

City of Praise:
The Politics of Encomium in Classical Athens

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INTRODUCTION

In the beginning of his *Achilleid*, the Roman poet Statius conjures up an image of Thetis as a worried mother pondering where she could best conceal Achilles from the gathering of the Greek forces. As in the mythic tradition, she eventually chooses the court of Lycomedes on Scyros, but before this the poet allows his audience a glimpse at her thought process as she discards other cities and nations that would prove too threatening to her son's life. Among these is Athens, inhabited by "the sons of Cecrops, who would goad him on with praises."¹ The Athenians would be dangerous to Achilles through feeding his desire for heroic action, prompting him to set out of his own accord for his prophesied death at Troy. From these lines it is clear that Athens had, by the Flavian period, gained a special reputation for bestowing praise.² Furthermore, this praise is not an unalloyed good, as it involves certain tensions: Thetis imagines that Achilles would seek praise as something to be desired, while she herself fears it for this same quality.

Statius was steeped in the Greek literary tradition, and particularly in the literature of fifth- and fourth-century Athens.³ While his view of Athens may have been influenced

¹ *Achilleid* 1.202–3: *laudumque daturi / Cecropidae stimulos*.

² Cf. *Punica* 13.484–5, where the Athenian funeral oration is included in a catalogue of exotic mortuary customs—a sentiment perhaps suggested by Demosthenes 20.141.

³ Aside from the erudition displayed by his poetry in general, Statius will have been familiar with the authors taught by his own father, whose "syllabus" is given at *Silvae* 5.3.146–58. Statius' predilection for classical Athenian literature is evident particularly from the *Thebaid*'s use of Euripides, Aeschylus, and Sophocles; see, e.g., Smolenaars 2008, Hulls 2014.

by his personal experience and the city's historical dealings with foreign potentates in the third century BCE and later, it is chiefly from the literary material of the classical period, and especially from drama and oratory, that his impressions will have been derived.⁴ Nonetheless, it is striking how foreign the typical modes of praise in Statius' own milieu would have seemed to the Athenians of the classical period: compare, for instance, Statius' *Silvae*, or the proems of the *Thebaid* and *Achilleid*, or for that matter Pliny's *Panegyricus*, with any of the surviving Athenian funeral orations.⁵ The Athenian reputation for praise stems from a tradition that predates that of the Hellenistic and Roman-period encomia for powerful rulers, and yet it also forms the foundation for these later literary manifestations of praise. Furthermore, owing to great differences in social structures across these eras, the tensions navigated by both the giver and the recipient of praise—that is, the intricate system of social risks and rewards posed by an act of laudation—were vastly different in kind.

This dissertation explores the social tensions aroused by the praise of individuals prominent in the Athenian state during the decades from the end of the Peloponnesian War down to the Lamian War (404/3–323/2), and in particular the difficulty of reconciling praise of the individual with the concerns of the conceptually united Athenian

⁴ For Statius' reception of Athenian oratory, see especially *Thebaid* 12.510, where the city of Olynthus occurs in a list of otherwise mythological characters who receive asylum at Athens, though one should note that several editors have daggered this line because of the seeming incongruity of an *exemplum* from history occurring in mythological epic. Although it is possible that Statius himself never traveled to Greece, his father certainly did (*Silvae* 5.3.141–5) and may have told his son about the veritable forest of inscriptions he would have seen at Athens—as well as, perhaps, the honors granted to Statius' father himself by the Areopagus, according to Clinton's interpretation of a statue base from Eleusis (*JG* II² 3919); see Clinton 1972.

⁵ *Silvae* 1.1 is paradigmatically laudatory. The proems of the *Thebaid* and *Achilleid* are also in praise of Domitian, in the tradition of the proem of Lucan's *Bellum Civile* in praise of Nero (cf. the proem of Valerius Flaccus' *Argonautica*, praising Vespasian). Praise for the autocrat in Latin epic has its most prominent beginning in Virgil's praise of Augustus in the *Georgics*.

δῆμος. In a society where equality before the law and equality of speech were key aspects of citizenship, the use of one's speech to praise another individual and set that person apart from the rest of the δῆμος risked inspiring envy against the recipient of praise and accusations of flattery on the part of the giver. These tensions largely inhibited the production of literary praise for individuals in fourth-century Athens. The present study aims to examine when, how, and—to the extent possible—why some political actors chose to face down this inhibition and publicize their praise for fellow-citizens. Under the right circumstances, praise itself could be praiseworthy.

Genus: terms and tensions

The risks inherent in an act of praise depend on what kind of praise it is. For example, Plato's Socrates says in the *Menexenus* that it is easy to praise Athenians at Athens.⁶ That dialogue, however, covers only one particular type of praise, the *epitaphios* speech delivered at the burial of a given year's fallen soldiers.⁷ To praise not the deceased collective but the living individual mobilizes an entirely different set of anxieties, but one worth examining for its relative rarity just as the *epitaphios* custom is worth examining for its institutionalized approval and annual repetition. The following chapters examine praise occurring under several constraints: praise of living or recently deceased individual citizens of Athens in the fourth century BCE, composed usually in prose and delivered or disseminated by Athenian authors.

⁶ *Menexenus* 236A: ... ὅμως κὰν οὗτος οἷός τ' εἴη Ἀθηναίους γε ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἐπαινῶν εὐδοκιμεῖν. Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1367B (ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν, οὐ χαλεπὸν Ἀθηναίους ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἐπαινεῖν). On the aims of the *Menexenus* see especially Monoson 2000:181–205, Haskins 2005, and Trivigno 2009; cf. Osborne 2011:85–6.

⁷ Loraux 2006 (originally published 1981) remains the classic work on the *epitaphios* genre; see Hesk 2013 as well.

In his *Encomium of Helen*, Gorgias defines the forces whose operation on Helen deprived her of agency and thus of blame for sparking the Trojan War. As Isocrates points out in his own *Helen* (10.14–15), this is hardly praise: Gorgias has composed an ἀπολογία speech, defending Helen from blame rather than praising her for any positive quality or achievement. A series of justifications like those of Gorgias, however, is necessary for the present purpose: an account of the aforementioned variety of praise cannot be rendered unless each of the parameters has been defined and defended.

Speeches of praise: ἔπαινος, ἐγκώμιον, ἐπίδειξις

The most basic question is how one identifies acts of praise in the first place. Those texts that call themselves ἔπαινος or ἐγκώμιον constitute the easiest case. The word ἔπαινος, “praise,” signifies the act itself, generally, but can also indicate an individual text or performance of praise, a sense found clearly in the plural ἔπαινοι. The ἐγκώμιον, meanwhile, has as its primary sense a delivery or text of praise, particularly for a specific accomplishment; ἐγκώμιον was originally a type of song, sung for revels (κῶμοι), but by the late fifth century it had been generalized to include all manner of praise-texts.⁸ Short of the occurrence of ἔπαινος, ἐγκώμιον, and their cognates, praise must be identified by context—positive evaluation of the subject’s traits or deeds—but on the whole the terms ἔπαινος and ἐγκώμιον were useful to authors wishing to lay down expectations of genre for their performances and were therefore deployed frequently.

These terms for verbal acts of praise must be distinguished from τιμή, “honor.” The latter term covers a wide variety of concrete actions as well as intangible values—too

⁸ Cf. Schiappa 1999:187 (with references). For Aristotle ἐγκώμιον is specifically for deeds and ἔπαινος for virtue (*Rhetoric* 1367B).

many, indeed, to map in any comprehensive fashion.⁹ Praise, as only one type or source of τιμή, lends itself more readily to analysis. Honor must be kept in mind, however, as a motivation for the receiving and bestowing of praise, and to that end the chapters that follow often highlight authors' discussions of φιλοτιμία, "love of honor."¹⁰ Despite the breadth of compound abstractions the Greek language produced, φιλοτιμία was made to cover the motivation to achieve any type of honor, including praise: the adjective φιλέπαινος does not appear until the late third century BCE (Ariston of Ceos fr.15), and φιλεγκώμιος is restricted to a single scholium on Aristophanes.¹¹ For the authors who promote praise as means of encouraging civic good, φιλοτιμία serves both as the catalyst by which praise operates, because there must be φιλότιμοι in order for praise to have a significant effect, and as something to be cultivated in the presently unambitious, who are to be inspired by the praise of others. Beyond φιλοτιμία, though, the territory of values becomes harder and harder to recover, and therefore notions of δόξα, "reputation," are largely ignored in this study. Plato has his Prodicus claim that a good reputation is better than praise, "because it is possible to have a good reputation (εὐδοκιμεῖν) in the minds of the audience without needing to deceive them, but it is possible to be praised (ἐπαινεῖσθαι) in speech often if the speakers tell lies contrary to their own opinion."¹² For the present purposes, however, "the minds of the audience" are inaccessible, whereas

⁹ Brüggengbrock 2006 surveys the field. Cf. Harris 2005:26–7 (with references) on the impracticability of examining honor.

¹⁰ On φιλοτιμία at Athens see especially Whitehead 1983; cf. Whitehead 1993 and 2009, as well as Wilson 2000:144–97 and Engen 2010:37–47.

¹¹ At *Wealth* 773; the scholium is, however, pointedly appropriate: παίζει πρὸς Ἀθηναίους φιλεγκωμίους ὄντας ("the joke is on how the Athenians love hearing encomia of themselves").

¹² *Protagoras* 337B: εὐδοκιμεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν παρὰ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἄνευ ἀπάτης, ἐπαινεῖσθαι δὲ ἐν λόγῳ πολλάκις παρὰ δόξαν ψευδομένων.

examples of praise in words persist. It does not even matter “if the speakers tell lies,” because how authors represented the truth of their honorands’ deeds has greater bearing on Athenian values than the truth itself.

The opposite of ἔπαινος was ψόγος, “blame.” Particularly from the literary remains of classical Athens blame emerges as a dominant theme. Venues for blame at Athens included the comic stage, on which poets could single out figures present in the audience, such as Cleon, for revilement in front of a large swath of the citizen body and, at the Dionysia, in front of attending foreigners.¹³ In addition to Old Comedy, blame could be said to be the dominant mode of the law courts, in which it was frequently in the interest of both prosecutor and defendant to denigrate the opposition. The law courts also provided a venue, by the nature of ἀπολογία, for self-praise, which could occur in a comic context as well, most prominently in the παράβασις. Aside from the clear agonistic contexts of the festival and court, however, self-praise was generally not tolerable—though only slightly less tolerable than praise of other individuals, as will become apparent.¹⁴ Their performances of blame and restrictions on self-praise gave the Athenians a reputation among later thinkers as particularly prone to envy (φθόνος), the symptoms of which ranged from the phenomenon of ostracism to the execution of the generals after Arginusae.¹⁵

Both categories of evaluative discourse—that is, praise and blame—were grouped by Aristotle under the heading of ἐπιδεικτικόν, the “epideictic” genre (*Rhetoric* 1358B).

¹³ See especially Henderson 1998 for a synthesis of the operation of praise and blame in Old Comedy.

¹⁴ See Most 1989, Rutherford 1995, and Spatharas 2011.

¹⁵ Aelian (*Ποικίλη ἱστορία* 3.17), e.g., ascribes the expulsion of Demetrius of Phalerum to “the customary envy of the Athenians” (ὁ συνήθης Ἀθηναίοις φθόνος). On envy see further the essays in Konstan and Rutter 2003.

At the root of this classification is the performance of ἐπίδειξις, “display,” which could veer into the negative semantic territory of “showing off.” Aristotle’s tripartite classification of oratory into dicanic, symbuleutic, and epideictic branches postdates many of the authors and works discussed in this dissertation, and at any rate it is more useful for distinguishing modes of speech than it is for categorizing the texts of speeches, which often blended the three modes in order to achieve particular ends.¹⁶ Aristotle’s scheme is, however, useful for identifying the social biases at work: praise and blame were subjects for ἐπίδειξις—trivial, self-important performance—rather than for the running of the Athenian state through the ἐκκλησία and the courts. In the latter contexts, the Athenians obviously needed evaluative language in order to persuade their fellow-citizens of correct courses of action and adjudication. It is important to consider how and why rhetorical theory could have cordoned off “pure” praise and blame from the same sort of language occurring in other contexts, and to what extent venues for non-dicanic, non-symbuleutic oratory even existed.¹⁷ For the authors addressed in the first three chapters of this dissertation, namely Xenophon and Isocrates, the notion of ἐπίδειξις as politically insignificant served as a sort of challenge: they use the term ἐπίδειξις to mark

¹⁶ See further Schiappa 1999:198–203 (with references); cf. Yunis 1998, Thomas 2003, and especially Pratt 2006. On the insufficiency of ancient formulations of genre see Rosenmeyer 1985. The classic treatments of epideictic oratory are Burgess 1902 and Buchheit 1960.

¹⁷ Liddel, reacting against the overuse of Thucydides’ *epitaphios* in reconstructing “the Athenian idea of liberty” (2007:74), excludes epideictic oratory from his study because it is not subject to opposition (2007:87). While Liddel’s caution is warranted, epideictic oratory, insofar as there was such a thing in this period, presupposes and must formulate opposition to itself, by its evaluative nature: it offers, e.g., praise instead of blame, or fame instead of obscurity (cf. *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* 1440B). It is true that litigants had to recognize that their arguments would face immediate opposition, but analogous standards of proof applied outside of the courts and ἐκκλησία as well; if one must beware epideictic oratory as unopposed, one should be equally cautious regarding forensic texts from trials for which only one speech survives, because the interpretation of these texts requires sifting out the embedded arguments of the opposition.

their literary displays of praise as performances worth emulating rather than as recitations to be applauded and then ignored.

Any speech, then, could contain elements of praise and blame, and that includes speeches beyond the surviving corpus of Attic oratory, and indeed beyond the purview of any corpus of texts: praise for individuals will have occurred far more frequently *viva voce*, which placed less long-term risk on the speaker than written publication would have done. The contexts in which unrecorded praise could be delivered will have ranged along the continuum from the most private to the most public, from individual-to-individual conversation and the small-group symposium to sophistic declamations in the Agora and speeches on the Pnyx. The chapters that follow scrutinize instances of praise within the surviving literature, rather than solely texts that call themselves ἔπαινος or ἐγκώμιον, and throughout one must also keep in mind the possible praise contexts that are now invisible.¹⁸ As will be discussed particularly in the fourth chapter, the epigraphic record provides a number of texts that call for ἔπαινος and that reflect some of these invisible contexts, such as speeches before the βουλή or ἐκκλησία.¹⁹ The epigraphic record of praise bestowed by the δῆμος upon both foreigners and Athenian citizens is bountiful, and the mechanisms by which these inscriptions operate provide a useful analogue for literary praise, especially insofar as the inscriptions record the proposer alongside the recipient.

¹⁸ See further the terms laid out by Dominik and Smith 2011 for the study of praise in rhetoric at Rome, transferable and equally fruitful here.

¹⁹ Cf. Osborne 1999:341, 350.

Fourth-century Athens

Such inscriptions of honors for Athenian citizens, however, do not appear until the 340s, decades later than the first monuments recording honors for foreigners.²⁰ Fourth-century Athens is a crucial laboratory for exploring the tensions of public praise because of its essential absence. For instance, if one limits political encomium to literary praise of living, individual citizens, the genre becomes purely hypothetical: while it was by no means common earlier in the fifth century, such praise is not represented in texts of the period from the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404/3 to the end of the Lamian War in 323/2. While strict periodization is not usually desirable, an examination of the developments in encomium over these eight decades reveals a picture of both consistent inhibition and constant experimentation. Athenian authors sounded the margins of political encomium, approaching such praise obliquely at all times, while simultaneously the δῆμος, of which they were usually a part, made corporate trials of praise in order to obtain through words and crowns what they could no longer get through taxation. These phenomena are hardly separable. The development of the political encomium must therefore be approached with cautious historicism.²¹

Nonetheless, this dissertation ponders an absence more than it celebrates a presence. Given the relative dearth of praise in this period, it is unsurprising that little attention has been paid to its role in Athenian society, especially in the first half of the fourth century. Two scholars deserve singling out for their important contributions to the study of praise in Greek society outside this period. The first, Leslie Kurke, produced a

²⁰ Lambert 2004:86; there were, according to Lambert, a few exceptions, but they do not survive. Honors decreed for Athenians before the era of regular inscription will have had a degree of permanence both in oral memory and in the public archive, but neither of these modes approaches the monumentality of a *stèle*.

²¹ Cf. the approach of Moles 2001 to Thucydides.

magisterial work of scholarship (*The Traffic in Praise: Pindar and the Poetics of Social Economy*, 1991) dedicated to the intricate system of aristocratic social networks in archaic and early classical Greece. Her dissection of how praise works to negotiate social tensions aroused in reintegrating powerful, and therefore dangerous, athletic victors back into their home communities provides a conceptual starting point for the present investigation. Shortly after Kurke's study appeared, the second scholar, Laurent Pernot, produced a compendious work in two volumes (*La rhétorique de l'éloge dans le monde gréco-romain*, 1993). At first glance, the study aims at describing panegyric oratory of the Second Sophistic, but the preliminary matter in the first volume retails the history of rhetorical theory from its beginnings down through Cicero. This history, combined with a comprehensive analysis of modes of praise used by rhetoricians under the Empire, forms an essential background for the present study. Between Kurke and Pernot, however, there is a noticeable chronological gap, as Kurke's examination ends before, and Pernot's main subject picks up after, the era from the death of Pericles to the rise of Macedon. Neither, moreover, takes Athenian civic values as the prime mover for the development of praise: though admirably examining the tensions between the victor and *polis*, Kurke's focus is on more Panhellenic aristocratic circles, while Pernot, aiming to describe the hyper-literary consciousness of the Second Sophistic, keeps to the rhetorical tradition as it developed across the Mediterranean world.

The present study, by contrast, is unabashedly Athenocentric. In the first instance, this is a concession to the nature of the evidence: more can be said about the Athenian ideological landscape because of the bulk of that city's textual remains, and it is neither possible nor desirable to extrapolate onto the Greeks more generally a social and

intellectual climate demonstrably pertaining to only one *polis*. Furthermore, the literary works under discussion, even when they treat non-Athenians or, as frequently in Isocrates, have notional addressees beyond Athens, inherently look inward. These Athenian-born authors—Xenophon, Isocrates, Demosthenes, Lycurgus, Aeschines, and Hypereides—write in Attic, and where they describe, or invent, the customs of foreign states it is from the perspective of the outsider, for an audience of fellow outsiders. The works of Xenophon, such as the *Lakedaimonion Politeia* and *Agésilas*, are emblematic: by modern scholars charged with, and then dismissed for, a perceived Laconophilia, Xenophon will not have written his works for consumption by Spartans. Whether or not he had some missionary zeal for Spartan νόμοι, he presents these νόμοι so that his audience can emulate them or learn from their failings. He aims thereby to improve non-Spartan communities, and the evidence does not suggest that Xenophon, author of the *Hipparchicus* and *Poroi*, was concerned with any specific *poleis* other than his native city.

The importance of Athens for this examination does not arise solely from these constraints of the evidence. The quantity of Athenian literary output coalesced with historical contingency in such a way as to render classical Athens—particularly its dialect and artistic achievements—of paramount importance through the rest of antiquity. It would be a large project in its own right to trace the impact of fourth-century praise on the later development of panegyric; in the chapters that follow some suggestions are made, but the treatment is not intended to be comprehensive. From this period the sole surviving prose encomia—texts devoted entirely to praise—are the *Evagoras* of Isocrates and *Agésilas* of Xenophon. In each case, as will be discussed in greater depth in

chapters two and three, an Athenian author chose to praise a foreign monarch. This choice was conditioned by contemporary attitudes and biases, but it was a choice that would prove crucial for later authors under autocratic rule hunting for encomiastic exemplars. Despite the discrepancy between the Athenian democracy and later autocratic regimes, the genre of the prose encomium has its roots in the cultural milieu of fourth-century Athens, in which the elevation of the individual was undertaken only with great sensitivity regarding those who were not so fortunate. The threat of the powerful individual abetted by a complacent δῆμος is encapsulated by a passage of Demosthenes, speaking against Aeschines and Eubulus (19.296):

οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅ τι τῶν πάντων μᾶλλον εὐλαβεῖσθαι δεῖ ἢ τὸ μείζω τινὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἔαν γίγνεσθαι. μή μοι σφῆξέσθω μηδ' ἀπολλύσθω μηδεῖς, ἂν ὁ δεῖνα βούληται, ἀλλ' ὃν ἂν τὰ πεπραγμένα σώιζῃ καὶ τοῦναντίον, τούτῳ τῆς προσηκούσης ψήφου παρ' ὑμῶν ὑπαρχέτω τυγχάνειν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστι δημοτικόν.

There is nothing—nothing whatsoever!—about which we must be more cautious than about letting some individual become more important than the many. I beg you, do not let anyone's life or death depend on the will of So-and-So. Instead, let it suffice, if a man's deeds deserve life or death, for him to obtain from you the vote he has coming to him: for this is how democracy works.

The individual citizen

In spite of, or perhaps because of, the tensions involved, praise of the individual provides the most suitable lens through which to examine the aesthetic, ethical, and political ramifications of praise in classical Athens.²² A trait common to epic, tragedy, and early historiography is the emphasis on the extraordinary individual's ability or inability, against the backdrop of the society of the *polis*, to effect change. Though "Great Man" theories of history should rightly be discarded, the extraordinary individual,

²² Gill 1996 treats individual personality in Greek literature; some sections of Adkins 1960, Higgins 1977, Duplouy 2006, and Schmitt Pantel 2009 are also relevant to the study of the individual in classical Greece.

especially when at odds with the community, seems to have been at the forefront of Greek thought. This emphasis on the individual applies not just to a fascination with mythological kings on the tragic stage, but also to the treatment of much more tangible contemporary public figures, such as the ever-ambiguous Alcibiades, whose career looms large in authors writing in the decades after his death in 404/3. While Athenians of earlier periods—Theseus, for example, or Themistocles—could be used, and frequently were used, as *loci* for the illustration and negotiation of Athenian ideology, the legacies of living or recently deceased individuals remained under contestation and required special tact on the part of authors, or decree-proposers, wishing to invest them with a paradigmatic ethical function.²³

These ethical concerns are inevitably bound up in questions of group identity and ideology. If an individual performs deeds that are then praised as appropriately “Athenian”—deeds, for example, in accordance with ancestral values or motivated by love of the *polis*—the speaker of praise thereby communicates in brief compass a torrent of ideas: that membership in this group, “Athenians,” is valuable; that the audience should emulate the recipient in order to be considered for praise; and that the audience should also emulate the speaker, by using praise to police the members of their community. These same forces also apply for smaller gatherings, as well, as for example when an individual is praised at a symposium for conforming to typically aristocratic ideals of sympotic behavior.

²³ Isocrates takes up this problem in the *Evagoras*: see below, chapter three. Those still living could be praised only under very particular circumstances; cf. Demosthenes 18.315, τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδε τῶν πάντων, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν ζῶσι πᾶσιν ὑπεστί τις ἢ πλείων ἢ ἐλάττων φθόνος, τοὺς τεθνεώτας δ’ οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν οὐδεὶς ἔτι μισεῖ; (“For who on earth does not know that, while alive, everyone is at least to some degree subject to envy, but the dead are no longer hated by even a single one of their enemies?”) Cf. also Thucydides 2.45.1.

On the one hand, despite the necessary involvement, and sometimes complicity, of the community in its generation, ideology is constructed through the rhetoric of speakers and writers to suit their own purposes; it does not exist independently. On the other hand, again and again there emerges from Athenian-produced texts the same trepidation over singling out individuals, particularly for praise. Each speaker has come to the same conclusion, that a text will succeed if it broadcasts its wariness of the individual. This makes intuitive sense under a democracy, and in particular under a democracy whose self-definition, against other states, is wrapped up in underscoring its use of collective action.²⁴ Even more than the opposition of mass and elite, the opposition of collective and individual drove Athenian political thought.²⁵ There are any number of factors that can distinguish an individual from the collective: wealth is one of them, as are, for example, noble birth and speaking ability. Although some of these factors had an empirical basis now largely inaccessible, each could be rhetorically minimized or maximized, depending on the author's goals. Taken together, these factors in turn could minimize or maximize individuality, the degree of a person's separation from the collective. In this way individuality is a more basic conceptual category than membership in the elite, and, because it is constantly manipulated in texts produced and consumed at Athens, it offers a crucial entry point for examining the structures of Athenian identity.

Praise would appear at first glance to maximize individuality, marking out the recipient from those who are not being, but perhaps have the potential to be, praised.

²⁴ *Inter alia*, of course; see, e.g., Meyer 2013 for Athenian emphasis on piety toward the gods. Cf. Morrison 1994:532.

²⁵ *Pace* Ober 1989. As Ober proves, membership in the Athenian elite was rhetorically constructed and maintained; see further below, chapter four. See Morrison 1994 for the contrast of individuals and cities in Thucydides.

Athenian authors, however, use rhetoric to smooth down the rough edges of individuality, to prove that So-and-So, despite his exceptionality, is more normative than he appears at first glance. It is important that he not seem too wealthy, except insofar as his liturgies have benefitted the state, nor too rhetorically gifted, nor too much an expert in some technical field, such as law.²⁶ It is true that the vast majority of the speaking *personae* in Attic prose literature are elite voices, but the extent to which they must apologize for their privilege is just as striking as the extent of the privilege itself. The careful balance of praising an individual and contextualizing that individual within the collective is, in essence, the subject of this thesis.

Laudator, laudandus, and audience

The individual receiving praise and the collective are not, however, the only figures important to this balance.²⁷ Successful praise must also acknowledge the praise-giver's own role. On the most basic level, one giving praise must have some sort of qualification for doing so, and here Aristotle's analysis of ῥητορς, as it applies to all rhetoric, is useful (*Rhetoric* 1377B–78A). Specific to praise are the extreme tact and deference required, to avoid offending either the audience or the addressee. At Athens, though, because the speaker should be notionally equal to the subject, too much deference could lead to the speaker being accused of flattery (κολακεία). These are just a few of the obstacles encountered by the would-be author of an encomium or proposer of

²⁶ As explored by Todd 1996 regarding Lysias 30.

²⁷ To what follows, compare “the structures of praise” laid out by Osborne 2011:83–7. Osborne sees praise in terms of compacts among the various parties involved: “Praise demands the creation of a compact between the giver of praise and those who hear the praise, and the denial of a compact between the giver of praise and the person praised” (2011:86). The present analysis sees praise in terms of the risk taken on by the *laudator*, which presupposes not a compact between *laudator* and audience but an ambiguous and potentially dangerous relationship.

an honorary decree. The chapters that follow, therefore, track authorial strategies of self-presentation as a key indicator of the tensions surrounding praise.

For the sake of convenience, from this point forward the terms *laudator* and *laudandus* are used to indicate the praise-giver and praise-recipient. In addition to avoiding bulky circumlocutions, as well as the short but awkward “praiser” and “praisee,” *laudator* and *laudandus* leave the mode of praise unrestricted. Praise can be offered by an author, speaker, writer, or proposer—sometimes the same entity fills several of these roles—and by an individual or group: to speak of a *laudator* cuts across these distinctions. Likewise, the word “audience” allows for consideration of oral, visual, and written media, as well as for any number of consumers on any number of occasions. Reducing an act of praise to the quasi-algebraic notation of *laudator*, *laudandus*, and audience renders such acts commensurable and therefore susceptible to comparison and analysis. In all of the praise-texts discussed in the following chapters, the *laudator* shows an awareness of the need to define each of the three terms and weigh their needs against one another.²⁸

These three are always the *minima* of praise for an individual other than the author. When the *laudator* engages in self-praise, when the community authorizes praise for one of its own members, or when the audience is praised by the *laudator*, the terms are reduced to two. There were of course many forms of praise practiced in the same time and place, and each illuminates the riskiest variety, individual-to-individual praise, by

²⁸ The three figures are generated by the text: the author of literary praise, for example, molds the speaking *laudator* with an eye toward self-presentation, while carefully delimiting the *laudandus* and also carving out the audience whose intended reception of the work clarifies its purpose just as much as the selection of the *laudandus*. This is not to rule out external factors entirely, however: the physical space in which some praise was delivered, as well as the performance contexts (e.g., ritual occasion), could determine the audience, at least for that moment, and could constrain who would be eligible to act as *laudator* and *laudandus*.

contrast. The rituals surrounding the public burial of the Athenian war-dead provide the clearest contrasts, from the speech delivered in praise of the anonymous mass of the fallen to the epigraphic recording of the names of the dead, which acknowledged each soldier but controlled his individuality by not including his patronymic: the values of the *polis* were thereby elevated over those of the *oikos*. The texts here called political encomia by definition present, dispute, and celebrate the values of the *polis*, but the authors accomplish their civic purposes through underscoring, rather than excising, individuality. *Laudatores* had to manage the risks of praise from many angles, of which the following three are representative but not exhaustive. First, and most generally, *laudatores* needed to avoid stirring up envy (φθόνος) against their *laudandi* while encouraging emulation (ζήλος). Second, they had to work around the potentially undemocratic sense of hierarchy inherent in an act of praise.²⁹ Third, their success depended on positioning the *laudandi*, themselves, and the audience as benefitting from an act of praise, rather than being harmed by it as individuals or as a community. Successfully delivered praise was necessarily praise not only of the *laudandus*, but also of the performance of the *laudator* and the values of the audience.

***Educatio*: a brief history of praise**

Praise of course predated the fourth century, and a reminder of what came earlier will assist in situating the politically-oriented manifestation of praise in Attic prose. Interactions in the Homeric poems that may be considered forms of praise are far too many and too complex for anything less than a book-length investigation: one thinks of

²⁹ Which is to say, generally, the ability to praise implies either: that the *laudator* has power over the *laudandus* and is therefore in a position to reward or punish the behavior of others; or that the *laudator* of inferior status and is therefore flattering the *laudandus* out of self-interest.

the multiple layers of Glaucus' boast to Diomedes (*Iliad* 6.206–211), which allows Glaucus, through praising his own ancestors, to praise himself obliquely through implying his own virtue—and thereby threaten his adversary.³⁰ Hesiod's *Theogony*, meanwhile, provides a sophisticated example of what would later be called encomium at the outset of the poem (75–103). The poet carefully navigates praise of both the Muses and mortal kings through connecting them, and then—in a gesture of self-praise often to be found in later literature—slyly injects the praise of poets.

Praise and blame are frequent topics of archaic lyric and elegiac poetry; one need only think of some of the most famous lines of Alcman and Sappho for the former, or Alcaeus and Hipponax for the latter.³¹ Praise for mortals also coexists with the somewhat different modes of praise for divinities in the hymnic tradition.³² By the late sixth and early fifth centuries, two interrelated strands of praise poetry for mortals had developed, both often associated with poets operating alongside or even under the patronage of the archaic tyrants. The first is the encomium, usually erotic and envisioned as delivered within the context of the symposium.³³ Ibycus is the representative author. In one poem he compares the *laudandus*, Polycrates, to the heroes of the Trojan War, and himself, as *laudator*, to Homer (*PMG* fr.1a); another fragment expounds the ideal beauty of a certain

³⁰ On relative honor in the *Iliad* see further, e.g., Nagy 1999; for the vocabulary see especially Elmer 2013 on the semantics of ἔπαινος/ἐπαινεῖν in communal decision-making.

³¹ Archilochus contains notable instances of both praise and blame. The importance of blame in protecting the community from unsavory individuals emerges clearly in archaic poetry and persists through the classical period in all arenas of literary and political endeavor, as one can gather from the recriminations volleyed between Demosthenes and Aeschines; see further chapter four, below. On the operation of discourses of blame in archaic poetry, see, e.g., Bowie 2001 and Steiner 2008.

³² For the further connection of the hymn with the epigram, see Depew 2000. On the Greek hymn generally, see Furley and Bremer 2001; Lattke 1991 catalogues the genre's surviving representatives.

³³ Plato would later problematize this kind of poetry in the *Lysis* and *Symposium*: see Nightingale 1993. On poetry and the symposium generally, see Clay 1999 and Bowie 2002

Euryalus (*PMG* fr.7).³⁴ Later encomia would preserve the trope of mythological comparison, but physical qualities would cede ground to the representation of character.

The other strand is the epinician ode, a specialized encomium in honor of a victorious athlete.³⁵ The poems of Pindar, organized into four books, form the bulk of the epinician odes, and praise poetry generally, surviving from pre-Roman Greece. It is therefore largely in Pindaric scholarship that the modern study of ancient Greek praise has flourished, especially in terms of how the language and structure of the odes generate and moderate praise.³⁶ For this study Pindar is particularly important because his lifespan (c.522–443 BCE) chronologically bridges the eras of the aforementioned archaic poets and the authors of classical Athens, of whose shared cultural background Pindar’s lyrics formed an important element.³⁷ Among his odes are two composed for Athenian citizens, the Alcmeonid Megacles (*Pythian* 7) and Timodemus of Acharnae (*Nemean* 2).³⁸ Both poems exhibit tensions of praise similar to those stressed by authors of the next several decades, as Pindar advertises the envy that confronts his *laudandi* but adds to their fame in the long run, even if it is inconvenient for them in the here and now. In the ode for Megacles, the poet decries “that envy is the recompense for your noble deeds” (φθόνον

³⁴ Cf. Pindar S-M fr.123, an encomium for Theoxenus.

³⁵ One author of epinician poetry, Simonides, is also strongly associated with more communal forms of praise, such as his ode written in tribute to the fallen at Plataea. On Simonides’ modes of praise, see Steiner 1999 and Sider 2006. See further the discussion of Xenophon’s *Hieron* in the first chapter, below.

³⁶ For Pindar, Bundy 1962 remains a crucial study, as do Crotty 1982, Most 1985, and Race 1986. The following works, organized by topic, are representative. On the figure of the poet: Morgan 1993, Carey 2000, Mackie 2003. On the development of the genre: Bremer 2008, Morgan 2008. On language and structure: Race 1992, Bonifazi 2001, Wells 2009. On performance context: Heath 1988, Heath and Lefkowitz 1991, Kurke 2007. Works on specific odes relevant for their discussion of praise: Most 1986, Kurke 1990.

³⁷ Cf. Lefkowitz 2012:61–9.

³⁸ *Pythian* 7 (on which see Kurke 1991:195–6) probably dates to 486; *Nemean* 2 is not readily dateable.

ἀμειβόμενον τὰ καλὰ ἔργα, *Pythian* 7.19), with probable reference to Megacles' ostracism (487/6 BCE). Timodemus is perhaps more fortunate: because the *laudandus* is a potential "glory for great Athens" (ταῖς μεγάλαις ... κόσμον Ἀθάναις, *Nemean* 2.8), Pindar calls upon Timodemus' fellow-citizens (πολιῖται) to celebrate his return home with a κῶμος (2.24). The κῶμος, however, is to honor Zeus in the first instance, just as Pindar says that rhapsodes start with Zeus (2.1–3). By giving precedence to Zeus in both his own ode and in the hypothetical performance of praise by the πολιῖται, the poet softens the potential force of envy. As Pindar constructs it, the victor's position *vis-à-vis* his fellow-citizens is precarious, as his mentions of πολιῖται elsewhere prove.³⁹ Pindar does not limit this minefield of envy to Athenian victors, but it is difficult not to take Megacles, at least, as an extreme case.

Related to this cultural complex surrounding athletics is Xenophanes' complaint (fr.2) that athletes receive excessive praise in proportion to the benefits they provide for society.⁴⁰ Xenophanes in this fragment proposes his own σοφίη ("skill, wisdom," fr.2.12) as an alternative good, to be honored in place of athletic victory. These verses provide an early example of a rhetorical structure that would prove crucial for the political encomia: others have been praising the wrong sort of qualities. The onus then falls on the *laudator* not only to praise the correct qualities of the *laudandus*, but to argue that these qualities are in fact more valuable. Rather than merely rehearsing values taken for granted, each such *laudator* builds, adjacent to what he casts as the existing ideological framework, a

³⁹ *Pythian* 4.117 is the most innocent, though this is a vocative put in the mouth of Jason. The three other instances of the word πολιῖτης cast fellow-citizens as potentially malign or envious (*Pythian* 4.296–7, 11.28–9; *Olympian* 5.16, on which see Kurke 1991:202). On "elite negotiation" with the community outside the epinician odes, see Kurke 2007.

⁴⁰ See further Harris 2009.

modified system that brings greater benefit to the community, as Xenophanes indeed suggests in his own case (fr.2.19–22).⁴¹

Also important to understanding praise at Athens are the various funerary practices of the classical period. Epigrams on funerary monuments often invoke the framework of civic ideology in order to praise the deceased; by the same token, dedicators of objects in sanctuaries engaged in a comparable variety of self-praise.⁴² The instances of funerary praise that speak most directly to the values of the Athenian δῆμος, although the majority of them do not praise individuals, are the surviving examples of the funeral oration (ἐπιτάφιος λόγος), as mentioned earlier.⁴³ The first surviving instantiation of this genre, a speech put into the mouth of Pericles within the context of Thucydides' history, entails not only praise of the fallen, but also praise of the environment coming from which the soldiers performed their virtue: that is to say, praise of Athens' past and praise of the living Athenians.⁴⁴ Throughout, Pericles appears to describe the virtues of Athens: the goal, of course, of the Aristotelian epideictic orator. Yet instead of describing them, he in essence *prescribes* them, even down to the level of praising Athens for how

⁴¹ Additionally, in fr.1, Xenophanes proposes praise not for himself necessarily but for a general type of sympotic companion: one who spurns certain kinds of poetry that depict the gods in the wrong light (fr.1.21–4).

⁴² The essays in Baumbach et al. 2010 are invaluable in this regard; see especially Keesling 2010 on the Callimachus monument (CEG 256). Day 1989 and Day 2000 are also useful, especially for concerns of genre; Tsagalis 2008 provides a discussion of themes in fourth-century epigram; see also Petrovic 2009. For the visual language of funerary monuments, see Osborne 2010; cf. Osborne 2011, as well as Shear 2007 for the spatial dynamics of individual commemoration at Athens.

⁴³ The word “examples” here serves two roles, indicating both that the individual speeches are each separate instantiations of the genre and that several of these speeches may never have been intended for recitation, in paraphrase or in their *ipsissima verba*, on the occasion of the annual public burial of the Athenian war dead, but rather may have been rhetorical or philosophical exercises.

⁴⁴ For the use of the past outside of the funeral oration, see the material presented by Higbie 1997, Higbie 1999, Grethlein 2009, Grethlein 2010 and, for an epigraphical take on the issue, see Lambert 2010 and Luraghi 2010; these are only a few examples of a currently flourishing area of investigation. On the notional unity of Athenian mores and its importance to later literature, see Richter 2011.

the citizens go about—or, rather, should go about—praising one another.⁴⁵ Here also is found one of the most famous passages regarding the treatment of Athenian women (2.45.2): so stark a restriction on the praise of this group of Athenians says much about the character of Thucydides' Pericles, but for the present purposes it at the least reconfirms his interest in the role of praise in the state.⁴⁶

By the end of the fifth century, some of these modes of praise had declined in prominence, at least as far as the evidence permits one to judge. For example, the victory ode supposedly written by Euripides (*PMG* fr.491) for Alcibiades in 416 seems, thirty years after Pindar's latest datable ode (*Pythian* 8), a reactionary gesture.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, Alcibiades' unprecedented Olympic victory ensured his prominence when it came time to propose the expedition to Sicily: mechanisms of praise such as the epinician ode thus could contribute to sweeping political changes. Indeed, in the era of Alcibiades and Critias the tensions of praise approached their practical maximum; in some cases the dissonance Kurke noted between victor and community in the archaic world presented the very real threat of the dissolution of the Athenian democracy.⁴⁸ In this ideologically charged atmosphere, praise, especially in its traditional verse forms, could be used to

⁴⁵ See especially Thucydides 2.35 (praise) and 2.40 (blame). See also Connor 1994 and Yoshitake 2010.

⁴⁶ In addition to funerary monuments, praise of individual women can be found in the Socratic tradition, most notably regarding the figures of Aspasia, Diotima, and Ischomachus' wife. Cf. also Xenophon's treatment of Agesilaus' sister Cynisca: see Perry 2007, as well as some comments below, in chapter two.

⁴⁷ For the poem and its circumstances, see Gribble 2012. Earlier in the fifth century, Timocreon continued the themes of archaic lyric within an Athenian political context: see Scodel 1983.

⁴⁸ See Carter 1986 on the attitudes of the aristocrats of Critias and Alcibiades' generation, though Alcibiades is here, as always, an exception. The scholarship on Alcibiades and his literary reception is sizeable: see, among others, Talbot 1963, Vickers 1987, Moorton 1988, Bloedow 1991, Gribble 1999, Domingo Gygax 2006b, and Evans 2010. Modern biographies include Hatzfeld 1951, Ellis 1989, De Romilly 1993, and Rhodes 2011. Bloedow 1973 and Forde 1989 examine Alcibiades as he is portrayed by Thucydides and the extent to which the historian praises his actions and character.

separate the *καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ* from their perceived inferiors.⁴⁹ The chief context for aristocratic poetic production was the symposium, a nexus of elite interaction, ideological reinforcement, and competition.⁵⁰ Such gatherings were certainly not open to the broader public, but neither were the goings-on entirely private, as the events of 415 proved. Sympotic poetry, whether actually delivered at a symposium or merely invoking sympotic motifs, could therefore take on an ambiguous civic dimension: one could receive praise either for working within the strictures of the broader community or for transgressing them.

The tensions of praise emerge clearly in Critias' elegy for Alcibiades (G-P fr.2), likely composed around 408 BCE.⁵¹ As it was impossible for Critias to work into dactyls

⁴⁹ The work of Bourdieu (such as Bourdieu 1984, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*) is theoretically relevant here. On this period as one particularly laden with cultural conflict, see Osborne 2007, along with Taylor 2007 in the same volume for possible demographic causes; for internal disputes in Greek culture generally, see Dougherty and Kurke 2003:1–19; on cultural conflict in the realm of music, see Martin 2003 and Wilson 2003. Regarding lyric poetry in particular, Agócs 2011 has categorized the various words used for song in archaic and classical culture; Carey 2009 reviews the major genres; Davies 1988 is also helpful on the distinctions between monody and choral lyric; Garner 2011 presents the development of archaic elegy and its generic ethos; see also Bowie 1986 and the essays in Athanassaki and Bowie 2011. On the consumption of poetry in classical Greece generally, see Gentili 1988; for changes to this consumption in fourth-century Athens, see Wallace 1995; on the development of poetic genres in the fourth century, see LeVen 2014.

⁵⁰ For elite competition at Athens (and its communal benefits), see Whitehead 1983, as well as Wilson 2000 for the example of the *χορηγία*. Alcibiades' praise of Socrates (*Symposium* 215A–222B), though fictive and in prose, provides an intriguing example of sympotic praise for the hyperbole of its situation and contents; see further comments in chapters two and three, below.

⁵¹ Gentili and Prato 2002 *ad loc.* Scholarship on this poem includes Iannucci 2002:37–44 and Wilson 2003; for the figure of Critias, see also Presutti 2001. It is tempting to link G-P fr.3 with the circumstances of this poem, for a hint at how Critias might have attempted to position himself relative to the *laudandus*; for the possible historical circumstances of G-P fr.3, see Hatzfeld 1951:257–8; cf. Iannucci 2002:48–58. Alcibiades would already have been crowned on the occasion of his Olympic victory (cf. *PMG* fr.419.5); Plato will later represent Alcibiades entering the *Symposium* crowned as well (212E). If, as some have suggested, Critias' (sympotic) motion to crown Alcibiades is in response to some political or military maneuver on the part of the latter, it is interesting in how many fields of endeavor Alcibiades is represented as crowned: athletics, politics, debauchery.

the series of three short syllables in the honorand's name, the second line of the poem is not the expected pentameter, but rather an iambic trimeter:⁵²

καὶ νῦν Κλεινίου υἱὸν Ἀθηναῖον στεφανώσω
Ἀλκιβιάδην νέοισιν ὑμνήσας τρόποις·
οὐ γάρ πως ἦν τοῦνομ' ἐφαρμόζειν ἐλεγείῳ,
νῦν δ' ἐν ἱαμβείῳ κείσεται οὐκ ἀμέτρως.

And I shall crown the Athenian son of Cleinias, Alcibiades, now that I have worked out new ways to hymn him: for there is no way to fit his name into elegy, but now it will stand not without measure in iambs.

Critias was not forced to make this metrical choice; surely no contemporary would have found much room for mistaking identities on hearing Critias honor “the Athenian son of Cleinias.” Perhaps the inclusion of both the patronymic and the nationality reflects epinician practice.⁵³ If this is the case, however, there is no homologue in the elegy for either the event or the festival. Likewise, if the model is decree formulae, there is no equivalent of an ἐπειδὴ clause giving the *laudationis causa* as in, for example, the contemporary *IG I³ 110.6–13*.⁵⁴ This conspicuous absence of details—what an epinician poem would say about the victory, or what a decree would say about the recipient's euergetism, or even something akin to the vague statements of the σκόλια about the tyrannicides—draws attention to the metrical conceit, the only actual “content” of the verses. This conceit is spelled out twice, through νέοισιν ... τρόποις, “new ways,” in line two and οὐκ ἀμέτρως, “not unmetrically,” in line four. Alcibiades, never a model of self-control, could easily have been charged with acting ἀμέτρως at even the best of times in

⁵² Iannucci 2002:44 sees the addition of the iambic line as introducing ψόγος into a context of ἔπαινος by means of the genre's association with blame (2002:38–9).

⁵³ E.g., *Olympian* 11.7–15 and the condensed (Simonidean?) epigram εἶπον, τίς, τίνος ἐσσί, τίνος πατρίδος, τί δ' ἐνίκη. / Κασμύλος, Εὐαγόρου, Πύθια πύξ, Ῥόδιος (*Anthologia Palatina* 16.23). Iannucci 2002:41–2 points to Pindar, *Olympian* 3.4–6 as a possible model for G-P fr.2.

⁵⁴ On which see Henry 1983:3.

his career, and a radical sense of morality—another possible meaning of νέοι τρόποι—was practically his calling card, at least according to the biographical tradition. Presumably the reason for the praise, whether sympotic bravado or public gesture of gratitude, would have been clear from context, but to judge from these lines Critias played it safe for posterity, leaving the poem open to a variety of readings and thereby not leaving himself open to charges of excessive or unwarranted flattery, in the event that Alcibiades again fell out of public favor, as in fact happened. What remains is a remarkably prescient jest, highlighting through metrical irregularity the inability of Alcibiades to be properly reintegrated into the Athenian political landscape.

These aristocrats were not merely Athenian figures, but rather had international reputations; likewise, there were many non-Athenians who played influential roles in the Athenian political sphere. Lysander of Sparta provides perhaps the most obvious example, through his defeat of Athens in 404/3 and subsequent instigation of traumatic reforms.⁵⁵ In addition to his own apparent attempts at self-aggrandizement at international sanctuaries, Lysander received hyperbolic praise during his own lifetime, such as the festival established in his honor at Samos.⁵⁶ The theatricality of the actions of such larger-than-life figures lends itself to comparison with characters from contemporary comedy and tragedy; this theatricality also makes less detached from political society the rhetorical exercise of defending mythological figures such as Helen

⁵⁵ On the social and political aftermath of these events see Shear 2011; cf. Roscalla 2005.

⁵⁶ On Lysander generally, see Bommelaer 1981 as well as Cartledge 1987:77–98 (with further references), especially regarding Lysander's relationship to Agesilaus; see also Keen 1996 for an evaluation of the sources. The career of Brasidas and the honors granted to him (see Cartledge 1987:85) presented an additional model for political figures of the last two decades of the fifth century. Matthews 1996:15 gives the evidence for the Samian Lysandreia in brief compass; likewise Hölscher 1998:176, regarding the sanctuary dedications.

and Busiris.⁵⁷ Whether Athenian like Alcibiades and Socrates or foreign like Lysander, such individuals provided fourth-century authors with easily recognizable figures who could be made to embody contested ideologies. Furthermore, the desire to control the legacy of these individuals led to the development of the biographical encomium, of which Isocrates' *Evagoras* and Xenophon's *Agesilaus* are the earliest examples.⁵⁸ These texts are crucial to the history of praise at Athens; nonetheless, it is an inescapable reality that these Athenian authors did not choose to celebrate their own fellow-citizens, but rather foreign monarchs whose praise was in many ways less risky. The chapters that follow explore the apparent contrast between the tensions that inhibited praise of Athenians and the monarchical contexts of the examples proposed by contemporary theorists of praise. Praise of the individual may have been easiest to give and receive wherever individuals wielded the greatest authority, but the theorists nonetheless prove that the Athenian democracy could reap the benefits of a robust praise-culture that would draw on historical modes of praise as well as marshal novel sorts of honors.

Virtutes et facta: political encomium in the fourth century

Faced with the loss of the tribute from the Delian League, with an ever-shifting diplomatic situation in relation to Sparta, Thebes, and Persia, and eventually with the growing power of Philip of Macedon, Athens in the decades following the democratic

⁵⁷ Old Comedy is of course highly politicized, and the frequent appearance—or at least naming—of prominent politicians makes it an essential source of evidence. Alcibiades was not immune to criticism on the comic stage (see especially the tradition surrounding the *Dippers* of Eupolis), and among surviving plays his presence looms in the *Frogs*. Relevant scholarship on ideology and comedy includes Henderson 1998, Christ 2008, Fisher 2008, Rosen 2008, and Storey 2008. Various links have been made between tragedy and the *polis* over the past few decades; particularly relevant to this study, in addition to the seminal articles presented by Winkler and Zeitlin 1990, are Walker 1995, Rosenbloom 2002, Rodighiero 2012, Rosenbloom 2012, and Saïd 2012. On praise for Helen, Busiris, et al., see chapter three.

⁵⁸ See chapter two (*Agesilaus*) and three (*Evagoras*).

restoration of 403/2 provided a fertile medium in which political theory could take root.⁵⁹ Athenian politicians constantly experimented with and adjusted the mechanisms of governance; Athenian intellectuals composed, performed, and disseminated texts confronting the problems of the day and suggesting solutions. To the body of scholarly work on this period and these authors, the four chapters of this dissertation contribute two main ideas. First, praise for individual Athenian citizens, alongside the telling absence of such praise, should be taken as a key indicator of Athenian civic values in this period and of their development over time. Second, Athenian authors not only recognized the importance of praise in ordering their social world, but also actively promoted the multiplication of acts of praise as something beneficial to political life, both in a general, ethical sense and in its ability to accomplish particular practical goals through incentivizing the charitable behavior of individuals.

Three of the four chapters treat the contributions of Xenophon and Isocrates to the theory and practice of praise at Athens; the writings of Plato are adduced for comparison where appropriate. The first chapter discusses Xenophon's theory of leadership and governance. Scholars such as Vivienne J. Gray and Vincent Azoulay have demonstrated that this theory of leadership is coherent across the corpus of his writings; the first chapter asserts that praise deserves greater prominence than it has been assigned within this system, as a crucial element of Xenophon's doctrine of rewards and punishments.⁶⁰ Two of Xenophon's shorter works bring out this feature most clearly. The first, the *Hieron*, in which the epinician poet Simonides converses with the titular Syracusan

⁵⁹ Rhodes 2009a provides a succinct overview of external and internal policy development in this period. Cf. Engen 2010:10.

⁶⁰ See in particular Gray 2011 and Azoulay 2004.

tyrant, delineates how praise can be used to the benefit of all members of the *polis*, through encouraging competition for symbolic honors. The conclusions of this dialogue are reflected in the second text, the *Poroi*, a pamphlet explicitly aimed at improving the finances of Xenophon's native city. The remainder of the chapter fills out the picture by addressing Plato's *Laws* as well as a range of Xenophonic *comparanda*, from the *Education of Cyrus* to the technical treatises.

The second chapter moves from examining Xenophon's theory of praise to his own practice. In promoting as ethical models such diverse figures as Cyrus the Younger, Socrates, and Agesilaus, Xenophon emphasizes the praise they themselves delivered: the roles of *laudator* and *laudandus* mirror each other, reinforcing the moral lessons of the texts and laying out a pattern for how the audience should praise others in turn.

Xenophon signals this mode of exemplarity particularly through his use of the word ἐπίδειξις and its cognates: the original ἐπίδειξις of virtuous deeds on the part of the *laudandus* is answered by the literary ἐπίδειξις of those virtues as delivered by the *laudator*. By far the most important text for the argument of the chapter is the *Agesilaus*, in which Xenophon places his literary performance in competition with Agesilaus' self-memorialization and suggests that the written encomium is the most effective vehicle for communicating ethical lessons.

Isocrates receives the focus of the third chapter, which argues that this author invented the self-contained, politically-oriented encomium in prose but intentionally chose for his own example of the genre, the *Evagoras*, an insufficiently weighty subject. His goal in this text is to turn Athenian prose artists from the creation of παράδοξα ἐγκώμια to tasks of greater social impact, but as in many of his works Isocrates leaves it

to others to follow his instructions to their fullest conclusion. He minimizes his own risk in praising his subject, the tyrant Evagoras of Cyprus, through manipulating the context of the work's delivery: whereas Xenophon's later *Agésilas* stands on its own, with no indication of external circumstances prompting its composition beyond the compulsion to praise a great man, Isocrates enfolds his encomium within a letter to Nicocles, the son of the *laudandus*, and claims that it was inspired by the funeral games Nicocles had put on for his father. Praising a recently deceased monarch to his son hardly inspires envy, and comparison with other works of Isocrates shows that this sort of defensive maneuver is key to his usual practice of praise. Nonetheless, the works of Xenophon and Isocrates are in agreement that expanded use of praise would be beneficial to Athenian society.

In the fourth chapter, these authors' theories and practice of praise are put into their historical context: first by comparison with contemporary state mechanisms for commending Athenian citizens, and then through a narrative of the role of praise in central oratorical texts from the three decades subsequent to the date of Xenophon's *Poroi* (355/4–323/2). These case studies comprise Demosthenes' speech *Against Leptines*, Lycurgus' speech *Against Leocrates*, the conflict of Demosthenes and Aeschines that reached its climax with Aeschines' speech *Against Ctesiphon* and Demosthenes' *On the Crown*, and finally Hypereides' funeral oration for those who died in the Lamian War. Both the state-sponsored modes of praise and these texts show that, in the third quarter of the fourth century, the Athenians were aware of and capitalized on the benefits of bestowing inexpensive symbolic honors on individual citizens. The oratorical texts demonstrate the interpersonal conflicts that arose from the award of such honors while also serving as vehicles for praise and blame in their own right. As the

conflict with Macedon intensified, so too did praise for individual citizens. Athenian self-definition, including the ethical ramifications of praise, adapted to suit the times, so that against the baleful influence of autocrats and their toadies there arose the praiseworthy figure of the ambitious Athenian, who was now authorized to activate his individual prominence in order to serve the interests of the collective.

From antiquity to today, the social uses to which praise is put—to encourage, to flatter, to teach, to criticize with subtlety—are comparable to one another at every level, and at every level tact is required, tact that must be altered depending on the relative privacy or prominence of the interaction.⁶¹ Additionally, the means and motivations change according to who or what is being singled out, and by whom: an individual praising an individual prompts quite different tensions from those aroused by a hero receiving the thanks of a grateful city, or by a person lavishing praise upon a collective eager for validation. Through examining one particular variety of praise, that bestowed on individuals in the heyday of democratic rule at Athens, this dissertation aims to further the modern understanding of how the notionally equal citizens of that *polis* interacted with one another, managed their conflicts, and sought their own advantage alongside that of the community.

⁶¹ Praise is of course not unique to the Greco-Roman world; anthropologists have done much work on praise poetry traditions. As examples, for a summary of ethnographic work on modern African praise poetry, see Barber 2007 (cf. Thomas 2012); for North-West India, see Basu 2005. Hardison 1962 addresses praise in Renaissance literature and gives a succinct review of the history of praise theory from Plato through the sixteenth century (1962:24–42). For a comparative approach to praise poetry, see Stewart 2005. Ferguson 2012 discusses the nature of the recommendation letter, from Cicero to the present. Praise is of course not foreign to modern psychological investigation: see, e.g., Henderlong and Lepper 2002 (from the abstract, 2002:774: “Provided that praise is perceived as sincere, it is particularly beneficial to motivation when it encourages performance attributions to controllable causes, promotes autonomy, enhances competence without an overreliance on social comparisons, and conveys attainable standards and expectations”).

CHAPTER 1

Xenophon and the utility of praise

The extensive and varied writings of Xenophon provide a lens for examining the many facets of praise relevant to Greek life and culture during the decades after the deaths of Alcibiades and Critias. Xenophon's upbringing crucially coincided with the events of the Peloponnesian War; between his social status and the vagaries of his biography, he is a perhaps uniquely qualified observer of aristocratic Athenian mores, bringing to bear both an insider's perspective and an outsider's ability to draw comparisons.¹ Furthermore, his international high profile during the first half of the fourth century and his literary acumen mean that his influence on his own times cannot be ignored, particularly as a key figure in the development of several prose genres.

This chapter and the next will draw comparisons broadly across the Xenophontic corpus; in taking a synoptic view of this author's writings, they follow the valuable precedent set by Vivienne J. Gray (2011) and Vincent Azoulay (2004). In most cases, it has seemed preferable not to attempt to posit a relative chronology for Xenophon's works, as this is largely irrecoverable, with two important exceptions: the *Agesilaus*, written after its subject's death c.360 BCE, and the *Poroi*, probably composed in 355/4.²

¹ Cf. Kroeker 2009:200–1.

² On the date of the *Poroi* see recently Schorn 2012:695n.26. The *Poroi* will be discussed at greater length in the present chapter; the *Agesilaus*, in chapter two.

In the past, much scholarly energy has been devoted to addressing the nature and duration of Xenophon's exile from Athens and to the question of Xenophon's alleged Spartan sympathies.³ It will be argued here that Xenophon's writings, regardless of the time or location of their composition, reflect overall the Athenian cultural background of the author, as well as his interest in Athens' political improvement. The demonstrably late date of the *Poroi* does not indicate that only at the end of his life did Xenophon turn his thoughts toward Athens.⁴ Recent scholarship has done much to "rehabilitate" Xenophon as a proponent of democracy, or at least as a loyal adherent of the constitutional government of Athens: Ron Kroeker, for example, provides a helpful corrective to the usual view that Xenophon was hostile to Athenian democracy.⁵ Xenophon never loses sight of his native *polis*, and his beliefs regarding government within an Athenian context inform his experimental scenarios such as the *Hieron*.

Much of Xenophon's *oeuvre* aims at explicit or implicit moral didacticism, particularly in the realm of leadership, as both Gray and Azoulay have demonstrated. Time and again, for instance, Xenophon informs the audience of his belief that good

³ On Xenophon's biography see Delebecque 1957 (the classic work), Breitenbach's 1967 *RE* article on Xenophon, and Anderson 1974 (an introduction of the "life and letters" variety). Aside from the work of Leo Strauss (mentioned sporadically below, especially Strauss 2000 on the *Hieron*), within classical studies Higgins 1977 essentially began the strand of literary and political criticism of Xenophon in which this chapter is involved (cf. Tuplin 2004:13n.1).

⁴ Contrast Schorn 2012:691: "It will emerge that our understanding of the programme Xenophon presents in the *Poroi* is enhanced by viewing it as the author's attempt to transfer to the Athenian democracy the basic ideas of leadership which he first developed by studying relations between individuals and then applied to the context of monarchic rule."

⁵ See especially Kroeker 2009:198–9 (the usual view), 227–8 (the corrective). See likewise Gish 2012, who examines Xenophon's political leanings particularly with regard to *Hellenica* 1.7.1–35. Cf. Seager 2001 and Johnstone 2010. Cf. Badian 2004:33: "Xenophon ... regarded himself as, and indeed remained, a loyal Athenian, at least by his own lights"; see also Badian 2004:49–51, on Xenophon's constancy in refusing to place blame on Athens in the *Hellenica*, and contrast his treatment of Thebes, which he faults for bad leadership (Sterling 2004:458).

leadership consists in rewarding the obedient and punishing transgressors.⁶ This applies to civic life, military life, domestic life, and even how to treat your horses and hunting dogs.⁷ For Xenophon, finesse at leadership requires a mastery of praise in two ways: first, one must be able to inspire appropriate praise from others and accept it tactfully; second, one must be able to bestow praise in turn to impel others toward virtuous action without fomenting envy against the recipient. This latter aspect should be familiar, for example, to the educator: praising students excessively for their work comes with its own set of perils, while if one should fail to criticize with tact—that is, to temper blame with praise—one runs the risk of alienating those one attempts to help. Because he places such emphasis on leadership, Xenophon is perhaps also the foremost theorist on praise, beyond the realm of rhetoric alone, surviving from classical Greece. Xenophon’s literary and philosophical maneuvers are intricately linked to his political ideas, and it is no exaggeration to say that Xenophon places an overwhelming emphasis on the propriety of praise and on its role in the state.

Xenophon’s works can be divided—though, it must be admitted, not cleanly—into two categories: those that comment on or promote the use of praise toward political ends, and those texts that themselves also constitute an act of praise, such as the *Agésilas* and passages of the *Hellenica* and *Anabasis*. This latter category will receive fuller treatment in chapter two; for now, it is Xenophon’s shorter treatises that demand examination: these provide a wide array of comments, variously scattered or systematically presented, on how vital praise was to Xenophon’s theory of leadership

⁶ This notion forms the basis of Azoulay 2004, regarding Xenophon’s sense of the *χάρις*-relationship and its utility for leaders, who can recognize the good behavior of others by means of euergetic expenditures, honors, and attentions (2004:91). Cf. Schorn 2012:700 with n.50.

⁷ See Wood 1964 *passim* for Xenophon’s application of military-style leadership to civic life.

and, by extension, to political life in classical Greece and particularly in Athens. This examination will begin with Xenophon's dialogue *Hieron*, which dramatizes a conversation between Simonides and Hieron. It will then turn to Xenophon's *Poroi*, in which the speaker takes on the role of Simonides from the *Hieron*; after that, it will briefly contrast Xenophon's ideas to those found in Plato's *Laws*. The chapter will conclude with a treatment of other Xenophonic texts that relate his theories on praise, from the most abstract (*Education of Cyrus*) to the most practical (*Peri Hippikes*). Only a few treatises within this spectrum are explicitly set within an Athenian context (*Poroi*, *Hipparchicus*), but even the courts of Hieron and Cyrus were painted by Xenophon using a palette of specifically Athenian social and political mores. In short, Xenophon's concern with leadership, especially regarding the role of praise, was shared and molded by the culture from whose vantage point he viewed and critiqued institutions across the Greek world and beyond. He intended for his own inquiries to be relevant not just, as has often been assumed, to the international cadre of aristocrats and Laconophiles, but to the needs of his native Athenian democracy.

Hieron the Athenian tyrant

By its title alone, the dialogue that has come down under the name Ἱέρων ἢ Τυραννικός (*Hieron, or Dialogue on Tyranny*) may give one pause in considering the applicability of its content to fourth-century, Athenian, democratic values.⁸ Despite the dialogue's Sicilian setting and focus on tyranny, however, this dialogue is a manifesto for the value of praise to the Athenian state, mixing a description of practice with advice on

⁸ The *Hieron* has been favored by a series of critical editions and translations with at least some commentary: these include Luccioni 1948, Fernandez Galiano 1954, Tedeschi 1986, Waterfield and Cartledge 1997, Doty 2003a, and Gray 2007, of which the most extensive comments are to be found in Luccioni 1948 and Gray 2007. Tedeschi 1991 includes Erasmus' Latin translation of the dialogue (1530).

implementation. Crucial to the following reading of the *Hieron* are two elements of the text: the choice of setting and the dialogue's focus on the problem of genuine praise. This latter element can be further subdivided into Hieron's views on praise and those of Simonides; each will be handled in turn.

The setting of the dialogue

In the *Hieron*, two figures from the century before Xenophon discuss a topic that was likely to have been of real interest to the historical Hieron I of Syracuse, that of managing a tyranny, but which was mostly outside the lived experience of Xenophon of Athens and the vast majority of his potential audience.⁹ And yet despite this distance, the dialogue was no mere rhetorical exercise. Tyranny was a live issue: the Dionysii ruling at Syracuse in the first half of the fourth century will have been at the forefront of the audience's mind, and in Athens itself the law of Eucrates (337/6) serves as a reminder of the anxiety surrounding tyranny, especially in times of political uncertainty.¹⁰ For just one example the dialogue's contemporary relevance, it exhibits the essential problem of the license available to the courtier to speak the truth to tyrants such as the Dionysii, whose attested outrages some scholars have seen in Xenophon's choice of setting.¹¹ It does, however, not take one very far to consider the dialogue's Hieron a mere stand-in for

⁹ Pace Xenophon's temporary ambitions in the *Anabasis* (5.6.15).

¹⁰ Rhodes & Osborne 79 (= *IG II*³ 1.320).

¹¹ Cf., e.g., Diodorus 15.6.4–5; cf. also, the anecdotal tradition that emerged regarding Plato and the Sicilian despots (Riginos 1976:70–92); for democratic ideology in the *Seventh* and *Eighth Letters*, see Monoson 2000:145–53. Athenaeus (10.427F–428A) reports an anecdote regarding a cantankerous Xenophon himself visiting the court of Dionysius (cf. Luccioni 1948:11); Sordi 2004:71 makes this anecdote the basis of an article exploring Xenophon's historical relations with Sicily.

one of Xenophon's contemporaries.¹² In electing to use a tyrant from the past, Xenophon could be secure in the knowledge of that tyrant's later success and legacy. The traditional prominence of Simonides as advisor to tyrants may have prompted Xenophon to consider the list of tyrants with whom that figure associated.¹³ Hieron, as the single most powerful individual in the Greek world during his own reign, provided Xenophon with an *a fortiori* case for the risks and benefits of tyranny. Xenophon was also prone to seeking ethical models, such as Cyrus the Elder, from history and from the edges of the οἰκουμένη.¹⁴ Creating maximal distance from the here-and-now allowed the author not only to interpret and interpolate the historical circumstances as he saw fit, but also to maximize the applicability of his political and ethical messages: the audience is to apply the lessons learned from Hieron or Cyrus to their own lives.

Nonetheless, Hieron, unlike Cyrus, was Greek, and it is to the concerns of life in the *polis* that the *Hieron* continually responds. While Xenophon clearly intends his discussion of political life to be applicable in many times and places, it is even possible to see a specifically Athenian *polis* emerge from beneath the dialogue's relatively light Syracusan trappings. For instance, Hieron laments (4.5) that tyrant-slayers are honored with statues at public expense; from both Hieron's and Xenophon's perspectives, the most salient example would be the statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton set up in the

¹² Cf. Aalders 1953:214–15. Hatzfeld 1946/7:57 supplies a list of contemporary incidents that could have provided Xenophon with the basis for Hieron's litany of assassination threats (3.8). These incidents, particularly Xenophon's own account of Thessalian intrigues (*Hellenica* 6.4.33–7), are useful to consider, although mythological and Herodotean narratives also provide plenty of *comparanda*.

¹³ The Peisistratids were perhaps too politically charged in Athens, and Hipparchus himself came to a notoriously bad end through mismanaging relations with his citizens; on Hipparchus and Simonides, see *Hipparchus* 228B–C, as well as Aelian's particularly bald statement of Simonides' avarice at *Ποικίλη ἱστορία* 8.2; on the Peisistratids in Athens, cf. Strauss 2000:33, stated in perhaps stronger terms than necessary: Athens is not being avoided here, but rather just Hipparchus; cf. also Sandridge 2012:2.

¹⁴ Cf. Luccioni 1948:13–14.

Athenian Agora.¹⁵ Other aspects of the dialogue may also reflect conditions at Athens, or at least do not exclude that *polis*, most notably the dialogue's use of choral analogy (9.4) and reference to military division by tribes (9.5).¹⁶ The notorious episode of Alcibiades' Olympic victory may even lie behind how Simonides warns Hieron away from participating in this activity (11.5).¹⁷ Finally, Simonides, despite his association with the archaic tyrants, was also remembered by later Greeks as the great poet of the Persian Wars, and his appearance in the dialogue would perhaps have rung a patriotic note among fourth-century Athenians, always eager to leverage their association with the Persian Wars into symbolic capital.¹⁸

If Xenophon intended his treatise to be applicable to the contemporary Greek *polis* and even to radically democratic Athens, it remains to ask in what realms of human interaction he meant for Simonides' advice about the behavior of a tyrant to be employed.¹⁹ Xenophon's strategy is perhaps best illuminated through the opening passage of Aristotle's *Politics* (1252A), in which Aristotle seeks to distinguish his own political analysis from those who have claimed that the types of men he distinguishes as *ó*

¹⁵ Fernandez Galiano 1954:15n.1. These statues are discussed further in chapter four, below. Cf. *Hellenica* 6.4.32, 7.3.9–10.

¹⁶ Fernandez Galiano's notes to his translation of the dialogue perhaps go too far in referring everything to Athenian practice (1954:25n.3, 25.n4, 26n.1, but perhaps especially 25n.2, regarding the χορηγία: "Un *lapsus* de Jenofonte: Simónides no es ateniense, y los hechos descritos se refieren esencialmente a Atenas"); for a less extreme comparison, see Gray 2007:138, but cf. also Luccioni 1948:96 and Tedeschi 1991:96n.42. Luccioni refers the πανηγύρεις of 1.11 (1948:76) and adultery laws of 3.3–4 (1948:84) to Athenian practice as well.

¹⁷ See also chapter two, on Xenophon's *Agesilaus* (especially *Agesilaus* 9.7).

¹⁸ In addition to his connection to the Peisistratids at Athens, Simonides is also linked in the anecdotal tradition to Themistocles (see sources and discussion at Bell 1978:41–2). For Simonides' universal popularity, see Hatzfeld 1946/7:61. As at *Second Letter* 311A, Simonides was also linked to Pausanias of Sparta; for Simonides' presence at Sparta, see Bell 1978:39n.28. See further chapter four on Lycurgus' speech *Against Leocrates* (especially 1.109, regarding Simonides).

¹⁹ Gelenczey-Mihálczy 2000:115, citing Strauss indirectly (perhaps with reference to Strauss 2000:33, 64, or 69), denies relevance to Athens; contrast below, regarding the *Poroi*.

βασιλικός (the monarch), ὁ πολιτικός (the statesman), ὁ οἰκονομικός (the estate-manager), and ὁ δεσποτικός (the head of a family) all require the same skills for exercising leadership in their respective arenas. When Aristotle asserts that these roles differ in kind as well as in scale—the skills needed to run one family do not suffice for the running of a state consisting of many families—he aims his criticism at the Socratics: Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus* might be taken as the exemplar of the dialogues that express affinity among these various fields of endeavor.²⁰ The *Hieron*, too, exhibits this blurring of boundaries: Hieron’s essential desire is to be genuinely loved, whether it be in his personal erotic relationships or by all his citizens. Xenophon submits this dialogue for the consideration of anyone, tyrant or not, concerned with the problem of self-interest in the leader/follower dynamic. Any individual Athenian citizen interested in the art of government, even one without aspirations to the generalship or to being a respected ῥήτωρ, could have applied the ideas of the dialogue to his role within the household, to his place within his circle of friends, or to the role of the δῆμος itself in its internal or foreign affairs.

Hieron’s speech: the problems of praise

The interlocutors’ remarks on tyranny, and by extension on the role of praise in society, come in two stages. The first of the two main sections of the dialogue (1.1–7.13) is taken up by Hieron’s diatribe, occasionally interrupted by Simonides; in the second (8.1–11.15), despite brief interjections by Hieron, Simonides is the main speaker.²¹ This

²⁰ See especially *Oeconomicus* 21.9–10; cf. *Education of Cyrus* 1.1.1–2. See also Squilloni 1990:106 on the differences between Xenophon and Plato in defining ὁ τυραννικός, and Brock 2004:247–51 on Xenophon’s use of household management as a metaphor for autocratic rule.

²¹ Many other readers identify this division (e.g., Luccioni 1948:6, Gray 2007:35, 135, Gray 2011:34).

structure allows Xenophon to separate a discussion of the benefits and problems associated with tyranny in the first section from Simonides' prescriptions in the second for improving both the tyrant's lot and the state. For both Hieron's complaints and Simonides' solutions, praise is of the utmost importance.

At the outset, Simonides establishes that non-tyrants live their lives variously pleased and aggrieved by input from the various senses (1.4–6), and Hieron rejoins that the same is true for tyrants (1.7). The poet plays the εἶρων, feigning shock: how could tyrants be worse off than private citizens, if so many apparently well-off people desire to become tyrants themselves (1.9)? Hieron begins his response with the sense of vision, and in particular with the joys of foreign sightseeing (ἄξιοθέατα).²² Whereas private citizens can travel to see whatever *poleis* they wish and to communal festivals (πανηγύρεις), tyrants are bound to their own states (1.11–12).²³ To be cut off from festivals in particular is to be cut off from a venue for the giving and receiving of praise.²⁴ Of course, Xenophon will have known the epinician odes for tyrants, Hieron among them, who were more than content to send athletes to the games to compete by proxy, and he will also have seen dedications made by these tyrants in international sanctuaries such as Delphi. These forms of commemoration had far more reputational currency than could have been acquired through mere attendance. In the context of the dialogue, however, Hieron's desire to see and be seen in public makes a certain amount of sense:

²² Monoson 2000:235–6 argues that intellectually-motivated θεωρία was a particularly Athenian phenomenon, at least as it is represented in Plato.

²³ Hieron's emphasis here is less on the sights themselves than on freedom of travel (Gray 2007:110).

²⁴ The remains of epinician literature, as well as the material culture associated with athletic victory, demonstrate the ability of the πανήγυρις to provide opportunities for fame; in the fourth century, the games hosted oratorical displays, which could include ἔπαινος of individual states, as attested by Isocrates' (fictive) *Panegyricus*.

despite his greater capacity for broadcasting his name, he reaps the benefits of these events only gradually and from a distance. Moreover, the rare spectacles that reach the tyrant's city—historically another mode of local self-aggrandizement, as in the case of Aeschylus' *Women of Aetna*—are, according to Hieron, not worth the price asked by those who put on the show (οἱ ἐπιδεικνύμενοι, 1.13), who charge the tyrant far more than what they otherwise would. This remark is the first intimation of the dialogue's central problem: the tyrant cannot trust others to give him genuine affection, a problem closely related to his difficulty in attaining the instruments of praise.

The tyrant's paucity of accessible, genuine praise emerges plainly from the discussion of hearing. To Hieron's contentions about spectacle, Simonides replies as follows (1.14):

ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν τοῖς θεάμασι μειονεκτεῖτε, διά γέ τοι τῆς ἀκοῆς πλεονεκτεῖτε. ἐπεὶ τοῦ μὲν ἡδίστου ἀκροάματος, ἐπαίνου, οὔποτε σπανίζετε· πάντες γὰρ οἱ παρόντες ὑμῖν πάντα καὶ ὅσα ἂν λέγητε καὶ ὅσα ἂν ποιῇτε ἐπαινοῦσι. τοῦ δ' αὖ χαλεπωτάτου ἀκροάματος, λοιδορίας, ἀνήκοί ἐστε· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐθέλει τυράννου κατ' ὀφθαλμοὺς κατηγορεῖν.

But if you tyrants are worse off in terms of visual sensations, you are better off at any rate in hearing, since you never are lacking for the most pleasant sound, praise, for every person in your presence praises everything you say and everything you do. And in turn you are deaf to the harshest sound, reproach, for no one wants to speak against a tyrant to his face.

Simonides, as an expert in praise and in particular an expert in praising the powerful, can be assumed to know that he is saying something problematically naïve here. Simonides' ironic presentation of the private citizen's understanding of praise occasions the following exchange, in which Hieron brings up the objection that there is no point in this sort of fettered praise. It cannot constitute reliable advice, let alone criticism, except insofar as its absence signifies malice (1.15–16):

καὶ ὁ Ἱέρων εἶπε· καὶ τί οἶει, ἔφη, τοὺς μὴ λέγοντας κακῶς εὐφραίνειν, ὅταν εἰδῇ τις σαφῶς ὅτι οἱ σιωπῶντες οὗτοι πάντες κακὰ νοοῦσι τῷ τυράννῳ; ἢ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας τί δοκεῖς εὐφραίνειν, ὅταν ὑποπτοὶ ᾧσιν ἔνεκα τοῦ κολακεύειν τοὺς ἐπαίνους ποιεῖσθαι; καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης εἶπεν· τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία ἔγωγέ σοι, Ἱέρων, πάνυ συγχωρῶ, τοὺς ἐπαίνους παρὰ τῶν ἐλευθερωτάτων ἡδίστους εἶναι, ἀλλ' ...

HIERON: How do you suppose that it provides any pleasure to listen to speakers who say nothing bad about you, when it is obvious to anyone that every single one of those who are silent bears a grudge against the tyrant? Or how do you think it pleasurable to hear people praise you, when they make you suspect that they do it for the purpose of flattery?

SIMONIDES: Yes, by Zeus, on *this* point I for one very much agree with you, Hieron, that praise is most pleasurable from those who are most free, but ...

Hieron connects the problem of genuine praise to the already developing theme of the tyrant's lack of genuine affection, but immediately, with an impressive pile-up of mollifying particles, Simonides effects a transition to the next topic, food and drink. One might ask why Simonides chooses to move the debate along so abruptly. It may be that he wishes to address this topic at greater length later and does not want Hieron to exhaust its potential; at any rate he closes the discussion of auditory sensation with a barb to which Hieron is not given time to respond, in saying that "praise is most pleasurable from those who are most free."

The dialogue continues through the remaining senses and bodily pleasures, concluding with Hieron's complaint, stated fully for the first time, that not only can the tyrant never be sure that he is receiving genuine affection, but indeed he is most likely to be struck down by those who feign it best (1.37–8). After many paragraphs of complaints, Simonides steps in to relieve Hieron by giving the discussion a sharper focus (7.1): he states that honor (τιμή) is the source of so many troubles, because of the lengths to which people will go to acquire it. Tyrants, in fact, bring all of their woes upon

themselves, because their desire for honor induces them to claim their office (7.2). Hieron has previously gone to some trouble to refute the notion that tyrants receive any benefits, down to lamenting that tyrants are denied the chance to exercise φιλοτιμία in arranging beneficial marriages for themselves (1.27). Here Simonides reasserts the visual and auditory aspects of public honor—everyone looks to the tyrant, everyone honors (γεραίρωσι) him with words and deeds (7.2)—that have already been denied, in order to set the stage for his later redirection of Hieron’s focus away from the honor received by himself and toward the honors he can bestow on others. The poet’s quasi-anthropological doctrine is worth quoting at length (7.3–4):²⁵

καὶ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Ἱέρων, τούτῳ διαφέρειν ἀνὴρ τῶν ἄλλων ζῶων, τῷ τιμῆς ὀρέγεσθαι. ἐπεὶ σιτίοις γε καὶ ποτοῖς καὶ ὕπνοις καὶ ἀφροδισίοις πάντα ὁμοίως ἡδεσθαι ἔοικε τὰ ζῶια· ἡ δὲ φιλοτιμία οὐτ’ ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις ἐμφύεται οὐτ’ ἐν ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις· οἷς δ’ ἂν ἐμφύῃ τιμῆς τε καὶ ἐπαίνου ἔρως, οὗτοί εἰσιν ἡδὲ οἱ πλεῖστον μὲν τῶν βοσκημάτων διαφέροντες, ἄνδρες δὲ καὶ οὐκέτι ἄνθρωποι μόνον νομιζόμενοι. ὥστε ἐμοὶ μὲν εἰκότως δοκεῖτε ταῦτα πάντα ὑπομένειν ἃ φέρετε ἐν τῇ τυραννίδι, ἐπεὶ περ τιμᾶσθε διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων. καὶ γὰρ οὐδεμία ἀνθρωπίνη ἡδονὴ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγγυτέρω δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ ἡ περὶ τὰς τιμὰς εὐφροσύνη.

For I believe, Hieron, that a man differs from the rest of the animals in this respect, that he strives for honor. After all, it seems that every animal is equally gratified by food and drink and sleep and sex, but the love of honor crops up neither in the unreasoning animals nor in all humans. But whichever have within themselves a passion for honor and praise, these are actually the ones who most differ from cattle and who are considered to be *men*, and no longer merely *humans*. Therefore, the way I see it, in all likelihood you tyrants endure everything you suffer in tyranny because you are honored distinctively compared with the rest of humanity. For indeed there seems to be no human pleasure nearer to the divine than the joy one feels from receiving honors.

²⁵ Generally, see Seager 2001:393. Regarding the restrictive word ἀνὴρ at 7.3, as Simonides says momentarily, he is not speaking of humanity generally, but rather of what one might call “real men,” a designation that could skew toward covering “true gentlemen” in an aristocratic sense, though Xenophon prefers the more usual καλὸς κἀγαθός for this (cf., e.g., *Oeconomicus* 6.12). See further on the *Evagoras* (9.8), chapter three below.

Here Xenophon, via Simonides, not only assigns a place of prominence to honor within human society, but passes a judgment of value upon those who pursue it: those who practice φιλοτιμία are true men, and not cattle. Of course Simonides has an occupational interest in placing so great a value on praise and honor, but his self-interest, as will be seen, does not invalidate the sincerity of his statements or the likelihood that they reflect Xenophon's own political thoughts.²⁶

Hieron has from the outset dwelt on his own welfare exclusively, and it remains for Simonides to guide him toward that of his subjects. Perhaps paradoxically, the most desperate section of Hieron's rant does some of the work for the poet.²⁷ He complains initially that the honors described by Simonides are just as insubstantial as the tyrant's supposed sexual advantages, against which he has already provided evidence (7.5–6, cf. 1.32–8.). Honors (τιμαί), according to Hieron, are not properly honors if the bestower is coerced by force or fear: no one is so hypocritical as to genuinely honor those who injure them (τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας) or whom they hate (7.7–8). Rather, Hieron claims that a man receives genuine praise when he both has enough money to benefit people (εὐεργετεῖν) and in fact spends it on them, at which point they praise him vocally and in their actions, ceding their seats to him and yielding to him in the road “through love and not through fear” (φιλοῦντές τε καὶ μὴ φοβούμενοι); they crown him for his community spirit and benefaction (στεφανῶσι κοινῇς ἀρετῆς καὶ εὐεργεσίας ἔνεκα) and desire that he be given gifts (7.9).²⁸ He underscores his point rhetorically through repetition: these people truly

²⁶ See also the general remarks of Azoulay 2004:99–107.

²⁷ Compare also Herodotus 3.80 (see Gray 2011:167); cf. Sevieri 2004:282, on the tyrant's “arbitrary favour and disfavour.”

²⁸ The crowning phrase resembles honorary decree formulae, for which see chapter four.

honor (ἀληθῶς) him; this man is honored in actuality (τῷ ὄντι); Hieron considers such a one blessed (μακαρίζω). He goes to such lengths to split off the tyrant's lot from that of the public euergete (7.10) that one cannot help thinking that Hieron desires to become this sort of person, and Simonides indeed makes this suggestion, that Hieron should put down the tyranny in favor of being a leading citizen (7.11). According to the distraught tyrant, however, this is an impossibility (7.12–13): Hieron can see no route to genuine praise, nor even to any end but an inglorious death.

Simonides' speech: the exploitation of praise

At this point the dialogue shifts direction: Simonides will now attempt to instruct Hieron as to how he can be both tyrant and euergete, receiving the benefits of each position without suffering the fallout of either giving up or holding onto the tyranny. Gray (2011:34–5) characterizes the *Hieron* as recommending “willing obedience” as the key to the happiness of the ruler, aptly citing the *Oeconomicus* (21.12). While willing obedience is indeed the product of Simonides' reforms, it is not a course of action: Simonides' precise recommendation revolves around euergetism and praise. His workload is reduced by Hieron's having previously defined the true euergete. By their agreement and by the absence of intimations to the contrary, his definition can be taken as normative for Greek society: genuine praise goes to those who sacrifice their own resources in the service of others, with the understood proposition that genuine praise is desirable. Simonides begins by rebuking Hieron for believing that his tyranny—which Simonides rephrases as τὸ ἄρχειν—stands in the way of his being loved; indeed, he can show that the leader is better off even than the private person (καὶ πλεονεκτεῖ γὰρ τῆς ἰδιωτείας, 8.1). Just as Hieron's complaints heavily featured iniquity of praise, Simonides

will seek to solve his problems through it. In short, Hieron's aims can be accomplished by a nexus of praise and emulation: the leader acts as a *euergete*—who should receive society's praise—through modeling how that praise should be bestowed on others.

The poet first demonstrates the capabilities of the leader relative to those of the private man in terms of bestowing favors: even if the benefaction is objectively equal, the pleasure taken in it by the recipient should be greater by virtue of the charisma of the ruler. To prove this, Simonides compares the effects of friendly greetings from leader and private individual as the first and most basic in a list of the *minima* (τῶν μικροτάτων παραδειγμάτων) of human interaction (8.3–4). Crucially, his second example is the joy (εὐφροσύνη) created by the bestowing of praise, underscored by its prominent position in the list: again it can be taken as normative that praise is both important to Greek society and a good thing, in so far as it produces joy. In turn, the leader, capable of bestowing the most valuable praise, also receives the most honor from both gods and mortals.

Simonides accomplishes his aim by removing the focus from Hieron's personal pleasures and canalizing his ambitions toward the pleasure that he can inspire in others. Indeed, the effect of tyranny is in heightening the contrast: Hieron's negative characteristics fade away, and the bright points of his character appear brighter (λαμπρότερα). The light metaphor is an important one for indicating aristocratic prowess in the public arena, and with this statement Simonides negates Hieron's earlier assertion that only non-tyrannical *poleis* can achieve a bright reputation (δόξαν λαμπράν, 2.15).²⁹ Having suggested that merely by virtue of being a ruler Hieron can accomplish more than a private citizen,

²⁹ See Wilson 2000:139–40. Many of Hieron's concerns find parallels in Alcibiades' speech in Thucydides (especially 6.16.2–3). In using λαμπρός, Simonides keeps the discussion centered around Hieron's reputation, rather than his internal feelings; see also *Symposium* 8.43.

Simonides closes this part of the argument with a rhetorical question: because the ruler's resources also vastly exceed those of anyone else, how could the ruler not be more beloved (8.7)?

To offset the hatred stereotypically leveled at the tyrant, Simonides argues that is the task of the leader “to teach (διδάσκειν) what things are best and to praise (ἐπαινεῖν) and honor (τιμᾶν) the one who accomplishes these things in the finest fashion” (9.2).³⁰ The ideas expounded by Simonides here are crucial to Xenophon's program, as each new statement builds on a central thesis: the good leader encourages emulation of virtue through a combination of modeling the behavior, explaining it, and officially recognizing it in others.³¹ While it is at times necessary to punish a citizen who has acted against the interests of the state, the leader should deputize others to carry out the punishment, while reserving the right to bestow prizes (τὰ ἄθλα) personally (9.3). This central tenet of Simonides' advice—that one should bestow rewards personally but should punish, when appropriate, only by proxy—is underscored, as often in Xenophon, by a choral metaphor (9.4): the head of state (ὁ ἄρχων) hands out the prizes to competing choruses, but it is in the hands of the χορηγοί and their associates to bring the individual dancers into line. The fact that the state is divided many times over into smaller units (9.5) brings with it two important corollaries: first, the proxies required for separating the ruler from the enforcement of penalties are already to be found in the leaders of the various units; second—and here again Simonides effects a subtle shift of focus away from the problems of the tyrant to the management of a more perfect state—these units can be made to

³⁰ Azoulay 2004:91 uses Simonides' observations (9.1–4) as the starting-point for his second chapter.

³¹ For the role of the leader as educator, cf. *Education of Cyrus* 1.3.18: the young Cyrus coyly notes how even tyrants have educative potential for their citizens. See further below, chapter three, especially regarding Isocrates' *Nicoles*.

compete with one another for prizes similar to those given out in choral contests, engaging in a sort of Hesiodic, productive strife (φιλονικία, 9.6).³² Simonides urges Hieron to consider the motivating force of honor in giving people the drive to succeed, particularly in farming, an occupation for which, according the Simonides, prizes are not often awarded (9.7). He ends this appeal by making a concession to Hieron's hypothetical objection, that these prizes would be too expensive: rather, just as athletes compete for cheap prizes (e.g., a vegetal wreath), so too would these—along with verbal praise from the ruler himself—suffice for rewarding other human endeavors (9.11).

The most impressive aspect of this sequence of thought is the subtlety with which Simonides, making good use of the choral metaphor, redirects the focus of praise. Hieron had been worried about how the tyrant could receive genuine praise; Simonides, in turn, virtually ignores that problem, replacing it instead with the suggestion that the good ruler should become the source of praise, rather than its target. After Simonides proposes that the ruler mitigate negative opinion by punishing through proxies, the emotional wellbeing of the tyrant is forgotten, to be transmuted into the wellbeing of the state and its citizens, guided by the wise ruler. The problems of tyranny, much like the discussion of them, would evaporate in a state founded on praise and a healthy drive toward competition. It is all too appropriate that an epinician poet propose this theory, which turns out to be Simonides' most developed and central point of advice.³³ The poet has managed to steer

³² Gelenczey-Mihálc 2000:118–21 sees φιλονικία as key to Xenophon's economic thought, perhaps rightly, but takes the notion to libertarian extremes far removed from recognizing the needs of the tyrant as Xenophon does.

³³ Cf. Sevieri 2004:284: "[Hieron must] take upon himself the function, once performed by the community at large, of dispensing praise and blame, rewards and punishments, and in so doing prove himself the real touchstone upon which to measure the value of things and human beings." Sevieri establishes firmly that the *Hieron* transfers into prose the themes of epinician poetry, though it should be noted that one is largely at the mercy of Pindaric evidence for these themes; Xenophon's choice of Simonides, rather than Pindar, as

the conversation from the most abstract terms—“how the lifestyles of private man and tyrant differ in respect to human joys and sorrows” (1.2)—to a discussion of the lofty but practicable steps toward improving Hieron’s Syracuse, and it would seem that this was his goal all along. Indeed, an epinician poet should be able to turn his advice from an abstract formulation, such as a myth, to something more specific, encouraging a victor to emulate or shun the paradigm. While the form of the *Hieron* is dialectic rather than lyric, lyric-derived expectations for the relationship between poet and patron do not lead one astray, proving the importance of the figures of the interlocutors to the construction of the dialogue.

In a quick flourish, Simonides notes how Hieron could improve the architectural, military, and economic landscapes of the city (11.2–4), but he then dilates on a topic that the audience may have been expecting to crop up all along: Hieron’s participation in international athletic competitions. This subject has come near the surface previously—with the equine metaphors (6.15–16, 10.2), which in any event are persistent throughout Xenophon’s corpus, and with Hieron’s vague statements about festivals at the outset of the dialogue (1.11–12)—but the topic of the tyrant’s famous victories has not yet been raised in earnest.³⁴ Simonides, however, subverts epinician expectations on this point: even if the keeping of chariot-horses is “what is considered to be the finest and most magnificent pursuit,” he advises Hieron not to participate in the sport directly, but to set up his state in such a way that many of his private citizens are wealthy enough to enter

interlocutor should therefore give one pause. Sevieri 2004:277 ascribes this choice to Simonides’ reputation as the first epinician poet, but it is worthwhile to consider the anecdotal tradition binding Simonides to Hieron (see Bell 1978 *passim* and Lefkowitz 2012:55–60).

³⁴ Regarding horses, the *Oeconomicus*, for instance, contains a massive array of equine analogies (3.10, 7.9, 10.7, 11.4–5, 11.20, 12.20, 13.7, 20.13). Cf. the role played by the incipient Persian cavalry in the *Education of Cyrus* (on which see Johnson 2005).

their own chariots (11.5).³⁵ The risks of competing under his own name are too great: if he wins, it inspires envious comments that he is draining the state to finance his team; if he loses, he becomes a laughingstock (11.6).³⁶ The true “finest and most magnificent” competition is that among the rulers of different states, in making their *poleis* prosperous (11.7): Hieron can only accomplish this by enriching his city and its citizens, and not by glorifying himself, which will occur instead as the natural result of his good policy. In fact, Hieron will not have to hire a herald—or an epinician poet—to announce his victory, because “all of humanity would sing the praises of your virtue” (πάντες ἄνθρωποι ὕμνοϊεν ἄν τὴν σὴν ἀρετὴν, 11.8).³⁷ Simonides emphasizes this point through the well-chosen example of chariot-racing, encapsulating in it, through its resonances with the dynamic of epinician poet and patron, the drastic changes necessary to Hieron’s regime and to his concept of himself not as the one to be praised in the first instance, but as the one to allow others to be praised and thereby gain his subjects’ genuine affection.

The remainder of the speech spins out, in a series of antitheses and anaphorae, the ramifications of Simonides’ policy. Key concepts from earlier in the dialogue appear again: for example, Hieron will be conspicuous (περίβλεπτος, 11.9), which refers back to

³⁵ Simonides calls the sport τὸ ... πάντων κάλλιστον καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατον νομιζόμενον εἶναι ἐπιτήδευμα. The collocation of κάλλιστον and μεγαλοπρεπέστατον is a favorite of Xenophon’s for describing aristocratic competition, and particularly for describing the competitions that “really matter” as opposed to more frivolous pursuits like athletics (*Agesilaus* 9.7, *Memorabilia* 1.2.64; cf. *Epinomis* 982E). Cf. also the earliest example of this collocation, at Aristophanes, *Birds* 1125: while the adjectives there refer to the birds’ fortification wall, the speaker describes the wall with a metaphor from chariot-racing.

³⁶ It has been suggested that the events related by Diodorus Siculus regarding the failings of Dionysius the Elder (14.109.2) are relevant here (Sordi 1980:8, Tedeschi 1991:97n.50, Doty 2003a:4).

³⁷ Hunter 1996:99 intimates that this statement is born of Simonides’ legendary greed. In fact, rather than finding here a suggestion that the speaker will be commissioned to write the hymn, one might instead see a statement of hyperbole: the services of the great Simonides will not be necessary to make Hieron’s name resound across the world. The characterization of praise as automatic in the event of great deeds does, however, spring directly from the epinician tradition.

his obsession with the visual aspects of reputation, addressed also by his subjects' longing to see him when they are apart (11.11). No one will want to murder him if he dares to travel abroad (11.10, cf. 1.12), but he should not have to travel, because his majesty will inspire continual local πανηγύρεις of real quality, at which performers will wish to put on displays (ἐπιδεικνύναι) of "something clever or fine or noble" (τι σοφὸν ἢ καλὸν ἢ ἀγαθόν, 11.10, cf. 1.13). The successful ruler, as the result of good government, has these instruments of praise delivered up to him almost automatically, because his citizens willingly provide them and serve him. The overall result exceeds the φιλία demanded by Hieron and enters the realm of ἔρωσ directed at him by his subjects (11.11), far surpassing Hieron's own expectations for praise (cf. ἀγαπῶιο, 11.9). The dialogue ends with Simonides' final summary of this course of action (11.14–15):

... καὶ τούτους πάντας πειρῶ νικᾶν εὖ ποιῶν. ἐὰν γὰρ τοὺς φίλους κρατῆις εὖ ποιῶν, οὐ μὴ σοι δύνωνται ἀντέχειν οἱ πολέμιοι. κἂν ταῦτα πάντα ποιῇς, εὖ ἴσθι, πάντων τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις κάλλιστον καὶ μακαριώτατον κτῆμα κεκτήσῃ· εὐδαιμονῶν γὰρ οὐ φθονηθήσῃ.

Try to surpass all of them in working for their good. For if you conquer your friends in working for their good, your enemies will absolutely not be capable of resisting you. And if you keep doing all these things, know well that you will have acquired the finest and most blessed of all human possessions: for in your prosperity you will not be burdened by envy.

According to the course of action offered by Simonides and likely endorsed by Xenophon, Hieron is to win the genuine praise he desires by enabling others to win praise for themselves.³⁸ The able leader controls the means and venues for the delivery of praise

³⁸ Strauss 2000:83–5 contorts logic in order to deprive Simonides' statement of its logical connection with the preceding advice on government and to make Simonides imply that Hieron can never attain this happiness. Scholars who do not see Xenophon in agreement with his Simonides (see Meier 2005:167 with 131n.3, and cf. Schorn 2008) posit that a true philosopher regnant would not need to pursue self-satisfaction to the extent Simonides allows for Hieron (Meier 2005:176). Concerning the potential effectiveness of this advice, it should not be forgotten that Simonides is recommending governmental policy rather than listing off platitudes; Strauss 2000:93 aptly contrasts *To Nicocles* in this respect.

and punishment in order to motivate his subordinates to compete with one another and thereby stabilize and increase the prosperity of the leader, the individual citizens, and the *polis*.³⁹ Despite the Syracusan setting, no course of action could be better calculated to fit the agonistic character of Xenophon's Athens.

Permeating Simonides' speech is the notion that praise and its proper apportionment are vital to governing, and Simonides paved the way for this conclusion as early as his initially ironic claim that praise is the greatest of sounds (1.14). Here lies the chief difference between the *Hieron* and what one could imagine Socrates saying to the tyrant. According to Leo Strauss, "the difference between Socrates and Simonides seems then to be that Socrates is not at all concerned with being admired or praised by others, whereas Simonides is concerned exclusively with it."⁴⁰ Strauss goes on to dismiss this difference as inconsequential, continuing to align the message of the *Hieron* with that of a generic Socratic text on the nature of virtue. On the contrary, the dialogue is a reflection on not only the morality but also the practice of leadership: Simonides, poet of praise, establishes a theory of praise and then details how it could be implemented. That Hieron was an extraordinary figure, uniquely powerful within the Greek world, provided Xenophon with an ideal hyperbole: the conclusions reached by the dialogue should not be applied only by tyrants of Hieron's caliber—an audience all too limited—but by any leader on whatever scale, whether legally appointed, like the Spartan kings and Athenian generals, or of constitutionally vague office, as that held by Hieron or the Athenian demagogues. There is no implication that tyranny, or even monarchy, is the ideal form of

³⁹ Cf. Sevieri 2004:285 and Gray 2004:173.

⁴⁰ Strauss 2000:102; cf. Gera 1993:45, Schorn 2012:704.

government, despite the choice of Hieron as interlocutor. Indeed, rather than positing that the Sicilian tyrants of the fourth century lie behind Xenophon's choice of Hieron, one should instead look to the extraordinary figures of the Athens of the author's lifetime: there is much in the pre-reform portrait of Hieron to suggest the likes of an Alcibiades.⁴¹ The Athenian democracy had much to learn from Xenophon's attempts to improve it, both in terms of how it behaved corporately toward other states and how its individual politicians exercised leadership over citizens and non-citizens alike. Xenophon, like his Simonides, diagnosed the maladies afflicting the Athenian state and the Greek world at large, and with the *Hieron* he supplied instructions both philosophically derived and pragmatic for curing them.

Xenophon's speech: public euergetism in the Poroi

Immediately before Simonides' peroration, Hieron had recapitulated his concern about the hatred he incurs through using mercenaries (8.9–10). Here there may lie a shade of Xenophon's defense of his own actions, fighting not on behalf of his native *polis* but in the retinues of Cyrus and Agesilaus. Xenophon advised these figures, as Simonides did, and would go on, in his own fashion, to sing their praises. While slight, this point of contact could suggest that Xenophon stands behind the advice he puts into the mouth of Simonides, and it is worth considering how other works of Xenophon support the agreement of philosopher and poet. Nowhere is their harmony more clear than in Xenophon's treatise on Athenian public finances, known as the *Poroi* (355/4). That the views presented in the two works coincide has not gone unnoticed, but this point has

⁴¹ Meier 2005:175–6 suggests that the dialogue was composed with potential successors of Critias and Alcibiades in mind, but Xenophon's intent may run much deeper: see the famous description of Alcibiades in Thucydides 6.15 for the seeds of Hieron's character. Smith 2009 reads Thucydides 6.16 as itself drawing on the epinician tradition for Hieron.

usually been made to inform arguments about the authorship and relative dating of the two works, rather than to examine the program of Xenophon's political thought.⁴²

While it would exceed the scope of this chapter to analyze properly the economic and political arguments advanced by Xenophon in the *Poroi*, or their feasibility, let it suffice to say that this speech puts forward various ways in which the Athenians could capitalize on their relationships with marginalized groups over whom the citizens could be seen as ruling: metics, slaves, traders, and allied cities.⁴³ The speech shares with that of the *Hieron*'s Simonides an emphasis on the mutual benefit of ruler and ruled, except that the tyrannical individual has been replaced by a Thucydidean tyrannical *polis* and the subject citizens replaced by groups that do not possess citizen status.⁴⁴ Additionally, despite the *Hieron*'s more expressly artful genre, both works present specific solutions rather than theorizing: the *Poroi* is not a description of economics generally nor even of the Athenian economy, but rather a list of proposals aimed at particular ends.⁴⁵

⁴² See Hatzfeld 1946/7:59, Luccioni 1948:32, Aalders 1953:208–9, Doty 2003a:5 and 8–9, and Jansen 2007:31–2. Frolov 1969:124 (the English résumé of Frolov's article; *cetera non legi*) compares the two works in support of the notion that Xenophon was interested in bringing about "an ideal monarchy." Leppin 2010:88, in the course of discussing the *Hieron*'s intellectual context, suggests that Simonides' ethical ideas are generally comparable to those in the *Poroi*. Schorn 2012:702 compares how Simonides and Xenophon (the *Poroi* speaker) present their arguments; furthermore, both end with a promise of εὐδαιμονία (Schorn 2012:716: *Hieron* 11.15, *Poroi* 6.1). For further comparisons not treated below, see Gauthier 1976:54, 203.

⁴³ Doty 2003b:5–15 provides an overview of scholarship on the economic arguments; for the valorization of trade in *Poroi*, see Gelenczey-Mihálcz 2000:118. Regarding the genre of the *Poroi*, careful rhetorical crafting and especially the signposting of new arguments mark the work as a specimen of oratory, regardless of whether Xenophon delivered it or had it circulated. It is thus here called a "speech." Such signposting is prominent in the *Agésilas* and *Evagoras*, the encomia discussed in chapters two and three.

⁴⁴ Schütrumpf 1982:15–20 (summarized by Gauthier 2010:116–17) suggests that Xenophon's proposals are meant to suppress the civic participation of the poor. If this assertion is valid, there may be another dyad of tyrant and subject in the subjection of the poor to the dominating aristocrats.

⁴⁵ Cf. Doty 2003b:15, comparing the *Poroi* to the work of Keynes.

The similarities do not end there. Xenophon places great emphasis upon the use of praise, honors, and rewards in solving Athens' economic woes: he hopes to encourage, as does Simonides, a state where the natural Athenian characteristic of φιλοτιμία is fruitfully employed and the city's agonistic tendencies are transmuted from breeding internecine strife to nurturing the greater good.⁴⁶ At the opening of the speech, Xenophon claims that he has often observed a substantial overlap between the character of a state and the character of its leaders (ὅποιοί τινες ἂν οἱ προστάται ᾧσι, τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι, 1.1).⁴⁷ Within its immediate context, this *sententia* chides politicians who have blamed their mistreatment of the allies on the neediness of the Athenian poor; taken as a programmatic statement, however, it colors the entire work, highlighting how the agonistic qualities of the Athenians—and particularly of the leading aristocrats—can inform public policy and infuse the state with healthy, Hesiodic competition.

After the brief introduction, Xenophon launches into an encomium of Attica's physical characteristics and economic potential (1.3–8). Other scholars have compared Xenophon's encomium to other praises of Athens, notably Pericles' funeral oration in Thucydides, and found a distinct lack of emphasis on military superiority.⁴⁸ Xenophon's ideal Athens is powerful because of its natural resources and access to goods from throughout the οἰκουμένη, for which international peace is requisite.⁴⁹ In praising Athens

⁴⁶ See Seager 2001:392–4 for Xenophon's belief that the Athenians possessed the most φιλοτιμία of all nations and for the problems he acknowledges that excessively individualistic φιλοτιμία can bring.

⁴⁷ Gauthier 1976:35 compares *Education of Cyrus* 8.8.5 and Isocrates 8.53 for the sentiment.

⁴⁸ Dillery 1993:3, Jansen 2012:732–3.

⁴⁹ Schorn 2012:712–16.

here, Xenophon models how the Athenians should go about praising others: the opening of the speech performs what the bulk of its content recommends.⁵⁰

In the body of the speech, Xenophon gives proposals for how the state should praise metics, merchants, and foreign dignitaries. To those in the first category, metics, Xenophon is keen to provide opportunities for earning praise.⁵¹ He asserts the point also made by Simonides (*Hieron* 7.3–4): that the right sort of men possess innate φιλοτιμία.⁵² Generally, he proposes “to remove the regulations, unbeneficial to the *polis* as they are, that seem to pile ἀτιμιαί onto the metics” (ἀφείλομεν μὲν ὅσα μηδὲν ὠφελοῦντα τὴν πόλιν ἀτιμίας δοκεῖ τοῖς μετοίκους παρέχειν, 2.2). Undue restriction of the metics’ privileges in the state hinders maximized productivity. In terms of particulars, Xenophon seeks to stop the practice of having metics serve in the military by obligation (2.2–4) but seeks to encourage at the same time voluntary service in the cavalry, which Xenophon claims would make the wealthy metics more well-disposed to the state, through personal investment in military outcomes, and render Athens on the whole stronger (2.5, cf. *Hipparchicus* 9.6). Finally, he proposes two ways of encouraging metics to come to Athens and in particular to dwell closer to the instruments of government, through expanding grants of ἐγκτησις for abandoned sites within the city walls (2.6) and through appointing magistrates he terms μετοικοφύλακες (2.7). His stated goal is to increase the

⁵⁰ See further below, chapter two. Schorn 2012:712 (making good use of Azoulay 2004:444) remarks on how Xenophon has transformed his comments elsewhere on the behavior of individual leaders into guidelines for the behavior of the state as a whole.

⁵¹ Schorn 2012:704 emphasizes that Xenophon’s proposed elevation of the metics by no means is intended to erase the distinctions between metic and citizen; *contra*, see Jansen 2012:741. Jansen 2012:754–5 suggests that Xenophon, having spent much of his own life as an outsider in the *poleis* of others, sympathized with the metics and traders in particular. Engen 2010:199–201, it should be noted, sees Xenophon here as contemptuous of the metics.

⁵² Cf. Gauthier 1976:83, with further citations.

overall population and its excellence (πλείους τε καὶ βελτίους, 2.6), and to this end he suggests rewarding not just the metics themselves with new privileges, but also those Athenians who entice the most metics, particularly metics disenfranchised by other *poleis* (οἱ ἀπόλιδες), to become loyal members of Athenian society (2.7). Even more so than in his later proposals, Xenophon's suggested treatment of the metics exhibits an elegant sort of nesting, offering praise to those who offer metics their own chance at earning praise.

Regarding those foreigners who would not necessarily settle at Athens but would still contribute to the state's affairs, Xenophon proposes more direct praise. He suggests putting a quite literal premium on expeditious arbitration of trade disputes (3.3) before listing off various civic honors for traders and the practical consequences (3.4):

ἀγαθὸν δὲ καὶ καλὸν καὶ προεδρίαις τιμᾶσθαι ἐμπόρους καὶ ναυκλήρους, καὶ ἐπὶ ξενίᾳ γ' ἔστιν ὅτε καλεῖσθαι, οἳ ἂν δοκῶσιν ἀξιολόγοις καὶ πλοίοις καὶ ἐμπορεύμασιν ὠφελεῖν τὴν πόλιν. ταῦτα γὰρ τιμώμενοι οὐ μόνον τοῦ κέρδους ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς τιμῆς ἕνεκεν ὥς πρὸς φίλους ἐπισπεύδοιεν ἄν.

It is a fine and noble thing that traders and ship-owners be honored even with *prohedria* and that those who seem to benefit the *polis* with extraordinary ships and merchandise be summoned, on occasion, to state dinners.⁵³ For if they should keep being honored in these ways, they would keep rushing here just like people rush to see their friends, not only for profit but also for honor.

In this it is clear that Xenophon believes that symbolic gestures will motivate actual gains: he recognizes the degree to which the praise Athens can bestow is valued across the οἰκουμένη.⁵⁴ Furthermore, when he recommends that private investors support state-

⁵³ In pre-Byzantine literature, ἐμπορεύμασιν ("merchandise") is found only here and at *Hieron* 9.11 (Richards 1907:91); *Hieron* 9.11, in turn, is reflected in *Poroi* 4.41 (Luccioni 1948:98). Taken together, these scattered coincidences may reflect a close link (whether intentional or unconscious) between the two works. For ξενία here, see Engen 2010:172–3, as well as for the interpretation of the infinitives in this passage. Jansen 2007:326–9 analyzes these grants as Xenophon's attempt to extend traditional, aristocratic modes of ritualized friendship into the world of commerce. As noted by Gauthier 1976:85, Aeneas Tacticus also suggests honors for grain suppliers (10.12).

⁵⁴ Cf. the rewards Simonides proposes for traders at *Hieron* 9.9–10 (Luccioni 1946:290–1).

financed trading operations, he first mentions the fiscal benefits for any Athenian who invests (3.10), but he then turns to symbolic benefit when he discusses foreign investors (3.11). In Xenophon's analysis, even kings, tyrants, and satraps will want a share of Athenian χάρις (μετασχεῖν ταύτης τῆς χάριτος), if they are promised a place on a register of all-time benefactors (εὐεργέται εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον).⁵⁵ Praise can become Athens' most noteworthy commodity.

The verbal and conceptual parallels between the two works place the Athenians, in essence, on the throne of Hieron, confronted with a wise adviser who tells them to make good use of their position of authority: they should give praise in order to get praise, as well as material benefits. Xenophon plays the role of Simonides through the rest of the treatise, which continues with a discussion of public financing of mining operations. He mentions how mining investors, unlike other entrepreneurs, manage to avoid envy (4.5), precisely the goal underscored at the end of the *Hieron* (11.15).⁵⁶ No matter how much silver comes out of the ground, says Xenophon, it does not depreciate in value, unlike when too many smiths or vintners compete with one another (4.5–6). Likewise, the symbolic capital of praise is not diminished when it is given lavishly or when there are many givers: no one will hate Hieron if he invests in a praise economy, and it could be understood, by connecting what is said about mines with the policies delivered earlier, that the Athenians should treat praise like silver as well. Xenophon pauses here to emphasize that the Athenians already allow foreigners to mine as much as they want (4.12), reminding the audience of his earlier proposals.

⁵⁵ See further Gauthier 1976:96–7, as well as below, chapter four.

⁵⁶ Out of the several interpretations of *Poroi* 4.5, that of Jansen 2007:392 is surely correct and is assumed in what follows here: “Xenophon does not mean to imply that competition is a bad thing, but rather that competition in the mines does not lead to animosity among competitors.”

While the proposals regarding mining are perhaps the carefully-worked jewel at the center of the speech, the climax arrives in the shift to discussing international policy.⁵⁷ Thus far the speech has concerned internal affairs, under which rubric falls convincing outsiders to make a personal investment in the Athenian state. Now Xenophon enters the realm of external affairs, only to deny the necessity of aggressive involvement on the part of Athens as he delivers an extensive praise of peace (5.1–13).⁵⁸ The *Hieron* too prioritizes the internal over the external, and similar advantages accrue both to the tyrant of Syracuse and to Athens from this altered focus. Furthermore, Xenophon’s idealized Athens includes not only experts at commerce (5.3), but also the best entertainers in the world (5.4, cf. *Hieron* 11.10). Xenophon also employs a technique not available to Simonides, that of praising the Athenians’ previous euergetism toward other states (5.5–7), but there is in this section a duality very much at home in the *Hieron*, the difference between acting tyrannically (ὡμῶς ἄγαν δόξασα προστατεῦειν, 5.6) and behaving in such a way as to receive the voluntary submission of one’s subjects (ὕπὸ τῶν νησιωτῶν ἐκόντων προστάται τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἐγενόμεθα, cf. *Hieron* 11.12). Finally, a reformed, peaceful Athens, like the reformed tyrant, will see the city’s safety become the subject of everyone’s prayers (5.10, cf. *Hieron* 11.11). A comparison of the two treatises suggests that Xenophon meant for both works to include theoretical reflection alongside what he saw as practicable solutions, grounded in the proper utilization of praise.

⁵⁷ On role of the mining proposals in the structure of the *Poroi* see Jansen 2007:352–3 with n.207.

⁵⁸ For discussion of the implications and cultural climate of this passage, see particularly Dillery 1993:2 (and *passim*) and Kroeker 2009:224–5, as well as Higgins 1977:138.

As the texts discussed in chapter four reveal, Xenophon was remarkably prescient in several of the arguments advanced in the *Poroi*.⁵⁹ Commentators have focused on how Xenophon's proposals would have seemed a pipe dream to the contemporary audience, and it is true that Athens did not return to the prominence touted in the treatise.⁶⁰ Nonetheless, the writing of the *Poroi* was followed not long after by conditions that led to the Athenian dependency on praise for purchasing symbolic and economic capital. Enrollment and inscription of foreigners as benefactors became common, and Athenian cultural hegemony long outlasted Athens' empire in large part because of the χάρις the city could bestow on others. Xenophon was, in hindsight, wrong to predict Athenian military dominance, but perhaps the culture of praise he promoted was to the benefit of the survival of his own works: he himself became valued less as a historical actor than as a chief ambassador of Attic sophistication.

The Athenian's speech: praise in Plato's Laws

The importance of praise as delineated in the *Hieron* and *Poroi* finds parallels elsewhere in contemporary literature, not only in Xenophon, but also in Plato. While it would require a much longer work than the present chapter to sift through the Platonic corpus for comments on praise, for now it will be briefly argued that Xenophon's emphasis on praise shares much with the less concentrated discussion of praise in Plato's

⁵⁹ Cf. Ober 2008:252 (with 2008:118–24), Oliver 2011:121–3, Lambert 2011b:196–7; contrast Azoulay 2004:87, 447 with n.68. Regarding the importance of the work to Xenophon's career, Higgins 1977:142–3 provocatively suggests that this work encapsulates the author's life and thought in miniature, down to the very words that open and close the treatise: it begins with ἐγώ and ends with πόλει.

⁶⁰ For the apparent impracticality of Xenophon's proposals, see, e.g., Higgins 1977:138, but cf. Schorn 2012:706. Also, Aeneas Tacticus says (14.2) that he has composed a ποριστικὴ βίβλος for the express purpose of mitigating internal class conflict, perhaps through means similar to Xenophon's. See also Luccioni 1946:304–5 on the influence of Xenophon's life and political thought on the Macedonians.

Laws.⁶¹ The interlocutors of the *Laws* build upon the notions of praise already found in the *Republic*, namely that μίμησις, if it must occur at all, must be of only the truly praiseworthy.⁶² In the *Laws*, there is a much more nuanced set of restrictions, developed at greater length, for a state removed by one or two degrees from the utopian ideal.

The conversation of the Athenian, Spartan, and Cretan has not progressed very far before the example of Tyrtaeus arises (1.629A): the archaic poet had composed encomia of warriors fighting foreign wars (1.629C–E). As it transpires, Tyrtaeus’ protreptic aim of promoting courage ranks relatively low in the Athenian’s estimation (1.630D), but the example of this poet’s praise is set within a wider discussion of how to encourage virtues.⁶³ The Athenian stranger states, in the first of many similar sentiments over the course of the *Laws*, that it is the job of the lawgiver (νομοθέτης) “to attend to the citizens by correctly distributing honor and dishonor” (1.631E), and that this task of “blaming and praising correctly” should be performed “by means of the laws themselves” (1.632A).⁶⁴ In other words, the lawgiver is to take on the function of Tyrtaeus, using praise to control the behavior of the citizens, albeit with the community’s laws—i.e., the text of Plato’s *Laws*—substituted for the poet’s verses.⁶⁵ Just as in the case of Xenophon’s *Hieron*, a

⁶¹ The present analysis is meant to highlight the similarity of the ideas of the *Laws* to those of Xenophon; Morgan 2013 treats the role of praise and blame in the *Laws* perspicaciously and at much greater length.

⁶² *Republic* 10.607a (only hymns to the gods and encomia of good men will be allowed); cf. 10.599b7 (we should strive to imitate good men in our actions rather than on stage and be more eager to have encomia sung about us than by us).

⁶³ Contrast the more positive evaluation of Tyrtaeus in the later speech of Lycurgus (1.106–8); cf. Renehan 1970:226–9. For the opposition of Tyrtaeus and Theognis in the *Laws*, see Morgan 2013:268.

⁶⁴ Shortly after this, the Athenian registers a typically Xenophontic concern, that of rewarding the obedient and punishing the disobedient (1.632B, cf. 1.634A, 4.711B–C, 7.809A). Withholding of civic praise itself constitutes a punishment at 8.841E (ἄτιμον τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπαίνων).

⁶⁵ For praise as a mode of social control, cf. the lawgiver’s toolkit at 2.663C (ἔθεσι καὶ ἐπαίνοις καὶ λόγοις) and the three forces that inhibit bad behavior at 8.841C (among them τὸ φιλότιμον).

prose dialectic work arrogates to itself the praise-function of poetry, while highlighting how such praise can create and sustain the community.

Praise and blame continue to be important definitional aspects of the discussion. After the interlocutors determine that one must be an expert in a given field in order to praise or blame appropriately (1.639C), they discuss education among the first topics in laying out the state. A proper education consists in loving and hating the correct things (2.653B–C, cf. 3.689A)—an internalization, that is, of the performed acts of praise and blame, as is hashed out through the extended metaphor of dancing and music (2.653D–656B) again taken from the poetic realm.⁶⁶ Fundamentally, what one chooses to praise or blame reveals one’s own dispositions, as in the discussion of funerary extravagance (4.719D–E). It is essential, therefore, to model how to praise and blame, because these acts can educate the citizenry in ways that even laws cannot (5.730B), and the optimal community is one in which there is a consensus as to what is praiseworthy and what is blameworthy (5.739D).⁶⁷ The Athenian goes so far as to state that the goal of the interlocutors’ discussion of statecraft is this very sort of justice, that honors be distributed according to merit (6.757C).

From this running thread of the theoretical importance of praise and blame it follows naturally that the interlocutors should discuss what, exactly, constitutes praiseworthy behavior for a citizen of the imaginary Magnesia. The topic springs initially

⁶⁶ Cf. Morgan 2013:270: “[I]n Magnesia, everyone is a performer and everyone should be a critic.”

⁶⁷ Cf. 7.798D: changes to common wisdom about character—particularly ἐπαίνου τε καὶ ψόγου πέρι—are of great consequence and require skillful handling. See further Morgan 2013:272 on 5.730B (ἔπαινος παιδεύων καὶ ψόγος).

(3.696A–697C) from a discussion of the policies of Cyrus the Great.⁶⁸ The interlocutors are here concerned with determining which virtues should be honored, eventually ranking those of the soul highest, provided that the honorand also possesses temperance, which receives no special praise on its own (3.697C). Later, there is a rather long speech dedicated to praiseworthy qualities—or perhaps they should be called honorable qualities, because the Athenian makes a distinction between praising something, which one can do falsely, and truly honoring it as it deserves (5.727A–B).⁶⁹ Additionally, one finds repeated the notion that the most truly honorable and praiseworthy behavior is serving others, particularly by means of obedience to the laws: no one, according to the Athenian, can be a proper leader without first having been a follower, and even leaders should conceive of themselves as servants of the state, in order to gain the purest sort of honor (6.762E). Indeed, the citizen should value praise gained from service to the state over victory at Olympia (5.729D), a sentiment that resonates strongly with Simonides’ advice in the *Hieron* (11.5–7).⁷⁰ Furthermore, Xenophon’s advice in the *Poroi* has its own analogue in the Athenian’s suggestions regarding praise and honors to be made available to metics (8.850B–C, 9.881B–C).

As intimated earlier, there is a special relationship in the *Laws* between the laws—or the *Laws* text itself—and existing poetry, which find themselves in an

⁶⁸ Beginning at 3.694A; cf. Xenophon’s project in the *Education of Cyrus*. Comparison of a given *laudandus*—here, a constitution—with Cyrus the Great is common in the fourth century; see further the texts discussed in chapters two and especially the *Evagoras* (chapter three).

⁶⁹ The speech begins at 5.726E. For false praise, cf. the commonplace regarding flattery at 5.729A.

⁷⁰ On athletics in the *Laws* cf. Morgan 2013:271–2. Morrow 1960:333 notes that Plato is preceded in his sentiment by Tyrtaeus (fr. 12.1–4), his model from earlier in the dialogue. Compare, however, 7.807C, where the Pythian or Olympic competitor’s lifestyle is a model for the sort of virtuous toil expected of the citizen, and perhaps also 7.822B, where the games at Olympia provide an analogy for the validity of praise; see further Morgan 2013:276–7.

antagonism inherited from the *Republic*. This antagonism presents itself most apparently in the discussions of not just what qualities to praise, but whom to praise and how. Just as in the *Hieron*, where the poet Simonides manipulates the tropes of epinician in prose debate, in the *Laws* dialectic is made to substitute for praise-poetry, usurping and expanding its role within the state.⁷¹ The poetry of praise is allowed—indeed, it is granted exclusive rights and privileges among poetic genres—but only insofar as both *laudandus* and *laudator* have lived in accordance with the laws.⁷² The *laudandus* in particular must have lived in perfect obedience to the laws, both in the letter and the spirit (7.822E–823A).⁷³ This qualification is so strict that, after the dictum of Herodotus’ Solon, only the dead can be praised (7.802A). Moreover, regarding the *laudator*, the only citizens allowed to give such praise must be decently close to death themselves and personally accomplished in some field of virtue (8.829C), and their entries in poetic competitions must be vetted in advance, by qualified judges, to ensure that they meet standards of moderation (8.829D–E). Such judges are themselves only qualified if they have won prizes for their own virtuous deeds, as is said elsewhere (11.919E). These tight controls on the instruments of praise find their ultimate expression in the difference between the

⁷¹ This usurpation is symptomatic of the relationship between prose and poetry in the fourth century. See further on the *Evagoras* (chapter three, below), and generally Hägg 2012; cf. Morgan 2013:266, and for epinician themes in the *Laws* see especially 2013:273–8.

⁷² Note here also the inclusion of potential *laudandae* (7.802A) as well, in contrast to, most famously, Pericles’ sentiments in Thucydides (2.46). For the privileges granted to praise poetry, see 7.801D, where the state is also served well by the performance of hymns and encomia of the gods, as well as of praise-containing prayers (μετ’ ἐγκωμίων εὐχαί) to divinities and heroes. Contrast the sorts of poetry decried at 10.886B–C.

⁷³ Here “the most correct mode of praise for a citizen” is reserved for the citizen ὃς ἂν τοῖς τοῦ νομοθέτου νομοθετοῦντός τε καὶ ἐπαινοῦντος καὶ ψέγοντος πειθόμενος γράμμασι διεξέλθῃ τὸν βίον ἄκρατον. Cf. also the initial statement at 7.801E, regarding how the lawgivers should institute this practice ἄνευ φθόνων: τῶν πολιτῶν ὅποσοι τέλος ἔχουσιν τοῦ βίου κατὰ σώματα ἢ κατὰ ψυχὰς ἔργα ἐξεργασμένοι καλὰ καὶ ἐπίπονα καὶ τοῖς νόμοις εὐπειθεῖς γεγονότες, ἐγκωμίων αὐτοῦς τυγχάνειν πρέπον ἂν εἴη. Obedience to the laws derives great emphasis from its position at the end of the list of qualifications for praise.

funerals of common citizens and those of the public examiners (εὔθυνοι), wherein those who are permitted to control praise also receive the greatest when they die. Whereas normal citizens are allowed only a four-line epigram when they die (12.958E), funerals for examiners are lavish, public affairs involving day-long hymns of praise (12.947B–E).⁷⁴ Poetry of praise, then, is allowed in Magnesia, but it is strictly regulated in order to control shared social values.

In the final tally, however, praise poetry is not just subordinated to the laws, but replaced by them. The Athenian describes the ongoing conversation as a sort of poem (ποιήσει τινί, 7.811C), one which the hypothetical magistrate in charge of education should make required reading in Magnesian schools (7.811D). The magistrate should allow for other relevant material, whether poetry or prose, to be included in the curriculum, but at all events he is not to retain any teacher who does not praise the same writings as he praises (7.811E).⁷⁵ As the dialogue approaches its conclusion, the Athenian even provides an example of how the text of the *Laws* can be used educationally: his description of military life (12.942A–E), a microcosm of life in the Magnesian state, is called an ἔπαινος (12.943A), a formal speech of praise on a subject, much like Xenophon’s praise of the Attic landscape at the beginning of the *Poroi*. The Athenian then goes on to list the various rewards and punishments for citizen behavior in the Magnesian military (12.943A–945A), detailing how a citizen can earn praise and how citizens should praise each other in this field of endeavor. Just as in the *Poroi*, the

⁷⁴ Cf. the funerals of Spartan kings (*Lakedaimonion Politeia* 15.9). See further Morgan 2013:282–3.

⁷⁵ The obvious point of comparison is that mentioned above regarding consensus of praise (5.739D), but one might also consider, for the semantics of praise here, the rhapsode Ion’s enigmatic role as Homeric ἐπαινέτης (*Ion* 536D)—at the same moment *laudator*, exegete, critic, and propagator. For further discussion see Capuccino 2011.

speaker—throughout known only as “the Athenian”—has provided a model for the action of the audience, not only praising a subject his audience should praise as well, but suggesting how further praise can strengthen the community. When the citizens reread the text of the *Laws* as part of their education, they will reenact and internalize the Athenian’s praise of military life in order to conduct their own acts of praise.⁷⁶ Here these two Athenian authors are in accord, not only regarding their presentation of praise as crucial to human society, but also regarding the manner of the presentation itself.

Cyrus the Athenian king, Xenophon the Athenian hipparch

Other works of Xenophon amplify the theories and rhetorical techniques present in the *Hieron* and *Poroi*. In the approach that each work takes to praise one can see the mores of Athenian society both behind the author’s words and confronted by them. The following section will treat each work briefly as it examines the role of praise in social spaces ranging from Xenophon’s imaginary Persia to the very real Athenian Agora. Across the many genres of his corpus, Xenophon displays a remarkable consistency in his and his characters’ position on the role of incentives in leadership, foremost among them the use of praise, which deserves to be held in still higher regard than it has previously been held by students of Xenophontic leadership theory.

Persia, Sparta, Athens

In his adventurous philosophical narrative and longest work, the *Education of Cyrus*, Xenophon gives maximally free rein to his theories regarding the role of praise and rewards in government. The *Education of Cyrus* has been well served by recent

⁷⁶ Cf. Morgan 2013:287 on mimetic praise and blame in *Laws*, alongside the magnet metaphor from *Ion*.

scholarship, particularly by a spate of monographs devoted to it.⁷⁷ In the wake of ironic readings of Xenophon prompted by the work of Leo Strauss, much energy has been spent attempting to diagnose the level of irony present in the *Education of Cyrus*, perhaps more than for any other work of Xenophon.⁷⁸ Whatever irony may be present should not, however, interfere with the basic point, to be discussed here briefly, of the utility of praise within the work—even if one is suspicious of the purposes to which praise is put by particular characters within this historical fantasy. Failure to maintain ethical ideals is a common theme in Xenophon, and the eventual decline of the Persian kingship detailed at the end of the work does not negate the usefulness of the leadership techniques recommended by Xenophon through the mouthpiece of Cyrus; if anything, the decline provides another kind of proof, through emphasizing the care and consistency required of the apt governor.

From the outset, Xenophon is at pains to show not only the φιλοτιμία of his hero, eager to risk everything for praise, but also how Cyrus rewards the same quality in others.⁷⁹ Xenophon's Cyrus applies at every possible turn a lesson he learned early in life: the Persian educational system, Xenophon says, is rooted in rewarding good performance with praise.⁸⁰ While it is demonstrable that both the Athens of Xenophon's

⁷⁷ These include Tatum 1989, Gera 1993, Nadon 2001, and Sandridge 2012. Gray 2011, while not exclusively concerned with this text, gives much attention to it as well.

⁷⁸ The ironic approach of Strauss is encapsulated well by its opponent, Vivienne J. Gray, particularly in discussions of the *Hieron*: see Gray 2007 (especially 2007:211–13) and 2011:158–77; more generally, see 2011:54–62. Cf. Dorion 2010 and Johnson 2012. On the *Education of Cyrus* in particular, see the summary of Danzig 2012:500–1, as well as the useful consideration of Xenophon's political leanings in Johnson 2005:203.

⁷⁹ On Cyrus' φιλοτιμία, see 1.2.1: ... καὶ φιλοτιμώτατος, ὥστε πάντα μὲν πόνον ἀνατλήναι, πάντα δὲ κίνδυνον ὑπομεῖναι τοῦ ἐπαινεῖσθαι ἕνεκα. Cf. also 1.3.3, for Cyrus' φιλοτιμία in childhood, and Sandridge 2012:26–8 for risk-taking in the *Education of Cyrus*.

⁸⁰ 1.2.12, 1.5.12 (a sentiment virtually identical to that expressed in 1.2.1 of Cyrus alone; cf. also 3.3.51).

upbringing and especially the city of the fourth century shared this value, there were times when the Athenians failed, in Xenophon's eyes, to reward their politicians and commanders appropriately. In the *Education of Cyrus*, it is crucial to Xenophon's political fantasy that—unlike in the Athens of the *Hellenica*—public-minded service receives its just deserts. Therefore Cyrus, by dint of his education and his character, dispenses praise unstintingly throughout his career, beginning in childhood.⁸¹ Cyrus succeeds so fantastically in his imperialist ambitions because he takes the best characteristics of Xenophon's Persians to their extremes, and chief among these is the interplay between expressing one's own φιλοτιμία and nurturing the φιλοτιμία of others.⁸² As with the advice of Simonides in the *Hieron* regarding agriculture, Cyrus' primary means of encouraging φιλοτιμία is the distribution of prizes for displays of merit among his soldiers.⁸³ In an early conversation between Cyrus and his father Cambyses, Cyrus formulates this theory, and Cambyses readily agrees, saying that it will help his army perform like a chorus (1.6.18).⁸⁴ Throughout the narrative, Cyrus regularly dispenses prizes for conduct in combat, and in the absence of combat he institutes contests to keep his men sharp and foster healthy competition among them.⁸⁵

⁸¹ On several occasions as a child he distributes resources and praise as rewards for good turns done to him (1.3.7, 1.4.10, 1.4.15).

⁸² Cf. Sandridge 2012, who identifies φιλοτιμία as one of three “fundamental” virtues displayed by Cyrus, alongside φιλανθρωπία and φιλομάθεια (see especially 2012:59).

⁸³ For Xenophon's Cyrus and Hieron as complementary figures, see Luccioni 1946:259–68, Gera 1993:293, and Tamiolaki 2012:577–8.

⁸⁴ Cf. *Hieron* 9.4 and *Oeconomicus* 8.3, 8.20. Cambyses later reiterates his opinion (8.5.23); additionally, in the third book, the choral metaphor comes to life, as Cyrus' soldiers retreat in lockstep (3.3.70). On the utility of praise cf. 8.1.39, 8.1.34–6 (on the merits of hunting; cf. the lament at 8.8.12), and in particular 7.5.60–5, practically an encomium of eunuchs for living their lives with great φιλονικία.

⁸⁵ Combat prizes: 3.3.6, 4.2.12, 7.2.7–8, 8.4.29–30. Non-combat contests: 2.1.22–4, 6.2.4–6, 8.2.26. Cf. the lament at 8.8.13, as well as below, chapter two, on the *Agesilaus*.

In these actions Cyrus follows the precepts of his Persian education, and in turn he inspires his men to mimic his own behaviors. Cyrus exercises his own φιλοτιμία, constantly displaying his own virtue, in order to have his men mirror him.⁸⁶ Cyrus' intent finds its fullest expression at the end of the narrative, when he decides to hold a procession displaying his victories and emphasizes in conversation the importance of putting his wealth and virtues on display.⁸⁷ Among the future leaders of the Persian empire, he commands the satraps to emulate his actions (8.6.10) and notes on his deathbed that his son Cambyses will have to display a great φιλονικία in order to rival his father's deeds (8.7.12), but perhaps his largest accomplishment is spreading emulation of his own φιλοτιμία throughout the army. At one point he assigns men to move through the captured enemy camp distributing rewards to those camp followers who continue performing their duties (4.2.47), but elsewhere he does not even need to delegate his function as arbiter of praise explicitly: the rivalry he encourages through contests is transmuted into *esprit de corps* when the soldiers are faced with a common enemy, to such an extent that they lavish praise upon one another of their own accord.⁸⁸

It should be emphasized that Cyrus' rewards and praise are not, in the main, distributed corporately. Pursuant to a debate starting at 2.2.18–21, he decides (2.3.16) to award prizes to valiant individuals, rather than equally to all members of a victorious

⁸⁶ The metaphor of the mirror is Xenophon's (7.1.2, on Cyrus' mirror-surfaced armor). Cyrus always accepts praise with grace (3.2.14, 3.3.2–4); he is praised for rewarding obedience in particular at 2.3.8; he asks Gobryas for no reward other than praise at 5.2.11; he is said to act φιλονίκως in caring for his friends (8.2.14, cf. *Hieron* 11.14, and see also Farber 1979:511–13 for the interpersonal nature of Cyrus' euergetism).

⁸⁷ 8.4.8, 8.4.34–5, both replete with words from the δεικ- root; cf. 5.2.12. The procession in the final book, including reminders of those conquered over the course of the narrative's action, doubles as a display of Xenophon's own narrative. For this sort of nested rhetoric of display, highlighting the virtues of both protagonist and author, see further below, chapters two and three.

⁸⁸ 3.3.10, a paragraph full of language crucial to this discussion (φιλοτιμίως, ἐπιφθόνως, ἐπαινοῦσι).

force.⁸⁹ Perhaps paradoxically, this has an elevating effect: all the members of Cyrus' army are made to feel as though they are peers of their commander, because time and again the reward for virtue and particularly for new allegiance to Cyrus is an invitation to dinner, where they can partake in the same dishes as Cyrus himself.⁹⁰ Shortly after the description of Cyrus' mirror-surfaced armor (7.1.2), which underscores the parity between Cyrus and his men, Cyrus encourages the army by comparing the upcoming battle to an ἔρανος (7.1.12), a typically aristocratic potluck: just as Cyrus has honored them with dinner, so too can they repay him by contributing equally to the battle. Crucial also to this parity is Cyrus' habit of addressing his men by name, another way of manipulating their individual φιλοτιμία in addition to ensuring efficiency of command.⁹¹

All this is not to say that φιλοτιμία is vaunted without reservation throughout the narrative. Notably, in Xenophon's version of the narrative, Croesus' downfall stems from having received excessive praise (7.2.23), and in another episode the commander of the Cadusians becomes a victim of his own ambition.⁹² Cyrus must temper the praise he gives in order to avoid such disasters, as he does when praising Chrysantas' virtues before asking him not to display them (2.4.26–8).⁹³ Praise even for Cyrus himself is, appropriately, made conditional on outcomes and future behavior (5.5.35, 6.1.11).

⁸⁹ Instances of Cyrus' praise for individuals include 4.1.2–4 and 6.3.16–17. Cf. Higgins 1977:50–2.

⁹⁰ 2.1.30, 3.1.37, 3.2.25, 5.2.14, 6.1.49, 8.2.2–3. At 8.4.4, the practice of ranking dinner guests is said expressly to promote φιλονικία. Cf. perhaps Athenian ξένια grants as in the *Poroi*, discussed above.

⁹¹ Discussed at length in 5.3.46–50; cf. the lament at 8.8.24.

⁹² 5.4.15: βουλόμενος δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς λαμπρὸν τι ποιῆσαι ... Cf. the near-catastrophic case of Cyrus' uncle Cyaxares, whose ego Cyrus takes great care not to bruise; see Danzig 2012:514–38 and Sandridge 2012:90–3.

⁹³ Additionally, praise given by Cyrus is challenged by a third party at 2.2.10–11. For the value of praise in directing the course of a dialogue, cf. *Oeconomicus* 11.1, where Socrates diverts Ischomachus from continuing to discuss his wife by praising them both; similarly, *Oeconomicus* 11.11. Cf. perhaps Aeneas Tacticus 22.16–17, and also Xenophon's behavior as reported by Athenaeus (10.427F–428A).

Perhaps the most important problematizing of praise occurs in the dialogue between Cyrus and his father mentioned earlier, a dialogue that bears comparison to the advice of Simonides in the *Hieron*.⁹⁴ Cyrus here recognizes the same universal qualities that Simonides expounds (*Hieron* 7.3) and that the virtuous Pheraulas takes as gospel: praise inspires praise, and this sets humanity apart from the animals (*Education of Cyrus* 8.3.49). It is hard not to take this as Xenophon's own view, particularly in light of the similarity of Cyrus' opinions to those of Simonides: kindnesses to subordinates are the leader's surest safeguard against envy (2.4.10, cf. *Hieron* 11.15).⁹⁵

Xenophon's *Lakedaimonion Politeia* shares many characteristics with the *Education of Cyrus*. Both texts are in essence an extended encomium of a lawgiver, and both end with the author lamenting the decline of the modern culture from the ancient ideal. Like Cyrus, and as per Simonides' advice to Hieron, Lycurgus obtains good results from instituting contests, for both women and men (1.4).⁹⁶ Regarding the young men in particular, Xenophon represents Lycurgus as astute enough to notice that the youths who display the most φιλονικία put on the best choral and athletic performances.⁹⁷ The lawgiver takes this lesson and applies it to a more important contest, the one περὶ ἀρετῆς (4.2), which is later described as ἡ θεοφιλεστάτη τε καὶ πολιτικωτάτη ἔρις (4.5).⁹⁸

Finally, the idea of the contest is recapitulated as the author describes Spartan pre-battle

⁹⁴ 1.6.20–4; see further Sandridge 2012:100.

⁹⁵ For Cyrus' deft handling of envy in the *Education of Cyrus*, see Tatum 1989:115–33.

⁹⁶ Likewise he allows for older boys to be deputized to punish miscreants (2.11); this measure not only keeps the younger boys under guard at all times, but also must, after the fashion of Cyrus, encourage φιλοτιμία through the honor of the rank: see especially 4.3. Cf. also *Hieron* 9.3.

⁹⁷ Cf. *Hieron* 11.10 and *Poroi* 5.4 for competition producing the best performances.

⁹⁸ Cf. *Hieron* 11.7 (τῶι καλλίστῳ καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεστάτῳ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀγωνίσματι).

etiquette: the “contest in arms” is in essence decided in advance by the combined religiosity and showmanship of the Spartan army (13.8–9).⁹⁹ In these passages Xenophon’s Sparta exemplifies his theories regarding display and competition.

Especially when compared to Xenophon’s usual mixture of rewards and punishments, however, Spartan society does not contain much in the way of positive reinforcement: rather, the abundance of negative social pressure is backed up by looming legal punishments.¹⁰⁰ Only in the discussion of the prerogatives of the kings is there much mention of the honors intended by Lycurgus (τιμὴν κατεσκεύασε, 13.1). In a fashion suited to Xenophon’s ideas as expressed elsewhere, these honors have an ethical function that outweighs their superficial status-enhancing quality.¹⁰¹ They are intended to keep a king’s ego in check, rather than gratifying it, so as to discourage both τυραννικὸν φρόνημα and the citizens’ φθόνος (15.8). The avoidance of envy forms a clear parallel with the ending of the *Hieron* (11.15), in which Simonides has advised the tyrant to avoid the problems of tyranny through redistributing honors he would otherwise keep to himself. In the end, the payoff for the kings themselves comes only after they have died, in the splendor of their funerals (15.9).

Blame is far more common than praise at Sparta, particularly for Spartans who do not meet Lycurgus’ standards of conduct. The author himself has harsh words for the modern Spartans (14.7), who have let all parts of the constitution degenerate except for

⁹⁹ Cf. the effects of the orderly army at *Oeconomicus* 8.6; see also on the *Agésilas*, chapter two below.

¹⁰⁰ See especially 9.6. At 8.4 the ephors are allowed to punish after the fashion of tyrants (see Gray 2007:167 for discussion); also, the only evidence Xenophon gives for the apparently extreme honor given to the *gerousia* is their ability to hand down the death penalty (10.2); contrast the rewards available from youth to Xenophon’s Persians (*Education of Cyrus* 1.2.12).

¹⁰¹ 15.3–4; they are meant not to keep these advantages to themselves, but to use them in bestowing honors on others (15.4–6). For Nadon 2001:36, even here the Spartans fall short of Xenophon’s Persians, who use praise as a reward as opposed to mere food.

the kingship (15.1).¹⁰² Xenophon's Sparta is a place of action: naturally one should not expect the laconic to take much interest in words in preference to deeds; when they do, it results in an unseemly susceptibility to flatterers that has destroyed their ancestral temperance (14.2). One of the most striking instances of Xenophon's praise for Sparta stems from this very contrast of words and deeds: other cities recognize the value of Sparta's laws and praise them, but they do not live up to their words (10.8). A state like Athens fails because, while it is quite capable of bestowing praise, the citizens do not hold themselves to high enough moral standards; Sparta, meanwhile, has reached its nadir through failing to provide a proper outlet for φιλοτιμία.¹⁰³ It is unsurprising that in the idealized *Education of Cyrus* the pedagogical and governmental regimes remove the Spartan system's negative αἰδώς and replace it with copious honors and praise, blending the best of both systems.

Athens itself is the setting of the *Oeconomicus*, in which Xenophon's doctrine of rewards and punishments comes to the fore as the central tenet of the wealthy Athenian Ischomachus' καλοκἀγαθία. Not only does he believe in using praise and rewards as tools to motivate his workers, but he himself also desires honor, and so dedicates much thought to modeling for his subordinates the giving and receiving of praise.¹⁰⁴ Ischomachus is constantly practicing praise and blame in the form of rhetorical exercises, which are themselves a sort of contest that Ischomachus strives to win (11.23–5). He expects his

¹⁰² On the authenticity and proper placement of *Lakedaimonion Politeia* 14, see Gray 2007:217–21.

¹⁰³ Most evident in the pressure placed on the Spartans to rule over foreigners (14.4–5). *Contra*, Higgins 1977:68–9 claims that Lycurgus' laws only ever created the semblance of virtue.

¹⁰⁴ Honor for Ischomachus: 11.8, particularly on a civic level, as in the positive discussion of the liturgy at 11.9 (contrary to previous remarks in the dialogue: Socrates at 2.5–8 and Ischomachus' own joke at 7.3); cf. Cyrus the Younger at 4.24, and *Hieron* 11.1–2. Socrates praises civic φιλοτιμία at 11.10.

foremen to distribute rewards and punishments just as he himself would, and he praises or blames them according to how well they go about it (13.12). This didactic, self-replicating praise—giving praise to encourage others to praise properly—lines up well with Ischomachus’ philosophy on teaching, specifically the teaching of leadership: anyone who can teach a person to be the master of an estate can also teach the art of kingship, and therefore deserves great praise (13.5).¹⁰⁵ The situation in the *Hieron*, where the praise-artist Simonides recommends his own methods to the tyrant, comes to mind, and indeed Ischomachus’ project of teaching leadership through praise is close to Xenophon’s own. Ischomachus, beyond all of Xenophon’s other praise-givers, places the utmost emphasis on the desirability of praise: to be sure, he rewards the virtuous, but he doles out even greater rewards to those who are not merely honest, but actively ambitious and desiring praise (14.9–10).¹⁰⁶

As discussed earlier regarding the *Hieron*, political or military leadership finds a ready analogue in the management of the private estate, and in the *Oeconomicus* the analogy is made overt early on, in the discussion of merit-based awards in Persian governmental policy (4.4–25).¹⁰⁷ In the middle of this passage, Socrates leaps from the topic of Cyrus the Great into a miniature encomium of would-be king Cyrus the Younger (4.18–19), an encomium which introduces the dialogue’s major qualification for a good leader, that he is obeyed voluntarily. These collected glimpses of leadership in the incomparably large empire of the Persians give Xenophon an *a fortiori* case for the

¹⁰⁵ For Xenophon’s broad views on who can learn and practice leadership, see Pomeroy 1994:66–7.

¹⁰⁶ For a similar problematization of ambition and gain, see the dialogue *Hipparchus* (especially 232C).

¹⁰⁷ In short, the Persian king gives awards for agricultural and military achievement (4.7–8). Pomeroy 1994:255–6 notes that (like the boastful Cyrus the Great, 4.16) land-owning Athenian citizens would be in the running for both awards: unlike Persian subjects, the ideal citizen was accomplished at both pursuits.

validity of many points later in the discussion regarding the microcosmic situation of managing one's own estate, in which praise and rewards play a crucial role in maintaining the voluntary efforts of the workers.¹⁰⁸ At the dialogue's close (21.2–7), Ischomachus returns to the military analogy in demonstrating that his lessons regarding the management of the estate should be expanded into other fields of endeavor. Both the general (21.6) and the estate-manager (21.10) should inspire φιλονικία and φιλοτιμία in their subordinates, and anyone who successfully does so “has something of a kingly character” (ἔχειν τι ἥθους βασιλικοῦ, 21.10). Just as with Simonides' advice in the *Hieron*, Ischomachus' techniques are meant to encourage voluntary obedience, which is a divine gift that Ischomachus opposes to the lot of the tyrant (21.12). The dialogue ends with a reference to Tantalus as the arch-tyrant, constantly afraid of the rock looming over him (21.12), just as Hieron will continue to fear his own citizens unless he accepts Simonides' teaching. In ending the dialogue with this cosmic expansion of his doctrine of leadership, Xenophon suggests the universality of the leadership theory he expresses across the corpus of his writings, but one should also consider to what extent the Athenian setting of the dialogue and its civically-minded interlocutors indicate Athens as the point of origin for the author's thoughts on praise.

The technical treatises

The same theories of praise appear even in the three most technical treatises in the Xenophontic corpus, the *Cynegeticus*, *Peri Hippikes*, and *Hipparchicus*. While Xenophon

¹⁰⁸ Examples: 5.15–16 (set within Socrates' encomium of farming: see Pomeroy 1994:254–5), 9.11 (the worthy housekeeper anticipates being rewarded or punished for her actions), 9.14 (another governmental analogy), 9.15, 12.6, 12.16, 12.19, 13.6–8 (on operant conditioning generally; cf. *Peri Hippikes* 2.3, 8.4, 8.13), 13.9 (some slaves are motivated by φιλοτιμία), 13.10. Persia comes up again later, at 14.6–7, this time in the mouth of Ischomachus; cf. 12.20. For patterns and analogies latent in the structure of the dialogue, see Pomeroy 1994:240–2.

insists that the subject matter of treatise is a teachable skill (τέχνη), it must also be remembered that each treatise relentlessly attempts to inculcate virtue into the reader, in a way that, for example, the work of Aeneas Tacticus does not. These treatises are therefore, like many of Xenophon's works, of a hybrid genre, imbuing straightforward instruction in the subject at hand with an ethical tinge.¹⁰⁹

The *Cynegeticus* stands apart in several ways, but the content and ethic of the treatise are of a piece with the rest of Xenophon's works.¹¹⁰ The treatise opens with an aetiology of the art of hunting, granted by Apollo and Artemis to the mortal sphere in honor of Cheiron (1.1); Cheiron in turn passes on his knowledge to his pupils, who go on to gain many honors and laudations of their own.¹¹¹ The list of heroes is itself instructive (1.2): Xenophon here formulates a multigenerational, international coterie of civic-minded aristocrats, precisely the individuals he elsewhere would like to see as leaders of the Greek world at peace.¹¹² Hunting is only the outward manifestation of the underlying socio-economic commonalities that bind these heroes together into something resembling the political *ἐταιρεία* of Athenian aristocrats.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Doty 2011:2. For an expansive exploration of τέχνη in Xenophon, see Wilms 1995.

¹¹⁰ On the vexed question of the authorship of the *Cynegeticus*, see Baehrens 1927, di Benedetto 1967, Delebecque 1970, Gray 1985, and Phillips and Willcock 1999. Cf. L'Allier 2012:479. The present discussion assumes Xenophon as the author and the longer version of the first chapter as original. Xenophon's aristocratic inclination toward hunting should not come as a surprise: cf., e.g., *Lakedaimonion Politeia* 4.7, *Education of Cyrus* 1.2.10, *Oeconomicus* 5.5–6; cf. also that even in Plato's *Laws* hunting looms large as a sport with civic consequence (1.633B, 2.654E, 7.823B–824C).

¹¹¹ 1.2: ... ὧν κατὰ χρόνον ἕκαστος ὑπὸ θεῶν ἐτιμήθη. 1.3: θαυμάζετω δὲ μηδεὶς ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν ἀρέσκοντες θεοῖς ὁμῶς ἐτελεύτησαν· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις· ἀλλ' οἱ ἔπαινοι αὐτῶν μεγάλοι ἐγένοντο. Many also receive individual accolades (1.8, 1.9, 1.11, 1.12, 1.14, 1.15); Xenophon offers direct praise at 1.7 and 1.12.

¹¹² Cf. 1.17, the patriotism (and, apparently, Panhellenism) of those who enjoy hunting, a discipline that “the noble love and the base envy.” L'Allier 2012:482 compares this section to the thought of Theognis and particularly the invocations of the opening lines (1–14).

At the end of the treatise, these heroes act as role models for the young hunter (12.18), particularly insofar as the hunter develops not only acumen in the hunt but also skills of politics and military leadership (12.6–9). The author takes some time to dispel the argument that hunters neglect their household and civic duties.¹¹³ He counters that, as in the *Oeconomicus*, those who develop one sort of skill at leadership will be able to apply it more broadly, especially in the protection of the community from outside threats (12.11, 12.15). Just as the heroes were favored by the gods, so too should one imagine that young hunters are also being watched by the gods, whose gaze moderates their actions and makes them strive for virtue.¹¹⁴ The noble hunter must constantly put on a display of *καλοκάγαθία* in order to benefit both the self and the community.¹¹⁵ Xenophon's treatise in turn is an *ἐπίδειξις* of what behaviors hunters should display and therefore serves as a model for its own adherents in blaming the vitiated theories of the sophists (13.3, 13.6) and praising the virtues acquired through hunting practice (13.10–16).¹¹⁶ Hunting is, in sum, a praiseworthy activity precisely because it provides the opportunity for earning irreproachable praise, through service to the *polis* (13.12).

¹¹³ 12.10–17. Xenophon's imagined disputants are called out for their lack of education in making this claim; this lack makes them ineligible for properly dispensing blame (12.16).

¹¹⁴ 13.17; see also 12.19–22, where the unseen figure of Virtue distributes praise and blame (cf. *Memorabilia* 2.1.21–33, discussed below, chapter two). Cf. also 5.34, where the hunters must preserve planted crops not only for the crops' sake, but also to be an example to other hunters. Additionally, the dogs are watched by the hunter and are eager for the hunter's praise: the hunter shouts encouragement to them at all times (6.17–21) and tailors the shouts to the natures of the individual dogs in order to motivate them best (6.24–5). Cf. *Education of Cyrus* 5.3.46–50; see also Arrian *Cynegeticus* 17.1–2 and especially 18.1–2: *χαίρουσιν γὰρ ἐπαινούμεναι* [sc. αἱ κύνες], *καθάπερ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ γενναῖοι*.

¹¹⁵ On *καλοκάγαθία*, see Doty 2001:6–7, citing Johnstone 2010:147–8; cf. also 10.21.

¹¹⁶ The final chapter (13.1–18) is a tirade against the teachings of the sophists. Phillips and Willcock 1999:164–6, among others, compare many of the points made by Xenophon with those found in Isocrates' *Against the Sophists*; see also L'Allier 2012. Johnstone 2010:150 describes Xenophon's approach to hunting as a redirection of the "agonistic impulse" of Greek political life, so that aristocratic members of the *polis* can cooperate in serving the state rather than destroying it through competing against one another. Contrast the sophists, who hunt the wrong game (13.9).

In both the *Peri Hippiques* and the *Hipparchicus*, the *polis* is expressly that of the Athenians. Xenophon has been anticipated in publishing his *Peri Hippiques* by one Simon, who, Xenophon says, has dedicated at the Athenian Eleusinium a bronze horse, the base of which contains depictions of his deeds (1.1).¹¹⁷ Xenophon admits that his treatise will cover similar ground to Simon's and that he is glad to include points on which he is in agreement with his predecessor.¹¹⁸ It is to be understood, through this veil of approval, that there are also points on which they disagree; Xenophon's own modesty makes a stark contrast with Simon's overt self-praise. Rather than glorify any individual, Xenophon's treatise will suggest how to integrate the aristocratic horseman into democratic society.

Above all, Xenophon sees horse-owning as a civic enterprise: riding horses can be a pleasurable activity (cf. *Hipparchicus* 8.6), but the horses are meant first and foremost to serve the needs of the estate and of the *polis*. To be able to judge a horse properly—to praise or blame its qualities—is to be an effective member of the state. Likewise, Xenophon shows the value of the equestrian expert through praising and blaming various techniques and articles of equipment.¹¹⁹ This display of the author's knowledge is matched in the content of the treatise by an ever-present concern for propriety of display. His advice is often defensive—how one can show off a horse without looking like a fool

¹¹⁷ The Eleusinium is mentioned also at *Hipparchicus* 3.2 as an ideal waypoint in a cavalry demonstration. A portion of Simon's treatise survives, the text of which has been edited by Widdra 1964:41–4 as a companion to an edition of the *Peri Hippiques*. Soukup 1911 also provides an edition, with commentary. Pliny (34.19.76) mentions a statue of Simon (*equitem Simonem, qui primus de equitatu scripsit*) by Demetrius; see further Soukup 1911:35, Bugh 1988:91.

¹¹⁸ Arrian (*Cynegeticus* 1.5) posits Xenophon as his own predecessor on analogy with Xenophon's citation of Simon; he furthermore claims that there was no strife between Xenophon and Simon (οὐχὶ ἐριδί τῇ πρὸς Σίμωνα). Cf. the stance of Onasander at the start of his own technical treatise (*prooem.* 10).

¹¹⁹ The word ἐπαινέω in this treatise usually means something like the English (re)commend. Instances of this word and associated terms for blame include 6.4, 6.5, 6.16, 7.4, 7.5, 7.9, 7.13, 7.14, 8.10, 11.11 (bracketed by some editors), 12.5, 12.11, 12.12, and 12.13. Cf. *Hipparchicus* 1.17, 4.10.

(7.2, 10.1)—but at times (7.10, 10.17, 11.9) one finds the proud culture of display that finds even fuller expression in the *Hipparchicus*. The eleventh chapter of the *Peri Hippikes* conveys the potential majesty of a parade on horseback, and here the author returns to his predecessor Simon (11.6). Xenophon cites Simon here in an elegant bit of ring composition that underscores the point made in this passage, that the horse's obedience, like the obedience of any of Xenophon's human characters as discussed earlier, must be voluntary. When this is the case, a horse and its rider seem to be subjects worthy of sculpture (11.8) that arrest the view of any who witness them (11.9), iterating in life the display that Simon made in stone. A cavalry commander who rides out in such an excellent state will not diminish the appearance of his subordinates by outshining them, but his very excellence will compel their horses to mirror his own (11.10–11). Anyone who pays attention to Xenophon's praise and blame for the techniques of horsemanship can, with sufficient wealth to buy a horse, come close to the charisma of Xenophon's Cyrus. In the end, the treatise comes down from this reverie to discuss military equipment and training (12.1–13), but this turn places even greater emphasis on the civic obligations of horse-owners to model correct behaviors.¹²⁰ The civic-mindedness of Xenophon's treatise makes it a far more appropriate memorial to its author's virtues than Simon's dedicatory statue. This superiority of text to image, where praise is concerned, will emerge repeatedly in subsequent chapters.

Whereas the *Peri Hippikes* concerns the individual horseman, the *Hipparchicus* addresses itself to the elected commanders of the Athenian cavalry. As with the *Poroi*, this treatise allows one to see how Xenophon applies his general theory of leadership—

¹²⁰ Cf. Ischomachus' constant self-training in cavalry warfare (*Oeconomicus* 11.17, with Socrates' compliment at 11.19).

using praise to encourage competition and thereby boost productivity—to actual practice within the context of the Athenian democracy.¹²¹ His theory can be applied all the better to Athens because of the φιλοτιμία peculiar to this *polis*, especially relative to the Spartans and Boeotians.¹²² In order to make the best use of this φιλοτιμία, the hipparch should make his phylarchs engage in healthy competition with one another (φιλοτιμοῖντο) in training the men under them.¹²³ Just as in the case of Hieron and his chariot-racing, however, the honor-driven phylarchs (1.23) should not go to great lengths to outstrip their subordinates in superficial displays of prowess: for instance, it brings the *polis* better repute if the entire regiment, and not just its phylarch, is sumptuously costumed (1.22). A capable hipparch, therefore, will manipulate and moderate the φιλοτιμία of his lieutenants for the greater good.¹²⁴ The best example of this manipulation is the advice to place the φιλοτιμότεροι of the decarchs in the front ranks (2.2). Elaborating on his preference for this formation (2.6), Xenophon stresses that, simply by having honored the decarchs with their rank, the hipparch ensures their desire to perform on the battlefield; at the same time, the formation increases the efficiency with which

¹²¹ Higgins 1977:133 claims that the treatise must actually have been written at Athens, but Xenophon's physical presence at Athens has little relevance for his interest in his native *polis*. Bugh 1988:154–8 also connects the *Hipparchicus* and *Poroi*, regarding the role of non-Athenians in the military.

¹²² In a hypothetical conflict with the Boeotians, properly-trained Athenian forces would be φιλοτιμότεροι (7.3) and thus victorious. Later in the treatise, φιλοτιμία can be fed through putting the Athenian forces in friendly competition with allied mercenaries (9.3) and metics (9.6). While Sparta is adduced as an example of successful incorporation of mercenaries (9.4, an understated instance of self-praise, as Xenophon himself would have been among them; cf. Delebecque 1973:110), the link to Xenophon's advice in the *Poroi* (2.5) suggests that metic φιλοτιμία, especially when opposed to the begrudging obedience of the περίοικοι and helots of Sparta, was a phenomenon peculiar to Athens.

¹²³ 1.21: φιλοτιμοῖντο γὰρ ἄν, ἧ τὸ εἰκός, ὥς πλείστους ἕκαστος ἀποδείξει ἀκοντιστὰς τῇ πόλει. Cf. below, chapter two, on the *Agésilas*, especially 1.25. Only once (3.11) does Xenophon bring up the fact that there were two hipparchs at Athens (Aristotelian *Athēnaion Politeia* 61.4; cf. Delebecque 1973:6); this potential rivalry could engage the hipparch's own φιλοτιμία.

¹²⁴ See 1.25 (παρόρησις τῶν φυλάρχων εἰς τὸ φιλοτιμεῖσθαι); cf. 1.12.

orders are handed down through the ranks. Xenophon's theory thus combines the more psychological aspects of praise with a pragmatic view of the battlefield.

As is discussed further in chapter two, Xenophon often constructs parallels between the rhetorical display of his own knowledge and the performances through which his ideal leaders become exemplars for their followers. In the *Hipparchicus*, this modeling requires the hipparch to put on a good show at religious festivals and other occasions when a cavalry display is necessary (3.1).¹²⁵ He is to serve, in essence, as χορηγός, ensuring a visually captivating and impressive performance rivaling the Athenian choral and theatrical tradition, at times even within the Agora, which had long served as a performance space.¹²⁶ The many shrines and statues of the Agora (3.2) give the hipparch competition for attention, but also supply him with a symbolic audience as he performs his virtue before an array of gods and heroes.¹²⁷ Xenophon, making his own sort of ἐπίδειξις, carefully choreographs his recommended cavalry display, naming specific monuments and maneuvers to perform around them (3.2–5). Through such a performance, the hipparch can deliver to the *polis* a lesson in virtue just as powerful as one could find in drama, and one even more tightly connected to the civic sphere by virtue of the physical landscape.¹²⁸ In addition to their ideological value, however, the

¹²⁵ Xenophon links cavalry performances to literary endeavor through an abundance of forms of ἐπιδείκνυμι (3.1, 3.4, 3.7, 3.8, 3.10); for ἐπίδειξις and parallel displays of author and subject, see below, chapters two and three.

¹²⁶ The other spaces are the Lyceum (3.6–9), Hippodrome (3.10–13), and Academy (3.14), though the Agora is marked out by its placement first within the series and the relative wealth of detail within the description of the maneuvers.

¹²⁷ The emphasis on the gods as an audience for the hipparch's display is typical of Xenophon's religiosity as expressed in this treatise and elsewhere. For the piety of the hipparch and its effects, see 1.1–2, 3.1–2, 3.4, 5.11, 5.14, 6.1, 6.6, 7.1, 7.3–4, 7.14, 8.7, 9.2, 9.8–9.

¹²⁸ Xenophon compares the cavalry displays to the choruses of the Dionysia, in the need for paying homage to all the gods of the Agora (3.2), but he casts aspersions on the theater at 2.7 and especially 1.26, where he

hipparch's displays have a practical military application: just as the hipparch seeks to impress onlookers in the exhibitions, so too should he be able to use ἐπίδειξις (5.6) to deceive the enemy as to the true strength of his forces (5.5–7).¹²⁹ Even in battle itself, the hipparch must be in control of appearances, using feints to harm the enemy and preserve his own troops' lives (8.24). That these maneuvers are described in terms similar to those of the cavalry exhibitions lends a unity to the overall picture of Xenophon's ideal commander: successful ἐπίδειξις, combined with proper recognition of φιλοτιμία, grants that fortune and the gods will join together in praising (συνεπαινῇ, 5.14) the hipparch and his endeavors. Xenophon's own ἐπιδείξεις, meanwhile, through imparting the arts of hunting, horsemanship, and leadership to his audience, aim to ensure the good of the community while bringing benefit to their individual practitioners.

Conclusion

In Xenophon's theory of leadership, stated most simply, the leader must inspire voluntary obedience in the followers. This claim by itself is no road map to success, however: Xenophon's works also emphasize the means of achieving this state. In order to attain this obedience, the leader must correctly apportion rewards and punishments at frequent intervals, inventing occasions for the apportionment—that is, contests—whenever natural competition slackens. Xenophon's focus, however, is not on punishments, which should be handled delicately and meted out by subordinates if

marks the importance of the character of the *laudator* in an act of praise. Cf. *Hieron* 9.6, 9.11. Xenophon also disparages the professional athlete (*Hipparchicus* 8.7); for this fifth- and fourth-century *topos*, see Harris 2009.

¹²⁹ In this particular passage Delebecque 1976:102 asserts that Xenophon intends that these methods be used to deceive the βουλή as well as the enemy regarding the strength of the troops, but this reading is neither required nor implied by the context.

possible; rather, he sees rewards as the key motivator of success. He never loses sight of economic reality, though, and therefore the rewards that he proposes are, except where plunder from a military enemy is available, less tangible. This is where praise enters the picture: the leader will inspire performance by conferring even purely symbolic honors upon meritorious individuals. This praise inspires emulation of the *laudandus*' deeds in addition to teaching the audience nuances of leadership that they can then apply to their own subordinates. All the while, success at leadership garners praise for the leader, who must possess a native sense of φιλοτιμία in order to recognize it in others.¹³⁰

Each of Xenophon's ideal leaders exhibits this pattern described, regardless of the field of endeavor: Cyrus on the battlefield and in the camps; Hieron, potentially, in domestic governance, and Simonides in advising him; Ischomachus within his own household; the hunter with his dogs and slaves; the hipparch in his training procedures; Socrates in conversing with powerful Athenians; Lycurgus in his laws; the Spartan king Agesilaus, as will be seen in the next chapter; and finally Xenophon himself, not only in the *Anabasis* but in his role of preceptor for the hunter, the horseman, and the hipparch. This array of examples lends universality to Xenophon's claims, which are often expressed in anthropological terms (e.g., *Hieron* 7.3). It would be perverse to assume that the *Hieron* or the *Education of Cyrus* were composed solely for the benefit of those rulers with powers as broad and talents as marvelous as those of the titular autocrats; rather, in Xenophon's theorizing there is no small amount of *a fortiori* argumentation, through which he magnifies the scope of his investigations into human nature.

¹³⁰ It may be objected that none of the above pattern seems to acknowledge the tensions outlined above, in the introduction: that there is an element of risk for *laudator* and *laudandus* both in the singling out of an individual for praise within an envious collective. For Xenophon, in an ideal civic landscape, open access to praise mitigates the forces of envy (cf. the silver-miners of *Poroi* 4.5–6). The *Hellenica* and *Anabasis* illustrate what happens outside the ideal, as discussed below, chapter two.

The resulting observations are then to be applied by leaders on any scale, though always with special reference to the civic sphere. The *polis* is at the center of Xenophon's thought, even when he advises which horses to buy or how to conduct hunting dogs, and more often than not it is the Athenian *polis* to which his thought responds. Xenophon imposes a sort of rigor on the chaotic system of military meritocracy he observed in his youth at Athens, at the same time expanding it into other forms of civic endeavor. Despite appearances, his system of rewards and punishments need not be at odds with the random nature of allotted magistracies, provided that the magistrates and the ἐκκλησία give and receive credit as warranted—as indeed they did, increasingly over the course of the fourth century, by means of honorary statues and inscribed decrees. It was perhaps the Athenian value of φιλοτιμία that most attracted Xenophon's gaze, especially as it appeared to him opposed to customary Spartan behavior, which nonetheless provided him with correctives for Athenian excess.¹³¹ Xenophon takes the practices of his native city and expands them into a theory of human behavior, adjusting as necessary in order to perfect and universalize his recommendations.

The universality of this theory, its Athenian origins, and its contamination with foreign customs and philosophically-derived notions are perhaps best encapsulated by an ancient interpreter of Xenophon's thought, the anonymous author of the letter that purports to be from Xenophon to Agesilaus.¹³² The letter reflects on Xenophon's philosophical investigation into and exposition of νόμοι, including those of Sparta.

¹³¹ Cf. Seager 2001:396. Higgins 1977:36 presents a contrary view of Xenophon's opinion of φιλοτιμία among the Athenians.

¹³² Preserved by Stobaeus 2.31.128, s.v. περὶ ἀγωγῆς καὶ παιδείας. Xenophon's status as an exile from Athens, though one no less markedly Athenian, was picked up at other moments of his reception as well: witness Pausanias' report (5.6.6) that Xenophon's tomb was shown at Scillus, the place of his exile, but that the statue associated with it was made out of Pentelic stone.

“Xenophon” claims that, despite what some may consider unpatriotic elements of his political proposals, he would be capable, if it came to it, of dodging a γραφή παρανόμων—no better signal that Xenophon’s writings were judged in antiquity by the standards of Athenian civics. According to the letter, Xenophon escapes the charge because he is patently neither “a lover of mortal νόμοι” nor “a praiser (ἐπαινέτης) of foreign νόμοι,” but rather of those “divine and eternal νόμοι” considered to be more worthy of study. That is to say, any non-Athenian aspects of his proposals are not out of line even if he appears to have borrowed them from Sparta. Instead, his theories stem from a consideration of the universal good and should therefore be unimpeachable.

Throughout his corpus, Xenophon nonetheless retains a sort of realism. Even the ideal practitioners of his praise-culture cannot ensure an everlastingly perfect society: the narrator laments how Cyrus’ Persia goes to ruin in the next generation and how the Spartans have fallen from Lycurgus’ intentions; Ischomachus, Callias, the Deinomenid tyrants, and many of the heroes in the *Cynegeticus* have unfortunate ends awaiting them. What Xenophon himself could not know was that his recommendations for the use of praise in Greek society would in fact be taken up—if not directly from his works, then at least from the culture that produced them. The virtues constantly praised in the *Education of Cyrus*, for instance, are the same as those espoused by the Hellenistic kings, adapted more literally than they ever could have been within a democratic context.¹³³ The culture of display as described and prescribed in the *Hipparchicus*, where the author stresses the novelty of his positions, becomes the norm for Hellenistic cavalry parades.¹³⁴ Finally,

¹³³ See Farber 1979.

¹³⁴ See Dillery 2004.

Xenophon's emphasis on rewards and punishments in military contexts was shared already by his contemporary Aeneas Tacticus, who stresses the need for praise and encouragement, rather than excessive blame and punishment, while under siege (38.4–5).¹³⁵ Later writers on strategy, such as Onasander (33.6, 34.1–5, cf. 1.13–15), continue to develop the topic along Xenophontic lines, but it must be noted that Polybius, at least, did not see Xenophon's advice being employed fruitfully by Hellenistic Greeks: his preferred model for the proper distribution of rewards and punishments was, as might be expected, that of the Romans (6.39.1–11). There is little, however, to separate Polybius' description of the Roman general's practice from that proposed by Xenophon, and one suspects that, just as Xenophon underscored his desired ethical system by ascribing its invention to the Persian other, so too does Polybius, in praising the Romans as a model of virtue, attempt to educate his own contemporaries, having adopted both the lesson and the manner of his Attic predecessor.

¹³⁵ As stated in this passage, he considered the art of communicating with subordinates important enough to warrant a separate treatise (titled τὰ ἀκούσματα), now lost.

CHAPTER 2

Xenophon's encomiastic performances

The letter discussed at the end of the preceding chapter—the letter, preserved by Stobaeus (2.31.128, *s.v.* περὶ ἀγωγῆς καὶ παιδείας), purporting to have been addressed by Xenophon to his friend and patron Agesilaus—concerns itself with the proper mode of education, defined in this letter as in part Laconian and in part derived from philosophical reflection. The anonymous author of this letter must have been an acute reader of Xenophon, for the latter could not but agree with the recommended education: it places a premium on hearing stories of the virtuous (ἀνδρῶν ἐπ' ἀρετῇ τὸν βίον διενηνοχότων) and on associating “with moderate men” (σὺν ἀνδράσι σώφροσιν), so as to habituate the future πεπαιδευμένος to their ways. In these words Xenophon's own adulation of, among other exemplary figures, his teacher Socrates rings clear, as does his insistence on the role of conditioning in training, whether of hunting dogs, horses, or humans. The passage in Stobaeus, presumably the entirety of the letter, then ends with this explanation:

πέφυκε δὲ πάντων μὲν ζώων κρατεῖν τὸ ἔθος, παντὸς δὲ μᾶλλον ἀνθρώπου.
κινδυνεύομεν, ὃ Ἀγησίλαε, μιμηταὶ εἶναι τῶν λεγομένων τε καὶ δρωμένων.

And habit holds a natural sway over all animals, but especially humans. We may well be, Agesilaus, imitators of words and deeds.

The word μιμηταὶ speaks volumes. The author of the letter may, for instance, have used this word in order to wink at the pseudepigraphic enterprise. One should, however, consider more seriously the role of imitation of words and deeds within Xenophon's

corpus. Not for nothing is the letter addressed to Agesilaus, as the last sentence reminds the reader by repeating his name: it is in the unusual work *Agesilaus* that Xenophon commits a most risky act of praise, in the name of educating Greece about the Spartan king's virtue.¹ In doing so he emulates Agesilaus' own risks and himself jockeys for literary praise just as he aims for his subject to acquire the praise of the Greeks—and aims thereby to modify their behavior.

The present chapter attempts to describe the emulative relationship among *laudator*, *laudandus*, and audience in Xenophon's praise-texts. In these texts Xenophon applies his theory of the role of praise in society, as discussed in the previous chapter, to actual practice. His modes of praise will be compared in the next chapter with those of his contemporary Isocrates. The encomiastic similarities between these authors suggests—though the innovations made by each as a literary artist should not be discounted—that Xenophon and Isocrates partook in a cultural discourse of praise peculiar to fourth-century Athens. The civic values to which they were responding and which they performed and shaped would in turn affect the delivery of praise for centuries to come.

Those writings of Xenophon whose examination was deferred in the preceding chapter all attempt—though in some instances not throughout nor as their primary purpose—to pass judgment on the author's contemporaries, usually recently deceased.² These texts fall into three rough categories. In the first are Xenophon's historical

¹ On risks in the *Agesilaus*, see further below; contrast *Hipparchicus* 4.13. Note also in the letter presently under discussion the sentence-initial verb κινδυνεύομεν.

² Gray 2011:70–118 covers similar ground to the present chapter, which is indebted to Gray's perspicacity and insistence on taking Xenophon's praise unironically (see especially Gray 2011:62–7, 117–18); nonetheless, Gray's interests and ends differ from those of the present chapter.

writings, the *Anabasis* and the *Hellenica*, in which military leaders, Greek and Persian, come under the author's magnifying glass. Xenophon analyzes their moral and political failings and accomplishments, and he does not spare even himself the critical eye in the course of the *apologia* for his dealings with Cyrus the Younger. The second group of texts comprises those in which the author's image of Socrates predominates: the *Apology* and *Memorabilia* constitute first and foremost, as the author himself emphasizes through various framing devices, encomia of Socrates.³ Finally, the third "group" contains only the *Agesilaus*, a work *sui generis* within the Xenophontic corpus and nearly unique in fourth-century literature. In all these works, Xenophon is concerned with the exemplary function of his praise, encouraging imitation of the virtues of the *laudandi* while also putting forth his texts as monuments of his own virtues. Key to this educative performance is the term ἐπίδειξις, "display," which describes the author's own undertaking but which is also often used of the actions of the *laudandi*: Xenophon reinforces his ethical messages through the parallelism between the figures within the text and the composition of the text itself.

Cyrus and his epigones

Anabasis

As did Cyrus the Great, Cyrus the Younger provided Xenophon with paradigms of effective rule, or at least proved an adequate conduit through which Xenophon could

³ The *Symposium* is also useful for painting the picture of the philosopher among his fellow Athenians. Despite the presence of Socrates, the *Oeconomicus*, for the purposes of this project, has greater affinity with the *Hieron* and so has been discussed in the previous chapter.

convey them.⁴ Xenophon's most explicit account of his former captain comes in the first book of the *Anabasis*. The Cyrus he presents is a master of praise, as Xenophon shows both in the narrative section of the first book and in the obituary occupying much of its conclusion. While Cyrus is alive, he uses praise to suggest a sort of parity between him and his forces, praising them first as part of a promise that they will have reason to praise him later (1.4.16). He motivates his lieutenants Menon and Clearchus to work toward a common purpose through encouraging a rivalry for honors (e.g., 1.4.17, 1.6.5), while taking care to defuse any escalating violence within the Greek ranks (1.5.16–17). As Xenophon portrays him, Cyrus also shows a particular understanding of how to praise Greeks: in crafting Cyrus' exhortation speech (1.7.2–4), Xenophon draws on a rhetoric of freedom and envy that would not have been out of place at Marathon or Thermopylae.⁵ His distribution of favors secures Cyrus the fidelity of his lieutenants up to the bitter end (1.8.28–9, 1.9.31).

Constrained by the story of his expedition to relate in the main action only Cyrus' final deeds, Xenophon nonetheless manages to incorporate further praise of the would-be king through the device of the obituary notice (1.9.1–31).⁶ Following what would become the traditional ordering of encomiastic and, later, biographical texts, Xenophon begins

⁴ The slippage in Xenophon's thought between the two figures is evident in, e.g., the quick movement from one Cyrus to the other at *Oeconomicus* 4.18. Cf. *Anabasis* 1.9.1.

⁵ Rood 2004:309–11.

⁶ Elsewhere in the *Anabasis*, the obituary notice is by no means solely a vehicle for praise. The author passes judgment on the leaders executed by Tissaphernes in quick succession: the notice for Clearchus (2.6.1–15) is ambivalent from the very beginning (ἄνθρωπος καὶ πολεμικὸς καὶ φιλοπόλεμος ἐσχάτως); that for Proxenus (2.6.16–20) strikes a firmer ethical note, sounding Xenophon's own ideals, but Proxenus falls short through lack of pragmatism; the potentially admirable φιλοτιμία of Menon (2.6.21–9) is foiled by his unethical means, which may in Xenophon's eyes have justified his end; and finally some slight praise for two additional commanders comes at the end of the series (2.6.30). So important a character as Cheirisophus receives no similar evaluation upon his passing (6.4.11). On these notices see also Tuplin 2004:28 and Hägg 2012:16–19.

with an account of Cyrus' education (1.9.2–6); the rest of the notice is taken up not, as might be expected from modern biographical practice, with a chronological account of his life, but rather with a summary of Cyrus' virtues coupled with anecdotes in which these virtues are put on display.⁷ Exemplarity is key in all stages of Cyrus' life: Xenophon depicts him admiring others and being admired himself. This admiration begins with his upbringing in the royal household, where “the sons watch and listen while people are being honored by the king, and others dishonored, so that straight from childhood they study ruling and being ruled.”⁸ The young Cyrus surpasses his fellows in modesty and obedience, as well as in feats of skill related to military practice, including hunting. From this latter arena derives the only particularized event from Cyrus' childhood (1.9.6): Cyrus was attacked by and killed a bear. The core of the anecdote, apart from the expression of Cyrus' fortitude, comes at the end, where it is said that he bestowed conspicuous favor (πολλοῖς μακαριστὸν ἐποίησεν) on the first person to come to his aid. This enterprise, including the great risk involved—Cyrus is, after all, described as φιλοκινδυνότατος—forms a microcosm of his life, encompassing both his violent end and his conspicuous talent at the game of χάρις.⁹

In the remainder of the notice, Xenophon conspicuously repays an apparent personal debt to Cyrus through praising him for his mastery of this particular skill. Cyrus' stated mission in life is to outdo his friends in the performing of favors (1.9.11), a goal expressly approved by the narrator (1.9.24). It is important, however, that Cyrus also

⁷ Cf. below, regarding the *Agesilaus* and *Evagoras*.

⁸ 1.9.4: θεῶνται δ' οἱ παῖδες καὶ τιμωμένους ὑπὸ βασιλέως καὶ ἀκούουσι, καὶ ἄλλους ἀτιμαζομένους· ὥστε εὐθὺς παῖδες ὄντες μανθάνουσιν ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι.

⁹ Cf. Hägg 2012:17–18, along with *Education of Cyrus* 1.2.1.

wants to be conspicuous in performing these favors: Xenophon emphasizes how the display of virtues, and not just the virtues themselves, granted Cyrus the reputation that made his revolt possible (1.9.29). Early on, as satrap, he displayed (ἐπέδειξεν, 1.9.7) his faithfulness and repeatedly put it on display (ἐπεδείκνυτο, 1.9.10) thereafter; he also valued in turn those who were striving to make their own displays of virtue (βουλόμενος ἐπιδείκνυσθαι, 1.9.16); he was furthermore keen on making conspicuous alongside himself anyone he was honoring (ὥς δηλοίη οὖς τιμᾶι, 1.9.28). By putting on display this encomium of Cyrus' virtues, Xenophon also makes it known to the audience that he himself requites kind offices and makes a point of honoring the virtuous.

Xenophon sets up the Persian as a paradigm of leadership at the opening of the *Anabasis* in order to assist the audience in judging the effectiveness of the many other figures who attempt to manage the Greek mercenaries, Xenophon himself *in primis*. Cyrus' leadership techniques—praise, display, benefactions—crop up frequently, providing object lessons in their practice while at the same time allowing Xenophon to judge the practitioners.¹⁰ The Laconian terror Clearchus, for instance, never praises, but motivates his men through fear and punishment (2.6.10); Proxenus, his opposite, only uses praise, and therefore appears weak (2.6.20), though Xenophon does point out that Proxenus shares Cyrus' professed love of using a lofty position to help others (2.6.17).¹¹ Xenophon tellingly treats Clearchus, who is obsessed with his own personal honor (e.g., 1.3.3–6) but whose only attempt to share honor with others comes off as duplicitous at best (2.1.17–18), after the pattern of his treatment of Cyrus: just as Cyrus praised others,

¹⁰ Dionysius of Halicarnassus characterizes the whole work as large-scale (μέγιστον) encomium of the Cyreians (*Epistula ad Pompeium* 4.1), though there is of course much more nuance than pure praise.

¹¹ Reichel 2007:26 suggests that Cyrus is the middle term between Clearchus and Proxenus; cf. Momigliano 1993:52

so does Xenophon praise Cyrus; just as Clearchus led by means of compulsion (2.6.13), so too does Xenophon write about Clearchus out of the necessity of recording his deeds, though without any particular pleasure.

It is the figure of Xenophon himself, however, whose traits as a leader the narrative invites the audience to judge most closely and most thoroughly. By the criteria established in the case of Cyrus, he is successful in spite of many setbacks, at least in ethical terms.¹² His concern with putting on a display is in turn put on display by the author in matters ranging from his attire (3.2.7) to instituting prizes in battle (4.3.29) and in games (4.8.25–8) in order to encourage φιλονικία (4.8.27). He even accedes to the more brutal leadership techniques of the late Clearchus, not as useful in themselves, but so as to make the enemy fear the discipline put on display by the Greeks (3.2.31). Xenophon the author supports the efforts of Xenophon the commander by taking care to memorialize the virtuous, as when he records the names of hoplites jockeying with each other for honors (4.1.26–8) that are paid out in no small way by the composition of the text.¹³ Xenophon depicts himself as fighting doggedly on behalf of the soldiers whom he leads, on numerous occasions and at times to his own detriment, in order to prove that both in the event and in the act of writing he has properly paid back their χάρις.

Xenophon the commander shows many times an acute awareness of how his and the soldiers' deeds will be memorialized, using praise—specifically expected praise from

¹² For Xenophon's self-presentation in the *Anabasis*, see Rood 2004 *passim* (and especially 2004:323) and Ferrario 2012:361–71. For “in the case of Cyrus” one may also read “in the case of Agesilaus,” on which see further below.

¹³ Cf. Cawkwell 1976:74.

mainland Greeks—as a carrot in his speeches to the soldiers.¹⁴ He considers his personal honor within his private thoughts, as well (e.g., 6.1.20).¹⁵ On the several occasions when he vocally defends his own actions, he discusses the soldiers’ opinions of himself in an attempt to corral these opinions into a positive, leadership-worthy reputation.¹⁶ The fifth book ends, in fact, with one of these speeches, which Xenophon concludes by stressing how the soldiers blame him for slights but do not recall his good deeds, chief among them the praise and honor he has distributed (5.8.25). In this way, Xenophon the author memorializes his own self-defense, and he furthermore confirms a positive impression of it with the stated outcome of the episode: “After this, they started standing up and recounting things, and consequently it turned out well.”¹⁷ Not only are the hearers persuaded, but the author has started them all historiographizing, mimicking his own praise of Xenophon the commander: they model how the audience should carry forward their own praise of the author.¹⁸ He has just claimed that “it is fine and just and pious and more pleasurable to remember good deeds rather than bad ones,”¹⁹ and thereby the author provides himself with a pretext for biasing the narrative in his own favor, defending and praising his actions and his narrative choices at the same time.

¹⁴ Cf. the nearly identical wording of 5.7.33 and 6.6.16. Both speeches successfully persuade the audience, and, after the former, Xenophon institutes Athenian-style εὐθυναί. Cf. 6.3.18, where he posits future praise coming not from the Greeks, but from the gods.

¹⁵ Cf. Higgins 1977:91.

¹⁶ Compare 5.8.25 and 7.6.33.

¹⁷ 5.8.26: Ἐκ τούτου μὲν δὴ ἀνίσταντο καὶ ἀνεμύνησκον, καὶ περιεγένετο ὥστε καλῶς ἔχειν.

¹⁸ See further Ferrario 2012:373.

¹⁹ 5.8.25: ... καλὸν τε καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον καὶ ἥδιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν κακῶν μεμνήσθαι.

This compounding of praise—taking place within the narrative, actuated by the fact of narration, and ethically modeled by both the internal and the external Xenophon—shows itself clearly toward the end of the narrative as well, as Xenophon declines to remain with Seuthes. In the prose equivalent of stichomythia, the two go back and forth, each trying to convince the other, and Seuthes even tempts Xenophon with additional honors (7.7.50), but in the end Xenophon’s winning argument is this (7.7.52):

Ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν σὴν πρόνοιαν ἐπαινῶ· ἐμοὶ δὲ μένειν οὐχ οἶόν τε· ὅπου δ’ ἂν ἐγὼ ἐντιμότερος ᾶ, νόμιζε καὶ σοὶ τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν ἔσεσθαι.

At any rate I commend the thought you take for me, but I for my part cannot stay. But wherever I am more highly honored, consider that it will be a good thing for you as well.

Seuthes gives in, partly owing to Xenophon’s courtesy of praise (ἐπαινῶ) in the immediate present, but more importantly because of Xenophon’s ability to memorialize him: it will be more worthwhile for Seuthes to allow Xenophon to spread his reputation abroad, allowing his fortunes to rise and fall with Xenophon’s. That Seuthes makes this choice, trusting Xenophon’s historiographical skill, provides a model for the reader’s faith in the author as well.

Beyond what is suggested by Xenophon’s own speeches, the author also provides exemplars for praising Xenophon’s deeds in the form of third parties who commend him within the narrative. The first is Cheirisophus (3.1.45): previously the only thing he knew about Xenophon was that he was an Athenian, but after Xenophon’s speech (3.1.35–44) he praises him and states a desire to have an army full of Xenophons.²⁰ Xenophon’s Athenian background is linked to his being praised by Seuthes, as well, when the

²⁰ While Xenophon does not manage to bend the army to his own character within the *Anabasis*, in the more idealized *Education of Cyrus* something of the sort occurs with Cyrus the Elder; see above, chapter one.

Odryian first attempts to lure him with an offer of Thracian strongholds that would fall under Xenophon's personal command (7.3.19). This offer strikes at a tension present already in the fifth book, as Xenophon contemplates ceasing his νόστος and founding a city.²¹ At that moment he let go of his ambitions, but throughout the seventh book the question of his personal power and legacy comes even more under the microscope. The obvious precedent for an Athenian maintaining private fortresses in Thrace would have been Alcibiades, whom Xenophon risks becoming through Seuthes' flattery.²² Once he manages to offend Seuthes by standing up for the soldiers (7.5.8), it looks as though the offer has been rescinded and Xenophon spared the choice, but in the end, back in Seuthes' good graces, the disenchanted Xenophon outright refuses the fortresses when they are offered (7.7.50). That he refuses in accordance with the advice of Zeus Basileus (7.6.44) does not make the refusal any less significant; rather, it allows Xenophon to point up his own piety. Furthermore, other speakers confirm the positive assessment of Xenophon as φιλοστρατιώτης, the virtue of self-effacement that gets him into trouble with Seuthes.²³ Even the morally dubious Heracleides' use of this adjective (7.6.4), though intended as sarcasm, can be taken as valid from the audience's point of view, while the praise from Charminus the Lacedaemonian (7.6.39) is more straightforward. In this elegantly plotted series of episodes, Xenophon the author allows his internal avatar

²¹ 5.6.15, on which see Rood 2004:320–1 for an intertextual analysis. Ma 2004:343 engages in a delightful reverie on this scenario and its hypothetical aftermath in modern scholarship. On the νόστος and Xenophon's representation of himself as an Odyssean heroic figure, see Tuplin 2003 *passim*.

²² See also Rood 2004:328 and Ferrario 2012:368–9 on Xenophon's potential for becoming another Alcibiades at *Anabasis* 6.1.19–24. See Sears 2013 *passim* regarding Thrace's appeal for Athenian elites in this era, and especially 2013:114–17 for Xenophon's motives.

²³ Xenophon the commander's most explicit reference to tension between his honor and the soldiers' needs comes at 7.7.40. See also 7.6.38, where he attacks their present treatment of him, despite that they had previously referred to him as εὐεργέτης.

not only to be praised—moderately by some, extravagantly by Seuthes—but also to maintain his integrity in the face of such praise, winning the approbation of the reader according to the ethical models proposed within the work up through its imminent conclusion.

Hellenica

The *Hellenica*—written, at least on the surface, with less concern for self-representation than is the case with the *Anabasis*—nonetheless provides comparable moments of interplay among the characters, narrator, and reader, as Xenophon passes judgment on the powerful individuals and cities that populate his history. There is not, however, a programmatic passage in the *Hellenica* comparable, for example, to Diodorus Siculus 15.1.1–5 either describing Xenophon’s method or handing down so broad a verdict on the Spartans in particular. One must instead make do with more scattered authorial comments; Vivienne J. Gray’s 2003 article provides an excellent starting point for one examining Xenophon’s “interventions” in the narrative as indicative of his methods.²⁴ The following analysis examines the role of praise and blame in the text, treating both evaluative statements made by characters and interventions of the authorial voice, in order to demonstrate the importance of praise to Xenophon’s ethical lessons.

Among the least complex instances of praise are those that record some brief approbation, as in the Athenian assembly (1.7.12, 7.1.12).²⁵ Xenophon also frequently

²⁴ See especially Gray 2003:111–15.

²⁵ In neither instance is initial praise from the assembly followed by the adoption of the motion lauded. One suspects that Xenophon treats praise in the assembly as a device to heighten the drama of the inevitable rejection and, later, the customary regret of the δῆμος, as the historiographers often portray it (cf. Thucydides 3.36.4). The speaker at *Hellenica* 7.1.12, Procles of Phleius (cf. Gray 1989a:118–20), had earlier adduced Spartan fondness for praise as an argument in an attempt to persuade the Athenians of Sparta’s good faith (6.5.42).

presents praise as a motivating factor, trotting out a character's hypothetical process of thought; where Xenophon's authorial voice does not concur with the praise or source of pride, the result for the participants is usually catastrophic.²⁶ Perhaps most useful, however, for examining Xenophon's literary technique of praise are those passages in which the narrator delivers it directly, *in propria persona*, as when he famously praises Theramenes' dying words.²⁷ Xenophon acknowledges that these are "quips unworthy of being related" (ἀποφθέγματα οὐκ ἀξιόλογα)—unworthy, that is, of the austere history he has set out to pen.²⁸ This austerity is in fact defined in the breach: with his willfully out-of-character praise of Theramenes' own willfulness, Xenophon manages to display his own habitual integrity while also using this *laudandus* as an exemplar both for how to behave and for how to write or not to write history.²⁹

Xenophon's verdicts are sometimes corroborated by the speeches or actions of his characters, a device that strengthens his authority as narrator on top of the authorizing technique in the aforementioned case of Theramenes.³⁰ This interweaving of what might

²⁶ See 4.4.6 (the motives of certain Corinthians), 5.3.10 (the people of Phleius have been made overconfident by the praise of Agesipolis), 6.3.3 (Callias enjoys hearing himself praised, even if he's the one talking—probably not an altogether positive trait, *pace* Gray 1989a:124), 6.5.23 (the Thebans overextend themselves thanks to excessive praise), 7.1.23 (flattery moves the Arcadians, though at 7.1.25–6 the narrator suggests that it is more or less justified), and perhaps 7.3.12 (a gnomic statement on the occasion of the burial of Euphron: οὕτως, ὥς ἔοικεν, οἱ πλεῖστοι ὀρίζονται τοὺς εὐεργέτας ἑαυτῶν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι).

²⁷ 2.3.56: καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἄγνοῶ, ὅτι ταῦτα ἀποφθέγματα οὐκ ἀξιόλογα, ἐκεῖνο δὲ κρίνω τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαστόν, τὸ τοῦ θανάτου παρεστηκότος μήτε τὸ φρόνιμον μήτε τὸ παιγνιώδες ἀπολιπεῖν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς.

²⁸ It is not necessary to enter here into the debate surrounding Xenophon's merits as a continuator of Thucydides; one need not look beyond this passage for the implication of austerity, though one could compare, e.g., *Hellenica* 4.8.1 for the claim that the author will only include ἀξιόλογα.

²⁹ Gray 1989a:28 sees this passage as programmatic for how "Xenophon is boldly and unabashedly championing the idea that history should concern itself with great and astonishing moral achievements." Contrast Tuplin 1993:37. Gray 1989a:200–1n.17 provides a helpful review of past commentary on Theramenes' death scene. For this passage as ψόγος of Critias, cf. Usher 1979:40–1.

³⁰ In Theramenes' case there can also be perceived a certain sympathy of rhetoric between narrator and subject: Xenophon's οὐκ ἄγνοῶ construction at 2.3.56 takes its cue from a line he has just given to

be called “direct” and “indirect” praise finds its fullest expression with five characters in particular: the Theban Epameinondas, the Athenian Iphicrates, and three Spartans—Dercylidas, Agesilaus, and Teleutias. The case of Epameinondas is dealt with most easily: famously ignored as an actor by Xenophon until the final book (7.1.41), Epameinondas receives direct praise in the run-up to Mantinea (7.5.8, 7.5.19–22), but this praise is delivered only in the context of the commander’s φιλοτιμία-driven downfall.³¹ One need only compare, e.g., Diodorus Siculus (15.88.1–4) or Pausanias (8.11.9) to see the restraint applied by Xenophon to his praise of Epameinondas: the author proves his own magnanimity by giving some credit where it is due, but he makes these direct comments only at a point where they can be read as little more than a begrudging epitaph. Had he wished to use Epameinondas as a straightforward positive *exemplum*, Xenophon could have named him, let alone praised him, earlier in the narrative. As it stands, this praise shows off Xenophon’s sense of fairness more than it rewards any quality of Epameinondas.

The second of these characters, Iphicrates, is not new to the narrative in the relevant passage of the sixth book. Earlier he had entered the story with little fanfare (4.4.9) and departed it again with a flourish, after defeating the Spartans at Abydos (4.8.39). His next major appearance pits him against the Spartan commander Mnasippus, if only in terms of leadership skills, as Mnasippus is killed through his own incompetence

Theramenes (2.3.53). Contrast passages such as 1.1.30–1, where Hermocrates of Syracuse is praised, but the author takes no pains to speak in the first person and the complimentary phrases are largely restricted to the opinions of others. Rahn 1971:499n.6 treats this passage as a forerunner of Xenophon’s methods in the later books of the *Hellenica*; Gray 2011:101 ascribes the seemingly restrained praise to lack of autopsy. Cf. also the internal praise of Polydamas of Pharsalus (6.1.2–3), whose subsequent episode contains a complex interweaving of praise motifs.

³¹ Xenophon’s attitude toward the Thebans generally, against which his comments on Epameinondas must be read, has been discussed recently by Sterling 2004. For the role of φιλοτιμία here, see Sterling 2004:459–60; cf. Tuplin 1993:156–7.

(6.2.22) before they can meet in battle.³² Xenophon directly condemns Mnasippus' abilities at 6.2.19, having earlier allowed a more vague *vox populi* to malign his character (6.2.6, 6.2.16). As for Iphicrates, the Athenians have dispatched him to oppose Mnasippus' siege of Corcyra. Although he was not their first choice for the command (6.2.13), his training exercises prove him worthy of it: he insists on using the oars rather than the sails as much as possible, to keep his men in good shape (6.2.27); he institutes a contest to minimize the time spent at each waypoint (6.2.28); and he has other sound practices as well (6.2.29–31) that lend themselves to positive comment by the author (ὥσπερ προσήκει, 6.2.29). Iphicrates, according to Xenophon, has perfectly combined his goals with his methods (6.2.32):

ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἐπαινῶ, ὅτι ἐπεὶ ἀφικέσθαι ταχὺ ἔδει ἔνθα τοῖς πολεμίοις ναυμαχῆσαι ὤρετο, ἤϋρετο ὅπως μήτε διὰ τὸν πλοῦν ἀνεπιστήμονας εἶναι τῶν εἰς ναυμαχίαν μήτε διὰ τὸ ταῦτα μελετᾶν βραδύτερόν τι ἀφικέσθαι.

[Everyone makes preparations], but I praise the fact that [Iphicrates], when he had to arrive quickly where he thought he would be engaging the enemy, found a way to keep his men from forgetting their combat skills because of the voyage and from arriving too late because of practicing them.

Not long after, Iphicrates recommends as colleagues for himself some of his Athenian rivals, Callistratus and Chabrias (6.2.39).³³ Xenophon praises him directly at this juncture as well, not only for obtaining intelligent advisers regardless of political inclinations but also for his pointed display of μεγαλοφροσύνη—in this instance a positive trait, as his recommendations resulted in success, at least in Xenophon's view (6.2.39).

Iphicrates, in sum, uses among other methods a contest for praise and mollifying his rivals with honor to accomplish multiple ends at once, just as Xenophon uses his

³² For further analysis of this episode and its ethical components, see Rahn 1971:506–7.

³³ On this passage cf. Gray 2011:94–5.

praise of Iphicrates both to memorialize his actions and to create an ethical paradigm, heightened by contrast with the obtuse Mnasippus, for the good leader. Iphicrates was in a way a more successful version of Xenophon himself, in that he accepted the offer of Seuthes refused by Xenophon in the *Anabasis* and indeed married into Seuthes' family.³⁴ He also obtained and kept—until his prosecution after Embata—a reputation as an esteemed Athenian commander. In the end, however, Xenophon follows the same pattern as with Mnasippus in criticizing Iphicrates' later actions: he reports the grumbling of the troops against Iphicrates (6.5.49) before attacking him directly (6.5.51–2). Xenophon tempers his general criticism of the veteran leader (εἰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλο τι καλῶς ἐστρατήγησεν, οὐ ψέγω, 6.5.51) but nonetheless roundly censures him for the particular errors of judgment that allowed the Thebans to escape from the Peloponnese: Iphicrates left an important route unguarded (6.5.51) and—apparently a worse error in the author's view, though it had no immediate consequences—risked his entire cavalry on a scouting mission (6.5.52). The narrator dilates on this latter concern and uses a didactic tone to step out of the immediate narrative, expounding on the proper use of cavalry: the author of the *Hipparchicus* would not have made such a mistake.³⁵ In this fashion Xenophon sets his own authority on leadership above even that of the previously lauded Iphicrates. Furthermore, at 6.5.49, Xenophon says that this was the first time they were faulting Iphicrates (πρῶτον ἔψεγον αὐτόν): “first” likely points to Iphicrates' merits as displayed earlier, but it may also refer to his later disgrace and prosecution, during which process

³⁴ See especially Anaxandrides K-A fr. 42.

³⁵ Cf. *Hipparchicus* 4.5–20; Gray 2011:96 also cites *Hipparchicus* 8.9–11. Iphicrates should also have known better: here he displays a folly similar to that of the Spartan Anaxibius, which folly Iphicrates had earlier turned to his own advantage (*Hellenica* 4.8.36). For Xenophon's lack of patience with mismanaged cavalry, see also *Hellenica* 6.4.10–11, which contains, as Xenophon bemoans the state of the Spartan cavalry, what Sterling 2004:454 calls “the most bitter invective Xenophon makes against the Spartans.”

Xenophon may have been writing the *Hellenica*. Praise and blame of Iphicrates would therefore have held great contemporary significance.³⁶

Of the Spartans Dercylidas, Teleutias, and Agesilaus, the last will receive a fuller treatment later, in the discussion of the homonymous encomiastic work. Regarding the first two, Xenophon praises Dercylidas through the persona of the anonymous captain of the Cyreians, speaking to the representatives of the Spartan ephors (3.2.7): the author's deliberate vagueness allows the reader familiar with Xenophon's biography to assume that he stands behind this sentiment, even if it was in fact spoken by another or never uttered at all in this form or on this occasion. While it might appear that Xenophon does not want to claim these words overtly, having omitted his own name, he names neither Dercylidas, whom he praises, nor Thibron, whom he censures. The short speech, rather, is a masterpiece of Laconic expression, proof set in the narrative by Xenophon to show that he can deal out praise and blame in modes suited to his audience.³⁷ Notably, the context in which he delivers this praise is one in which his own behavior is being examined: the ephors have instructed their representatives to convey praise and blame, and describe the conditions of future praise and blame, to the soldiers (3.2.6). The anonymous speaker's response accordingly refers, as should be expected in Xenophon, the behavior of the soldiers to the merits of their commanders. Dercylidas afterward continues to prove himself an effective commander along Xenophontic lines, especially in the episode immediately following, in which he constructs a wall across the Chersonese (3.2.8–10): notably, he seizes the initiative, sacrifices before beginning

³⁶ See further chapter four, on civic honors for Iphicrates and others.

³⁷ Cf. later Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1367B: δεῖ δὲ τὸ παρ' ἐκάστοις τίμιον ὃν λέγειν ὡς ὑπάρχει, οἷον ἐν Σκύθαις ἢ Λάκωσιν ἢ φιλοσόφοις.

construction, and uses prizes as incentives for the builders (3.2.10). Later on, he uses the language of euergetism (4.8.4) to convince the people of Abydos to persist in their loyalty to the Spartans. Despite that the speech is made up primarily of platitudes, the platitudes are well chosen, and Dercylidas accomplishes his typically Xenophontic object: eager obedience (προθύμως ἐπείσθησαν, 4.8.5).

Like Dercylidas, Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus, is praised by his soldiers, in this instance when he is relieved from command of the Lacedaemonian fleet by Hierax (5.1.3). Although on this occasion Xenophon was not necessarily among them personally, he nonetheless injects his voice into the scene to ratify the soldiers' praise.³⁸ Even though Xenophon includes no indications of any "noteworthy (ἀξιόλογον) expense, risk, or maneuver" on the part of Teleutias at this juncture, he suggests that the audience should ponder just how Teleutias managed to garner such lavish praise from those he led (τοὺς ἀρχομένους). Indeed, according to Xenophon, "this is a more noteworthy (ἀξιολογώτερον) deed for a man than spending a lot of money or facing many dangers." Xenophon praises Teleutias for the sheer fact that he receives praise; even though Teleutias has already been mentioned a few times in the narrative, this praise is mostly unsubstantiated and therefore puzzling.³⁹ One is left to work out, from the preceding narratives of commanders both failed and successful—particularly Agesilaus—and from one's knowledge of Xenophontic ethics, what sort of leadership was so amply rewarded.

³⁸ 5.1.4: γινώσκω μὲν οὖν ὅτι ἐν τούτοις οὔτε δαπάνημα οὔτε κίνδυνον οὔτε μηχανήμα ἀξιόλογον οὐδὲν διηγοῦμαι· ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία τόδε ἄξιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀνδρὶ ἐννοεῖν, τί ποτε ποιῶν ὁ Τελευτίας οὕτω διέθηκε τοὺς ἀρχομένους. τοῦτο γὰρ ἤδη πολλῶν καὶ χρημάτων καὶ κινδύνων ἀξιολογώτερον (Dindorf's emendation for ἀξιολογώτατον) ἀνδρὸς ἔργον ἐστίν. On ἀξιόλογον see Tuplin 1993:37–8; cf. 4.8.1 and the discussion of 2.3.56 (Theramenes' death) above.

³⁹ Teleutias' previous appearances: 4.4.19 (where he and Agesilaus are praised together), 4.8.11, 4.8.23–5.

Xenophon reveals the answer incrementally in the subsequent chapters: in short, Teleutias meets, on multiple occasions (5.1.3, 5.1.13, 5.1.18, 5.2.37), with such enthusiasm from his men because he reflects the virtues of Xenophon's Cyrus the Younger. Teleutias' address to his men (5.1.14–17) outlines his ethics of command, chiefly that he will repay enthusiasm (προθυμία) in any way he can and that he—like Xenophon's Cyrus the Elder—strives to equal himself to his men and vice versa.⁴⁰ He goes on to praise their earlier good actions in order to exhort them to better ones (5.1.16), but he recognizes the ethical limits of praise as well: he prefers autarky to having to flatter others for money (5.1.17). This latter sentiment is not merely an ethical point, as it aims at informing his audience that the only money—and food—they can expect will be that which they claim through victory and which will double as a source of εὐκλεία. With logistical efficiency, Teleutias then fulfills two of his duties at once, sacrificing and thereby providing additional food to his men as an incentive (5.1.18). He later fulfills his promise to funnel spoils back to his men, with the result that “his soldiers were following him gladly and swiftly” (5.1.24, τοὺς στρατιώτας εἶχεν ἡδέως καὶ ταχέως ὑπηρετοῦντας). When Teleutias holds the command against Olynthus, the allies of Sparta flock to him “because he seemed to be not ungrateful to those who performed services for him.”⁴¹ This skill at inspiring χάρις is, in Xenophon's eyes, the predominate characteristic of Cyrus the Younger, and for Teleutias it pays dividends: for instance, after having had to

⁴⁰ For the rewarding of προθυμία, cf. especially *Anabasis* 1.9.18; regarding Cyrus the Elder, see chapter one, above.

⁴¹ 5.2.37: ... προθύμως τῷ Τελευτίᾳ ὑπηρετοῦν, καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἀχάριστος ἐδόκει εἶναι τοῖς ὑπουργοῦσι τι. The Thebans are separated out from the rest of the allies: they follow Teleutias expressly to earn the favor of Agesilaus, a more Machiavellian consideration. In addition to characterizing the Thebans, perhaps Xenophon interjects Teleutias' more powerful brother at this moment to prepare for Teleutias' Cyrus-like death, soon to follow.

cajole the Elimeians into joining his forces (5.2.38), he rewards their obedience by stationing their leader Derdas and his cavalry in an honorable position (5.2.40). Derdas in turn repays this confidence on several occasions, and even after Teleutias' death, with both zeal and skill.⁴² Nonetheless, despite Derdas' victorious cavalry maneuvers—reminiscent of the Greeks at Cunaxa—Teleutias' attack on Olynthus ultimately fails because he, like Cyrus, is inopportunately gripped by anger and killed (5.3.5–6).⁴³

These four figures—Epameinondas, Iphicrates, Dercylidas, and Teleutias—represent different facets of successful leadership and are therefore praised by Xenophon; all but Epameinondas make use of praise and rewards to obtain their ends. As has been seen, however, these *laudandi* are also not immune from the author's blame. Teleutias' death affords the author a chance to rail against ὀργή (5.3.7), deeming it inferior to γνώμη, but the more salient point in this aside is the general one, that one should find lessons in such disasters (ἐκ μέντοι γε τῶν τοιούτων παθῶν ἐγὼ φημι ἀνθρώπους παιδεύεσθαι). The statement is programmatic for Xenophon's history, as he urges the audience to take the praise and blame he doles out with the utmost seriousness and educative purpose. Just as Xenophon praises Teleutias extraordinarily, so too will he not spare him extraordinary censure, so that benefit can accrue to the reader and Xenophon himself receive credit for his just arbitration of history. The author has learned from his own experiences, as put on display in the *Anabasis*, and the virtues and the failings of Cyrus, as well as those of Xenophon's younger self, must be borne in mind in order to

⁴² 5.2.41, 5.3.1–2, 5.3.9 (ἔτι προθυμότερον ἢ πρόσθεν).

⁴³ Perhaps Xenophon's vague citation of "others" who have fallen prey to similar errors (5.3.5) is intended to alert the audience to the presence of a patterned narrative, in this case with the pattern adapted from Xenophon's own experience and *oeuvre*. See also 5.3.7, in which anger prevents one from properly harming one's enemies (part of Cyrus' creed: *Anabasis* 1.9.11).

judge the ever-changing cast of commanders who fill out the *Hellenica*: the praise and blame they receive is to be weighed against the precedents of the *Anabasis* and against Xenophon's authorial self-presentation.

Xenophon's praise of individuals can be fruitfully compared with his praise for various collectives. The examples of the Phleasians and of the Athenian cavalry are perhaps the most illuminating. Xenophon's digression on the Phleasians (7.2.1–23) is preceded by an apology, couched in Herodotean terms, for celebrating so small a city, whose faithfulness to Sparta nonetheless warrants memorialization. Xenophon depicts the Spartans as honoring the Phleasians' good faith (7.2.3) to support the authorial evaluation of their collective character, which reaches its climax, following a distinguished act of clemency, with a rhetorical question: "How indeed could anyone deny that men who do such things are well-bred and valiant?"⁴⁴ Any doubts remaining in the minds of the audience would then be dispelled by the subsequent anecdote, in which the Athenian general Chares is moved to action by a speech of a group of Phleasians (7.2.20): the speech stresses their piety, tactical knowledge, and perhaps above all their awareness of Chares' φιλοτιμία. Before the final plunge into the ἀκρισία and ταραχή with which the end of the *Hellenica* characterizes the post-Mantineian state of affairs (7.5.27), Xenophon uses the Phleasians to remind his audience that the chaos is the product of Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, and that there still remain positive ethical exemplars elsewhere. That he singles out no individual Phleasians for praise, or even for naming,

⁴⁴ 7.2.16: γενναίους μὲν δὴ καὶ ἀλκίμους πᾶς οὐκ ἂν τις φαίη εἶναι τοὺς τοιαῦτα διαπραττομένους;

heightens their value as exemplars, as no complications of individual ambition and purpose enter their narrative.⁴⁵

The anonymous Phleasians prepare the way for the valor of the undifferentiated Athenian cavalry at Mantinea. These men respond to the suppliant Mantineians (7.5.15) with immediate, self-sacrificial action, prompting another rhetorical question from the narrator: “Who would not admire the virtue of these men, too, in that hour?”⁴⁶ Xenophon goes on to describe the cavalrymen’s process of thought, ending with how they “longed to rescue their ancestral glory” (ἐρῶντες ἀνασώσασθαι τὴν πατρώϊαν δόξαν). The author’s praise for the resultant action is concise but thorough: they accomplish their objective, those who die fall to worthy opponents and their comrades diligently rescue their bodies, and the survivors are clement toward the enemy. After the Athenians’ display of virtue, Epameinondas and the *Hellenica* both hasten toward their ends, throwing focus on the cavalrymen as precipitating, in terms of narrative if not in terms of strategy, the end of the campaign.

As with the Phleasians, it is impressive to see the Athenian cavalry acting as one, with no names named. Nonetheless, Xenophon’s audience would likely have known some of the unnamed individuals, among whom was Xenophon’s own son, Gryllus. It is said that Gryllus was honored with encomia by some of the intellectual lights of his day, and that a painting at Athens depicted him in the action at Mantinea.⁴⁷ Xenophon’s

⁴⁵ The Phleasian leader Procles had appeared earlier, most recently to give the speech that opens the campaign (7.1.1–12), but not in the digression.

⁴⁶ 7.5.16: ἐνταῦθα δὴ τούτων αὖ τὴν ἀρετὴν τίς οὐκ ἂν ἀγασθεῖη;

⁴⁷ Painting: Pausanias 1.3.4, 8.11.6; Pausanias has Gryllus wounding Epameinondas, an impossibility from Xenophon’s narrative but nonetheless of obvious appeal as a story, given the fame of the two figures. Encomia: Diogenes Laertius 2.55, citing Aristotle (ἐγκώμια καὶ ἐπιτάφιον Γρύλλου μυρία ὅσοι συνέγραψαν, τὸ μέρος καὶ τῷ πατρὶ χαριζόμενοι) and Hermippus (stating that Isocrates wrote one).

restraint in praise is therefore marked: despite his well-known and all too close connection to a prominent individual in the cavalry, he ostentatiously occludes the relationship in order to present himself as an unbiased interpreter of events. Here, just as in the *Anabasis* and the passages of the *Hellenica* discussed earlier, Xenophon's framing and diction of praise are critical ingredients in his self-presentation.

In praise of Socrates

The following paragraphs cannot begin to do justice to the philosophical underpinnings of Xenophon's portraits of Socrates, any more than a similar amount of text could scratch the surface of Platonic philosophy.⁴⁸ It is nonetheless the goal of this section of the chapter to describe, in brief compass, the ways in which Xenophon's Socratica are connected to the rest of his corpus, particularly as concerns their composition as vehicles of praise. While the *Symposium* and *Oeconomicus* undoubtedly have the praise of Socrates as one among their author's several aims, in the *Apology* and *Memorabilia* this praise is the most conspicuous purpose of the text. Xenophon here states repeatedly, in his own voice and in the voices of others, the reasons for which he lauds his former teacher and those for which he finds it necessary to defend him. For all four texts it is crucial to consider Xenophon's theories and modes of praise as expressed elsewhere, given the texts' didactic nature. Socrates, on whom copious praise and blame were focused both during his lifetime and after, is depicted as handing down his own

Speusippus, Plato's nephew and successor, was among Aristotle's *μυρίοι*, as was, it seems, Aristotle himself (Diogenes Laertius 4.4, 5.22; Aristotle's work on Gryllus also concerned the art of rhetoric: see Fortenbaugh 2007:45); see further Tarán 1981:194–5. Seneca (*De Beneficiis* 3.32.3) agrees with Diogenes' report of Aristotle in ascribing Gryllus' popularity to the fame of his father.

⁴⁸ For Xenophon, Waterfield 2004 provides a helpful starting point with a thorough and concise analysis of Xenophon's Socrates.

evaluative judgments on the behavior of his associates, and the audience is continually called upon to apply the lessons taught by the Socrates within the text to that figure himself, judging him for his adherence to the qualities he is made to espouse. Noteworthy also are the irrefutably Athenian setting and concerns of Socrates and his associates: while much of the ethical system laid out by Xenophon's Socrates could be followed in societies greatly distant from fourth-century Athens, the audience is never allowed to forget that the chief mission of this *imago* of Socrates is to improve Athenian political life. To accomplish this improvement both Xenophon's Socrates and Xenophon himself make extensive use of praise.

Apology

Xenophon's *Apology* partakes in the fourth-century debate over the legacy of Socrates and particularly in the debate over the circumstances and outcome of his trial in 399 BCE. Alongside it there remain Plato's *Apology* and notices of Polycrates' Σωκράτους κατηγορία; there may well have been other such texts in circulation.⁴⁹ How these pamphlets refer to and contend with one another has been much discussed, as has their relative dating.⁵⁰ Regardless of the chronology of the three works, it can be seen that this particular Athenian figure aroused a spate of literary reactions that couch the evaluation of Socrates—praise or blame—within a judicial fiction, allowing the audience

⁴⁹ The closest contemporary reference to Polycrates' work is Isocrates' scathing reprimand to Polycrates, under the guise of friendly advice, in the *Busiris* (11.4). Isocrates (11.5) mentions that Polycrates brought up Alcibiades' association with Socrates, presumably as a mark against the latter. Some believe that Libanius demonstrates in his own *Apology* (*Declamation* 1) that he read Polycrates' κατηγορία in full, but perhaps Libanius' own creativity is responsible for the discrepancies between his account and the circumstances of the trial as related in the extant *Apologies* (Livingstone 2001:32–6, Stokes 2012:245n.7).

⁵⁰ See most recently Stokes 2012 for a summary of the issues and contentions; see also Waterfield 2012, particularly for Xenophon's contributions.

to re-perform the Socratic controversy after the fact while also modifying the terms of the controversy to match the interests of the time period and individual authors. One should use caution in taking either of the surviving fourth-century *Apologies* as reflecting the actual trial, though it is fruitful to compare the two in order to bring out what is particularly Platonic or Xenophonic in each.

In contrast to its Platonic counterpart, Xenophon's *Apology* refers repeatedly to its praise function. Plato leaves this function more implicit, in part because of the format of his *Apology*.⁵¹ Whereas Plato presents only the three speeches of Socrates, Xenophon includes a narrative frame that allows the author to communicate his motives directly. Others, according to Xenophon (*Apology* 1), have depicted Socrates on trial previously, but they have fallen short of the mark of memorializing Socrates (Σωκράτους δὲ ἄξιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι μεμνησθαι) through an incomplete rendering of his choice to die. Instead of praising Socrates, they have made his mode of speech come off as “somewhat foolish” (ἄφρονεστέρα). Xenophon seeks to elevate Socrates, and his own account of Socrates, through blaming others, whether insufficient apologists or the actual prosecutors, as is most pointedly on display toward the end of the *Apology*, where Socrates and the narrator concur in their negative analysis of Anytus and his son (29–31).⁵² Here, as in the *Hellenica*, Xenophon puts this blame into the voice of a character as well as stating it in the narrative frame. Apart from blame, in the final sentences of the *Apology* the praise

⁵¹ E.g., the attempts of Plato's Socrates to counter the διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος that have plagued him (28A). Both *Apologies* nod to the tradition—one might almost say genre—of rhetorical exercises praising controversial mythological figures, such as Helen, Busiris, and Palamedes, the last of whom is mentioned by Socrates in both texts (Plato, *Apology* 41B; Xenophon, *Apology* 26). In Xenophon's *Apology*, the reference to Palamedes implies that Socrates looks forward to receiving posthumous praise, at least more than his accusers will receive (πολὺ καλλίους ὕμνους).

⁵² Cf. Socrates' curse upon the jurors in Plato's *Apology* (38C, 39C–D), with an emphasis on the blame they will receive in the future for their actions.

function is spelled out plainly: Xenophon, in his own words, can neither cease to remember Socrates for his wisdom and noble-mindedness nor remember him without praising him (34).⁵³

Xenophon's *Apology*, then, is a monument in praise of Socrates, and the internal figure of Socrates aides the author in accomplishing this goal. In both the *Apology* (2) and the *Memorabilia* (4.8.4), Xenophon ascribes his knowledge of the end of Socrates' life—for he was of course still absent from Athens in 399—to Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus and brother of the infamous rake Callias. This same Callias plays host to Xenophon's *Symposium* and is described by Xenophon in the *Hellenica* as “the sort of man who takes no less pleasure in being praised by himself than by others.”⁵⁴ Xenophon's Socrates, in order to make good on his choice to die, must also praise himself obnoxiously, though it is to be understood that he praises himself accurately. Xenophon therefore credits the more sensible and philosophical brother of Callias with this apparent innovation in the recounting of Socrates' trial and death: an emphasis on the modified, philosophically tolerable, and truth-based form of self-praise that Xenophon calls μεγαληγορία.⁵⁵

Socrates' self-praise looms large in the *Apology*, beginning with his conversation with

⁵³ For the encomiastic hyperbole of the adjective αξιομακαριστότατον in the sentence that follows this one and ends the work, cf. *Evagoras* 9.70, and contrast Plato's use of three much more common superlatives at the end of the *Phaedo* (118A); cf. Hägg 2012:27, on the end of the *Memorabilia*.

⁵⁴ 6.3.3: ἦν δ' οὗτος οἷος μηδὲν ἤττον ἠδεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλων ἐπαινούμενος. Gray 1989a:124 takes Callias' self-praise as virtuous rather than as a mark of his bad character, citing *Agesilaus* 8.2 (cf. Gray's more extended apologetic at 2011:105–11), but see further below on both the *Symposium* and the *Agesilaus*. The audience's knowledge of Callias' reputation—and Xenophon's interest in the ultimately failed potential of the various students of Socrates—should trump the available reading of this remark as a compliment. Gray (2011:110–11) is surely right, though, that the criticism of Callias has little to do with veiled “malign cleverness” on the author's part.

⁵⁵ *Apology* 1–2 (*ter*); cf. Danzig 2003:286–8, as well as Gray 1989b:136–7, discussing the rhetorical quality of propriety. Compare the brief reference in Plato's *Apology* to Socrates' manner of speaking, as he asks for the audience to indulge his μέγα λέγειν regarding the oracular response (20E). For other suggestions as to the importance of the ascription to Hermogenes, see Pangle 1985 *passim*.

Hermogenes (3–9): he insists not only that he has lived entirely satisfactorily, but also that his friends substantiate this claim (5); he desperately wants to avoid having to blame himself in his old age (καταμέμφομαι ἑμαντόν, 6); and he wants to put before the jurors his blessings and self-esteem, regardless of how it may irk them (9). Similarly, in his trial speech, while Socrates recognizes that the anecdote about Apollo’s response to Chaerephon might cause offense (14), he ostensibly softens the blow by comparing himself unfavorably to Lycurgus (15)—but in fact he uses the comparison as a springboard for a lengthy passage of self-praise (15–18). In this passage he lists his criteria for praising an individual and claims to meet each requirement, ending by asking, “Why indeed should I not justly be praised by gods and men?”⁵⁶

Socrates’ speech fulfills this purpose both within the dramatic situation and by virtue of Xenophon’s publication of it. This publication in turn advertises and canonizes what Xenophon believes to be the criteria for judging the life well lived. Within these criteria falls the educating of virtuous citizens (17), the chief goal of the Xenophontic philosopher and of Xenophon’s writings generally: the author shows Socrates praising Socrates and thereby praises his own goals, obliquely. At the same time, Xenophon makes it clear that all this willful self-praise was the cause of Socrates’ death (διὰ τὸ μεγαλύνειν, 32).⁵⁷ Only a Socrates can undertake this sort of μεγαληγορία, and then only with the proper motive, to bring about the end of his own life while making an ἐπίδειξις

⁵⁶ *Apology* 18: πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἤδη δικάως καὶ ὑπὸ θεῶν καὶ ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων ἐπαινοίμην;

⁵⁷ Despite that one might think self-praise both justified and necessary in a defense speech (cf. Plutarch, *Περὶ τοῦ ἑαυτὸν ἐπαινεῖν ἀνεπιφθόνως* 541E–F), Socrates’ lack of humility is meant to be taken as unviable within the constraints of the genre. Here Xenophon states that Socrates brought envy upon himself through this self-praise (μεγαλύνειν). Cf. the *Hieron*, where the ultimate goal is happiness without envy (11.15): the tyrant, as Hieron claims (2.17), cannot glory in his deeds (μεγαλύνεται), but rather must make defense speeches (ἀπολογεῖται).

of that life (33). While Xenophon cannot praise himself and his teachings so directly without incurring envy, he can come close by performing his own ἐπίδειξις of the virtues of his former teacher. In this way the author generates faith in the validity of the praise he bestows on Socrates and consequently in the ability of the praiseworthy qualities to improve the wayward Athenian state that had enabled the death of Socrates.

Memorabilia

The *Memorabilia* is an *Apology* writ large.⁵⁸ Like Xenophon's *Apology*, the *Memorabilia* seeks to exonerate Socrates from the charges leveled at him, which are refuted extensively in the opening chapters (1.1.1–1.2.64). The trial resurfaces later in the work as well (4.4.1–4), preparing the reader for a restatement of the themes of the *Apology* at the very end of the work, again channeled through the conduit of Hermogenes (4.8.1–11). Direct praise for Socrates in general terms is scattered throughout the work (e.g., 1.2.62, 4.1.1), but as in the *Apology* Xenophon's chief *modus operandi* is to present Socrates in conversation with one of his associates or disserting before an unspecified audience, and thereby to show Socrates' qualities and beliefs. The contents of the episodes, though they appear separate from one another, overlap with the contents of others and with the aims of the author. For example, on several occasions Socrates performs his role as go-between (cf. *Symposium* 4.56–64), connecting potential friends, as in the case of the rich Criton and the poor Archdemus (*Memorabilia* 2.9.1–8). Although Archdemus is accused of flattering Criton (κολακεύοι, 2.9.8), he defends his apparent sycophancy by citing his own virtue and that of his patron: he does no wrong in

⁵⁸ The following argument relies on the assumption that Xenophon's *Memorabilia* is a competent work of literature; perhaps regarding this text more than any other work Xenophon's artistry has been impugned. See Gray 1998 *passim* for the defense of this assumption of competence.

helping their mutual friends and attacking their enemies. Likewise Xenophon, for whom this tenet of popular Greek morality is always at the fore, could defend himself against blame for praising Socrates and attacking his accusers, through modestly placing himself in the role of the downtrodden Archdemus compared to Socrates' wealth of virtue.⁵⁹ Xenophon also performs the Socratic function of go-between through introducing the audience to his Socrates. The very next episode (2.10.1–6) is a doublet of that of Criton and Archdemus, in which Socrates encourages Diodorus to seek out the poor Hermogenes. Praised here to Diodorus and to the audience for his reliability and usefulness, Hermogenes later relays the crucial narrative of Socrates' trial and death.

While Xenophon was absent from Athens during the events surrounding the *Apology*, his prior acquaintance with Socrates could hypothetically have prompted him to place himself in some of the scenes set prior to 401 BCE, in order to add the authority of autopsy. Although the narrator often speaks in the first-person in order to frame the episodes, only rarely does he cite his own experience (e.g., 2.4.1), and only once does Xenophon actually appear as an interlocutor (1.3.8–13). Even in this episode he is merely a bystander, asked by Socrates to comment on the situation—Critobulus' love for the son of Alcibiades—and receiving a reproach for his efforts. The modesty of Xenophon's self-presentation, as in the case of his restrained praise for the Athenian cavalry at Mantinea, inclines one all the more to trust his guidance:⁶⁰ like his putative audience, he too once had an incomplete understanding of Socratic ethics but was set right by witnessing

⁵⁹ It is not Socrates, who usually gets the last word in the episodes of the *Memorabilia*, but rather Archdemus who places the capping moral on the episode (2.9.8), Socrates having dropped out of the action at 2.9.4. For perhaps a more straightforward example of this sort of transference of dramatic action to authorial purpose, compare Socrates' encomium of friendship at 2.4.5–7, which provides a standard whereby Socrates himself is to be judged.

⁶⁰ Cf. Gray 1998:94–104.

Socrates conversing with others. Ideally, the audience will undergo the same transformation, taking the author as a model.

The *Memorabilia*, then, serves as an ἐπίδειξις of what Xenophon has learned from his teacher, dedicated both to praising Socrates and to educating the audience. To these ends the author puts the words and deeds of Socrates on display—as he in fact states after the exordium rebutting the charges, in the course of introducing the main body of the work (1.3.1). It is appropriate that Socrates, throughout the *Memorabilia*, makes displays of his philosophy and encourages others to do the same, using the verb that describes an author’s undertaking. Socrates performs ἐπίδειξις in order to elucidate the deeper meanings of his examples and parables, but his displays are also of his way of life as opposed to his words alone.⁶¹ Xenophon devotes the whole of one episode to the problems associated with display. Here Socrates, substituting as usual the philosophic for the seamy, goes to visit Theodote, a famous beauty resident in Athens.⁶² Theodote, as it happens, allows artists to paint portraits of her, “putting on display as much of herself as is proper” (ἐπιδεικνύειν ἑαυτῆς ὅσα καλῶς ἔχου, 3.11.1). Socrates, his curiosity piqued, barges in with his associates during a modeling session and proceeds to watch until the painter is finished, at which point he asks who owes the greater gratitude (χάρις, 3.11.2): those to whom Theodote displayed her beauty, or Theodote herself, for the opportunity to display it? The initial conclusion, as Theodote agrees, is that she profits by their praise (τὸν ἔπαινον κερδαίνει) both now and, once word spreads, in the future (3.11.3). As their discussion continues (3.11.4–18), it emerges that Socrates and Theodote are members of

⁶¹ 1.5.6. At 4.8.1 the display includes the entire spectacle of the trial, both speech and exemplary behavior. Cf. δεικνύμι at 1.2.17–18 (*bis*). For ἐπίδειξις of deeper meanings, see 1.2.55, 3.9.11 (*bis*).

⁶² For further discussion of this episode see Goldhill 2010:180–91, where it is the centerpiece of an article touching on the civic dimensions of viewing and being viewed (see especially 2010:168–9).

the same profession: they are both hunters of friends, an area in which Socrates professes expertise and teaching credentials.⁶³ Such displays as Theodote makes are the μηχανή (3.11.5, 3.11.10) whereby she catches her game, and it is likewise Socrates' displays of virtue that have drawn to him Apollodorus, Antisthenes, Cebes, and Simmias (3.11.17), and not, as he jokes, love-potions and charms (3.11.16). By extension, Xenophon, in publishing the *Memorabilia*, disseminates the self-propagating praise by which the showman Socrates will profit, alongside the Athenian state.

The practice of praise that arguably permeates the work is supported by frequent theoretical discussion of praise, which first arises as Xenophon attempts to dissociate Socrates from his lapsed students Alcibiades and Critias. These two are plagued with excessive φιλοτιμία, which drives them to seek out Socrates for his political teachings and drives them away from him when they cannot abide his ethical restraints.⁶⁴ Xenophon argues (1.2.26–8), using the standard Socratic comparison of instruction in philosophy and instruction in music, that any teachers whose students ignore their teachings do not deserve the blame for these failings, but rather deserve praise when weighed against subsequent corruptive influences. Socrates, according to Xenophon, should be judged by these principles, though he adds as a caveat that a teacher's own use of praise must be sound as well, in order for the teacher to receive praise (1.2.29). Socrates' correct usage of praise and blame is illustrated by his reproach to Critias and

⁶³ Cf., for the plainest version of the sentiment, 1.2.7.

⁶⁴ 1.2.14, cf. 1.2.47. Higgins 1977:36 takes this passage as Xenophon's blanket indictment of φιλοτιμία, but it is clear from the superlatives used here, as well as the other adjectives applied to this pair (cf. 1.2.12), that they, like Socrates himself, are exceptional cases. As in other works of Xenophon, there are indeed acceptable forms of ambition, and within the *Memorabilia* itself Socrates displays his own sort of φιλοτιμία in his desire to be a useful friend (cf. 1.2.55, 2.3.16), for which he is honored by Xenophon (e.g., 1.2.62, 1.2.64).

the subsequent decay of their relationship (1.2.29–38); that his erstwhile students were overly obsessed with praise is shown by the anecdote, unique within the *Memorabilia* for Socrates' complete absence, of the conversation of Alcibiades and Pericles (1.2.40–6). Here Alcibiades, true to form, perversely equates law with lawless violence, but perhaps most interesting is his disingenuous—one might even say Socratic, though not put toward Socratic ends—mode of introducing the issue. He wants to know what laws are, “because, when I hear that men are being praised for being law-abiding (νόμιοι) citizens, I realize that you cannot truly obtain that kind of praise unless you know what a law is.”⁶⁵ Xenophon has him frame his inquiry through the implication that he, too, desires public praise. This characterization strongly distinguishes Alcibiades from Socrates, who in Xenophon's view did not desire praise from the state so much as deserve it from philosophic individuals, and yet who proved himself to be entirely “law-abiding” in life and death.⁶⁶

Perhaps the most famous episode of the *Memorabilia*, Prodicus' parable of the choice of Heracles (2.1.21–33) is also concerned with praise. In the episode's frame (2.1.1–20), Xenophon presents Socrates in conversation with the indolent Aristippus, attempting to convince the latter both that labor is essential for rulers and that he should aspire to accomplish something with his life, in order to earn praise and inspire emulation (2.1.19). In order to illustrate the choice between labor and indolence, Socrates gives a

⁶⁵ 1.2.41: ὥς ἐγὼ ἀκούων τινῶν ἐπαινουμένων, ὅτι νόμιοι ἄνδρες εἰσίν, οἶμαι μὴ ἂν δικαίως τούτου τυχεῖν τοῦ ἐπαίνου τὸν μὴ εἰδότα, τί ἐστὶ νόμος. For the definition of νόμιμος, compare the conversation of Socrates and Hippias (4.4.13–18).

⁶⁶ Cf. the language of episodes such as 2.3.1–19, in which Xenophon applies the language of φιλοτιμία and φιλονικία, used of politics and the military in his other works, to relations between individuals, here the brothers Chaerephon and Chaerecrates, who are to win each other's praise through emulative euergetism. Cf. also 2.6.1–39, in which analogies between the individual and the state abound; 2.6.12 in particular cites the value of sincere praise in winning friends.

less florid version (2.1.34) of what he calls the composition of “Prodicus the Wise” regarding Heracles, which Prodicus is said to show off (ἐπιδείκνυται, 2.1.21) before large audiences.⁶⁷ Socrates’ ἐπίδειξις of another’s ἐπίδειξις may call to mind that Xenophon, too, is representing the words of another for educative purpose; Socrates also betrays no overt sign of disagreeing with Prodicus, at least in the general import of the passage he has selected and reworded, and neither does Xenophon disagree with the Socrates of his own text.

Within the allegory, personifications of Vice (Κακία) and Virtue (Ἀρετή) jockey for the young Heracles’ attentions. Virtue, it seems, wins the day, at least insofar as she has the final speech; the choice between them is not narrated, though the audience will have assumed that Heracles chose Virtue in order to achieve his various labors and earn universal renown.⁶⁸ This renown lies at the heart of Virtue’s speeches and is opposed to Vice’s emphasis on bodily pleasures: by choosing Virtue, Heracles will garner more praise both for his deeds and for Virtue herself (2.1.27, 2.1.32). One can easily apply the notion of praise for both student and teacher to the relationship of Xenophon and Socrates. Furthermore, Virtue requires of Heracles both private and public euergetism (2.1.28, cf. 2.1.33), in line with Socrates’ individualistic ethics and Xenophon’s civic reforms. Finally, the form of Virtue’s speeches harmonizes with the content, as she delivers what amounts to a somewhat formal ἔπαινος of herself and a ψόγος or blame-

⁶⁷ Athenaeus (12.510C) attributes the crafting of the episode to Xenophon himself. Any Prodicus kernel is irretrievable, and it is safe to assume that Xenophon has molded the fable to suit his own purposes; he had no enticement to transmit Prodicus’ lecture unchanged (*pace* Sansone 2004).

⁶⁸ A scholium to Aristophanes, *Clouds* 361 reports Heracles’ eventual choice, though with no further detail than can be surmised from Xenophon’s version. Prodicus fragment 84 B 1 DK combines that notice with Plato, *Symposium* 177B; if it can be trusted, with DK and Sansone 2004:129n.22, that Plato’s remark refers to this parable, Plato, at least, felt comfortable calling this work an ἔπαινος of Heracles.

speech of Vice (2.1.30–1). In the latter passage Virtue castigates Vice for how she is incapable even of attaining true pleasures of the senses, in terms reminiscent of the *Hieron*: “You are deaf to the most pleasant sound of all, which is hearing yourself praised.”⁶⁹ The parable, though put in the mouth of Socrates and attributed by him to Prodicus, fits well within Xenophon’s project of civic improvement through praise and toward this end utilizes the same technique as his other works, that of multiple layers of praise for both speaker and subject.

Xenophon represents Socrates as deeply committed to civic improvement through educating politicians, as is shown in the conversations grouped together as the first half of the third book of the *Memorabilia*. In the views of Xenophon’s Socrates, those who do the most good for the state are those who have the appropriate expert knowledge.⁷⁰ Here one may compare the *Oeconomicus*, discussed in the previous chapter, which lauds the acquisition of expert knowledge through presenting both Ischomachus’ extensive content-knowledge and Socrates’ mode of inquiry; the same mode of leadership advocated in that text for the household is here applied to the *polis*. Although the likes of Critias and Alcibiades represent an “upper bound” acceptable ambition, leaders of the state should also be conspicuously φιλότιμος and φιλόνομος.⁷¹ The good general must, in addition to possessing the quality himself, also recognize the φιλοτιμία of others and put them in a position to exercise it, “taking risks for the sake of praise” (ἔνεκα ἐπαίνου

⁶⁹ 2.1.31: τοῦ δὲ πάντων ἡδίστου ἀκούσματος, ἐπαίνου ἑαυτῆς, ἀνήκοος εἶ. Plutarch quotes this line at *Περὶ τοῦ ἑαυτὸν ἐπαινεῖν ἀνεπιφρόνως* 539D. Cf. *Hieron* 1.14.

⁷⁰ 3.1.1–11 starts the theme; cf. 3.5.22–3, 3.6.1–18 (especially 3.6.16: the inexperienced politician gets blame rather than the praise he desires), 4.2.4–5, 4.2.28. Xenophon’s own expert knowledge of ἵππαρχία comes to the fore at 3.3.1–15, which includes a disquisition on deriving obedience from making clear one’s expertise (3.3.9), through action (3.3.10) and through words (3.3.11).

⁷¹ 3.4.1–12 provides a useful illustration.

κινδυνεύειν, 3.1.10). This φιλοτιμία is a special quality of the Athenians that leads them to victory over other states whether in choral competitions or in war, through their desire for ἔπαινος and τιμή.⁷² Xenophon even shows Socrates addressing an Athenian of defective φιλοτιμία, Charmides (3.7.1–9), and encouraging him to seek a leadership role within the state in order to aid both the state and his own associates.⁷³ In these discussions as well, Xenophon praises Socrates through depicting a Socrates keen to use praise for the benefit of the state, just as Xenophon would use praise to benefit the memory of Socrates.

Symposium

No moment in Xenophon's Socratica encapsulates the educative use of praise so well as Socrates' encomium of Callias toward the end of the *Symposium*. The *Symposium* as a whole narrates a series of ἐπιδείξεις, especially those put on, paid for, or otherwise encouraged by the host Callias, who demands everyone's attention as one himself ἄξιοθέατος for his love of Autolycus (1.10).⁷⁴ In addition to the nameless Syracusan's troupe of performers, each of the guests is called upon at various times to deliver a rhetorical demonstration—described with forms of ἐπιδείκνυμι (4.43, 4.46)—of praise for some topic, as is familiar from Plato's *Symposium* as well.⁷⁵ The narrative bounces

⁷² The choral analogy comes at 3.3.12–4; see further 3.5.3, and also 3.4.3 and 3.5.6 for other choral analogies for Athenian behavior.

⁷³ Cf. the list of criteria for praising a citizen at 4.6.14, as well as 1.2.4–6 for Socrates' principles of self-denial, including praise of exercise (1.2.4).

⁷⁴ See Gray 1992:61–2. Key passages of display prior to Socrates' encomium include 1.6 (Callias promises an ἐπίδειξις, for which Socrates and those with him praise Callias but initially decline, 1.7), 2.1 (the Syracusan makes his living through ἐπίδειξις, for which Socrates praises him, with some irony, 2.15), and 3.3 (Socrates reminds Callias of his promise to put on a display of his learning).

⁷⁵ While Xenophon does not use the word ἐγκώμιον or its cognate forms in any of his writings apart from the *Agesilaus*, it is clear that later authors, perhaps taking their cue from the terminology of Plato's

between the Syracusan's displays of physical prowess and the guests' displays of wit and character until Socrates manages to entice the Syracusan out of the room, clearing the way for his own *opus* in praise of love.⁷⁶ Like Alcibiades' encomium of Socrates in Plato's *Symposium*, the speech comes late, after each of the guests has delivered an oration on a set topic, but whereas Plato has the problematic figure Alcibiades praise the virtues of Socrates, in Xenophon the scene is reversed: the virtuous Socrates praises the infamous Callias.⁷⁷ While Plato's Alcibiades cannot be said to improve Socrates by praising him, Xenophon's Socrates has a clear educative intent, as Hermogenes is made to remark, appreciatively (8.12): Socrates means to improve the degenerate Callias through praise. Xenophon has Socrates use this same technique in the *Memorabilia* (3.5.22–3), where Pericles son of Pericles, like Hermogenes, is bright enough to see through the trick but nonetheless admits that Socrates' underlying advice, there also regarding service to the state, is sound (3.5.24).

Socrates addresses Callias' extraordinarily public love for Autolycus.⁷⁸ Largely avoiding the specifics of Callias' case, Socrates names him only once during the middle portion of the speech (8.28), and the tone of the address is didactic, which is to say

Symposium, felt the individual episodes in Xenophon's *Symposium* to constitute encomia: see Plutarch, *Συμποσιακά* 711E, and Lucian, *Περὶ ὀρχήσεως* 25, for Socrates' apparent encomium of dance (*Symposium* 2.16–19); these sources are discussed by Huss 1999:384–5.

⁷⁶ The Syracusan leaves at *Symposium* 7.5. For the constant rivalry between these two characters, see Pangle 2010:142–3, 146–51, and cf. their similar statements at 7.5 and 8.12.

⁷⁷ Callias was a target of Old Comedy (and Andocides) for, among other ethical failings, his relationship with Autolycus, which was put on stage in Eupolis' *Autolycus*. Erler 2007:20–1 sees Alcibiades' encomium of Socrates as a form of biographical writing; Nightingale 1993:123–7 ties it closely to Plato's views on praise as expressed elsewhere in the *Symposium* and in the *Lysis*.

⁷⁸ Socrates excuses this through their general celebrity: they have famous fathers and are also famous each in his own right (8.7); cf. what would later become the standard encomiastic opening, praise of the parents of the *laudandus*; for an early example, see Isocrates 10.16. At any rate Callias has chosen well, because his ἐρώμενος “puts on display to all” (πᾶσιν ἐπιδεικνυμένου) his fine character, which in turn reflects well on Callias (8.8).

prescriptive, rather than encomiastic, or descriptive. At every turn Socrates argues that the lover should inspire virtue in the beloved, and one cannot expect to render (ἀποδειῖξαι) one's beloved virtuous if one does not act virtuously also (8.27). The ἀπόδειξις incumbent upon the lover recalls another erotic metaphor from the *Symposium*, that of the μαστροπός, who must render (ἀποδεικνύναι, 4.57) his protégés attractive to as many people as possible, even to the whole *polis* (4.59–60): Socrates claims that Antisthenes excels at this particular art, having attached Prodicus and Hippias to Callias (4.62) and, what is more, having introduced Socrates himself to other sagacious types.⁷⁹ That Antisthenes effected these introductions through praise (πρὸς ἐμὲ ἐπαινῶν, 4.63, *bis*) prepares the way for Socrates to introduce Callias to the city by means of praise, once he has educated him properly in the ways of philosophic love.⁸⁰

In its conclusion the speech returns to Callias, who, according to Socrates, will be held in honor by Autolycus for serving as the latter's teacher in virtue (8.38). Socrates deftly slips from Autolycus to the *polis* as the recipient of Callias' putative improving arts, by placing Callias and Autolycus into an analogy with Themistocles, Pericles, Solon, and the Lacedaemonians and their native *poleis* (8.39).⁸¹ He then asserts outright that the *polis*—not just Autolycus—would hand itself over to Callias due to his inherited virtues and expert abilities (8.40). Callias, already ἀξιοπρεπέστατος in the community, would have a chance to prove his actions equal to his appearances, and thereby earn praise from

⁷⁹ Callias' philosophical proclivities are put toward quite a different rhetorical end in Plato's *Apology* (20A–C); cf. also the setting of the *Protagoras*.

⁸⁰ Cf. Pangle 2010:150–1.

⁸¹ Socrates includes “the Lacedaemonians” in a catalogue with his fellow Athenians in order both to look back at his earlier praise for the Spartans for their sexual propriety (8.35) and to praise Callias for his position as Spartan πρόξενος (*Hellenica* 6.3.4).

both Autolycus and his fellow citizens.⁸² Socrates then closes by apologizing for altering the tone of the gathering, interjecting “serious speech” (σπουδαιολογῆσαι, 8.41; cf. 1.1, 4.49). This seriousness reflects Socrates’ civic mission: like the *polis*, he has always been “a lover of those who are both noble by birth and ambitious seekers of virtue” (ἀγαθῶν γὰρ φύσει καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς φιλοτίμως ἐφιεμένων ἀεί ποτε τῇ πόλει συνεραστῆς ὢν διατελῶ, 8.41). He casts himself as not only sympathizing with Callias’ love of Autolycus but also as Callias’ lover—should Callias live up to his end of the bargain.⁸³ Callias’ bad habit of wanting to show off can be converted into a virtue, as long as his ἐπίδειξις is of his true ἀνδραγαθία (8.43); Socrates in turn has made a proper ἐπίδειξις in praise of Callias’ love, educating him just as he hopes that Callias will educate the *polis*.

At the conclusion of Socrates’ speech, Autolycus and his father Lycon depart, but not before the latter turns to Socrates and praises him as καλὸς κἀγαθός (9.1). Xenophon could have included no finer internal praise for Socrates and his teachings than this, that Socrates managed to wrest approbation from one of his future prosecutors.⁸⁴ This perception of the power and correctness of Socrates’ speech is supported by the very end of the narrative as well: whereas other guests at the symposium are driven off by the intoxicating effects of the Syracusan’s final ἐπίδειξις, Socrates and Callias leave together

⁸² This passage forms a counterpoint to the narrator’s praise of Autolycus at the beginning of the work (1.8–9), in that just as Autolycus’ appearance makes Callias finer to look at (1.10), so too should Autolycus and Callias reinforce one another’s virtues.

⁸³ The teaching has not missed its mark, as Callias, ignoring everyone else in the room but Socrates and Autolycus, spells out Socrates’ point: Socrates is attempting to “procure” (μαστροπεύσειν) Callias for the *polis* (8.42; Socrates confirms, 8.43). Cf. the savvy of Pericles the Younger in the *Memorabilia*, discussed above.

⁸⁴ See Huss 1999:399 on Lycon (with references), and 1999:402 for Lycon’s praise; cf. 1999:406.

in search of Lycon and Autolycus.⁸⁵ Socrates, it seems has won over Callias in favor of chaste, improving philosophy, at least for the time being, and despite his continued dissolute lifestyle Callias did take a minor but active role in military and diplomatic actions well into the fourth century.⁸⁶ For his part, Autolycus, though Xenophon does not allot him an obituary in the *Hellenica*, was famously put to death by the Thirty—a martyr either to his own quarrelsomeness or, as Diodorus would have it, to congenitally Athenian παρρησία.⁸⁷ Of all the participants in the symposium, however, it is Socrates who maintains the best press, in part due to Xenophon’s memorialization of him as the chief display and arbiter of ethical behavior: Xenophon wants his audience to aspire to such praise as Socrates would give. By implication, Xenophon also shows that he himself took the lesson so much to heart as to put it on display for future generations.

The encomium of Agesilaus

Xenophon presents Cyrus the Younger and Socrates of Athens as his role models, inviting his audience to judge his actions and literary output on the basis of the behaviors for which he gives these men praise. It is Agesilaus II of Sparta, however, whom Xenophon honors with a work unique within his corpus and dedicated entirely to praise, one of the earliest examples of the Greek prose encomium.⁸⁸ The *Agesilaus*, written in the

⁸⁵ See Pangle 2010:151 for suggestions as to how the Syracusan’s display complements Socrates’ speech. For another example of the potential civic value in ἐπίδειξις see 2.13, with the caveat that there is a dark irony in a Syracusan teaching Athenians martial valor in the years prior to the Sicilian Expedition.

⁸⁶ *Hellenica* 4.5.13–14, 5.4.22, 6.3.2–6; cf. Gray 2011:110. For Callias’ lifestyle after the dramatic date of the *Symposium*, cf. Andocides 1 *passim*.

⁸⁷ Diodorus Siculus 14.5.7. Contrast Plutarch, *Lysander* 15.5, and Pausanias 9.32.8; Pausanias also reports that there was a portrait statue of Autolycus in the *prytaneion* (1.18.3).

⁸⁸ Marchant 1920:27–8 succinctly dismisses the arguments against Xenophon’s authorship of the work; Sorum 1984 exemplifies more recent attempts to deny that the work is Xenophon’s. For the first example of prose encomium, the *Evagoras*, see below, chapter three.

years following the death of its subject *c.*360 BCE, is marked out even from the *Memorabilia*, to which it has the closest affinity among Xenophon's praise-texts, through its rhetorical quality and, above all, its tight focus on direct praise. While it shares with both the *Memorabilia* and the *Apology* a recurrent desire to avert potential blame from the *laudandus*, the *Agesilaus* surpasses those works in its explicit framing as an act of praise, from the very first sentence. This centrality of praise can be compared to E. L. Bundy's analysis of Pindaric encomium, in which Bundy argues that all aspects of the epinician ode, even those passages that had traditionally been considered asides and digressions, are subordinated to the goal of praising the addressee.⁸⁹ This is not to say that what follows will be a purely formalist analysis, but it will take Xenophon's construction of the work's genre as crucial to its production of meaning. Xenophon's refrain, that this work is an ἐπίδειξις of praise for Agesilaus, forces the audience to meditate on what is praiseworthy in each of the actions and virtues presented.

Xenophon's *Agesilaus* overlaps with the *Hellenica* in its coverage of the Spartan king's deeds, and comparison between the two works has dominated scholarship on the *Agesilaus*.⁹⁰ The *Hellenica* has been read, against the supposedly insubstantial and propagandistic *Agesilaus*, as more authentically representing Xenophon's censure of the Spartans and the man who led them for four decades.⁹¹ While it is true that in the *Hellenica* Xenophon does not praise Agesilaus directly to the same degree, Agesilaus

⁸⁹ Bundy 1962 *passim*. See further Kurke 1991:9–10. In what could be seen as an application of Bundy's thesis to even the smallest details of the *Agesilaus*, Buijs 2007 examines how verbal aspect serves Xenophon's encomiastic purpose, relative to parallel passages in the *Hellenica*; cf. Opitz 1913:14.

⁹⁰ Krömer 1971 and Luppino Manes 1992 are rare examples of book-length studies concerned with the *Agesilaus* as a literary text; contrast, e.g., the historical studies of Cartledge 1987 and Hamilton 1991. Seyffert 1909:1–18 provides an overview of the correspondences among passages of the two works.

⁹¹ Badian 2004:49 refers the *Agesilaus*' lack of censure to its genre.

nonetheless cuts a respectable figure, and indeed some of his actions within the *Hellenica* profit from juxtaposition with events not immediately concerning him. To take but two examples plucked from the center of that work, Agesilaus' boldness at Coroneia (4.3.19) is all the more striking because the Spartans at Nemea had just performed the very maneuver that he rejects (4.2.22), and his clemency toward the suppliants after the battle (4.3.20) contrasts starkly with the impiety of the anti-Spartan party at Corinth (4.4.2).⁹² The picture of Agesilaus presented in the *Hellenica* cannot be taken as either purely censorious or unbiased.⁹³ Furthermore, the dearth of contemporary sources beyond Xenophon hampers weighing Xenophon's evaluations against anything other than the extant text.⁹⁴ It is therefore more productive to examine the *Agesilaus* on its own merits as a carefully constructed piece of rhetoric, though with the understanding that the fourth-century audience would have known much more about, and would have held more thoroughly developed opinions of, how the Spartans and Agesilaus himself had shaped their contemporary political landscape.

While the material presented in the *Agesilaus* is marshaled for the purpose of praising the Spartan king—that is, everything in the text was intended by the *laudator* to

⁹² These two episodes appear in the *Agesilaus* at 2.12 and 2.13, with no mention of the events at Nemea and Corinth. Later in the *Hellenica* (4.5.5–6), those defeated at Peiraeum entrust themselves to Agesilaus in an episode similar to that of the suppliants at Coroneia.

⁹³ Other complicated moments of evaluation include the ethical struggle between Agesilaus and Lysander (3.4.9) and the dubious anecdote (4.5.4) regarding the reputation won by Agesilaus by providing his men with fire—just before the unexplained burning of the temple of Poseidon. Agesilaus is often vindicated, however, as when the Achaeans censure him (4.6.13) but his advice turns out to have been good (4.7.1).

⁹⁴ Among Xenophon's contemporaries, Lysias (16.16) and Andocides (3.18) each mention Agesilaus, but only in periphrasis for the events at Coroneia. The author of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, in the surviving passages, passes no direct judgments on Agesilaus; the nearest thing to an evaluative remark is the description of Agesilaus' thought process at 25.2. Isocrates, for his part, lends Agesilaus a variable symbolic weight depending on his audience (4.144, 4.153, 5.62, 5.86, *Ep.* 9.11–14); see further below, chapter three.

reflect well on the *laudandus*—this is not to say that the act of praise itself cannot have other purposes behind it.⁹⁵ As regards potential social or material benefits for the author, some can be ruled out: Agesilaus for his part is dead and cannot continue to reciprocate in the cycle of χάρις; lack of evidence prohibits reconstructing any benefit Xenophon could have hoped to gain from those Spartans interested in hearing their king praised.⁹⁶ Some scholars have read the work as a polemic, defending Agesilaus against hypothetical contemporary screeds and slanders, but this is no different from claiming that he was motivated by sheer gratitude.⁹⁷ As it happens, Xenophon says explicitly that he means to present Agesilaus as an ethical model (10.2). In at least one respect Agesilaus is superior even to Socrates for this function, as Agesilaus took an active role not merely in shaping politicians, but in personally steering political life both locally in Sparta and internationally as the archetypal Greek in conflict with Persia. Xenophon presents Agesilaus as model of the civic sage, an ideal Xenophontic leader: given command by constitutional means, Agesilaus maintains the loyalty of those he leads through strategic acumen and personal virtue. Xenophon could thus aim the *Agesilaus* even at an Athenian audience, exaggerating his message through the use of the Spartan Other as he does with Persia in the *Education of Cyrus*. Through his φιλοτιμία and constant concern for public ἐπίδειξις, the figure of Agesilaus resonates both with Xenophon's self-presentation in this and other works and with Xenophon's ideal Athenian. The remainder of this chapter

⁹⁵ See further Cartledge 1987:56.

⁹⁶ Cf. Hägg 2012:41.

⁹⁷ Harman 2012:430 also rejects the apologetic view, for further representatives of which see the citations collected at 2012:430n.14, in particular Hirsch 1985:51–2 (with special reference to Diodorus 15.19.4) and 1985:55. See also Hamilton 1982:78, 1994:205; cf. Schepens 2003:128, and 2003:154 with references at n.85.

elucidates the parallels in the *Agesilaus* between *laudator* and *laudandus*, that is, how Xenophon presents Agesilaus as engaging in acts comparable to his own authoring of the work. That both the narrator and the figure of Agesilaus concern themselves with proper ἐπίδειξις, and particularly with ἐπίδειξις of praise, reinforces the perceived reliability of each, while the harmony of their actions implies that the author has put the lessons of Agesilaus' life, as he presents it, into practice.

Genre: praise, or the absence of blame

The interrelated themes of praise and blame pervade the work, as Xenophon constantly constructs and reconstructs the evaluative boundaries of the narrator's and Agesilaus' accomplishments. Xenophon demonstrates at every turn how he believes praise should operate and how blame should be avoided, and he invites the audience implicitly to judge the success not only of Agesilaus, but also of his treatment of Agesilaus on the terms he has established. He carefully marks out the genre of the work in order to leave little room for disagreement that the text achieves its aim. This rhetorical strategy is bolstered by his habitual modesty. Even where the narrator intentionally undercuts himself, acknowledging that the opinions of others may differ from his own, this too creates the illusion of consensus between, at least, the narrator and the audience: the narrator advertises the deliberate, self-conscious formulation of his opinions and thereby generates trust, while suggesting and then dismissing other possibilities.

The opening sentence (1.1) sets the tone for the work:

οἶδα μὲν ὅτι τῆς Ἀγησιλάου ἀρετῆς τε καὶ δόξης οὐ ράϊδιον ἄξιον ἔπαινον
γράφαι, ὅμως δ' ἐγχειρητέον. οὐ γὰρ ἂν καλῶς ἔχοι εἰ ὅτι τελέως ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς
ἐγένετο, διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲ μειόνων ἂν τυγχάνοι ἐπαίνων.

While I do know that it is not easy to compose a praise-speech (ἔπαινος) worthy both of the virtue of Agesilaus and of the esteem in which he is held, nonetheless

one must make an attempt. For it would not be proper if the fact that he proved himself a perfectly good man should keep him from receiving any speeches of praise at all, even if they are inferior to those he deserves.

Opening an encomium with professed ἀπορία positions the narrator as inadequate to the theme; it wins over the audience through a show of modesty combined with willingness to take a risk, twin qualities of both the narrator and his subject that will appear again and again in the remainder of the text. While the adverb τελέως is striking, because at first glance it appears unqualified, Xenophon calls Agesilaus not a perfectly good king or leader, but a perfectly good ἀνὴρ: Agesilaus presents an ethical model that can be followed by any male citizen, even if some take objection to his policies. Furthermore, Xenophon suggests, through his choice of verb (ἐγένετο), that evaluating Agesilaus requires examining the sum of his actions: it is not that Agesilaus was intrinsically good, but that he proved himself good in the final analysis, and in what follows Xenophon will lay out the evidence for this contention.⁹⁸ Xenophon will indeed suppress incidents that would detract from his image of Agesilaus, but his goal is neither Plutarchan *synkrisis* nor modern-style historical scholarship. Rather, like Gorgias in praise of Helen, Xenophon uses every rhetorical tool at his disposal, here in the service of constructing his model citizen.

Xenophon again specifies his aim—to analyze Agesilaus’ life for his displays of virtue—when he reflects, toward the end of the text, on his initial claims and on the genre of the work. One may justly consider Agesilaus an absolutely good man, he says, because he displayed the necessary virtues at the appropriate times, proving himself ever the more

⁹⁸ The opening lines of Simonides’ *Ode to Scopas* (ἄνδρ’ ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν ...) and the discussion of them in the *Protagoras* (339A–47A; see especially Most 1994; cf. Gerlach 1932:22–3) form essential *comparanda* for the opening of the *Agesilaus*; cf. also Simonides fr.531 Campbell. On honorific usage see Engen 2010:122, Whitehead 2009:50, Veligianni-Terzi 1997:265–7.

virtuous on each occasion (10.1). Because of these displays, the virtue of Agesilaus becomes a “measuring-line and standard” (στάθμη καὶ κανών), a “model” (παράδειγμα) for ethical behavior (10.2). Xenophon also names the fields in which his *laudandus* is to be imitated, by the device of ascribing the preference for these fields to Agesilaus’ own “boasting” (ἐμεγαλύνετο): despite his kingship he was most proud of ruling over himself, and he preferred guiding his fellow citizens toward virtue to guiding them into battle. Xenophon puts aside the specifics of Agesilaus’ many controversial acts in war in favor of a generalized picture of a model citizen of any *polis*, one who displays virtue while educating others as well. Author and subject overlap in both demonstrative and didactic intent, and this point of contact provides Xenophon with a transition into his definition of the work’s genre, by which its success may be judged (10.3):

ἀλλὰ γὰρ μὴ ὅτι τετελευτηκῶς ἐπαινεῖται τούτου ἔνεκα θρήνόν τις τοῦτον τὸν λόγον νομισάτω, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐγκώμιον. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἅπερ ζῶν ἤκουε ταῦτα καὶ νῦν λέγεται περὶ αὐτοῦ· ἔπειτα δὲ τί καὶ πλέον θρήνου ἄπεστιν ἢ βίος τε εὐκλεῆς καὶ θάνατος ὥραϊος; ἐγκωμίων δὲ τί ἀξιώτερον ἢ νῖκαί τε αἱ κάλλιστα καὶ ἔργα τὰ πλείστου ἄξια;

Indeed, let no one suppose that this speech is a funeral lament (θρήνος), just because [Agesilaus] is being praised after his death, but rather very much an encomium. For, firstly, the things he heard people say about him in life are still being said. And, secondly, what is further from the material of a lament than a life full of glory and death in its due season? And what is more worthy of encomia than the most noble of victories and the most valuable deeds?

A lament, then, is a speech of regret for an unfulfilled life and untimely death, whereas Agesilaus had neither and his deeds were superlative; he therefore deserves an encomium, which at least notionally could have been delivered while he was alive.

Xenophon’s sagacity is on display: he acknowledges that, as it turned out, Agesilaus was praiseworthy in life, but he also shows that he has restrained himself, after the fashion of

Herodotus' Solon, from premature praise.⁹⁹ This restraint is typical of, and would have been appreciated by, an Athenian audience.

The first major section of the speech, which occupies a little over half of the total length, covers the career of Agesilaus from his assumption of the kingship to his final adventures in Egypt, in an attempt to make his character (τρόποι) clear from his deeds (1.6). Xenophon revises his tactics, however, in the transition away from this account of Agesilaus' career (3.1). All the information that went before, it turns out, barely needed Xenophon to retail it, as "these things were done with very many witnesses" (μετὰ πλείστων μαρτύρων ἐπράχθη). This explains why Xenophon did not give relevant context or even indicate the passage of time between the deeds he related, but more importantly these transitional remarks advertise that the second section of the encomium will contain something like insider information.¹⁰⁰ Xenophon does not openly flaunt any personal intimacy with Agesilaus, but nonetheless he implies, first, that he has expert knowledge of the king's behaviors and, second, that he intends this section, reporting Agesilaus' "inner virtue" (τὴν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτοῦ ἀρετήν), to be the kernel of the text, containing the information most useful to the audience in evaluating the *laudandus*. The subsequent paragraphs (3.2–9.7) are a bravura performance of *variatio* as Xenophon introduces the several virtues of Agesilaus—piety, generosity, temperance, and so forth—along with appropriate anecdotes and points of comparison. Xenophon's technique here can be set

⁹⁹ *Agesilaus* 11.8 contains a similar maxim, and thus the author follows the example of his subject, on which see further below.

¹⁰⁰ Reichel 2007:31–2n.21 compares the structure of the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia*: diachronic narrative followed by synchronic description. Momigliano 1993:50–1 ascribes Xenophon's stark division between sections (relative to the disposition of the *Evagoras*) to his "greater historical sense." Cf. Leo 1901 90–2 and Fraustadt 1909:77. Hamilton 1991:10 deems the encomium a "static" portrait, without interest in the king's psychological development; cf. Alexiou 2010:44.

side by side with the famous statement of Plutarch (*Alexander* 1.1–3) that small incidents and quips portray character best: likewise, Xenophon wishes both Agesilaus and the encomium to be judged less on the narrative portion than on the portion that examines the author’s ethical concerns piecemeal.¹⁰¹ Each virtue is also discussed in a rhetorical style suited to its nature, for example when Xenophon begins to laud Agesilaus’ courage in phrases reminiscent of the Thucydidean funeral oration.¹⁰² Finally, Xenophon is careful to avoid tedium through claiming that he must speak briefly on matters that deserve to be drawn out (7.1), but he also recognizes the didactic power of repetition, adding a catalogue of virtuous traits as a “summary” (ἐν κεφαλαίοις, 11.1) after what he marks out as the ending of the main body of the speech (10.4).

While Xenophon occasionally gives Agesilaus direct praise in the first person, or at least through rhetorical questions, perhaps even more convincing as a rhetorical ploy is his use of indirect praise, the reactions of others to the deeds of the *laudandus*.¹⁰³ These reactions work in tandem with the praise bestowed by the narrator. As Agesilaus is recalled from Asia, for instance, some of the Greeks resident in Asia volunteer to return with him, having taken as a model their commander’s good faith and willingness to repay χάρις (1.38). Tachos and Mausolus are also so favorably impressed by Agesilaus that they are motivated to assist the Lacedaemonian state (2.27); Pharnabazus too, in the ethical section of the encomium, provides evidence of Agesilaus’ trustworthiness.

¹⁰¹ See also above, on Theramenes (*Hellenica* 2.3.56). Only in this second section of the *Agesilaus* does Xenophon allow the subject to speak for himself through direct quotation (4.6, 5.5, 7.5, 7.6, 8.3).

¹⁰² *Agesilaus* 6.1–2, to which compare especially Thucydides 2.41.4–42.2. For another example, the description of Agesilaus’ σοφία (6.4–8) bears the hallmarks of the fifth-century rhetoricians such as Gorgias and Antiphon, with its parallel cola and especially its rare superlatives; cf. Seyffert 1909:43–52.

¹⁰³ Rhetorical questions are used for praise, for example, in the series of sentences at 8.4–6; for the frequent use of forms of ἄγαμαι here, cf. 1.24 and 1.36.

Xenophon nonetheless takes care to control these sources of praise. The enthusiasm of the Asiatic Greeks is not matched in the account in the *Hellenica* (4.2.5): there he describes at length Agesilaus' mode of compensating for their deficient zeal; in the encomium the notion of even initial dissent is foreign to the author's goal of praise, and so the entire incident is elided. In the case of Pharnabazus, Xenophon omits from the encomium Agesilaus' response to the satrap praising him in turn (*Hellenica* 4.1.38), thereby maintaining the focus on praise of Agesilaus and only Agesilaus.¹⁰⁴

Xenophon does allow Agesilaus to bestow praise upon the anonymous, in order to make him a model for proper praise. Like any Xenophontic commander worth his salt, Agesilaus institutes games and prizes in order to motivate his subordinates.¹⁰⁵ Even regarding those who oppose his policies at Sparta (τοὺς διαφόρους, 7.3), Agesilaus only chastises their misdeeds, while remaining willing to praise and honor them should they do good for the state. In Agesilaus' delivery of praise even for his enemies there are shades of Xenophon's approach to his subject: he need not have agreed with every action of Agesilaus in order to praise his career and character as a whole, once he observed how it turned out. Even more telling than how Agesilaus bestows praise, however, is the manner in which he hears it. When hearing those who praise themselves, despite his own relative lack of boasting (ἥκιστα δ' ὦν οἶος μεγαληγορεῖν), Agesilaus maintains his composure, on the grounds that self-praise is a means of pledging one's future virtue

¹⁰⁴ The *Agesilaus* version also omits Pharnabazus' censure of Agesilaus' ingratitude (*Hellenica* 4.1.33), even though Xenophon allows Agesilaus to redeem himself with a pragmatic *sententia* (4.1.34). This exchange also includes some wise words on the part of Pharnabazus (4.1.37, τοιοῦτόν τι, ὡς ἔοικε, φιλοτιμία ἐστίν), relevant to Xenophon's overall anthropology of φιλοτιμία; cf. above, chapter one, on *Hieron* 7.3.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. chapter one, above, especially as regards the *Hipparchicus*; cf. also *Anabasis* 1.2.10 (the games of Xenias the Arcadian) and 4.8.25 (discussed above).

(8.2).¹⁰⁶ He combines this optimism with shrewd insight into human nature, as he also believes that those who praise or blame others expose “at least as much of their own character as that of their subject” (11.4).¹⁰⁷ His insight also aids the audience in judging Xenophon’s delivery of praise: because he chooses so noble and perspicacious a subject, the *laudator* himself must be cut from the same cloth.¹⁰⁸ The optimism expressed earlier also redounds to Xenophon, as this *mise en abyme* can be construed as a form of self-praise, by which Xenophon in turn gives his assurances that his aim of improving political life is a noble one. Furthermore, Agesilaus prefers that those who praise him also show a willingness to criticize him (11.5): Xenophon thus suggests that his praise is not unconditional, but grounded in reason.¹⁰⁹ By these means Xenophon gains credence through placing his text into relation with the *laudandus*’ own views on praise.

As much as the speech is concerned with praise, Xenophon also betrays an awareness that he must cut off any potential blame of Agesilaus at the source, and in the realm of blame, too, there are points of contact between narrator and subject.¹¹⁰ The process of defusing blame commences with the opening of the work. After the first sentence of the work has left little room for questioning Agesilaus’ praiseworthiness, Xenophon mentions the king’s Heraclid ancestry (1.2) and—without naming it—his *polis*

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Plutarch, *Life of Agesilaus* 23.5 and *Περὶ τοῦ ἑαυτὸν ἐπαινεῖν ἀνεπιφθόνως* 545A.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. the Agesilaus of the *Ἀποφθέγματα Λακωνικά* (208C) on the appropriate scope of praise.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. the apt formulation of Hägg 2012:49: “Bruns [1896:133] calls this postscript [i.e., *Agesilaus* 11.1–16] ‘the first detailed characterization of a human soul’; but whose soul?” For further analysis of *Agesilaus* 11.1–16, see Bruns 1895; cf. Seyffert 1909:22–5. Cf. also Lycurgus 1.100: Euripides is praiseworthy for his choice of myth in the *Erechtheus*.

¹⁰⁹ *Agesilaus* 11.5 is quoted with admiration by Plutarch (*Πῶς ἂν τις διακρίνει τὸν κόλακα τοῦ φίλου* 55D).

¹¹⁰ This rejection of blame goes beyond even techniques such as the rhetorical question (of the type, “How could anyone find fault with him for X?”) and litotes (“He was without blame”), which occur frequently; see 2.25, 4.1, 4.3, 4.5, 5.1, 6.8, and 10.4.

(1.3–4) as evidence of his greatness: no one could cast blame (καταμέμψασθαι) on Agesilaus as some petty prince unworthy of an encomium.¹¹¹ With one stroke Xenophon both asserts the praiseworthy ancestry of his *laudandus* and defends his own choice of subject. Later on, the narrator confronts even more directly the notion that he himself could be blamed for praising Agesilaus. After giving examples of the king’s σωφροσύνη, he appends a defensive remark: “But if I am falsely representing these things and all Greece believes otherwise, then I am both failing to praise [Agesilaus] and censuring myself.”¹¹² Because of his appeal to numerous witnesses in the preceding paragraphs, this can be taken not only as a refutation of blame but indeed as implying the inverse, that Xenophon is in fact praising both Agesilaus and himself. Potential blame for Agesilaus becomes a foil by which praise can be both artfully varied and magnified.

Agesilaus is also spared blame internal to the narrative, just as he receives indirect praise. His enemies, for instance, could not blame (ψέγειν) his acts in war, even though they had to hate him for his talents and successes (6.5).¹¹³ Indeed, his installation as king is due to his being the less blameworthy of the two contenders (ἀνεπικλητότερον, 1.5).¹¹⁴ Xenophon does not give blame so much as the opportunity to be aired at times when it might be expected: contrary to the usual course of this type scene, Agesilaus’ proposal before the Lacedaemonians to make war on Persia meets not with an opposing speech,

¹¹¹ See also Hägg 2012:44–5 on Xenophon’s omission of any other information relating to the first forty years of Agesilaus’ life.

¹¹² 5.7: εἰ δ’ ἐγὼ ταῦτα ψεύδομαι ἀντία τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐπισταμένης ἐκεῖνον μὲν οὐδὲν ἐπαινῶ, ἑμαυτὸν δὲ ψέγω.

¹¹³ For complications, see Harman 2012:449.

¹¹⁴ While such statements could be taken simply as litotic praise (as at, e.g., 6.8), Xenophon here omits the controversy over the succession, which indeed appears to have been a contest over whose faults were less consequential (cf. *Hellenica* 3.3.1–3 and Plutarch, *Life of Agesilaus* 3.3–5).

but with fervent and immediate assent (1.7–8). Agesilaus himself has definite standards for when blame is appropriate. For instance, he does not allow blame he has given in the past to stand in the way of the opportunity for praise (7.3), he blames those who are deceived by their enemies but commiserates with those who have been tricked by friends (11.5), and he holds public figures to greater account than individuals when they go astray (11.6).¹¹⁵ In the most general terms, Agesilaus is disinclined to trust those who blame (11.5), and he even takes advantage of it when his enemies fall into a spate of internal recrimination (1.33). Not only does Agesilaus provide a model for how one should go about criticizing others and how one should evaluate censure, but Xenophon also implies that blame itself is counterproductive, thereby bolstering the audience's faith in his own enterprise.¹¹⁶

At times, however, controversy does rear its head, and Xenophon acknowledges diverging opinions on Agesilaus' deeds. He does not hesitate to suggest that Agesilaus was not entirely noble in his quest to restore various exiles, though he ascribes any excesses in this campaign to Agesilaus' virtue of φιλευταιρία (2.21).¹¹⁷ In the case of Leuctra, Xenophon raises the specter of blame for Agesilaus, only to deny it (2.23). Regarding Agesilaus' sexual continence, the text gestures toward more than merely hypothetical blame, as Xenophon acknowledges that some people do in fact think

¹¹⁵ Here there may lie a tacit reference to Lysander, who—despite his own merits and influence on the policies Agesilaus—goes without explicit mention in the encomium, probably because of their infamously fraught relationship during the Asian campaign. Cf. Lippelt 1889:14–16, Seyffert 1909:2–3. Keen 1996:252 surmises that Agesilaus himself drummed up the sources' hostility toward Lysander.

¹¹⁶ For Xenophon's preference for praise over blame, see Gray 2011:77.

¹¹⁷ This apparent virtue takes on a life of its own as a more sinister daemon in Plutarch's accounts of both Agesilaus and Pompey. See especially *Life of Agesilaus* 5.1, *Life of Pompey* 39.4, *Synkrisis of Agesilaus and Pompey* 1.4, and generally Shipley 1997:11–14, 32–5; cf. *Πολιτικά Παραγγέλματα* 807E–F. Cawkwell 1976:77 claims that Agesilaus' concerted policy of φιλευταιρία found greater success than previous Spartan policies. Cf. Nevin 2014 on Agesilaus and Pompey's shared trait of φιλονικία.

differently (5.6). In other instances, to mediate between praise and blame—which is to say, to gloss over what could be perceived as bombast with the appearance of reasoned moderation—Xenophon makes various use of the notion of risk. He ostentatiously avoids exaggeration in describing the battle at Coroneia: he will not claim that Agesilaus recklessly took on superior forces, which would not only be a falsehood but would also run counter to his goal of praise through making the *laudandus* out to be a fool (ἄφρονα, 2.7), the same mistake he attributes to other apologists of Socrates (*Apology* 1).¹¹⁸ In the battle itself, however, Xenophon actually praises Agesilaus for taking a risk, though the praise is qualified (2.12). He diverts potential criticism of the fact of the battle, with its internecine strife, onto the ethics of Agesilaus’ strategy, where the terrain, so to speak, is somewhat more favorable: the narrating voice acknowledges dissent, though not for the most problematic facet of the issue, and gains credit with the audience for not unreservedly praising the subject, while nonetheless keeping the tone laudatory. Xenophon himself takes a rhetorical risk here, as well, entering upon a vivid tableau of the action, sights, and sounds among the battle-lines. In a similar earlier instance, Xenophon makes use of perhaps the most ambitious periodic sentence in the work to underscore another point of crisis (1.36, ἄξιόν γε ... τὰ καλὰ καὶ δίκαια). Here Agesilaus obeys the ephors and returns to defend Lacedaemon rather than retaining his glorious command in Asia. In doing so Agesilaus makes it clear that he would not take “shameful and riskless gains” (αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀκίνδυνα κέρδη) over “noble and just gains that come with risk” (μετὰ κινδύνων τὰ καλὰ καὶ δίκαια). Just so, the author himself attempts to

¹¹⁸ See further above, on the *Apology*. For other connections between the traits of Agesilaus and Socrates, see, e.g., 11.4 (ἥσκει δὲ ἐξομιλεῖν μὲν παντοδαποῖς, χρῆσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς) and Marchant 1920:28. For the rhetoric of *Agesilaus* 2.7, see Gray 2011:81–3; for avoiding praise of foolish actions, compare Xenophon’s evaluation of Teleutias at *Hellenica* 5.1.19, as discussed by Gray 2011:90.

render all things καλὰ καὶ δίκαια to the merits of Agesilaus, in the face of any controversy over those merits. Throughout the speech, Xenophon marshals unmitigated praise, deflected blame, and ostentatious caution in risky praise—all in the service of encomium.

Agesilaus on parade

Xenophon has crafted the speech such that both *laudator* and *laudandus* are concerned not only with ethical behavior, but with displaying this behavior for others to observe. Agesilaus, keen to use the visual, the spectacular, and the conspicuous to achieve his political ends, is matched by Xenophon on the literary level, as the author makes a different, more lasting sort of ἐπίδειξις in order to praise his subject and encourage imitation.¹¹⁹ Perhaps the most obvious point of contact between Agesilaus' displays and Xenophon's own display of praise comes when Xenophon describes the success of Agesilaus' governing policies in Asia. Xenophon asks, "How did he not demonstrate that this too is a task for a king worth praising?" (1.37, πῶς οὐκ ἀξιεπαίνου βασιλέως καὶ τοῦτ' ἔργον ἐπεδείξατο). Agesilaus becomes Xenophon's collaborator in providing evidence to support the overall thesis of the work: he demonstrates what any laudable ruler should do, rather than merely rendering himself laudable. Xenophon explicitly contrasts the Spartan with the Athenians here, positing that the Spartan king was able to fix problems caused by the Athenians (ἐπεὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἔληξαν), while at the same time implying that they should take his pacifying measures as their

¹¹⁹ For the visual aspects of the *Agesilaus*, see Harman 2012 (especially 2012:432–3), to which the following analysis is indebted, as should be clear from the notes that follow. Harman collects instances of display in the *Agesilaus* at 2012:434–5, though Harman's analysis of the vocabulary (2012:435–6) focuses on the rhetorical use of ἀποδείκνυμι for proofs rather than the performative implications of ἐπιδείκνυμι, which is more common in this text. Powell 2001:244–6 suggests that Agesilaus' habit of visual manipulation is a longstanding Spartan tradition.

standard—a timely message in the 350s BCE. Xenophon’s goal, however, is not to accomplish any specific reform, but to highlight the character of individuals, onto which light is thrown by their actions (1.6). Here he offers only an indirect solution to the turmoil decried in the *Hellenica* (7.5.27): for the Greeks to prosper, their individual leaders must be free of ethical failings, as Xenophon strives to show through his exemplary *laudandus*.

Agesilaus’ displays of virtue and manipulation of perceptions extend into all aspects of his leadership: as Xenophon says, “Which of his deeds do not display his skill?” (6.4, τὴν γε μὴν σοφίαν αὐτοῦ ποῖαι τῶν ἐκείνου πράξεων οὐκ ἐπιδεικνύουσιν).¹²⁰ After bringing to light Tissaphernes’ infidelity, Agesilaus “displayed by way of contrast” (ἀντεπιδείξας, 1.12) his own reliability.¹²¹ His easy demeanor is expressly aimed at encouraging the same in those who observe it (8.2, cf. 1.13, 11.2), and he takes care to increase the reputation of his friends along with their wealth (1.19).¹²² In addition to these instances, Xenophon makes use of three particular exploits during the campaigns to show Agesilaus’ skill. The first is the grand set piece of the springtime preparations at Ephesus.¹²³ Agesilaus institutes games that test each component of his forces,

¹²⁰ Cf. Hägg 2012:45.

¹²¹ See 1.17, where Agesilaus makes Tissaphernes look like a child (παῖδα ἀπέδειξε); cf. Harman 2012:445. See also De Voto 1988:52 for how Xenophon manipulates his narrative of their conflict at Sardis, playing the two figures off against each other.

¹²² Cf. Agesilaus’ remark that the old should be models for the young at *Αποφθέγματα Λακωνικά* 210B (and Aelian, *Ποικίλη ἱστορία* 7.13); *Αποφθέγματα Λακωνικά* has Agesilaus learn this sort of exemplarity early in life (208D, an anecdote attributed to other figures as well). On Agesilaus’ demeanor, cf. Harman 2012:444, and see Tanner 2006:128–31 on facial expression and character generally. Compare also *Education of Cyrus* 6.4.20: ἐπιδεικνύτω τις τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ἑαυτὸν ἄξιον ἀρχῆς, ἄφοβον δεικνὺς καὶ σχῆμα καὶ πρόσωπον καὶ λόγους.

¹²³ Reported also at *Hellenica* 3.4.16–19. For various complications to the reading of this scene, see Harman 2012:438–40. For similar celebrations of public ἐπίδειξις in Xenophon, cf., e.g., *Hipparchicus* 3.1–14, *Peri Hippikes* 11.1–13, *Education of Cyrus* 8.3.1. See further Dillery 2004:264–7 for the importance of Ephesus as a site of πομπαί.

encouraging their φιλονικία but also making the city into an impressive spectacle of their strength and skill (1.25); the civilian areas of the city also become “a sight worth seeing” (1.26); Agesilaus and the soldiers parade about in garlands, ostentatiously paying homage to Artemis (1.27). Although Xenophon could not make it more clear that Agesilaus means for these procedures to train his forces physically and emotionally and to encourage potential allies, the narrator continues with an additional anecdote: Agesilaus, “in the belief that disdain for the enemy also injects some confidence into fighters” (1.28, ἡγούμενος δὲ καὶ τὸ καταφρονεῖν τῶν πολεμίων ῥώμην τινὰ ἐμβαλεῖν πρὸς τὸ μάχεσθαι) has his prisoners stripped and exposed to the onlooking soldiers. The fruits of his psychological insight are victory in the campaigns and copious spoils, at least until he is summoned back to Greece by the ephors.

On his return, at Coroneia, his skill with spectacle is demonstrated twice more, this time employed to frighten the enemy as much as to encourage his own ranks.¹²⁴ First, before the battle, Agesilaus’ preparations have made his whole army conspicuous in bronze and crimson (2.7), a display part and parcel with how he has trained them to strive to outdo one another and be seen as the best.¹²⁵ Second, after the battle, both sides are presented with the grisly spectacle of the battlefield (παρῆν δὴ θεάσασθαι, 2.14).

Although in the two main actions Agesilaus’ forces had been victorious, the Thebans had escaped without capitulating (2.12). In order to end the conflict that had produced such grim results, Agesilaus drums up a spectacle of his own: he orders a victory celebration complete with a trophy, garlands, and pipe-music (2.15), the sight of which brings the

¹²⁴ Cf. Cyrus the Younger’s impressive ἐπίδειξις of his forces (*Anabasis* 1.2.14).

¹²⁵ 2.8: ἄριστοι φαίνονται; cf. in this passage εἰ ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται, with 1.1 (discussed above). Xenophon relates Agesilaus’ thought process here (νομίζων ...) in order indicate that the visual and psychological superiority of this army is not mere circumstance, but carefully plotted by the general.

Thebans to ask for a truce (2.16).¹²⁶ The victory comes at least as much through ἐπίδειξις as through tactics.

The examples adduced thus far, drawn mostly from the narrative portion of the encomium, mark the variety of Agesilaus' engagement with display and its educative function; they are hardly exhaustive. Immediately after the Coroneia episode, Agesilaus gives two demonstrations of his Xenophontic ability to rule and be ruled in turn (τὰ νόμιμα μὲν ἄρχειν, τὰ νόμιμα δὲ ἄρχεσθαι), in forsaking the Asian campaign (2.16) and, more lightheartedly, in taking direction from the choirmaster at the Hyacinthia (2.17). Further examples abound in the ethical half of the text: Agesilaus conspicuously used the honorific διμοιρία to increase the honor of others (5.1, cf. *Lakedaimonion Politeia* 15.4); he insisted on doing everything, even sleeping, in public, so as not to be liable to reproach (5.6–7); he paid obvious (φανερὸς) reverence to the laws despite his position of power (7.2); he censured the displays of others (7.6); the façade of his dwelling, which also advertised his lineage, was intentionally humble (8.7).¹²⁷ Moreover, Xenophon notes Agesilaus' approachability (τῷ ἀεὶ ἐμφανὲς εἶναι) relative to the Persian king (9.1), as well as his constant refrain (ὕμνων οὐποτ' ἔλγηεν) that the gods equate good deeds with sacrifices (11.2; cf. Isocrates 1.13). Perhaps the most obvious of the lessons Agesilaus

¹²⁶ For the visual impression made by a victorious army (also of Agesilaus, in this case after Peiraeum), see *Hellenica* 4.5.6; cf. also *Lakedaimonion Politeia* 13.8. Harman 2012:441 suggests that the reader might be made uneasy by Agesilaus' "self-congratulation" after Coroneia, but any uneasiness is subsumed by the immediate function—ending a vicious conflict—of what is, at least in the first instance, an act of deception rather than pride.

¹²⁷ On 5.6–7, cf. Harman 2012:443–4; on 7.6, cf. 2012:447; on 8.7, cf. 2012:437. Generally, cf. the verbs used of the displays of Lycurgus in the *Lakedaimonion Politeia* (1.2, 7.4, 10.7; cf. 13.10).

intentionally performed for the education of his observers is the calculated ἐπίδειξις he made of his sister Cynisca's horseracing (9.6–7).¹²⁸

In the end, Agesilaus' displays are powerful enough to function as general truths, even though Xenophon admits that only Agesilaus has provided the relevant evidence:

“In my own opinion, he also seems to be the only human to have demonstrated this fact, that bodily strength fails with age, but the force of the soul of noble men is unaging.”¹²⁹

These displays would be merely a leitmotif of the encomium, however, were it not for the fact that they mirror Xenophon's own enterprise, ἐπίδειξις of Agesilaus' virtues. The words of praise parallel and, as will be argued below, even subsume the originally visual displays. By means that include limiting those episodes and habits put before the audience and a rhetoric of reasoned praise, the author attempts to create through words the same sort of consensus for praising Agesilaus as he claims has been achieved for hating the Persian king (ὁρῶσι μὲν οὖν ἅπαντες ταῦτα, 7.7).¹³⁰ Xenophon offers to Agesilaus, of all possible *laudandi*, such singular praise for two reasons: first, the ease of parallelism between himself and his subject; second, Agesilaus' essential failure to display his virtues as he should have, a failure which necessitated a literary encomium.

The parallels between *laudator* and *laudandus* are all the more apparent because of the biography of each. Xenophon does not luxuriate in claims of autopsy: it is, after all, part of his technique of praise to insist that there are countless witnesses and that, while the audience may need to be informed of some of Agesilaus' less public deeds,

¹²⁸ Cf. *Lakedaimonion Politeia* 7.4, *Hieron* 11.5, *Memorabilia* 1.2.64, and see Perry 2007 *passim*, especially 2007:86 regarding Cynisca as a potentially positive exemplar as per Pausanias 3.15.1.

¹²⁹ 11.14: δοκεῖ δ' ἔμοιγε καὶ τόδε μόνος ἀνθρώπων ἐπιδεῖξαι, ὅτι ἡ μὲν τοῦ σώματος ἰσχὺς γηράσκει, ἡ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ῥώμη τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγήρατός ἐστιν.

¹³⁰ Note the visual aspect (ὁρῶσι) of this consensus, for which see Harman 2012:448.

there is still recourse to those few who were present.¹³¹ Nonetheless, as the audience was surely aware, Xenophon himself accompanied Agesilaus through many of his tribulations. Just as with his son Gryllus in the *Hellenica*'s description of Mantinea, Xenophon deliberately effaces himself in the account of Coroneia, though he intimates his presence twice with mentions of the Cyreians and the ξένοι (*Agesilaus* 2.11). That some of the ξένοι are crowning Agesilaus prematurely for his victory looks proleptically to Xenophon's measured, posthumous encomium: the older Xenophon has learned patience and judgment, presumably in part through his association with the *laudandus*. That the ξένοι are shown acting impetuously also serves an apologetic function, as Xenophon was in this battle arrayed against his fellow Athenians. Only here does Xenophon cast the Athenians as the enemies of Agesilaus; elsewhere he is careful not to exclude them from the potential audience of the work.¹³² Indeed, the author of the assuredly contemporary *Poroi* likely had the Athenians in mind, though perhaps not exclusively, in the formulation of the encomium; at any rate he does not laud or even mention Sparta and the Lacedaemonians as much as could be expected.¹³³

In light of Xenophon's own background and audience, Agesilaus should perhaps be seen primarily as a guest-friend—one of no inconsiderable political talent and authority—to whom Xenophon owes a personal debt of friendship. There are forerunners

¹³¹ Cf., e.g., *Memorabilia* 1.1.10, of Socrates' public visibility.

¹³² They are mentioned only at 1.37 and 2.6. That said, Cawkwell 1976:79 sees Agesilaus as having been relatively lenient toward Athens in actuality.

¹³³ Cf. Higgins 1977:77. Xenophon does not name ἡ πόλις ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἐνδοξοτάτῃ in the exordium and also evinces his discomfort when he must defend praising Agesilaus' πατρίς (1.3–4). Cf. 7.1: Agesilaus is praised as φιλόπολις (7.1), though the *polis* is not named. When Sparta and the Lacedaemonians are named, the context is often unfavorable (e.g., 1.13, 1.38, 2.21–4, 7.5), and at no point after the exordium does Xenophon interrupt his praise of the individual king to dilate on any laudable institutions or collective actions of his *polis*. Contrast, e.g., the role of Sparta as an internal evaluator of Helen, another native Laconian, at Isocrates 10.63.

of this χάρις in Agesilaus' benefactions: as Agesilaus doggedly returns kindnesses, so too does Xenophon, in the form of this encomium.¹³⁴ At the conclusion of the work, Xenophon even suggests that Agesilaus would be grateful for it. In a telling nexus of praise and ἐπίδειξις that defies the deceptively artless organization of the final chapter, Xenophon adumbrates a few additional virtues of his *laudandus* (11.9):¹³⁵

μετ' ὀλίγων δέ μοι ἐδόκει ἀνθρώπων οὐ καρτερίαν τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀλλ' εὐπάθειαν νομίζειν· ἐπαινούμενος γοῦν ἔχαιρε μᾶλλον ἢ χρήματα κτώμενος. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀνδρείαν γε τὸ πλεόν μετ' εὐβουλίας ἢ μετὰ κινδύνων ἐπεδείκνυτο, καὶ σοφίαν ἔργῳ μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ ἥσκει.

He was in very rare company, I think, in that he did not believe that virtue was a thing to suffer through but rather a thing to take comfort in. And indeed he took more pleasure from acquiring praise than from acquiring money. Furthermore he made displays of his courage more often through his good counsel than through taking risks, and he plied his cleverness in action rather than in speech.

With this swift stroke, Xenophon advertises the utility of the ἀρετὴ retailed throughout the encomium and underscores that praise is a type of εὐπάθεια, one more useful than money. Agesilaus did much for the coffers of Sparta, and some of the lucre was dubiously acquired, but here Xenophon tangentially brushes aside any personal avarice on the part of the king while simultaneously suggesting that Agesilaus would approve of the encomium itself. In the next sentence Xenophon glosses over Agesilaus' risky deeds, discussed earlier, and claims that Agesilaus more often achieved his successes through his attention to detail; so too does Xenophon push aside his own risks in praising a controversial figure, and this paragraph can itself be taken as a mark of Xenophon's εὐβουλία for its condensation of important themes.¹³⁶ That Agesilaus' σοφία, here the

¹³⁴ Cf. 2.29, 4.2, and 4.4. The self-interest of these favors is reminiscent of the *Hieron*: see chapter one.

¹³⁵ For a similar conjunction of themes (risk, rivalry, euergetism, ἐπίδειξις), compare *Memorabilia* 2.3.17.

¹³⁶ For Xenophon's risks, see especially Hägg 2012:41–2.

collaborator of his bravery, was shown in action rather than words clears the *laudandus* of accusations of duplicity, while at the same time it reminds the audience that Xenophon's own display of skill takes the form of a λόγος.

This tension between ἔργον and λόγος plays out across the encomium, as both *laudator* and *laudandus* strive to make displays of their respective virtues.¹³⁷ Despite his merits, Agesilaus in fact has failed to leave a suitable, educative monument, and Xenophon takes it upon himself to supply this need. If there is any serious criticism of Agesilaus nested within the encomium, it can be located in Xenophon's implicit censure of this failure.¹³⁸ The same bravery that goes hand in hand with Agesilaus' εὐβουλία is said to have contributed to his exemplarity in two ways (6.2): it led to trophies, which would be “immortal monuments” of his virtue, and to Agesilaus' battle-scars, euphemistically termed “clear signs” of his will to fight.¹³⁹ While the king's physical appearance, as much as his aphorisms, could motivate and educate his associates while he still lived, Xenophon of course recognized that the Spartans were not going to keep Agesilaus preserved in wax forever as a museum piece.¹⁴⁰ The sentiment is undercut by its very circumstance of standing in a posthumous eulogy. The “immortal monuments” of the battlefield trophies are likewise undercut by the text immediately: his every campaign was a sort of trophy, and moreover his accomplishments through diplomacy were

¹³⁷ That Xenophon could picture himself as, in a sense, competing with Agesilaus fits well with his frequent references to Agesilaus' φιλοτιμία and competitive nature—see 2.5 (with *Hellenica* 4.3.9), 5.3, 6.3, 9.7, 10.4, 11.2—as well as Agesilaus' encouragement of φιλοτιμία in others (2.8); cf. perhaps *Hellenica* 4.7.5.

¹³⁸ Pace Harman 2012:450–1, who sees much to doubt in Agesilaus' stated virtues relative to how the text invites the reader to view him (and Greekness generally).

¹³⁹ 6.2: ἀθάνατα μνημεῖα paired with σαφεῖ σημεῖα, with a Gorgianic jingle. Earlier, at 2.13, the narrator labors over Agesilaus' wounds at Coroneia in order to magnify his piety in pardoning his enemies.

¹⁴⁰ See Plutarch, *Life of Agesilaus* 40.3: in the absence of the more usual honey, wax was used to preserve his body until it could be repatriated.

ineligible for trophies, in spite of being “less risky and more advantageous” (ἀκινδυνότερον δὲ καὶ συμφωρότερον, 6.3). The physical trophies are insufficient to communicate Agesilaus’ virtue, not to mention, like his body, prone to decay. The encomium ends (11.16) by contrasting the worldwide “monuments” of his virtue that he “acquired” (κτησάμενος) with the royal burial he “happened to receive” (τυχών). This antithesis again denigrates the single physical memorial in favor of nonphysical remembrance; it also suggests, by means of the participles, that the fruits of his virtue were earned, while his kingship at Sparta was mere circumstance: Xenophon does not limit solely to kings or to Spartans the opportunity for receiving his praise. Agesilaus is said to have refused those who desired to honor him with portrait statues, because that sort of honor can be bought (11.7, cf. 9.6), but this combination of moral restraint and modesty, despite the exemplary intent, ironically does Agesilaus no favors in terms of memorialization.¹⁴¹ Xenophon must pick up the slack by composing and disseminating this encomium, which will outlast Agesilaus’ self-righteous but ineffectual methods.¹⁴² Agesilaus’ statues will be those whom Xenophon can mold into likenesses of his *laudandus*’ soul.

Indeed, Agesilaus is most valuable to Xenophon as an exemplar of virtue, so much so that, while paying lip service to Agesilaus’ uniqueness, he plays down his

¹⁴¹ Plutarch (*Life of Agesilaus* 2.2) insinuates that Agesilaus’ refusal to have a likeness made of himself stemmed from anxiety about his unimposing appearance (cf. Apuleius, *Apology* 15); contrast Dio Chrysostom 37.43. There is a report (Plutarch, *Ἀποφθέγματα Λακωνικά* 210D) that Agesilaus, unlike Lysander, turned down an offer of divinization from the Thasians. Flower 1988 takes this anecdote as historical but argues (1988:127) that, despite the anecdote’s obvious moral value, Xenophon felt it beneath the dignity of his work to mention the Thasians’ impiety. Stenger 2004:424, who does not mention the Thasian anecdote, sees Xenophon as treating Agesilaus like a hero, protecting his homeland both through the presence of his tomb and by his exemplarity, which is bolstered by the promulgation of the encomium. On statues and praise, and the Pindaric connections of these themes, see also on the *Evagoras*, discussed below, chapter three, as well as chapter four, on μέγισται τιμαί at Athens.

¹⁴² For a similar contrast see famously Thucydides 1.22.4.

individuality. Unlike Cyrus the Great, whose upbringing Xenophon could order and control, Agesilaus loses all ties to his background except for his status as a Heraclid king of Sparta—and here the encomium of the Spartan kingship is as much a warning as it is praise.¹⁴³ Far from being singled out or praised, his father Archidamus is only mentioned once, in a routine clarification of Agesilaus’ lineage as opposed to that of Leotychidas (1.5); his son Archidamus, who took the throne after him, is not addressed or even mentioned. In this Xenophon makes a stark break with the precedent of Isocrates’ *Evagoras*, as will be discussed in the following chapter.¹⁴⁴ This lack of specificity is reflected at the level of composition as well: also unlike the *Evagoras*, the *Agesilaus* does not refer to any particular performance context.¹⁴⁵ The encomium cannot be dismissed as insincere or narrow in application, as perhaps it could if it cast itself, for example, as an oration over the tomb or as a letter meant to advise Archidamus. Agesilaus’ value lies in how he displayed his virtues, a display which Xenophon can extend indefinitely in order to encourage imitation by those who do not have the native advantages of a Spartan king. By stripping Agesilaus of his background, by subordinating his deeds to his character, by undercutting his ephemeral actions and physical monuments and replacing them with a carefully constructed encomium, Xenophon reduces his own risk in praising the deeds of Agesilaus the Spartan king and increases the number of those willing to be educated by

¹⁴³ 1.4: Xenophon does not praise the present actions of the Spartan kings, but pointedly only what they avoided doing in the past. Cf. the tone and topics of *Lakedaimonion Politeia* 14.1–15.9.

¹⁴⁴ Reichel 2007:31 contrasts the two works as “ein rhetorisches Musterstück” of Isocrates against Xenophon’s “aufrichtiger Bewunderung,” but this formulation is inadequate to the exemplarity—of form as well as subject—prized by both authors. To bring out a more crucial contrast, Isocrates’ praise for Evagoras is, *in nuce*, focalized through his son Nicocles. Cf. Isocrates’ works relating to Agesilaus’ son, *Archidamus* and *Epistle* 9, the latter addressed to Archidamus and the former written in his voice.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. Hägg 2012:43, on the importance of the word γράψαι in the opening sentence of the *Agesilaus*. For the *Evagoras* as a pseudo-ἐπιτάφιος, see below, chapter three.

the example of a particularly noble soul. Moreover, chief among the virtues to be imitated are Agesilaus' use of displays and indeed his very exemplarity: through the composition of the encomium Xenophon provides his audience with a model for their own educative praise of Agesilaus and other worthies. Because of his emphasis on ἐπίδειξις of praise, Xenophon's image of the good leader becomes self-propagating.

Conclusion

At least from a post-Aristotelian perspective, Agesilaus could be seen as something of a tragic hero, a larger-than-life figure put before the audience's eyes, here by means of emphatically visual language. The audience knows from the outset, even though Xenophon does not belabor the point, that Agesilaus is destined, despite his magnanimity, to fall from a great height along with his *polis*. The audience is meant to derive from Agesilaus, and then emulate, the marks of character that allowed him to thrive in adversity and made him admirable despite his ultimate fate, just as one should be moved by the figure of an Oedipus or Jocasta but not strive to replicate their circumstances.¹⁴⁶ Xenophon effaces Agesilaus' individuality and leaves only the mask, anticipating some of the audience's labor in abstracting his hero. One could envision a similar tragedy of Socrates or of Cyrus the Younger. Indeed, the latter is not far from the mold of Polyneices, and Euripides' *Suppliants* provides a model for the posthumous praise of figures who, in other contexts, behave less than admirably.¹⁴⁷ While retrojection should be avoided, Aristotle's later analysis of genre seems apt here: tragedy is a species, or at least an evolution, of praise poetry (*Poetics* 1449B). Particularly regarding his close

¹⁴⁶ The Athenians, despite their democratic context, were accustomed to seeing monarchs and non-Athenians take the stage; Agesilaus the Spartan king would hardly be disqualified as a tragic *exemplum*.

¹⁴⁷ Cf. Tuplin 2004:28.

focus on the deeds and words of the exemplary individual, Xenophon's encomiastic prose in turn contains elements of tragedy, as is appropriate in light of his Athenian intellectual background. There are of course many differences of form and content separating tragedy from Xenophon's endeavors, such as the lack of coherent action, a criterion met perhaps only in the case of *Cyrus the Younger*, whose drama is at any rate not self-contained. One crucial difference, of great advantage to the moralist, is the encomiast's self-positioning as explicit evaluator of the action, guiding the audience through the ethical lessons presented by the *laudandus*. Through his more overt presence relative to the tragedian, Xenophon can also inspire emulation not only of the *laudandus*, but also of his own civically-charged act of praise.

This dual exemplarity of both *laudator* and *laudandus* is a natural outgrowth of Xenophon's theories of praise as discussed in the first chapter. Xenophon encourages emulation through juxtaposing the praise he gives his subject with praise given by the subject to others and received by the subject from speakers internal to the narrative. The perpetuation of praise and of the prerequisite for praise—ethical behavior—is thereby encoded within the text itself. This layering plays out across all of the most important lessons of Xenophontic leadership: how one should have φιλοτιμία and recognize it in the psychological profiles of others, as the principal means of motivation; how one should interpret an ἐπίδειξις of virtue and broadcast one's own; how one should accept an education in civic life and impart it to others in turn. The layering effect, in sum, creates parallels and reciprocal flows of influence among the *laudator*, *laudandus*, other figures within the text, and the audience. In terms of its logical structure, it therefore meshes well with that most basic of Xenophon's ethical principles, known to Agesilaus and crucial for

the operations of the Athenian democracy, which is understanding what it is to rule and be ruled in turn (ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι). As will be seen regarding Isocrates in the next chapter, and as can be illustrated by examples drawn from many instances of praise from later centuries, this parallelism between *laudator* and *laudandus* allows the former to advise the latter, with the complicity of the audience, from a position of didactic authority even where actual social or political superiority is out of the question. While Xenophon shies away from praising living individuals and seeks to advise only the potential epigones of his departed luminaries, his own epigones in the field of encomium will use the same techniques to advise their superiors from a rhetorical position of safety.

Beyond Xenophon's more general influence, stemming from his primacy and popularity, upon the later development of encomium and biography, it is worthwhile to examine the reactions of later authors to the particular manifestations of Xenophonic praise.¹⁴⁸ Plutarch, whose *Life of Pompey* is twice the length of the *Life of Agesilaus* with which it is paired, states without reservation that Pompey's achievements surpassed those of Agesilaus in scope, as even Xenophon would have to agree, but adds that nonetheless

¹⁴⁸ Apart from those authors cited elsewhere in this chapter, and even putting aside the ocean that is the reception of praise of Socrates, many reflections of Xenophonic praise can be located. It is hard to imagine that Agesilaus would dominate the anecdotal tradition to such an extent (cf. the mass of anecdotes in the *Αποθνήγματα Λακωνικά*) without having received Xenophon's *imprimatur*, as is quite clear from Harpocration (s.v. Ἀγησίλαος). Important moments of reception of the *Agesilaus* in particular include the frequency of Agesilaus in such collections as those of Polyaeus (33 paragraphs in 2.1 on Agesilaus' stratagems, including several manipulations of perception quite in character for Xenophon's Agesilaus but not recorded by Xenophon, such as at 2.1.23), Aelian (six stories in the *Ποικίλη ἱστορία*, 4.16, 7.13, 10.20, 12.15, 14.2, 14.27), Valerius Maximus (7.2.ext.15), and Frontinus (eight stratagems, 1.4.2, 1.4.3, 1.8.12, 1.10.3, 1.11.5, 1.11.17, 2.6.6, 3.11.2). Nepos' *Life of Agesilaus* as a point of reception goes without saying, but Agesilaus frequently crops up in Nepos' other lives as well. Ampelius (14.10) condenses the key moments of Agesilaus' career (fighting the enemy abroad rather than at home, obeying the ephors, lamenting the violence at Corinth) in a way Xenophon surely would have approved. Diogenes Laertius records (6.84) that one Onesicratus became a second-rate Xenophon by substituting, in his own works, Alexander for each Cyrus. Menander Rhetor (389) brings up the example of Agesilaus when discussing the incorporation of narrative into encomium (with intent to advise: cf. 388). As a final example, Julian (*Oration* 3.104A) takes Xenophon as an exemplar for willingness to give praise openly, despite any demands of modesty; the paragraphs immediately prior (especially 3.103B–C) could be said to condense Xenophonic praise theory quite tidily.

Xenophon has “a sort of special dispensation to write and say whatever he wants about the man.”¹⁴⁹ Plutarch does not elaborate on this “special dispensation,” but it is clear that he recognizes the generic license afforded to Xenophon as encomiast and has taken this potential, though not necessarily blameworthy, bias into account. Aside from his use of Xenophon as a source, Plutarch also nods to the reciprocal, emulative relationship between Xenophon and his *laudandus*, in which influence does not move in only one direction: envy of Xenophon and the Ten Thousand provides Agesilaus with a motive for war on Persia (*Life of Agesilaus* 9.2), and Agesilaus also offers, out of admiration for Xenophon ὁ σοφός, to have Xenophon’s sons educated at Sparta, where they could learn ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν (20.2, cf. *Αποφθέγματα Λακωνικά* 212B). Plutarch’s pardon of Xenophon’s exaggerations can be contrasted with his rougher treatment of Theopompus’ apparent penchant for slander.¹⁵⁰ Theopompus’ praise is more trustworthy than his censure; Xenophon’s praise is, by “special dispensation,” above reproach.

Xenophon was also dear to Cicero, who translated the *Oeconomicus* and refers to the Attic author, whose generic versatility was akin to his own, in numerous contexts. As a testament to the impact of Xenophontic praise, Cicero cites the *Agesilaus* as one of the most famous panegyrics, and he assumes on the basis of Xenophon’s writings that Xenophon was not merely Agesilaus’ follower, but also his instructor in philosophy.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹ *Synkrisis of Agesilaus and Pompey* 3.1: ... οὐδ’ ἂν ὁ Ξενοφῶν μοι δοκεῖ παραβαλεῖν τὰς Ἀγησιλάου νίκας, ὥι διὰ τᾶλλα καλὰ καθάπερ γέρας ἐξαίρετον δέδοται καὶ γράφειν ὃ βούλοιο καὶ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ ἀνδρός.

¹⁵⁰ See *Life of Lysander* 30.2. Plutarch also quotes lavish praise from Theopompus directed at Agesilaus (*Life of Agesilaus* 10.5).

¹⁵¹ Agesilaus among famous *laudati*: *De Oratore* 2.341, *De Finibus* 2.116; at *De Officiis* 2.16 there is no mention of encomia, but the list is similar enough. For Xenophon as Agesilaus’ teacher (on par with such pairs as Plato/Dion and Isocrates/Timotheus), see *De Oratore* 3.139. Cicero also advises his brother to take Xenophon’s Cyrus and Agesilaus as models for how to win friends (*ad Quintum Fratrem* 1.2.7).

The most elaborate moment of Cicero's reception of Xenophontic praise comes in his famous letter to Luceius (*ad Familiares* 5.12), in which he requests that his correspondent compose a history of his consulship as a monograph. The letter evinces a delicate balance of praise both for Luceius (e.g., 5.12.1), to motivate him, and for the author himself, to advertise why he merits the laudatory history he requests.¹⁵² He cites Xenophon twice to make his points, first regarding Luceius' demonstrated immunity to favoritism (5.12.3): Luceius, it seems, has written that he would not be swayed any more than was "that famous Hercules of Xenophon" (*Herculem Xenophontium illum*). With this citation of both Xenophon and Luceius Cicero praises his addressee for his integrity. In the allegory, though, Virtue demands that Heracles take on difficult tasks in order to earn both praise for himself and for Virtue: thus Cicero can position himself as the Virtue to Luceius' Heracles. Slightly later, Cicero refers to Agesilaus' refusal to have images made of himself and adds that "one little book of Xenophon's in praise of that king has easily surpassed all the images and statues of anyone else."¹⁵³ Cicero gives no such praise to any of the other historians he mentions, except of course Luceius, to whom he presents Xenophon as the perfect encomiast and worthy of imitation, however risky.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵² Cicero hits all the important notes of praise: Luceius is to dispense praise and blame (5.12.4) and to retail the career of an exemplary individual (*vir excellens*, 5.12.5); Luceius will also be praised for the undertaking, particularly as he knows the difference between true *laudatores* and those too envious to praise (5.12.6); Luceius is moreover an ideal *laudator* as he has public *auctoritas* himself (5.12.7). For this last point Cicero aptly quotes Naevius *trag.* fr. 17 (from the *Hector Proficiscens*): *laetus sum laudari me abs te, pater, a laudato viro*. For further social aspects of this letter see Hall 1998.

¹⁵³ 5.12.7: *unus enim Xenophontis libellus in eo rege laudando facile omnis imagines omnium statuasque superavit*.

¹⁵⁴ Shackleton Bailey 1977:322 detects a possible third reference to Xenophon in Cicero's anxiety regarding the censure he could receive for writing self-praise, as Xenophon was his studiously cautious predecessor in this genre with the *Anabasis*. Cicero here concocts a metaphor along suitably Xenophontic lines, as well, with its combination of athletics and envy: heralds at the Olympic festival proclaim honors for the victorious, but allow others to give them their crowns when their own turn to be praised arrives.

If there is anything un-Xenophontic in the letter, it is to be found in Cicero's twice-stated hope that he live to read this praise (5.12.1, 5.12.9). Xenophon's models for the Athenians are largely foreign and all deceased. His ideal citizens are to praise one another frequently in order to motivate good deeds, but perhaps on this point Xenophon shares with the Socrates of the *Phaedrus* a distrust of writing: he cannot guarantee that his exemplars will continue to be worthy of display and imitation until their careers have ended. Xenophon is perfectly willing for an individual to praise the community, as he praises the Athenians, and he encourages the community to praise individuals, as with honorific decrees. Nonetheless, as the silence of his multifarious works bears witness, for an individual *laudator* to publish praise of a living *laudandus* presents, in Xenophon's eyes, an insurmountable barrier of envy.

CHAPTER 3

Isocrates and the contexts of praise

In Archilochean terms (fr. 201 West), Xenophon is a fox, Isocrates a hedgehog. Each is in his own way important for the later development of Greek prose, but where Xenophon impresses with a multitude of generic experiments and wide array of topics, Isocrates is remarkable for uniformity of both style and didactic intent.¹ Xenophon's underlying didactic intent—protrepsis toward virtue—remains consistent across his works, though it competes with other concerns, such as proper dog-training; Isocrates above all else intends to teach his intertwined modes of thought and expression.² Despite this essential difference, the two authors share, *inter alia*, an Athenian background, an emphasis on the citizen's role at home and abroad, and a tendency in modern scholarship to be compared primarily to Plato rather than to each other.³ The present chapter puts Xenophon and Isocrates side by side and examines Isocratean praise and its professed civic function relative to the theories and practice of Xenophon. Because Isocrates' expressed views, while always shrewdly adapted to the circumstances of a given

¹ Although Usher 1973 has qualified, and indeed quantified, the uniformity of Isocrates' style, it appears quite consistent when compared to the range exhibited by, e.g., the *Education of Cyrus* and *Peri Hippikes*.

² On the wide range of forms in which political philosophy could be communicated in the fourth century, see Sykutris 1927:35, who cites the *Evagoras* and *Hieron* among other examples.

³ The following examples are representative, not exhaustive: compare Blass 1892:28–38, 456–75 against 1892:42–3, 475–85, and Jebb 1876:49–50 against 1876:50–3; Mason 1975:69–90 compares the *Evagoras* with the *Republic* at length, but not so the *Agesilaus*; Poulakos and Depew 2004 present no chapter comparing Isocrates and Xenophon; cf. Haskins 2005:25.

composition, nonetheless vary little across his corpus, the *Evagoras* can remain the primary point of reference, in lieu of a more exhaustive encounter with the rhetorician. In the final analysis, Isocrates shares with Xenophon his interests in the *laudator*'s self-presentation and in what one might call mimetic ἐπίδειξις, while reserving to himself a special concern with the contexts and audiences of praise.

The *Evagoras* and the *Agesilaus*

Despite the relative rarity of the pairing of Isocrates and Xenophon in modern scholarship, it has been only natural for scholars to bring the two together in discussing the development of the prose encomium: if the genre comprises only self-contained works in praise of contemporary individuals, then the *Evagoras* and *Agesilaus* are the sole surviving classical Greek examples. Praise permeates the Isocratean corpus, as has already been seen with Xenophon, but it is still worthwhile to consider these two works *rarae aves*. In the most general terms, beyond their genre thus defined, their affinities include professions of ἀπορία, long passages devoted to exemplary behaviors and virtues of the *laudandus*, and a smattering of what would now be called biographical information—including markedly incomplete accounts of the deaths of their subjects. The differences between them can be summed up under two headings: the question of priority and the question of risk. The present chapter will examine those differences and then turn to one particularly close point of contact, regarding the value of statues and, by extension, of ἐπίδειξις.

The question of priority

Evagoras of Cyprus died in 374/3 BCE, more than a decade before Agesilaus of Sparta, and it has accordingly seemed reasonable to assume that the *Evagoras* was

composed prior to the *Agésilas*, especially as Nicocles, the addressee of the *Evagoras*, may have himself predeceased Agesilaus.⁴ Arguments of influence among contemporary authors can lead to an undesirable circularity—it is first assumed that text B was written after text A; text B yields alluring readings under this assumption; therefore text B was written after text A—and in any event to claim that Xenophon displays the influence of Isocrates does not diminish the artistic achievements of the *Agésilas*.⁵ More interesting for the present purpose is the difference between the texts regarding the rhetoric, rather than the fact, of priority: while the *Agésilas* grapples with the boundaries of the encomiastic genre (10.3), the *Evagoras* goes so far as to claim to have begun it, at least in its prose incarnation.

The *Evagoras* begins with the reasoning behind its composition, from two perspectives: first, Isocrates believes that Evagoras' memory will be best served by an encomiastic speech (9.2–4); second, praise of contemporaries should lead the young to emulate or even surpass the virtues of the deceased (9.5). Isocrates laments that this sort of encomium has not yet been undertaken, as it would not only restrict orators to speaking the truth—as they would be among witnesses (ἐν εἰδόσι)—but it would also “make the young more ambitiously disposed toward virtue” (οἳ τε νεώτεροι φιλοτιμοτέρως διέκειντο πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν), because they in turn would witness (εἰδότες) this sort of praise and would aim to earn even greater. Two factors, in Isocrates' view, have prevented this genre from arising (9.6). First, the market on praise has been cornered by hymns and tragedies written in honor of mythological figures, who have

⁴ At any rate he had died before the dramatic date of the *Antidosis* in 354/3 (15.67).

⁵ Hägg 2012:41 cautions that the evidence that Xenophon knew the *Evagoras* is very slight.

been praised hyperbolically despite the ease with which one might surpass their accomplishments.⁶ Second, envy (φθόνος) makes audiences prefer to hear, as Isocrates memorably states it, “about those whose existence they cannot verify rather than those by whom they have been personally well treated” (οὐς οὐκ ἴσασιν, εἰ γεγónασιν, ἢ τούτων ὑφ’ ὧν εὖ πεπονθότες αὐτοὶ τυγχάνουσιν).⁷ Despite precedents in lyric poetry for praise of contemporaries, he exhorts himself and others to generic innovation (9.7).⁸ Nonetheless, he proceeds to confess that his own task is even more tricky (9.8), as he is attempting “to praise the virtue of a man in prose” (ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν διὰ λόγων ἐγκωμιάζειν). Here are found the most explicit definition of Isocrates’ apparent innovation and his strongest evidence for it, that none of the “philosophers” (οἱ περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὄντες) have previously attempted to compose anything like this.

It is worth examining each component of the definition of this novelty. Isocrates specifies that his subject is an ἀνὴρ, not an ἄνθρωπος, a distinction already encountered in the works of Xenophon.⁹ This removes from consideration the erotic encomia of courtesans and boys, of which prose examples appear in the early fourth century, as well as encomia of deities or of trivial subjects such as salt.¹⁰ The singular ἀνὴρ is important as well, as it excludes the Athenian-style ἐπιτάφιος and Isocrates’ own public orations in

⁶ Papillon 1998:44 notes that Isocrates here makes use of a Pindaric *topos* (*Nemean* 7.20–30): poetry has anticipated him even in complaining about poetry. Cf. also Ibycus *PMG* fr.1a.

⁷ By admitting his difficulties to his audience, he gains sympathy; cf. Mason 1975:20: “His audience has been praised and challenged: it cannot remain passive.” On Isocrates’ distinction between envy and emulation, see Saïd 2003:220–1.

⁸ Cf. Race 1987:134–5.

⁹ E.g., *Hieron* 7.3; cf. *Agesilaus* 1.1 (τελέως ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐγένετο). Fraustadt 1909:59 sees ἀνδρὸς as the key word in Isocrates’ definition; see Sykutris 1927:41–3 for a more detailed discussion.

¹⁰ See Isocrates 10.12 and Plato, *Symposium* 177B for encomia of salt, as well as the *Symposium* generally for the speakers’ encomia of Eros. Pease 1926 catalogues the reported παράδοξα ἐγκώμια; cf. Burgess 1902:165–6 and Pernot 1993:21–2. Cf. also Nicolai 2004:90.

praise of communities.¹¹ Isocrates further specifies that he will be praising ἀρετή, rather than the *laudandus*’ πεπραγμένα: the author’s interest lies in character and in making character traits accessible and replicable; any deeds, or details of the subject’s life or community, are secondary to this consideration.¹² Coming just before the infinitive, διὰ λόγων arguably receives the most weight in the phrase (ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν διὰ λόγων ἐγκωμιάζειν), and Isocrates will spend no inconsiderable amount of time bemoaning the advantage (πλεονεξία) of the poets over would-be encomiasts in prose (9.9–11). Encomia of ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή most certainly preceded the *Evagoras*—one need only look to Pindar’s epinician odes—but these did not have the limitations imposed by prose, as Isocrates defines them. Often adduced in discussion of this passage is Aristotle’s comment (*Rhetoric* 1368A) that the first encomium was composed for a certain Hippolochus. Although some have seen an oblique refutation of Isocrates in these words in part because Isocrates is mentioned almost immediately after, the easiest resolution is to posit that this non-extant encomium was poetic, and therefore that here Isocrates stakes another claim for prose within the former territory of the poets.¹³

Finally, ἐγκωμιάζειν may rule out the ἀπολογία-texts regarding the likes of Helen, Busiris, Palamedes, and Socrates, particularly those in which the defendant is the speaker,

¹¹ Cf. Hägg 2012:32.

¹² Hägg 2012:32. This is consonant with 9.2, περὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν κινδύνων ... τῶν ἐκείνῳ πεπραγμένων. The latter subject veers close to “deeds” but includes the morally evaluative term κινδύνων as the head of the phrase, on which see further below; ἐπιτηδευμάτων, despite Hägg’s rendering “accomplishments” (2012:30–1), refers even less ambiguously to character. Burgess 1902:116 sees Isocrates’ emphasis on character as critical to the eventual solidifying of the encomiastic form; cf. Hürth 1906:14.

¹³ For the history of the question, mostly a series of rebuttals to Wilamowitz 1900:533–4, see Hürth 1906:10–12n.6, Fraustadt 1909:59–60, Stuart 1928:96, Momigliano 1993:49, Pernot 1993:21–2, Too 1995:34n.60, Alexiou 2010:28–30, and Hägg 2012:31–2. Jebb 1876:108n.11, predating this dilemma, is clean and direct.

as these are never called ἐγκώμια. Though some ἀπολογία-texts do include ἐγκώμιον in their traditional titles, their defensive framing separates them from the sort of encomium Isocrates has in mind, one with little to no adversarial aspect: the force of the *Evagoras* derives from its repeated reference to communal consensus surrounding the actions of the *laudandus*.¹⁴ As in the *Agesilaus*, the praise of Evagoras is bolstered by the constantly extolled collusion of the audience as witnesses. This collusion erodes opposition variously by insisting that the audience will side with the encomiast in disputed matters or by leaving no space for any opposition whatsoever. Each element of the phrase ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν διὰ λόγων ἐγκωμιάζειν therefore narrows the set of external standards by which the *Evagoras* can be judged, leaving only those standards proposed within the text itself.

The opening sections of the *Evagoras* constitute not just a series of apparent truisms, but also a programmatic definition of the praise to be delivered in this very speech. The seemingly generalized comments are subordinate to their context. Isocrates only adduces his claim of priority in support of contending that the task ahead of him is difficult (9.8). This protestation of inadequacy—to which can be compared, e.g., *Agesilaus* 1.1—will become a standard encomiastic trope, warding off envy from the seemingly modest *laudator*.¹⁵ The paragraph (9.8–11) does indeed serve the important task of developing the antagonism between poetry and prose, a theme to which Isocrates will frequently have recourse; the truth value, however, of Isocrates' claim, relative to previous authors' praise-texts in prose, is of less consequence. Deeming the *Evagoras* the first prose encomium allows Isocrates to delimit its boundaries: unlike other, perhaps

¹⁴ For Isocrates' views on the difference between encomium and apology, see 10.14–15; for consensus in praise, see 3.46, an extreme case as it involves self-praise (cf. Nicolai 2004:93–4).

¹⁵ Cf. Hägg 2012:33. For an extreme example in Isocrates, see 4.82; Hypereides 6.6 is also representative, especially for the rhetorical questions in which the ἀπορία is couched.

hypothetical texts that merely involve praise, the *Evagoras* will be an act of praise and praise alone.¹⁶ This limitation compels the reader or audience member, as in Bundy's approach to Pindar, to interpret all aspects of the text as designed, at least in the first instance, to favor Evagoras and Nicocles.¹⁷

While this is not the moment to make historical arguments about the reign of Evagoras, the implication that the text at hand will be totally devoted to praise rather than, for example, to analysis of motivation may lead the more skeptical reader to wonder just how much distance separates the apparently sincere encomium of Evagoras from the truth-bending style of the *Busiris*. The *Evagoras* all but admits its own exaggerations, as will be seen below, but any parodic, satirical, or sinister readings can be dismissed by reference to the claim of priority. Insincere praise in prose demonstrably predates the *Evagoras*, and Isocrates defuses that particular charge by stating that he is doing something new. Unlike his other productions, this encomium is meant to be serious.¹⁸ While the *Busiris* and *Helen* have clear political and literary relevance—they are “serious” in those regards—the *Evagoras* must avoid offending Nicocles at all costs.¹⁹ Disrupting the audience's expectations by claiming novelty smoothes over any untoward

¹⁶ Isocrates complicates matters by spelling out his additional protreptic intent (9.5, 9.73–81), but see further below, on statues.

¹⁷ See Bundy 1962:3 for the barest statement: “[T]here is no passage in Pindar and Bakchylides that is not in its primary intent enkomiastc—that is, designed to enhance the glory of a particular patron.” For the relationship between Pindar and Isocrates generally, see the concise statement of Race 1986:121; for Pindar and the *Evagoras*, see the fine analysis of Race 1987. Too 1995:218–21 (regarding *On the Team of Horses*) is also useful.

¹⁸ See 10.11, 11.9; cf. Fraustadt 1909:60, Sykutris 1927:45, and Pernot 1993:22. For a contemporary differentiation between “serious” and “playful” modes, see Xenophon, *Symposium* 1.1; cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1366A.

¹⁹ For the seriousness of the *Helen* see Papillon 1996a; for *Busiris*, Papillon 2001; cf. Papillon 1996b. Isocrates 15.40 implies that at least some Athenians could think Nicocles did indeed receive the speech well; cf. *Lives of the Ten Orators* 838A.

implications and leaves the audience charitably attentive to Isocrates as he navigates professedly uncharted waters.

The question of risk

As in the *Agesilaus*, the *laudator* and *laudandus* come into alignment through their parallel risk-taking. Isocrates mentions Evagoras' risks several times, including in the initial definition of the work as an account of Evagoras' ἐπιτηδεύματα and κίνδυνοι (9.2).²⁰ Praise for Evagoras consists not only in the things he accomplished, but also, and at least as importantly, in the degree of difficulty involved (cf. Isocrates 1.7). Thus far the author of the *Agesilaus* agrees: perhaps the grandest statement of praise in that work contrasts Agesilaus' choice to hazard his gains in Asia for the sake of his homeland (1.36). Isocrates, on the other hand, goes further than Xenophon in playing up the risks undertaken by the *laudator*. Xenophon leaves his authorial risks mostly implicit, outside of the initial sentence of the work; Isocrates spends a significant portion of the proem asserting his originality in daring to set himself and Evagoras against the poets and their mythical *laudati*.²¹ This elaborate assertion of literary risk deflects the audience's attention away from the otherwise minimized hazards of this act of praise. Isocrates, aware of and looking to exploit the novelty of the genre, protects his experiment by choosing a completely unobjectionable *laudandus*, especially when one compares Xenophon's choice to lionize the controversial Agesilaus. The trumped-up literary risk of priority and innovation becomes a screen for the fact that praise of Evagoras was, by the

²⁰ See especially 9.36; cf. 9.27 and 9.29, on the hazards of exile and return, respectively. Evagoras' Aeacid ancestors' risks are praised at 9.16 (Peleus) and 9.18 (Achilles, Ajax, Teucer).

²¹ Cf. Carey 2007:239 on praise-rhetoric generally. Chroust 1966:207 posits that Aristotle, in addressing the *Protrepticus* to the later Cypriot king Themison, attempts to rival Isocrates' praise in turn.

year of his death, an act simultaneously obvious and trifling. Isocrates must strike a balance between the apparent risks of praising a contemporary and the actual ease of praising Evagoras, between highlighting his own political and literary ingenuity before his fellow Athenians and protecting the pride of Nicocles. One can observe this process both on the level of diction and in the text's construction of its own context.

In terms of diction, the text evinces a curious obsession with the μέγεθος (“bigness, magnitude, grandeur”) of the *laudandus*' deeds and virtues.²² Sheer numbers tell the story best: forms, including cognates and compounds, of the adjective μέγας occur forty-four times in the *Evagoras*, which is to say that they make up 9.13 words out of every thousand.²³ The Isocratean corpus as a whole—twenty-one speeches and nine letters, not including fragments—has a rate of 4.61 instances of μέγας-words per thousand, with most texts clustering around that average; with nearly twice the frequency, the *Evagoras* is a clear outlier.²⁴ Of the texts most similar to the *Evagoras*, the *Helen* and *Busiris* average only 4.88 and 4.24 μέγας-words per thousand; the *Panathenaicus* and *Antidosis*, also praise-texts after their own fashions, average 4.51 and 3.58; the *To Nicocles* and *Nicocles*, related in subject matter though not in form, are closer, with

²² Aristotle would later call it the task of praise “to highlight magnitude of virtue” (*Rhetoric* 1367B: ἔστιν δ' ἔπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς).

²³ These numbers and those that follow are based on the texts and word counts supplied by the online *TLG*, as accessed in July 2013.

²⁴ The average of 4.61 μέγας-words per thousand was calculated through comparing the total of all μέγας-words in the corpus against the combined word count of all thirty texts. If the frequencies for all the individual texts are averaged together—so that the lengthier texts have less influence on the result—the overall frequency is only slightly higher, at 4.75; weighting the texts equally in this fashion helps show what could be considered the programmatic usage of μέγας-words but is less useful for determining Isocrates' general practice. The letters generally have higher averages of μέγας-words; across the nine letters, the average is 5.47 μέγας-words per thousand (5.19 weighting the texts equally). Comparing only the speeches, one finds an average of 4.56 (4.57 weighting the texts equally).

frequencies of 5.45 and 6.40; one might also wish to compare the *On the Team of Horses*, with 5.63.²⁵

It can be seen in these numbers that Isocrates, far beyond his usual linguistic habits, emphasizes the greatness of Evagoras as an ethical model.²⁶ Xenophon's *Agésilas*, by way of contrast, has only 4.10 μέγας-words per thousand: Xenophon had no need to exaggerate the magnitude of Agesilaus' effects on Sparta and the Greek world.²⁷ Like Xenophon, Isocrates resorts to other forms of embellishment such as comparatives and superlatives, but his focus on magnitude is striking. Μέγας-words appear at critical moments to describe Evagoras' virtues and deeds, as when Isocrates begins to draw the speech to a close through the device of ἀπορία (9.69). Briefly rehearsing the *laudandus*' major actions, the speaker confesses that he cannot decide which of them is greatest (μέγιστον), no matter how often he reviews them mentally—insinuating that the audience should also constantly contemplate Evagoras.²⁸ This statement picks up a thread laid down earlier (9.33), when Isocrates was capping his narrative of Evagoras' accession and claimed that describing this alone would sufficiently convey the magnitude (μέγεθος) of the king's accomplishments: with the ἀπορία of 9.69,

²⁵ On the similarity of the *Evagoras* to other Isocratean texts, see Usher 1973:54.

²⁶ Though the count of μέγας-words is exaggerated relative to the rest of his corpus, the orator's focus on greatness and great topics, as opposed to trifling ones, is part of his usual program: see in particular 15.276 (cf. Alexiou 1995:56, with Too 2008:225, who refers this criterion to Thucydides' historiographical practice); see also 4.141, 4.173, 10.13, and *Ep.* 9.15. Poulakos 1987:324 also senses the "extraordinary degree" of magnification in the *Evagoras*: "all is touched by the linguistic power of augmentation."

²⁷ The Lysianic ἐπιτάφιος, which takes pains to show Athens' transformation from a minor *polis* into a great one (2.63) and therefore might have employed similar rhetoric of scale (cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus *Rhetorica* 6.2), nonetheless has only 4.78 μέγας-words per thousand. The remaining extant ἐπιτάφιοι fall short even of this average.

²⁸ Hürth 1906:12 claims that Isocrates introduced ἀνακεφαλαίωσις into the genre with this passage.

Isocrates multiplies this exemplarity across each of Evagoras' actions.²⁹ Additionally, perhaps the most important transition in the speech, that which bridges the end of Evagoras' life and the protrepsis of Nicocles, is effected through the claim that Evagoras' greatest success (τὸ μέγιστον) lay in passing his kingdom to his offspring (9.72).

Μέγας-words are not, however, limited to describing Evagoras himself: they participate in the agonistic aspect of encomium, weighing the *laudandus* against the greatness of his ancestors, enemies, and allies. To take only a few examples, Isocrates creates several parallels between Evagoras and his Aeacid ancestors.³⁰ This sort of mythological comparison is by no means unusual in Isocrates: witness the Agamemnon digression in the *Panathenaicus* (12.76–88).³¹ In the case of the Aeacids, the verbal echoes align this section (9.12–18) closely with what follows. The Greeks are faced with a threat of exceeding magnitude (τὸ μέγεθος τῆς συμφορᾶς ὑπερέβαλλεν, 9.14), and therefore Aeacus receives suppliants from the rest of Greece.³² Likewise, Evagoras will, in Isocrates' terms, be the salvation of the Greeks against the Spartans and then the

²⁹ To illustrate the role of these words in describing Evagoras' virtues, one can look to, e.g., the four μέγας-words that come in quick succession during the portion of the text given over to ethical analysis (9.45). On 9.33, cf. Sykutris 1927:31.

³⁰ Cf. Race 1987:138. As in Xenophon's *Agésilas*, Isocrates makes no mention of Evagoras' more direct ancestry. Pace Hägg 2012:35, there is here a neat parallel between *laudator* and *laudandus*: the *laudator* must contend with those who praise mythological figures, and the *laudandus* must compete for praise against his own mythological forebears. Cf. 3.28 (with Sykutris 1927:53), and contrast the advice given at *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* 1440B, that one should at least acknowledge skipped-over ancestors. For Isocrates' general purposes in praising ancestors, cf. 12.120–3.

³¹ On which see Race 1978. Cf. Heracles digression in the *Philip* (5.109–115), praise of Philip's ancestor. On these digressions generally see Cizek 1975, especially 1975:296 and 305.

³² Cf. especially 9.70; see further below on hyperbole. At 10.10 Isocrates looks down upon praising catastrophes *per se*, though they can be useful in praising the character of those who face them (e.g., 10.20, 10.29, 10.62; cf. 4.119).

Persians, whose forces also pose a lexically underscored threat.³³ As a result of their benefactions, Aeacus and Evagoras are each honored with μέγιστα τιμαί (9.15, 9.57).³⁴ In general terms, Evagoras' ancestors present him with "very great exemplars" (μεγίστων παραδειγμάτων, 9.12; cf. τηλικάυτα τὸ μέγεθος, 9.19) whose greatness he is said to match and surpass at every stage of his life. Next, after the mythological excursus, the nameless Phoenician on the throne of Salamis serves as a point of comparison not only for his general lack of virtues next to Evagoras' full stable, but also as he had obtained μεγάλας δυναστείας (9.19).³⁵ This phrase recurs as Isocrates dramatizes the thought process of the Persian king, supporter of the Phoenician's power (9.20), in comparing other nameless monarchs with the insurmountable virtue of Evagoras (9.59): Isocrates bolsters Evagoras' standing by comparing him first against one opponent and then, using the same terms, against a whole mass of them.

Just as there were many parallels between the *laudandus*' deeds and the *laudator*'s role in Xenophon's *Agesilaus*, so too does one find in the *Evagoras* that μέγας-words abound not just within the narrative but also as discourse markers that assist the speaker in laying out the evidence for his subject's greatness. Isocrates describes a point of evidence as the "greatest" proof of something four times in the course of the speech: first in the proem (9.8), then in the mythological section (9.17), and twice for

³³ For μέγας-words describing Sparta and contemporary Persia, see especially 9.61 (Persia, ὑπερμεγέθεις παρασκευάς) and 9.64 (Sparta, δύναμιν μεγίστην); also, Evagoras is of course being compared to the Great King (βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας, 9.20, 9.64).

³⁴ Cf. Isocrates 8.89, Lycurgus 1.51 (also regarding euergetism), and especially Thucydides 1.144.3, where Pericles claims that μέγιστα τιμαί accrue through superlative risk-taking (ἐκ τε τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων). In poetry the phrase refers normally to divinities and their cult (e.g., *Homeric Hymns* 2.366, 5.37; *Hippolytus* 1424), suitable for Aeacus and extendable to Evagoras on the terms of the hyperbole at 9.72. Lysias 26.20 uses the phrase of the chief magistracies, again appropriate for both Aeacus (*qua* judge) and Evagoras. For the Athenian technical meaning of μέγιστα τιμαί that developed over the fourth century, see chapter four.

³⁵ On the nameless Phoenician, see Vallozza 2005.

evaluating Evagoras (9.51, 9.58). The superlative nature of Evagoras is matched by the apparently overwhelming evidence on offer. In dealing with the miraculous stories surrounding Evagoras' birth, Isocrates acknowledges that the evidence may exceed credence, but this occurs only in *praeteritio*: Isocrates can highlight Evagoras' extraordinary qualities and maintain his audience's favor at the same time (9.21).³⁶ Isocrates amplifies his apparent confidence in later passages. On the next occasion when he self-consciously addresses potential skepticism, he claims that the audience will not find him "eager to talk big" about Evagoras (μεγάλα λέγειν προθυμούμενος, 9.39), but rather to have spoken in accordance with the truth, justifying the "big talk."³⁷ A few paragraphs later comes the final stage of amplification: Isocrates states his worry not that he will be caught boasting excessively (μείζω λέγων τῶν ἐκείνῳ προσόντων, 9.48), but that he will in fact fall short of his task. Evagoras' greatness, as Isocrates illustrates by degrees, comes to exceed even the powers of the rhetorician.

Closely allied to the emphasis on magnitude is the recurring theme of hyperbole, or rather the impossibility of ὑπερβολή, of exceeding Evagoras' accomplishments. Evagoras is not only great, but indeed unsurpassable, having himself already surpassed all mythical exemplars. William H. Race terms these rhetorical turns "superlative vaunts."³⁸ These vaunts permeate the speech, beginning with the opening sentence: Nicocles' funeral games for his father have apparently left no room for improvement (9.1). As it turns out, Isocrates will attempt to go beyond Nicocles' perfection by

³⁶ Cf. Hägg 2012:35.

³⁷ Cf. chapter two, on μέγα λέγειν in the apologetic tradition.

³⁸ Race 1987:138–9. Race takes the term "vaunt" itself from Bundy, who distinguished among several varieties; see, e.g., 1962:20–2 for examples.

performing praise of Evagoras' perfection.³⁹ This praise will furthermore incorporate and subsume the apparent perfection of the Aeacids, all notable for their primacy in their own day.⁴⁰ Evagoras, Isocrates claims, surpassed in his fighting against the Spartans and Persians even the heroes of the Trojan War (καὶ τὸν [*sc.* πόλεμον] τῶν ἡρώων ὑπερβαλόμενος, 9.65) and, on that basis, has not received his proper due from the poets. Indeed, Isocrates marshals poetic hyperbole at the climax of the speech (9.72) in order to claim that all exaggerations such as the poets use would be especially appropriate to Evagoras' extraordinary φύσις (cf. 10.54). This conclusion comes up just short of suggesting Evagoras' divinity and indeed reduces the risk of the author being accused of such excess through taking an acknowledged poetic conceit as its model.⁴¹ Despite the cautious crafting of this statement—Evagoras was no Lysander—the point remains that Evagoras has surpassed the mythical figures and that, by implication, Isocrates has surpassed their poets.⁴²

Like Nicocles' funeral games and the Aeacid ancestors, however, Evagoras is only unsurpassable to a degree: Isocrates makes it clear that he believes that praise should inspire the audience to strive beyond the accomplishments they hear retailed (9.5).⁴³ To that end it is paradoxically on Evagoras' relative smallness or insignificance that the speech depends. One could suppose that a text flooded with descriptions of magnitude

³⁹ For an amusing acknowledgement of the rivalry Isocrates feigns between the two of them, see 3.11. In the same speech, Nicocles is given a first-person superlative vaunt of his own (3.35).

⁴⁰ See especially 9.13, which has a Pindaric ring. Cf. 9.17–18 for a heap of distinguishing features of the Trojan War generation. Conon, another foil for Evagoras, is described similarly at 9.52.

⁴¹ On divinization and the *Evagoras*, see Sykutris 1927:30.

⁴² Further examples of Evagoras' ὑπερβολή: 9.23, 9.34, 9.41 (cf. 9.13), 9.45.

⁴³ Cf. Isocrates' Archidamus, who wants his generation to win ineffable, unsurpassable praise (6.105) such as that already received by those who fell at Thermopylae (6.100); cf. 16.34.

would also include the opposite, μικρότης, but in terms of diction this is not the case; Isocrates instead accentuates the μέγας-words and avoids all but implicit reference to any unfortunate characteristics of the *laudandus*.⁴⁴ Isocrates could not fail to acknowledge that, whatever his ambitions a decade prior to his death, Evagoras ruled a small city and ultimately had no such influence on Mediterranean affairs as that wielded by his Athenian, Spartan, or Persian contemporaries.⁴⁵ When these facts arise, however, they are marshaled to prove Evagoras' greatness in spite of his limited circumstances.⁴⁶ This use of smallness finds a precedent in Gorgias: that λόγος is contained in so small a physical form (σμικροτάτῳ καὶ ἀφανεστάτῳ, *Encomium of Helen* 8) makes it all the more impressive that it is a δυνάστης μέγας.⁴⁷ Likewise, in the *Evagoras* the hero recovered the throne of Salamis with a force of only fifty men, according to those of Isocrates' sources who gave the highest figure (9.28, cf. 9.64). One is to praise Evagoras for taking so great a risk (9.29) with so few men, forgetting for the moment that Salamis was no impregnable bastion (cf. 9.47). In a similar later instance, the abandonment of Evagoras by his allies becomes a badge of virtue for the Cypriot king as he continues to wage war

⁴⁴ Forms of μικρός appear only five times (9.40, 9.45, 9.58, 9.59, 9.62), and never to describe Evagoras—indeed, usually they set up a contrast with the grandeur of the *laudandus*. Deficiencies are addressed through such phrases as οὐδενὸς χείρων (as at 9.18, of Teucer, the least distinguished of the Aeacids but the most immediate of all of the named ancestors of Evagoras; for Teucer's relative absence, see Lienhard 1975:98; for the complete absence of Cinyras, Vallozza 2005:190).

⁴⁵ The *Busiris* provides an example of Isocrates' belief in praise that intimates its opposite without mentioning it. Just as Isocrates glosses over the enormity of Busiris' actions, so too does he silent surrounding Evagoras' decline. In the literary tradition Evagoras is passed over even at the height of his international influence: the victory at Cnidus is usually said to belong to Conon and Pharnabazus, as early as Xenophon (*Hellenica* 4.3.11, 4.8.1; cf., e.g., Plutarch *Life of Agesilaus* 17.2), and not to Evagoras, as Isocrates would have it (9.68)—nor, for that matter, is Cnidus always represented as a positive event, even by Isocrates (4.119).

⁴⁶ Compare Xenophon's praise of the Phleiansians, as discussed in the previous chapter.

⁴⁷ Note also Isocrates himself at 4.8: λόγος makes the small great (τοῖς μικροῖς μέγεθος περιθεῖναι) and vice versa. Cf. *Phaedrus* 267A–B.

alone (9.61). Evagoras' smallness is even directly acknowledged in the section comparing him to Cyrus the Great (9.37–8), where Isocrates parlays it into a statement of Evagoras' moral superiority in the face of the μέγεθος of Cyrus' accomplishments.⁴⁸ This smallness also makes him compare favorably with the mythical heroes, who barely took one Asian city with all Greece behind them, whereas Evagoras, “with only one city” (μίαν πόλιν ἔχων, 9.65), fought against the entire continent. His relative insignificance amplifies the risks and thereby calls for greater praise, when their deeds are considered proportionally: “If the same number of poets had been willing to write encomia for him as did for [the mythical heroes], he would also have acquired a far greater reputation than theirs.”⁴⁹

In order to craft an appealing ethical model out of this petty foreign prince, Isocrates repeatedly asserts the magnitude of his subject's accomplishments, and he furthermore molds an Athenian audience's reception of Evagoras through devices of internal praise. As has been seen with the *Agesilaus*, here too the *laudator* supports his own praise of the *laudandus* by citing praise conferred upon the *laudandus* by other parties. Isocrates appeals in particular to the authority of Athens and Persia as evaluators: if such powerful nations once deemed Evagoras a worthy collaborator or opponent, the audience has little choice but to agree with them. For example, Isocrates argues that Artaxerxes considered Evagoras a “greater and more difficult” opponent than his brother

⁴⁸ Cf. Hägg 2012:37: “[Isocrates] is well aware that the Persian Empire is of another dimension than the kingdom of Salamis.”

⁴⁹ 9.65: ... ὥστ' εἰ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος ἐγκωμιάζειν αὐτὸν ἐβουλήθησαν ὅσοι περ ἐκείνους, πολὺ ἂν μείζω καὶ τὴν δόξαν αὐτῶν ἔλαβεν. The past aspect of the condition reminds one that Isocrates sees himself as remedying this lack, as one against many just like his *laudandus*. The careful elaboration of the poets' number—τοσοῦτοι clarified by τὸ πλῆθος—rather than their quality is pointed and bears comparison with the play of numbers in the Cyrus digression, 9.37 (πολλοί, πλεῖστα).

Cyrus (μείζω ... καὶ χαλεπότερον, 9.58) and claims that the actions of this one Cypriot made many Persians grieve (9.62).⁵⁰ Isocrates even makes excuses for the duplicity of which Artaxerxes was frequently accused. It was, according to Isocrates, “not entirely unreasonable” (οὐ μὴν παντάπασιν ἀλόγως, 9.58) for the Persian king to attack his benefactor Evagoras, because Artaxerxes, despite his ethical faults, is made out to be a competent judge of both historical trends and character (9.59); Persian ingratitude is elsewhere put in a purely negative light (4.115). The grudging respect of the Persian king becomes a high compliment for the *laudandus*. Persian War narratives popular at Athens in the fourth century frequently cited, as a point of pride, a special grudge supposedly held by Dareius and Xerxes against the Athenians (e.g., Lysias 2.22). The description of Artaxerxes’ feelings toward Evagoras would therefore curry favor particularly with an Athenian audience, who would see Evagoras as imitating their own example. Furthermore, the enmity of the Persians is important to the rhetoric of the *Evagoras* because the *laudandus* was for many years a satellite king of Persia, a fact the *laudator* is keen to avoid mentioning.

Indirect praise appears even more persuasive as a rhetorical strategy if the audience is envisaged as Athenian and therefore susceptible to reminders of their earlier opinions and of the opinions of fellow Athenians.⁵¹ This strategy finds a direct parallel in the *Helen*: Isocrates has only barely begun his encomium (10.16–17) when he inserts a lengthy digression on the deeds of Theseus (10.18–37) that takes up almost a third of the

⁵⁰ The short passage describing Artaxerxes’ reaction is suffused with μέγας-words—μείζω (9.57 and 9.58), μέγιστον (9.58), μέγας and μεγαλοψυχίαν (9.59), μειζόνων (9.60)—in addition to other comparatives and some hyperbole (ἄνυπέρβλητον, 9.59).

⁵¹ Cf. Bruns 1896:116, who sees Athens as the text’s most important audience, particularly with reference to 9.5–11; Münscher 1927:1067 and Sykutris 1927:38 agree.

entire speech. Isocrates seeks to establish that Theseus was the perfect hero (10.21) and that his obsession with Helen therefore constitutes an endorsement of her virtue. In the *Evagoras*, it is the latter-day Athenian hero Conon who performs this evaluative role, as was clear to Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1399A).⁵² Conon arrives at Salamis along with many other anonymous noble refugees of various cities (9.51–2), and Conon and Evagoras find themselves kindred spirits, better matched to one another than to their own fellow-citizens (9.53). This is understandable for the exiled Conon, at least until he is restored to a position of honor in Athens, but in the case of Evagoras it sets him apart from his Salaminian context. Indeed, here Isocrates reminds the audience that Evagoras has already been made an Athenian citizen owing to his “many great benefactions” (πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας εὐεργεσίας, 9.54), which qualifies him to oppose the “great change in circumstances” (μεγάλῃ μεταβολῇ) to which Athens has been subjected.⁵³ Conon’s friendship and Evagoras’ own services to the Athenians matter more, it seems, than his local governance, and the magnitude of these services (τοῦ μεγέθους τῆς εὐεργεσίας, 9.57) earns the Cypriot king μέγισται τιμαί at Athens.⁵⁴ Here the audience is reminded not only of Conon’s approval of Evagoras, but of their own earlier, public acts of praise on two separate occasions several years apart. As far as Athens is concerned, Isocrates

⁵² For Conon’s role in this speech see also Gotteland 2012:71–4, especially for the notion (2012:72n.30) that Conon and Athens are parallel figures in this speech through the misfortune Isocrates attributes to them. Race 1987:147–8 compares the pair of Conon and Evagoras to that of Achilles and Patroclus in *Olympian* 9. For internal evaluators elsewhere in Isocrates, cf. 15.101–139, where the life and reputation of Timotheus, Conon’s son, vouch for the worth of Isocrates himself.

⁵³ The decree for the citizenship grant (*IG* I³ 113, c.410 BCE; see Osborne 1972:55 for references, and see also Osborne 1974) survives partially. It may have been motivated by the grain supply (Lysias 6.28, cf. Andocides 2.20–1; note, however, Costa 1974:45–6).

⁵⁴ The ἡμεῖς μὲν of 9.57 is answered by the Persian king’s reaction immediately following (βασιλεὺς δ’ οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην ἔσχε περὶ αὐτῶν...), which further emphasizes the weight of paired Athenian and Persian responses to Evagoras in evaluating him.

leaves no room for debating the greatness of Evagoras' deeds and therefore his praiseworthiness.

It is primarily in and for the eyes of outsiders, and not the Salaminians, that the text's version of Evagoras has achieved what he achieved.⁵⁵ As Isocrates sums up the *laudandus*' major accomplishments (9.66–8), he expands outward in relevance. First mentioned is Evagoras' personal tyranny, followed by the honors he restored to his γένος. Isocrates then describes how the citizens of Salamis fared under Evagoras. He mentions no particulars of Evagoras' policy—no decrees, no building projects—but only the transformation of the citizens from barbarians into Greeks.⁵⁶ This transformation (9.66–7) entailed them becoming more bellicose, to the benefit of Athens as previously described, and both better known to and more receptive of Greeks and Greek culture, again traits with clear political and economic benefits to Athens.⁵⁷ Finally, as the result of Cnidus (9.68), Evagoras put the Lacedaemonians into dire straits and bestowed great benefits upon Artaxerxes, the eastern Greeks, and especially the Athenians, the restoration of whose empire is the final deed listed in the sequence. Despite the fact that he ruled for another two decades after Cnidus, nothing is said about Evagoras as leader of Salamis,

⁵⁵ Cf. Mason 1975:28. Lienhard 1975:97 sees a process of “déchyprisation” at work in the text, in which Cyprus becomes “un lieu abstrait” in which Isocrates can discuss ideology. Momigliano 1993:50 goes even further, claiming that Isocrates hardly even depicts Evagoras as having achieved anything at all: “Isocrates combines rather ineffectually a static description of Euagoras' character with a chronological account of what other people did to Euagoras.” Alexiou 2010:44 sees this “static” character as a common element of the fourth-century encomia.

⁵⁶ 9.47 had acknowledged Evagoras' improvements to the physical apparatus of the city, but note there also the priority of the cultural transformation.

⁵⁷ Archaeologists have pointed out that the very notion of an Evagorid re-Hellenization of Cyprus is a rhetorical construct of Isocrates; the material culture of the fifth century is continuous (Maier 1985:37–8, with references). Following Pownall 2006, Isocrates can be seen as tapping into the motif of the mythological “culture hero” in magnifying Evagoras' accomplishments. For historical analyses of Evagoras' reign see Hill 1940:125–43, Spyridakis 1964:20–3, Costa 1974, Tuplin 1983:178–9, and Maier 1985; the ancient sources are summed up by Spyridakis 1935:1–4.

but instead that he was above all else a loyal Athenian citizen: his “bigness” was exercised primarily toward his adopted *polis* and was magnified by the contrast with his essential smallness on the fringe of the Athenian sphere of influence.

The constant bruited of Evagoras’ bigness is appropriate to the absolutism favored by encomium, but it also intimates to the audience Salamis’ relative insignificance within an Athenian context. The audience is to admire the king all the more because of this smallness, and yet it also lowers the stakes by removing some risk of envy. This is no praise of Artaxerxes, Agesilaus, Epameinondas, Dionysius, or any contemporary native Athenian, encomium of whom could have more readily offended some element of the audience. Indeed, Isocrates does not bother to set up as opponents to his praise anyone who disagrees about Evagoras’ virtue, but rather touts previous poets and the scarcity of prose encomia as his opposition. Evagoras is not an archaic victor needing to be reincorporated into his home city; public opinion had instead solidified decades prior, when Evagoras was first made a citizen of Athens and later granted a permanent position in Athenian civic space by means of his statue in the Agora.⁵⁸ What is more, Isocrates’ concern for asserting Evagoras’ already-proven value to the Athenians is not matched by any similar discussion of his role as leader of the Salaminians. The nature of the evidence is such that the Salaminian context is mostly irretrievable, and modern readers are left without the means to compare Isocrates’ picture against reality.⁵⁹ For all

⁵⁸ The statue was paired with that of Conon and placed near the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios; for the symbolism, see Oliver 2007b:197; for the novelty, Shear 2007:109 (with references). An honorary decree from this occasion survives in fragmentary state (*IG* II² 20); see Lewis and Stroud 1979. Demosthenes (20.70) points out the significance of Conon’s statue, the first of a mortal Athenian since the tyrannicide group; Conon’s honors were later eclipsed by those for Iphicrates (Oliver 2007b:189). See chapter four for further remarks on Athenian “statue culture” (as defined by Oliver 2007b:181–2).

⁵⁹ Cf. the more extreme argument of Poulakos 1987, especially 1987:323: “The *Evagoras* presents not a pre-existing reality but a possible world.” Cf. Sykutris 1927:30 (with references). See Hägg 2012:38–9 for

that can be discerned, he may even have fallen short of the mark in aggrandizing his *laudandus*. Regardless of how Evagoras' subjects viewed him, or indeed how other powers of the eastern Mediterranean may have viewed him, it is only the opinions of Persia and Athens that matter in the *Evagoras*, and this bias of the text implicitly reduces Evagoras' stature. While Evagoras' risks are to be praised, in his choice of *laudandus* Isocrates does not expose himself, as Xenophon will, to potential hazards of political criticism.

The value of statues

Evagoras and Agesilaus make an odd pair as the earliest *laudandi* of extant Greek prose encomia. One can, of course, locate a few commonalities—monarchical authority, for instance, limited in one case by the dominance of Persia and in the other by the Spartan constitution—but other than their protracted campaigns against Artaxerxes no particular bond would indicate on first glance that these two would be singled out for this honor, much less by Athenian authors.⁶⁰ Indeed, at the height of their fame they were opponents: Evagoras and Conon's signal victory at Cnidus was also the defeat of Agesilaus' brother-in-law Peisander.⁶¹ Furthermore, despite receiving the same literary honor as Evagoras shortly after his death, Agesilaus went on to eclipse the Cypriot king in terms of his later reception. Cornelius Nepos and Plutarch each grant Agesilaus a biography, but neither author writes a *Life of Evagoras*, and Nepos does not even name

several modern opinions on whether or not Isocrates exaggerates in the encomium, the differences among which reveal the limits of the evidence; cf. especially Jebb 1876:113: "The *Evagoras* is professedly an encomium; but the praise which it awards does not, on the whole, appear to be exaggerated."

⁶⁰ There are some additional minor similarities in their careers: e.g., each had a fundraising expedition to Egypt (Diodorus 15.8.1, for which see Hill 1940:138).

⁶¹ Cf. Xenophon's frustration at this web of alliances (*Hellenica* 4.8.24).

Evagoras in his *Life of Conon*.⁶² The anecdotal tradition after the fourth century is brimming with Agesilaus' words and deeds, but Evagoras is virtually forgotten. Though Xenophon supplies only a few of the anecdotes that entered the tradition, his portrait of Agesilaus' character—combined perhaps with the importance of the historical Agesilaus—ensured that his *laudandus* would remain popular for centuries. Isocrates did not manage the same for Evagoras.⁶³

Xenophon's advantage lies both in his daring to praise the likes of Agesilaus so wholeheartedly and in his attempt to capture his *laudandus*' charm and wisdom. Isocrates, concerned with the emulation of Evagoras' greatness, especially as a benefactor of Athens, does not construct a similar image. The text betrays little of Evagoras' thoughts, feelings, or motivations, aside from his daring and φιλοτιμία; his opinion is cited prominently only at the opening of the speech, where Isocrates envisions him viewing the funeral proceedings from the afterlife (9.2), and by its very nature this opinion is putative rather than reported.⁶⁴ This posthumous image of Evagoras stamps the implicit approval of the *laudandus* onto the praise delivered in the rest of the speech, but it does not reveal Evagoras' personal character, which the encomium treats perhaps more

⁶² Contrast *Life of Chabrias* 2.2, with Evagoras as the conduit through which Chabrias and the Athenians “gained great renown” (*magnam gloriam sunt adempti*); he is not included among the *Reges*. Plutarch names Evagoras only once, in passing (*Life of Lysander* 11.5); within the wider Plutarchan corpus, Evagoras is mentioned in the *Life of Isocrates* (838A).

⁶³ Matters may be complicated by the reputations of Xenophon and Isocrates in later eras: both were important Attic authors, but the former surpassed the latter in popularity; therefore, Xenophon's praise had wider repercussions. Nepos again proves a useful point of reception: at the start of his *Life of Agesilaus* (1.1), that *Xenophon Socraticus* deigned to praise Agesilaus vouches for the worthiness of the subject; cf. the role of Theseus and Conon as evaluators, above.

⁶⁴ Cf. Hägg 2012:40, and 2012:38: “[W]hile many of the historical events are at least mentioned, Evagoras' own viewpoint is entirely missing.” Gomperz 1905:184 saw this passage as a gesture toward the ἐπιτάφιοι (especially *Menexenus* 248B–C).

briefly than Isocrates leads one to expect.⁶⁵ Xenophon's Agesilaus is further along the spectrum of individualization.⁶⁶

Nonetheless, in Isocrates' own terms his work is more successful in transmitting Evagoras' inner nature to the audience than another mode would have been: visual representation such as the statue group of Evagoras and Conon at Athens. Isocrates brings the work into its conclusion by claiming that statues, however beautiful, are surpassed by verbal depictions of "actions and purpose" (τὰς πράξεων καὶ τῆς διανοίας [sc. εἰκόνας], 9.73).⁶⁷ As discussed in the previous chapter, the *Agesilaus* reflects a similar iconoclasm, though put into the mouth of the *laudandus*: Agesilaus refused to have statues made of himself because they would prove only that he was wealthy, and not necessarily virtuous (*Agesilaus* 11.7).⁶⁸ Isocrates' preference for words over statues, however, is motivated less by ethical concerns than by pedagogy. Having just finished his account of Evagoras' life, Isocrates once again addresses Nicocles in order to append to the encomium instructions for its interpretation.⁶⁹ Words are more effective than statues, according to

⁶⁵ Where character is concerned, the virtues displayed by Evagoras are those of an ideal monarch, or at least of an ideal public figure; cf. Azoulay 2006a:152, Vallozza 2005:191, and Fraustadt 1909:66–7, who sees the lack of historical value in Isocrates' description as a generic tendency.

⁶⁶ Isocrates 9.41–6 (which Krischer 1982:62 compares with Thucydides 1.138.3) is the possible exception (cf. Mason 1975:34) and a forerunner of the conclusion of the *Agesilaus*. On the structural differences between the two encomia, see, e.g., Alexiou 2010:40–1. Hürth 1906:18 points out that the *Evagoras* is the more influential of the two in terms of later orators' approach to structuring encomia, which may be related to Seyffert's contention (1909:27–8) that Xenophon's text appears more archaic next to the artful coherence of the *Evagoras*.

⁶⁷ Cf. 9.1–4, as well as 2.1, on material gifts to kings as inferior to advice. Steiner 2001:265–81 reviews the history of honorific statues and their ethical evaluation.

⁶⁸ Compare also Xenophon's more nebulous slighting of physical memorials such as trophies (chapter two, above) and Isocrates' brief gnome in the *To Nicocles* (2.36).

⁶⁹ Such instructions are common in Isocrates: see especially the opening and conclusion of the *Busiris*, notionally addressed to Polycrates but intended for a wider audience. *Panathenaicus* 12.200–72 is perhaps the most complicated of Isocrates' instructive epilogues, with several layers of reception of the speech modeled for the audience. For explanatory prefaces, cf. 10.1–15, 11.1–9, and especially 15.1–13.

Isocrates, for three reasons.⁷⁰ First, and in a more or less ethical vein, people generally care less about the appearances of noble men than they do about their “deeds and judgment” (τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ, 9.74). More important, and more distinct from the reasoning of the Agesilaus anecdote, are the second two reasons, on which the remainder of the present discussion will meditate: the physical limitations of statues and the imitation of character rather than appearance.

Isocrates disparages statues because of their limited, physical contexts: statues influence only those in their vicinity, whereas words can be disseminated abroad (9.74).⁷¹ He has already said that Evagoras was honored with a portrait statue at Athens, apparently, alongside Conon’s, the first such honor bestowed upon a mortal since the tyrannicides and a mark of the Athenians’ desire to put him and Conon forth as *exempla* of euergetism and foreign alliance (9.57). In concluding the speech, Isocrates moves away from his earlier implicit approval of the honors at Athens and toward suggesting how these honors could be improved, much in the same way as he set his performance up as a supplement to, or indeed replacement for, Nicocles’ funeral games (9.1–4).⁷² The ring composition of these analogies prompts the audience to consider how a published speech is advantageous over both a funeral celebration and a portrait statue. The first of these is ephemeral, location-bound, and, Isocrates adds, more apt for displaying the

⁷⁰ Hägg 2012:32–3 also discusses these three reasons, in much briefer compass; cf. Steiner 2001:279–81.

⁷¹ Readers have long noted that Isocrates’ opposition of verbal praise to statues resembles Pindaric precedent, particularly *Nemean* 5.1–2: see, e.g., Seyffert 1909:36–7, Sykutris 1927:37 (with further ancient *comparanda*), Race 1987:149–50 (likewise), Alexiou 1995:99, and Papillon 1998:53. Not all scholars agree that Pindar refers chiefly to the relative mobility of statues and song; Pavlou 2010:2 surveys the range of opinions. Race 1987:53–5 also submits *Isthmian* 2, particularly 2.46, as relevant to the *Evagoras*. Vallozza 1990:49–58 discusses the similarity between the two authors regarding statues at greater length. Fearn 2013 nuances the general picture by contending that the lyric poets’ passages comparing their own works favorably with physical monuments do not operate by simple rivalry.

⁷² Cf. 2.11, 4.1–2, and Steiner 2001:279.

talents of the living (9.4, cf. *Agesilaus* 9.6–7, 11.7); the second option may resolve one or two of those problems but is nonetheless spatially fixed. A speech copied out and read repeatedly can reach beyond Athens to stimulate the euergetism of allies and foreign-residing citizens alike, while at the same time fulfilling the statue’s commemorative duty to Evagoras.

A statue also cannot interpret itself in the same way that Isocrates can attach an explanatory passage of this very sort to his own speeches. Isocrates’ claim that “published speeches can be highly regarded in the studies of the right-thinking” (διαδοθέντας ἐν ταῖς τῶν εὖ φρονούντων διατριβαῖς ἀγαπᾶσθαι, 9.74) indicates a certain elitism, to be sure, but it can also be read as a desire to teach the audience only the intended implications of an act of praise.⁷³ This reference to the role of the educated in propagating praise finds a parallel in the *Helen*: praise of the powerful goddess is incumbent upon the educated as their version of a first-fruits offering (ἀπαρχάς, 10.66). In the *Evagoras* passage, Isocrates evinces a concern that some, or most, viewers of a statue would not be able to move beyond the superficial beauty of the image and read the underlying character of the *laudandus*. At the same time as he submits Nicocles as the ideal reader of the encomium (9.76–7), he tips off the rest of the audience to the interpretive tools, or character traits, they need in order to read it properly (9.78–81). In this way Isocrates preserves the dignity of Nicocles’ kingship by honoring him foremost but leaves open the possibility that others may also derive inspiration from the life of Evagoras, just as he claimed at the start of the speech was the proper function of encomium (9.5).

⁷³ For the role of the “right-thinking” in interpreting historical events, compare 4.9, with Hamilton 1979:296.

Despite this move away from binding praise to a particular place and time, the speech opens with Nicocles' arrangements for Evagoras' funeral. While the encomium's frame does not commit to a circumstance for the composition or delivery of the speech, one could reasonably assume, on the basis of the description of the funeral games (9.1–4), that Isocrates wrote it not long after the death of Evagoras, to be delivered before an audience at Salamis. The introduction of the funeral games as locus of praise for Evagoras, regardless of the actual chronology of composition, makes for a vivid opening and sets up the first of the obstacles to the success of Isocrates' praise, attempting to rival the grandeur of these games.⁷⁴ Citing this event, however, reduces the risk of praise: it is acceptable, and perhaps required, that an ἐπιτάφιος praise the dead hyperbolically.⁷⁵ By intimating such a context for the speech, the text arrogates to itself the immunity to envy customarily granted to an ἐπιτάφιος. The dedication to Nicocles further distances the *Evagoras* from envy, as one would not expect Isocrates to speak in any terms other than complimentary to the son of the deceased, or to the Salaminians for that matter.⁷⁶ These shades of localization grant Isocrates the sort of license he attributes to the poets (9.9). Xenophon will provide no such shielding context for his *Agesilaus*: bound to no particular moment of permissible obsequiousness, his praise for the Spartan king must stand on its own merits whenever and wherever it is read. In light of this precedent and the later tradition of praise delivered in specific contexts, such as Pliny's *Panegyricus*,

⁷⁴ Cf. Steiner 2001:278–9. The other, more difficult obstacles will be envy and poetic precedent, as discussed above. The citation of such obstacles by the *laudator* is common; see Race 1987:133.

⁷⁵ Cf. the *Busiris*, in which Isocrates gives himself license to praise such an odious figure through the frame of correcting Polycrates' defective encomium (11.9).

⁷⁶ Cf. Socrates' barb at *Menexenus* 236A. For Bruns 1896:115, Isocrates' use of hyperbole derives from the Phoenician or Persian elements of Cypriot culture, but it is unlikely that Isocrates would play up the non-Greek elements of the *laudandus*, given his usual Panhellenic mode.

the *Agesilaus* appears a particularly bald act of praise, the sort for which its author could not later attempt to apologize. The *Evagoras*, meanwhile, has at least this much in common with the statue of Evagoras at Athens.

As discussed above, the linguistic emphasis on Evagoras' greatness, relative to the position of Salamis, reduces the risk of envy, as does the hint of localization provided by the frame. When one considers these two factors together, however, one finds that Isocrates' careful strategy of avoiding risk is more nuanced, as these factors compete with, rather than reinforce, each other. Despite the suggestion that praise of Evagoras could be restricted to the court of Nicocles, the insistence on his greatness takes the *laudandus* beyond the bounds of Cyprus and exhibits him as a model on the world stage. Nowhere is this more clear than in the final section of the encomium proper, in which Evagoras is said to have been "worthy of ruling not just over Salamis, but even over all of Asia" (μη μόνον Σαλαμῖνος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς Ἀσίας ἀπάσης ἄξιος εἶναι τυραννεῖν, 9.71). During Evagoras' lifetime his expansionist attempts on Persian territory (9.62) ultimately failed, but nonetheless the risks he undertook qualify him for honors that exceed not only the borders of Salamis, but also, apparently, the powers of the encomiast. Isocrates protests that it is impossible for a speech to do justice to all of Evagoras' deeds (9.34); that he has tried to explain Evagoras' character, but may have fallen short of the mark because of Evagoras' exceptionality (9.48); and that his old age prevents him from praising Evagoras as he should (9.73).⁷⁷ Each separate occurrence of this modesty, similar to that displayed by Xenophon at the start of the *Agesilaus* (1.1), further

⁷⁷ Halliwell 1990:43 understands this last excuse to mean that Isocrates is acknowledging the triteness of his writing; one might prefer to see it as a more standard *captatio benevolentiae*, especially given Isocrates' claims to novelty elsewhere.

compliments the *laudandus* and helps the audience trust the *laudator*. Taken together, these claims further reduce the *Evagoras*' similarity to a statue: that Evagoras' greatness cannot be contained by either Salamis or Isocrates' encomium simultaneously communicates to the audience his importance as an ethical model and the universality of the lessons to be derived from contemplating him.

That the *laudandus* should seem "larger-than-life" in this way is an indispensable element of Isocratean praise, as it is defined in the *Helen*. That text opens, like the *Evagoras*, with a statement of the obstacles Isocrates' text will encounter, namely the tradition of sophists taking on unusual topics for dubious purposes (10.1–13). "There are some people," Isocrates begins, "who take great pride (μέγα φρονοῦσιν) if they can adopt some unusual and unexpected theme and speak on it tolerably well."⁷⁸ Isocrates will go on to demonstrate that it is in praising greatness, rather than trivialities, that one should "take great pride," especially with the goal of educating the audience in what really matters (10.5).⁷⁹ With a change in topics, the mode of the sophists—finding the best arguments in support of a given proposition—can be adapted to political and ethical instruction. Plato's Socrates (*Symposium* 198D–E) also exhibits discomfort with the tendency of encomiasts to make their subjects "as great as possible" or "as beautiful as possible" (ὡς μέγιστα ... ὡς κάλλιστα) without regard for the truth.⁸⁰ While his eventual definition of the truth of Love skews more idealistic than Isocrates' pragmatic approach to civic philosophy, Socrates is made to support the method adopted by Isocrates,

⁷⁸ 10.1: εἰσὶ τινες οἱ μέγα φρονοῦσιν ἣν ὑπόθεσιν ἄτοπον καὶ παράδοξον ποιησάμενοι περὶ ταύτης ἀνεκτῶς εἰπεῖν δυνηθῶσι. On μεγαλοφροσύνη in Isocrates, see Alexiou 1995:80–2. At 15.131, μεγαλοφροσύνη is the characteristic of Timotheus that makes him both praiseworthy and envied.

⁷⁹ Cf. 2.39, 2.53: wise advisers discuss the greatest matters and thereby make states great.

⁸⁰ Cf. the opening of the *Busiris* (11.4), as discussed by Livingstone 2001:106–7.

selecting “the most beautiful elements” (τὰ κάλλιστα) of the subject and elevating them with an extended encomium.⁸¹ Intermingling these elements with frequent reference to past authorities who approved of Helen—Zeus, Theseus, Paris, and Homer among them—Isocrates will follow this very pattern (10.11), which fits the *Evagoras* neatly as well.

At the end of his proem to the *Helen*, Isocrates takes the opportunity to praise a writer who had previously praised Helen, but he then specifies that she has not yet received a proper encomium (10.14).⁸² Isocrates finds fault with this previous author specifically because he wrote an apology where encomium was required, and he makes a useful distinction between the two genres here (10.15). His definition of encomium relative to apology determines some of his rhetoric of praise as discussed earlier, especially his preference for setting up as his opponents other encomiasts or literary types, instead of those who would deny that his subject is praiseworthy: to acknowledge dissent is to enter into a defensive mode unsuitable, in Isocrates’ eyes, to constructing effective role models. It turns out, however, that Helen will not obtain the encomium due to her here, either: by Isocrates’ own judgment, Helen, too, exceeds his encomiastic abilities (10.67).⁸³ He has, indeed, foreshadowed this conclusion near the outset, when he

⁸¹ Socrates mentions (198D) that he “used to take great pride” (μέγα ἐφρόνουν) in knowing what he believed to be the correct mode of encomium; one author may be alluding to the other here, though neither text can be dated with great precision (Dover 1980:10, Zajonz 2002:58–9). For a more detailed comparison between the *Symposium* (or a symposium) and *Evagoras*, see Stuart 1928:112–17, with the reservation that the ephemeral quality of praise bandied about at a non-literary symposium does not imply much about the tensions involved in more permanent published praise. Gomperz 1905:183–5 also hunts for more general Socratic ideas in the *Evagoras*.

⁸² The previous author is presumably Gorgias, though some have been troubled by Gorgias’ earlier appearance in the catalogue of sophistic ne’er-do-wells at 10.2–3; see the discussion of Zajonz 2002:138–40, with citations.

⁸³ Cf. 4.187.

claims that “it is easy to exceed some topics with words, but for other topics it is difficult to get at their magnitude” (τὰ μὲν ῥαίδιον τοῖς λόγοις ὑπερβαλέσθαι, τῶν δὲ χαλεπὸν τοῦ μεγέθους ἐφικέσθαι, 10.13). Both parts of this dictum are at work in the *Evagoras*, where Evagoras’ deeds are portrayed as excessively great in and of themselves, making it difficult for the *laudator* to praise them as they warrant. Finally, despite his ἀπορία in the *Helen*, Isocrates hopes that he has given future writers a framework for more expansive praise (10.69). In just this way he expects the eventual audience of the *Evagoras*, and especially the “right-thinking” (9.74), to continue to rehearse his speech regardless of their proximity in time or space to Nicocles and Salamis. While Isocrates is content to create fictional contexts for his works, unlike a maker of statues he intends the message to reach far beyond an individual *polis*.

The final advantage of encomium over the visual arts lies in the human capacity to imitate the character of others. As Isocrates frames it, “No one would try to make his physical body conform to what he sees sculpted and painted, but for those who do not choose to be lazy, but wish to be to useful, it is easy to imitate one another’s habits and the ways of thinking expressed in what we hear spoken.”⁸⁴ Once the published text has been spread abroad, the virtuous can learn to replicate Evagoras’ greatness. Emulation in turn propagates the initial act of praise.⁸⁵ This theme appears also in the *Agesilaus*; in the *Evagoras* it is in some ways more lightly felt and in others even closer to the surface. The *Evagoras* presents fewer parallels between the activities of *laudator* and *laudandus*,

⁸⁴ 9.75: ... τοῖς μὲν πεπλασμένοις καὶ γεγραμμένοις οὐδεὶς ἂν τὴν τοῦ σώματος φύσιν ὁμοιώσειε, τοὺς δὲ τρόπους τοὺς ἀλλήλων καὶ τὰς διανοίας τὰς ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ἐνούσας ῥαίδιον ἐστὶ μιμεῖσθαι τοῖς μὴ ῥαίθυμειν αἰρουμένοις, ἀλλὰ χρηστοῖς εἶναι βουλομένοις. Another Isocratean passage puts it more simply: ὦν τὰς δόξας ζηλοῖς, μιμοῦ τὰς πράξεις (2.38). Steiner 2001:280 cautions that Isocrates’ stance is rhetorical: Greek statuary was indeed intended to encourage mimesis of ἥθος.

⁸⁵ Cf. Halliwell 1990:44–5.

especially as Evagoras is not shown to have dealt in praise and honor to the same extent as Agesilaus. There are, however, suggestions of themes Xenophon will enlarge in the *Agesilaus*: for example, the *laudator* and *laudandus* have similar obstacles, namely the *πλεονεξία* of the poets (9.11) and the *πλεονεξία* of the previous rulers of Cyprus (9.20). Xenophon's Agesilaus manipulates spectacle to his own advantage; Isocrates at least invites one to share in the awe of the internal spectators (9.31). An even better internal reaction comes later, when Isocrates describes how the Salaminians have imitated Evagoras and thereby improved themselves (9.50), just as he would have the audience do. Coupled with Isocrates' use of internal evaluators, as discussed above, these internal reactions help the audience discern what to imitate.

The *Evagoras* also makes use, though not to the same extent as the *Agesilaus* does, of the concept of *ἐπίδειξις* and the parallel performances of *laudator* and *laudandus*.⁸⁶ Early in the text, Isocrates dismisses *ἐπίδειξις* as showing off one's talents for the sake of one's own glory: it is detrimental to the act of praising Evagoras during his funeral games (9.4).⁸⁷ Isocrates goes on to prove, however, that performances in prose such as his, when they are not left ephemeral but published broadly, are useful in

⁸⁶ Burgess 1902:98–102 catalogues and discusses Isocrates' uses of forms of *ἐπιδείκνυμι*, of which the most programmatically important is perhaps that at 4.4 (1902:101).

⁸⁷ For the disparagement of *ἐπίδειξις*, alongside the calculated use of it, see Carey 2007:237, who cites 4.17, 5.26, 12.271, and 15.147 in particular; cf. Too 2008:117–18. Self-display becomes problematic for Isocrates when it involves a runaway *φιλοτιμία*, ambition directed not at resolving political issues but at trivial rivalries. Papillon 1995:158–9 (cf. 2001:86) develops the notion that Isocrates was actually interested in supplanting *ἐπίδειξις* with “hypodeictic rhetoric,” but Isocrates' relationship to *ἐπίδειξις* is perhaps not so inimical: extravagant (trivial) displays of rhetorical skill make a convenient villain, but Isocrates operates within the same agonistic sphere, showing off his own greater *φρόνησις* not through a different mode of expression, but through his selection of topics. At 11.44 the claim that he is not making an *ἐπίδειξις* is disingenuous; if the composition was truly meant as a friendly suggestion to Polycrates it would not have been made public (Livingstone 2001:97–8). As in the rest of the speech, here he disguises his aggression and rivalry toward Polycrates, an equally convenient villain. By only barely suppressing his contempt for Polycrates, thereby allowing the audience to recognize his effort, he can display all the more clearly his stance on the value of praise rather than blame as a more effective mode of communication. The process is parallel to his suppression of the obviously villainous Busiris' negative qualities.

encouraging virtuous behavior. He does not, as in the *Helen* (10.15) and *Busiris* (11.9) term his own praise an ἐπίδειξις directly, though he comes close: having summed up Evagoras' accomplishments in the war against Persia, Isocrates asks, "Indeed, how would anyone more clearly demonstrate [ἐπιδείξειεν] Evagoras' bravery, wisdom, or overall virtue than through such deeds and risks?"⁸⁸ The echo of his initial statement of subject matter (9.2) and, immediately after it, the reminder of Isocrates' rivalry with the poets of the Trojan War (9.6) together round out the narrative portion of the speech. Moreover, Evagoras himself has recently made an ἐπίδειξις of his own, proving his valor in the face of losing all his allies (9.61). Although this theme is better developed in the *Agesilaus*, Isocrates and Evagoras are engaged in parallel displays of virtue that will encourage others to do the same (cf. Isocrates 2.19). For Isocrates, rhetorical display, the making available of his own thoughts on the subject, is the most effective vehicle of praise.

The language of emulation in the *Evagoras* exceeds that in the *Agesilaus*, however, insofar as the former text has an internal addressee and contains several paragraphs of philosophical protrepsis.⁸⁹ Direct, rather than merely implied, protrepsis within an act of praise is nothing new, as it occurs frequently in Pindar, and it is certain that Isocrates follows epinician precedent on this point as in other matters.⁹⁰ In epinician, however, both praise and protrepsis are directed toward the *laudandus*; here, as in an ἐπιτάφιος, the two functions are naturally separated. Nicocles, the addressee, is to follow

⁸⁸ 9.65: καίτοι πῶς ἂν τις τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἢ τὴν φρόνησιν ἢ σύμπασαν τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν Εὐαγόρου φανερώτερον ἐπιδείξειεν ἢ διὰ τοιούτων ἔργων καὶ κινδύνων;

⁸⁹ On the transition to the conclusion of the speech, see Hägg 2012:39. Blass 1892:287 notes that the epilogue addresses, subtly, the same topics as the proem, in an altered order. On encomium as protrepsis in related texts, see Halliwell 1990:45n.16.

⁹⁰ Cf. Race 1987:151n.55.

his father's example, which should be easiest for him as the ideal audience for praise of Evagoras. As part of his persuasive strategy, Isocrates must also include praise of Nicocles, lauding him for his persistence in philosophical studies. Conveniently, praise for Nicocles does not distract from praise of Evagoras; rather, it compounds the earlier encomium with further evidence of Evagoras' success. Isocrates had praised the late king earlier for the valor of his son Pnytagoras (9.62), now also deceased, but with praise of Nicocles Isocrates supplies proof for what he offers as Evagoras' greatest accomplishment, the establishment of a royal line (9.72). Symbolic praise of the dead Evagoras, who cannot react, and direct praise of Nicocles, who can, combine to show Isocrates' mastery of both the ideological and pragmatic ends of praise.

One should consider, however, in what respects Nicocles can actually attempt to emulate his father. Isocrates has made Evagoras' acquisition of power out to be a highlight of his career, surpassing any other such accession (9.39–40), and has praised how he passed the scepter he won to his own offspring.⁹¹ Nicocles, however, cannot imitate his father's virtue and daring in this regard, nor can he, as a Persian ally, exercise much control over Salaminian foreign policy.⁹² That is, unless one reads the *Evagoras* as a subtle call for Nicocles' revolt, he is not expected to reenact Evagoras' decade-long struggle against Artaxerxes.⁹³ Rather, in the final section, Evagoras' deeds have fallen

⁹¹ Seyffert 1909:26 contrasts Isocrates' emphasis on Evagoras' taking the throne with the brief treatment of Agesilaus' controversial accession at *Agesilaus* 1.5.

⁹² Cf. 3.34, where Salaminian military failings become Nicocles' moral victory, and 3.41, where, in a reduction of the scope of his reign, he praises himself especially for how he manages his own household. In contrast to the career of Evagoras (3.28) and indeed to many other *loci* of praise in Isocrates (e.g., 4.51, 4.75), risk is generally bad in the *Nicocles*: see 3.50, 3.57, and especially 3.54, where bad κίνδυνοι are paired with bad ἐπιτηδεύματα (cf. 9.2); the exception is 3.64; 3.23 and 3.24 bear a more neutral sense.

⁹³ It is possible that Nicocles did in fact revolt in the late 360s, but there is little in the *Evagoras* of the anti-Persian exhortation one would expect if this were Isocrates' goal, based on his stance across the rest of the corpus. Maier 1985:39 points out the insularity and opportunism of Evagoras' revolt, in contrast to

away, and Isocrates claims to have been amassing the *laudandus*' virtues alone (9.76), with no second noun as in previous pairings. Nicocles' rule is indeed of great importance, but now it is conceived in terms of the philosophical and the inward: Nicocles must live up to his own, and his father's, standards of temperance (9.80). No mention is made of his impact upon the wider Mediterranean; in an echo of Isocrates' refrain for Evagoras, Nicocles' position is "greatest" by dint of ruling so many others, but he can only rule them in any meaningful fashion by providing himself as an ethical example.⁹⁴ Isocrates suggests only one task for Nicocles that approaches a concrete political goal, which is that he now must try to make other tyrants jealous of his education (9.78). Not by coincidence, Isocrates offers himself as an ideal teacher and coach in this field: the *laudator* of the father offers to become the *laudator* of the son as well, should he prove a worthy *laudandus*.⁹⁵ Indeed, the encomium's *laudator* and *laudandus* combine forces to encourage the ideal audience, Nicocles, to rule after an example that could only be put on display through the actions of one and the words of the other.⁹⁶ While Nicocles cannot achieve much on the international stage, he may become a recipient of praise for his ethical qualities, a living advertisement for Isocrates' own protreptic powers and a demonstration of the greater force of the well-crafted encomium over the jejune statue.⁹⁷

Isocrates' hopes for united action against Persia; perhaps on this basis Isocrates recognized that it would be better to have Nicocles imitate Evagoras' character, rather than his actual deeds.

⁹⁴ Cf. especially 2.31, but also 2.4, 3.12 (προεπιδείξαιμι), 3.37.

⁹⁵ Isocrates frames this advice quite delicately (9.79), to avoid offending Nicocles.

⁹⁶ Cf. 1.11–12. Plutarch, at *Life of Aratus* 1.1–4, seems to grasp this Isocratean dynamic.

⁹⁷ It is somewhat ironic that Isocrates' adopted son is said to have dedicated a statue of him near the Olympieum (*Lives of the Ten Orators* 839B), in addition to other images of Isocrates and his family that stood in various Attic locales (838C–D, 839C–D).

Isocrates and Xenophon

Isocrates takes refuge in the hyperbolic license permitted to encomium and in praising a foreign king to his son in order to suggest how praise should, but does not currently, function in Athenian society. The *laudandus* matters less for this aim than the *laudator*, who puts himself forward as a model for others as they take on potentially risky acts of praise. This modeling is consonant with Isocratean education generally (e.g., 13.17–18), as Yun Lee Too (1995) has described it. Modeling the function of *laudator* is not exclusive to praise of the *laudandus*, which is in fact furthered through repeated study of the model text and because the *laudandus* is established as a benchmark for praiseworthy achievement, much like Cyrus the Great in fourth-century literature.

Throughout his body of writings, Isocrates demonstrates various means for managing the hazards of envy. *On the Team of Horses* and *Antidosis* both use a forensic context, like the Socratic apologies, to create a space in which praise is acceptable as self-defense.⁹⁸ In *On the Team of Horses*, the son of Alcibiades praises his father in court, just as Isocrates praises Evagoras to his son in a notional funerary context: such extravagant praise is permissible when delivered by or to a family member, particularly a direct heir.⁹⁹ In the *Antidosis*, Isocrates constructs an elaborate defense for himself in a case he admits at the outset to be fictive, and he also exposes his reasoning: “I saw that, if I were to attempt a eulogy of myself, I would not be able to include everything I chose to cover

⁹⁸ Cf. Gorgias, *Palamedes* 32. On (usually fictive) trials as a mode of praise and blame, see Too 1995:81 (with references); cf. Carey 2007:246–8. On the trial(s) of Socrates, see chapter two above. Defendants even in seemingly more mundane suits could be represented as glorying in the opportunity to praise themselves unabashedly: see Isocrates 19.2 and Lysias 16.1–3.

⁹⁹ See Too 1995:115, with 1995:201–5 on the speech’s representation of Alcibiades (the father) as a teacher to be emulated; cf. Saïd 2003:224. On the speech as pseudo-encomium more generally, see Fraustadt 1909:42–4 and Gribble 1999:111–13.

or speak in an acceptable manner without arousing envy.”¹⁰⁰ His goal is to leave the speech as “a monument to myself, one much more beautiful than statues of bronze.”¹⁰¹ The statue motif should by now be familiar from the *Agesilaus* and the *Evagoras*, and it is perhaps no coincidence that one of the major sections of the speech (15.101–39) is dedicated to praising the actions of the general Timotheus: Isocrates’ associate, Conon’s son, and recipient of an honorary statue at Athens, set up next to his father’s.¹⁰² Whereas Isocrates used internal evaluators to magnify praise in the *Evagoras*, here he praises himself through performing a defensive encomium of a third party. As long as the audience agrees with Isocrates’ evaluation of Timotheus, then they must agree that both of them are praiseworthy (15.106). Isocrates assumes the commemorative function of Timotheus’ statue, toward which one might imagine him physically gesturing in a real court case, as an argument in favor of his own memorialization.

Isocrates’ non-forensic discourses also manipulate genre and context in order to carve out space for praise. The *Philip* accomplishes its praise of the Macedonian monarch in part through flat-out denial that the text is an ἐπίδειξις or encomium (5.17, cf. *Ep.* 1.6). The protreptic force may predominate, but Isocrates uses praise, both in the moment and

¹⁰⁰ 15.8: εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐπαινεῖν ἑμαυτὸν ἐπιχειροῖν, ἑώρων οὔτε περιλαβεῖν ἅπαντα περὶ ὧν διελθεῖν προηροῦμην, οἷός τε γενησόμενος, οὔτ’ ἐπιχαρίτως οὔδ’ ἀνεπιφθόνως εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν δυνησόμενος. Translation by Too 2008:36. On Isocrates’ self-presentation in this speech see Too 2008:8–11; for his “strategies of envy-reduction,” Said 2003:227–9. On the relationship of the *Antidosis* to the Socratic *Apologies*, see Momigliano 1993:59 and Ober 2004:35–8.

¹⁰¹ 15.7: μνημεῖόν μου καταλειφθήσεσθαι πολὺ κάλλιον τῶν χαλκῶν ἀναθημάτων. See further Too 1995:188–94. Pindaric precedent matters here as well: Isocrates will go on to compare himself to Pindar as a *laudator* of Athens (15.166, his only direct mention of the poet: see Race 1987:131).

¹⁰² Leo 1901:92–3 sees the Timotheus section as a kind of *variatio* of genre, substituting for a standalone encomium after Isocrates had already worked that form over with the *Evagoras*. For Timotheus’ statue, see Pausanias 1.3.2 and Shear 2007:110, as well as chapter four, below.

yet to come, as his main carrot.¹⁰³ The *Panegyricus*, framed as praise for Athens before an international audience, implies that the speaker never could have delivered any such encomium through its impossible dating.¹⁰⁴ The *Panathenaicus* tackles the same subject at even greater length, ostensibly offering direct praise of Athens in order to counter insufficient and hyperbolic praise given by others.¹⁰⁵ Nonetheless, the text conditions its own reception by means of the conclusion: the blow against Sparta and the praise for Athens are both tempered through dramatizing a more or less inconclusive debate between Isocrates and an unnamed student over the identity of the text's true *laudati* (12.200–72).¹⁰⁶ In his closing remarks, Isocrates claims that the *Panathenaicus* is an ἔπαινος of the right-thinking members of the audience, who can discern his weighty purposes (12.271). Another Pindaric gesture (cf. *Olympian* 2.83–5), this conclusion defends his praise against facile readings while capturing the favor of the audience, allowing the individual members to believe—as no one would not name themselves among the “right-thinking”—that they are being complimented.

Within the Isocratean texts traditionally grouped as the letters similar maneuvers are on display. The letter to Antipater (*Ep.*4), for example, manages the risks of praise through emphasizing the hard luck and unbending character of the *laudandus*, not unlike the defense of Timotheus in the *Antidosis* (e.g., 15.131); careful praise of the addressee

¹⁰³ See especially 5.67, 5.140–8, and 5.153; cf. *Ep.*2.22, where the *laudator* equates himself with the *laudandus* as a recipient of envy. At 5.11, Isocrates uses the device of the internal evaluator in order to state his own credentials for delivering praise. On Philip and Isocrates generally, see Guth 2011:188–228.

¹⁰⁴ Tuplin 1983:181.

¹⁰⁵ See 12.35–8; a secondary consideration is combating the *laudatores* of Sparta, 12.110–13.

¹⁰⁶ 12.237 exemplifies the various “outs” Isocrates gives himself. For a concise discussion of the layering of internal responses in the epilogue, see Gray 1994:101–2.

also enters into the equation.¹⁰⁷ It is the letter to Archidamus (*Ep.*9), however, that relates most directly to the themes of praise found in the *Evagoras* and, especially by dint of the addressee, the *Agesilaus*.¹⁰⁸ Whereas Xenophon does not mention the son of his *laudandus*, Isocrates elects to address him directly. The first section of the letter forms an elaborate *praeteritio* (*Ep.*9.1–5): praise of Archidamus, his father, and his family is too easy (λίαν ῥάιδιος, *Ep.*9.1), and so Isocrates will leave that task to others. This alone would strongly insinuate that Isocrates is responding to the *Agesilaus*, which opens with the difficulty of praising him (οὐ ῥάιδιον, 1.1), but Isocrates continues to develop this theme despite initially dismissing it. Praise of Archidamus would surpass all other encomia (*Ep.*9.2), especially because of his and his father’s defense of Sparta in 362 (*Ep.*9.4): “no one could put on display any deed finer than this one” (οὐ κάλλιον ἔργον οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπιδείξειεν). The use of ἐπιδείκνυμι encroaches on the realm of competitive rhetorical display, underscoring Isocrates’ potential to rival previous acts of praise (cf. *Ep.*9.2, ἐναμίλλους). Xenophon treats the defense of Sparta only briefly in the *Agesilaus* (2.24); for him, Coroneia is the more important *geste*.¹⁰⁹ While one could say that Isocrates chooses the battle at Sparta simply because of Archidamus’ personal involvement, he supplies a reason—defense of the homeland is the most noble deed—and furthermore claims that the encomiast of the aforementioned acts would win great fame

¹⁰⁷ See Garnjobst 2006:278–87; for the parallel risks of *laudator* and *laudandus*, 2006:293.

¹⁰⁸ Smith 1940:11–18 argues convincingly for the genuineness of this letter. See Garnjobst 2006:310–19 on its truncated ending. Circumstances prevent dating the texts under consideration (of Isocrates, *Archidamus* and *Ep.*9; of Xenophon, *Agesilaus* and *Hellenica* 7.1.30) with any precision relative to one another. *Archidamus* has a dramatic date of 366 BCE, but this says nothing about its period of composition; at *Ep.*9.16 the author claims to be eighty years old (i.e., the year is 356), but Isocrates may be rounding; the *Agesilaus* of course postdates the death of the *laudandus* (c.360); the dating of the *Hellenica* remains unsettled. Smith 1940:13 points out the similarities between *Hellenica* 7.1.30 and the *Archidamus*.

¹⁰⁹ See further chapter four, on Demosthenes’ *Against Leptines*.

(*Ep.*9.5). This slippage from the fame of the *laudandus* to the fame of the *laudator* not only cements the antagonism of Isocrates and the unnamed encomiasts, but also leads into the conclusion of the letter (*Ep.*9.17). Here Isocrates pairs himself with Archidamus as potential saviors of Greece, each using his own abilities: the latter as actor, the former as adviser.¹¹⁰ He signals his strength as an adviser through a demonstration of his *παρησία*, and here again Xenophon's unfettered praise of Agesilaus may lie behind the text. Isocrates claims that he would rather be blamed for his criticism than "find favor through praise beyond propriety" (*παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον ἐπαινέσας χαρίσασθαι*, *Ep.*9.12), in the context of criticizing the actions of Agesilaus (*Ep.*9.11–14, cf. 5.86–8). By submitting this even-handed analysis as proof of his noble, non-flattering intentions, Isocrates gives himself license to praise Archidamus to the sky (*Ep.*9.18) and at the same time puts himself forward as the instructor who can solve all of Greece's troubles (*διδάξαι*, *Ep.*9.19). Here as in many of his works, Isocrates manipulates the context and audience of his praise in order to attempt to manage the risks of praise more successfully than other encomiasts.

Conclusion

This chapter and the previous one have attempted to show how Isocrates and Xenophon use various strategies to ensure that their acts of praise are not only well received but repeated and emulated. They must convince the audience to imitate both the virtues praised and the mode of praise itself: the dual exemplarity of *laudandus* and *laudator* spurs the propagation of their preferred systems of values. At the same time,

¹¹⁰ Isocrates has already established, at the end of the *praeteritio* (which also acts as a sort of priamel: Papillon 2004:278–9n.5), the superiority of advice to praise (*Ep.*9.6–7); cf. the denial of praise in the *Philip*, discussed above. Azoulay 2006b:531 posits a role for Isocrates in his dealings with Agesilaus and Archidamus quite distinct from that of Xenophon: the "intellectual patron" rather than the grateful eulogist.

fixing their acts of praise as texts to be studied widely performs a monumentalizing function akin to, but surpassing, that of the statue-maker. Like an honorific decree, the encomium preserves the name of the proposer along with that of the honorand, but it can provide a much more extensive account of laudable traits and actions as well as the author's credentials for the act of praise. In the fourth century, then, agonistic ἐπίδειξις of praise developed beyond encomia of trivial subjects that reflect only on the *laudator* to become a vehicle of both political philosophy and commemoration aimed to benefit *laudator* (e.g., Isocrates 4.186, 8.145), *laudandus* (12.86), and the audience (12.135–7). This evolution of praise paralleled changes in civic commemoration over the same period, as will be seen in the next chapter: the Athenian δῆμος, too, would serve as a corporate *laudator*, out of self-interest and eventually for survival itself.

As was noted above, however, the only two standalone encomia of this period, despite their composition by Athenian authors aimed at improving the here and now, praise deceased foreign monarchs. Exploring this contradiction will benefit from turning back momentarily to the Isocratean corpus and to the Evagorids. The speeches *To Nicocles* and *Nicocles* exemplify the duality of *laudator* and *laudandus*: in the first, Isocrates displays his praise-laden instruction of Nicocles; in the second, Nicocles becomes the teacher of his own citizens, who are in turn to pass this education on to their own offspring (3.57, cf. 3.60–1). While some sections of the *Nicocles* in particular may seem starkly autocratic, even proto-fascist, it should be recalled first that the speech is an attempt at ethopoeia and second that Isocrates plies many of the same notions in democratic contexts. In another instance of ethopoeia, the construction of himself as a defendant in an Athenian court, Isocrates ardently denies any undemocratic quality of his

dealings with Nicocles (15.70). Indeed, Isocrates wrote no finer praise of the efficacy of modeling than that found in the *Panegyricus* (4.47–50), in which Athens is the teacher of the world (cf. 6.83). The point of Isocratean, and for that matter Xenophontic, praise is the replicable act of ἐπίδειξις and the associated ethical benefits; regarding the *To Nicocles*, *Nicocles*, and *Evagoras*, that the addressee was a tyrant matters far less.¹¹¹ The transparency of Nicocles' situation, like that of Agesilaus, lends itself to educative purposes, and the Salaminian orations therefore become as much about the theory of praise as its practice.¹¹²

It may be that Isocrates considered blame of tyrants to be too easy among the fiercely anti-tyrannical Athenians of the fourth century: a more hazardous *laudandus* could bring greater pedagogical rewards, and therefore he chose as a first experiment praise of a tyrant who was nonetheless an Athenian ally. As in the *Helen* (especially 10.15) and *Busiris*, Isocrates found blame counterproductive and instead preferred unadulterated praise of worthy subjects in the service of promoting virtue. The Salaminian tyrants, like the mythological royalty populating the tragic stage, provided memorable models for behavior even in democratic Athens. Rhetoric, according to Isocrates, was the natural activity of the Athenians, as much as warfare at Sparta or horsemanship in Thessaly (15.297–8): therefore they should be able to identify and honor those who praise the city and, by extension, those who use praise to improve civic life (8.72). Isocrates and Xenophon aim their experiments toward this end, though one should

¹¹¹ Azoulay 2006a:144 cites 9.46 to suggest that Evagoras' excellence lay in transcending any particular variety of constitution, and he goes on to argue that Isocrates and Xenophon were less interested in the form of a state's government than in the personality of its leaders (2006a:152–3); cf. Buchheit 1960:70. Cf. also Poulakos 1997:26–46 on the *Nicocles*, with the caveats framed by Konstan 2004:119.

¹¹² Cf. Hägg 2012:33–4 regarding the *Evagoras*.

note the continued deficit of a standalone prose encomium for someone still living, even a foreigner.¹¹³ These authors appear to have tested the waters for permanent praise, aware of the potential longevity of their texts, which could outlast even bronze or stone.¹¹⁴ Solon's injunction against praise of the living prevailed: Isocrates eulogized Evagoras to inspire others to praise and be praised; he complimented Nicocles more moderately, under the guise of protrepsis and aware of the risk of losing credit as an evaluator of character.¹¹⁵ Ideally, however, the cycle of encomium and emulation takes place among the living, as citizens jockey with one another for praise and constantly refine their own characters to suit those around them. They should, as Isocrates says in the *Evagoras*, "imitate one another's habits and the ways of thinking expressed in what we hear spoken."¹¹⁶ Words are the medium of evaluation (3.7, 15.255), and it is on proper evaluation that civic improvement depends (8.27). Quintilian reports that "Isocrates believed that praise and blame are inherent in every genre."¹¹⁷ So too, Isocrates might add, is the potential for public good, as long as one praises a subject of sufficient μέγεθος.

¹¹³ See Buchheit 1960:75 for further literary examples of fourth-century reticence to praise living contemporaries.

¹¹⁴ Cf. Thucydides 1.10.2 and 1.22.4.

¹¹⁵ On Nicocles' later failings see Athenaeus 12.531D–E.

¹¹⁶ 9.75, quoted above. The message is more pointed if one reads ἀλλήλων instead of ἄλλων, for which see Forster 1912:108 and Alexiou 2010:180.

¹¹⁷ *Institutio* 3.4.11: *Isocrates in omni genere inesse laudem ac vituperationem existimavit*. On this remark cf. Papillon 1995:157.

CHAPTER 4

Public praise of Athenian citizens, 355/4–323/2 BCE

This chapter is structured differently from the three that precede it. Whereas the other chapters have addressed the theory and practice of praise in the works of Xenophon and Isocrates, the present chapter uses a series of case studies to narrate developments in literary and civic practices of praise through the third quarter of the fourth century BCE at Athens. This period covers the bulk of the oratorical activity of Demosthenes, the ideological regime of Lycurgus, and the gathering centripetal momentum of the Macedonian monarchy, which would radically alter the relationship of the individual to the state. The literary and epigraphic texts produced between the Social War and the Lamian War put into practice the praise theories related by Xenophon and Isocrates. While it would go beyond the evidence to claim that these two authors alone provided the impetus for the upswing in civic honors for individual citizens during the third quarter of the century, their ideas on the utility of praise do reflect, and at times anticipate, the ongoing changes in Athenian political culture as Athens continued to adapt to the loss of hegemony and the rise of Macedon.

Regarding the literary texts from this period, there emerges a major theme in the contestation of praise: strife over who is permitted to propose and receive honors. In Xenophon's idealized Persian monarchy or Syracusan tyranny, such contestation is unlikely, as the ruler's position makes clear his prerogatives as *laudator*. As Xenophon's

and Isocrates' own encomia show, however, the social station of the *laudator* need not eclipse that of the *laudandus*, though without the benefit of monarchy or tyranny the *laudator* must take pains to put his own *bona fides* on display for the audience. In the cases of the *Agesilaus* and the *Evagoras*, this display entails a competition with the *laudandi* themselves, as the authors assert the superiority of the encomium as a mode of memorialization and protrepsis. Once Athenians began recording praise for individual citizens on an unprecedented scale, there were two important innovations. First, non-ephemeral praise was directed at living individuals; second, these individuals could now be Athenian citizens. Because *laudator*, *laudandus*, and the members of the civic audience were notionally equal, conflicts broke out over the propriety of individual acts of praise and over the limits of what honors the state could offer. Politicians now had, in addition to competing for honors of their own, a secondary field of competition in the courts: the law allowed them to contest civic honors and, at the same time, the available audience for works of forensic oratory permitted them to publically blame or praise others within the texts of their speeches.

The main body of this chapter opens with a review of the development of Athenian honorific practices, beginning with the so-called μέγιστα τιμαί for Athenian generals of the fourth century. There then follow four case studies from oratory.¹ The first is Demosthenes' speech *Against Leptines*: delivered in 355/4, and therefore exactly contemporary with the *Poroi*, it forms a natural bridge from the Xenophontic period into the later material. The next two case studies examine the praise and blame offered in two famous trials of 331/0: on the one hand the prosecution that produced Lycurgus' speech

¹ Gauthier 1985:92, while recognizing the superiority of epigraphical evidence for later eras, defends the use of literary texts for reconstructing honors in the classical period; cf. Whitehead 2009:52.

Against Leocrates, and on the other the paired speeches of Aeschines (*Against Ctesiphon*) and Demosthenes (*On the Crown*).² The chapter ends with a consideration of the position of the individual in the Athenian state at the death of Alexander, with Hypereides' unusual *Epitaphios*, praising the general Leosthenes, as the representative text.

Honors for individual citizens from Conon to Phanodemus

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the defeat of the Lacedaemonians at Cnidus in 394/3 prompted a new form of commemoration for the victors: bronze statues in the Agora put up at public expense, an honor previously exclusive to the tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogeiton.³ The Athenians were not alone in commemorating the battle, though their choice of honorands is revealing. Elsewhere Conon and the satrap Pharnabazus were credited with the victory; at Athens it was Conon and Evagoras.⁴ This choice brought with it several advantages. Both were Athenian citizens, but both were also disassociated from the δῆμος: Conon had been in exile for years, with no official Athenian command, and Evagoras was a citizen by grant alone.⁵ To celebrate Athenian victors over Sparta only ten years after the disastrous finale of the Peloponnesian War will have been good for public morale, and these particular Athenians were less prone to

² Steinbock 2011:280 provides a recent discussion of the dating of *Against Leocrates*.

³ According to Gauthier 1985:81, the honors for tyrannicides defined the “canon” of the later μέγισται τιμαί. On their honors see Gauthier 1985:92–5; on Conon and Evagoras as the new tyrannicides, 1985:97 and Shear 2011:255–6, 277–9. On honorific bronze statues at Athens generally, see Tanner 2006:112, von den Hoff 2009:194–6, Engen 2010:164–8, Shear 2011:274–81, Ma 2013:4–6, Meyer 2013:479–82; Oliver 2007b contributes the useful phrase “statue culture” and argues that Athens was unique in its control over the physical location of statues (2007b:181–2).

⁴ Cf. Lewis and Stroud 1979:191, Shear 2011:281. Presumably honoring Pharnabazus—let alone Artaxerxes—at Athens was, given the propagandistic cachet of Athenian enmity towards Persia, out of the question (though cf. Rhodes & Osborne 98, from 327/6). On honors for Pharnabazus and Conon elsewhere, see Gauthier 1985:96 with n.58; see also Rhodes & Osborne 8 (cf. Rhodes & Osborne 11, for Evagoras).

⁵ Cf. Gauthier 1985:96–7, Ma 2013:5; contrast Shear 2011:277. Conon was also unique in being praised, at least in part, for his connections of ξενία (Engen 2010:48).

envy because of their disassociation. Envy will also have been reduced by the pairing of the two of them. Imagine a statue for one or the other alone: to honor the less important player Evagoras would have denied Conon the victory that was thought to be his, while honoring Conon alone would have been an unprecedented glorification of a single citizen, exile or not. Instead, the pair of statues matched those of the tyrannicides, minimizing the departure from precedent.⁶

These statues, however, then set their own precedent. In the two decades that followed, three more generals were honored with statues for victories over Sparta. The first, Iphicrates, faced some controversy over the award, which was granted *c.*389 for defeating a Spartan division at Corinth.⁷ Moreover, unlike Conon, who died within a few years of Cnidus, Iphicrates had several decades of his career remaining, in the course of which he fell out of favor. The same occurred to Conon's son Timotheus, honored perhaps as early as 375 for his victory at Corcyra; both he and Iphicrates went into exile in 356/5.⁸ The other honorand, Chabrias, was granted a statue *c.*376/5 for his victory at Naxos.⁹ Chabrias and Iphicrates were both from previously undistinguished families, and

⁶ Cf. Shear 2011:178, 283. The pairing may also have allowed the viewers to conceive of the victory at Cnidus as a joint venture: ascribing an event like Cnidus, or the assassination of Hipparchus, to two individuals opens up the ability of the community to share the credit for the deed; viewers can more easily conceive of themselves as joining a group that already exists, rather than having to impinge on the aloofness of an individual statue. Regarding the intentionality of the juxtaposition, cf. Diodorus Siculus 20.46.2 regarding the statues voted for Demetrius and Antigonos almost a century later.

⁷ See Gauthier 1985:97–9; for the dating, 1985:177–80, along with Shear 2011:282 (who agrees with Gauthier's dating of the honors for Chabrias and Timotheus as well; cf. Oliver 2007b:184–8). As related by Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1398A), the honors were opposed by one Harmodius (a descendant of the tyrannicides); speaking in self-defense, Iphicrates is said to have responded that his deeds made him more closely related than Harmodius to the latter's own forebear. This anecdote may in turn be reflected by Hypereides (6.39) in praise of Leosthenes, on which see further below.

⁸ On honors for Timotheus see Gauthier 1985:102–3; others prefer 360 as the date (e.g., Oliver 2007b:184, though cf. 2007b:197).

⁹ See Gauthier 1985:99–102; these honors were also contested, by Leodamas (1985:102n.83, citing in particular Demosthenes 20.146–7: Leodamas was a συνήγορος of Leptines; see further Kremmydas

it has been suggested that their grants of statues will have been important to their credibility as Athenian leaders in lieu of the advantages of γένος.¹⁰ For this same reason, they will have been important to the δῆμος as honorands. They had no record of engaging with the δῆμος as individuals, separate from and notionally on par with or superior to the mass of citizens, and therefore they made suitable visual symbols of Athenian virtues that any citizen could notionally display.¹¹ As for Timotheus, the placement of his statue next to that of his father will have downplayed his individuality as well.¹² In each instance, the seemingly extraordinary praise of an individual was balanced or excused by some trait binding the honorand to the community and to precedent.

Nonetheless, after the prosecution of Timotheus and Iphicrates, no further generals were awarded bronze statues in the fourth century. The downfall of these two figures may have prompted the Athenians to reconsider honoring living citizens: at the end of the century and into the Hellenistic period, beginning with the posthumous honors for Lycurgus in 307/6, only the dead or elderly are granted statues.¹³ The four generals who had been granted statues at the apex of their careers—Conon, Iphicrates, Chabrias, and Timotheus—became important *loci* in Athenian thought on the power of the individual because of the exceptional nature of their honors, even after lesser honors for

2012:38, 425–7). On the monument for Chabrias see Burnett and Edmonson 1961, Anderson 1963, Buckler 1972, Tanner 2006:122, and Shear 2011:282–3.

¹⁰ Gauthier 1985:125. On the private commemorations of these generals, set up on the Acropolis, see Meyer 2013:282 with 282–3n.128.

¹¹ On the civic value of statues, cf. Tanner 2006:140, Ma 2013:42–3.

¹² Cf. Meyer 2013:489–90, Oliver 2007b:197.

¹³ See Gauthier 1985, especially 1985:82–3. Cf. the digest of Gauthier’s argument presented by Kralli 1999/2000:138–41; Kralli provides *passim* a well-reasoned examination of the political motives for the post-Cassander grants of the μέγιστα τιμαί. Cf. perhaps also Plato, *Laws* 7.802A.

citizens had become more widespread.¹⁴ For example, Deinarchus, prosecuting Demosthenes, ascribes the successes and failings of a *polis* to its leaders (1.72) and looks back on these four generals as representing a high point of Athenian power (1.75).¹⁵ Nostalgia for the first half of the fourth century is unusual: more normally the orators' references to ancestral behavior point back to the fifth century, to the Persian Wars or the Delian League.¹⁶ That Deinarchus could place the four generals before his audience as unequivocally praiseworthy may reflect the cumulative impact of their statues' presence in the Agora over the preceding decades. Additionally, here Deinarchus builds on a passage of Aeschines (3.243), in which that orator had invited the jury to examine the reasoning behind the honors given to Chabrias, Iphicrates, and Timotheus, including their statues, and to compare the honors offered to Demosthenes. The enormity of the honors, though, made their symbolic function vary. On the one hand, Demosthenes could use even the non-military exploits of Iphicrates and Chabrias as positive *exempla* against the actions of Meidias (21.62–4): these famous honorands also knew how to behave with self-control when their opponents were praised. On the other hand, only a few years before, in two separate speeches the same author had cast the honors for Timotheus, Iphicrates, and Chabrias in a negative light.¹⁷ The generals of the Persian Wars had not

¹⁴ Between Chaeroneia and Crannon, there were some grants of statues to living non-generals—especially the notorious example of Demades (see Brun 2000:78–83, as well as Gauthier 1985:103, 109–10)—but these grants did not make as large an impact on the surviving literature, except where they are cast in an unfavorable light. On the generals' achievements as *loci*, cf. Worthington 1999:170; on these statues' influence on later perceptions, see Ma 2013:104.

¹⁵ Cf. Xenophon, *Poroi* 1.1, for the equation of the state's leaders with the state itself.

¹⁶ Cf. the fifth-century canon produced by Callicles at *Gorgias* 503C (Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Pericles).

¹⁷ These are Demosthenes 13, delivered by Demosthenes before the ἐκκλησία, and 23, composed for delivery by Euthycles. Honors as negative: 13.20–2, 23.196–8. On the date and authenticity of Demosthenes 13, see MacDowell 2009:226–9.

received individual credit for their victories, but the more recent generals are said to have accomplished deeds actually performed by their armies and under the authority of the δῆμος, in addition to receiving bronze statues the ancestors had not.¹⁸ According to Demosthenes, the Athenians had altered both their linguistic usage and, by means of the statues, their city's landscape in order to praise living individuals whose worth was open to contestation.

Bronze statues were only one of three honors often called, in modern scholarship, the μέγιστα τιμαί.¹⁹ Alongside these exceptional honors were a host of other possible grants, of which the most significant—not in terms of absolute honor, but in regard to its importance to modern reconstructions of Athenian political life—was the inscribed *stele*.²⁰ Recording, and then constantly reaffirming and reenacting, the initial proposal of honors, *stelai* will have shaped the relationship of even illiterate Athenians to their daily landscape, through their sheer number and prominence in well-trafficked civic spaces.²¹ The surviving honorific inscriptions have been fruitfully analyzed for how their language

¹⁸ Cf. Gauthier 1985:121–2. See also 23.129–32, where Charidemus is compared unfavorably against Iphicrates, though the latter is by no means praised: despite receiving a bronze statue, he still fought against Athens on behalf of Cotys, who did not reward him appropriately for risking his previous honors (23.136); cf. Kallet 1983:249–51.

¹⁹ The others were προεδρία and σίτησις; see further Gauthier 1985:27, Kralli 1999/2000:134, Oliver 2007b:183. For an example of the earlier non-technical usage of μέγιστα τιμαί, see Isocrates 9.57, discussed in chapter three (cf. Gauthier 1985:97).

²⁰ On the honorific value of inscribed *stelai*, see Lambert 2011b, as well as Engen 2010:175–9; for a succinct definition of “honors,” see Engen 2010:140.

²¹ For the spatial distribution of Athenian decrees, see Liddel 2003; regarding the religious dimensions of the “epigraphic habit,” on which was predicated much of the development of Athenian inscriptions including their placements, see especially Meyer 2013; on the performative quality of public inscriptions, Osborne 1999:358.

both reflects and constructs Athenian civic identity throughout the fourth century.²²

Although the *Agésilas* and *Evagoras* are set by their authors in opposition to bronze statues of their honorands, because the statues have lower semantic potential, it would be entirely appropriate to conceive of fourth-century literary praise-texts as rivals instead to the inscribed documents of the state.²³ Indeed, they are self-consciously inferior rivals, striving against the norms of communal praise represented by the decrees: for literary praise to distinguish itself, it must have some memorializing quality lacking in the public honors. For just one example of the advantages enjoyed by an inscription, one can compare an encomium such as the *Agésilas*, which attempts to de-contextualize and generalize the virtues of the *laudandus*, with decrees praising an honorand's ἀνδραγαθία in the most general terms.²⁴ In response to a specific benefaction, the Athenians praise general goodness, increasing the potential for emulation by removing the specificity. The hortatory clause of *IG* II³ 1.400 is exemplary in this regard, all the more so because it is the sole part of this decree that has been preserved: by an accident of history it is now completely generalized. The stone exhibits only the order for its own inscription along with a hortatory clause: “so that [other officials?] may also show love of honor

²² The most important studies of honorific vocabulary are the monographs of Henry 1983 and Veligianni-Terzi 1997; see also three articles by Whitehead (1983, 1993, 2009). Cf. Liddel 2007:160–82, Engen 2010:119–39 (especially the table at 2010:120).

²³ On the relationship of the *Agésilas* and *Evagoras* to statues, see chapters two and three, with *Agésilas* 11.7 and *Evagoras* 9.73 in particular.

²⁴ Cf. Luraghi 2010:250 and Osborne 1999:350–4, as well as 1999:356: “But in the case of honour or dishonour, hiding the circumstances which led to the honour at least reduces the possibility of the issue remaining a live one. It is as if the criteria for public honours are as straightforward and preordained as those for victory in a foot-race.” On ἀνδραγαθία see especially Whitehead 2009.

(φιλοτιμῶνται), knowing that the δῆμος gives thanks (χάριτας ἀποδίδωσιν) to those who show love of honor towards them (τοῖς εἰς ἑαυτὸν φιλοτιμουμένοις).²⁵

Honorific practices at Athens were not static throughout the fourth century. One important change was that, whereas foreigners had received inscribed honors at Athens for decades, there were no inscribed honors for native Athenian citizens until the 340s.²⁶ Non-inscribed honors were certainly granted prior to this date, but the sudden introduction of visible monuments to individual Athenians, especially those put up at public expense, marks a shift in political culture.²⁷ This shift is all the more striking given that the Athenians had ceased to honor individual generals with statues by this point. Like the literary encomia, state decrees had to justify singling out individuals for praise, and for each decree these reasons will have been the subject of discussion in the βουλή before the decree was proposed, in the ἐκκλησία before it was passed, and at times—as will be seen later in this chapter—in the courts, after the fact.²⁸ The text ultimately inscribed on

²⁵ Translation Lambert (*Attic Inscriptions Online*), modified. Lambert 2004:111 believes this decree “probably ... honoured Athenian official(s)”; Lambert 2007:122n.101 dates it to after 350 because of the hortatory clause (cf. 2011a:176). On hortatory clauses see further Henry 1996, Luraghi 2010:249–52, Lambert 2011b:194–8; on φιλοτιμία in fourth-century decrees see Whitehead 1983:62 (cf. Osborne 1999:356, Lambert 2011b:197).

²⁶ Lambert 2004:86, noting a few exceptions that do not survive. Lambert identifies in total thirty decrees honoring citizens from the 340s until 322/1. For the ideological “asymmetry” between honoring citizens and honoring foreigners, see Domingo Gygax 2006a. Although Athens began inscribing honors for citizens in this era, at no point in the classical period was a citizen awarded the title of εὐεργέτης in his own *polis* (Veyne 1990:76, cf. Gauthier 1985:8–10). Among other changes, Engen 2010:62–3 describes an increase in trade-related honors after 355/4 and then again after 338/7—noting also that no native Athenians were honored for trade services in any of the thirty-four decrees of his study (2010:104).

²⁷ Cf. Oliver 2011:123 (within a discussion not of citizen honors, but of ἔγκτησις grants): “Whether or not what we see in fact is an increase in the epigraphical display of such awards, the crucial point is that the greater prominence of such awards by virtue of the increasing frequency of the publication of such honours on inscribed *stelai* underlines the suggestion the *polis* was concerned to show that non-Athenians serving the city could be rewarded with the kind of privileges that might reinforce their ties to the *polis*.”

²⁸ See Osborne 1999:350. “Praise” and “honors” should be understood in what follows as interchangeable to a large extent: ἔπαινος was among the honors most frequently granted (see Henry 1983:1–21, Osborne 1999:354, Engen 2010:142–6), but any verbal description of an honorific act—whether *viva voce* at a meeting or on stone—constitutes the bestowing of praise.

any given *stele* occludes this evaluative process.²⁹ In its wake remain only those clauses that describe the actions of the *laudandus*, often in vague terms, and those that exhort others toward emulation, in the hopes that they too may be voted honors.

Looking at only a few decrees in honor of Athenians—those that follow are by no means an exhaustive sample—one can catch some glimpses of this deliberative process, in which, as in the encomia, the roles of *laudator(es)*, *laudandus/-i*, and audience are carefully balanced. The decree *IG II*³ 1.402 honors Cephisophon of Paeania for his ἀνδραγαθία, pursuant to a resolution of the βουλή to crown “whoever is deemed to have given the best advice.”³⁰ This is consonant with Xenophon’s refrain, that states should institute competitions in all aspects of civic life, and this decree provides only one example of an honor regularly offered by the βουλή.³¹ As *laudator*, the βουλή not only advertises itself as following through on its promises, but in a way arrogates to itself the credit for Cephisophon’s good counsel, by narrating the sequence of events that led to his honors. The stone could merely have recounted Cephisophon’s award; instead, it suggests that his exemplary citizenship received its impetus from the βουλή, which thereby retains its authority over even a praiseworthy individual. Another dynamic is at work in *IG II*³ 1.469, for the ἀναγραφεύς Callicratides of Steiria.³² Here the process of honoring an official is spelled out: the πρόεδροι are to bring him before (προσαγαγεῖν) the δῆμος, where the resolution of the βουλή—these very instructions—are to be read out, before the

²⁹ Though some occlude less than others: e.g., inscriptions that include riders put more of the process on view (see Osborne 1999:350–1 on *IG I*³ 101).

³⁰ Translation Lambert (*Attic Inscriptions Online*). Dated by Lambert 2012:405 to c.345–335.

³¹ For another sort of contest instituted by the βουλή see Demosthenes 51 (360/59; on the authorship and date see MacDowell 2009:133–4): this is the earliest securely attested grant of a gold crown given by the *polis* to a native Athenian (Engen 2010:158). Cf. Rhodes & Osborne 100.

³² Dated to c.340–325 by Lambert 2004:89, then to c.330 when published in 2012 as *IG II*³ 1.469.

ἐκκλησία passes the resolution. This clearly occurred; otherwise the stone would not have been inscribed. The inscription breaks off as it specifies how Callicratides, if he successfully renders his εὖθυναί, should go about asking the δῆμος for honors. By describing all of the hoops through which Callicratides must jump in order to be honored, the δῆμος and βουλή advertise how circumspectly they vet their honorands, proving their reliability as *laudatores*. Finally, two decrees from Oropus, dated to 332/1 and relating to the Atthidographer Phanodemus, exhibit the tendency of the literary encomia to praise givers of praise and thereby model how future laudation should be done.³³ For his φιλοτιμία, here displayed toward the divine Amphiaraus instead of toward the δῆμος *vel sim.*, Phanodemus is to be crowned (*IG II³ 1.348*).³⁴ As it happens, on the very same day that Phanodemus was voted these honors, he himself proposed a crown for Amphiaraus (*IG II³ 1.349*), likely the most recent in the series of benefactions toward Amphiaraus that led to his own crowning.³⁵ One who honors so august a past, and presumably future, benefactor is shown by the simultaneity of these decrees to be himself worthy of the same level of honor, in this case a thousand-drachma gold crown.³⁶

Honors for individual citizens of course coexisted with honors for groups of citizens—such as outgoing members of the βουλή—and for foreigners, again as individuals or groups, and for any permutation of *laudandi* similar tensions of praise will

³³ On these decrees see in particular Scafuro 2009.

³⁴ Phanodemus had also been crowned eleven years earlier (*IG II³ 1.306*) in a similar fashion to Cephisophon, and then also in part for honoring divinities (Hephaestus and Athena); Cephisophon himself also appears on that same stone, this time as the proposer of honors for the βουλή. On the “reciprocity of action” displayed by *IG II³ 1.306*, see Scafuro 2009:69.

³⁵ Scafuro 2009:82n.59.

³⁶ On Amphiaraus being honored as “both a god and a foreigner”—that is to say, as a powerful foreign benefactor on the model of, e.g., Evagoras—see Scafuro 2009:73.

have applied, though the restrictions on honors for citizens differed in magnitude and, as has been said, appear in the epigraphical record relatively late. Just as the distinctions among *laudandi* should be nuanced, so too should the definition of the *laudator*. In the examples above, the δῆμος, whether as ἐκκλησία or βουλή, has been represented as managing the risks of praise, but this picture is incomplete and does not do justice to the blurring of boundaries between *laudator* and audience that was crucial to the functioning of decrees for citizens. Two entities could claim the title of *laudator* in any given honorific decree: the decreeing body as a whole and the individual proposer. On the one hand, *laudator* and audience, for those decrees encouraging φιλοτιμία of other citizens, are essentially one and the same: the δῆμος exhorts its members to single themselves out for praise. The *laudandus* is therefore also assimilated into the other figures, which accounts for the non-specific virtues enumerated in some decrees; more biographical honorific inscriptions would not appear until the very end of the fourth century.³⁷ On the other hand, the individual proposer, separated out from the community, could also be seen as the *laudator*, by providing the impetus for the honors. Notionally, the recording of the proposer could serve as a kind of honor for the proposer himself, for having the good sense to honor benefactors of the *polis*. In the decrees, though, it is always the collectivity of Athenians that offers praise, calls for emulation, and sets itself up to reap the benefits of future euergetism. The recording of the proposer may instead be considered a kind of scapegoating, a means of reducing the risk inherent in praising those who may turn out not to have deserved it—a situation particularly delicate when the

³⁷ E.g., the posthumous honors for Lycurgus, as inscribed in 307/6 (*IG* II² 457A+B).

laudandus is a powerful individual.³⁸ The proposer, in exchange for having his name inscribed on the stone, takes on the chance of being brought to trial by γραφή, as happened to several of the politicians treated in the remainder of this chapter. The corporate δῆμος frees itself of being called to account for inappropriate praise of an individual by offloading the risk onto one of its own members, temporarily separated out as a third party.

Against Leptines: praise in defense of praise

In 355/4 Demosthenes participated in a γραφή trial against Leptines, though not, in this instance, in order to counteract inappropriate praise. Instead, his goal was to preserve one particular form of honorific grant: exemption from financial impositions such as non-military liturgies (ἀτέλεια).³⁹ The twentieth speech in the Demosthenic corpus is directed at Leptines' attempt to nullify these grants and prevent anyone else from gaining ἀτέλεια in the future. Speaking as a συνήγορος of the main prosecutor Apsephion, Demosthenes presents the legal and social impediments to Leptines' proposal.⁴⁰ In the course of arguing for the continuation of one form of honor, ἀτέλεια, Demosthenes illustrates the benefits of honor and praise generally for Athens and,

³⁸ Or when the *laudandus* is opposed to those in power: see Lambert 2011a:180 for Athenian honorary decrees for foreigners opposed to Macedon in the period following Chaeroneia. Lambert 2011b:204 argues that "inscribed honorific decrees can, or can sometimes, be interpreted as assertions of the power of the proposers of the decrees, in other words as instruments of competitive display by political leaders." Lambert uses the examples of Lycurgus and Demades, for the extraordinary number of decrees each proposed. He is certainly correct that this is the case in at least some instances, though perhaps the broader avenue of elite display ran through the courts, attacking the proposals of others: see further the case studies below.

³⁹ Kremmydas 2012:43–5. On ἀτέλεια grants generally see Rubinstein 2009, as well as Henry 1983:241–5, Oliver 2007a:30–7, Engen 2010:187–92; such grants were among the loftiest offered (Engen 2010:187–8). There is some conflation in the speech of ἀτέλεια as liturgical exemption (for citizens) and ἀτέλεια as tax exemption (for foreigners), though these exemptions have similar honorific motivations and economic ramifications.

⁴⁰ For Demosthenes' possible political purposes, see Burke 2002:177–9; cf. Osborne 1999:356–7.

furthermore, demonstrates these benefits by including within the speech examples of praise for previous benefactors.⁴¹ In this he follows the example of the encomia of Xenophon and Isocrates, performing the praise for which he advocates.⁴²

Indeed, at several moments he may even allude to these earlier encomia, as in the cases of the Corinthians and of Conon. He praises a group of Corinthians for their actions following the battle at Nemea (394 BCE), which earned them honors from Athens and exile from home. This battle occurred prior to that at Coroneia, during Agesilaus' return from Asia. In Xenophon's *Hellenica*, the sequence of events is as follows: Agesilaus is ordered to return home (4.2.1–8); the Spartans in the Peloponnese head for Corinthian territory (4.2.9–15); the battle lines are ranged at Nemea (4.2.16–19) and the armies clash (4.2.20–2); after the Spartans defeat the allied Greeks, the Corinthians shut everyone else out of their city (4.2.23); Agesilaus, having reached Amphipolis, hears of the victory (4.3.1–2) and then marches toward Coroneia (4.3.3–14). From this can be seen the tight chronology of the events as well as their narrative association in the *Hellenica*. There the narrative is focalized through Agesilaus as he makes his approach; Xenophon emphasizes how he hears and reacts to the news of Nemea and then Cnidus (4.3.10–12). These

⁴¹ These miniature encomia, each carefully argued as creating precedent for condemning Leptines, take up much of the central section of the speech. They are grouped by (native) citizenship. Foreign benefactors: Leucon of Bosporus (20.29–40, the only contemporary among the foreigners), Epicrdes of Cyrene (20.41–8), the pro-Athenian faction at Corinth (20.52–5), the Thasians under Ecphantus (20.59), Archebius and Heracleides (20.60), and hypothetical present benefactors (20.61). Citizen benefactors: Conon (20.68–74), Chabrias (20.75–87), the generals at Eion (20.112), Lysimachus (20.115). See Kremmydas 2012:242–3 on ring composition in the ordering of the *laudandi*.

⁴² One caveat: Demosthenes does not use the vocabulary of ἐπίδειξις as it was employed by his predecessors. Possibly ἐπίδειξις as a term was already too weighted down with the negative qualities analyzed, and indeed assigned to it, by Isocrates (as at, e.g., 10.4; see further Papillon 1995, with some reservations as expressed in chapter three). Compare Demosthenes' derogatory usage at 18.280; at 51.3 he makes his nearest approach to the encomiastic usage. In *Against Leptines*, as elsewhere, Demosthenes strongly prefers the *simplex* δεικνύμι and its cognates. Perhaps as a nod to the encomiastic usage of ἐπίδειξις, however, the sole appearance of that compound in *Against Leptines* (ἐπιδείγματα, 20.142), is markedly positive.

reports heighten the drama prior to Coroneia, which Xenophon calls “unlike any other battle fought by our contemporaries” (οἷα οὐκ ἄλλη τῶν γ’ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν, 4.3.16).

Demosthenes entirely discards Xenophon’s emphasis on Agesilaus, who was not present at Nemea. One could argue that he simply follows a different historian or, indeed, oral history.⁴³ To the contrary, Demosthenes underscores his erasure of Agesilaus by alluding to Xenophon’s own language.⁴⁴ As he begins his description, Demosthenes calls Nemea “the great battle” (ἡ μεγάλη μάχη, 20.52), signaling his departure from Xenophon’s emphasis on Coroneia as the central event of that campaign.⁴⁵ From there, he launches into an impressive period describing the valor of some of the Corinthians, who allowed the Athenians into their city against the wishes of the majority.⁴⁶ This event is not mentioned in the *Hellenica*, but the terms in which Demosthenes narrates it resemble Xenophon’s own massive periodic sentence in the *Agesilaus*, the one which puts on display Agesilaus’ difficult moral choice in abandoning his gains in Asia.⁴⁷ In addition to

⁴³ Which he claims as his source (ἂ παρ’ ὑμῶν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων αὐτὸς ἀκήκοα, 20.52). On his apology for using material predating his own lifetime see Kremmydas 2012:285–6.

⁴⁴ It is almost certain that the *Agesilaus* (probably composed shortly after the death of the *laudandus*) predated *Against Leptines* (on the dating of which see Kremmydas 2012:33–4) and likely enough that the *Hellenica* was disseminated earlier as well, though perhaps very recently.

⁴⁵ On the magnitude of the battle at Nemea see Kremmydas 2012:286. Hypereides would later consign this conflict to obscurity for the selfishness of the Spartans’ victory relative to their glory at Thermopylae (*Against Diondas* 176v.11–13= Carey et al. 2008:9).

⁴⁶ 20.52–3: τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλ’ ὅσα χρησίμους ὑμῖν ἑαυτοὺς ἐκεῖνοι παρέσχον, ἐάσω· ἄλλ’ ὅθ’ ἡ μεγάλη μάχη πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐγένεθ’ ἢ ἐν Κορίνθῳ, τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει βουλευσαμένων μετὰ τὴν μάχην μὴ δέχεσθαι τῷ τείχει τοὺς στρατιώτας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπικηρυκεύεσθαι, ὁρῶντες ἡτυχηκυῖαν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τῆς παρόδου κρατοῦντας Λακεδαιμονίους, οὐχὶ προὔδωκαν οὐδ’ ἐβουλεύσαντ’ ἰδίαι περὶ τῆς αὐτῶν σωτηρίας, ἀλλὰ πλησίον ὄντων μεθ’ ὅπλων ἀπάντων Πελοποννησίων ἀνέωξαν τὰς πύλας ὑμῖν βίαι τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ μᾶλλον εἶλοντο μεθ’ ὑμῶν τῶν τότε στρατευσαμένων, εἴ τι δέοι, πάσχειν ἢ χωρὶς ὑμῶν ἀκινδύνως σεσῶσθαι, καὶ εἰσέφρουν τὸ στράτευμα, καὶ διέσωσαν καὶ ὑμᾶς καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους. On the chronology of these events see Kremmydas 2012:287–9, with the scholarship cited there.

⁴⁷ *Agesilaus* 1.36: ἄξιόν γε μὴν καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ὑπερβαλλόντως ἄγασθαι αὐτοῦ, ὅστις ἄρχων μὲν παμπόλλων ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ πόλεων, ἄρχων δὲ καὶ νήσων, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν προσήψεν αὐτῷ ἡ πόλις, αὐξανόμενος δὲ καὶ εὐκλείαι καὶ δυνάμει, παρὸν δ’ αὐτῷ πολλοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς χρῆσθαι ὃ τι ἐβούλετο, πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις τὸ μέγιστον, ἐπινοῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων καταλύσειν τὴν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα στρατεύσασαν πρότερον ἀρχήν, ὅμως ὑπ’

their reference to near-simultaneous historical events, the sentences both have as their climax the dilemma faced by each party: Agesilaus “made it clear that not for the whole earth would he trade away his homeland, nor his old friends for those he had acquired, nor would he take shameful and riskless (ἀκίνδυνα) gains over noble and just gains that come with risk”; the pro-Athenian Corinthians “chose to suffer, if it proved necessary, alongside you who had fought beside them rather than to find safety without risk (ἀκίνδυνως) and without you.” Both sentences emphasize the risks undertaken by the *laudandi*, but Demosthenes’ version creates a more sympathetic picture, at least from an Athenian perspective.⁴⁸ Whereas Agesilaus, flushed with success, struggles with his conscience over merely doing his duty to his own city (ἐπείθετο τῇ πόλει), these Corinthians, having just lost a battle, use violence against their countrymen (βίαι τῶν πολλῶν) in order to save distressed soldiers from a *polis* not their own (ὁρῶντες ἡτυχηκυῖαν τὴν πόλιν).⁴⁹

In each instance, the virtue of the *laudandi* is set against the backdrop of Spartan success, but in the case of the Corinthians it is more praiseworthy that they were on the losing side; furthermore, Agesilaus’ decision has for its result, at least in the short term,

οὐδενὸς τούτων ἐκρατήθη, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ ἦλθεν αὐτῶι ἀπὸ τῶν οἴκοι τελῶν βοηθεῖν τῇ πατρίδι, ἐπείθετο τῇ πόλει οὐδὲν διαφερόντως ἢ εἰ ἐν τῷ ἐφορείῳ ἔτυχεν ἐστηκὼς μόνος παρὰ τοὺς πέντε, μάλα ἐνδηλον ποιῶν ὥς οὔτε ἂν πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν δέξαίτο ἀντὶ τῆς πατρίδος οὔτε τοὺς ἐπικτήτους ἀντὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων φίλων οὔτε αἰσχροὶ καὶ ἀκίνδυνα κέρδη μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ κινδύνων τὰ καλὰ καὶ δίκαια. In the *Hellenica*, Xenophon reduces this internal struggle to a μέν-clause (χαλεπῶς μὲν ἠνεγκεν, ἐνθυμούμενος καὶ οἶον τιμῶν καὶ οἶον ἐλπίδων ἀπεσπερεῖτο, ὅμως δὲ συγκαλέσας ... 4.2.3).

⁴⁸ Other verbal echoes include forms of δέχομαι, κρατέω, and στρατεύω, though these words are perhaps to be expected in such a context. While the antithesis of risk and lack of risk might seem a *topos*, the closeness of the parallel can be supported by contrasting these passages with Lysias 31.7, which contains a similar antithesis but exhibits neither the correspondence of structure nor the chronological concurrence of the events narrated. The language of risk here returns prominently at the end of the speech: οὐκ ἀπορήσετε τῶν ἐθελήσόντων ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν κινδυνεύειν (20.166; contrast Leptines’ foolish excess of risk at 20.145: φιλοκινδυνότατος πάντων ἀνθρώπων εἶ).

⁴⁹ See Kremmydas 2012:287 for why one should understand τὴν πόλιν to refer to Athens here.

victories in Thessaly and at Coroneia, whereas the Corinthians find themselves exiled (20.54). Xenophon, however, had contrasted this Corinthian faction and Agesilaus not in terms of their conduct before Coroneia, but after it: Agesilaus had pardoned a group of suppliants (*Hellenica* 4.3.20 = *Agesilaus* 2.13), right before these Corinthians massacred suppliant fellow-citizens (*Hellenica* 4.4.3).⁵⁰ Demosthenes' adaptation of Xenophon's writings goes beyond imparting to the Nemea episode a Xenophontic flavor. In crucial aspects of the episode—the combatants, the author's moral judgments—Demosthenes takes Xenophon's narrative and reverses it, applying the same language to *laudandi* from the other side of the conflict.

The *Evagoras* lurks beneath *Against Leptines* as well.⁵¹ Just as Demosthenes takes the language of the *Agesilaus* and applies it to Agesilaus' Corinthian opponents, similarly he adopts the phrasing of Isocrates' encomium in order to praise not Evagoras, but his Athenian ally Conon. This praise comes just after Demosthenes has effected a transition from the deeds of foreign benefactors to those of Athenian citizens. To mark this transition, Demosthenes makes the ostentatious wish “that the best and largest number of benefactors should be our own citizens.”⁵² In the previous chapter, it was argued that Evagoras' citizenship by grant was useful to Isocrates in that the orator could praise him with less risk than would attend an encomium of a native-born Athenian: the chance for envy was lower, and the citizenship grant indicated the Athenians' longstanding goodwill

⁵⁰ Kremmydas 2012:289 calls Demosthenes' rendering of the episode “simplistic,” but it can also be read as intentionally silent on blameworthy matters, as is customary in praise-texts.

⁵¹ The enmity Rowe (2000 and 2002) sees between Isocrates and Demosthenes is immaterial to this point; for a rebuttal to Rowe 2000, see Burke 2002:171–2n.33, and cf. Ober 2004:35–6 on Isocrates' adaptation of Plato's *Apology* in the *Antidosis*.

⁵² 20.67: καὶ ἀνδρας ἀρίστους καὶ πλείστους εὐεργέτας τῆς πόλεως πολίτας εἶναι. Translation by Harris 2008:42; contrast Kremmydas 2012:113 (“... that there might be many excellent men and numerous benefactors among the citizens of this city”).

toward the *laudandus*, which would render them more willing to hear him praised.

Demosthenes has already used this technique in praise of his first *laudandus*, Leucon of Bosphorus (20.29–40), also an Athenian citizen by grant.⁵³ At 20.67 Demosthenes acts on the implication of both the *Agesilaus* and the *Evagoras*, that praise of citizens would be beneficial, and takes that very risk.

The next section (20.68) invites the jurors to criticize (καταμεμψαμένους) Conon as the first example of a citizen benefactor, with the implication that such criticism is impossible. In a breathless sentence, Demosthenes runs through the highlights of Conon's career, emphasizing both the extent of his deeds and the relative weakness of Athens at the time, a contrast that magnifies the benefactions.⁵⁴ The similarity of this passage to one particular section of the *Evagoras* (9.52–7) has been debated over the last century.⁵⁵

Demosthenes' use of the *Evagoras* has been both over- and underrated: on the one hand, excepting that both passages are about Conon, the similarities between 20.68 and

⁵³ See 20.30: ἔστι γὰρ γένει μὲν δήπου ὁ Λεύκων ξένος, τῇ δὲ παρ' ὑμῶν ποιήσει πολίτης. See further Kremmydas 2012:245 on the process and circumstances; cf. also the antithetical phrasing of *Evagoras* 9.54, on citizenship as a motivation of both Conon and Evagoras for helping Athens. This statement of citizenship takes the place of what would later become standardized as the first element of encomium, treatment of the γένος of the *laudandus*. Similarly, about ten years later, the inscription (*IG* II³ 1.298 = Rhodes & Osborne 64) bestowing additional honors on Leucon's sons is framed with several references to their father.

⁵⁴ 20.68: οὗτος γάρ, ὥς ὑμῶν τινῶν ἔστιν ἀκοῦσαι τῶν κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ὄντων, μετὰ τὴν τοῦ δήμου κάθοδον τὴν ἐκ Πειραιῶς ἀσθενοῦς ἡμῶν τῆς πόλεως οὔσης καὶ ναῦν οὐδεμίαν κεκτημένης, στρατηγῶν βασιλεῖ, παρ' ὑμῶν οὐδ' ἠγνινοῦν ἀφορμὴν λαβὼν, κατεναυμάχησεν Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ πρότερον τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτάττοντας εἴθισεν ἀκοῦειν ὑμῶν, καὶ τοὺς ἀρμοστὰς ἐξήλασεν ἐκ τῶν νήσων, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα δεῦρ' ἐλθὼν ἀνέστησε τὰ τείχη, καὶ πρῶτος πάλιν περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἐποίησε τῇ πόλει τὸν λόγον πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους εἶναι.

⁵⁵ Kremmydas 2012:309 collects the relevant scholarship. Summing up the argument against Isocratean influence on Demosthenes, Kremmydas writes, "The similarities between the two have been exaggerated. In Isokrates 9 *Evagoras* of Cyprus takes some of the credit for Konon's success at Knidos, whereas here that victory is credited solely to the Athenian general. Dem.'s praise for Konon is outright, whereas in the *Evagoras* it is only indirect since that speech seeks to praise the Cypriot ruler." Kremmydas is correct regarding each of these differences between the texts, but these differences are precisely the point of Demosthenes' adaptation. The passages need not have the same import in order for there to be an allusion; the allusion becomes more pointed, in fact, if Demosthenes is creating his own distinct spin by transferring to Conon praise given by Isocrates to *Evagoras* himself.

Evagoras 9.52–7 are not strong; on the other hand, Demosthenes’ language can be shown to encompass an even broader swath of the *Evagoras*. In terms of form, the catalogue at *Against Leptines* 20.68 can be compared to *Evagoras* 9.66–8 and to 9.69. As for content, one can find the following echoes, here in the order presented by Demosthenes: the initial weakness of Athens can be compared to the condition of Salamis at *Evagoras* 9.47, especially regarding the lack of triremes; Spartan naval defeat is mentioned at 9.56 (Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν κατεναυμαχήθησαν); the Spartans are said to have been previously accustomed to leadership, to which can be compared 9.63, regarding the Persians, and especially 9.68 (τοὺς πρότερον αὐτῶν ἄρχοντας ἐλθεῖν αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀρχὴν δώσοντας); walls are (re)built at 9.47 (τείχη προσπεριεβάλετο); the restoration of Athens to competitive status can be compared to 9.47 and 9.56. Immediately after 20.68, Demosthenes discusses inscribed honors for Conon (20.69), to which can be compared the transition from 9.56 to 9.57. Finally, the uniqueness of Conon’s honors is comparable to *Evagoras*’ uniqueness at 9.66.

The relevant portion of the *Evagoras* (9.47–69) is so long that it is better to see Demosthenes’ narrative of Conon not as a citation of a passage of Isocrates, relevant only because both mention Conon, but as an extreme compression of Isocrates’ laudatory technique for his primary *laudandus*. That *Evagoras* himself is not mentioned in the section on Conon (20.68–74) underscores that Demosthenes has taken up Isocrates’ cue from the *Evagoras*: praise of a native-born Athenian citizen trumps that of a foreign euergete. Demosthenes also reflects Isocratean practice in his references to honors received by Conon both at Athens (20.70) and elsewhere (20.71): Conon’s praiseworthiness is secured by the audience’s previous praise for him and by external

evaluators. Finally, Demosthenes caps the section by comparing Conon favorably against the standard of Themistocles, just as in Isocrates' calculus Evagoras comes out ahead of the heroes of myth (9.65).⁵⁶

Another key feature of the encomia discussed in the previous chapters is the parallelism of *laudator* and *laudandus*. Demosthenes recognizes this mode of praise as well, though he does so not with respect to himself, but in describing the Athenians' corporate acts of praise. Civic honors acknowledge that the individual's behavior reflects the values of the *polis*—that is to say, the individual *laudandus* has acted as the *polis* in miniature. This equation of honorand and Athens is nowhere more clear than in the section on Conon. Demosthenes says that the inscription for Conon is a point of pride (φιλοτιμία) for Conon relative to his fellow Athenians and for the Athenians relative to the rest of the Greeks (20.69). The individual competes for honor within the *polis*; the *polis* has the same agonistic relationship with other *poleis*. Demosthenes has already suggested that Leptines, too, should change his tune and bring himself and his proposals into line with the character of Athens, in order to earn praise that he may well deserve (20.14).⁵⁷ Discord between the individual and the state is shameful to whichever party does not live up to the other's standard: shameful to the individual in the case of Leptines, and shameful to Athens in the case of Leucon should his honors be revoked (20.36, cf. 20.9, 20.136). For Demosthenes' main purpose, however, the most important parallelism between individual and state is the one he attempts to prevent: to deprive

⁵⁶ Cf. *Agésilas* 9.1–5, comparing Agésilas to the Persian king.

⁵⁷ Cf. the similar thought at 22.64. See Kremmydas 2012:208 on the remarkable tact of this section: a more overt insult “would appear to diminish Dem.’s own rhetorical *ethos* as a defender of the city’s *ethos*.” Cf. 2012:57. For the character of Athens (τὸ τῆς πόλεως ἦθος), see 20.11, 20.13, 20.64, and cf. 20.140–1, 20.157; beyond this speech, cf. 24.170–1.

honorands of their ἀτέλεια is to deprive the city of potential honorands (20.103, cf. 20.166).

By using the praise techniques of the earlier encomiasts and at times even alluding to specific passages from their texts, Demosthenes seeks to persuade his audience of the benefits of praise. He both advocates for and performs this teaching, demonstrating it for future *laudatores* to imitate, in opposition to the stinginess represented by Leptines. Of course Demosthenes exaggerates this stinginess: the specific grant of ἀτέλεια generally has little to do with how he constructs the relevance of his examples; he combs through Athens' past to search for examples of honorands whose honors—regardless of what they were—it would be shameful to rescind. Nonetheless, despite the exaggerations, the speech taken as a whole describes the place of praise and honors in Athenian society in a manner consonant with the ideas of Demosthenes' literary predecessors.

That ideology, as it is presented in *Against Leptines*, can be summarized as follows. The traditional notion of χάρις compels the δῆμος to show and maintain gratitude to its benefactors. Leptines' law would cast blame on Athens because the δῆμος would default on this obligatory gratitude (20.10).⁵⁸ Viewed from another angle, however, this obligation is actively beneficial: it provides a source of power for the δῆμος, because the δῆμος is placed in the position of evaluating benefactions before it weighs out the proper recompense.⁵⁹ With this authority, the Athenians have the means of canonizing the values that work to their ethical and economic benefit and that thereby can

⁵⁸ Cf. 20.31 (parallelism of Leucon and the Athenians), 20.47, 20.54, and especially 20.56 (the danger of a reputation for envy).

⁵⁹ 20.2; cf. 20.107. Later (19.177), Demosthenes puts it plainly: ὑμῶν ὁράντων τῶν καὶ τιμῆσαι κυρίων ὄντων καὶ τοῦναντίον κολάσαι. Cf. Cohen 1995:194.

also encourage future benefactors (20.5–7).⁶⁰ At 20.64 Demosthenes justifies inscribed honors in particular: they serve the honorand in his lifetime, and then afterward they vouch for the city’s willingness to show gratitude. While one might assume that these honorific practices be utilized by any state, democracies offer the most satisfying praise, because it comes voluntarily and from equals, and the most permanent, because it is not subject to the whims of a tyrant.⁶¹ Furthermore—as the Athenian Demosthenes suggests to an Athenian jury—nowhere else would extravagant displays of gratitude be so well matched to the city’s character and history.⁶² Demosthenes’ most succinct statement of the role of praise at Athens comes at 20.108: “the freedom of a democracy is guarded by the rivalry of the elite, which they conduct for the sake of grants given to them by the people” (τὴν δὲ τῶν δήμων ἐλευθερίαν ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἄμιλλα, ἣν ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τοῦ δήμου δωρεαῖς πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς ποιοῦνται, φυλάττει). Like a Xenophontic ruler, the Athenian state encourages competition among its citizens in order to ensure its own survival.

The speech, then, contains evidence of, and commentary on, the performance of the δῆμος as *laudator*, but it also allows Demosthenes to co-opt this role for himself, aligning his own ἦθος with that of the state and putting on display, through his willingness to give praise, his own praiseworthiness. The text was not composed to

⁶⁰ Cf. 20.39, with Kremmydas 2012:263. 20.154 is particularly Xenophontic, pairing rewards and punishments.

⁶¹ 20.15–17 could be read as a direct rebuttal to *Hieron* 8.3–5; cf. *Hieron* 1.15–16 (discussed in chapter one). Non-democratic regimes, in Demosthenes’ view, have the situation exactly backwards: they give money to their benefactors rather than receiving it from them. See also the comparison of the Theban, Spartan, and Athenian constitutions at 20.105–11.

⁶² See 20.3 and 20.13–14. Demosthenes recognizes that modes of praise have changed over time: see 20.114. Kremmydas 2012:385 paraphrases the argument well: “The spirit of gratitude of the city has not been altered over the years, only its external manifestation has changed.”

inform future scholars of Athenian practices and values, but rather it was meant in the first instance to serve the ends of its author. Demosthenes describes Athenian praise, but at the same time he prescribes it: his picture of Athens is an ideal constructed for the purposes of attacking Leptines' law and suggesting his own alternative. This adaptation, rather than straightforward presentation, of reality is in keeping with the methods of Xenophon and Isocrates, as are other encomiastic tendencies observable in the text. For example, Demosthenes avoids praise for any living, native-born citizen, though he comes closer than any previous literary praise-text in the section on Leucon: the latter is still alive, though a citizen only by grant and at a great geographic and cultural remove.⁶³ The native-born Athenian who receives the most extravagant praise in the speech, Chabrias, has recently died.⁶⁴ Demosthenes does discuss his still-living son Ctesippus, who is an important participant in the trial (20.1, 20.75). In this he does not follow the precedent of Xenophon, who makes no mention of Archidamus in the *Agesilaus*, but rather that of Isocrates: in the *Evagoras* Demosthenes has a clear model for binding a son's future activity and virtue to his father's posthumous praise.⁶⁵ Furthermore, the text of *Against Leptines*, once published or disseminated, could stand as a guarantor of the honors of its various *laudandi*, even if they should be repealed by the δῆμος: because it narrates previous honorific acts, it could become, like the other encomia, a monument more lasting than physical memorials, in this case the inscribed *stelai* (cf. 20.35–7).

⁶³ See Burke 2002:178 on possible reasons for including the still-living Leucon.

⁶⁴ In 357/6: see 20.82, with Kremmydas 2012:352–3. Praise of Chabrias takes up the section 20.75–86; 20.78, though hyperbolic, is representative.

⁶⁵ Timotheus, by contrast, is not mentioned in the section on Conon (20.68–74): prosecuted by εἰσαγγελία in 356/5 (Sealey 1955:74), Timotheus was perhaps still too controversial in 355/4, at the time of the present trial (1955:78).

Finally there is the treatment of Leptines himself. The lack of vitriol in this speech can perhaps be ascribed to Demosthenes' relative youth and inexperience or, even better, to his desire to present himself as possessing the generous Athenian ἥθος, but it may also stem from the extension of an Isocratean constraint.⁶⁶ Just as Isocrates, in contrast to Polycrates, allows no blame to enter into his *Busiris* (11.4–6), so too does Demosthenes hold back from overt blame of his opponent: at 20.143, Leptines' actions are not criminal *per se*, but rather the opposite of good (οὐδὲν αὐτὸς ποιεῖν ἀγαθόν); Demosthenes cannot praise him among the rest of his *laudandi*, but also will not blame him (ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἔχω πῶς ἐπαινέσω, ψέγειν δὲ οὐ βούλομαι).⁶⁷ Demosthenes is cautious with his praise, following the previous encomiasts in praising the dead almost exclusively, but he is equally cautious with his blame. He claims that even personal enemies do not readily attempt to rescind the honors their foes have received (20.138, cf. 20.151). Leptines may reform his ways and become a *laudandus* in his own right, and so Demosthenes chooses not to tarnish his own character by going on record defaming him. Instead, he adopts an admonitory tone throughout, using praise of past figures both to argue against Leptines' law and to suggest praiseworthy alternatives to Leptines' deeds. Demosthenes thereby establishes himself as a *laudator* whose praise defends, echoes, and enhances that delivered by the δῆμος: surely a deed itself praiseworthy, at least within the ideal Athens conjured by Demosthenes' narrative.

⁶⁶ For Demosthenes' restraint see, e.g., 20.102; cf. above, on 20.13–14 (with Kremmydas 2012:208). For the furthest extent of his aggression see Kremmydas 2012:366 on 20.102. At 20.144 Demosthenes mentions that Leptines is without personal risk in this trial, perhaps another reason why he spares him the vitriol he brings out against Meidias and others.

⁶⁷ Cf. perhaps *Agesilaus* 6.5.

Against Leocrates: the blame game

Whereas Demosthenes' implicit venue for "the rivalry of the elite" (20.108) is liturgical euergetism, in *Against Leocrates* (331/0 BCE) Lycurgus looks to the other side of encouraging euergetic behavior: chastising harmful deeds in order to promote their opposite. His "defenders" of the δῆμος—laws and litigation (1.3–4)—operate within the same realm of social status as does Demosthenes' rivalry, and his source of blame for Leocrates, the defendant's actions, are described as opposite what is usually praised. The present analysis leaves to the side the religious, philosophical, and literary-critical dimensions of Lycurgus' prosecution, which have been ably treated by other scholars, in order to focus on his rhetoric of praise and blame.⁶⁸ In underscoring the defendant's failure to win praise, Lycurgus uses techniques similar to those of the encomiasts, though here with the aim condemning the subject.

Lycurgus couches his blame of Leocrates in praise for others: the speech is ultimately protreptic, like the *Evagoras*, praising the audience and their ancestors while goading them toward additional virtuous acts—first and foremost voting against Leocrates, but also serving the state as Leocrates failed to do.⁶⁹ Frequently Leocrates' malfeasance is appended to a positive exemplum, often after lengthy passages with no mention of the defendant. The gests of the Persian Wars, for instance, bestowed "unforgettable praise on those who accomplished them and unforgettable glory on the city" (1.110, καὶ τοῖς πράξασιν ἔπαινος καὶ τῇ πόλει δόξα ἀείμνηστος), entirely unlike "what Leocrates has done" (ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ Λεωκράτης πεποίηκεν). Prior to this, Leocrates

⁶⁸ See especially Renehan 1970 (Plato), Whitehead 2006:144–6 (religion), Hanink 2014:25–59 (poetry).

⁶⁹ Lycurgus even uses a form of προτρέπω, early in the speech (1.10).

had not been mentioned since 1.101, with six lines of Homer, thirty-two of Tyrtaeus, and two epigrams intervening in addition to Lycurgus' analysis of each poem. The cumulative effect of Lycurgus' evidence of patriotic valor diminishes Leocrates. It could even crowd him out of his own trial, if the speaker did not pause intermittently to point out that this very accumulation makes Leocrates' transgression all the more galling.⁷⁰

In essence, Lycurgus sets up a simple dichotomy: praise is the prize for virtue; blame—and death—the fruit of cowardice. He makes this contrast most explicit by subsuming within his speech another genre of oratory entirely, the *epitaphios logos*.⁷¹ This was the *ἔπαινος* *par excellence* at Athens, and the contrast could not be more stark: the fallen Athenians, nameless and selfless, are typically praised for the way they died; the individual Leocrates is to be blamed for his selfish preservation of life. At 1.46–51 Lycurgus delivers an Athenian *epitaphios* in miniature, rehearsing the usual tropes of noble sacrifice and replete with *figurae* bordering on the Gorgianic.⁷² He justifies the diversion thus (1.46):

αἱ γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν εὐλογίαι τὸν ἔλεγχον σαφῇ κατὰ τῶν τάναντία ἐπιτηδευόντων ποιοῦσιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ δίκαιον τὸν ἔπαινον, ὃς μόνος ἄθλον τῶν κινδύνων τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐστί, τοῦτον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐκεῖνοι εἰς τὴν κοινὴν σωτηρίαν τῆς πόλεως τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν ἀνήλωσαν, ἐν τοῖς δημοσίοις καὶ κοινοῖς ἀγῶσι τῆς πόλεως μὴ παραλείπειν.

Speeches of praise for noble men make it obvious how to establish the guilt of those who behave to the contrary. Furthermore, it is also the right thing not to leave this praise, which is the only reward for the dangers the brave men faced,

⁷⁰ As, e.g., he continues to say in 1.110: ἀλλ' ἐκὼν τὴν ἐξ ἅπαντος τοῦ αἰῶνος συνηθροισμένην τῇ πόλει δόξαν κατήισχυνεν. On the effect of the multitude of literary and epigraphic citations in the speech, see Allen 2000:25–6 (with reservations; cf. Steinbock 2011:312).

⁷¹ Cf. Loraux 2006:181, with Steinbock 2011:286–8 on the later Codrus passage and Hanink 2014:31–9 on the *Erectheus* quotation.

⁷² In addition to the rhetorical parallels between this passage and earlier encomia, Lycurgus conjures the ἐπιδείξεις of praise for trivial subjects—on which see chapter three—through his description of his own praise as παραδοξότατον (1.49).

out of the city's public, communal trials, since they too lost their own lives for the city's communal safety.

Here as in the rest of the speech blame and praise cohabit comfortably, as the latter magnifies the former by contrast. At the end of the section (1.50–1), the figures of *laudator*, *laudandus*, and audience become blurred as praise flows along several vectors: Lycurgus praises the fallen, the fallen are both a source and symbol (στέφανος τῆς πατρίδος) of honor for the Athenians, and the Athenians are said to be the best at bestowing honor on the fallen, for which Lycurgus praises them. The intense reverberation of praise in Athenian society, as it is depicted by Lycurgus, makes all the more dramatic the discrepancy between Leocrates and his fellow Athenians. The discussion is capped with praise for the uniquely Athenian habit of honoring not athletes but only generals and tyrannicides with statues in the Agora. Unlike in the *Evagoras* and *Agesilaus*, where literary praise is meant to surpass the plastic arts, here statue grants are meant as a positive example of Athenian gratitude and the best evidence Lycurgus can muster for the exceptionality of Athenian praise practice (1.51).⁷³ Lycurgus is praising Athenian praise, and he advises his *laudandi*, the jurors, to use their customary good judgment in putting blame on Leocrates (cf. 1.74–5). The superlative judgment of the Athenian δῆμος, which offers highest honors (μέγισται τιμαί, 1.51) to its euergetes, should apply the opposite to Leocrates: the ultimate penalties (ταῖς ἐσχάταις τιμωρίαις).

This layering of praise functions similarly to ἐπίδειξις in the encomia: Lycurgus performs praise and blame, and cites examples of past judgments of the Athenians, in order to encourage his audience to vote in accordance with the value system he

⁷³ On this claim see Kralli 1999/2000:145. Statues are also relevant to praise and blame later in the speech: see 1.117 and 1.136–7 (cf. perhaps Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1411B.)

presents.⁷⁴ Only once in the speech does he use a cognate of ἐπιδείκνυμι, when he claims that sixth-century Athenians “made a demonstration of their preference for the finest deeds” through their incorporation of Homeric poetry into the Greater Panathenaea.⁷⁵ The word ἐπίδειξις is particularly appropriate to rhapsodic display.⁷⁶ Elsewhere, however, Lycurgus prefers παράδειγμα for this sort of modeling: showy display recedes, while the notion of the example, transmitted in order to be imitated, comes to the fore. Lycurgus both opens and closes the speech by asking the jurors to make an example of Leocrates, in order to inhibit future treason (1.9, 1.150, cf. 1.27). By doing so they would in turn be following the example of their ancestors, by the very act of laying down examples. Over the course of the speech Lycurgus has narrated several instances in which the Athenians educated their contemporaries and epigones through establishing precedents.⁷⁷ Poetic precedents are especially useful for Lycurgus, because the poets explain the morals of their poetry more clearly than laws can (1.102); they perform Lycurgus’ role as interpreter of παραδείγματα while at the same time laying down παραδείγματα themselves. Lycurgus praises them for their exemplary exemplarity, as it were, and most extravagantly in the case of Euripides (1.100).⁷⁸

⁷⁴ Allen 2000:20–1 sees epideictic elements particularly in Lycurgus’ vocabulary.

⁷⁵ 1.102: ... ἐπιδείξιν ποιούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ὅτι τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἔργων προηροῦντο. At 1.104 Conomis reads ἐνεδείκνυντο, though some manuscripts give ἐπε- (read by Rehdantz 1876:116, followed by Petrie 1922).

⁷⁶ In the *Ion* Plato uses cognates of ἐπιδείκνυμι frequently, in conjunction with cognates of ἐπαινέω, to describe the rhapsode’s work: see 530D, 533A, 541E *bis*, 542A *bis*; cf. Murray 1997:104.

⁷⁷ 1.12, 1.83 *bis*, 1.119, 1.124 (cf. 1.127); for the same theme without the word παράδειγμα, cf. 1.80, 1.104. The Lacedaemonians can also leave positive παραδείγματα (1.128, 1.129; cf. Aeschines 1.180). Lycurgus may imply mythological precedent for the μέγισται τιμαί in the Codrus story (σῆτησις, 1.87). See also Ober 2008:183–90 for Lycurgus’ use of παραδείγματα in this speech to invoke “a unified diachronic community and its unifying common knowledge” (2008:189). On the παράδειγμα of the lawgiver in the *Laws* and in *Against Leocrates*, see Renehan 1970:222.

⁷⁸ See further Hanink 2014:35–6, 39–49.

Toward the beginning of the speech Lycurgus spells out the educative function of the παράδειγμα (1.9) particularly clearly: “There are two things that educate the young: punishing wrongdoers and rewarding noble men” (δύο γάρ ἐστι τὰ παιδεύοντα τοὺς νέους, ἢ τε τῶν ἀδικούντων τιμωρία, καὶ ἢ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διδομένη δωρεά, 1.10). This outlook is an adaptation of Xenophontic leadership strategy. For Xenophon, rewards and punishments will eventually improve the state by accretion, but they operate primarily through changing the attitude of the recipient. For Lycurgus, the conditioning is by proxy: rewards and punishments educate the audience. The orator sees his program of prosecuting traitors as the punitive equivalent of the now-flourishing system of public honors, and Lycurgus’ word for reward is δωρεά, the technical term for a civic grant central to the conflict of *Against Leptines*.⁷⁹ Both speeches aim to persuade the jurors by insisting that the reputation of the Athenian δῆμος hangs on their choice to lay down appropriate precedents.

While the social impact of a court speech in the moment of its delivery should not be underestimated, to circulate a negative speech beyond the immediate context of the trial makes the negative judgment of that speech immortal (1.7), just as a published speech of praise fixes the *laudandus* in the literary-historical record. Like many honorific decrees, the literary encomia demand imitation of the virtues of the subject. A speech like *Against Leocrates* has the opposite import: “Do not imitate Leocrates,” says Lycurgus (μηδὲ μιμεῖσθαι Λεωκράτην, 1.20). Just as the distant, deceased Evagoras was a convenient *laudandus* for Isocrates, so too is Leocrates a convenient target for Lycurgus’ blame. His relative lack of prominence allows Lycurgus to invest him with the most dire

⁷⁹ Cf. Demosthenes’ extended sense of δωρεά at 18.293.

wickedness without fear that the jurors and the text's wider audience will remember him otherwise. Lycurgus systematically dissociates the defendant from the rest of Athenian society, marking him out not only as traitorous, but all the more so because he was alone in his treason; his individuality threatens the state, rather than being insignificant against it (1.63–7). In memorializing blame for an individual, *Against Leocrates* serves as a counterpart to previous literary praise: in its preference for praising the collective, which also inhibited the greater production of political encomia; in its choice of a non-controversial subject, whether due to temporal and spatial distance or, as here, to obscurity; and in its ability to influence posterity more effectively than the subject himself has done.

As in *Against Leptines*, despite the apparent depths of Leocrates' treachery Lycurgus does not stoop to the sort of pseudo-biographical character assassination that marks the feud between Demosthenes and Aeschines. Instead, he applies what could be termed a rhetoric of restrained blame. At the outset he insists that he is not conducting this prosecution "out of personal enmity or any kind of quarrelsomeness whatsoever" (οὔτε δι' ἔχθραν οὐδεμίαν οὔτε διὰ φιλονικίαν οὐδ' ἡντινοῦν, 1.5)—a *topos*, certainly (cf., e.g., Lysias 1.4), but one closely linked to Lycurgus' self-presentation as a prosecutor at the end of the speech as well (1.149). First and foremost these claims serve to establish Lycurgus' rhetorical ἡθός: the jurors should trust him because he is not biased, but has in mind only the interests of the state.⁸⁰ Yet in addition they bolster his own exemplarity as issuer of blame. By leaving the rest of Leocrates' biography alone, Lycurgus can use his opponent as a cipher, a *locus* for general condemnation of treason

⁸⁰ Cf. Allen 2000:12–18.

and for praise of approved behaviors. The Athenians should follow his lead in using the courts to police free-riders, making examples of them in order to prescribe behaviors that benefit the state; that Leocrates has no personality other than his role as traitor extends the applicability of the speech as παράδειγμα. This reduction of Leocrates' individuality functions identically to the effacing of the *laudandi* in the *Agesilaus* and *Evagoras*, with prosecution substituted for encomium. There is, however, a figure within the speech whose character is fleshed out after the fashion of encomium, whose various facets are assembled with an eye toward lavish praise, and whose virtues, like those of Agesilaus and Evagoras, are conveyed through numerous examples of past deeds and through evaluative passages of static description: the *laudandus* artfully interwoven with the blame of Leocrates is none other than the Athenian δῆμος.

Demosthenes and Aeschines: the zero-sum game?

Less than a year later (330), the γραφή παρανόμων lodged by Aeschines against Ctesiphon in 336 finally came to trial.⁸¹ It has long been noted how Demosthenes, notionally Ctesiphon's συνήγορος but in essence defending himself, marshals various strategies in *On the Crown* to make his self-praise seem more palatable to the jury and to his wider audience.⁸² He recognizes early in the speech that self-praise constitutes a distinct obstacle to his case: "It is part of human nature to be eager to hear abuse and accusation, but to be annoyed at those who praise themselves" (ὁ φύσει πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὑπάρχει, τῶν μὲν λοιδοριῶν καὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἀκούειν ἡδέως, τοῖς ἐπαινοῦσι δ'

⁸¹ For the reasons behind the delay, see Harris 1995:142 (replying to Burke 1977:335); cf. Cawkwell 1969 for an analysis of the years leading up to the trial. On the language of Ctesiphon's proposal, and the litigants' manipulation of this language, see especially Cook 2009.

⁸² See Plutarch, *Περὶ τοῦ ἑαυτὸν ἐπαινεῖν ἀνεπιφθόνως* 541E–F; among moderns, see especially Yunis 2001:109, as well as Yunis 2005:32–3n.11.

αὐτοὺς ἄχθεσθαι, 18.3). This *captatio benevolentiae* sets the tone for the speech.

Demosthenes will discuss his own record, underscoring his attempts at modesty as he does so, in order to prove that he deserves the praise that Aeschines' accusations would deny him.⁸³ In terms of its reception, *On the Crown* proved one of the most successful efforts at self-memorialization in the Greco-Roman world, and so it is the aim of this section not to state the obvious—that Demosthenes got away with lavish self-praise—but rather to examine the position of praise itself in the conflict between Demosthenes and Aeschines, as they dramatized it in the texts of their speeches. Both authors employ, as part of their overall strategies of recrimination and of self-promotion, a discussion of the role and limits of praise and blame in Athenian society.⁸⁴ While Demosthenes 18 (*On the Crown*) and Aeschines 3 (*Against Ctesiphon*), because they were written for a trial concerning honors, express these concerns most frequently, Demosthenes 19 (*On the False Embassy*) and the two other speeches of Aeschines (1, *Against Timarchus*, and 2, *On the False Embassy*) invoke the same themes and will be considered in what follows. For both Demosthenes and Aeschines—and, one imagines, for their immediate audience as well—to be worthy of praise requires appropriate praise and blame of others. Each attempts to position himself as the evaluator more in tune with the praise and blame given by the Athenian δῆμος and to cast his opponent as lacking in this most basic sort of political judgment.⁸⁵

⁸³ For Demosthenes' ostentatious modesty see especially 18.286, but also 18.10, 18.65, 18.206 (with Yunis 2001:225), 18.305, 18.321. Often the modesty is effected through litotes (cf., e.g., 8.71).

⁸⁴ Cf. the fragments of Hypereides' speech *Against Diondas* (Carey et al. 2008). Yunis 2000:105 also sees evaluation of past deeds as central to *On the Crown*, though he sees Demosthenes attempting to evaluate deeds morally but apart from their role in the chain of events, as in tragedy.

⁸⁵ See especially 18.280 (cf. 18.292, 21.14). Cf. Ober 1989:166–8.

Each speaker's construction of his and his opponent's ἥθος can be broken into four aspects, as if divided by two axes, praise *versus* blame and self *versus* opponent(s).⁸⁶

	Self	Opponent(s)
Praise	"I praise appropriately"	"Others praise inappropriately"
Blame	"I blame appropriately"	"Others blame inappropriately"

The first of these four aspects ("I praise appropriately") is most crucial for Demosthenes, who must prove that the community is bestowing appropriate praise on him, which he can accomplish by demonstrating his own use of appropriate praise.⁸⁷ Early in *On the Crown*, he defends his proposal of προεδρία to some Macedonian envoys (18.28), arguing that it was appropriate to honor them in this way, but he otherwise relentlessly focuses on praising the Athenians themselves: there could hardly be more appropriate praise than praise of the audience, to demonstrate one's praiseworthy goodwill (εὖνοια, cf. 18.320–2).⁸⁸ Two extended passages are representative of his technique. In the first (18.95–101), Demosthenes, like Lycurgus before him, engages in an *epitaphios*-like commendation of Athenian deeds. In retailing fourth-century history, Demosthenes emphasizes how many times the Athenians took risks for those who were not only not their benefactors, but even their former enemies (18.97–100), with the implication that, *a fortiori*, they should give at least as much to their proven euergetes, among whom would be Demosthenes himself (18.99). In the second passage (18.199–205), he argues that the Athenians were right to oppose Macedon, because this opposition took its cue from the

⁸⁶ These aspects are not exclusive of Cook's analysis (2012:222) of these speeches in terms of "conceptual categories or frames" that serve as metaphors for good or bad citizenship (see especially 2012:230–2 on Aeschines 3.168–70) and cover more ground than praise and blame alone. While the trial of 330 presents these axes of praise and blame in the most developed fashion, a similar analysis could also be performed on *Against Meidias* (21), *Against Androtion* (22), or *Against Aristocrates* (23).

⁸⁷ Demosthenes' equation of himself with the δῆμος is part of a larger project of arguing that their goals are in alignment (18.8). See further Yunis 2001:209–10 (on 18.178).

⁸⁸ Cf. Spatharas 2011:208 on "sop-sharing."

deeds of their ancestors. The Athenians of old had staked everything on their honor and reputation (18.203), and in praising them for doing so Demosthenes supports his own claim to φιλοτιμία. He brings in the audience to support this contention, praising them for praising these ancestors (18.204, cf. 19.269). He aligns himself with his audience through commending them for praising what he praises.

In addition to his penchant for giving praise, another arrow in Demosthenes' quiver is his ability to win glory for the Athenians through his actions (18.322, cf. 18.297–305). At 18.108, he says plainly, “I am worthy of receiving praise because I chose all such policies, by which the city met with fame, honor, and power all at once” (ἄξιός εἰμι' ἐπαίνου τυχεῖν, ὅτι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα προηιρούμην πολιτεύματα, ἀφ' ὧν ἅμα δόξαι καὶ τιμαὶ καὶ δυνάμεις συνέβαινον τῇ πόλει, cf. 19.86). Demosthenes also associates this sort of argument specifically with crowning. He claims that as early as 341/0 he was obtaining praise for Athens from the city's allies, including crowns bestowed upon the *polis* (18.80); as a result, he himself received a crown (18.83). Crowns, it seems, beget crowns, for all parties (18.86), and so Demosthenes urges his audience to continue to the cycle of honoring him so that he can bring honor to the city.⁸⁹ As in *Against Leptines*, to deprive an individual of one honor, as Aeschines is attempting to do, is to cut off future ἐγκώμια of the city at the source.⁹⁰ The good politician not only dispenses praise, but generates it.

⁸⁹ Additionally, he includes his audience within the speech as internal evaluators of his deeds: they should keep praising him because they did so in the past (18.85, 18.179, 18.250, 18.286). Yunis 2000:106 notes the oddity of the lack of opposition in the ἐκκλησία at 18.179; cf. perhaps *Agesilaus* 1.7–8.

⁹⁰ See 18.207, where Demosthenes rails against Aeschines' charge that he put the city in danger (ὥς φόβον καὶ κινδύνων αἰτίῳ τῇ πόλει). Rather, facing danger head-on lies at the core of *epitaphios* conventions, as Demosthenes demonstrates immediately following (18.208; cf. Yunis 2000:108–9). His own willingness to run risks (18.197) therefore aligns with the city's traditions; they should, in essence, thank him for putting them in danger, for the associated opportunity to earn praise.

Aeschines also uses positive praise within his orations. He too praises his audience, though in his case this praise is directed immediately at the jury and only by extension at all Athenians (2.5). Like Demosthenes, he is also at pains to construct a laudatory autobiography (e.g., 2.146–52, 2.171–7). Primarily, however, Aeschines praises others in order to confirm by contrast the inadequacies of his opponents. By bringing in past and contemporary *laudandi* whose praiseworthiness the audience can confirm, Aeschines aligns his praise-giving with that of the Athenians themselves, with the implication that they should also agree with his blame-giving.⁹¹ One passage from *Against Timarchus* is particularly demonstrative: Aeschines praises, among other figures, Timarchus the nephew of Iphicrates in order to malign his homonymous opponent (1.156–7). He cuts himself off before praising them more extensively, however, in order not to appear to engage in flattery (ἵνα μὴ δοκῶ τὸν ἔπαινον θεραπείαι τινὶ κατ’ αὐτῶν ποιεῖσθαι). Here Aeschines shows off both his recognition of approved *laudandi* as well as his restraint, which may incline the audience to trust him as a moral critic.

Just as Demosthenes’ own use of praise is the most important aspect, of the four described above, for his rhetorical purposes, so too for Aeschines is Demosthenes’ and his allies’ use of praise crucial—with the difference that Aeschines must prove that his opponents use praise entirely inappropriately. This charge is of course the legal *raison d’être* for his speech *Against Ctesiphon*: “I, as prosecutor, must demonstrate to you that these words of praise about Demosthenes are fraudulent” (δεῖ γὰρ δὴ πού τὸν μὲν κατηγοροῦντα ἐμὲ τοῦθ’ ὑμῖν ἐπιδεικνύναι ὥς εἰσὶν οἱ κατὰ Δημοσθένους ἔπαινοι

⁹¹ *Exempla* from the past include the tyrannicides (1.140), the mid-century generals who received μέγιστα τιμαὶ (3.243: Chabrias, Iphicrates, Timotheus), and a catalogue of euergetes in the peroration of *Against Ctesiphon* (3.257–9: Solon, Aristides, Themistocles, and the dead of Marathon and Plataea). On historical *exempla* in *Against Ctesiphon*, see especially Hobden 2007.

ψευδεῖς, 3.50). Not only Ctesiphon, but more importantly Demosthenes himself is injudicious in his distribution of praise, whether in private conversation or in public speeches and decrees; indeed, his praise is so poorly judged as to have sparked the war that led to Chaeroneia.⁹² Aeschines constantly depicts his opponent as a flatterer possessed of runaway φιλοτιμία, which drives him to commit sins against appropriate praise that include venality and excess.⁹³ Concomitant with this lack of judgment in praising others is Demosthenes' gall in demanding honors for himself, for which reason he offends his audience with self-praise.⁹⁴ Whereas Demosthenes pairs crowns for himself with crowns for the δῆμος, Aeschines argues that these are mutually exclusive (3.230). Perhaps the height of Demosthenes' inappropriate praise, in Aeschines' view, was praise deserved by the recipients but delivered by the wrong person: the *epitaphios* Demosthenes pronounced for those who fell at Coroneia.⁹⁵

⁹² Private conversation: 2.41. Public speeches and decrees: 2.45–6 (later-withdrawn praise and honors for the envoys to Philip: cf. 2.121–2, 3.63; cf. Deinarchus 1.43–5), 2.156 (hypocritical praise of Satyrus, cf. 2.14, of Philocrates), 3.76 (flattery of Macedonian envoys: cf. 2.55, 2.110; contrast 18.28; cf. Deinarchus 1.28, 1.103, and Hypereides 5.20, 5.25), 3.83 (crown for Aristodemus, which was as Aeschines tells it the final straw for the war; cf. 2.17).

⁹³ Venality and excess: 3.87 and 3.97, relating to Callias of Chalcis; this whole passage (3.85–105) makes an analogy between Demosthenes' ignoble praise for Callias and Ctesiphon's honors for the unworthy Demosthenes (3.94; cf. 3.103–4, where Demosthenes is so crass as to take money over an honorific statue). Flattery: 2.113, 3.61, 3.76–7, 3.162; Demosthenes can even make a recantation of praise sound like flattery (2.112). Noxious φιλοτιμία: 2.111 (cf. 2.177), 3.23 (the injunction μὴ ἄρπαζε τὴν φιλοτιμία, contrasted with the moderated φιλοτιμία of the Areopagus at 3.20). Demosthenes also charges Aeschines and those like him with flattery: 18.46, 18.162, 18.320, 18.323, 19.48–9, 19.259–61 (cf. 19.88, 19.336); cf. 18.43 for the flattery perpetrated by the Thessalians and Thebans (contrast Theban praise of Athens at 18.215–16, along with Aeschines' grief at 18.217).

⁹⁴ See especially 3.241, along with 3.248–50 (cf. 3.196, a *topos* found also at Lysurgus 1.140). 3.147 is the best example of a recurring theme, that Demosthenes, rather than demanding honors, should count himself fortunate not to have been executed for his bad advice (cf. Demosthenes 23.151, 51.9). Cf. also 18.128, for Demosthenes' charge that Aeschines is insufficiently educated to possess the tact requisite for self-praise. Lack of judgment in praise can also appear in accidentally (or hypocritically) praising one's enemies, a charge leveled by both Aeschines (2.178) and Demosthenes (18.251) against the other.

⁹⁵ 3.152. This passage may respond to Demosthenes' refrain in *On the False Embassy* that Aeschines refuses to praise the ancestors appropriately: 19.16, 19.307, 19.311, 19.313. Demosthenes insinuates that Aeschines would be shameful at delivering a hypothetical *epitaphios*, which must include the themes he

Demosthenes is not the only target for Aeschines' charge of inappropriate praise. Aeschines goes so far as to accuse the Athenian δῆμος of generally ill-considered honorific practices.⁹⁶ At 3.177 he pauses in his attack on Ctesiphon and rounds on the audience: "Unless you abolish these endless grants and the crowns you give out haphazardly, neither will you get the gratitude of those you honor, nor will the affairs of the *polis* be set right" (εἰ μὴ καταλύσετε τὰς ἀφθόνους ταύτας δωρεὰς καὶ τοὺς εἰκῇ διδομένους στεφάνους, οὐθ' οἱ τιμώμενοι χάριν ὑμῖν εἴσονται οὔτε τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα ἐπανορθωθήσεται, cf. 3.255). His argument is conservative: he hearkens back to the Athenian past, when the city was more prosperous and honors were rarer (3.178), and suggests that scarcity would make honors mean more and encourage more people to strive harder for them (3.179–80).⁹⁷ A catalogue of famous Athenians who received paltry or no honors follows.⁹⁸ His mode of argument for how honors should operate instead is not unlike that of Demosthenes himself in its reasoning, though he comes to the opposite conclusion. Aeschines commends existing laws that limit honors, constructing a narrative that gives a supposed etiology of each (3.10–12, 3.41–7). Through these laws, the Athenian δῆμος has already, according to Aeschines, been cured of a propensity for excessive praise; the jurors now must act in accordance with this precedent. These laws,

rejects; Aeschines retorts that Demosthenes' actual *epitaphios* was shameful. Cook 2012:233 points out that "Aeschines cannot, in fact, eulogize the war dead because he would then be forced to say that they died for a noble cause."

⁹⁶ With the exception of 2.80 (cf. perhaps *Agésilas* 6.3), these criticisms are limited to *Against Ctesiphon*.

⁹⁷ Cf. Cohen 1995:74–5.

⁹⁸ 3.181–8: Themistocles, Miltiades, the democrats at Phyle, Aristeides, and the generals at Eion, with a variety of forms of evidence (see especially Gauthier 1985:124 on Miltiades, Raubitschek 1941 on Phyle, and Petrovic 2013 on the Eion herms). He does not admire the past uncritically: he likens Demosthenes' character to that of the Thirty, whose rise he blames on the former susceptibility of the δῆμος to flattery (3.234–5). Cf. Demosthenes 23.196–9.

he claims, were established to prevent a charge of hypocrisy (cf. Demosthenes 22.39). Just as in *Against Leptines*, the δῆμος should not be put in the position of withdrawing previously voted honors, or of having honored someone who later proves unworthy. Demosthenes' solution is that it is better to be over-generous than stingy; Aeschines' solution is to give fewer honors in the first place, to prevent the δῆμος from being blamed for excessive praise. As he comes to the end of *Against Ctesiphon* (3.254), he applies this logic to the case of Demosthenes: crowning Demosthenes will lead to blame for Athens, whereas voting against Ctesiphon will remove the blame. Aeschines presents himself as knowing the limits of useful praise and cautions the audience to be equally circumspect.

While it is not as prevalent as claims of appropriate and inappropriate praise, appropriate use of blame, the third aspect from above, features in both authors. As a basic example, Demosthenes says that he has judiciously made accusations that withheld honors from those who customarily expected them.⁹⁹ Primarily, though, for both Demosthenes and Aeschines, to bestow appropriate blame is to bestow as little blame as possible.¹⁰⁰ Although their speeches feature famous passages of invective—such that neither the jury nor modern readers could mistake their viciousness—the rhetorical pose they strike attempts to compensate for the invective by insisting that they blame only as much as necessary, as was the case in *Against Leptines* and *Against Leocrates*. Restraint in blame contributes to a trustworthy ῥῆθος: if the speaker does not appear fired with

⁹⁹ 19.31–2; cf. 19.45; contrast his defensive posture at 19.234–6, and Deinarchus 1.101.

¹⁰⁰ Demosthenes: 18.126, 18.256; at 18.219–20 he offers blame and self-praise with a light hand. Aeschines: 3.78 (καὶ οὐ τὸ δυστύχημα ὀνειδίζω, ἀλλὰ τὸν τρόπον ἐξετάζω). Both orators see μὴ μνησικακεῖν as an Athenian virtue (Demosthenes 18.94, 18.96, 18.99, 18.101; Aeschines 3.208), to which their feigned reluctance to blame may be related.

inappropriate enmity, the audience is more likely to agree with the evidence presented.¹⁰¹ Additionally, both speakers offer *exempla* of blame given by the Athenians in the past, in order to show that their programs of blame align with that of the city. In fact, on separate occasions they offered the same *exemplum*: Arthmius of Zeleia, the *stèle* of whose censure had been placed among the forest of more positive commemorations on the Acropolis.¹⁰² Aeschines locates the *exemplum* prominently at the end of *Against Ctesiphon* as a final *a fortiori* argument that Demosthenes, whose crimes were apparently worse than those of Arthmius, should, in lieu of punishment, at the very least not receive public honors.

The fourth and final of these aspects of ἥθος construction is the assertion that one's opponent uses blame inappropriately. This aspect is the polar opposite of the first, the correct use of praise, and so Demosthenes uses it frequently in *On the Crown* to create maximal distance between his ἥθος and that of Aeschines.¹⁰³ He insists that Aeschines does not attack him in the appropriate manner: instead of legally sanctioned κατηγορία, Aeschines practices λοιδορία.¹⁰⁴ Whereas κατηγορία is a form of blame potentially useful to the city, Aeschines' prosecution has no basis in fact, because of his excessive enmity toward Demosthenes—which, in turn, is enmity toward the *polis* that has approved of Demosthenes' policies (18.125).¹⁰⁵ Unlike Demosthenes, Aeschines

¹⁰¹ See especially 18.141; cf. 18.121 (with 18.124). Cf. Christ 1998:158.

¹⁰² Demosthenes 19.271–2, with Aeschines 3.258–9. See further Demosthenes 9.41–5 and Deinarchus 2.24–5. The Arthmius decree is a prosecutorial trope; no speaker uses this *exemplum* when defending.

¹⁰³ In Demosthenes 19 he had charged Aeschines with spewing excessive blame (19.72–4) and with limiting his own ability to get honors, by association (19.223). In Aeschines this trope appears only at 1.169, notably in a passage directed not at Timarchus but at Demosthenes himself.

¹⁰⁴ 18.123–4; see further Cohen 1995:78–9. Cf. 21.148.

¹⁰⁵ Cook 2012:246–8 explains the rhetoric of this passage.

chooses to blame extravagantly rather than praise appropriately; unlike Demosthenes, Aeschines' value judgments are opposed to those of his fellow-citizens. Aeschines' blame furthermore reveals his lack of understanding of the genre, because he chooses the wrong points of comparison: as the fourth-century *encomia* show, the dead can be praised to the skies, but the living are prone to being envied; therefore the living should not be blamed for falling short of those who can be praised so highly (18.314–17). Finally, the timing of his act of blame is criminal. He has embarked on a prosecution that connects him to the project of contemporary political witch-hunters in other *poleis* (18.197), and he did not prosecute any misstep on Demosthenes' part when it happened, but only after the fact does he attack the third party Ctesiphon “for a crown and a praise-speech” (στεφάνου καὶ ἐπαίνου, 18.279).

Though at loggerheads with each other, Aeschines and Demosthenes agree on this rhetorical purpose of praise and blame. They also agree on the educative function of the judgments of praise or blame made by the ἐκκλησία and the jury. In response to the charge that it would be illegal for Demosthenes' crown to be awarded at the Dionysia, Demosthenes replies:¹⁰⁶

ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν οὕτω σκαιὸς εἶ καὶ ἀναίσθητος, Αἰσχίνη, ὥστ' οὐ δύνασαι λογίσασθαι ὅτι τῷ μὲν στεφανουμένῳ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει ζῆλον ὁ στέφανος ὅπου ἂν ἀναρρηθῇ, τοῦ δὲ τῶν στεφανούντων εἵνεκα συμφέροντος ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ γίγνεται τὸ κήρυγμα; οἱ γὰρ ἀκούσαντες ἅπαντες εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν εὖ τὴν πόλιν προτρέπονται, καὶ τοὺς ἀποδιδόντας τὴν χάριν μᾶλλον ἐπαινοῦσι τοῦ στεφανουμένου.

But, by the gods, are you so foolish and senseless, Aeschines, that you cannot calculate that a crown inspires the same pride in its recipient wherever it is announced, whereas it is for the benefit of the ones bestowing it [i.e., the δῆμος]

¹⁰⁶ 18.120, responding to Aeschines 3.32–48. Demosthenes has already countered the other charge, that he could not receive a crown while in office; see especially the παραδείγματα of prior *laudati* at 18.114. For the translation of ζῆλον in the present passage as “pride,” see *LSJ*.

that the proclamation is made in the theater? For all who have heard it are steered toward benefitting the *polis*, and they give more praise to those who are showing their gratitude than they do to the person being crowned.

Aeschines agrees that the theater is a potent location for crowning, but argues instead that the ἐκκλησία should be sufficient for any true Athenian (3.33), to avoid embarrassing the δῆμος in front of young Athenians and the rest of the Greeks if they should honor the wrong man (3.34, 3.246). The young in particular require a παράδειγμα (3.245), because “wrestling-schools are not the only thing that educate the young, nor even schoolhouses, nor poetry, but public proclamations educate them far more.”¹⁰⁷ Public praise or blame for Demosthenes, just like the acquittal or condemnation of Leocrates, can have lasting effects, and Aeschines urges the audience to consider the risks of elevating an individual with such great power either to help or harm the state.

Some scholars have used the concept of the “zero-sum game” to describe political rivalry such as that to which these speeches are a testament.¹⁰⁸ The zero-sum game in some ways does adequately characterize the rhetorical situation conjured by each speaker: a vote for one is a vote against the other, especially as each casts himself and his opponent as archetypes of the good and bad citizen.¹⁰⁹ The concept fails, however, to fit the available data for the outcomes of the trials. Neither of Aeschines’ victorious

¹⁰⁷ 3.246: ... οὐχ αἱ παλαῖστροι οὐδὲ τὰ διδασκαλεῖα οὐδ’ ἡ μουσικὴ μόνον παιδεύει τοὺς νέους, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τὰ δημόσια κηρύγματα. See further 3.247: ... τοιαύτη δόξει ἡ πόλις εἶναι ὁποῖός τις ἂν ᾗ ὁ κηρυττόμενος (“The city will take on the reputation of the kind of person who is proclaimed”).

¹⁰⁸ Yunis 2001:21 gives a basic definition: “D[emosthenes] and A[eschines] are engaged in a zero-sum game in which one gains in popular esteem insofar as the other loses.” Ober 1994:98–9, in a discussion of *Against Meidias*, provides a more nuanced statement; 1994:108n.30 offers further references (Winkler 1990:45–70, Cohen 1991:35–69); cf. Ober 1989:250–1. Winkler 1990:47 cites the particularly apt statement of the *Anonymus Iamblichi* (D-K fr.2.3): οὐ γὰρ ἡδὺ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄλλον τινὰ τιμᾶν, αὐτοὶ γὰρ στερίσκεσθαι τινος ἡγοῦνται. For criticism of this model, see Gagarin 2003:548, reviewing Yunis 2001; cf. Rubinstein 2000:19–21, 178. Cf. Luraghi 2010:251: “the bestowal of public honours was a win-win game for the demos, and it was clearly perceived as such.” Brennan and Pettit 2004 present “the economics of esteem,” which could prove a more useful model than “zero-sum” if applied to fourth-century Athens.

¹⁰⁹ For these archetypes, cf. the “frames” of Cook 2012.

speeches in the 340s (*Against Timarchus*, *On the False Embassy*) managed to eject Demosthenes from the arena or significantly diminish his status; nor did Demosthenes ultimately experience a rise in status in 330 corresponding to Aeschines' ἀτιμία. Even their rhetorical poses are more complicated than the zero-sum game implies, because into the polarity of self and opponent each introduces a third term, the audience. Each argues that the honor of the *polis* will increase with his victory, and therefore the *polis* will reap praise and gain benefactors. Indeed, each serves his self-interest best by tying the honor of the δῆμος to his own. In this aspect Demosthenes was perhaps more successful: in 330, at least, it was easier to argue that praise is useful and blame counterproductive, as he had already done in *Against Leptines*. Demosthenes' rhetoric suggests not the inevitability of the zero-sum game, but the potential for greater benefit to devolve upon the whole *polis*, as long as malefactors are excluded. Aeschines and his ilk form a small subset of the *polis* whose removal would generate more good for the state than ill for the malefactors.¹¹⁰ Once they are removed from the equation, all that remains is praise, and a sort of praise in which the distinctions among *laudator*, *laudandus*, and audience are utterly collapsed.

The sheer fact that Demosthenes praises himself, however, provides one serious complication, relevant also to many other works discussed in this dissertation. Self-praise, to state the obvious, requires a living *laudandus*, at least in the context of its original performance and initial dissemination.¹¹¹ The tensions surrounding praise

¹¹⁰ See especially 18.323 for Demosthenes' description of such men, including their wrongheaded praise for Greek calamities.

¹¹¹ Cf. Most 1989:130 on the Solonic constraint: "... the biographer can wait until his subject has died to find out if he was really happy; the autobiographer, alas, cannot." "Initial dissemination" need not imply that the writer personally authorized copying and distributing the text, though this may well be the case for the orators discussed in this chapter. For a Roman-era case study in an author's desire to control

therefore approach the maximum and must be defused by a combination of tact and carefully selected venue. In the fourth century, the preferred venue was the defense trial.

The sentiment is expressed as early as Lysias' speech for Mantis: ¹¹²

εἰ μὴ συνήιδειν, ὦ βουλή, τοῖς κατηγοροῖς βουλομένοις ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου κακῶς ἐμὲ ποιεῖν, πολλὴν ἂν αὐτοῖς χάριν εἶχον ταύτης τῆς κατηγορίας· ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ τοῖς ἀδίκως διαβεβλημένοις τούτους εἶναι μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους, οἵτινες ἂν αὐτοὺς ἀναγκάζωσιν εἰς ἔλεγχον τῶν αὐτοῖς βεβιωμένων καταστῆναι.

If I were not aware, councilors, that my prosecutors wish to harm me in every way possible, I would be very grateful to them for prosecuting me: for I think that those who have been wrongfully slandered receive the greatest benefits from those who compel them to stand trial for how they have lived their lives.

The “greatest benefits” given to the defendant consist in the chance to praise oneself without the risk of envy. The chief example of this genre is the *Antidosis*, notable for its length and depth of analysis of Isocrates' career, but also for the unflinching, though hardly humble, meta-analysis at the outset (15.1–13): the *Antidosis* admits its own fiction. Nonetheless, Isocrates tempers what could be a straightforward encomium, given the boundless potential of fictive contexts, with a defensive frame. The heightened, though counterfeit, risk of the trial allows him to show off his rhetorical range and—it should not be forgotten—maintains the interest of the audience through the trial's dramatic quality. ¹¹³ It is no wonder, then, that authors of the next generation published written

dissemination of praise and blame and the reputation acquired thereby, see Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* praef.20.

¹¹² 16.1, cf. 24.1. Contrast Demosthenes 18.8: in order to win sympathy and to yoke his fate more firmly to that of the city, Demosthenes eschews this trope, evincing no gladness for the chance to defend himself; cf. Spatharas 2011:203.

¹¹³ See further Ober 2004, especially regarding Isocrates' adaptation (“misperformance,” 2004:23) of Plato's *Apology* (2004:35–8); cf. Most 1989:124. One could perhaps characterize several of the speeches covered in this chapter as attempts by the author to leave his own *Apology*, rather than requiring a Plato—or a Xenophon, or (as Isocrates 11.6 would have it) a Polycrates. Disseminating self-praise cuts down the risk of a polyphony of *laudatores* altering one's preferred self-representation. Aeschines may in part refer to Demosthenes' self-apologetic mode of publishing speeches when he compares him to Socrates at 1.179 (cf. Hypereides fr.11.55 and Ober 2004:36).

accounts of actual trials with the same self-laudatory intent.¹¹⁴ Lycurgus, too, left a speech (fr.1) to account for his role in Athenian political life: instead of the self-effacing stance he adopts in *Against Leocrates*, in this speech he would have been able to praise himself openly, perhaps defining himself by contrast with his inveterate enemy Menesaechmus, if the contest of Demosthenes and Aeschines can serve as a guide.¹¹⁵

Like Xenophon's and Isocrates' works in praise of others, these trial speeches not only dispense praise and blame, but also consciously model how to do so: the speakers discuss why the state should give honors; they give examples of praise and blame they have themselves offered in the past; they point to their opponents as examples of how not to go about praising and blaming. From the performance of discussing proper evaluation they derive credit as authorities on the subject. With this credit they strengthen their own immediate cases and cast themselves as beneficial to the *polis*, which must constantly make such judgments and which therefore needs such speakers and their texts to educate it. Contests over honors provide the perfect context for this self-promotion because they require no special pleading for the inclusion of evaluative discourse: these trials require the audience to consider praise and blame by their very nature. Behind the rhetoric of

¹¹⁴ The chronological bounds of this autobiographical tendency can be marked out by comparison with texts such as Andocides 1 and Lysias 12, where the author, as narrator of his own personal history, is seeking the agreement or sympathy of the jury and wider audience but not, in the first instance, their praise. Cf. the defensive posture of the *Anabasis*, written in the third person and published pseudonymously.

¹¹⁵ Conomis 1970 collects the fragments, mostly from Harpocration. The *testimonium* for the speech (*Lives of the Ten Orators* 842F) gives further details, but the scenario seems concocted: Lycurgus, on his deathbed, asks to be brought before the βουλή to undergo εὔθυναί for his whole career; Menesaechmus alone rises in opposition. Either the circumstances are exaggerated by the later tradition, or Lycurgus' speech itself is embellished from reality or entirely fictive, on the model of the *Antidosis*. If the latter is the case, here Lycurgus' innovation lies in putting a living politician into an unflattering role as his opponent. Immediately after this notice the *Life* reports that Lycurgus was "considered fair-minded his whole life through and praised for his speeches" (ἐπιεικὴς νομισθεὶς παρὰ πάντα τὸν τοῦ βίου χρόνον καὶ ἐν λόγοις ἐπαινεθεὶς): a sign that his rhetorical pose as expert assessor of praise and blame worked to his credit with posterity. Cf. the encomium of Lycurgus by Philiscus of Miletus (see Engels, *BNJ* 337B F1), as well as the ἀναγραφὴ of Lycurgus reported at *Lives of the Ten Orators* 843F.

these speeches, the opponents agree that correct evaluation and recompense is the business of governing at Athens, and it is apparent that praise and blame—and particularly the decorum with which one doled out or received them—played a central role in the development of fourth-century Athenian literature and political thought.

Conclusion: *epitaphios* as *epilogos*

On the Crown and *Against Ctesiphon* represent one famous example of contested praise in this period; there were many others. Lycurgus, for example, opposed honors offered to Demades by prosecuting the proposer, Cephisodotus.¹¹⁶ Several speeches from the 350s remain as a testament to the contentions that continued up until the Lamian War. The speech *Against Androtion*, written by Demosthenes to be delivered by Diodorus, accused Androtion of illegally proposing honors for the βουλή.¹¹⁷ Another Demosthenic speech, *Against Aristocrates*, was written to oppose honors for the controversial Charidemus. Furthermore, early in his career (360/59), Demosthenes anticipated the crowning dispute of 330 with his short speech *On the Trierarchic Crown*, which condenses many of the themes discussed in this chapter.¹¹⁸ In 323/2, after the death of Lycurgus, the treatment of his sons relative to the honors their father received became a live issue: a letter of Demosthenes writing from exile presents a complex interweaving of

¹¹⁶ Lycurgus fr.9 Conomis. At Deinarchus 1.101 Demosthenes is accused of *not* opposing honors for Demades, though it is unclear to which proposal this refers. See also Hypereides 14, prosecuting Demades for proposing honors for Euthykrates, of which 14.fr.80 contains the famous serpent analogy for how some politicians attack others for the benefit of the state; cf. Hypereides 2, prosecuting Philippides for proposing crowns for the πρόεδροι (2.fr.15b.4), of which 2.fr.6 mentions (μέγισται?) δωρεαί for some previous benefactor by way of comparison.

¹¹⁷ Androtion was equally active as a proposer of honors—including those for Leucon (Rhodes & Osborne 64), relevant to the argument of *Against Leptines*—and as an honorand himself, at Arcesine (Rhodes & Osborne 51). Harding 1976 gives the basics of his career in short compass.

¹¹⁸ See in particular how Demosthenes frames the case at 51.3, and also the hypocrisy avoidance trope in 51.4.

the concerns of the audience, the late Lycurgus as *laudandus*, and himself as *laudator*, attempting to secure his own return.¹¹⁹

These are only those examples of disputes which are showcased in the surviving literature, and in any case all proposals of honors, even when less controversial, will have required the proposer to speak in favor of the *laudandus*.¹²⁰ Therefore, with each successive proposal, the Athenians were constantly defining and redefining the desirable qualities of a good citizen, as exemplified by the individual *laudandus*. In the decades following the expansion of public praise of living citizens, this continual self-reflection paid dividends in assisting the δῆμος to adapt its values to rapidly changing political circumstances. Chief among the changes was the increasing dominance of the Macedonians, whose autocratic regime made for a productive contrast with the Athenian democracy. Praising individuals, while it may have aroused envy within the *polis*, was worth the risk because of its potential to stem social change prompted by external events: they are praised, generally, for their conformity to democratic norms and preservation of the state against the encroachments of Philip and Alexander. Athenian financial and political independence relied on reinforcing this ideology; praise for individual citizens facilitated cohesion while at the same time encouraging wealthy Athenians to support the public coffers.¹²¹ Hypereides, in the recently discovered fragments of his speech *Against Diondas*, defends his own proposal of a crown for Demosthenes, much as Demosthenes

¹¹⁹ Demosthenes *Ep.3 passim*; cf. Hypereides 31.fr.118. MacDowell 2009:408–23 accepts all six letters as genuine, building on Goldstein 1968, who had accepted the first four.

¹²⁰ The literary record is full of proposals about which little is known; see, e.g., the honors for Neoptolemus and Diotimus mentioned at the end of the *Life of Lycurgus* (*Lives of the Ten Orators* 843F–844A).

¹²¹ Oliver 2007a:15–47 summarizes the state of the Athenian economy in this period.

would defend Ctesiphon, and by extension himself, a few years later.¹²² At the same time as he defends praising this particular individual, however, Hypereides expresses the tension surrounding the political influence of individuals collaborating with Macedon: “It used to be that individuals—appropriately, in my opinion—feared facing the retaliation of the δῆμος, but nowadays it is just the opposite: the δῆμος fears being held accountable by individuals.”¹²³ The remark is directed at Demades in the first instance, and at Diondas in the second, but it was this same general anxiety about individual influence that contributed, a decade later, to Hypereides’ prosecution of his own former *laudandus*. The essential problem was reconciling the new and useful modes of praise for citizens with the risks that not only had previously inhibited such praise but which were magnified by the temptations of the Macedonians.

One attempt to resolve the dilemma came in the form of Hypereides’ funeral oration for those fallen in the Lamian War, delivered in early 322.¹²⁴ Like the other texts discussed in this chapter, Hypereides’ speech hinges on the use of evaluative language; indeed, the occasion demanded, and the audience will have expected, copious praise of the fallen. Unlike the other texts, however, this was no law-court speech, and thus no opponent waited in the wings to oppose Hypereides’ praise.¹²⁵ In order to lend authority to his speech and capture the favor of the audience, he constructs his own opposition: he

¹²² Carey et al. 2008 present the text; for dating (early or mid-334), see Horváth 2009 and Rhodes 2009b.

¹²³ *Against Diondas* 175r.16–174v.20 (= Carey et al. 2008:10): ... ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις οἱ ἰδιῶται, εἰκότως, οἶμαι, ἐδεδοίκεσαν μὴ τιμωρίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἔχωσι, νυνὶ δὲ τοῦναντίον· ὁ δῆμος δέδιεν, μὴ ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν αἰτίαν λάβῃ.

¹²⁴ Herrman 2009, Petruzzello 2009, and Worthington 1999 each provide a recent introduction, text, translation, and commentary. In what follows the Greek text is that of Herrman, with the editorial marks removed; for most of the passages cited a different reconstruction of the text would not much affect the meaning. On the date see Petruzzello 2009:67–8.

¹²⁵ Cf. Liddel 2007:87.

must strive to equal the deeds themselves, and furthermore the audience's knowledge will act as a check on the veracity of his claims (6.2).¹²⁶ Hypereides may also have conceived of previous epitaphic orators as his opposition, as in the Lysianic speech (2.2, cf. Thucydides 2.35.2). He therefore made, as far as it is possible to tell from the other *epitaphioi*, a signal innovation, to be described in what remains of the present chapter. His agonistic authorial strategy reflects its times as well as do the trial speeches, with the added poignancy that, owing to the forces that have selected the extant corpus of Athenian literature, this speech marks the end of an era.

Hypereides' first deviation from epitaphic precedent is that he generally eschews rehearsal of ancient deeds and focuses on the recent past.¹²⁷ His most striking departure, however, is not merely naming the fallen general Leosthenes—that alone would have been unique in the surviving corpus of *epitaphioi*—but in fact eulogizing him at length.¹²⁸ Hypereides even signals his own awareness of the potential problem in the middle of the speech (6.15).¹²⁹ In order to make this innovation more palatable, Hypereides balances praise for Leosthenes against both praising the troops and casting aspersions on the

¹²⁶ Cf. Worthington 1999:206. The contrast of words and deeds is a commonplace in all genres, but cf. Lysias 2.1 and *Menexenus* 236D, further variations on its employment at the start of an *epitaphios*.

¹²⁷ 6.3–4, 6.6. Hypereides also ostentatiously sidesteps praising the fallen for their γένος (6.7) and upbringing (6.8).

¹²⁸ Hesk 2013:53, Herrman 2009:57–8, 61–2, Loraux 2006:160–4; cf. Petruzzello 2009:83, Worthington 1999:36, Prinz 1997:273–4, Thomas 1989:215. Whether or not the other surviving *epitaphioi* were actually delivered is immaterial (though see Hesk 2013:51–2 for an overview of the issues involved). Their success as rhetorical display required verisimilitude, and so it is safe to assume that the majority of *epitaphioi* did not mention contemporary individuals, if indeed any ever had before Hypereides (see further, however, Hesk 2013:55–60). Hesk 2013:65 makes the excellent point that Demosthenes 60 constantly refers to and fashions an identity for at least one important contemporary, the speaker himself. Socrates in Plato's *Menexenus* gestures toward the possibility of commemorating the individual (234C), but see Yoshitake 2010. On the career of Leosthenes see Herrman 2009:58–9, Petruzzello 2009:45–9.

¹²⁹ Cf. Prinz 1997:273.

Macedonian autocracy.¹³⁰ The soldiers get their due in particular for the dangers they faced on behalf of the rest of the Greeks.¹³¹ Indeed, Hypereides manipulates the poignant contrast between their relatively small numbers and the magnitude of their achievements, lauding the Athenian dead as if they were an individual singled out for praise from among the collectivity of Greece. Just like an individual Athenian honorand, their deeds benefitted the wider community, but they also received a personal prize for their efforts: the εὐδοξία that “they have placed on their fatherland as its private crown.”¹³² By contrast, Hypereides presents Macedonian domination as antithetical to the hard-won praise of the Athenians. They demand divine honors (6.21), the effrontery of which magnifies the praise owed to the troops (6.22).¹³³ He applies standard tropes of tyranny to the Macedonians: they bring with them arbitrary policies, sexual violence, and a crop of flatterers and slanderers, whose false praise and blame subvert the rule of law.¹³⁴

Leosthenes enters the equation as a powerful individual who avoids the excesses of the Macedonians through displaying and facilitating the virtue of the rest of the soldiers: he is separate from their masses only insofar as he is particularly representative of their Athenian virtues. Democratic decision-making led to the battle; the battle was

¹³⁰ On praise of the troops counterbalancing praise of Leosthenes, see Loraux 2006 (especially 2006:280; cf. 2006:312–13) and the discussion of Loraux’s argument by Hesk 2013:49–50.

¹³¹ Risks undertaken by the soldiers: 6.15, 6.17, 6.26, 6.29. Dying for Greece, not just Athens: 6.16, 6.17, 6.19, 6.24, 6.40; see also 6.5, where this is a quality of Athens in general, though that section is heavily restored.

¹³² 6.19: καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐλευθερίαν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν κατέθεσαν, τὴν δ’ εὐδοξίαν τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν πράξεων ἴδιον στέφανον τῇ πατρίδι περιέθηκαν. See Herrman 2009:84–5 on the relationship of this passage to Lysurgus 1.50, discussed above.

¹³³ Cf. Prinz 1997:282–7.

¹³⁴ Arbitrary policies: 6.20, 6.25. Sexual violence: 6.20, 6.36. Flatterers and slanderers: 6.25; cf. especially Demosthenes(?) 11.10–11. On these tyrannical tropes see further Herrman 2009:88. On the rule of law, cf. Hypereides fr.214, cited and discussed by Herrman 2009:93–4.

fought by valiant soldiers; Leosthenes has the distinction of playing a key role in both phases, and therefore he should be singled out (6.3). When Hypereides begins his extended eulogy of Leosthenes (6.9–14), he glosses over the oddity of praising an individual in an *epitaphios* through a bold assertion of its normalcy: “I will start first with the general, as is only right.”¹³⁵ Any envy that may have arisen is then quashed through the identification of the general with his *polis*. Hypereides depicts Leosthenes as seizing the initiative against the typical malign forces of this era, the paid cronies of Macedon (6.10), just as Athens metes out punishment to the common enemies of Greece (6.5). This identification is then asserted twice within one sentence: “Because Leosthenes saw that our city needed a true man (ἀνδρός) and that all Greece needed a city that could take command, he devoted himself to his fatherland and his city to the Greeks in the cause of freedom.”¹³⁶ Leosthenes is therefore the city in microcosm.¹³⁷

This perfect alignment of individual and *polis*, well beyond Demosthenes’ self-representation in *On the Crown*, was nonetheless only capable of being expressed after

¹³⁵ 6.9: ἄρξομαι δὲ πρῶτον ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιον. The language is reminiscent of the later invocations of Zeus at Aratus, *Phaenomena* 1 and Theocritus 17.1, the latter beginning an encomium for Ptolemy; these may also share a common rhapsodic genealogy with Pindar *Nemean* 2.3, which, incidentally, begins an ode for an Achaean victor who has become a κόσμον Ἀθάναις (2.8).

¹³⁶ 6.10: Λεωσθένης γὰρ ὁρῶν ... τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἡμῶν δεομένην ἀνδρός, τὴν δ’ Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν πόλεως ἥτις προστῆναι δυνήσεται τῆς ἡγεμονίας, ἐπέδωκεν αὐτὸν μὲν τῇ πατρίδι, τὴν δὲ πόλιν τοῖς Ἑλλησιν εἰς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.

¹³⁷ The eulogy of Leosthenes may also reflect specific ideas from the encomia of Xenophon and Isocrates (cf. Hesk 2013:54). Hypereides praises the general for his Xenophontic style of leadership: in contrast to the Macedonians, Leosthenes inspired willing obedience (6.13); Leosthenes also exhorted (προτρεψάμενον, 6.24) his forces to endure hardships (καρτερίας, cf. *Agesilaus* 5.3, 10.1, 11.9, as well as, possibly, Hypereides 6.34) and thereby give an account (ἀπόδειξιν) of their virtue, which has in turn led to their being praised by Hypereides. Regarding Isocrates, the vision of Leosthenes in the underworld, being greeted by the Trojan War heroes whose deeds he has surpassed (6.35), is strongly reminiscent of *Evagoras* 9.65. Cf. Petruzzello 2009:86–7 on situating the *Epitaphios* in the tradition of encomia. The underworld scene’s mention of Harmodius and Aristogeiton reflects a remark of self-praise made by Iphicrates and related by Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1398A), perhaps another attempt by Hypereides to make palatable his praise of Leosthenes through citing past, successful praise.

the death of the subject. Even after a century of developments in willingness to praise citizens, the Solonic dictum retained its force.¹³⁸ Epigraphic honors could offer as a defense their occasionality—the Athenians praised So-and-So on a specific date for specific reasons—and in any event words could be erased and *stelai* knocked down.¹³⁹ Literary praise was harder to take back. Hypereides is well aware of the significance of the *epitaphios*, which lies in its ability to perpetuate the memory of the fallen and to derive political utility from that memory at the same time.¹⁴⁰ In a passage of consolation that may derive from the end of this speech, with reference to the soldiers who died childless he says that “speeches of praise from the Greeks will be their immortal children.”¹⁴¹ This *epitaphios* is one of those speeches, and it will reenact the original praise on every occasion on which it is recited.¹⁴² Another section of the speech includes several extremely fragmentary paragraphs (6.31–4), but the end of the passage is clear and provides a basic statement of the function of the *epitaphios*. Hypereides asks, “What speech could better improve the souls of its future audience than one that will praise virtue and noble men?” (τίς ἂν λόγος ὠφελήσειεν μᾶλλον τὰς τῶν ἀκουσόντων ψυχὰς τοῦ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐγκωμιάσοντος καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας, 6.34). *Laudator* and *laudandi*

¹³⁸ Cf. Demosthenes *Ep.* 3.20: προκαλεῖσθε γὰρ πάντας ἐκ τούτων δημοτικούς εἶναι, ὀρῶντας ὅτι κἂν ἐν τῷ κατ’ ἑαυτοὺς βίῳ ταῖς προσηκούσαις αὐτῶν τιμαῖς ὁ φθόνος ἀντιστῇ, τοῖς γε παισὶν ὑπάρξει τὰ προσήκοντα παρ’ ὑμῶν κομίσασθαι.

¹³⁹ Cf. Tanner 2006:115.

¹⁴⁰ On the speaker’s “self-referentiality” in the *epitaphioi*, see Hesk 2013:60.

¹⁴¹ 6.42: ... οἱ παρὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔπαινοι παῖδες αὐτῶν ἀθάνατοι ἔσονται. 6.41–3 are preserved by Stobaeus (4.56.36), though only under the name of Hypereides; it is, however, reasonable that these paragraphs come from this speech because they are strongly epitaphic in sentiment, and probably from the end of the speech, where the εἰ δ’ ἔστιν αἴσθησις ἐν Ἀίδου trope (6.43) is conventionally located: see the *comparanda* given by Herrman 2009:109. Plato, *Apology* 40C–41C is perhaps the most famous example; for the trope appearing at the beginning of a speech, see *Evagoras* 9.2.

¹⁴² Cf. 6.30.

cooperate in the betterment of political life by providing examples for the audience to follow.¹⁴³ Here Hypereides speaks in general terms: his *epitaphios* is only one speech of many to come that will praise the fallen and inspire the listeners toward emulation, of both the *laudandi* and the *laudator*. The cycle of praise perpetuates itself, requiring others to take up the mantle of encomiast. Hypereides, like Leosthenes, shows those who follow him what must be done.

¹⁴³ Regarding emulation of Leosthenes, cf. Hesk 2013:64.

CONCLUSION

After the *epitaphios* of Hypereides, both the corpus of the ten Attic orators and Athens' freedom from the domination of Macedon come to an end. For the former, barring the discovery of a new speech of Deinarchus, the end is absolute; for the Athenian democracy, the Macedonian-imposed oligarchy was only temporary.¹ Nonetheless, among other societal shifts, the conflict with Macedon throughout the third quarter of the century left an indelible mark on Athenian praise practice: the floodgates had been opened. The epigraphic record shows that public honors continued to flourish at Athens in the Hellenistic period.² This was a natural consequence of the euergetism promoted by the δῆμος and by Athenian intellectuals of the previous decades—so natural as to make one loath to apply the strict periodization that demarcates classical from Hellenistic. The continuities were many.³ The Athenians, along with the rest of the Greeks, kept experimenting with and expanding the interrelated phenomena of communal praise and, on the part of the elite, self-glorification.⁴ Many contingencies contributed to

¹ For Athens' history in the Hellenistic period see especially Habicht 1997 and Bayliss 2011; for a narrative of the Lamian War's immediate aftermath (322–317) in particular see Green 2003a; for Athens' government in the same period, Oliver 2003.

² See Gauthier 1985:77–92, Rosen 1987, Kralli 1999/2000, Oliver 2007b, 2007c; Shear 1978 treats the quasi-biographical inscription of honors for Callias of Sphettus (270/69). Cf. Wörrle 1995 and van der Vliet 2011 on these phenomena elsewhere in the Hellenistic period.

³ To take only a few examples, Veyne 1990:92 sees Demosthenes' self-presentation at 18.171 as a prototype of the Hellenistic euergete ("patriotic, rich *and* clear-sighted"); Scholz 2009:187–8 finds in Hellenistic honorific inscriptions echoes of Lycurgan civic virtues.

⁴ See especially the eloquent statements of Ma 2013:63, 294–7.

the culture of praise in the Hellenistic period, but the influence of the Athenian literary lights, as well as the culture that produced them and that they produced, was paramount.

In terms of prose encomia, the *Evagoras* and *Agesilaus* were certainly not the last of their kind.⁵ The Lycian orator Theodectes, who spent a good deal of his life at Athens, composed an encomium for Alexander of Epeirus, possibly during the latter's lifetime—an anomaly for Athenian-generated praise, though perhaps explicable in that Theodectes was not strictly Athenian.⁶ The rhetorician Philiscus of Miletus, also active at Athens, wrote a work on Lycurgus, presumably after his subject's death and under the same political conditions that led Demosthenes to write his third letter and Hypereides his speech (31.fr.118) on behalf of Lycurgus' children.⁷ These are only two fourth-century examples of a genre that, once launched by Isocrates' *Evagoras*, saw many practitioners outside of Athens as well, though their works do not survive.⁸ According to later reports, the funeral games of Mausolus (353 BCE) included a competition of encomiastic speeches that lured several of Isocrates' followers—whether actual or spiritual—to Caria

⁵ The following two examples are mentioned as encomia by Momigliano 1993:64n.21.

⁶ *Suda* s.v. Θεοδέκτης. *Suda* reports that there were two writers of this name, a father and son, and that the son wrote the encomium, but at any rate it is possible that both predeceased this Alexander; see further Tuplin (*BNJ* 113 T1). The elder Theodectes was also a tragedian, victorious seven times at the Dionysia (*IG* II² 2325A.45, Millis and Olson 2012:148–9), and he is listed among those who spoke in praise of Mausolus at the latter's funeral games (*Suda*, along with Gellius 10.18.6); Aristotle is fond of quoting from his plays (see further Hanink 2014:199–200). One of the two wrote a *Socrates* (Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1399A; called an ἀπολογία in the *Lexicon rhetoricum Cantabrigiense* s.v. ἴσαι αἱ ψῆφοι αὐτῶν).

⁷ The sole fragment of Philiscus on Lycurgus (Olympiodorus on Plato's *Gorgias* 515c) ensures that the subject was Lycurgus of Athens, not Sparta; see further Engels, *BNJ* 337B F1 (especially for the distinction between Olympiodorus' phrase τὸν βίον γράφων τοῦ Λυκούργου φησὶν and a hypothetical ἐν τῷ βίῳ *vel sim.*). This was presumably an encomium, as biographical writing had not yet separated itself out as a genre distinct from praise. His elegy on Lysias (preserved in the *Life of Lysias*, *Moralia* 836c), if genuine, would demonstrate a longstanding interest in praising Athenian orators.

⁸ Likely because they were never disseminated, or perhaps even never written down. See also above, chapter two, on the tradition of encomia for Gryllus.

to participate, along with, perhaps, Isocrates himself.⁹ If speeches such as these were published and had survived, a much broader picture of fourth-century praise could be drawn, one more inclusive of non-Athenian authors and ideas. In this regard the works of Theopompus are sorely missed.¹⁰

One prominent survivor among the praise theorists and practitioners is Aristotle, of whom it would be an understatement to say that he maintained interests in both political life and the art of rhetoric.¹¹ On the one hand, his reception of earlier praise texts is problematic owing to his novel organization of the “epideictic” genre, which groups together different modes of speech somewhat artificially.¹² On the other hand, he treated these texts with the utmost seriousness. Far from dismissing display speeches as Plato had, in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle cites such works almost exclusively, alongside quotations from poetry and oral anecdotes.¹³ Praise-texts, and not law-court speeches or deliberative orations, provided Aristotle with the material he wanted to present to his students. This choice may indicate that he took the civic purpose of his predecessors to heart; at minimum it proves that these praise-texts demanded special attention in fourth-century intellectual culture.

⁹ Gellius 10.18.5–6 (who hesitates regarding Isocrates of Athens); cf. *Suda* s.v. Θεοδέκτης and Ἰσοκράτης (son of Amyclas, from Apollonia Pontica); Naucrates of Erythrae and the historian Theopompus are also mentioned as contestants.

¹⁰ What remains are evaluations of his praise, usually sniping perceived inaccuracies: see, e.g., Plutarch, *Agesilaus* 10.9–10, *Lysander* 30.2 (with Athenaeus 12.543B–C). See further Flower 1994:71–83.

¹¹ Space is insufficient here to situate praise within Aristotle’s political thought. Though many of his works are demonstrably concerned with Athens, and despite his long residence there, Aristotle did not favor Athenian-style democracy and views the system as an outsider seeking to describe it to others; the Peripatetic *Athenaion Politeia* was only one of many such works describing states. He is therefore unlike the other authors treated in the preceding chapters, in that he was not motivated by a desire to improve civic life specifically at Athens.

¹² Schiappa 1999:185–206.

¹³ Trevett 1996:376–8.

Aristotle, moreover, recognized the need to overcome tensions of praise in his own practice, as well: a lyric of his (*PMG* 842) blends a hymn to the irreproachable divine figure of Virtue with an encomium of one particular worshipper of Virtue, his deceased father-in-law Hermias.¹⁴ Praise poetry, already uncommon at Athens in the time of Alcibiades and virtually invisible in the decades that followed, experienced a resurgence concurrent with Macedonian domination of Athens, in response to the extraordinary political power of Demetrius of Phalerum and then of Demetrius Poliorcetes. Poetry performed in civic celebrations reaffirmed the city's loyalty to the ruler, which in turn would ensure benefits for the city: such poems were honorific inscriptions writ large. The following paragraphs aim to situate the two poems for which evidence has survived within their historical context, delineating their continuities with and departures from previous praise practice.

The first of the two honorands, Demetrius of Phalerum, was well known in antiquity both for his Macedonian-imposed rule at Athens (317–307) and for his philosophical works.¹⁵ His personal interest in the role of praise in the state is indicated by his funerary legislation, which severely restricted grave monuments. Unlike the proposals of Xenophon, Isocrates, and others, his interest in praise was entirely negative: though he was himself an individual marked out from the community, he recognized that extravagant displays of family pride in the form of elaborate grave markers gave

¹⁴ See especially LeVen 2013 on the genre and context of this poem. Cf. also the elegy on Plato ascribed to Aristotle (West fr.673).

¹⁵ As in the case of Alcibiades, the modern understanding of his reign and personality is largely subject to the caprice of the anecdotal tradition. O'Sullivan 2009 provides a coherent picture of his regime, making good use of the texts and essays compiled in Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf 2000. Among his literary productions was yet another *Apology of Socrates* (Diogenes Laertius 5.80); the most telling fragment is preserved at Diogenes Laertius 9.57: Diogenes of Apollonia "came very near danger at Athens because of great envy" (διὰ μέγαν φθόνον μικροῦ κινδυνεῦσαι Ἀθήνησιν).

individuals too easy an avenue of self-promotion.¹⁶ Of the poem in which he receives praise himself—it commemorates his year as eponymous archon (309/8)—only one line survives, alluding to the performance context, a festival of Dionysus: “Exceedingly noble, looking like the sun, the archon with holy honors (τιμαῖσι) honors (γεραίρει) you.”¹⁷ While the elevation of specific community members within cultic song has precedents in Pindar, such praise is novel at Athens.¹⁸ In addition to this poem, the Athenians also apparently condoned statues of Demetrius, though their number was acknowledged to be out of keeping with previous Athenian tradition and their destruction followed swiftly after his reign.¹⁹ His various honors had soured, perhaps because the Athenians were not accustomed to allotting them to one of their own—a sentiment encapsulated by Aelian, specifically with regard to Demetrius, in the phrase, “the customary envy of the Athenians” (ὁ συνήθης Ἀθηναίοις φθόνος, *Ποικίλη ἱστορία* 3.17).

Some of the tensions of praise discussed in this dissertation, such as the contrast between the individual and the community, were most keenly felt in the time of the

¹⁶ On the funerary legislation see O’Sullivan 2009:47–66. His elimination of the χορηγία may stem from the same purpose (2009:168–82).

¹⁷ Preserved, along with the information that it was sung at this festival, by Athenaeus (12.542E): ἐξόχως δ’ εὐγενέτας ἡλιόμορφος ζαθέοις ἄρχων σε τιμαῖσι γεραίρει. The text of Athenaeus ascribes the poem to a “Seiron” of Soli, but it is more probably by the attested poet Castorion of Soli (*PMG* 845). The praise poem was not the only unusual aspect of the procession: see Polybius 12.13.11 (as cited by O’Sullivan 2009:182).

¹⁸ See Pindar’s *partheneia* (S-M fr.94A–C), with Kurke 2007.

¹⁹ More than one such statue would be out of keeping with tradition, but the sources give intolerably high figures, unless the statues were as omnipresent in the city as herms (and, indeed, the herms of the ethically-inclined Peisistratid Hipparchus may have provided the philosopher regnant with a compelling precedent). See Nepos, *Miltiades* 6.2–4 (300 statues, cf. Ampelius 15.19), Diogenes Laertius 5.75 (360, cf. Pliny, *Natural History* 34.27), Dio Chrysostom 37.41 (1500); cf. Plutarch, *Πολιτικά παραγγέλματα* 820E–F (300), particularly for his comment on excessive praise: καὶ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα τιμαὶ πεπόνθασιν οὐ μοχθηρῶς τοῦ λαβόντος μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ μεγέθει τοῦ δοθέντος δυσχερανθεῖσαι. See further Azoulay 2009. Cf. another report of Athenian discomfort with excessive praise, Demades’ loss of citizenship for proposing divine honors for Alexander (Aelian, *Ποικίλη ἱστορία* 5.12; see O’Sullivan 2009:61), as well as the destruction of Demades’ own honors (on the tradition of which see Brun 2000:82). On honors for the Macedonians at Athens, see Kralli 2000.

radical democracy at Athens, but there was one tension that, if anything, grew enormous in later periods of autocratic rule in the Greek world. Already in Aristophanes there are expressions of concern over the bogeyman of the flatterer (κόλαξ), one who praises excessively and out of self-interest, and Eupolis wrote a comedy, *Flatterers*, lampooning the lifestyle of the wealthy Callias.²⁰ Later, the figure of the flatterer provided much grist for the ethically-inclined mill of the Second Sophistic.²¹ Athenaeus, for his part, provides a catalogue of anecdotes and quotations related to flattery (6.248C–262A), among which is preserved the ithyphallic hymn written in honor of Demetrius Poliorcetes’ visit to Athens in 291/0 BCE.²² The thirty-four lines of this hymn represent a macro-evolutionary change in the practice of praise at Athens, adapted for survival under the Macedonian monarchs—particularly insofar as Demetrius has been divinized and his arrival presented as an epiphany.²³ This alteration necessitates a form more hymnic than sympotic, and the

²⁰ For the fragments of *Flatterers* (*Κόλακες*) and commentary, see Napolitano 2012. In Aristophanes, see, e.g., the joke about Alcibiades’ speech impediment at the start of *Wasps* (45).

²¹ When it avoided being charged with flattery, praise could also be useful in private relationships. This study has focused on the ethical dynamic between individual and community, but in the Hellenistic and Imperial periods the ethics of interacting with peers gained in prominence. The utility of praise in acquiring friends had long been recognized: see Isocrates 1.33 (οὗς ἂν βούληται ποιήσασθαι φίλους, ἀγαθὸν τι λέγει περὶ αὐτῶν πρὸς τοὺς ἀπαγγέλλοντας· ἀρχὴ γὰρ φιλίας μὲν ἔπαινος, ἔχθρας δὲ ψόγος).

²² Athenaeus 6.253D–F; see also 15.697A. It is difficult to analyze this hymn as individual-to-individual praise, because not enough is known about the composer, one Hermocles or Hermippus. Marcovich 1988 provides a text, commentary, and some bibliography. For one of the hymn’s most interesting elements—the insistence that Demetrius, unlike other deities, is present and responsive—see Marcovich 1988:13–17, who suggests that this stance could be derived from Critias’ *Sisyphus*, Plato’s *Laws*, or the school of Epicurus. For the religious and historical context of Demetrius’ divinization, see Green 2003b and Chaniotis 2011; for the poem’s influence on Mesomedes and its connections to later imperial cult, see Whitmarsh 2004:389–90.

²³ For which see Platt 2011:143–6. On divinization, one should contrast here Agesilaus’ reported response to an offer of receiving divine cult (Plutarch, *Αποφθέγματα Λακωνικά* 25). On the commemoration of Demetrius in the visual arts see Brogan 2003.

language of tragedy rather than that of civic affairs.²⁴ The first twenty lines amply demonstrate the difference between a hymn and, for example, the *Agesilaus*:

ὥς οἱ μέγιστοι τῶν θεῶν καὶ φίλτατοι
 τῇ πόλει πάρεσιν·
 ἐνταῦθα <γὰρ Δήμητρα καὶ> Δημήτριον
 ἅμα παρῆγ' ὁ καιρός.
 χῆ μὲν τὰ σεμνὰ τῆς Κόρης μυστήρια
 ἔρχεθ' ἵνα ποιήσῃ,
 ὁ δ' ἱλαρός, ὥσπερ τὸν θεὸν δεῖ, καὶ καλὸς
 καὶ γελῶν πάρεστι.
 σεμνόν τι φαίνεθ', οἱ φίλοι πάντες κύκλῳ,
 ἐν μέσοισι δ' αὐτός,
 ὅμοιος ὥσπερ οἱ φίλοι μὲν ἀστέρες,
 ἥλιος δ' ἐκεῖνος.
 ὦ τοῦ κρατίστου παῖ Ποσειδῶνος θεοῦ,
 χαῖρε, κάφροδίτης.
 ἄλλοι μὲν ἢ μακρὰν γὰρ ἀπέχουσιν θεοὶ
 ἢ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὧτα
 ἢ οὐκ εἰσὶν ἢ οὐ προσέχουσιν ἡμῖν οὐδὲ ἔν,
 σὲ δὲ παρόνθ' ὀρῶμεν,
 οὐ ξύλινον οὐδὲ λίθινον, ἀλλ' ἀληθινόν.
 εὐχόμεσθα δὴ σοι.

The greatest and dearest of the gods
 are here in the city! For here the
 moment has brought together
 Demeter and Demetrius: she comes
 to celebrate the revered mysteries of
 Kore, and he is at hand in a joyous
 mood, as befits the god, and
 handsome and laughing. He seems an
 object of reverence, all his friends are
 in a circle, and he is in the middle of
 them, exactly as if his friends were
 the stars, and he the sun. Greetings,
 son of Poseidon, the mightiest god,
 and of Aphrodite! For the other gods
 are too far off, or have no ears, or do
 not exist, or have not even the
 slightest care for us, but we see you
 because you are present, no figure
 carved in wood or in stone, but in
 truth. And so we pray to you.

As Demetrius of Phalerum was ἡλιόμορφος, so too is Demetrius Poliorcetes the sun among the stars.²⁵ The former, however, was merely a celebrant in the god's festival, albeit a superior one; here, Poliorcetes is not subordinated to Demeter but put on the same plane, himself “an object of reverence” (σεμνόν τι) to be supplicated even in preference to the other gods. With the divinization of the ruler, Athenian praise has gone far beyond its former restraints and anticipates the adulation of monarchs by the likes of Callimachus, Theocritus, and Vergil.²⁶

²⁴ For Demetrius as a theatrical figure, see, e.g., Chaniotis 2011; the performative nature of his reign is famously described by Plutarch in his *Demetrius*.

²⁵ Cf. O'Sullivan 2009:300, who notes this connection and suggests that these two poems were quoted by the same source (Duris or Demochares) because of their useful similarities of content and circumstance.

²⁶ E.g.: Callimachus' *Ἐκθέωσις Ἀρσινόης* (Pfeiffer fr.228); Theocritus 17; Vergil, *Georgics* 3.1–48.

Those later poets have aesthetic and political motives for their praise; likewise, the hymn for Demetrius Poliorcetes has a pragmatic purpose. The remaining fourteen lines (21–34) request that Demetrius tackle the metaphorical sphinx of the Aetolian League. Later encomia produced in highly stratified societies use praise in order to suggest courses of action: commendation and recommendation are not, after all, semantically distant, as Isocrates (9.76–81) and Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1367B–68A) had already recognized.²⁷ The benefits of using praise for exhortation nonetheless came with a complementary set of risks, such as the aforementioned accusations of flattery; praise of autocrats did not entail diminished tensions, but tensions of a different variety. The difference in situation can be reduced, once again, to the binary of individual and community. In fourth-century Athens, praise was problematic unless it cast the individual *laudandus* as an exemplar for the community and avoided setting the *laudandus* above the rest. The autocrat, however, was already a powerful individual to whom entreaties on behalf of individuals and groups would be commonplace: the *laudator* competed not against the envy felt by the community toward the *laudandus*, but against other acts of praise offered by members of the audience attempting to achieve their own ends. Athens' praise for Demetrius Poliorcetes would appear grubbing to later authors for both reasons: the poem ran contrary to the democratic traditions evident in earlier literature, and it did not sufficiently conceal its own desires in the face of competing interests outside of Athens. By contrast, in the inscriptions of honors that the δῆμος decreed for its own citizens, not appealing to a higher authority or to external circumstances, it was actively

²⁷ Cf. Osborne 2011:97–8. Isocrates' *Philip* is an early and paradigmatic blend of praise and exhortation. Gibson 2010 and Rees 2010 highlight techniques used by Pliny which are also relevant to the study of classical Greek rhetoric. For an overview of the later development of Greek praise, see the *Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium* s.v. “enkomion,” “basilikos logos,” and “prosphonetikos logos.”

desirable to leave bare the self-interest of the state, to say that the *stèle* exists in order to make others benefit Athens. With regard to this motivation, it is clear that the civically-minded prose encomia of the fourth century are more akin to contemporary public honors than to the tradition of autocratic praise that nonetheless owes to them its form.

Both the development of literary praise-texts and the expansion of inscribed honors for citizens received a vital impetus from the political atmosphere of fourth-century Athens. The four chapters of this dissertation form a narrative of anxieties and solutions. Xenophon, observing Athens in economic and military need, described in many of his works how praise could be used to incentivize altruism. By means of ἐπίδειξις, he also provided himself as a model *laudator*. At the same time, Isocrates was demonstrating his own mode of encomium, devising strategies for softening the audacity of his innovations. After these authors' ideas had entered circulation, and after the stresses of the Social War, the Athenians began giving out honors to citizens in an unprecedented fashion. The oratorical texts of the third quarter of the century reflect both their literary antecedents and the expanded role of communal praise. As the years passed, praise continued to prove useful both to individual actors and to the *polis*: it was the reward for benefactors like Phanodemus, it fostered discussion and reinforcement of civic values in conflicts such as the one over Demosthenes' crowning, and during the Lamian War it provided the community with exemplars like Leosthenes.

Callimachus, who reignited several varieties of praise poetry including epinician, in all likelihood perceived the value of honors at Athens personally, through being recorded as a benefactor in 248/7.²⁸ Three centuries later, Statius, too, acknowledged the

²⁸ Callimachus' epinician: see especially Pfeiffer fr.384 (in elegiacs, rather than lyric); Callimachus' benefaction to Athens: see Oliver 2002 (on *Agora* xvi 213).

force of Athenian praise. Scholars such as Laurent Pernot (1993) have investigated how the fourth-century prose encomium evolved to suit the needs of rhetorical production in the Second Sophistic, but it remains to be explored more comprehensively how the political values that gave rise to the prose encomium—the specifically Athenian qualities of this mode of praise—are reflected in later Greco-Roman literature. It is hoped that this dissertation, through its examination of praise as an object of ideological contestation and political utility in the fourth century BCE, could assist the exploration of the reception of Athenian civic values in the centuries that followed. A truly synoptic view of praise at Athens not only should acknowledge, as in the preceding chapters of this dissertation, the archaic roots of praise, the literary and social conventions for praise under the radical democracy, and the early Hellenistic development of these praise practices, but should also account for the later flourishing in the Greco-Roman world of panegyrics in prose and verse. Many important themes and concerns of genre in later praise literature, particularly the use of praise for exhortation and admonition, found themselves in a crucible of experimentation in classical Athens, which heightens the importance of having examined this one *polis* and its leading intellectuals during this period. Furthermore, the present study has brought together texts usually considered separately as specimens of philosophy, oratory, and epigraphy, to name only a few of the represented genres. In doing so, it has offered praise as a unifying concept, a nexus of the ethical values and patterns of thought around and by means of which the Athenians structured their own image. The mutually reinforcing roles of praise at Athens, in literature and in civic life, display clearly the tensions of communal existence in the *polis*, as well as the potential rewards.

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