the community. Interviewees seemed discouraged, however, with the potential of Latino elected officials and Latino organizations to address these concerns.

Initially, Latino leaders, who were first generation Puerto Ricans, worked collectively to resist blatant discrimination and inequality. Differences in strategy and ideology promoted healthy competition among leaders, and leaders united the community to challenge exogenous threats. However, insufficient leadership and bitter divisions overwhelmed Hartford's Latino community. The financial success of some second and third generation Puerto Ricans, along with the emergence of new Latino groups in the city further splintered the Latino community's cohesion. Their lack of unity, combined with personal agendas and party politics, limited their elected leaders' efforts to serve as a representative for the Latino community.

Table 6.1 – Top 5 Latino National Groups in Hartford

National Origin	Population	Percentage
All Latinos	54,185	
Puerto Rican	41,995	77.5%
Mexican	2,272	4.1%
Dominican	2,191	4.0%
Peruvian	2,119	3.9%
Colombian	1,074	2.0%

Table 6.2 – Current Latino Elected Officials in Hartford

	Position	Years in Office	Party	National Origin
Current				
Alex Aponte	City Council	2010 – present	Democrat	Puerto Rican
Raúl De Jesús, Jr.	City Council	2011 – present	Democrat	Puerto Rican
Joel Cruz, Jr.	City Council	2012 – present	Working Families	Puerto Rican
Pedro Segarra	Mayor	2010 – present	Democrat	Puerto Rican

Table 6.3 – Top Community Issues for Latinos in Hartford

Issue for Latino Community	Number of People Who Mentioned Issue
Education	12
Employment/Economic Issues	9
Housing	4
Political Engagement	4
Immigration	2
Health	2
Safety	2

CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusion: Understanding Latino Leadership in City Hall

Announcing his campaign for mayor of Boston in 2013, Felix G. Arroyo proclaimed: “I am a son of Boston. I love my city” (Ryan and Sacchetti 2013).⁸⁵ Currently one of Boston’s at-large city councilors, Arroyo is the first Latino to run for mayor of Boston. At Arroyo’s announcement, his supporters applauded and chanted the widely-adopted, Latino political phrase: “¡Sí, Se Puede!” (Yes we can!). But Arroyo downplayed the role of his Puerto Rican ethnicity in his race for mayor. He told reporters, “To me it’s not about a New Boston or an Old Boston; I only know one Boston.” In Arroyo’s first campaign ad, he reiterated his identity as a son of Boston. However, this time his message was in Spanish. “Hola mi nombre es Félix Arroyo y soy hijo de esta ciudad que amo” (Hi, my name is Felix Arroyo, and I’m a son of this city that I love). His 30-second ad, entitled “Con Tu Ayuda Vamos a Hacer Historia” (With Your Help We Will Make History), ran on Univision and Telemundo in the summer of 2013 (Dumcius 2013). Arroyo’s attachment to both his identities, as a Bostonian and as a Latino, in his campaign for mayor reveals the process many Latino elected officials go through in defining themselves as Latino leaders in their cities across the U.S. If elected, Arroyo

⁸⁵ Arroyo comes from a politically-active family. Arroyo is the son of former Boston Councilor Felix D. Arroyo, the first Latino member of Boston’s city council and son-in-law of Hector Luis Acevedo, former mayor of San Juan, Puerto Rico.

would join Hartford Mayor Pedro Segarra and Providence Mayor Angel Taveras, becoming the third Latino mayor in a major city in New England.

Understanding Latino Leadership

What does it mean to be a Latino city councilor or a Latino mayor? One of the most significant changes in contemporary American politics is the election of Latinos like Mayors Taveras and Segarra to office. In the post-civil rights era, the number of minorities in political office increased dramatically. In 1973, there were an estimated 1,280 Latino officials; now nearly 6,000 Latinos serve in elected office. In my research, I find that many local Latino elected officials today are still relatively new to political office, like Taveras and Segarra who have both been mayor of their cities only since 2010. In the last decade, there has been a 37% increase in the total number of Latinos serving in elected office.

Much of the public attention on this set of leaders tends to focus only on select Latino leaders – such as Marco Rubio, the Cuban Republican Senator of Florida or Luis Gutiérrez, the Puerto Rican Democratic Representative from Illinois' Fourth District. Research on Latino elected officials looks primarily at Latino members of Congress or Latino state legislators from certain states, like California, Texas and New Mexico, which have an established, sizable presence of Latinos. While these Latino elected officials serve in prominent roles, they make up less than five percent of Latinos serving in political office. In contrast, nearly 400 Latinos serve in office in approximately 175 cities in 25 states across the United States. The majority of Latinos serve in local offices, yet much less focus has been given to the local Latino leaders in cities across the United States.

This project hopes to rectify that gap in the scholarship by presenting a broader portrait of Latinos and their leadership behavior in local office. The growth of Latino elected officials in cities throughout the United States raises an important question: What should we expect from them as leaders? What role will their ethnicity play in their leadership styles? Most of our understandings of minority leadership behavior are based on African American or previous immigrant groups' leaders. One of the major questions of this dissertation is whether Latino elected officials' actions in power parallel the behavior of prior groups' leaders. My research aims to enhance our understanding of the factors that influence the leadership behavior of this new set of leaders. In my final chapter, I return to previous scholarship and discuss my findings for Latino leadership in city hall.

Expectations of Ethnic Leadership

Prior studies establish the expectation that group leadership begins first with the recognition of the group's interest by its members. Perceptions of group consciousness or linked fate mobilize racial or ethnic group members to prioritize the needs of the group over their individual self-interests. Scholarship additionally suggests that local context shapes the nature of the group's competition over a range of social, political and economic resources. Therefore, the trajectory of ethnic leadership can be largely understood as a function of the different features of the local context that help shape the development of the racial or ethnic group. Our understandings of ethnic leadership are primarily derived from the experiences of prior immigrant groups and the experiences of African Americans.

Dahl's (1961) observations in New Haven of immigrant groups in the early 20th century predicted a three-stage process of ethnic leadership as a result of immigrants' assimilation. In the first stage, political parties initially recruited immigrant leaders as symbolic gestures for the groups' loyalty to the party. In the second stage, immigrant leaders developed power of their own and worked to secure group benefits; however, by the third stage, the demand for group benefits and ethnic leadership declined as immigrants' socio-economic status improved and they became assimilated into the larger American society.

Scholars examining the African American community and its leaders have not seen a similar decline in demand for group leadership as a result of rising African American socio-economic status. However, African American leaders utilize different leadership styles, dependent on their local contexts. Wilson (1960) notes differences in styles of leadership among two prominent Black elected officials, Adam Clayton Powell and William Dawson. Wilson proposes that their differences in leadership styles were a product of their support in their local communities. Dawson's leadership behavior developed as a result of the patronage politics of the Chicago machine while Powell's leadership behavior was a response to community expectations in Harlem and Abyssinian Baptist Church.

A Study of Latino Leadership

To understand whether Latino leaders' styles matched any prior patterns of ethnic leadership, I explored different facets of local Latino leadership behavior. Through national survey data I collected from 129 local Latino elected officials, I began the project by developing a better base understanding of local Latino elected officials. I

looked to see whether local Latino elected officials' shared a sense of national origin or Latino-base linked fate, which could mobilize them as ethnic leaders. Then I assessed whether they had an ethnic campaign outreach for Latinos and what factors influenced their Latino outreach choices. Additionally, I explored their leadership behavior in terms of policy advocacy while in office. I looked in particular at immigration policy, an area where we may expect ethnic leadership by Latino elected officials, and then more broadly, at areas they personally defined as their top policy accomplishments. I combined the analysis from the survey with two case studies in Hartford and Providence that focused on community leaders' perspectives of the Latino elected officials and the needs and interests of their Latino community.

So, to return to the question: what does it mean to be a Latino city councilor or a Latino mayor? Research from the Latino Leadership Study and case studies in Providence and Hartford suggest it means membership in a diverse club of elected officials with Latinos of different backgrounds who serve in different contexts. Despite their differences, some patterns of Latino leadership behavior emerge. In this final chapter, I summarize the findings of the earlier chapters with a special focus on Providence and Hartford and their current Latino mayors to reveal insights about the leadership behavior of Latino elected officials in cities.

Cities Where They Serve

Hartford's Mayor Pedro Segarra and Providence's Mayor Angel Taveras represent Latino elected officials emerging from new places for Latino leadership. Most Latinos live in states in the Southwest or in one of a few states considered traditional destinations for Latinos. Latino local leadership is still largely concentrated in these

areas: over 80% of local Latino elected officials are from cities located in one of eight states: Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York and Texas. However, since 1990, Latinos are increasingly expanding across the country to new places: 14% of Latinos live in the Northeast, in cities like Hartford and Providence.

Latinos make up a sizable presence in many major metropolitan areas: in nearly half of the 100 largest metropolitan areas, Latinos comprise at least 10% or more of the population. Their population growth helps fuel their increasing success in winning office. Latino elected officials serve in a quarter of all cities in the United States. Cities traditionally have been a starting point for many minority group leaders. Over the years, many minorities settled in large cities, beginning with the earlier waves of European immigrants and continuing with African American migration to northern cities.

Hartford and Providence have a rich history of immigrants and ethnic leadership. Both are medium-size cities, similar to the majority of cities where Latino elected officials serve. Both cities' populations exploded at the turn of the 20th century, thanks to a booming manufacturing economy and increased number of Irish, Italian and other immigrants. Like previous immigrant groups, Latinos arrived in Providence and Hartford attracted to the possibilities of jobs and a better life for their families. The Latino populations in the two cities grew amidst significant economic restructuring and demographic changes that crippled both cities' well-being. Although Providence has rebounded slightly better than Hartford in recent years, both cities face challenges of a limited tax base as a result of businesses and white residents fleeing the city for nearby suburbs. As a result, Hartford and Providence have the highest Latino unemployment rates in the nation. However, not all Latinos face the same economic challenges in their

communities across the United States. The cities in which Latino elected officials serve vary greatly, as Chapter Two demonstrates.

Question of Unity and Group Mobilization

In both Providence and Hartford, Latinos are the largest racial or ethnic group in the city: Latinos make up 43% of Hartford's population and 38% of Providence's population. Approximately half of all local Latino elected officials serve in cities where Latinos are the majority of the population; over a third serve in cities where there is no racial or ethnic majority group but Latinos are the largest group, like Providence and Hartford. I find that most cities with populations that are at least 30% Latino tend to have at least one Latino city councilor or mayor. In Providence, there are four Latino city councilors in office, in addition to Mayor Taveras. In Hartford, there are three Latino city councilors in office, along with Mayor Segarra.

The Latino population in Providence is far from monolithic: no one national origin group makes up a majority. In Providence, Dominicans are the largest group (37%), followed by Puerto Ricans (22%) and Guatemalans (18%). Sixteen percent of local Latino elected officials serve in cities like Providence, where there is no one national origin group makes up the majority of Latinos. In contrast, Hartford's Latino community has traditionally been largely Puerto Rican: nearly 90% of Latinos in Hartford in 1980 were Puerto Rican. Today, Puerto Ricans are still the largest group but now make up only 78% of the Latino community in Hartford. Other groups, including Peruvians, Dominicans and Mexicans, have grown to make up a more visible portion of the city's Latino community. Most local Latino elected officials serve in cities where a majority of Latinos are Mexican or Mexican-American. Ten percent of local Latino

elected officials serve in cities like Hartford, where Puerto Ricans are the majority and 16% are in office in cities with a variety of Latino national origin backgrounds.

The majority of Latinos in the U.S. are Mexican or Mexican-American, as are the majority of local Latino elected officials. About three percent of Latinos are Dominican like Mayor Taveras, and nine percent are Puerto Rican like Mayor Segarra. The rapidly growing Latino population is largely made up of Latinos born in the United States. I find that most local Latino elected officials are also born in the United States: 71% were born in the U.S. like Mayor Taveras, and 8% were born on the island of Puerto Rico like Mayor Segarra. Twenty-one percent of local Latino elected officials were born in other countries.

Latinos arrive from countries across Latin America, South America and the Caribbean. There is not a single entry point into the United States' political system to define Latino's history and development in the United States. There is an on-going debate among scholars over whether Latinos see themselves as an identifiable, cohesive group with shared political interests, and if so, what the basis of that commonality is for Latinos. Some scholars question the usefulness of a pan-ethnic term, given the lack of a common historical experience for Latinos and Latinos' tendency to self-identify based on their national origin.

Low levels of Latino group consciousness may limit the group's potential to coalesce and mobilize. Likewise, it may limit the role ethnicity plays in Latino elected officials' leadership. Alternatively, it may mean that Latinos tend to see their communities through their national origins, for example as Mexican or Cuban-based and

expect ethnic leadership based only on those sub-groups. Or a third alternative could question whether individuals view a distinct or unified community at all.

Although Latinos typically identify by national origin, more recent work finds an emerging pan-ethnic identity. Sanchez and Masuoka find evidence of Latino group consciousness but suggest it may be only temporary as Latinos integrate into broader American society, similar to Dahl's observation of prior immigrant groups' assimilation process. They find Latino linked fate is highest among Latinos who are Spanish-dominant or recent immigrants, and perceptions of Latino linked fate decline with greater levels of income.

In Chapter Three, I explore whether similar dynamics influence local Latino elected officials' sense of linked fate. I expected this to have important implications, as Latino elected officials with a higher sense of linked fate may be more likely to mobilize as ethnic candidates and ethnic leaders. I find an overall high sense of national origin and pan-ethnic linked fate among local Latino elected officials. However, I did not find any evidence that this linked fate may be temporary or that more assimilated local Latino elected officials felt less of a sense of linked fate.

Instead, I find similar results to prior findings on Black linked fate. According to scholars of Black group consciousness, the shared experiences of racial discrimination are a critical component of the high levels of linked fate found among African Americans. Similarly, among local Latino elected officials, discrimination has a significant, positive relationship for Latino and national origin-based linked fate. Although Latinos' traditionally have had lower levels perceived of discrimination than African Americans, newer research suggests perceptions of group discrimination may be rising among later

generations of Latinos, particularly in the heated context of the immigration reform debate. This might imply that linked fate may not weaken over time but instead strengthen and local Latino elected officials' experiences may be an indication of this trend.

I also find differences in linked fate based on the backgrounds of local Latino elected officials. Cuban Latino elected officials had a higher sense of national origin linked fate and Latino elected officials with family backgrounds from places outside the U.S. other than Mexico and Puerto Rico had a higher degree of pan-ethnic linked fate. Furthermore, in cities where there was no one national origin group that made up the majority of the Latino community, perceptions of national origin-based linked fate were higher for local Latino elected officials. These findings suggest that in some scenarios we may see groups mobilized as Latinos and in other contexts sub-groups of Latinos may mobilize by national origin. In these cases, ethnic leadership may be based on national origin group needs and not necessarily in response to the larger, pan-ethnic Latino community.

In the case studies, I examine the level of unity among Latinos in Hartford and Providence and find differences between the two cities' Latino communities. With the predominance of Puerto Ricans in Hartford, I expected to see a stronger sense of ethnic unity and leadership than in Providence. However, Latino community leaders in Hartford overwhelmingly noted the lack of unity among Puerto Ricans, particularly in comparison to their past. In the past, I find some moments of unity for Puerto Ricans in Hartford: blatant acts of discrimination and outside challenges to the group mobilized them to work collectively through Latino organizations. Similar to my finding for today's local Latino

elected officials, discrimination mobilized a common sense of Puerto Rican identity. However, their unity was only temporary; internal competition over political strategies and personality conflicts among Puerto Rican elites disrupted any long-term efforts for cohesion.

I find in Providence a larger sense of unity among Latinos, despite their diverse backgrounds as Dominicans, Puerto Ricans and Guatemalans. This may be due to the fact that many Latino leaders in Providence are Dominican, who I find to have a higher sense of pan-ethnic linked fate. The community leaders in Providence credited different Latino-based organizations for their efforts to mobilize Latinos on behalf of the greater community. They were able to do so even in the absence of an external challenge like discrimination that was needed to unify Latinos in Hartford. Some leaders in Providence worried for the future of the Latino community. They expressed concern over whether the unity could survive the current economic hardships, which had limited community organizations' capacity and forced competition over increasingly limited resources. They feared that unity was declining as a result of Latinos' decreasing socio-economic status, not an increasing socio-economic status, as Dahl would predict.

Emergence of Local Latino Elected Officials

In both cities, Latinos have achieved a level of political incorporation: Hartford and Providence have both Latino city councilors and a Latino mayor. Hartford first gained a Latino city councilor in 1979; Providence's first Latino member of the city council was elected in 1998. In 2001, the first Latino, Eddie Perez was elected as mayor of Hartford; Pedro Segarra followed Perez after his conviction and resignation in 2010,

and he was re-elected in 2011. Angel Taveras won election in 2010 as the first Latino in Providence.

Both Mayors Taveras and Segarra share some similarities in their backgrounds. Both mayors are highly-educated with high family incomes. They both worked previously as lawyers in the community. Segarra and Taveras are Democrats, as I find nearly three-fourths of local Latino elected officials to be. Both are conversationally fluent in Spanish, similar to the 82% of local Latino elected officials who report they can hold a conversation in Spanish very well or pretty well.

Prior to their elections as mayor, both were moderately involved in Latino organizations. Taveras has been involved as a legal advisor to the Rhode Island Latino Political Action Committee since the organization's founding in the mid-1990s. However, community leaders tended to describe him as more "behind the scenes" and focused on his law career. Segarra's involvement in Latino organizations in Hartford seemed to relate to his first career as a social worker. He was involved primarily in organizations related to Latinos' health. I did not find any evidence that Segarra was involved in the now-inactive Puerto Rican Political Action Committee or any other Puerto Rican or Latino political organizations that have existed over the years in Hartford. Segarra's public biography on Hartford's website highlights only his involvement as a founding member of the Hispanic Health Council and CLARO, a LGBTQI organization for Latinos and Latinas (*About the Mayor* 2012).

Both mayors became involved in politics at a relatively young age. In 1991, at age 32, Segarra was appointed Corporation Counsel for the city of Hartford. Segarra was later appointed to the city council in 2006 and elected in 2007, before his appointment as

mayor in 2010. Taveras similarly became interested in politics at a young age, although he remained more of a political outsider than Segarra until his election as mayor. Taveras unsuccessfully ran for Congress in 2000 at the age of 29. Taveras returned to his legal career but stayed active in politics during Rhode Island's General Assembly redistricting process and campaigned for Mayor David Cicilline in 2002. Cicilline appointed Taveras as Providence's Housing Court Judge in 2007. My research indicates that, like Taveras and Segarra, 70% of local Latino elected officials said they were moderately or very active in political parties or others' political campaigns.

Latino Leadership in Campaigns

In results from the national survey of local Latino leaders, I find that Latinos who were more involved in Latino organizations prior to their election were more likely to conduct more Latino campaign outreach, using efforts to reach Latino voters through Spanish ads and Spanish written materials. Alternatively, Latino leaders who were more involved in other people's political campaigns were less likely to show Latino ethnic leadership during campaigns.

A closer examination of Taveras's and Segarra's backgrounds and elections help illustrate the survey results. Taveras was more involved in Latino organizations that involved mobilizing Latinos, but less involved in insider-type politics than Segarra, prior to his election. Wilson (1960) points out in his case studies of Adam Clayton Powell and William Dawson that their involvement in the different community groups of New York City and Chicago helped shape their leadership behavior as Black U.S. Representatives. Powell's activities in his church and the Harlem community encouraged racial advocacy while Dawson's involvement in the Democratic political machine of Chicago did not.

Although the differences between Taveras's and Segarra's prior community involvements are subtle, I believe they have important implications for their styles of leadership. Their differences support my findings from the national survey of local Latino elected officials: Latino ethnic leadership during campaigns is partially shaped by elected officials' involvements in different community organizations, as Wilson expects. Additionally, although both Taveras and Segarra are Democrats and ran in partisan elections, the nature of their elections was quite different, which suggests other factors may shape ethnic leadership in campaigns.

Taveras first ran for office in 2000, and in that election, he realized the potential of the Latino vote in Providence. As a young political novice in a competitive Congressional race, Taveras was polling at only 3% of voters before the election (Sabar 2000). However, Taveras ended up winning four times that percentage and came in third place, ahead of some more established candidates, thanks in part to the Latino vote. In the election, he actively courted Latino voters: conducting two-dozen interviews with Spanish-language media, advertising in Spanish and campaigning during the city's Bolivian, Dominican and Puerto Rican festivals.

In results from my national survey of local Latino elected officials, I find many Latinos engage in similar kinds of outreach for the Latino community. Over 80% of Latino leaders canvassed in Spanish, and over half used Spanish-language media to advertise. I also find some differences among the local Latino elected officials in terms of their ethnic leadership in campaigns. The percentage of Latinos whose families had been in the U.S. for a long time with a high level of Latino campaign outreach was much lower (20%) in comparison to Latinos from other backgrounds. Local Latino elected officials

with higher levels of involvement in Latino organizations provided more Spanish outreach in the forms of advertisement and written campaign materials. In contrast, those with higher levels of prior involvement in other people's political campaigns were less likely to do Spanish outreach.

Although Taveras had previously been involved in the former Mayor Cicilline's election and replicated Cicilline's successful campaign coalition strategy, he was largely viewed as a political outsider. Taveras kept a fair degree of separation between himself and the former mayor (Donnis 2010b). Taveras instead relied on endorsements from others with high levels of respect among voters in different communities, such as former gubernatorial candidate Myrth York who was popular among liberal whites in East Side and State Senator Juan Pichardo, a leader in the Latino community (Scharfenberg 2010). Taveras also showed his political independence when he passed on endorsing fellow Democrat Frank Caprio for Governor (Donnis 2010a). His campaign finance reports reveal donors from different sectors of the community. Taveras raised over \$300,000 before the Democratic primary, with a number of small and large donations and donations from some top executives from Rhode Island corporations like Ann & Hope's President, Irwin Chase and former CEO of Hasbro, Alan Hassenfeld (Nesi 2010).

In his first race in 2000, Taveras expressed his desire to "appeal to the entire district" and the *Providence Journal* described him as "prickly about the label" as the "Latino candidate" (Sabar 2000). In his 2010 mayoral race, he continued to broadly shape his appeal. He described his background in inclusive terms: "It's the story of Providence. It's the story of Rhode Island. It's the story of America" (Scharfenberg 2010). He stressed his humble roots and the role public education had in his life, having gone from

“Head Start to Harvard.” Taveras’s campaign strategy was similar to what other scholars found for other Latino mayors, such as Henry Cisneros and Ed Garza in San Antonio and Frederico Pena in Denver.

While his campaign portrayed Taveras as broadly appealing, it also relied heavily on the Latino community for support. The campaign had a number of Latinos involved as volunteers and advisors, such as community leader Victor Cappellan. Latinos were also prominent in his campaign as advertised members of fundraising host committees, and Taveras held a Latino-based fundraiser in Providence’s Peruvian restaurant, El Príncipe. Taveras also received the important endorsement of the Rhode Island Latino Political Action Committee.

Taveras’s campaign also recruited and mobilized Latinos for the mayoral election. A group of over 150 Latinas organized as "Mujeres con Angel" (Women with Angel) to support his campaign (Brito 2010b). His campaign used the slogan “Todos con Angel” (Everyone with Angel), which popular Dominican singer Fernandito Villalona created as a merengue campaign tune. He also did interviews with local Spanish-media, such as *Acontecer Latino*. Dominican radio show host, Jochy Santos, broadcasted his popular show “El Mismo Golpe” (The Same Beat) live from Providence where he interviewed and endorsed Taveras (Brito 2010a).

In his interviews in Spanish, Taveras maintained his broadly appealing message and mentioned support in both the white and Latino communities in Providence. Community leaders explained in interviews that they felt Taveras’s opponents, both two established Italian-American politicians, did not use Taveras’s ethnicity to attack his candidacy. The community leaders also mentioned they supported Taveras’s efforts to

broaden his appeal, with many leaders expressing the need for mayors to connect with all voters in the city. Taveras's campaign shows how Latino leaders may combine ethnic leadership outreach with deracialized campaign appeals.

In contrast to Taveras, I find surprisingly little evidence of campaign outreach, in either the Latino community or in the city overall, by Hartford's mayor, Pedro Segarra. Segarra's path to office is somewhat unique; in each election, he has run as an incumbent. He was appointed in 2006 to fill an empty city council position prior to his 2007 election to the council. After his selection as council president, he was appointed mayor, following the city charter's rules of replacement after former Mayor Perez's conviction and resignation in 2010. In his time in politics, Segarra has been appointed to three positions in Hartford's government: corporation counsel, city councilor and mayor, as well as being selected council president. His appointments and leadership positions signify his allegiance to the party apparatus in Hartford.

Most of the voters in Hartford, like in Providence, are Democrats, and local races are determined through partisan elections. The Democratic Party apparatus seems to be much stronger in Hartford than in Providence. In interviews with community leaders, the political system in Hartford was frequently described as an extremely closed process to political outsiders. Leaders explained that the Democratic Town Committee endorsement was the "real election" in Hartford. In 2011, Hartford's Democratic Town Committee nominated Segarra, who won 51 votes in the meeting; his closest opponent, Edwin Vargas, received only six votes. Segarra easily beat Vargas with 71% of the vote in the Democratic primary.

The size and reach of the Democratic Party in Hartford is a major source of concern for many Latino community leaders. More often than not, they explained, the ethnicity of the Democratic Party's candidates is used only as a pacifier, since it is loyalty to the party that is most important in Democratic Party nominations. Instead of providing ethnic leadership to the Latino community, many leaders allowed party loyalty and personal agendas to rule their leadership. According to the Latino community leaders in Hartford, it is this system of entrenched conventional political channels that blocks the interests of the Latino community and allows party politics to dominate the city.

Despite having a Latino mayor and Latino city councilors in Hartford, Latino community leaders showed little enthusiasm over elections in the city, a contrast to the Latino community leaders in Providence. Some Hartford community leaders explained that some level of outreach was necessary by all candidates to Latino voters but overall, elected officials did little to mobilize voters. In the 2011 election, only 17.8% of Hartford registered voters voted for mayor in the Democratic primary, and only 16.2% voted in the general election. Segarra did some campaigning throughout the city before the Democratic primary but he declined to attend a mayoral candidate forum scheduled a week before the primary. Hartford Voters/Hartford Vota Coalition, an organization of 14 civic and community groups whose aim is to increase voter turnout in the city, organized the forum. After the primary, Segarra accepted the endorsement of both the Democratic and Republican Party in Hartford and let go of all his paid campaign staff.

The elections in Providence and Hartford help to confirm my findings on ethnic campaign outreach from the national survey of local Latino elected officials. The local context of Latino elected officials helps shape the type of ethnic campaign outreach they

engage in their campaigns. Those who were previously active in Latino community organizations and avoided loyalties to others in politics provided more outreach for Latino voters, as shown in Taveras and Segarra's campaigns. The lack of outreach in Segarra's campaign also suggests some additional local context factors not explored in the survey research may influence campaign strategy. The entrenchment of conventional political channels in Hartford and the lack of voter turnout in the city further reduced the outreach efforts by Segarra in his 2011 campaign for mayor.

Latino Policy Advocacy

Once elected to office, minority leaders can serve as descriptive or symbolic representatives for minority constituents, and they may act as substantive representatives by pursuing policies benefiting the minority group. Scholars find the interests of minority groups receive the highest degree of attention when minorities are the electoral majority and make up a significant portion of the governing coalition (Browning et al. 1984). Minority groups can raise more awareness to their interests when they form unified community groups and use mechanisms outside electoral processes to influence leaders (Burns 2006). To understand local Latino elected officials' ethnic leadership in their policy advocacy, I first explored their positions on local immigration policy and then broadened my focus to what they defined as their top policy accomplishments.

Immigration Policy and Local Latino Leaders

Immigration is often perceived to be a Latino issue, despite the fact that it is not just an issue facing Latinos nor is it an issue facing all Latinos. Only four community leaders in Providence and only two community leaders in Hartford mentioned immigration as a top policy priority. Similarly, immigration was not mentioned often as

one of the top policy accomplishments of local Latino elected officials. However, the growth in the number of immigrants from Mexico and other Latin and South American countries has focused much of the immigration reform debate on Latinos. I found that local Latino elected officials generally supported language access policy but were more divided on other immigrant-friendly policies like non-citizen voting and municipal photo identification cards. They also mostly opposed immigrant-hostile policies like landlord fines and police immigration checks but some were supportive of policies like E-Verify or Secure Communities. Local Latino elected officials with a stronger sense of Latino linked fate were more supportive of immigrants, as were Democrats. I did not find any evidence that assimilation or prior group involvement influenced their immigration policy positions.

Both Taveras and the Latino city councilors in Providence have vocally opposed immigrant-hostile policies. In a debate sponsored by RILPAC, Taveras, along with the other Democratic candidates, denounced Arizona's strict immigration law and opposed the use of E-Verify in Rhode Island (Marcelo 2010). Immigration policy made headlines in Rhode Island shortly after Taveras assumed office. In January 2011, newly-elected Governor Lincoln Chaffee passed an executive order terminating previous his predecessor's "Illegal Immigration Control Order" which directed Rhode Island state police to participate in immigration enforcement with ICE (Baron 2011). Only a week later, Rhode Island's Attorney General Peter Killmartin signed an agreement with the Department of Homeland Security authorizing the state's participation in Secure Communities.

In response, Mayor Angel Taveras and Providence's Public Safety Commissioner Steven Paré publicly expressed opposition to the program, and Paré sent a public letter to DHS inquiring whether Providence could opt out of the program. Paré worried that the program would cause “fear and mistrust between the [immigrant] community and law enforcement - thus undermining our community policing model and risking the public safety of our capital city.” Taveras likewise noted, “Local police should not be doing the work of federal immigration officers” (Cruz 2011). The city council unanimously passed a resolution opposing the program as well.

In Hartford, Mayor Segarra and former Mayor Perez’s responses to local immigration concerns have tended to be more reactive than the proactive stance of Latino leaders in Providence. While Perez was in office in 2007, Hartford police and federal immigration agents arrested 21 Brazilian immigrants in a joint effort to find a Brazilian man wanted on charges of attempted murder and robbery (Spencer 2007). Following community outrage over the arrests, Mayor Perez, along with the police chief, issued a statement explaining that local police would not make immigration arrests unless there was also a criminal investigation. In a meeting with community activists, Perez expressed general support for immigrants but reiterated the role of the city’s law enforcement in investigating crime. Latino city councilor, Luis Cotto, of the Working Families party, proposed an ordinance barring the police from solely investigating residents about their immigration status. Perez reluctantly signed the ordinance: In a statement accompanying his signing, Mayor Perez stressed that the city would still comply with federal laws, although the city's policy had always been not to penalize community members seeking to make Hartford safer (Nalpathanchil 2008).

In comparison to Perez, Segarra has been more vocal in his criticism of immigrant-hostile policies, but still less proactive than other Latino leaders in Providence and Hartford. Like Taveras, Segarra criticized the Secure Communities program, testifying in front of the Connecticut House Judiciary Committee with Police Chief Rovella. When an immigrant march passed by City Hall in April of 2013, Segarra joined in and held a sign saying “*reforma migratoria justa ya*” (just immigration reform now) (Provost 2013). However, Working Families members in Hartford have continued to be more proactive on immigration concerns. For example, in the march that Segarra joined in, Working Families Councilmembers Larry Deutsch and Joel Cruz Jr., along with Working Families Board of Education member Robert Cotto Jr., participated in the full march, and Cruz gave the march’s closing prayer at the Capitol.

Although immigration has not taken a prominent role in either administration in Hartford and Providence, local Latino leaders in both cities have voiced opposition to immigrant-hostile policies. Latino leaders from Providence and in the Working Families in Hartford have been proactive in the immigration reform discussion. The national survey findings suggest that Democrats and Latino leaders’ with a stronger sense of linked fate will be more supportive of immigrants. The case of Hartford also shows that differences in ideology, as shown by the Working Families elected officials who are more liberal than Democrats in Hartford, may also lead some Latino leaders to be more proactive in their support.

Local Policy and Latino Leaders

The top five policy accomplishments for Latino local elected officials were in the policy areas of Planning and Development, City Finances, Public Safety, Housing and

Education. These top policy areas are issues Latinos typically rank as important in national polls. These were also issues mentioned in Hartford and Providence as important to Latinos.

Community leaders in Hartford and Providence suggested Latinos had similar interests and concerns. In both cities, education and the employment were listed as top priorities for Latinos. Community leaders described the need for opportunities in education and the economic development in the Latino community. In the interviews, I noticed that the problems faced by the Latino community were frequently described as related to one another. All the Latino issues in Providence and Hartford brought up by the community leaders were generally defined as quality of life issues. Particularly among those interviewed in Providence, there was a greater recognition that these issues disproportionately affected Latinos but also impacted others in the city.

In their policy leadership, both Segarra and Taveras expressed similar goals for their cities. When Segarra took office, he set four goals for his administration: “ensure accountability; safeguard the health, cleanliness and safety of the city; create jobs and improve education; and pursue opportunities to accelerate and expand economic vitality.” I found that Segarra frequently articulated these goals or some variant of them in his State of the City speeches, other speeches and press releases. Taveras expressed goals similar to Segarra’s; Taveras’s speeches and press releases emphasized his efforts in fiscal responsibility, public education, economic development and other quality of life issues. Taveras’s 2013 State of the City speech focused broadly on seven policy areas: economic development, education, public safety, city services, housing and infrastructure, health and sustainability, and arts and culture (Taveras 2013).

No goals articulated by Taveras or Segarra were specifically Latino-based, but policies highlighted by both Taveras and Segarra matched issues that Latino community leaders in the two cities said were of importance to Latinos. However, Latino community leaders differed in their evaluations of Segarra and Taveras: Hartford's Latino community leaders were disappointed in Segarra's leadership for Latinos; while Providence Latino community leaders mostly praised Taveras's leadership as effective for Latinos and well-balanced for the city's needs.

Taveras's top priority since assuming office has been the fiscal recovery of Providence. Facing a \$110 million budget deficit, Taveras negotiated settlements on municipal pensions, secured payments in lieu of taxes from some of the city's largest non-profits, and raised taxes. While general city financial decisions do not necessarily imply any Latino-based policy agenda, Taveras acknowledged his ethnicity in his duty as a leader. He later explained, "I didn't want the first Latino mayor of Providence to be the one who brought the city into bankruptcy" (McDaid 2013). Taveras's administration also increased the accessibility and transparency of Providence's government: he extended city hall hours to 7 p.m. for two evenings per month, held monthly "My Time with the Mayor" sessions to meet one-on-one with citizens, and created an open data portal which shares city information on the city website. Latino community leaders were confident in Taveras's leadership and supported his efforts, particularly in how he dealt with correcting the cities' finances.

Although Latino community leaders widely praised Taveras, he has received some criticism. The major incident that sparked criticism came early in his administration over the closing of five schools in the city. After several schools were identified to be

closed, Taveras's administration sent firing notices to nearly all of Providence's almost 2,000 teachers. Rhode Island regulation requires Providence to notify teachers by March 1st of each year if their position may be in jeopardy. Although three-fourths were expected to be retained, teachers had to reapply and be evaluated. This brought national attention and stern criticism from teacher's unions. However, since then Taveras's reputation on education policy has largely rebounded. For example, his administration more recently won a five million dollar grant from Bloomberg Philanthropies for Providence Talks program, which helps develop language skills in low-income families with young children. Taveras's administration has additionally faced criticism over the closing of a neighborhood pool and in response to raising taxes, but Taveras generally enjoys a high approval rating and is widely expected to run for Governor.

In contrast to Taveras, Segarra's administration has increasingly faced criticism. Latino community leaders expressed their disappointment in Segarra's focus on downtown development and tourism. Segarra's speeches and press releases often focus on his efforts downtown. In his 2013 State of the city Speech, Segarra highlighted downtown development as a top priority for his administration. Segarra explained, "Sports, entertainment, arts and culture attracts tourism. That is key to development in our city" (Segarra 2013). Similarly, Segarra has emphasized his administration's efforts through the iQuilt Plan, a downtown redevelopment plan of parks and plazas connecting the Capitol to the waterfront. Additionally, Segarra has attempted to lure residents to the city center with a marketing campaign that promotes events like Winterfest with ice-skating downtown (Cruz 2011).

While some community leaders praised these efforts to revitalize the city's center, others questioned their value for neighborhood residents. Segarra's administration developed a Livable and Sustainable Neighborhood Initiative, which has centered largely on anti-littering and blight. Segarra's administration tends to focus on neighborhood and community issues related to beautification. For example, the initiative grants up to \$15,000 to elderly or low-income residents to improve the exterior of their properties.

Although Segarra stresses accountability in the city's fiscal decisions, his administration has struggled with accusations of mismanagement. Some have questioned Segarra's awarding of bonuses to city employees as the budget deficits have grown each year he has been in office. The mayor and other top administrators charged a New Year's Eve dinner that totaled over \$700 dollars on a city purchasing card. Segarra's former chief of staff, Jared Kupiec, has come under scrutiny lately with allegations that he kept a city vehicle after he had left his job (Carlesso 2013a). As a result of these and other issues, Segarra's relations with the city council have unraveled. The Council has requested audits of all city purchasing cards, refused to confirm his appointments and challenged Segarra's 2013-2014 budget (Carlesso 2013c).

Segarra and Taveras's experiences in office reveal that Latino elected officials' different approaches to leadership extend beyond issues typically understood as Latino-issues. Like Taveras and Segarra, local Latino elected officials' top policy accomplishments address a range of community policies. Interviews with community leaders in Hartford and Providence point out that Latino-issues should also be broadly understood. Problems relating to education and the economy disproportionately impact Latinos in cities like Hartford and Providence, but opportunities in these areas can be

beneficial citywide. As Taveras's administration demonstrates, to win support from other leaders of the Latino community, a Latino leader's political agenda must prioritize economic and educational opportunities for the community and foster confidence in their ability to govern the entire city.

Assessing Local Power and Latino Leaders

As this project has demonstrated, the capacity to lead is embedded in a web of institutional, economic and political constraints, which are particularly complex at the local level. The local political context constructs political relationships within an evolving system of groups and available resources. Local political leaders, as one part of the polity, must manage these contingencies in strategic ways and develop styles of leadership that match their beliefs and support their efforts. My research suggests that Latinos choose their leadership style based on personality, political instincts and electoral circumstances. I find that ethnicity can play a role in their leadership behavior, but not all local Latino elected officials emerge as what we traditionally consider to be ethnic leaders.

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APPENDIIX

Dependent Variables	Min	Max	Mean	Standard Deviation
<i>Linked Fate</i>				
National origin linked fate	0	10	6.810345	2.84655
Latino linked fate	0	10	6.891473	2.76202
<i>Campaign Activities</i>				
Spanish written materials	0	1	0.7244094	0.4485809
Spanish advertising	0	1	0.5338983	0.3841153
Spanish canvassing	0	1	0.8220339	0.3841153
Latino leader endorsements	0	1	0.8050847	0.3978247
Latino campaign manager	0	1	0.4745763	0.5014827
Latino campaign events	0	1	0.8050847	0.3978247
Campaign composite	0	6	3.779661	1.735184
<i>Local Immigration Policy</i>				
Immigrant-friendly policies	0	1	0.65	0.29
Immigrant-hostile policies	0.13	1	0.74	0.23

Independent Variables	Min	Max	Mean	Standard Deviation
<i>Personal Traits</i>				
Spanish Fluency	0	3	2.356589	0.8821002
Born in the U.S.	0	1	0.7906977	0.4924331
Mexican	0	1	0.5968992	0.4924331
Puerto Rican	0	1	0.1395349	0.3478547
Cuban	0	1	0.0620155	0.242124
Other National Origin	0	1	0.124031	0.330902
Family in U.S. long time	0	1	0.0775194	0.2684563
Democrat	0	1	0.7286822	0.4463732
Female	0	1	0.3255814	0.4704185
Age	22	76	47.73643	11.44246
Education	0	1	0.4883721	0.5018136
Political Party	0	10	5.612403	3.500692
Political Campaigns	0	10	5.852713	3.460468
Latino Organizations	0	10	5.960938	3.460468
Discrimination	0	1	0.7952756	0.4050981
<i>Community Context</i>				
% City Latino Foreign-Born	9	77	35.16	1.23
% Δ in Immigrants 2000 – 2010	1.82	3.81	2.389859	.3235653
Latino Political Organization	0	1	0.60	0.04
City Latino Household Income	53.62	105.99	86.33	0.88
Spanish Language Media	0	1	0.81	0.03
Population size	4.71	6.91	5.16	0.04
No Ethnic Sub-group Maj.	0	1	0.1627907	0.3706139
<i>Institutional Traits</i>				
District	0	1	0.5193798	0.5015721
Partisan Election	0	1	0.1937984	0.3968139
Incumbent	0	1	0.503876	0.5019342
% Latino Constituency	10	99	56.34048	21.37105
Conservative Constituency	0	1	0.3565891	0.4808594

Interview Questions

1. What are the issues of most importance to the Latino community?
2. How unified do you see the Latino community in [name of city] on these issues?
3. Are there divisions within the Latino community?
4. Do you see Latinos, as a whole, as having distinct interests from other groups?
5. Who do you see as leaders of the Latino community in [name of city]?

I'd like to ask you some questions about the current Latino local elected officials in [name of city].

6. What is the top policy initiative or program do you see each of them especially concerned with currently?

In thinking about their most recent campaign –

7. How integral do you think they each viewed Latinos as part of their campaign base?
8. Did their Latino background ever become an issue in any of their campaigns?
9. Do they try to connect as part of the Latino community?
10. What kinds of outreach do you see the Latino local elected officials doing for the Latino community?
11. Do you think each Latino elected official considers the Latino community when making decisions in office?
12. Do you think Latino voters have a sense of pride about having a Latino in office?
13. [If mentioned divisions in q3] Earlier you mentioned divisions in the Latino community based on X, do you think they influence Latino leadership?
14. Are there any recurring lines of conflict among Latino leaders in [name of city]?
15. Are there any differences in today's Latino officials act today versus previous Latino officials?
16. What do you see as the future of Latinos in the politics of [name of city]?