NOTES OF THE WEEK.

It was suggested in these columns last week that the Economic Conference in Paris would almost certainly devote more attention to measures for combating German trade after the war, on a protectionist basis, than to some of the objects which, according to the newspapers, were actually to be discussed. The "recommendations" of the Conference may now be pointed to as demonstrative proof of our prediction; and, as frequent reference must necessarily be made to these resolutions in the course of future economic discussions, it will be pertinent to cast a rapid glance over their contents. The "recommendations," it has been announced, will be either "A" measures, "B" measures, or "C" measures, and it will be pertinent to cast a rapid glance over their purposes.

Before we proceed, let us acknowledge that the delegates were justified in casting the blame for the Conference itself on the Central Empires. Germany and Austria-Hungary, declares the second resolution, after having forced upon the Allies a military contest, "are to-day preparing, in concert with their Allies, for a contest on the economic plane, which will not only survive the re-establishment of peace, but will at that moment attain its full scope and intensity." It is well to set down, once and for all, the definite fact that an anti-European trade combination was first devised in Austria-Hungary, declares the second resolution, after frequent reference must necessarily be made to these industrialists in Austria and many landowners in Hungary.

Consideration of the plans suggested will make this clear. The "B" measures are to be adopted during the continuance of the war—we are not particularly concerned; for, as we stated last week, those measures, with all their anomalies, good points, and inequalities, were arranged long ago. The additional "A" measures—those measures to be adopted during the continuance of the war—will undoubtedly present a serious problem for the world to consider; but we are bound to admit that the counter-measures recommended at Paris are likely to cause at least as great a departure from pre-war ideas in international economics. With the "A" measures, we are told, the "B" and "C" measures may be regarded as being of a temporary nature, and the "A" measures are to be regarded as being of a permanent nature. In Paris, the "A" measures are likely to be the most difficult to carry into effect, taking them generally. For example, the Allies "will prohibit their own subjects and citizens and all persons residing in their territories from carrying on any trade with . . . persons, firms, and companies whose business is controlled wholly or partially by enemy subjects, or is subject to enemy influence, and whose names are included in a special list." Unless there is a quibble in the last clause of the sentence, this would prohibit just about all our trade with the United States of America; and that is a trade which, at the present time, we cannot afford to tamper with. The "B" and "C" measures may be considered together. The "B" measures are applicable to the period of reconstruction after the war, and the "C" measures are to be, we gather, practically permanent; but the period of reconstruction is expected to last for a few years, and at the end of a few years it will be next to impossible to take away from the persons affected the privileges accorded them. A more detailed consideration of the plans suggested will make this clear.

"During a number of years to be fixed by mutual agreement among themselves," it seems, the most-favoured-nation treatment is not to be granted to Enemy Powers, and the Allies undertake to assure another "compensatory outlets for trade." Further,
during these years, again, the Allied countries are to "conserve for the Allied countries, before all others, their natural resources during the whole period of commercial, industrial, agricultural, and maritime reconstruction, and for this purpose they undertake to establish special arrangements to facilitate the interchange of these resources." During the reconstruction period, too, a period of time is to be fixed "during which the commerce of Enemy Powers shall be submitted to special treatment, and the goods originating in their countries shall be subjected either to prohibitive or to a special regime of an effective character." The "C" measures provide for independence in the "key" industries; and, to assure an uninterrupted supply of raw materials, the Allies may "have recourse either to enterprises or Governments themselves, or to the grant of financial assistance for the encouragement of scientific or technical research and the development of national industries and resources; to customs duties or prohibitions of a temporary or permanent character; or to a combination of these different methods." Technical delegates are to consider the application of these principles to patent laws, shipping, transport generally, postal rates, and so on.

The fact that these proposals have been formulated at all indicates a decided change in economic and political outlook. There has hardly ever been a period in the world's history, after man emerged from barbarism, in which negotiations was not carried on. Before the industrial age, however, it seemed to be understood that countries ought to be, for the most part, self-contained and economically independent. With the progress of industry in the eighteenth century, and industrial progress in the nineteenth, this old view came to be abandoned, for no country could assure to itself an adequate supply of raw materials for industrial purposes without dependence on raw materials, then at least manufactured articles had to be thought of.

It seemed, up to two years ago, that commerce, if not humanitarian ideals, would at last unite the nations. The war has set an entirely new standard. The political groups in Europe, which were their present form or character a decade or so, have resolved themselves into political-economic groups; so that we now find ourselves back at a modification of the economic assumption of the Dark Ages. A country need not in itself be independent, and a group of countries may be. From this there necessarily follow the corollaries of the older assumption—the struggle for trade abroad and over and above the requirements of the homeland; the struggle for the carrying trade; the struggle for closed markets. In some respects, this theory of economic instrument, if the Allies are not to be reduced or suspended in the case of friendly powers, their productive power is steadily increasing, as Bastable emphasises in this international connection, the French iron-workers would find themselves suffering, and foreign trade may be dispensed with, in so far as they date from the new regime inaugurated by the recent development of agriculture in the United States and Canada, which "has taken place under the law of increasing return," and its effect on British farming is "more noticeable, since the latter comes under the law of diminishing returns". And this is a graph which has become particularly significant since the Conference:

The same considerations may, too, explain the predominance of a manufacturing country, when once attained, since its productive power is steadily increasing, and thus extending the field of international exchange to the dismay of the native producers of manufactures in other countries; but whatever is the nature of the operation, it is demonstrable that the operation of the law of diminishing return tends to limit the area of international exchange, and that a decrease in the area of that return is calculated to extend it..."Theory of International Trade," Chapter II.

We can imagine the "dismay" which is certain to arise if it becomes necessary to persist in a tariff policy as enunciated at the Conference; and we venture to predict, with more certainty than we attach to the prophecies of Mr. Wells, that under modern conditions this battle of tariffs must fail by both sides being driven off the field. It is, in our view, utterly impracticable for military adversaries to draw lines round areas of the world and declare that the countries comprised within definite boundaries shall not trade with countries within the limits of other boundaries. In practice, if ever found possible to maintain these utterly abnormal conditions for any length of time, we should simply have neutral countries piling up profits hand over hand as the result of facilitating the exchange of products between "enemy" countries. And the problems raised by an artificial exchange could not be practically solved at all. There is let us take an instance—a rising iron industry in France and Belgium, which, before the war, compete with German industries in Germany, and can much more hold its own with German and Austrian manufactures in regions bordering on the North German, as well as in Scandinavia. Under the new conditions proposed by the Conference would be compelled, in practice, to regard themselves as excluded from Austro-German markets, as they certainly would be, military victory or no military victory; and French iron-workers would find themselves suffering,
in their own country, from the competition of the
tax-adjustments would be such as to enable Great Britain to send
her products into Allied countries. Or perhaps not? Perhaps
there would be expected to adopt a merely nominal tariff, leaving free competition to be
borne on the Allies as before the war? Or perhaps inequalities of tariffs would be made up by
the amputation of our best markets and the creation of
a purely artificial market, with the resultant problems of prices, production, and reciprocity demanded
involved, has never been considered by any. This, we fancy, is somewhere near the truth. We believe that
the Conference did its best to humour Mr. Hughes.
Whether it did or not, there could have been no better
option of neutral countries on the extra-
question we have quoted; and, two, the,
attitude of Labour—we do not mean the attitude of
Labour with regard to wages, which is a relatively
unimportant factor in the Labour question
with regard to co-management in industry, which will
be one of the most pressing problems of the next
decade. In his exhaustive volume on "The Trade Policy of
Great Britain" Carl Johannes Fuchs (whose learning,
even in English, must surely surprise even the most
nationality) insists time and again on the point which
he makes in the final words of his concluding chapter:
"Questions of trade policy by themselves have not the
primary importance they are generally assumed to have;
and to-day they fall relatively into the back-
ground as compared with the great problem of the
country organisation of production and of labour." And this after the most profound consideration of every
aspect of British trade policy in the nineteenth century!
Decidedly the delegates to the Conference did not set
out well documented. Let us investigate this aspect of
the problem a little further.

First, as to neutrals. We have stated the fact that
tax-adjustments in Austria and Germany were before the war,
taking them on an average, lower than those of Italy and
France, and very much lower than the Russian
tariff. If our Allies have to increase their tariffs after
the war (and this may be regarded as a certainty), and
if we are forced to adopt a tariff for the purpose of
aiding them, if not "for revenue only," it follows that
the entire Allied combination will not find itself in a
very favourable position to compete in neutral markets
with (a) important neutral productive countries, such
as the United States, or with (b) Germany and Austria.
Let it be remembered that we cannot interfere with the
Central Powers to the extent of refusing to carry their
goods; for, if we did so, we should lose an important
factor in the carrying trade, and, even if we were pre-
pared to risk this loss (though our shipping companies are not—imagine them!), we should see a rapid development
of neutral shipping, e.g., Dutch and American.
To express this more pointedly, the recommendations of
the Conference did its best to humour Mr. Hughes.
Whether it did or not, there could have been no better
way of allowing the Antipodean house of cards to col-
lapse than to build it carefully in accordance with the
plan of the architect. We fear Mr. Hughes would ill
pass an examination in geometry.

Secondly, as to production and labour. While we
are not prepared to deny that certain tax-adjustments
might be desirable, and even valuable, after the war,
we are certainly not prepared to lend our sanction to
any tariff changes of a nature likely to enrich our pro-
ducers, while impoverishing the community. We do not overlook the fact that there are tariffs in operation
in this country now, ostensibly for the purpose of keep-
ing out luxuries and of decreasing consumption.
The people of England have not been allowed, such is
the character of their newspapers, to know how the pro-
hibitions and tariffs have driven up production and
"rings" and "Trusts"; but these pernicious institu-
tions, hitherto associated only with the United
States and the worst forms of laissez-faire, are insepa-
rateable from tariffs. The fact that after the tax on
bacon and chilled meat, in particular, being held up in
stocks, the United States time after time, from the Michigan Salt Association
down to the Steel Corporation and the latest
developments in Standard Oil. The English profiteers
have not driven prices up without having kept; the examples
of their American counterparts are in mind.

Let us mention one. A classic form of Trust is pro-
vided by the Addyston Pipe Company (1894-1895)
which was the first Trust to develop the principle of
"reserved cities" and "pay . territory" or "bonus territory"
on a large scale—the prices quoted for manufact-
ured goods being calculated (irrespective of freight)
on local conditions, the absence of competition, and, in
general, the ability of the company to "put on the
screw" where occasion offered. The result was that
in a very short time there was, by arrangement, no
competition for most public contracts, and local
manufacturers were either absorbed or "frozen out" by
special low prices. Further, in order that stocks
might be kept low and prices high the pipe-making con-
cerns forming the Trust deliberately worked their res-
pective plants at only one-third to half capacity. Our
dealers in pork and meat; our dealers in coal; and, let it be whispered, our dealers in munitions as well,
have acted in a precisely similar manner, the result being
bacon and chilled meat, in particular, being held up in
storehouses until they rotted, solely in order that there
might be an inadequate supply for the public. Of
course, the profiteers who act in this way are the first
to complain that the British workman deliberately re-
stricts his output ("ca'canny"), and must be taught
better in view of the conditions to come after the war.
How many such firms, we wonder, does the Govern-
ment propose to subsidise after the war, in accordance
with the Conference resolution?

Not content with having increased the prices of es-
cential foods by fifty-nine per cent. since the war
began (see the Board of Trade "Labour Gazette" for
June), the profiteers are now assuring the working

classes that they must be prepared for hardship after the war, alleging the reasons (shortage of capital, and so forth) mentioned in these Notes last week. Alternatively, the workman is assured that if only he will accept protection all the other desiderata will follow—higher wages, shorter hours, better conditions of employment, and the like. On this point we take leave to make a comment. In an admirable little volume ("Introduction to the Study of Prices") Professor W. T. Layton summarises the effect of a tariff on wages and employment, and., and on Trusts themselves. As against the contention, often made in these pages, that strikes for higher wages, shorter hours, better conditions of work are ineffective because the extra wage is added to the price of the article, Mr. Layton adds the American argument with special reference to the Trusts—namely, that they have been called into existence at which wage concessions, although they "cut into profits," cannot be "passed on" to the public. Higher wages are demanded; they are granted by the Trust; profits fall; business suffers. An application is then made for an increased tariff on the goods sold by the Trust, and the process begins again.

Behind the tariff barrier, the influx of gold has produced, in conjunction with the increased requirements of the population, a brisk demand for all kinds of commodities. Prices once having risen, fresh supplies of gold and paper currency have been called into circulation. In a free-trade country this rise would soon have been stopped by the importation of lower-priced goods from other countries, and the level of prices produced a new morning to that of the open market. But this has been prevented in the case of the United States by the existence of the tariff, while competition in the home market, which might otherwise have been effective in reducing prices to a lower level, has been eliminated by the existence of large industrial and commercial trusts.—Study of Prices," Chapter VIII.

The vicious circle, in other words, begins with tariffs, and proceeds by way of higher wages, higher prices, smaller profits, additional currency, and political intrigue, to tariffs again. Before the war nobody would have thought of England as a country in which tariffs stood the slightest chance of being buoyed up by an inflator currency. But the opportunity of the Trust "magnate" has come with the issue of paper currency during the war. As the returns show, within the first few months of war we had thirty millions of paper at a time when we had only thirty millions of gold. The ratio is about a hundred and twenty millions to thirty millions. The tariffs, it is little exaggeration to say, have been raised in anticipation, by inflated currency, even before they have been adopted on a scientific scale. We can well imagine Mr. Lloyd George, always a far-seeing opportunist, making a name for himself in five or six years by imitating Mr. Roosevelt—appearing in public as the daring "Trust buster" and in private as the capitalists' friend.

Our working classes—and the expression here must be held to include the professional classes and the salaried—have stood much; and more than once their patience has surprised us. But we question whether they will stand the effects of the Paris policy; they are more likely to become as restive as neutrals now are. We have not much to thank America for; but she is at least entitled to our passive gratitude for having provided a passive warning of the fate of an enormously rich country, and of an active, enterprise people, at the hands of unscrupulous profiteers. Participation in the management of industry by workmen and salaried is the only effective check on the profits which can be devised—the only form of industrial re-organisation which will enable us to compete on efficient terms with our rivals in the world-markets.

As the German Government is making an unusually strong effort, through its ordinary propagandist channels, to distort the meaning of the action taken by the Allied Powers with regard to Greece, it is well that the essential points of the Note handed to the Greek Government last week, and the circumstances relating to it, should be borne clearly in mind. The Note makes reference to England, France and Russia as the "Protecting Powers" of Greece. This is in full accordance with the Treaty of London (1863), whereby the seven Ionian Islands, until then administered under British protection, were ceded on the distinct understanding that Greece was to be governed as a constitutional State. A king was chosen; a constitution was laid down; elections were held regularly with no more than the normal amount of corruption associated with the Balkan States. No interference of any kind was attempted when Greece, league with Serbia, Bulgaria, and Macedon negro, went to war with Turkey in 1912. Such procedure may not have been to the interests of Russia or France, or even our own; but the matter was one for Greece to decide, and she was left to do so unhindered. In consequence of the eventual outcome of that war, a treaty was signed whereby Greece and Serbia undertook to help one another in the event of either being wantonly attacked. Bulgaria, of course, was the cause of this treaty and its stipulations.

Towards the end of last year Serbia was attacked by Bulgaria with the very minimum of warning. It might have been held to be doubtful under the Serbo-Greek Treaty whether or no Greece should have come to the aid of the Serbs, for the latter country was in no case; but there was no doubt whatever with regard to the attitude of Greece when Bulgaria joined in the war. M. Venizelos had just been returned to power with a large majority, and he made preparations for helping the Serbians to drive out their enemies. With this object the Greek Army was placed on a war footing, and an invitation was sent to the Entente Governments to land forces at Salonika. The Greek people, as we have every reason to suppose from their unmis- takable proofs of being hourly buoyed up by an inflator currency.

The Queen of England, being the sister of the Kaiser, was presumed to be influencing her consort in a sense inimical to the Entente Powers; and undoubtedly there were many influential German elements in high administrative positions. What cannot be disputed, again, is that the action, taken by King Constantine at the time of the Allies' landing in Salonika, was arbitrary, unconstitutional, and unwarranted. He refused to consider himself as bound by the Serbo-Greek Treaty, dismissed M. Venizelos, and dissolved Parliament.

The next Chamber was admittedly the product of corruption and unfair dealing, and most of the followers of M. Venizelos stayed away from the polling-booths. M. Zaimis, the successor to M. Venizelos, adopted a policy which was too mild for the Court, and he soon disappeared to make way for M. Skouloudis, who has just been forced to resign in favour of M. Zaimis by the action of the Entente Powers. The policy of M. Skouloudis was all along hostile to Serbia and to England, France, and Russia. Not only was he help refused to King Peter, but even the pretence of neutrality was not kept up. Angry protests were made against the continued presence of the Allied armies in
Salonika, despite the fact that M. Venizelos, in his capacity as Prime Minister, had invited them to go there; and the climax came when the Greek Government connived at attacks on the Entente Legations, and on Greek politicians known to be favourable to the Allies. It is suspected that the army which had been demobilised to aid Serbia might very soon be turned against Serbia's friends; but repeated requests for its demobilisation were ignored. At last the Allies took the only possible course consistent with their own safety and with the Treaty of London by which Greece had become an independent country. A Note couched in strong terms was presented to the Sioucoudia Government just as the Premier was about to resign in order not to have the onus of dealing with it. The Note demanded the dismissal of pro-German functionaries, the demobilisation of the army, the resignation of the Cabinet in favour of a thoroughly neutral Ministry, and the holding of free elections. These demands have been accepted, and it is reported as I write that King Constantine has signed decrees demobilising the army and providing for a general election.

No matter how this action of the Allied Powers may be regarded, from the diplomatic point of view or any other, no possible exception can be taken to it. Everything that has been done has been done in accordance with constitutional procedure, and, indeed, in favour of a constitutional as contrasted with an arbitrary regime. The power of the Court, pro-German through and through, was too great for them. But the surrender of Port Ruppel to the Bulgarians was an event which called forth vivid comments even in the heavily censored Press; and even if the Allies had taken no steps at all, it is likely that a popular rising would have been attempted against the Bulgarian invasion—an invasion which was not resisted by the army and appeared to be welcomed by the Court.

It is premature to speak of the future policy of the Allies in the Balkans, for political policy depends on military strategy. It will doubtless be the duty of the Entente Ministers in the immediate future to make sure that the Germanophile officials are dismissed from their posts at Athens and throughout the country, and to make sure, also, that satisfactory arrangements are made for holding elections. M. Zaimis is known to be a close friend of M. Venizelos, whom he may consult from time to time, and whose policy he will almost certainly adopt. It is not suggested by the Allies that Greece shall take part in the war—that is a point which is made quite clear in the Note. The chief result of the démarche is that the Entente armies at Salonika will no longer be threatened by a combination of enemies, including Greece. It is assumed that we can deal with our known enemies, but that there must be no possible opportunity for treachery. An aspect of the new situation which ought to be mentioned is the action taken by Italy. As Italy was not a Protecting Power under the treaty of 1863 she could not sign the joint Note; but, acting in agreement with her Allies, she presented a simultaneous demand that the Greek Government should withdraw its troops from Southern Albania, where they were threatening the Italian frontier. The demand was instantly agreed to by M. Zaimis; and the fact that it was made is adequate proof of the solidarity of the Quadruple Entente with respect to Balkan questions.

The Alleged Confusions of Mr. Bernard Shaw.

I hasten to acknowledge that the critical article of Don Ramiro (if he will allow me to designate him thus briefly and honourably) is an excellent and instructive one. But I do not see why he should assume that I am an Englishman. Let me explain.

The subject of his criticism is an article of mine addressed to the Germans in America. Its object was to engage their sympathies for the Allies. Now an Englishman—Sir Edward Grey, for example—would undoubtedly have tended to make the 'slightly patronising attempt to make these foolish people see that Germany is entirely in the wrong, and England, as ever, spotlessly, loftily, and necessarily in the right. He would measure his success by the heartlessness of the reception of his demonstration by the English papers. If it incidentally led to an exasperated declaration of war on England by President Wilson under hyphenated pressure, he would become the darling of his countrymen and the hero of the hour.

But I happen to be an Irishman. When I address a jury I do so with a view to winning the verdict, and not, as English barristers do, to becoming famous through the hanging of my client. In addressing the American German jury it was clear to me that the one thing I must not say was that Germany is in the wrong. On the contrary, I began by saying everything nice about Germany that I could, and, in particular, by dwelling on her numerous superiorities to her present enemies. Having thus gained the ear of the jurors, I proceeded with my case. That case was not in the least, as Don Ramiro suggests, that efficiency is right, or is an attribute of the Life Force (whose inefficiency I have repeatedly and publicly deplored), or is anything else than itself. My case was that the Germans, though as averse as we to the tyranny of Prussia, and submitting to it only for the sake of its alleged superlative efficiency, had not found their conscience justified by the Hohenzollern conduct of the war, seeing that Republicanism was proving quite as efficient in the field.

I further argued that this was a natural result, because a Republican army can sacrifice everything to efficiency, whereas the Hohenzollern can only sacrifice everything to efficiency except themselves. In vain, as against this argument, does Don Ramiro urge that the Kaiser has sacked Von Tirpitz, Von Kluck, and all the rest of them. He has not sacked the Crown Prince; and he has not sacked himself. Don Ramiro says truly that "When the Hohenzollern family has a competent man like Frederick the Great at its head, the Hohenzollern regime is competent; and when not, not." But my point is that when a Republic has an incompetent President or Premier, it can get rid of him; but when Germany has an incompetent Hohenzollern, it can't. Therefore, a German convinced (rightly or wrongly) of the importance of efficiency, should support Republicanism against Hohenzollernism.

Pretty lucid, that; eh? Where is the confusion?

Infant mortality is a matter of kindness. It is kind to share your rashers and gin with your children; have them all to sleep in the same bed with you; and spend a month's wages on their funerals. But infant vitality is a first-rate test of social organisation. Don Ramiro must not say that infant vitality is one thing, and social organisation another; that sometimes they coincide and sometimes not. He might as well say that alcohol is one thing and drunkenness another; that sometimes they coincide and sometimes not. If it be true that though you may have the first without the second (as in Consulate-General Good's case), yet you cannot have the second without the first, you may conclude that a vigilant regard to the multiversity of the universe must not be carried to the point at which the world appears so disconcerted that it falls to pieces intellectually. Don Ramiro
may take it from me that in places like Berlin social organisation and infant vitality are so closely connected that, on the other side, be considered a function of the other in the mathematical sense. It is, therefore, fair to argue that a community with a relatively high infant mortality is not really as highly organised as a community with a relatively low mortality.

Don Ramiro suggests that if the mortality represented an intentional scientific elimination, it might imply a higher standard. So it might; but it doesn't. Mortality now represents neglect, not attention. That is why a high death-rate among infants involves a high invalid rate among the survivors.

I give due credit to the staff of the "Daily Mail" for seeing clearly "that England had to prepare to fight against Germany." But why restrict its foresight to Germany? It foresaw that we had to prepare to fight everybody, including France. I claim to have been a little cleverer than the "Daily Mail," because I saw clearly that England had to prepare not to have to fight Germany. And it was for want of that preparation that we got landed in the present mess.

Thus, "the confusions of Mr. Bernard Shaw" turn out, as usual, to be Shavian lasciviousness so dazzling that Don Ramiro cannot see them at first. All the same, his article is an admirable one; and I acknowledge its value by answering it.

G. B. S.

The So-Called Law of Rent.
By Ramiro de Maeztu.

Some of the best minds of England are amusing themselves with a discussion of the Law of Rent. As such a discussion is of no great significance at the present time, I venture to write about it in the hope of hastening its end. In one of the first New Age articles I believe I showed the impossibility of separating economic from military, and that is why it suggested afterwards the foundation of a Cratology or doctrine of power, which should deal, in general, with all kinds of social power—economic, military, and political. What I meant by that was that Economics could not be seriously regarded as a generalising science. In the same way as a science of war has never arisen and can never arise; so also a science of Economics should not have arisen. The instruments of economic activity, such as statistics, mechanics, chemistry, agronomy, etc., may be and ought to be scientific, in the same way as the instruments of war—gunnery, tactics, engineering, etc., but, just as war cannot be scientific, so is it impossible for Economics to be scientific.

For that reason I protest against a discussion of the Law of Rent. It is said, on the one hand, in this discussion, that the Law of Rent renders impossible the distribution of land under a system of peasant proprietorships. It is maintained, on the other hand, that, in spite of the Law of Rent, the human will may establish such a system, in the same way as it is possible to erect a Roman arch in spite of the Law of Gravitation. Both sides acknowledge the validity of the Law of Rent, and give to it the character of a natural and inevitable law. There is not such a thing. That Law one may say may or may not exist. There is not a single economic law. Economic facts, like military facts, are not susceptible of "legal" treatment. They are susceptible only of an individual or historical treatment. Every generalising treatment of economic facts is a pseudo science. The way as Taine's method was false when he tried to explain with generalisations the individual works of artists. If it were true that the lagoons of Venice can explain to us the painting of Titian, why is it that the gondoliers do not paint like Titian? What is not possible to anticipate the result of an economic action in the same way as we can predict in chemistry that with so much oxygen and so much hydrogen we shall produce so much water with an electric spark. In Chemistry we can produce water from elements, such as hydrogen, oxygen, and an electric spark, in which the water was not contained. In Economics, on the other hand, we have no right to expect from any element anything beyond what is contained in it. Those laws which happen to be true are not laws but definitions. When Gresham tells us that bad money takes the place of the good he only defines money. But if the Law of Rent were true, Economics could then be a generalising and deductive science. Unfortunately, it is not true. It is only right that when men are undertaking economic, military, or political activities, they should try to study economic, military, and political facts, so that they may learn "from analogies"; but they would be wrong if they attempted to regulate their conduct "by identities." In Natural Science the cause is always equal to the effect. In History the cause is never equal to the effect. Economic, military, or political virtue cannot be founded upon economic, military, or political science; for it is only a mixture of wisdom and fortitude, two of the cardinal virtues. There are no such sciences; they can exist only as aspects of History.

If we did not know that Ricardo was an excellent man, we could say that the so-called Law of Rent was invented by him with the object of proving to the English poor that rent was based upon a natural monopoly, and was, therefore, unchangeable. Most people believe, on the other hand, that rent is based upon property—that is to say, upon the right that the laws grant to the landowner of getting as much rent as possible for the use of his land. In other words, most people believe that rent is a juridical monopoly, and, therefore, changeable. Hence, when the people feel themselves oppressed by high rents, they ask for reforms so that the owner may be compelled to sell his lands, as has been done in Ireland, or to lower the rents, or to leave his tenants in possession. But those scientific people who believe that rent arises from a natural monopoly oppose these reforms, as if they were contrary to Nature. Such people are either conservatives, like Ricardo, or "scientific" socialists, like Marx.

The proof on which Ricardo based his Law of Rent was very subtle; and it is probable that if it had not been for the work of his commentators it would never have been understood except by a comparatively few persons. "Economics is a science which pays great honour to the intellect," Hegel used to say. What he meant by that was that in the classic books on Economics much more subtlety than truth was to be found. But the history of Astronomy teaches us that subtlety is not truth. Before it occurred to Copernicus that the earth was not perhaps the centre of the Universe, there prevailed highly complicated systems by which it was sought to explain the movements of the stars. Only a few superior people could grasp these systems. It may be that the psychological impulse which originated the Copernican discovery was the sheer inability of Copernicus himself to understand these systems. Copernicus felt the need of explaining to himself simply these complex things of heaven. And, although the astro-theorists held it to be much easier to understand than those of the fifteenth century, it is, nevertheless, true in its essentials.

The Ricardian proof that rent is a natural and not a juridical monopoly is more or less as follows. Every sedentary society exploits first of all the lands of the best quality; those which yield the largest product with the smallest expenditure and effort. In such a society there is no rent. But as the population increases it finds it necessary to increase the products of the land. That does not mean putting more labour or more capital into the land. Still, there is no rent. But it happens that as the population goes on increasing the Law of Diminishing Returns begins to operate,
According to which it is not possible to increase indefinitely the productivity of the soil, for there comes a point at which, if you put more labour into the land, you do not obtain from it a quantity of products equal to the amount of capital put into it. There comes a point at which the Law of Diminishing Returns begins to operate again, the lands of third quality then is reached the lands of second quality begin to be cultivated; and, when the Law of Diminishing Returns begins to operate again, the lands of third quality then.

Ricardo's theory is that it explains rent by the difference in the productivity of lands. In order to do this he pre-supposes the existence of marginal lands, which produce no rent, because they are of such a quality that they return only the amount of labour and capital put into them, without any surplus. From this it is deduced that if the rent of marginal lands is equal to $0$, that of the lands which produce a surplus of $1$ is equal to $1$, that of the lands producing a surplus of $2$ is equal to $2$, and so forth. All of which is very pretty; but we need no science to tell us that we can get more from productive lands than from non-productive lands.

What the theory of Ricardo does not explain is rent. Rent, he tells us, is the difference in rents. That is why the Ricardian theory is known by the name of the Theory of Differential Rent; and it has been regarded for nearly a century as the most precious of scientific laws.

The point is, that the Ricardian theory is very clear. It says to the tenants: "Don't complain of the rent. Rent does not arise from a changeable or a variable cause. Rent arises from a fatal fact—the difference in the productivity of lands. Except in cases of undue interference on the part of Governments, you pay no other rent than the natural or just rent." On the other hand, it says to the consumers: "Do not complain of the prices. Prices do not arise from rent, but rent from prices. Prices spring from the Law of Supply and Demand. That is the usual thing to workmen and capitalists: the interest on capital is determined by the competition of capital; the wages of workmen by the competition among workmen. The evils arising hence are irremediable. The best we can do is to let Nature take its course—laissez-faire; laissez-passer. The selfishness of the individual coincides in the long run with the interests of humanity.

Against all these ideas we need only make one simple observation. The differences in rent are one thing; the differences in rents are another. Rent is qualitative; the differences in rent are quantitative. The differences in lands may explain the differences in rents; what they do not explain is rent. Rodbertus destroyed the Ricardian theory by postulating an inaccessible and uniformity and irreversibility of the Law of Rent. He pre-supposes the existence of marginal lands, which produce no rent, because they are of such a quality that they return only the amount of labour and capital put into them, without any surplus. From this it is deduced that if the rent of marginal lands is equal to $0$, that of the lands which produce a surplus of $1$ is equal to $1$, that of the lands producing a surplus of $2$ is equal to $2$, and so forth. All of which is very pretty; but we need no science to tell us that we can get more from productive lands than from non-productive lands.

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The Innocents Abroad.

IV.

From the direction of a floating straw you can tell the way in which the river runs. In its contest for trade modern English diplomacy only reflects a tendency common, more or less, to the whole of modern England. It represents a change of mental attitude in the nation itself. To appreciate this change at its full value, one has but to glance back at the social history of this country. So long ago as the tenth century we find Athelstan enacting that a merchant who had made three long sea voyages on his own account was entitled to the rank of "thegin," and eventually to that of an "eort." The democratic spirit of Anglo-Saxon legislation survived even the establishment of the Norman aristocracy. In England heralds declared that gentility is not degraded by the exercise of commerce, and during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and earlier part of the eighteenth centuries mercantile employment was for younger sons of good families, who on the Continent would have been reckoned nobles and forbidden trade, the usual road to economic independence. The Livery Companies of the City of London—to say nothing of such mighty corporations as the Levant and the East India Companies—numbered many youths of gentle birth among their apprentices, and the same was the case in much humbler business spheres. As Gibbon, in speaking truly of the English middle class, writes, "the most respectable families have not disdained the counting-house or even the shop." The nickname "Proud Preston," which still clings to that Lancashire town, is traced to the fact that in the seventeenth century many of its tradesmen were cadets of old county families, and—claiming the right to bear arms, entered their pedigrees at the Heralds' Visitations. When Voltaire came to this country in 1726 his sharp eye noted this typical trait of English life, and in the dedicatory epistle to his tragedy "Zaire" he extols the respect in which�� traders—men of great competence. It is the spirit that characterises all great currents, this also owes its existence not to the weak point, nor even the shop. The nickname "Proud Preston," which still clings to that Lancashire town, is traced to the fact that in the seventeenth century many of its tradesmen were cadets of old county families, and—claiming the right to bear arms, entered their pedigrees at the Heralds' Visitations. When Voltaire came to this country in 1726 his sharp eye noted this typical trait of English life, and in the dedicatory epistle to his tragedy "Zaire" he extols the respect in which merchants are held in England: an implicit reflection on the immeasurable void that separated the upper from the middle class in his own country under the ancien regime.

By an odd coincidence, while France was advancing towards the English standard of values, England was retrogressing towards the French; and the movement on both sides was so rapid that the generation which witnessed the uprooting of caste prejudices from the soil of France beheld their triumph in England: "Your Prince and your Ministers," sneered Napoleon, "appear to wish to change altogether the spirit of the English, and to render you another nation. to make you ashamed of your shops and your trade which have made you what you are, and to sigh after nobility, titles, and crosses: in fact, to assimilate you with the French." The reaction was shrewdly observed, though the explanation lacks philosophical depth. The Prince and the Ministers doubtless had much to answer for, but to hold them answerable for English snobbishness is to credit them with quite disproportionate powers for evil. The profuse supply of titles and trinkets only fostered a prevailing demand; it did not create it. Such things are the symptoms, but seldom the causes, of national decline, and their chief merit is to accentuate the weakness from which they derive their force.

The true causes of this new shame for the shop, this tone and tendency of thought, which finds its supreme and most pernicious expression in our Foreign Office, must be sought in other than personal influences. All great currents, this also owes its existence not to any one source, but to the combination of many. Those which contributed most largely to it are, probably, the growth of our Indian Empire, the multiplication of our home admiralties of the seas, and improvements in our army and navy. All these developments opened gradually so many fresh fields of employment and emolument for the gentlemen who once flocked to the counter. It was inevitable that an occupation which gentlefolk ceased to favour should in time come to be considered unfit for gentlemen. There is a good illustration of the converse process in the cases of another profession. After the Reformation and the spoliation of the Church of England, the sacerdotal office lost its attraction for the higher classes, and simultaneously the esteem in which it was formerly held. During the seventeenth century, then, a few of the persons of birth took orders, the clergy were regarded as, on the whole, a plebeian class: hardly superior to menial servants. When the Church recovered its pecuniary attraction, in the eighteenth century, salons of the nobility and gentry found their way back to the sacred profession, and which guides a fly to a jam pot; and the clerical calling was restored to its pristine respectability. So great is the effect of fashion even with the service of God: how could it be less with the Government service?

The detachment of our Diplomacy from commercial interests marks a departure from realities which constitutes a melancholy and sure sign of decadence. It is a decadent spirit that dictates this scorn for the things which have made us what we are. It is a decadent spirit, too, that regards birth but not brains, and sets considerations of caste above considerations of competence. It is the spirit that characterises all nations in their decay: from India with her worthless Brahmanos to Spain with her hidalgos. Our diplomatic body in the reign of George V has its counterpart in the diplomatic body of Spain in the reign of Philip II. Thus Diego de Mendoza, himself a contemporary diplomat, depicts his brethren of the craft:

"O embajadores, puros majaderos,
Que al los reyes quites guests, y
Comienzan por nosotros los primeros.
Nuestro mayor negocio es, no dafar,
V jamas euer cosa, mi diablo,
Que no corramos riesgo de casa.

With the exception of the fourth line, all this applies to our own modern ambassadors and has so applied for a much longer time than most people imagine. When recent events in the Balkan Peninsula revealed the full measure of our diplomatists' debility, a critical but somewhat hasty leader-writer shouted: "There is a sad contrast between England's diplomacy in the Napoleonic period, when her representatives abounded with energy, were usually admirably informed, and knew what they were about, and that of the twentieth century!" The contrast was singularly ill-chosen. For it was in that very period that Baron von Humboldt, brother of the great traveller, paid our Mr. Coleridge the following compliment at Rome: "I confess, Mr. Coleridge, I had my suspicions that you were here in a political capacity of some sort or other; but upon reflection I acquit you. For in Germany, and, I believe, elsewhere on the Continent, it is generally understood that the English Government, in order to divert the envy and jealousy of Europe at the power, wealth, and ingenuity of your nation, makes a point, as a 'ruse de guerre,' of sending out none but fools of gentlemanly birth and connections as diplomats to the courts abroad. An exception is, perhaps, sometimes made for a clever fellow, if sufficiently libertine and unprincipled." Coleridge himself sums up his own opinion of the English diplomatists of the day in the one terse phrase, "dull coxcombs.

The were bad then; they have become worse since. Decadence, like growth, is progressive. What else can you expect from a system rooted in the vicious superstition of caste? A system which attaches far greater importance to family influence than to a life of honest toil? It was a system that considered its victims: "Only be well-connected enough, mediocre enough, plant enough, good enough at stooping and crawling, and you shall have your reward." "Tis in vain that genius or virtue or energy of character striv
against such a system. 'Tis in vain that all the time-
dishonoured sophisms are employed to screen its flamboyant imbecility.

It is pretended, for example, that in these days of rapid portal, telegraphic and telephonie communications the business of the diplomatist is rather to convey the instructions he receives from headquarters than to exercise any initiative of his own, and, consequently, he requires no individual capacity of a high order. If that be so, why have permanent embassies at all? Why not carry on negociations by letter, telegraph, or telephone direct from London, and only on exceptional occasions send an envoy on a special mission? Why spend so many thousands a year, when a few hundreds would suffice? Either diplomatics have a general reason for being, or they have not. If they have, the only sensible course is to get the best men we can find. If they have not, the sooner they cease to be the better.

V.

I have mentioned this plea, because it is based on the characteristic English fallacy that first-hand knowledge is unnecessary—the fallacy that lies at the root of all our administrative troubles. Our armies, our finances, our foreign and domestic interests suffer from this egregious fallacy. All sound minds should rise against it.

John Bull should be made to get out of his reason for being, or they have not. If they have, the instructions he receives from headquarters than to the business of an ambassador is rather to carry out the instructions he requires no individual capacity of a high order. If he requires no individual capacity of a high order. If he only sensibly course is to get the best men we can find. If they have not, the sooner they cease to be the better.

John Bull should be made to get out of the habit of receiving the instructions he requires no individual capacity of a high order. If he requires no individual capacity of a high order. If he requires no individual capacity of a high order. If he only sensibly course is to get the best men we can find. If they have not, the sooner they cease to be the better.
that, as a class, they have good manners? There are
nice men among them as there are everywhere; but
there also are—well, men who might be nice. Even
if it were the case that every man who enters the
Foreign Office service is a pattern of good manners,
and that none of those who are prevented by lack of
funds and friends from entering can have equality of
goods, what then? Manners maketh man; but other
qualities, far more substantial than manners, go to
make a statesman. Is it not the height of fatuity to
value the frill more than the cutlet?

Be it admitted that all means that dull coxcombs
and befrilled fops have their uses (they must, else God
would not have created them): find them, in the name
of common sense, the employment in which they can be
useful, or, at least, in which they cannot be harmful.
The Romans, I remember reading in history, had a
great veneration for geese—they kept them in the
Capitol at the public expense; but, to echo the witty
Marquis of Halifax, I do not remember that those geese
were made Consuls.

Our Un-idea’d Press.

II.

A few weeks ago there appeared simultaneously in
Pastiche and in "Punch" parodies of the "Spectator." In
each case the heart of the joke was the shameless
manner in which the "Spectator" avoided committing
itself upon any current topic. There can be no ques-
tion of collusion: the two parodists had clearly no
political aims in common. No, it needs must be true;
the "Spectator" has no ideas!

Let us again imagine our hypothetical statesman,
say, Mr. Asquith, approaching the weekly papers in
search of a material to profit him in the arena of public
opinions. There is one consideration to which he
will refer. We were surprised by the outbreak of hostilities, had never
read Mr. Chamberlain’s recent speeches in the
parliamentary arena. There was no free sale of wine,
by (perhaps not without a smile) the string of pious
exclamations—"God speed," "Heaven grant"—which
so often represent its comments on affairs, his eye will
be arrested by an article headed "The 'Credo' of a Free
Trader," and initialed by the editor Mr. J. St. Loe
Strachey himself. It is well known, of course, that
the "Spectator," alone among the Tory papers, has
always been a supporter of a Free Trade policy.
Mr. Asquith, therefore, on reading the article, will
recognise its importance as an argument of a great
truth. He may well ask himself how Mr. Strachey
will review the "New Protection," weigh its value against
the State should see to it that we hold the producing plant.
It will occur to Mr. Asquith that, on this reasoning,
why certain relaxations from this tariff for revenue may
not be given to our own [i.e., England's] flesh and
blood, and also in appropriate proportion to our Allies.

Are we not over-running ourselves in our new pur-
suit? Indeed, we nearly were in at a death; in fact,
two deaths. So we must turn from the consideration
of tariffs said that "he was not at a time like this or in
some other new ground is to be broken, set out at least one clear
proposal.

Mr. Asquith begins to read.

The article is headed with a quotation from one of
Mr. Austin Chamberlain's recent speeches in the
Commons. This gentleman, speaking particularly of
tariffs, said that "he was not at a time like this or in
the future going to consider himself bound to the exact
measures which he advocated before the war." In
essence this means that Mr. Chamberlain is prepared,
like his father before him, to turn his fiscal coat if he
thinks this expedient. These words, says Mr.
Strachey, "will raise Mr. Chamberlain's reputation for
sanity, moderation and fairness even higher than it was
before. . . . When a Tariff Reformer makes admissions
so freely and so generously, it would turn the heads of
many."

Mr. Strachey goes on to confess that he now sees
the need of certain essential modifications in his old
opinions. There is one consideration to which he
always attached importance, but, as he now sees, not
important enough. It is the "State of Siege" argu-
ment. Our economics must find us prepared for war
as for peace. We must place "the nation in a posture
of economic as well as of military and naval defence."
(Seconds out of the ring, gentlemen; a clean fight, and
may the best man win!)

A nation like our own, which will always have to be
fed partly from abroad, must obviously keep not only
the command of the sea in the military sense, but the command
of the carrying trade. This means that we cannot leave
the production and ownership of the mercantile marine
purely to chance.

There are also certain other industries whereof "the
State should see to it" that we hold the producing plant.
This, then, is the argument which Mr. Strachey for-
merly under-estimated, but, he says, he has now
under-estimated. Let us consider this system of
tariffs we are to have, and see first why Mr.
Strachey, the Free Trader, wants them at all. These
are the reasons, as Mr. Asquith will read:
(i) "I still hold in the abstract as firmly as before"
that a tariff is "a wasteful way of raising revenue,"
whereas direct taxation "is by far the best method
of raising revenue," BUT "mankind will not bear more
than a certain proportion of direct taxation!" (Tax
me, tax my dog, say they.) THEREFORE:
To liquidate the charges of the war, we shall have to
follow the example of all other States and make use of a
tariff. In no other way shall we be able to draw
sufficient revenue for the needs of the Exchequer.

THEREFORE, Free Trade tends to demoralise us.
It will occur to Mr. Asquith then, on this reasoning,
we ought to have let von Kluck take Paris, because
then we should have fought so bravely to turn him out
again. And at this point we may imagine Mr. Asquith,
having reached the end of the article, to put down the
"Spectator" and regret the waste of precious time in
reading it. He has learned nothing from Mr. Strachey.
Let us, however, permit ourselves one or two com-
ments on Mr. Strachey's incredible "Credo."
First, it did not follow from Mr. Chamberlain's offer
to turn his coat (without his so doing) that his opponent,
Mr. Strachey, need have turned his. To those of us
who have regarded Free Trade and Tariff Reform as
just the two sides of a manufacturers' quarrel, this
mutual tenderness of the two protagonists smells not
so much of "freedom and generosity" as of collusion:
let us compromise, and call it simply Trust. And what
are we to think of Mr. Strachey's sudden confession
that he, who only a few short years ago was un-
bearably odious because of the outbreak of hostilities, had never
properly considered his policy in the light of war?

But, after all, the "New Protection" is intended not
so much for war-time as for the peace which is to follow it.
By Mr. Strachey's own showing in this article,
nothing could be better for England's prosperity in the
period of peace than its Free Trade. What is wrong
with Free Trade England, according to Mr. Strachey,
is that it knows when it is well off. Hats off, gentle-
men! We exclaim spectatorially, this is psychology;
and as such it should be cured; an overwhelming cam-
paign of "moral uplift," such as Mr. Strachey loves;
would make us all so heartily miserable that we should
go to work simply to forget how happy we were.

We have, says Mr. Strachey, to "liquidate the
charges of the war"—and the interest on them—but
there must not be too much direct taxation because
"for good or evil, mankind will not bear more than a
certain proportion of direct taxation." It seems almost
a pity that mankind, which is to suffer Protection for
its sins, is not to be made to bear direct taxation, which
"is by far the best method of raising revenue"; it looks
like a kink in the treatment. Indeed, we might say
that mankind must learn to grin and bear it, did we not
remember that Mr. Strachey has just shown us that
grinning is the very vice which has destroyed our
civilised countries the method is better concealed.
Usually, however, the distinguishing feature is the
enclosure of the common lands. Thus shut out of
the use of the necessary tools of production, the property-
less man, now become proletarian, must go and ask an
alms. But charity without work is demoralising, so
they must work. Upon what? Upon and with the
tools belonging to the more fortunate few who have
retained their property. But there are so many of the
workers—who among them shall find an owner to hire
them? Why, the cheapest—those, in fact, who can
shift on least wages. Wages thus tend to a minimum
owing to the number of the proletarians. What, however,
even if they combine in unions and by all co-operating
with each and each with all, fix a minimum price
for their labour? Why, very then the resources of capi-

talist civilisation are not exhausted. If English work-
men, let us say, can no longer get cheap, foreign
workmen of a cheap pattern can be imported. But
public opinion will not allow much of this alien imperta-
tion. Very well, Mahomet will go to the mountain.
In other words, capitalist tools are sent where cheap
labour abounds; and this is called foreign investment.

SOCIAL REFORM. The impulses of Social Reform
are two: Humanitarian-commercial and commercial-
humanitarian. In the first the humanitarian motive is
predominant; in the second the commercial motive is
predominant.

(a) The first includes every provision made for wage-
slaves who break down in health, become too old to
work, or are unable to command a wage sufficient
to support them. The humanitarian motive in it is the
distress of society at the spectacle of the suffering poor.
The commercial motive in it is the desire of capitalists
to transfer the cost of keeping their useless wage-slaves
from themselves to society in general. Better charity
out of the rates, they say, than out of our pockets
exclusively!

(b) The second includes all the forms of popular
education. Its prime object is commercial, being to
catch wage-slaves young and to civilise and train them
to become skilled yet docile labourers. The secondary
motive is the desire of society to become intelligent.

WAGE AND CHATTEL-SLAVERY. An outcry
was raised when we first called the proletariat wage-
slaves and their condition one of wage-slavery. On
the contrary, the wage-slaves profess to be free men, and
regard their state as a great advance upon chattel-
slavery or serfdom. But let us note that it was not by
their exertions that the change from chatteldom to wage-
dom was brought about. If, therefore, it was progress
for them, the motive was not theirs, nor do they deserve
any credit for it. As for the advantages, let us see.
In general, commercial men have discovered that for
some forms of tool-labour hiring is cheaper than pur-
chase. For instance, many printers prefer hiring their
expensive type-setting machines to buying them
outright. By this means, and for a comparatively small
additional cost, they have the use of the machines with-
out the real responsibility. Even amongst the old slave
communities the axiom prevailed that it was cheaper to
buy than to breed. This meant that it was less trouble
and expense for a slave-owner to buy slaves already
prepared for the market than to prepare them himself.
A step further, and we are at the point in relation to men
that printers are in relation to machines. The axiom, in short, of commercialism is that it is cheaper to hire labour than to own it. Why? For two reasons: In the first place, a man who owns labour and can hire no other is tied down to the skill his slaves happen to possess. He has not the free choice that an open market for labour gives him. And, in the second place, the privileges that were demanded by slaves grew to be excessive: they actually expected to be reared and educated, to have leisure while they were working, and provision made for illness and old age, as if they were human! The trouble alone was great, and the cost excessive: they actually expected to be reared and provision for sickness, and so on. Then the employers would have only their working years to consider. They could go into the proletarit quarters and select only the fit, leaving the unfit to die or to become fit at the expense of the rest. Is it not obvious from this consideration that if the substitution of wage-slavery for chattel-slavery, hiring for owning, was one step forward for labour, it was at least two for capital? And the proof is that capital has immensely increased its wealth, while the wages of labour are much the same as they were when labourers were chattels.

WAGES. Wages are paid in money; but money is worth only what it can buy. In other words, money wages may vary in value even while their nominal value remains the same. Two years ago a money-wage of a sovereign could purchase 80 loaves. To-day it purchases only about 45 loaves. If nominal wages are to-day what they were two years ago, their real value is only a little more than half what it was. Nominal wages are fixed by the Supply and Demand of labourers. Their amount thus has no relation with the prices of goods, which are fixed by the Supply and Demand of goods. If prices fixed wages, the nominal amount of wages would rise with prices; but the obvious is that they do not. No, wages, being the price of labourers, their amount is determined by the supply and demand of labourers. Why are wages comparatively high during the war? Because labourers available for ordinary industry are few. Why will wages be low after the war? Because labourers will be in numbers far exceeding the demand. It might be thought that legislation or sentiment could fix the price of labourers. But only the power that holds a monopoly of any commodity can fix its price. In the tobacco trade, for instance, the Imperial Tobacco Trust had a complete monopoly of tobacco in this country (as it has very nearly), and could forbid any other company to import tobacco, the Trust could fix the price of tobacco as it pleased; and we may be sure that it would charge to the last farthing what we could pay for it. Being as yet, however, an incomplete monopoly, the Trust cannot fix prices. Now, as neither sentiment nor Parliament has a monopoly of labourers, cannot compel labourers to refuse lower wages, cannot make employers pay high wages, and cannot forbid the importation of labourers or (what is the same thing) the exportation of capital, neither sentiment nor Parliament can fix wages. The only method of fixing wages is to obtain a monopoly of labourers; and the only way of obtaining a monopoly of labourers is to create a national trade union which is black-leg-proof. In a foregoing note it was said that wagess are much the same to-day as they were in the days of chattel-slavery. The proof is obvious. Somehow or other chattel-slaves got food, shelter, and clothing sufficient to keep thef them fit for work and to enable them to reproduce and multiply themselves. The slave-population of Greece acted as “putting-out” to the revenue-kicked. Some slaves saved and bought their freedom. Well, to-day, somehow or other, wage-slaves do no more than obtain food, clothing, and shelter sufficient to keep them fit for work and to enable them to reproduce and multiply themselves. The amount of their wages, however, they can save no more than chattel-slaves could. In short, “wages” are much the same as the “keep” of serfs.

Drama.

By John Francis Hope.

When Madame Roland asked Liberty what sins were committed in its name, the apostles of Liberty straightway knocked off Madame Roland’s head. It was a silly question to ask, and the penalty was perhaps excessive; but with that precedent to remind me of the danger of asking questions, I shall not address interrogations to Unity; I shall enumerate the sins. Before the war, Shaw’s “Getting Married” was a sin committed in the name of Unity; most of Goreville Barkers’s productions were equally bad results of a good war; the war, Mr. Walter Hackett has tried to commend “The Barton Mystery” to the shade of Sophocles by preserving the unity of time and place, and now “The Riddle,” recently produced at the New Theatre, tries to commend itself to Mr. Walter Hackett. “The action of the play takes place in the drawing-room of the Slieve Ard Hotel, Ardecastle, Co. Down, Ireland, and is comprised within the space of eight hours.” Mr. Walter Hackett will notice with pride that two men were required to “comprise” the action of “The Riddle” within the space of eight hours; and Messrs. Anthony Wharton and Morley Roberts will notice with regret that their “unitarianism” has not produced so entertaining a person as the beastlike Beverley.

This is to be regretted, for the only dramatic value of the unity of time and place is that attention can be concentrated on the diversity of persons. The dramatic moment should be critical of character—but I must not talk of technique. The point that I want to make is that the authors of “The Riddle” are so obsessed with the idea of unity that they are really as bad as Buddhists. “All is one,” may be an admirable doctrine for a philosopher; but a dramatist should try to show that at least one is all. It may be true that the civilising function of the lettered arts is to show the essential likeness of human nature under all disguises; but without the presentation of difference there can be no demonstration of similarity. For example, the Irish and the English are supposed to be, and apparently are, unlike each other (chorus in unison, “Thank God”); and we do not expect a play of which the scene is Ireland to be a replica of the theatrical successes of Sir Charles Wyndham. Not even the fact that Ireland is at present under martial law can make us believe that its hotel life reproduces the situations of the London stage of ten years ago. Ireland may be behind the times, but not so far as that.

The authors do their best to make the situation credible; for example, the adventurer borrows “fivers” or “tenners,” but an adventurer in a London hotel would borrow nothing under a hundred pounds, and that she would probably win by cheating at cards. The requests of Mrs. Lytton have the rustic quality of “the wolf’s trail” as to be beyond redemption. Mrs. Lytton has the makings or the marrings of a good woman in her, I am not quite sure which; and she must be saved. Back we come to unity; salvation is the same everywhere, in Ireland as in England, and perhaps the most pleasing revelation of Irish hotel life is that there, as here, the task of salvation is committed to the Senior Bar. Our greater reverence for the Law sometimes induces us to call in even the Bench for this pur-
pose; but as Mrs. Lytton was only a beginner, her case fell within the competence of the Senior Bar. The Senior Bar had good reason for its interference. So long as the lone wolf of the redoubled blackmailer, the K.C., the K.C. need only study Bradshaw and raise his eyebrows and think the action futile. But when the K.C.'s god-daughter began to weep, because the adventuress was making love to her betrothed, something had to be done. The weeping prevented the god-daughter from playing the piano to the K.C., and the necessity of suspecting the adventuress became apparent. She must be living under a false name if she borrowed money and flirted; the problem was, how to discover her real name. Enter a blackmailer with a letter addressed to Mrs. Lytton, places it on the table and retires. A clue! The K.C. holds the letter to the light, sees that it contains another envelope, and bribes the blackmailer to leave the letter in its original envelope addressed in lady's name, which, by the way, is that of a woman who had been tried and acquitted for poisoning her husband. The adventuress then comes in to confirm the suspicion of the K.C. that she is the one whom she is addressing does in the most obliging way, by the very ostentation with which she repudiates any knowledge of this person’s identity. Being now quite certain of her identity, the K.C. proceeds to exposure. For this purpose, he requires very wet weather (Ireland, I believe, has a heavier rainfall than England, if that be possible), an audience, a pipe, about fifteen minutes, a good memory, and an opportunity. The audience is provided by the guests, who assemble in the drawing-room. The weather provided by the authors, the opportunity is provided by the request of one of them that he shall tell them a story; and the rest is discretion tempered by tobacco. He tells the story of the Leadbetter case, in which he had taken great interest; but suggests that the K.C. poisoned her dog before she poisoned her husband he gives Miss Irene Vanbrugh her chance of an hysterical outburst. She does it extremely well, as she always did; but it is a shame to throw away her gifts on such trifling. An actress of her quality ought to have something better to do than to betray her identity to a most tedious old bore of the Senior Bar; and if I had my way I would fine the authors all their royalties for this case of our finest actress being a “Riddle,” indeed! Mrs. Lytton is as full of holes as a most tedious old bore of the Senior Bar; and if I had my way I would fine the authors all their royalties for this case of our finest actress. But as for serving any purpose beyond exhibiting Mr. Shaw as a laborious trifler I can see no use in it whatever.

It is well known that everybody can find in the Bible what he looks for. Such a rag-bag as both Testaments are of fragments of history, fragments of mysticism, fragments of ethics, fragments of symbology, of poetry, of religion, of politics and of personal biography, we need not wonder that everybody can find a scrap in them to suit him. When it comes, however, to making a pattern of the whole, and to piecing the fragments of the jigsaw puzzle to form a single picture, nobody has ever succeeded in it and nobody ever will. It would be just as easy to construct a story out of the chance collection of the British Museum as to construct a story of the New Testament; for the New Testament is a museum, and the principles which governed its collection were quite as fortuitous as those that govern the collection of any other museum. What happens when anybody sets about the impossible task, is, in the first place, an arbitrary selection of a point of view; and, in the second place, an arbitrary rejection or interpretation of everything that does not fit into it. Thus one man will set out with the intention of proving the hero of the Gospels to have been a Dionysian, let us say. There are plenty of texts to support his view, and by a judicious parallelism of passages between the Bible and the Dionysian writers he can appear to establish his case. But only by tacitly suppressing as many equally authentic texts that bear a precisely contrary meaning. Another man, again, will wish to show that Jesus was first and foremost a Jewish religious reformer. Still another represents Him as a man of sorrows, while a different school holds Him to have been a child of joy. And each of these views is firmly based upon a selection of texts—and upon the suppression of the rest. Mr. Shaw is no exception to the hitherto unbroken rule of procedure in this matter. Setting out with the fixed intention of reading the Gospels impartially, he finds his point of view, (one of the famous early forerunner of the modern founder of the Fabian Society—a man, that is, like Mr. Shaw himself in his virtues, but with weaknesses which his successful disciple has been too wise to share). The founder of Christianity in this world, that is to say, is Mr. Shaw in an earlier imperfect incarnation, and His doctrine to have been an intelligent anticipation of Fabianism. All this, as I say, was to be expected from Mr.
Shaw's engagement in the impossible task of making a unity of the New Testament. It was doubly to be expected from Mr. Shaw's obstinate obsession that the meaning of history is Fabulism.

What is new in Mr. Shaw's "Preface" is not his view of the New Testament, but the evidence of his fear of Mr. G. K. Chesterton. This comes out vividly in several passages that I shall quote and in a philosophic admission that made me open my eyes. The quotations are as follows:

We have always had a curious feeling that, though we crucified Christ on a stick, He somehow managed to get a burst of sunshine and bird-music.

... will rise again in golden beauty amidst a great burst of sunshine and bird-music.

These passages, I venture to say, are not Mr. Shaw, but Mr. Shaw writing to conciliate Mr. Chesterton. And the observation is supported by the strange doctrine which Mr. Shaw has borrowed from Mr. Chesterton concerning the subjectivity of truth, and hence the credibility of miracles. Some years ago, a debate took place between these two friendly parties in which the point turned upon the credibility of the miracle of the liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius. Mr. Chesterton contended that the evidence for the fact of the miracle was sufficient for belief; and Mr. Shaw, I remember, not only denied that it was sufficient, but challenged Mr. Chesterton to assert that the miracle was a fact. Since that day a change appears to have taken place, for Mr. Shaw now agrees that "there is as much evidence that the miracles occurred as that the battle of Waterloo occurred." It is enough to say upon this point that nobody can believe it, and that nobody does believe it. The less serious implication is that Mr. Shaw has succumbed to Mr. Chesterton; and the more serious implication is that he has become a romantic. If, as he now says, belief is not dependent upon evidence and reason, but upon fashion and the prevailing prejudices, then all that can be asserted of any man's belief is that the only certain truth about it is that he believes it. Its truth or falsity is another thing altogether; and a thing apparently which there is no challenge Mr. Chesterton to assert that the miracle of Waterloo. We can never have established for us by any serious implication is that he has become a romantic. What I want, I suppose, is a profounder seriousness. And yet that does not describe me—interest and entertainment. Of the former, as I have found a very lenten supply; but of the latter I have found sufficient to conclude that the aspect of people with which I get on best is what they would call their superficials. The point in the conversation at which I lose contact with them is just when they become what they call serious, but what I cannot help calling superficial. What I want, I suppose, is a profounder seriousness. And yet that does not describe the missing element. I wonder what it is. I know I should recognise it in an instant if I heard it. A tone of voice, one word even, might mark its existence for me; or even a look might. But whatever the sign, that I should never miss it or have ever passed it over I am certain. This same negative sensibility that perceives this something missing (let me call it) is furnished, in my mind, with a patrol of scouts—antennae which are for ever searching for the forage their secret commander wants. At the sound of a new voice out they jump. I am aware of them at work; running and turning over the words that people say to discover whether the object of their quest is contained in them, and always I feel them turn away with the disappointed comment—this is not what we are looking for: this is not what we want—and at the same time I am conscious that somehow I have lost contact with my company. The worst of it is I feel, too, that if only this missing element could be discovered I should discover with it the key to myself. For exactly as I seek myself and yet do not know where to look, so I seek this unknown sign. That it is a rate, very near one another. All this must sound very foolish to you; it is all very real to me nevertheless. But what in particular I wished to assure you was that I have at least some points of contact with other people, that I get on quite well with certain aspects of the romantics (the ones I!) and that in a group which sits at the receipt of repartee and wit and even cynicism (for cynicism...
The Disposal of Disabled Soldiers.

A FEW SUGGESTIONS TOWARDS THE SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM, ADDRESSED TO THE GOVERNING CLASS.

By W. Mears.

The disposal of the human débris created by the war is a question that demands the serious attention of the best minds in this country. Unfortunately, the whole matter has been obscured by a sentimental agitation carried on by an irresponsible baronet, assisted by the disloyal section of the Press. It is most regrettable that such an agitation should be initiated by a member of the one class that has shown no disposition to hamper the successful prosecution of the war by selfish concern for personal interests. If the demand for extravagant pensions for disabled soldiers had been made by the Labour leaders there would have been no danger of any of the cultivated and patriotic members of the community being diverted from the destruction of Prussianism by insidious appeals to their generosity. The one satisfactory feature in this unfortunate affair is the upright conduct of the Labour leaders. They have treated the interests of the disabled soldiers with the same careful consideration for profits that they have shown when dealing with all the other interests of the class they represent. Their patriotism has, not only in this case, but throughout the war, been a standing rebuke to the disloyal section of the working class. The attitude of the bishops towards those maimed in the war has also been most exemplary, although there is less cause here for any feeling of gratified surprise, as they have never pretended to represent the lower orders, or to be swayed by foolish notions of humanity when profiteering interests are at stake.

It is essential, when considering this problem, that all sentiment should be rigidly suppressed. When the Empire is fighting for its very existence, victory cannot be imperilled by the wastage of our resources and the loss of those who can never be of use in the production of profits. Our wealth is not inexhaustible, and if Prussianism is to be utterly destroyed our financial resources must be carefully husbanded. Furthermore, after the war, the struggle for trade will be more and more directed towards those who have been maimed in the war and have also been most exemplary, although there is less cause here for any feeling of gratified surprise, as they have never pretended to represent the lower orders, or to be swayed by foolish notions of humanity when profiteering interests are at stake.

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Another aspect of the demand for large pensions deserves the careful attention of our captains of industry. If pensions are granted liberally there will be thousands of partially disabled soldiers capable of performing some work who will be able to live in idleness. Now this will have a serious effect on wages. If we are to hold our own against foreign competition after the war the present high level of wages must be greatly reduced, and it will be difficult to cut down wages if disabled soldiers can live on their pensions.

No man will work for wages if he can live in any other way. It is, therefore, essential that disabled soldiers, glad to get work on any terms, should be thrown back on the labour market. Besides, if men of the lower orders are permitted to live in idleness it will have a bad effect on the working class generally, quite apart from the moral effect on the pensioners themselves. There is a possibility that some pensioners, relieved from the economic control of employers, may become Socialists and agitators. The moral effect of idleness on the pensioners, however, need not be dealt with here, as there is no doubt that the clergy, the economists, and the Labour leaders will do full justice to this question.

Of course, it will be useless to throw the totally disabled soldiers upon the labour market; they would only fill up the workhouses and become a burden to the ratepayers. The more logical members of the governing class would gladly be glad to dispense of them according to recognised profiteering principles and let them starve like worn-out workmen; nor is it likely that the English people would do more than protest in a pacific manner. There is, however, a danger that the able-bodied soldiers might prove refractory and let them starve like worn-out workmen; nor is it likely that the English people would do more than protest in a pacific manner. There is, however, a danger that the able-bodied soldiers might prove refractory and agitators. The moral effect of idleness on the working class generally, quite apart from the moral effect on the pensioners themselves. There is a possibility that some pensioners, relieved from the economic control of employers, may become Socialists and agitators. The moral effect of idleness on the pensioners, however, need not be dealt with here, as there is no doubt that the clergy, the economists, and the Labour leaders will do full justice to this question.

Another very serious problem will arise if pensions can be claimed by disabled soldiers as a matter of right. The workers in the factories have been told again and again that their service is just as essential towards winning the war as that of the men in the trenches. Now many of the men and women who are making munitions have had their constitutions permanently impaired by the poison of the gas, and some few have been totally disabled. If a soldier can claim a pension as a right, then it is inevitable that a munition-worker will demand one too, and the demand will not stop here, but will extend to all the workers. At a time when the lower orders are being encouraged to do their share, and their maimed bodies would then cease to be an eyesore to members of the plutocracy travelling about the country.

There is nothing in the above proposals that is contrary to the morals of a capitalist State. It is almost universally recognised that the profiteering class has the right to impose such conditions of existence as it chooses upon the proletariat. Indeed, the lower orders will, if the above suggestions are carried out, be much better treated than they have any right to expect according to those principles of profiteering which few of them deny.

It will have been observed that no suggestions have been made as to pensions for the widows of soldiers. There is not the slightest likelihood of any member of the governing class being so foolish as to reduce the numbers of a type of labour so cheap, unorganised, and so easily exploited. Now that the true aspect of the matter has been put before them the moralists of any party will deal with the pensions question in a manner beneficial to themselves. Whatever solution they adopt it can rest assured that there are plenty of journalists and others ready to persuade the public that the interests of the profiteers are the interests of all true patriots.

IX.—THE NARRATIVE OF CAPTAIN JENKINSON. (With a Commentary by Anthony Nietzsche Smudge, M.A.)

I was born at Lyndhurst, in Hampshire, in the year of our Lord 1579, on the seventeenth day of April. My parents were mercers of that place in a fair way of business. I was baptised at the parish church and was given the name of Alfred 1 George 2 in addition to my surname Jenkinson. My parents sent me to school at the early age of seven. The local schoolmaster was a notorious atheist 3 and evil liver, and it was his barbareous custom to birch us children when we were unlucky enough as to incur his wrath 4. The brutal treatment I suffered at his hands occasioned in me such a horror of my existence that, when I was five years old, I made an attempt upon my life with a rusty nail. Fortunately for my fate, my elder sister 5 observed signs of blood, and, rushing into my little closet, discovered me lying motionless and unconscious at the very door of Death. She hastily called for a doctor, the speedy arrival of whom was the cause of my young life being saved. Needless to say, my parents never again let me fall into the hands of the villain who had driven me to so terrible an extremity. At fifteen I entered my father's business and spent two years in it, although I held in utter aversion a calling so foreign to my nature and inclinations. At another date...
last, my parents being deaf to all my entreaties to apprentice me to a profession more adapted to my own desires, I decided upon a desperate remedy, and, embarking foot to Southampton, I took service upon a barque6 which was on the point of sailing for Amsterdam. A war, however, happening to break out among the nations of South America, the owners of the vessel found themselves forced by the fluctuations of the market to change its destination, and, much to their regret and ours, we set sail for Buenos Ayres.7 Half-way out, our unhappy boat was wrecked by a terrible storm, and I alone of the ship's company was saved, being cast up by the waves upon an uncharted island. Here I lived in indescribable privations and misery for the space of several hours, until a frigate bound for Plymouth and blown out of its true course by easterly gales, sighted me and took me off.

I cannot describe the emotions with which I gazed upon the fair Cornish cliffs as we rode in sight of them at last.8 Falling on my knees in full view of the worthy captain and crew of the frigate, I rendered thanks to the Almighty for my restoration to my country and the bosom of my near ones. From that day to the end of my life I have been a comparatively rich man. Since then I have retired to my ease in my native village, amusing myself with decent amusements, and not unmindful of the immeasurable goodness of Providence. Who, at a single stroke,9 turned my awful casting-away into a most fortunate issue of this mishap, following an equally lucky source of untold advantage to the world and myself.

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in improving the woollen industries and the production of machinery; while Belgians have rapidly created a great iron industry in South Russia," Kropotkin argues from these and from other facts that Russia "will manufacture all she needs; and yet she will remain an agricultural country. And I say if Russia ceases to be an importing country, are we to suppose that her exports will be a free gift to the world? If they are not, there will be no exports; and if there are neither exports nor imports, what need is there to open their harbours?

Mr. Bechhofer argues that everyone knows, that Moscow is the natural capital of Russia, and also the chief manufacturing region of Russia; and the rivers run southward. From that he argues with a curious inconsequence that the Baltic is practically useless to Russia; what he says of Petrograd is as true of Riga, and she must come out another way. Southward ho! Mr. Bechhofer argues that the Dardanelles must be opened to her; let us suppose that they are. The Mediterranean is as much a corridor as the Baltic; its two outlets, Suez and Gibraltar, are controlled by England, at present Russia’s friend. The great question is: “To where does Russia wish to go?” If she desires only to trade in the Mediterranean, the neutralisation of the Dardanelles will be sufficient. But surely, if she wishes to reach the world by sea, she will not just as confined, although not so solitary, in the corridor of the Mediterranean as she does in that of the Baltic. Her melancholy will continue so long as Suez and Gibraltar are held by England; M. Goldstein, reported in the “Times” Russian Supplement of May 27 of this year, foresees that Great Britain may not always be the Ally of Russia: “I must say that on the question of the most important of all maritime routes, the Dardanelles—no matter how the war ends—we shall always have to reckon with the Queen of the Seas, Great Britain. Moreover, remaining economically isolated, that is, not proceeding hand in hand with France, Great Britain, Belgium, Italy, and Japan, in several years Russia may find herself face to face with a still more terrible castigation, viz., a new war in which Great Britain will no longer be our Ally, since economically she is interested in seeing that the Russian market shall not be closed to the access of her commodities.” To cure the melancholy of Russia, Gibraltar and Suez must be neutralised; and the way to the Atlantic be as free for her as for others. In short, we must re-arrange the world to make Russia happy. It would be simpler to forbid the reading of European maps in Russia, and the reading of Russian literature in England.

This pre-occupation with Russia’s export trade explains, but does not excuse, Mr. Bechhofer’s perfidious treatment of the internal Russian question. He writes as though an industrial proletariat has yet to be created in Russia; although Kropotkin showed that the factory workers numbered nearly two millions in 1910, and that the domestic trades of Russia occupied about seven and a half million peasants. But far more serious in Russia is the creation of an agrarian proletariat; as long ago as 1886, the chairman of the St. Petersburg Congress of Farmers estimated that there were about twenty millions of agrarian proletarians, a number equal to the number of serfs Russia possessed before the Emancipation. The number has certainly not diminished since then; but owing to the unprecedented scale of recruiting for this war, Russia is not complaining of a shortage of male labour. I learn from the “Times” Russian Supplement, June 24, 1916, that “unfortunately, owing to conditions of transport, the conveyance of Chinese labourers [into European Russia] cannot exceed 15,000 a month”; but they are coming, and the rules concerning the application of yellow labour were drafted by the Ministry of Agricultu-
And I'll abscond to thesaurus and folio,
For a month or a week or a day, perchance,
Till again I essay the part of Malvolio,
Trapped by a sidelong and wayward glance.
(And if some pert oaf should say that this clowning,
The tune of this jagged farrago of song,
Was filched from the garner of Robert Browning—
Why, stab my vitals, he wouldn't be wrong!

A victim am I
Of the Liquor Control Board.
Nonal Ale—let me die.
It is certain the sole board
On which to rely
Is the Mellor and Cole Board.

Peace will come by and by.
I am taking the shilling.
Peace will come by and by,
When we weary of killing.
Peace will come by and by,
Like the 'bases of Tilling:
Peace will come by and by:
No more tramping and drilling.
Peace will come by and by:
With its mafficky trilling!
Peace will come by and by
To the journalists' quilling.
Peace will come by and by
With the whisky distilling.
Peace will come by and by
Exit Pemberton Billing.

A. B. C. K.

SUMMER-TIME IDYLLS.
I.—CHINGFORD.
'S after nine, Liz! . . . blimey, 'ark!
'S marvellous . . . it don't seem right,
'S a corker, 'e's a gem;
There's a cuckoo! . . . 'e's a lad !
There's a little whistlin' cuss
Makin' bloomin' fun of us.

II.—DOWN THE ALLEY.
'Arf a mo', Joe, wiv that beer;
The time of the 'ouse down.

W. K. S.
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

A EUROPEAN FEDERATION.

Sir,—It was apparently in vain that I had so much emphasis upon the argument that I had no hope that an International Tribunal would prevent war: that I hoped only that it would render less frequent international quarrels on points of such small section as it did in the case of the old British admirals;—it was of small use to write this since "A. E. R." first impuited to me the statement that European Federation would bring an end to the state of peace, and I proceed to smash that statement by pointing to the civil war and industrial riots that occurred under the Federal constitution in the U.S.A. But do I not affirm my belief that civil wars have usually been waged for more important ends than international wars, and that so long as contention arose on subjects that strongly interested large bodies of men, armed conflict was likely to arise? Why did not "A. E. R." consider this statement before turning his military artillery on to me?

I denied that the U.S.A. is not a perfect analogy to employ for the future U.S.R.—I don't think I advanced it as such—but let me point out where the analogy does apply. Two grounds of it are offered against the Federation of Europe: (1) That the peoples of Europe are too diverse in racial feeling; (2) That the change is too great for the federated nations as they now permit at home. Such grounds have pointed out that crowds of the most undeveloped peoples of Europe go to the U.S.A. and live side by side in much greater unity than the federated nations as they now permit at home. I speak of the industrial riots of large cities in Russia, and the struggle between the local and central authorities over important ethical and economic principles. Such disturbances are sufficiently aware of the cloudiness of their respective income tax to a representative international tribunal for the policing of the Continent. No steps up flowery Flsgah are needed for this vision; but merely observation of the praiseworthy in the flat land, a little reasoning from them, and—energy to kick at the ugliness of the present imagination will not easily encompass the payment of income tax to a representative international tribunal for the...
For Captain White it was claimed that he had rendered distinguished service to his country. For as a Social Democrat he realized that the pitiable ineffectiveness of the British Social Democratic movement is largely owing to the neglect of its "leaders" and "manipulators" to provide for the members' teaching in Social Democracy. On the Clyde, and in many other parts of Scotland, for many years he devoted his leisure to the task of educating the Scottish workers in the principles of his vocation. His efforts were devoted to this work. So great was the success attending his labours that during the past winter a class in economics at St. Andrews was conducted by Mr. McLean and his colleague, J. McDougal (now undergoing a term of twelve months' imprisonment for "inciting to strike"), was attended by 468 students. Other classes in outlying districts were also well attended.

During the past winter it was determined to take this interesting Clyde working-class education movement one step further and to establish in Glasgow a higher working-class education movement. Mckan's paper outlining the plan was read by McDougall as the writer was a few days before the conference arrested under the Defence of the Realm Act. It was resolved that the movement should be supported, and that a second conference should be convened by Mr. Robert Smillie, who is a warm supporter of the movement, which, it is expected, will in the full become a centre of an International Federation of Socialist and Labour Colleges and of an International Working Class Students' Union. It is hoped that Mr. McLean's heavy sentences will be brought before Parliament. Certainly the public have a right to demand an explanation of the great difference in the sentences in the two cases here dealt with.

A STATE MEDICAL SERVICE

Sir,—The perils of a State Medical Service, as against a Guild Medical Service, do not concern the doctor alone. The public surely has a real interest in the question. I ask you to reconsider your statement that the nature of the organisation is a matter for the doctors to decide. The argument as to the present bad distribution of doctors is not quite so strong as it looks. You must remember that a large proportion of the working classes, when seriously ill, are treated in hospitals or infirmaries. This is, of course, due to the facts that many doctors reserve their services for private doctors in the "poverty-stricken and disease-ridden district of Shoreditch" treat, on the whole, minor ailments. In wealthy Hampstead the sick have little or no recourse to hospital treatment, but are of serious and minor illnesses by the private doctor.

Then, in the poorer districts, the semi-State Medical Service does rather more for the inhabitants than in the wealthier districts. This is not intended as an argument in favour of one system or the other, but I know your whole-hearted contempt for the support of any position by inaccurate statements.

The danger to the people of a State Medical Service is that its acceptance will be a great step towards Mr. Belloc's Servile State. (Perhaps, horrible though it be, it is the best bargain the people will be able to make, but, at all events, let it be made with eyes open.) A National or Guild Medical Service which should control its own medical affairs and medical education (as it is) would thus consist of a Public Health Service, perhaps Army and Navy Service, Guild Medical Service, and the private practitioner. The guild should have charge of the hospitals, etc.; it should include nurses, nurses, and should have strong tendencies to decentralisation.

THE EXCESS PROFITS TAX

Sir,—In your "Notes of the Week" of June 8 you say that, short of adopting the methods of forcible obstruction, many of our merchants stuck at nothing to defeat the imposition of the Excess Profits Tax. It may be interesting to recall the following facts.

When the tax was first debated in committee in 1915 there were on the order paper no less than 337 amendments to the excess profits clauses and schedules of the Finance Bill. It must be remembered that any amendment which will have the effect of increasing a tax is out of order. For these amendments about 60 members were responsible, and of these, according to "Ded's Parliamentary Companion," 14 were lawyers and 35 were merchants, shipowners, colliery owners, and directors of banks, railways, breweries, ironworks, and other companies, all of which would normally be affected by the tax. If particular could be obtained of all interested as shareholders, the figures would, no doubt, be still more significant.

AN END OF WAR

Sir,—I have been the Almighty for ten days, and I have made future war impossible. I have nationalised the financial resources of all communities threatened by war. Only the Almighty could do it. The first result it had was curious.

You know how little interest used to be taken in the doings of the world's diplomatists, although the consequences to the mankind of the nations were so grave. All that change since the battle. Magnates, capitalists, commercialists, all began to take the most intense interest in the doings of the Foreign Offices of the world. Did one Ambassador engage in conversation with another, the most searching inquiry was everywhere as to what it portended. Capital was in a constant state of jangled nerves. Finally, the tension became too severe to be borne, and a great clamour arose for the abolition of all diplomatists. There ensued...
a pretty little struggle, because diplomats and capitalists were about in plenty, and not much of the blood of the world was at that time. The possibilities of the situation were too gravely menacing to be trifled with. So happened the universal fame that all members of Foreign Offices on whose horizon a war-cloud appears are liable to capital punishment.

Then, at last, Foreign Offices emptied of their occupants in an anxious manœuvring, much of the blood of the world was, for the first time, driven to the hard necessity of earning a living. Our effort is to deal with the affairs of nations eventuated, as you know, committees representative of all classes of the community meet in open conference and see all in view of this yes it is true at last.

But why all this immense upheaval? With the threat of war, landed property goes, wealth goes, luxury goes, business goes, capital goes. In the old days it was only while murder that melted away like snow in sunshine. Now it is gold. Men you can always replace. But gold—

H. R. Stockdale Ross.

MR. BERNARD SHAW

SIR,-I am very sorry that Mr. H. E. Adstock should consider me a cad, for I have sense enough to value the good opinion of even the meanest of my fellow-creatures; but at a time like this, when horror stalks abroad, and pity seems to have left the earth, the grimaces of Mr. Bernard Shaw are, to me at least, out of place in a journal of the high character of The New Age. There are some of us, Sir, for whom life means tragedy, and we resent the intrusion of the comic and public entertainer at our table of bitter herbs. "Plow is still, and laughter is good," says Thackeray, "but love is best of all."

A writer in the New Age some time ago described Mr. Shaw as "therefore incapable of loving anything." What help can we look for from a man like that in our present trouble? Mr. Shaw's article on Ireland appeared in the "Morning Post"; but a stupid "Morning Post" writer would have probably had this advantage over the brilliant Mr. Shaw—he would have meant something different by his words, and these many years past I have been a humble and loving anything." What help can we look for from a man like that in our present trouble? Mr. Shaw's article on Ireland appeared in the "Morning Post"; but a stupid "Morning Post" writer would have probably had this advantage over the brilliant Mr. Shaw—he would have meant something different by his words, and these many years past I have been a humble and loving anything." What help can we look for from a man like that in our present trouble? Mr. Shaw's article on Ireland appeared in the "Morning Post"; but a stupid "Morning Post" writer would have probably had this advantage over the brilliant Mr. Shaw—he would have meant something different by his words, and these many years past I have been a humble and loving anything." What help can we look for from a man like that in our present trouble? Mr. Shaw's article on Ireland appeared in the "Morning Post"; but a stupid "Morning Post" writer would have probably had this advantage over the brilliant Mr. Shaw—he would have meant something different by his words, and these many years past I have been a humble and loving anything." What help can we look for from a man like that in our present trouble? Mr. Shaw's article on Ireland appeared in the "Morning Post"; but a stupid "Morning Post" writer would have probably had this advantage over the brilliant Mr. Shaw—he would have meant something different by his words, and these many years past I have been a humble and loving anything." What help can we look for from a man like that in our present trouble? Mr. Shaw's article on Ireland appeared in the "Morning Post"; but a stupid "Morning Post" writer would have probably had this advantage over the brilliant Mr. Shaw—he would have meant something different by his words, and these many years past I have been a humble and loving anything." What help can we look for from a man like that in our present trouble? Mr. Shaw's article on Ireland appeared in the "Morning Post"; but a stupid "Morning Post" writer would have probably had this advantage over the brilliant Mr. Shaw—he would have meant something different by his words, and these many years past I have been a humble and loving anything." What help can we look for from a man like that in our present trouble? Mr. Shaw's article on Ireland appeared in the "Morning Post"; but a stupid "Morning Post" writer would have probably had this advantage over the brilliant Mr. Shaw—he would have meant something different by his words, and these many years past I have been a humble and loving anything." What help can we look for from a man like that in our present trouble? Mr. Shaw's article on Ireland appeared in the "Morning Post"; but a stupid "Morning Post" writer would have probably had this advantage over the brilliant Mr. Shaw—he would have meant something different by his words, and these many years past I have been a humble and loving anything." What help can we look for from a man like that in our present trouble? Mr. Shaw's article on Ireland appeared in the "Morning Post"; but a stupid "Morning Post" writer would have probably had this advantage over the brilliant Mr. Shaw—he would have meant something different by his words, and these many years past I have been a humble and loving anything." What help can we look for from a man like that in our present trouble? Mr. Shaw's article on Ireland appeared in the "Morning Post"; but a stupid "Morning Post" writer would have probably had this advantage over the brilliant Mr. Shaw—he would have meant something different by his words, and these many years past I have been a humble and loving anything.

Sir,-Mr. Ince wants me to disentangle his barbed words. One question is, "Can you produce a line in your issue of June 15: "The staff of the Daily Mail" saw much more clearly that England had to prepare to fight against Germany. If not, there were plenty of those weightier and more proper missiles? Or is the collapse of our European civilisation a lesser event than this?

That very interesting writer, Señor Ramiro de Maeztu, rightly states in your issue of June 15: "The staff of the Daily Mail" saw much more clearly that England had to prepare to fight against Germany. If not, there were plenty of those weightier and more proper missiles? Or is the collapse of our European civilisation a lesser event than this?

Sir,-Do your readers forget that, years before the war, The New Age actually made a regular feature of Military Notes? It is really extraordinary how so many of your readers (I speak of those I meet) never understand your horses—and never forget the cackle of some of your correspondents.

A. M. Bagnall.

THE CASE OF RUSSIA

SIR,-In your issue of June 15, Mr. Bechhofer repeats the old fable that Russia is "landlocked" by the Turkish control of the Dardanelles—"the impossible secure passage into the seas. He cannot be referring to the position created by the war, but to the normal or pre-war condition of Russian commerce. Allow me to assure your readers that Russia's Southern-Russian commerce has never suffered any restriction, that the Bosphorus and Dardanelles have been freely open to Russia's trade, both outward and inward, and any German complaints that will corroborate this: It is only warships that Turkey has kept out of the straits, in accordance with the treaty imposed on her by Great Britain in 1878.

The extremely ancient rule that no foreign ship of war shall enter these narrow Turkish waters, except by permission of Turkey, has never prevented or obstructed one ton of Russian shipping passing to Western Europe. Turkey has never even exacted compulsory pilotage. The expansion of Russia, widely advertised in all her official publications, has long been possible, our commerce through the White Sea, the Baltic, and the perfectly unobstructed Black Sea channels. Why should it now require not only a route to the Black Sea, but to the Aegean Armenie, but Russian occupation of the Bosphorus, Marmora, Dardanelles as well?

As to the possible importance to England of Russia's gaining a military foothold in Asia as well as a commercial control of this route, the result of Russia's gaining the supremacy of the Baltic absolutely disappointed a similar hope, and the present hope is equally fallacious. Friendship with Germany is an inestimably superior policy from a commercial point of view than any of these Russian pretentious notes.

Arthur Field.

Sir,-Mr. Ince wants, it seems, to discuss whether England and Turkey should, or not, have gone to war. The initiative in hostilities was Turkey's; she disowned Europe. Sir,-Do your readers forget that, years before the war, The New Age actually made a regular feature of Military Notes? It is really extraordinary how so many of your readers (I speak of those I meet) never understand your horses—and never forget the cackle of some of your correspondents.

A. M. Bagnall.

**THE NEW AGE** AND THE WAR.

Sir,-Can any of your readers give me an explanation of the false prophets (with whom the multitude sided as it does to-day) retired from business after the fall of Jerusalem in 1844? If not, there were plenty of those weightier and more proper missiles? Or is the collapse of our European civilisation a lesser event than this?

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Arthur Field.

Sir,-Mr. Ince wants, it seems, to discuss whether England and Turkey should, or not, have gone to war. The initiative in hostilities was Turkey's; she disregarded a guarantee of neutrality offered her by the Allies and joined our enemies. Mr. Ince's inquiries should be addressed to the Porte.

I did not say, as Mr. Ince pretends, that "Constantinople is to be part of the swag awarded to Russia." Neither the proposal nor the vocabulary is mine. What I did say, and what I want Mr. Ince to try to understand, is that, unless, as a result of this war, Russia obtains the secure passage of the Dardanelles, she will not be able to transport her eastern commerce from the Sea of Marmora through the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Does Mr. Ince want this?

No. Mr. Ince wants to know if "I think that any military success which Russia may now attain can compensate for the lives sacrificed in Gallipoli and in Mesopotamia?"

Artful Mr. Ince! He has confused two separate questions—and I am to be caught either way. Let me disentangle his barbed words. One question is, "Can any military success whatever compensate for the lives sacrificed in Gallipoli and in Mesopotamia?" The other is, "Can any military
success compensate for our military losses in Galipoli and in Mesopotamia. Whatever my personal prejudice might be with regard to the first, the answer of the world is clearly "Yes!" With regard to the second question, I may answer that the present Russian successes in Galicia, Asia Minor, and Persia are in a good way to outweigh our mishaps.

When Mr. Ince calls the Mesopotamian campaign a "disastrous defeat," I should like to know by what standards he is judging, and what his authority is for making such judgments. C. E. BECHHOFER.

... "RUSSIA AT THE CROSS-ROADS."...
Press Cuttings.

No comment, as far as we know, has yet been made upon our suggestion of last week that the war loan of a hundred millions should be raised without interest. As a witness of the will of the people of this country, we are sure that our suggestion will be taken up and that the whole of the loan will be made.

The Government has, however, decided to offer a subscription of five per cent. interest on the loan. In time of war, especially when it is remembered that the sea-owners have been forced to send their ships to foreign ports, it is not surprising that the position of the cotton operatives to-day, as compared with the past week, twenty-four men have been sent by the Isle of Man Labour Exchange to "sign on" on boats involved in the dispute. He calculated that if we continued the war until we achieved a decided victory, the national debt would be increased by at least 5,000 millions. We were raising the money by the issue of private loans. If the money were raised by the Government, it would be possible to raise the interest on the loan to five per cent.

The financier was able virtually to blackmail the State. He calculated that if we continued the war until we achieved a decided victory, the national debt would be increased by at least 5,000 millions.

Perhaps one of the most striking features of the war has been the comparatively little inconvenience caused to the general public by the withdrawal of, roughly, one medical practitioner in every three from ordinary medical practice and their transference into the Army.

In the financial world no one knew when Mr. Hill spoke whether he meant what he said or not. He combined an apparently reckless frankness of speech with a baffling and often seemingly unnecessary tortuousness.

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Perhaps one of the most striking features of the war has been the comparatively little inconvenience caused to the general public by the withdrawal of, roughly, one medical practitioner in every three from ordinary medical practice and their transference into the Army. There must be very few necessary callings in which the withdrawal of a third of their members can have caused such slight inconvenience; medical charges have not increased in the slightest to the public. . . . In the opinion of your medical officer the whole arrangements for general medical practice are on a wrong basis altogether. At the present time every doctor is in competition with his fellows for his daily bread, and this competition is good neither for the medical man nor for his patients. . . . Medical success is not necessarily dependent upon a doctor's skill and knowledge; it depends upon much besides—for example, the size of his house, the luxury of his motor-car, the charm and ability of the doctor's wife: all these influence the patient, and the doctor must be venture to criticise those who employ him! How fares he, for example, should he tell his chief magnate that there are fancied ailments? Should he tell his chief magnate that the death-rate from consumption is due to his germ-breeding cottages, how would he fare?—M.O.I., Isle of Wight.

There are slave-making ants of many degrees. Some keep slaves as aids to their own industry; some let the captives do the dirty work, while the masters go to war for still further riches; but at last, we come to an old-class, where work, and that employment would rob her of all her doctor's skill and knowledge; it depends upon much besides—for example, the size of his house, the luxury of his motor-car, the charm and ability of the doctor's wife: all these influence the patient, and the doctor must be venture to criticise those who employ him! How fares he, for example, should he tell his chief magnate that there are fancied ailments? Should he tell his chief magnate that the death-rate from consumption is due to his germ-breeding cottages, how would he fare?—M.O.I., Isle of Wight.

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