workers when they disregarded demands of union leaders and supported measures aimed at protecting and expanding individual worker rights. But the results of this group's efforts are plainly discernible in the development of labor policy under Eisenhower. The chronological sequence is revealing.

This Administration's Concessions to Labor

September 1952. Speaking to the A.F.L. convention, Eisenhower emphatically opposed repeal of Taft-Hartley. He favored amendments, but mentioned only two: making employers as well as union officials sign non-Communist affidavits, and elimination of a "union-busting" provision, which denies replaced economic strikers a vote in representation elections. (He was wrong on this one, but it is a relatively minor point.)

December 1952. Eisenhower announced the appointment of Martin P. Durkin, then president of the A.F.L. Plumbers union, as his Secretary of Labor. The late Senator Taft, with his usual blunt honesty, called the selection "incredible." Durkin was a lifelong Democrat. He had supported Stevenson and advocated complete repeal of Taft-Hartley. In addition, whatever his personal character, he headed an A.F.L. union notorious for its monopolistic practices such as closed shop, closed union, and secondary boycotts. One could hardly conceive an individual less qualified to administer a new and unbiased national labor policy.

February 1953. In his state of the union message, Eisenhower again confined his comments on labor policy to the two amendments he had mentioned in his A.F.L. speech. Actually, a preliminary draft of the speech had contained several other concessions to union leaders' demands, but Senator Taft was able to get them eliminated. However, the Palace Guard already was working to shift the President to their way of thinking.

March 1953. Secretary Durkin's tripartite committee to recommend changes in Taft-Hartley broke up in disagreement. The fact that it was tried is significant. Both Truman and the late F.D.R. had used the tripartite device, with pro-union public members, in order to give flagrantly biased labor policies and actions an appearance of impartiality.

February to June 1953. In months of hearings before House and Senate Labor Committees, union leaders advocated amendments to repeal or nullify almost every provision of Taft-Hartley, but couched their demands in the same old general terms and failed to produce any convincing case histories to show any damage to legitimate union activities. Industry witnesses, on the other hand, cited hundreds of case histories to show that many key provisions of the act need strengthening, largely because of biased interpretations by the National Labor Relations Board.

May 1953. In efforts to develop an Administration labor policy, Secretary of Labor Durkin proposed at the hearings that the White House support seventeen changes in Taft-Hartley demanded by unions and oppose nine changes which had been urged by various industry groups.

June 1953. Congressional hearings closed with an impressive record which overwhelmingly supported the strengthening of Taft-Hartley rather than weakening amendments. The White House staff moved in and a series of conferences with congressional leaders, Commerce and Labor Department officials were held in an effort to develop an "Administration bill." The basis of discussions was a bill drafted by a group of lawyers, some representing the A.F.L. and some employer interests, which supposedly had A.F.L. endorsement. Of the twenty-one amendments proposed in this bill, fifteen were concessions to union demands, six were procedural, and three were concessions to employer views.

July 1953. Conferences with congressional leaders broke down, largely because of Secretary Durkin's adamant opposition to any concessions to employer views and his insistence on even more concessions to unions. White House Counsel Bernard Shanley said he would draft a proposed message, working with Labor and Commerce Departments and attorneys for congressional committees.

July 31, 1953. The proposed Eisenhower message was sent to Chairmen McConnell and Smith of the House and Senate Labor Committees, who were told by telephone that it would be submitted formally to Congress that afternoon. This message proposed twenty-four concessions to union demands, seven more than had been asked originally by Durkin, and it left out all of the industry proposals opposed by Durkin. In other words, the price of union leader (A.F.L.) acquiescence was going up steadily. Vice President Nixon and others succeeded in preventing formal submission of the message, and after it was published, the White House called it only a "working paper." Later it was learned the first draft had been prepared by one Charles Donahue, a holdover assistant solicitor in the Labor Department and an A.D.A. Democrat who drafted the late Secretary Tobin's anti-Taft-Hartley speeches and even wrote anti-Ike speeches last fall for the Democratic National Committee. His draft was worked over slightly by Shanley and McConnell on July 30, but Commerce didn't even hear about it until late that night and was unable to prevent the initial reference next day to McConnell and Smith.

The record speaks clearly. The Eisenhower advisers who wanted to sell out to the A.F.L. obviously were in the saddle from last November until along in February, when Senator Taft's growing influence with the President began to make itself felt in this field. But as Taft's fatal illness in May and June gradually reduced his effectiveness, the influence and boldness of the Administration advisers bent on appeasing union bosses grew steadily.

As it grew, the price of A.F.L. and Labor Department acquiesence in an Administration program increased also. Now, to anyone familiar with union bargaining techniques, it is obvious that the concessions to union power in the proposed message will be the starting point for additional union demands as soon as the subject becomes active again.

Other Labor Laws Involved

This record on Taft-Hartley does not stand alone. Administration of the Walsh-Healey and Bacon-Davis Acts (which authorize the Secretary of Labor to fix wages paid on all government contracts) has been transferred from the Solicitor's office to that of Under Secretary Lloyd Mashburn, himself an old A.F.L. building trades leader. Local communities all over the nation are protesting at the way these acts are being used to lever up local wage rates. The Labor Department itself is still staffed almost entirely by the same Democratic officials who made it little more than a sounding board for, and instrument of, big union policies under Truman. A new Atomic Energy labor panel has been set up, with pro-union members, and given powers to make recommendations for settlement of disputes, which amounts to compulsory arbitration in this field. In all of these areas, business people directly concerned report that the current situation, insofar as flagrant pro-union bias is concerned, is worse than under Truman.

There is no indication that Eisenhower is aware of these machinations within his Administration to sell out basic principles of labor policy for promised political support of A.F.L. leaders. There are plenty of sound officials within the Administration who would strongly oppose what is going on if they were made fully aware of it and given some political ammunition to combat it. Unfortunately, members of the A.F.L. sell-out group are in powerful positions. Most of them probably are sincere in believing they can negotiate a political deal to buy labor support at the cost of protection of public and individual rights.

Actually, the political facts of life are against them. The Republican victories in 1946, 1950, and 1952, when union leaders supported the Democrats almost 100 per cent, demonstrated their fallacy. Truman won in 1948 on prosperity rather than issues. Taft got millions of workers' votes in Ohio in 1950, even though union leaders unanimously demanded his defeat. John L. Lewis probably controls his coal miners more tightly than any other union leader, yet he couldn't deliver their votes to Willkie in 1940. Finally, the farmers of the Midwest and the small businessmen on Main Street are the backbone of the Republican Party. The twenty-year Democratic alliance with the industrial unions of the C.I.O. did not affect them directly, because those unions don't operate much on Main Street. They are in the mass production industries and deal with big business. But the A.F.L. craft unions live on Main Street. The smaller concerns are their main target. And both farmers and small business are very vulnerable to such racketeering devices as the closed shop, closed union, and secondary boycott. The proposed message would virtually repeal the protection against these tactics now in the law, and Heaven help the G.O.P. if the farmers and small businessmen ever wake up and find their own party has done that to them.

This drift of the present Administration toward a labor policy completely dominated by the moguls of the A.F.L. is far more frightening than was the democratic alliance with the C.I.O. Because of the type of unions involved, that alliance led to nationwide strikes and emergencies that made big headlines, and an aroused public could make its views felt, particularly in Congress. But the A.F.L. craft unions seldom or never create national emergencies. They don't make big headlines. They don't go in for mass picketing. But their smaller goon squads and secondary boycotts actually are more effective, if less spectacular. They get by with far more than the C.I.O. without the public's becoming aware of it.

The Public Must Act

If you are thinking that after all this is just Administration recommendations and that Congress can be relied upon to defeat any such proposals, think again. It is quite true that the 81st and 82nd Congresses refused Truman's request for Taft-Hartley repeal, and the 83rd Congress generally is rated as more conservative than those. But the effective power on labor policy in Congress has been the coalition of southern Democrats and Republicans, with the latter contributing the bulk of the votes. The southern Democrats haven't changed their views, but it is a different story with the Republicans. For them, it was easy to oppose Truman recommendations on labor law. It would be a very different thing to oppose recommendations of the first Republican President elected in twenty years. Add Eisenhower's personal popularity to public ignorance of labor law technicalities, and bucking the White House on this issue could mean primary defeat for many G.O.P. congressmen. Only those sure of the support of their own districts on this issue could afford to risk it, and there are not enough of them. Some G.O.P. congressional leaders have even swallowed the political deal aspect. As of now, a White House bill to amend the heart out of Taft-Hartley could not be stopped in Congress.

With the great bulwark against such a sell-out in Congress gone with Senator Taft's death, only one thing can reverse this trend and maintain a labor policy based on freedom and fairness instead of bias and coercion. That is an aroused public opinion that makes its views known.

The proposed message of July 31 on Taft-Hart-