NOTES OF THE WEEK.

The "Times" on Monday said that the resignation of Mr. Henderson was "only an episode necessitating a rearrangement of offices among the Labour members"; and so for the moment it has proved. But for the moment only. It may be true, as the "Times" goes on to say, that "the best Labour elements in Parliament are arrayed against him"; but unfortunately for this species of political optimism, the best Labour elements in Parliament are neither the best nor the most representative in the country. Mr. Barnes, who succeeds Mr. Henderson in the War Cabinet, confesses to being in a minority of one in his own Union. In other words, when he speaks in Parliament he speaks for himself alone. Mr. Hodge is in scarcely a stronger representative position; and only Mr. Wardle, among all the best elements to which the "Times" refers, can pretend to be upon good terms with his Union. But it follows that if the Labour Ministers are not representative of their unions they are representative of nothing in particular. Their merits are not individual but collective; they are symbols and not the thing itself. Take away, therefore, their representative character, put them at cross-purposes with their Labour constituencies, and, instead of a source of strength to the Government, they are a source of weakness, under whatever name they sail. It is this tendency that has been accelerated by the Henderson episode, and that makes of the events of the last few weeks something more than mere Parliamentary episodes. Labour opinion in the country generally is growing more and more out of sympathy with Parliamentary Labour; with the probable consequence that before very long the alienation will be complete and visible.

We do not propose to review all the circumstances of Mr. Henderson’s resignation, even now that they have become less mysterious than when we wrote last week. It is possible to regard the event as due to a misunderstanding upon both sides; and at that we are content for the present to leave it. On the other hand, we cannot see that upon any explanation the problem of the Stockholm Conference has been either illuminated or settled by it. Strictly speaking, in fact, the resignation of Mr. Henderson and all the circumstances attending it are irrelevant to this question whether a Stockholm Conference is or is not desirable. Upon this question we have not changed our minds, nor are we likely to. In our opinion the Stockholm Conference remains desirable and is fast becoming urgent; and not all the resignations of all the Labour Ministers would, in our view, alter these judgments. That the official (and proper) dissociation of the Russian Government from the responsibility of initiating the Conference has cleared the ground of one misunderstanding; and that the coincident declarations of our own, the French and the American Governments against the Conference have cleared the ground of another—we are prepared to agree. But since it was never an argument for the Conference that the respective Governments of the parties were publicly in favour of it; we do not see that their declared hostility is now any argument against it. On the contrary, if we may dare to say so, the indifference of the official Governments is almost a condition of the success of the Conference from an international point of view. Nothing, in fact, would militate more against the hopes we entertain of such a Conference than the open collusion of their Governments with the official groups of delegates.

This is not to say, however, that policy may not persuade the official Governments, while appearing to oppose the Conference, actually to support it. "When I want to appear to want something that I really do not want," said Napoleon, "I employ Talleyrand"; and in a similar but reverse sense the official Governments may say that when they want to appear not to want something they really want they can employ the International Socialist movement. For we cannot suppose that however honestly the mass of its critics condemn the proposal to hold a Conference at Stockholm, the few clever strategists in politics can in their hearts altogether disapprove of it. For popular appreciation of the possible advantages of such a Conference let us put a hypothetical case. Let us suppose that an oppor-
representatives are by mental capacity and training
peace-conference; it will not settle the terms of peace;
competent in any of these respects would be wise. But
favourable circumstances. To refuse to make use of
discussed at it; if the representatives of neutral and
neither the Conference nor the circumstances in which
influence to the Conference is, in our opinion, a
opportunity offered of carrying on Allied propaganda under
bureaucracy. The impression intended to be conveyed
by Mr. Balfour that the Government in June,
but in enemy countries. Let us suppose that the
indeed, this country and our Allies have spent millions
advantage of all the Allies to make use of the
but groups of enemy parties, also with influence
common lingo or jargon; and, chief advantage of all
propaganda and the groups receiving it were in fact
in the causes of peace are likely to be unfitted to do the work of
diplomacy. We largely
indeed, this country and our Allies have spent millions
opinions and propaganda likely to be favourable to the
advantage of all the Allies to make use of the
defects of the
as they are, of Mr. Balfour's claim
upon him; and, in the second place, that the published
and who are, as we have said before, men in the
British delegates (in Lord Hugh Cecil's eyes) that
whit more responsible or experienced than our own.
advantage of all the Allies to make use of the
especially when the cost was likely to be small and
to consider them. And the first of these is the argument

On the other hand, the advantages of sending just such
among enemies and neutrals. Even if it were possible,
advantage of all the Allies to make use of the
friends: it is not a
the Conference, we dealt last week. Others, however,
advantage of all the Allies to make use of the
Unfavorable circumstances. To refuse to make use of
advantage of all the Allies to make use of the

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British delegates (in Lord Hugh Cecil's eyes) that
whit more responsible or experienced than our own.
advantage of all the Allies to make use of the
especially when the cost was likely to be small and

street, for the most part, in whom the sight of a German who may conceivably be partly responsible for the horrors of this war is certain to arouse recollections of the last and the defensive training will fail to impress. What may therefore be expected is rather violent scenes at the Stockholm Conference than anything approximating to "hob-nobbing.

Of all the objections to the Conference, the legal quibble supplied to the Government by Sir F. E. Smith, the other of which is Mr. Snowden's view is, if anything, more wrong-headed; for he alleges, in the face of all the evidence to the contrary, that the chief reason for holding the Stockholm Conference is the conviction arrived at by the Labour and Socialist movement that a military victory over Prussia is no longer possible. Nothing, however, is farther from the truth; and the statement is on a par with a former statement made by Mr. Snowden that the Russian Revolution was motivated by the desire for peace without victory. The reply is simply that Mr. Snowden is mistaken. As little as the motive of the Russian Revolution was peace is the motive of the Stockholm Conference in the minds of the majority of its delegates the conviction that a military decision on the war is impossible. On the contrary, if that were indeed the conviction of the British delegates, we shall be on the ground that the Socialist party were usurping the rights of the State that alone has the responsibility of making peace. Mr. Snowden's influence, however, may be expected to be of a piece with his private conviction. He will certainly, therefore, convey to the Conference, and hence to Germany, the impression that a few people, at least, in this country, despair of a military decision of the war. Facing these facts frankly we are, nevertheless, still of the opinion that neither Mr. MacDonald nor Mr. Snowden, nor both together, are fatal objections to the Stockholm Conference.

Let it be supposed that they speak as we expect them to speak, they will, in the first place, find themselves outnumbered and out-represented by the rest of the British delegates in the second place, they will be opposed by the German Minority Socialists (who have, as we know, a particular explanation of the war) and by many neutral delegates; and, in the third place, these views are in no sense destructive of the more general attitude we know them to have adopted, namely, hostility to German autocracy. In comparison with the last consideration alone, how much more if the German Majority Socialists, the responsibility of this war in favour of the Allies is a fact in the making that Mr. Snowden cannot affect. The great question is whether the Prussian Government, by its constitution and by its character, is likely, under any conceivable circumstances, to be friendly to a lasting peace; and since, as we believe, the main discussions of the Conference will turn upon this point, and as it is upon this point that both Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Snowden agree with the rest of the world, their influence, on the whole, will be in favour of rather than against the Allies.

The positive aims of the mass of the British delegates can be easily defined. They are, first, to lay upon Germany and to the degree of their power upon the German Minority Socialists, the responsibility of this war; and, second, to dispose of the German delegates by the democratisation of their Government as the sole condition of a durable peace. In this sense we regard the delegation as a moral and democratic mission, whose object is the correction of the errors of the Ger-
man Socialists and their amendment in the future. To imagine that the British and Allied delegates, or, for that matter, the neutral delegates either, are proposing to attend the Conference in order to return with a mandate to their Governments in favour of a German peace, a peace with the Belgian and Dutch, a peace with the Central powers, is to misconceive grotesquely both the temper and ideas of the men it is proposed to send. On the contrary, the mission is as much a belligerent mission against Prussia as the Army now operating every day by one of a different and more direct purpose. If the methods used by the Allies towards the end of the enemy, as the military methods of the latter must needs also be. Our object is, we say quite plainly, to weaken the intellectual moral of Prussia by attacking her Socialist support; and if, while the armies are at work upon the Prussian troops, our Allied Socialists can get to work upon Prussian Socialists, the opportunity, as we said last week, of abbreviating the labours of the Army should not be missed. Nothing much, it is true, may come of it. We cannot guarantee beforehand that the democratisation of Germany—the only condition, remember, will be brought about by this ultimatum, will be nearer by it. The possibility, however, is there; and it would be criminal to fail to make trial of it. For this and for still another reason we may hope that the question of passports, in spite of Mr. Bonar Law's announcement of the finality of the Government's veto, will not be regarded as closed. Since, on every hand, and even in official quarters, the democratisation of Germany is admitted to be the condition preliminary of a durable peace; and since, we repeat, it is the Allied Socialists and Labour representatives alone who can possibly assure it, or even bring it within the region of probability, we pray that the Government may reconsider its decision at the eleventh hour and grant the passports. Nothing but good can come of it; if not good the result will be at worst indifferent.

The other reason is more general. It is often, we know, the case in policy that the choice is between the bad and the worse. Lord Morley, indeed, used to say that it is always the case. Let us, therefore, suppose that contrary to all our judgment of it the Stockholm Conference was deemed really to be as bad a policy as it appears to have in mind, was incompatible with the democratic aims of the Allies in general terms, but: their democratic aim in particular such as some sections of the Allied Governments appeared to have in mind, was incompatible with a durable peace, incompatible with democracy, and incompatible with the programme for the democratisation of Germany, it should be obviated by all the means at the disposal of the guardians of the democratic and Socialist ideals, the British, in particular, the French, the Americans, and the Labour and Socialist movements against their Governments. For whatever may be the attitude of other parties to Germany, the attitude of the International Socialists cannot be other than tolerant of the German democratisation and thereafter admitted into the comity of democratic nations, and forming the new International. As this was undoubtedly the true origin of the proposal for the Stockholm Conference, the positive alternative policy of the Allied Governments, if it is effectually to suppress it, must remove the apprehension on which it was founded. It must, in short, reaffirm with more clarity than before not merely the democratic aims of the Allies in general terms, but their democratic aim in particular. We are not writing now of detailed terms of peace, such as, we agree with Mr. Balfour, may well be left to the actual Peace Conference. We are meaning the democratic aims as regards the future of Germany. For whatever may be the attitude of other parties to Germany, the attitude of the International Socialists cannot be other than tolerant of the German democratisation. It follows that a common declaration by the Allies that they hope definitely to see Germany democratised and thereafter admitted into the comity of democratic nations, would go a long way towards removing the apprehension which gave birth to the demand for the Stockholm Conference. The Allies have still, therefore, the question in their hands. They are meeting this week or next; and by the precedent of Stockholm must come up for final solution. They can either make Stockholm unnecessary; or they can make it more imperative than ever.
Even the thought of separating from Russia, the Polish Problem During the Great War: Past and Present.

By Mieczyslaw Tuleja.

In the early days of the war, when big issues were raised, there was a tendency to submerge Poland in the sea of the Slavonic world and to treat her as a part and parcel of Russia.

All three partitioning Powers, from the very day the final partition of Poland took place, were afraid that, in the event of an international conflict, the voice of the Polish nation would make itself heard, with its unanswerable demand for restoration of its independence. These imperial robbers were afraid that in the event of such conflict Europe might compel them to return to Poland all that they have seized.

The Polish nation, long dissolved in the Germano-Russo-Austrian ocean, and that, therefore, the Polish question also does not exist. That, in the event of an international conflict, the voice of the oppressed Polish nation would make itself heard, long ago; that they were long since compelled to return to Poland all that they have seized.

That, in the event of such conflict Europe might compel them to return to Poland all that they have seized.

In the proclamation of November 5, Germany, one of the partitioning Powers, admitted Polish independence. Then came its recognition by President Wilson in a message to the Senate. Later still was the Russian Revolution, and the Proclamations of the Council of Workmen's and Soldier's Delegates and of the Provisional Government.

In this declaration there is no question of a delusive reference to "autonomy." It denounces the "hypocritical promises of the old régime, which could," as it states, "but would not execute them." It acclaimed the heroism of "precursors of Polish liberty"—both old and recent—who fought against that autocracy, which has been abolished by the triumphant Russian Revolution.

Thus the Russian Provisional Government has confirmed the right of Poland to decide her own affairs. Lastly, there was Mr. Bonar Law's statement on April 26th in the House of Commons welcoming Polish independence on behalf of the British Government. "Our efforts in the war," said Mr. Bonar Law, "will be directed towards helping Poland to realize her unity on the lines described in the Russian proclamation, that is to say, under conditions which will make her strong and independent. We hope that after the war Great Britain will remain united to Poland in bonds of close friendship."

All this is a complete vindication of the propaganda carried on in this country by those Poles who were not afraid to say that the Polish nation rejects with disdain any kind of "autonomy," and that it desires only real and complete independence. It is now recognised that nothing less than this can satisfy the Polish people.

The Polish question is an international question, i.e., it cannot be settled by any of the partitioning Powers, or even by their united agreement, but only by an International Peace Conference, which will have to make due account of the will of the Polish people. By the way, it was with very great regret that I read in some of the London papers, only a few days ago a statement of M. Camile Huysman, the Belgian deputy and secretary of the Socialist International Bureau, where he said that "the Polish question is one for Austria and Russia." No, it is not! For either the problem of Poland will be settled by the partitioning Powers, and then the repetition of the crime of 1815, with all its consequences, is inevitable, or, if it is to be settled according to the common justice and in the interest of a lasting peace in Europe, it must be
settled by all the belligerent peoples. Using M. Huysman's words, "I have the impression that the coming peace will be more the work of the peoples than of Governments."

The Poles know that the British Empire will have an important word to say in the international settlement of the Polish question, and they sincerely hope that the representatives of Great Britain at the Peace Conference will, without hesitation, support the Polish demand for independence.

Those who have traced the development of the Polish question throughout all the stages by which it has grown during the war, cannot have failed to be impressed by its close connection with the vicissitudes of democracy; that the Polish cause waxed bright when the cause of democracy was stronger, but became dull and lifeless with the temporary rally of autocracy. And this, in itself, is the surest proof of the righteousness of our cause, and the surest refutation of the arguments of our enemies.

The watchword of the Poles is, and for ever will be, that the nations of the world should live in peace and liberty, as free with free, and equal with equal.

Let the workers of England see to it that our cause be not again betrayed at the Congress of Peace—that the Congress which is to end all war be not a second Congress of Vienna.

In Defence of Virtue.

The "New Witness" has recently attacked the consistency of Mr. Snowden, a reputable member of Parliament, a gentleman whose rhetoric is informed with a spirit of piety altogether refreshing in these cynical days. I have waited in vain for some abler apologist to come forward in defence of this maligned statesman, whose heart beats in sympathy with the downtrodden masses.

In default of such, I venture to apologist to come forward in defence of this maligned caterers, amongst whose numerous patriotic activities sprawl the democracy as "gin-sodden"; it is described he is a bigot on the subject of strong drink, having endurance and self-denial, upon which our political and religious leaders depend. There are reforms needed, and a proper kind of virtue, particularly alcoholic abstinence, are bound up with wages, an institution—deny it who dare?—that calls out all those qualities of patience, endurance and self-denial, upon which our political and religious leaders depend. There are reforms needed.

Mr. Snowden has repeatedly said it, but that is altogether different in spirit and substance from laying irremediable hands upon the Ark of the Covenant. Upon reasonable reform men of good-will ought now to concentrate, and I do not doubt that they will discover no more ardent spirit than Mr. Snowden; but their kindly efforts to ease the wage-earner's burdens and strengthen his class of virtues would be frustrated, if not dissipated, by any vindictive attack upon the basis of our great economic system. I have not discussed it with him, so I cannot say whether the practical Mr. Snowden more regrets the economic disturbance threatened by wage abolition, or the moral Mr. Snowden would more regard the disappearance of those virtues and disciplines to which I have alluded.

Yet another aspect of Mr. Snowden's splendid consistency calls for comment. He is one of that distinguished band of feminist leaders who, knowing how salutary if not delightful wagery is to men, insist on women sharing in its labours and privileges. Even though he entertains pacifist views, I am sure he is a revolutionist and an iconoclast, waiting with patience for the moment to strike down our national fabric and crown the wreckage with a Phrygian cap. It is possible, that in moments of oratorical exhalation, he may have led his audience to picture him in the rôle of Marat, but we must judge him, not by his rhetoric, but by his deeds. At the Grand Inquest, the question will be put to Mr. Snowden as to Tomlinson—what did he do, and not how did he pose.

The sober reality, then, of Mr. Snowden's career is that he is a gentleman in active alliance with the Labour party. New is the Labour party composed of politicians who ardently believe in the wage-system, and who live laborious hours in perfecting it. They would raise wages if they could, but recognising that labour is a commodity, they logically infer that the better the commodity the higher the wages. It follows—this cannot be denied—that a sober commodity is better than one that is "gin-sodden." We are therefore justified in expecting from Mr. Snowden such suitable and eloquent moral appeals as may serve the great purpose of securing that quality of labour that can be exploited to the best advantage, and insist that a commodity is something that exists to be exploited. If this were not so, how could Messrs. Lyons pay Mr. Snowden a dividend upon his investment, the reward of his eloquence and abstention? It is therefore obvious that in condemning the drifting propensities of the wage-earners, Mr. Snowden proves how sincerely he believes in sober and therefore efficient wagery, incidentally securing a good dividend for himself and his fellow exploiters.

Serious as are the moral and religious aspect of Mr. Snowden's career, his economic effect is more important and dangerous. In these critical days, when thrones are toppling and constitutions are thrown into the melting pot, it is pleasant to reflect that we have in Mr. Snowden a vigilant guardian of our economic system, and an eloquent protagonist of morality. There are none, I know, who would bring down the existing economic system by a blasphemous rejection and a ribald condemnation of the wage-system with its basic commodity theory of labour. Clear-eyed and alert, Mr. Snowden stands sentinel against these intruders and disturbers. He, if none other, understands that the moral virtues, particularly alcoholic abstinence, are bound up with wages, an institution—deny it who dare?—that calls out all those qualities of patience, endurance and self-denial, upon which our political and religious leaders depend. There are reforms needed, Mr. Snowden has repeatedly said it, but that is altogether different in spirit and substance from laying irremediable hands upon the Ark of the Covenant. Upon reasonable reform men of good-will ought now to concentrate, and I do not doubt that they will discover no more ardent spirit than Mr. Snowden; but their kindly efforts to ease the wage-earner's burdens and strengthen his class of virtues would be frustrated, if not dissipated, by any vindictive attack upon the basis of our great economic system. I have not discussed it with him, so I cannot say whether the practical Mr. Snowden more regrets the economic disturbance threatened by wage abolition, or the moral Mr. Snowden would more regard the disappearance of those virtues and disciplines to which I have alluded.
sers. He very properly objects to diluting water with whiskey in whatever proportions, but what more enticing prospect can there hold out to the men returning from the trenches to find their labour diluted (and their wages lowered) by a million more happy and contented sweethearts and wives? In his concept of the 'bourgeois democracy' the worker is not to be a source of pleasure and content to Mr. Snowden that wagery is thus perverted (thereby providing a wide field for platform exhortation) whilst the aspirations of women to go into industry have been realized. Was there ever a more perfect instance of two birds with one stone? Truly may we say that great rewards await the diligent moralist.

Now, in my occasional walks down Fleet Street, as the tea hour approached, I have sometimes entered one of those ornate establishments of which Mr. Snowden is part proprietor. I have noticed that all my model wants were supplied by young women under the guidance of a woman manager and, on leaving, a young woman in a cage has taken my sixpence, returning one halfpenny. (Somehow or another, my tea always costs fivepence-halfpenny. It is, I think, a dispensation of the water). I wish to be very explicit at this point. I desire not to demonstrate to the public meeting, a Nonconformist minister in the chair, when Mr. Snowden has been denouncing with vigour and unction the drink traffic; of a gin-purveying business, he could speak with directness and urbane to Mr. Snowden that he has been ignobly inconsistent. He is, of course, too sweet-tempered and urbane to harbour any ill will to the wage-earners, so necessary to our national prosperity. They wrongly assume that he is guided by ideals inconsistent with partnership in the sale of intoxicating liquors. They forget that wage-earners, so necessary to our national economy, whom he would exhort, that their labour may be improved by society, and its quality as a commodity rendered more marketable for exploitation.

Personal v. Political Freedom

By Ramiro de Maeztu.

II.

Almost all discussions of political theory in modern times tend fatally to turn upon one point: is the individual or society the legitimate origin of rights? As the word 'origin' has not in this connection a historical meaning, the question reduces itself to another: ought laws to tend to the satisfaction of the individual or to that of society? From Leibnitz onwards the German of the eighteenth century has been dominated by the individualist idea. The essay of Stuart Mill 'On Liberty' was inspired by Wilhelm von Humboldt's essay on the 'Limits of Activity of Governments.' Stuart Mill published his essay in 1859; that of Humboldt was published in 1851, but it had been written before 1850. Humboldt died in 1859. I am saying that the ideas of Humboldt belonged to the nineteenth century and not to the Germany of the nineteenth century. The Napoleonic invasion was the historical cause that induced the German thinkers to give up the individualist idea and to replace it by the organic concept of society or the State.

This experience of invasion only exemplified the evident impossibility of founding a society upon the individualist idea. Stuart Mill placed in the front of his essay this thought of Von Humboldt: 'The grand leading principle towards which every argument unfolds in these pages directly converges, is the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity.' Upon this principle it is impossible to construct a society. A soldier in a trench will not remain in his place in case of danger and if flight is possible if he is convinced that the only essential and absolute thing is his own development. Humboldt does not say 'his own' but 'the individual's development.' Yes, but why should the soldier prefer the development of others to that of his own? Stuart Mill does not accept the full consequences of Humboldt's principles. On the contrary, at the beginning of his essay he tells that his purpose is "to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of societies with individuals": "that principle is that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their members is self-protection." In another place he maintains that each person "should be bound to bear his share of the labours and sacrifices (1) which it is necessary to construct a society," and on another page he speaks of "the inherent rights of society."

The contradiction is obvious. One cannot accept at the same time the principle of social defence and the principle that each man ought to aspire "to the individuality of power and development," as Humboldt preached. Either the principle must be the individual, as the Germans of the eighteenth century believed, or the principle must be society, as the Germans of the nineteenth century have thought, or there must be found a third principle, neither the individual nor that of society, such as that of the public thing, the republic, the commonwealth, which is the European, classical and eternal principle.

The individualistic principle is no good. As a matter of fact it is not a principle at all, but purely the inevitable casuistry of an idea. The Russian people who have betrayed their trust said to themselves what every conscious man must think when he sins. What was said in Galicia? (1) this war is not good; (2) be the war what it may, life is before everything; (3) let me save my life, my own life. We have all said this in effect when we have sinned, (1) what I want to do is not a sin, and if our consciousness is not satisfi-
fied with this negative, we take the second step, which consists in questioning the validity of the whole ethical system—(2) why should I obey the commandments of the socalled moral law? And we arrive inevitably at the thing that falls me, individuality. It is up to everyone everywhere but I; I am Number One. This casuistry is ineradicable in the spirit of man, for as man is both rational and capable of sin, his reason often makes itself the lawyer of his sin. What we can do to-day is to dishonour this casuistry by persecution. So long as every man says to himself, and society institutions remind him, that that individual consciousness is born of our baseness, it will be possible to overcome it; but this casuistry will become our master if it acquires respectability and honour, either because we judge it to be "scientific," or because it is repeated to us by people apparently worthy of respect, as the Lenin delegates probably appeared to the soldiers of the Fourth Russian Regiment. That is why societies find themselves compelled to persecute and to dishonour this casuistry of individualism. What is done by Governments has to be done by trade unions against blacklegs, and not equally done by every society that has not lost its instinct of self-preservation. The subsistence of any society which recognises the supremacy of the individual is inconceivable. But this does not oblige us to acknowledge society as the supreme principle of rights. Why not? First, because society is not a principle, but rather a result. All theories that proclaim the social principle are founded on the assumption that the social is first; and by the social is understood some kind of collective or super-individual consciousness, from which are derived individual consciousnesses. But nobody has ever proved the existence of collective consciousness. When we read in the newspapers that "Germany wants," or "the rulers of Germany want," or "the rulers of the Church want." Every other meaning lacks sense. What usually happens is that the rulers of Germany or of the Church speak in the name of Germany or of the Church, because their words acquire by this means an authority lacking if spoken in their own names. Collective personalities are only words invoked by men in power in order not to give account of their actions.

Thanks to these ghosts of collective personalities, it is possible to constitute stable and disciplined societies; but their discipline is oppressive, because it is founded on the assumption that society is a principle of authority. We have here what I have called "a principle of possible practical triumph, a miscarriage of justice." In purely authoritarian societies there is discipline, but there cannot be justice, because they are founded precisely in the injustice which maintains some men above and the rest below.

The escape from this authoritarianism cannot be found in individualism or in individualistic Liberalism, for these are not principles of association; but it must be found in the primary of things. We have said that Societies are only results. What, then, is first? On the one hand, the isolated individuals, but these do not constitute societies so long as they are isolated. But besides the individuals there are things. Men are born into a world of valuable things such as the planet Earth, or life or ideas, which impose obligations on mankind, because they have the property of provoking in the moral character of man a feeling of obligation towards them. Some of these obligations are of such a nature that man cannot fulfill them in his isolation. Hence the necessity of Societies. What is England? Is England merely constituted by her rulers and ruled? But beyond both the rulers and the ruled there are, among a thousand other things, the soil of England, her coal-mines, the towns and the roads constructed by former generations, the tradition of the sea, the translation of the Bible, the plays of Shakespeare, the Book of Common Prayer, the Hymns Ancient and Modern, Trial by Jury, Parliament, etc.

Not only England, all human societies are constituted around goods, values, or things concrete and abstract, which are also things in the sense that they are not persons. And the only principle of society and of discipline which offers to man the probability of defence against the unjust oppression of other men is the one that begins by acknowledging the primacy of the thing; or of the goods, as the only legitimate origin of rights, and does not grant to the individual or to society any other rights than the necessary to realise the function of maintaining and increasing the goods. It is the only principle that contains the necessary moral authority with which any man can face rich and poor, ruler and ruled, society and the individual, and put to them the question whether they are fulfilling their duties or whether they are not exceeding their rights.

The Collected Papers of Anthony Farley.

(VIII.—WASTE.

I AM tempted to interject a note of explanation into this narrative of my spiritual pilgrimage. Should other eyes than mine see these papers, I fear the depression that overcame me after Parnell's meeting may be misunderstood. After all, the critic may say, why should the fellow feel miserable in the embarrassment of activities? To share in the re-establishment of a nation, to bind its wounds, to soothe those wearied and distraught spirits that hover over the Island of the Saints, spirits that, in the flesh, mounted the scaffold or faced the dreary seas of transportation and exile—it were no mean task. Or to let considered action wait upon honest indignation at the miseries of a vile social and economic system—that, too, were worth effort and sacrifice. Nor does it appear from the evidence that the one excluded the other. For, after all, suppressed nationality and oppressed labour are but branches of the main trunk of injustice and triumphant tyranny. Why, then, should he be depressed, forecasting a wasted effort?

Let me then distinguish. Young though I was, I knew that to undertake too much in different directions meant dissipation of energy, something of a sin to the Quaker economy in which I had been trained. "Whatever thy hand findeth to do," I had been drummed into me from my earliest days. And I wanted to excel, to become a master of the business in hand, be it the Socialist or the Nationalist movement. Mere amateurish meddling seemed fatuous or worse. I was depressed because I could not do both; knew it to be beyond my strength, instinctively understood that Irish nationalism and British socialism were not merely diverse but antipathetic. No; I must choose. Candour, however, compels me to add that the nationalist movement attracted me because of its romantic possibilities, whereas to be an honest Socialist involved life in almost perpetual gloom and social isolation. I think I can forgive myself—and nobody else matters! For I was young, and enjoyed adventure and romance. I thought of Mazzini and Kossuth, of Thomas Davis and O'Connell, of John Mitchel and John Martin. They had their storm and adventure and romance. I thought of Mazzini and Kossuth, of Thomas Davis and O'Connell, of John Mitchel and John Martin. They had their storm and adventure and romance. I thought of Mazzini and Kossuth, of Thomas Davis and O'Connell, of John Mitchel and John Martin. They had their storm and adventure and romance.
collected the kudos. This is my debt to Tudor: he taught me the dignity of hard and honest thought; that there is no adventure so thrilling as the birth of a new idea. Across the abyss of years, I wave him my eternal gratitude.

Now that my hair is grey and I seek through spectacles at the point of my pen, I realise how woman’s; and once at Tralee, when I chanced to experience, this is mankind’s hardest task. It
be, stands up, faces Fate, and steps out. His eyes are clear, his nerves strong, his muscles taut. At least, there is no moral slackness, no softening of the spiritual tissues. Looking out upon the world to-day, I cannot too emphatically affirm that one of our seven curses is mismanaged labour. It is an economic loss that, no doubt, brings in its train moral diseases; but what shall be said at the day of reckoning of moral waste that can plead no economic excuse?

The orderly mind seeks always to correlate the day’s work with sound moral canons. In my own experience, this is mankind’s hardest task. It involves the marriage of thought with action. But the practical man, in the narrowness of his ever-diminishing soul, pours contempt upon the theorist, who, in his turn, shrinks from all action that does not strictly conform to his abstract deductions. In this way, we get two orders of society, the moralist and the economist. All my life I have tried to be a moralist, even a little sentimental. The upshot of that is that I must at this moment excuse myself. I find myself in revolt at palpable injustice in moral judgment. Parnell was not allowed to look over the dogmatic. Even if I fall back on law and custom, which turned like a snake and bit him, I cannot too emphatically affirm that one of our seven curses is mismanaged labour. It is an economic loss that, no doubt, brings in its train moral diseases; but what shall be said at the day of reckoning of moral waste that can plead no economic excuse?

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On the whole, she inwardly decided that the game was not worth the candle. London, the Quorn, Trouville, the Riviera were vastly more attractive. She suddenly remembered that, if elected, Clifford would spend busy hours with blue-books—in which she could have no part—and long hours at the House, with a separation during every Session. The role of devoted husband which she had mapped out for him was endangered.

Suddenly came the crisis. One morning Clifford opened a telegram: “Most important you attend party meeting Thursday night. Expect your presence will decide your selection. Hope Lady Annabel can come.” Clifford handed the flimsy to his wife, who read it carefully with puckered brows, nervously drumming the breakfast-table with her long pointed fingers.

“We must go, dear,” she said.

Annabel remained tantalisingly silent.

“Robotham’s telegram is very emphatic,” he urged.

“It seems a very cheap way to get chosen,” she said, slowly, “Surely we ought to trust to our principles. You wouldn’t like it to be said afterwards that you won by your wife’s smiles.”

“Her smiles to me are more precious than rubies. I’m afraid politics require some charm as a sauce to the solid fare of a serious programme.”

“If I went, I should feel as if I were selling myself.”

“I’d hate to go without you, but perhaps that would be the more dignified way.”

“Oh, Cliff! We’ve never been separated. I can’t bear the thought of it.” Perhaps after all I can come. But not horror! It is Tannhauser night and the Warrens are coming to dinner. Of course, I might put them off.

Having struck her blow, she lapsed into silence.

“Perhaps I’d better write regrets,” he said at last.

“You’re certainly taking the only self-respecting way,” she answered; “and, oh, Cliff! I’m glad it’s your very own decision. You don’t know how I love your splendid independence.”

She sat on the arm of his chair and embraced him. Her perfumed elegance, her grace of movements, her beauty of face, her smile, her wit, her charm, her accuracy of thought, her rapid perception of detail, her emotional tone, her quick and healthy voice, were all pretty to see. She was an intellectual, a woman of culture, a woman of the world, a woman of power, a woman of the world. She was not an independent woman, but a woman who “stands on her own.”

On their way to the Opera, that Thursday night, Clifford remembered Rolleston’s rendering of the Venus appeal to the traveller sorrow-stricken after a separation during every Session.

“The magical music bore Clifford along that strange journey to the enchanting palace where ‘siren voices in soft waves of sound’ lulled the tired warrior into forgetfulness of Heaven. Venus resumed supreme, bared her ivory breast, her whiteness shining through her soft robe, her eyes bright with pleasure, as she offered the cup of love to the conqueror. The music was beautiful, the words were beautiful, the melody was beautiful, the whole was beautiful, the whole was magnificent.

But no; horrors! It is Tannhauser night and the Warrens are coming to dinner. Of course, I might put them off.

“Sailor, come hither! Let thy check wither in the salt sea-wind; sailor, no more! Soft shall thy sleep be; dreamless and deep be, cares of the world lie far from our shore.”

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Yet mid the sweet and scented bowers I sigh for earth’s fresh woods and flowers; for our pure heaven of lucent blue; for fields adorning with morning dew; for song of birds in bouncy dells; and dear, familiar chime of bells. From thee, my queen, I must away—Ah, goddess, let me part, I pray!”

It is curious that, whilst Clifford understood Tannhauser’s revolt, he did not realise that he was in the same posture. He was hardly surprised, and not in the least annoyed, when Annabel laid her jewelled hand on his arm, asking in a whisper for what hour had he ordered the motor. “Eleven o’clock, dearest,” he answered, gently squeezing her clinging fingers. Then he thought the music told how that Tannhauser from the emotional was quickly reaching the reasoned revolt. The numbers moved more gravely:

Back—back to earth I needs must fly, or here a slave must live and die! For liberty, for liberty I thirst and yearn unceasingly; I long for battle, long for strife; yes, though it cost my very life, from thee, my queen, I must away—Ah, goddess, let me part, I pray!”

That Clifford could listen to all this and understand it, yet regard it objectively, with no sense of inner revolt, proved that Annabel need never fear that her man would be delivered from her bondage, entering on any crude enterprise.

I was recalled to reality by an attendant announcing that Lady Annabel in her motor waited. Clifford drained his whisky-and-soda, flicked some tobacco-ash off his waistcoat, signed his chit, rose and stretched himself.

“Tony, stop dreaming and come down and speak to the missis.”

So I went down. She sat there in her perfectly appointed car, nodded smilingly to her slave, and held out her white-gloved hand to me.

“How do you do, Mr. Farley? When are you coming to see me?”

Dear lady, my difficulty is not to come but to stay away.

“You double-edged Irishman, I must think out your meaning. Au revoir.”

I walked back to the lounge rather thoughtfully, to be loudly greeted by Wyatt:

“Hello, Tony! Cares of the world on you! Wherefore so solemn?”

“I was thinking of a passage in a book called Jeremiah, of which you have never heard, you pagan.”

“Wrong, my son; you’re not the only devil who can quote the Scriptures. Out with it; bet you drinks I’ll spot it.”

“Be quiet and I’ll recite it.” Apart from its relevance, it’s cooling stuff:

“’For of old time I have broken thy yoke and burst thy bands; and thou saidst, I will not transgress; when thou didst much sope, yet thine iniquity is marked before it’s corking stuff.”

“’For of old time I have broken thy yoke and burst thy bands; and thou saidst, I will not transgress; when thou didst much sope, yet thine iniquity is marked before thou wanderest, playing the harlot. Yet I had planted thee a noble vine, wholly a right seed: how then art thou turned into the degenerate plant of a strange vine unto me? For though thou wash thee with nitre, and take away. And I fear that Cliff is damned.”

With my life’s purpose utterly unfulfilled, a fool who has had his eyes on the ends of the earth, am I not, too, damned?”
Readers and Writers.

THE Military Critic of the "Times" thinks no small beer of himself; the "Times" thinks no small beer of him; and I am given to understand that even when his style is at its best the Government trembles at his periods. Being myself, however, only a literary critic who judges of the military efficiency of Colonel Repington must needs, therefore, be of that part of his total efficiency which I profess to understand, I think merely Government ale of him—a beverage which, again I have authority for saying, stands to small beer as small beer stands to wine. It is not that the Military Critic of the "Times" cannot write in the sense of conveying his ideas. Who could not convey the ideas of the Military Critic of the "Times," provided he confined himself to a modest style and vocabulary such as were adopted, let us say, by Wellington and Julius Caesar? This style, clear, workmanlike, soldierlike, was perfectly adapted to military service; and fitted the art of war as closely as the rest of the military accoutrements. Such military critics carried their vocabulary in their knapsacks; and every word and phrase of it was chosen for its military service. But the Military Critic of the "Times" is not content to write in the military tradition. Julius Caesar! he must invade the literary territory and attempt to write as we writers write. He must aim at embellishing his prose, dressing it up in civilian finery and setting it to dance. Good heavens, how he does it! But a truce to introductions, behold the style himself. Enter the Military Correspondent of the "Times" with a report of his ceremonial visit to the King's Fleet. His unhappy dispatch bears the address: "In Northern Mists"; and it appeared in the "Times" of last Wednesday.

When the grey grim forms of the King's Grand Fleet loom up before us in these Northern latitudes, they convey to us a sense of power that no one can dispute. Line after line, in ordered majesty, great ships and small, they stretch away further than the eye can reach, and as the vastness of the mighty armament becomes clear to us the terrible character of this tremendous instrument of war leaves beholders dumb.

Well, now that you have read it, what do you think of it? I know what I think of it; but my readers' opinion may be different. They may be of the opinion that it is fine writing. The "Times" is undoubtedly not of that opinion; so is Colonel Repington; and so, I imagine, will be the Government and forty-five million and a half of the population of the British Isles— including my recent correspondent, Mr. Brenton, who likes his prose written in verse. And, surely enough, if to write fine is to write a la Colonel Repington, the foregoing passage is not, as I think it, at all sea, but monstrous fine. May we, however, condescend to examine it? May we take it out of its glass-case and blow on it a little? May we inspect its splendour? As follows. The first thing that strikes the eye is the trot of the accustomed verse-forms. Trot, did I say? Here is a whole herd of horses trotting—sea-horses, perhaps, or, may I say, the horse and feet of an army? To begin with, we have the perfect line:

> When the grim grey forms of the King's Grand Fleet are seen advancing in these Northern latitudes, they convey to us a sense of power that no one can dispute. Line after line, in ordered majesty, great ships and small, they stretch away further than the eye can reach, and as the vastness of the mighty armament becomes clear to us the terrible character of this tremendous instrument of war leaves beholders dumb.

Dum! dididum! Dum!

As I last week upon a similar passage from De Quincey commented upon other excellencies than that of rhythm only; so I might this week upon this purple passage from the Military Critic of the "Times" comment upon its other defects. But to what purpose should I draw attention to the silly assonance of latitude and diadum? "di di dum dum di dum!" as I last week upon a similar passage from De Quincey. The first thing that strikes the reader is the trochee of the accustomed verse-forms. Trot, did I say? Here is a whole herd of horses trotting—sea-horses, perhaps, or, may I say, the horse and feet of an army? To begin with, we have the perfect line:

In compensation, the metrical form is immediately recovered; and the sentence closes with the perfect line:—

That no one can dispute.

Three lines of verse with the fourth a promising candidate for the bays is not bad for a single prose sentence. Can our author keep it up? Let us see. The next sentence opens well:—

Line upon line, in ordered majesty.

Splendid; and, at the same time, subtle with double entendre. To what other lines, in what other ordered majesty, than the lines and majesty of ships is not Colonel Repington hinting at? Here, as plainly as good taste may dare, we are called to read between the lines and enjoy the aesthetic spectacle of a fine writer constructing his line upon line in ordered majesty in onomatopoeia with the naval lines he is describing. Is it not excellent? Then comes another line—a different trot again. What! has this author all the King's horses at his command? Great ships and small.

Coleridgian, by my halidame! Coleridgian or Mr. Guy Thorne—one or the other, I am sure. Ah, but invention flags in the next phrase. We are in prose again. But not for long. No, no; Pegasus is merely taking his oats for some new leap in the air. Listen to the heinting of his mighty wings:—

The vastness of the mighty armament.

Shakespearian, sir, perfect Shakespearian. Count the feet of this noble trotter. They are precisely ten in number, and not a toe missing. It is a line to repeat in one's dreams; "the vastness of the mighty armament." Martial man cannot expect even when writing in northern mists to maintain this altitude of inspiration; and, indeed, the fog comes into Colonel Repington's throat and his muse slackens. "Becomes clear to us the terrible character" is pedestrian; alas, it is prose; it is even banal prose. What a fall, oh, what a fall! But our gallant Colonel is soon up again. From the prose to the sublime is only a kick; and in the very next phrase we are winging the empyrean once more in blank verse:—

Of this tremendous instrument of war.

After this, what does art demand but a solemn close, something suggestive of the grandeur and sadness of the mighty lines we have criticised? And here it comes: spondee (for so I take it); amphibrach; spondee (for so I take it).

Leaves beholders dumb.

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Notes on Political Theory.

The Radical doctrine of liberty in the form which it took with J. S. Mill has since been severely criticised. In the way of earlier criticism nothing better was done than by Mr. Justice Stephen's "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity," and a good deal of it is still final from the point of view of the political philosopher. The claim of the doctrine as a political theory was greatly affected by the change in the prevailing philosophy from Empiricism to Idealism. This gave, no doubt, new points of view. But like most innovations it was accompanied by a good deal of hot gospelling: and prophets of a new view ethic the old one. And in the case of Idealism there is another more individual reason. It has a peculiar trick of synthesis. It builds truth out of opposite errors. Truth is true because it interprets, and the interpretation is absolute.

You must begin by pointing to the element of truth in the view you are criticizing. In practice this means that if it doesn't contain any, you must pretend that it has some, and to a little ingenuity all things are possible. As an accomplishment this sort of thing is admirable: but as a method of historical appreciation it is disastrous. Though it is often traced to Hegel, and its affinity with his dialectic methods is pretty obvious, it goes much deeper. It is very marked in Green and Caird, who were not particularly affected by the devices of Hegel; while in other writers—such as Bosanquet—whose knowledge of Hegel is immense, it is not specially developed, and hardly ever used in a misleading way.

It is worth while pointing out in greater detail why this is so, for the influence of Hegel on modern English philosophy, and especially on the political side of it, is very generally misapplied. The real characteristic thing in his work is the detail of his dialectic, preceding the element in his thinking to which the "Hegelians" in this country have taken least kindly. It has, of course, been studied in the Logic: but only a few very lesser men have cared to watch the stretching of the facts of the history of philosophy or art or Society on the Procrustean bed of the dialectic. On the other hand, the general influence of Hegel has been enormous; but this does not amount to much more than the view of the universe which he shares with other great idealists like Spinoza, or perhaps Plato. Even at that it is in the appreciation of other thinkers that this is most unhealthy. And this must be borne in mind in dealing with Mill. There is another side of the supposed influence of Hegel of which we have lately heard a great deal too much. It is inevitable that any philosophy, and especially on the political side of it, is preceding the element in his thinking to which the authority is that of other people who infringe the rights of the individual: nor is it that coercion is bad for its own sake (as some of the Liberal idealists apparently still hold): but that the State can appeal only to relatively lower impulses and motives in human nature—those, that is, that can be reached by fear of punishment. This is all that State action can be certain of securing: it may accomplish more: but the appeal to it brings these qualities to the surface and suppresses those greater dispositions on which self-reliance and responsibility and in the end all the greatness of life depend. Secondly, this theory sets its face against the idea that moral character and rational achievement are functions of social classes. The fact that a man is poor does not make him less a man, for the essentials of life are everywhere the same; and the disastrous error of most schemes for the relief or abolition of poverty is that they will treat the people in whose interests they are framed as if they were somehow less human than other people. I should say that if I do not think that the advocates of this position are all consistent in the attempt to think out the relations of these things to practice. But it must be counted to them for righteousness that they have no sympathy at all with the facile scheme for improving the working classes which is the form of the servile State that seems most congenial to the English mind.

Mr. Ramiro de Maeztu's discussions of authority and liberty and his account of the origin of political ideas have a good deal in common with this form of political theory. I do not pretend they are identical, but except for one point which is really very important, though Mr. de Maeztu does not give it much prominence, their agreement is more fundamental than their difference. Consider, for instance, the doctrine of liberty. Mr. de Maeztu and Dr. Bosanquet (whom I shall treat as the idealist political philosopher par excellence) both criticise Mill on the ground that liberty as such is of no value at all. What does matter is the content of the act of will. Mill, they agree, is interested only in providing that the individual's will should be restrained as little as possible by the wills of other individuals, or by the collective will. He does not see that this need be no more than the delibration of mere caprice. On the contrary, they argue, the eternal values and the organised self-assertion of the citizens in the end must be accounted for, and as the end of the State and the standard of good life. And they both follow Plato with curious persistence in his use of function as the principle by which a man's duty to the State and his moral worth may be determined, and in defining justice by reference to this. There is, perhaps, a slight divergence in the point of view from which justice is regarded. Dr. Bosanquet has some, and to a little ingenuity all things are possible. As an accomplishment this sort of thing is admirable: but as a method of historical appreciation it is disastrous. Though it is often traced to Hegel, and its affinity with his dialectic methods is pretty obvious, it goes much deeper. It is very marked in Green and Caird, who were not particularly affected by the devices of Hegel; while in other writers—such as Bosanquet—whose knowledge of Hegel is immense, it is not specially developed, and hardly ever used in a misleading way.

It is worth while pointing out in greater detail why this is so, for the influence of Hegel on modern English philosophy, and especially on the political side of it, is very generally misapplied. The real characteristic thing in his work is the detail of his dialectic, preceding the element in his thinking to which the "Hegelians" in this country have taken least kindly. It has, of course, been studied in the Logic: but only a few very lesser men have cared to watch the stretching of the facts of the history of philosophy or art or Society on the Procrustean bed of the dialectic. On the other hand, the general influence of Hegel has been enormous; but this does not amount to much more than the view of the universe which he shares with other great idealists like Spinoza, or perhaps Plato. Even at that it is in the appreciation of other thinkers that this is most unhealthy. And this must be borne in mind in dealing with Mill. There is another side of the supposed influence of Hegel of which we have lately heard a great deal too much. It is inevitable that any philosophy, and especially on the political side of it, is preceding the element in his thinking to which the authority is that of other people who infringe the rights of the individual: nor is it that coercion is bad for its own sake (as some of the Liberal idealists apparently still hold): but that the State can appeal only to relatively lower impulses and motives in human nature—those, that is, that can be reached by fear of punishment. This is all that State action can be certain of securing: it may accomplish more: but the appeal to it brings these qualities to the surface and suppresses those greater dispositions on which self-reliance and responsibility and in the end all the greatness of life depend. Secondly, this theory sets its face against the idea that moral character and rational achievement are functions of social classes. The fact that a man is poor does not make him less a man, for the essentials of life are everywhere the same; and the disastrous error of most schemes for the relief or abolition of poverty is that they will treat the people in whose interests they are framed as if they were somehow less human than other people. I should say that if I do not think that the advocates of this position are all consistent in the attempt to think out the relations of these things to practice. But it must be counted to them for righteousness that they have no sympathy at all with the facile scheme for improving the working classes which is the form of the servile State that seems most congenial to the English mind.

Mr. Ramiro de Maeztu's discussions of authority and liberty and his account of the origin of political ideas have a good deal in common with this form of political theory. I do not pretend they are identical, but except for one point which is really very important, though Mr. de Maeztu does not give it much prominence, their agreement is more fundamental than their difference. Consider, for instance, the doctrine of liberty. Mr. de Maeztu and Dr. Bosanquet (whom I shall treat as the idealist political philosopher par excellence) both criticise Mill on the ground that liberty as such is of no value at all. What does matter is the content of the act of will. Mill, they agree, is interested only in providing that the individual's will should be restrained as little as possible by the wills of other individuals, or by the collective will. He does not see that this need be no more than the delibration of mere caprice. On the contrary, they argue, the eternal values and the organised self-assertion of the citizens in the end must be accounted for, and as the end of the State and the standard of good life. And they both follow Plato with curious persistence in his use of function as the principle by which a man's duty to the State and his moral worth may be determined, and in defining justice by reference to this. There is, perhaps, a slight divergence in the point of view from which justice is regarded. Dr. Bosanquet has
lays a great deal more stress on the provision of opportunity for the service of the community than Mr. de Maeztu does, and a great deal less on the distribution of rewards according to accomplishment. In this respect the advantage lies with the former: and it is the source of the impression one gets from the one that liberty is the very substance of life, and from the other that it is something our ancestors died of.

Against this, Mr. de Maeztu will, no doubt, point out that the basis of his theory is objective for and objective right, and that Dr. Bosanquet being an idealist is tainted with subjectivity. From certain of his references I gather that he takes all the English idealism to be a more or less disguised version of what he calls the German horyz. We may pass over—except for what has already been said—as of mainly historical interest the precise inter-relations of Hegel with T. H. Green and Dr. Bosanquet. With all respect to Mr. de Maeztu, I think he rides the subjectivist horse a great deal too hard. Though it be possible to show that a writer's theory of knowledge—if he has one—does violate the science of logical principles, he may, perchance, have made some acute observations on the way in which society works. Everything depends on the opening through which the fallacy enters. Subjectivism, we know, is the doctrine which makes the truth of a proposition or the rightness of a moral act or the value of a thing depend intrinsically on its relation to the state of somebody's mind. Mr. de Maeztu classifies the political theories he objects to according as they make social values depend on the will of the social group, or on that of the isolated individual. The first of these gives the principle of Authoritv, the second that of Liberty. Now, while the idealistic values are always realised in persons, and the greater values those which most fully realise the rational nature of man, and however much it may talk about the eternal values being those which a man sees to be good when his soul is at its highest stretch, it remains true that the precise criterion its ethical theory provides is not open, in the first instance, to the charge of subjectivism. Only experiences are valuable: experience is mind together with its object; and an experience has value in so far as it satisfies the logical conditions of comprehensiveness and harmoniousness. Values are therefore theorectically capable of being arranged in an ordered series. This is just what Mr. de Maeztu must deny. Certain things, he must hold, are valuable. They are so because they can be seen to be so, and for no other reason. Further, he is bound to maintain, there is no reason for supposing that experiences of values are also comprehensive and harmonious: still less that they are valuable because they have these particular characteristics. A divergence of this kind is sufficiently significant, but it does not turn over so small a point as the abstract idea of objectivity. It belongs, not to politics, but to the theory of abstract ethics. If the history of ethical theory has shown anything, it has sufficiently demonstrated that with regard to the kind of things that are really worth having, philosophers never differ very much from one another. They do differ from business men and priests and politicians and women.

The sceptic will, no doubt, draw the conclusions that philosophers can be shown never to differ about anything in so complete a manner as about nothing. In spite of an immense and desolating temptation to agree with him, we may try in the interests of philosophic sport to discover the real difference between Mr. Maeztu and Idealism. It is not, rs he imagines, to be discovered in objectivity; nor, as we may think most reasonably, for the functional principle, nor yet as to what things are valuable. It is in his doctrine of the State and its sovereignty, or alternatively—for it is all one—in his method of apply-

ing this functional principle. Mr. de Maeztu as I understand him, would deny the sovereignty of the State in a sense in which the idealist accepts it. There are two interesting points here. One is that when we try to find out the reasons which Idealist advocates of sovereignty from Hegel downwards (for it is a matter of the very substance of the content which they all agree) advance for the assertion of sovereignty, we find that they involve just those metaphysical theories we saw to be of little importance with regard to values: and the other is that Mr. de Maeztu has not said much about the point, an omission which I suspect has something to do with his defective appreciation of political liberty.

O. LATHAM.

Studies in Contemporary Mentality.

By Ezra Pound.

II.—"BLACKWOOD'S."

"UNANIMISM," as I said of "The Hibbert," would counsel me to regard "Blackwood's" as a personality or un dieu, introspective person presented with a brown cover, printed closely, very closely, in fact, and double columns. The object rests on the magazine rack, always on the magazine rack of a club or a library, any club, any library. I can conscientiously state that I have never seen a copy of Blackwood's in any private house whatsoever. Many people would cavil at its cover, printed closely, very closely, in fact, and double columns. Eight years ago, M., who is not always truthful, alleged that he had met a mythical Blackwood, "Old Blackwood," a man such as we are; and that this man was pleasing, and a cynic, and that he printed N. not because he believed in N.'s work or liked it, but solely because "people like that sort of thing."

But I repeat, M. is not always truthful, and I have even forgotten whether it was really N. who had been so lavishly paid for appearing in "Blackwood's." I should hardly expect N. to have returned any of the rewards of this review. I am, for all I know to the contrary, a lonely De Gama doubling an uncharted cape.

(Parenthesis: Since writing the above I have pushed inquiry further. One of the most learned officials of the Museum Britannicum assured me that "No one ever read 'Blackwood's.'"

Not content with this, I sought an officer of the old Army, who to my question replied firmly: "Yes, I have read 'Blackwood's,' and damn dull it was, too. I hear, since the war, they have never seen a copy of 'Blackwood's.'"

"M. is not always truthful."

"Isn't to-day sweet enough for you, mon ami? Just think he underestimates the Hun power.)"

I have been wounded in earlier wars than the present, but I consider his statement perfectly sagacious. (I think he underestimates the Hun power.)"

"Blackwood's" bears on its cover the following statement: "'Blackwood's' represents and appeals to all that is best in the undying genius of the race."—The "Times," Feb. 1st, 1913.

I should hardly expect M. to catch the "Times," in such an orgy of misanthropy. However, let us examine literature, the deathless voice of all the world, as presented in "Blackwood's."

"Isn't to-day sweet enough for you, mon ami? Just you and I and a punt and a perfect summer's day. Do bo's credit, and let's enjoy the present while we may."—P. 2. "Blackwood's" short story.

Opening of p. 4.—"How could anyone of ordinary flesh and blood be reasonable in a punt with Nan?
How altogether desirable she looked, half sitting, half lying, etc. . . . one graceful bare arm, etc. Nan's fingers would make anything infinitely precious.

P. 10.—"The fair, spare moustache . . ."

P. 11.—"What a boy he looked!"

P. 10.—"The fair, spare moustache . . ."

P. 12.—"Only five times this week."

P. 17.—"Asked you to marry me."

P. 12 of it, second column.—"Thank the Lord he was dead before the Askaris reached him. He struck a match to light his pipe."

P. 14 column 2.—"He had tried again and again to forget."

Last page.—"Then as she stood up arranging her hair."

NEXT STORY.

"Typical seamen the British Mercantile Marine, bronzed and breezy."

"It was plain he regarded the packet as of great importance."

"No worthy woman would willingly part for an hour, etc. . . ."

"His tears are very near; his throat chokes: what memories."

"Gentle Jesus, meek and mild. Look upon this little child."

"Even so, Lord Jesus."—Still "Blackwood's."

POESY.

"I wish that I could be a Hun, to dive about the sea, I wouldn't go for merchant men—a man-of-war for me.

And help our eyes at the periscope as the High Seas Fleet goes by."


TRAVEL BROADENS THE MIND.

"A summer's dawn in Kashmir is a lovely thing. My own destination is the Chasuma Shahi . . . I drive along the barred highway . . ."

THOUGHT.

"We are in the midst of the greatest war of history."

"June, 1917."

"The proposal to hold all elections upon one day is another sop to the Radicals and a resolute attempt to make the plural vote of no effect . . . etc. . . .

"He spoke with one unbroken policy. . . ."

"It is given to few enterprises to look back with pride and complacency upon a history of 100 years, to contemplate a long work well achieved, to one end and with one unbroken policy . . ."
indispensable in industry; and yet as not being free to be otherwise; and hence as not exercising an active function by definition? Or is it to be classified with Capital, as having the power to give or to withhold its services at its own discretion? There can be no doubt about the reply. From the fact that Labour is no more able to withhold its services to industry or to choose the use to which they shall be put than are horses or inanimate materials, Labour's function in industry is passive and not active. In short, the only active functions in industry are the functions discharged by Capital, since Capital alone has the power of withholding itself.

RESPONSIBILITY. As the word implies, to be responsible means to be answerable for. But to be, in fact, answerable for anything implies an undertaking to hold oneself in readiness to give an account of oneself. Responsibility or answerability cannot, thus, be thrust upon the individual; it must be assumed or, at least, accepted by him at a moment when another choice than to accept is open to him. Responsibility implies a choice made; an act of will; a resolution or undertaking to be answerable for a task or function. When, therefore, Labour finds itself in the position of having to work by the sale of its labour-power and with no alternative but starvation (which is no alternative at all); and when, having been thus thrust without any will of its own into industry, Capital holds Labour "responsible," and the Press preaches on the text of the "responsibility of Labour," the situation of Labour is wholly false. No choice, no responsibility. No responsibility, no answerability. No answerability, no obligation and no duty. Capital alone is responsible for industry, since Capital alone exercises choice. Only when Labour is given a choice and becomes self-directive can any responsibility attach to it.

ARBITRATION. When the two parties to industry, namely, the Capitalists and the Labourers, fail to agree upon the price to be paid for Labour, they may submit their respective claims and pleadings to an outside and supposedly disinterested party, and agree to accept his decision. Such a process of submission of evidence, and submission to an outside decision upon it, is called Arbitration. The materials for arbitration are the evidences and pleadings of the two sides, in the first place; and in the second place, they are the facts of the market in general, both as regards Capital and Labour. An arbitrator may, for example, supplement the evidence produced by both sides and bring in considerations drawn from a wider field than the area covered by the particular dispute. He may say, for instance, that the wages asked for are in excess of the market-price of labour in general and without reference to the conditions immediately before him. Or, again, he may say that the demands of the Capitalists are excessive, not merely in respect of the particular circumstances, but in respect of circumstances in general. As a matter of fact, however, an arbitrator is usually benevolently disposed, not only to Capital in general, but to the Capitalists before him in particular; and he therefore cites the immediate or the more general considerations, whichever shall prove to be the more favourable to his virtual clients.

CONCILIATION. Arbitration, as a rule, refers to disputes concerning wages; it is a means of arriving at the market-price of labour when the ordinary means have failed. Conciliation, on the other hand, is usually concerned with disputes as to conditions of labour, modes and rates of payment, workshop rates, and the like: disputes, in short, about procedure, etiquette and customs. The task of the Conciliator is to examine the grievances of the two sides and to judge which of them is the more considerable; but always upon the assumption that both parties are equally responsible. It is this very assumption, however, that invalidates the "justice" of every act of conciliation; for, in actual fact, the two sides are not equally responsible, but one is responsible (namely, Capital), while the other is not. Even upon this footing, nevertheless, conciliation may proceed, since industry must be carried on even when one of the parties has no responsibility in the matter. Conciliation is thus a Capitalists' device for appearing to be just, and Labour's device for appearing to be reasonable.

MANAGEMENT. A complete industry is composed of a series of processes each of which is designed to contribute towards the end in view, namely, the bringing to market of commodities. It is therefore necessary that all the processes shall be adapted and timed to fit into one another; and for this purpose it is no less necessary to appoint a head over each and each of these, a foreman or manager who shall be in fact responsible for the completion of the process assigned to him. From the sum of these offices or duties is called the Management. It is to be distinguished, on the one hand, from Labour, which consists of the labour-power under management; and, on the other hand, from Capital, which itself is the object for which management exists. Management is thus at present midway between Labour and Capital. Controlling Labour, it is itself controlled by Capital. Labour is "responsible" to Management, Management is responsible to Capital, but Capital is responsible only to itself. Management, however, needs not always be in this relation of subordination to Capital. On the other hand, Labour must always be subordinate to Management. To what, then, is Capital ceases to exercise control, must Management be responsible? To the industry.

RECOGNITION. To recognise is to acknowledge the existence of. But that is only the embryonic form of the Recognition spoken of in Trade Union matters. For it is obvious that an Employers' Federation that refuses to "recognise" a Trade Union cannot fail to recognise that a Trade Union exists. Something more than the recognition of its existence is required to bring about the "recognition" required by a Trade Union; and this something more is the recognition of its right to speak and act on behalf of a nation, is suddenly subverted and transformed. A Tsar, for instance, may be exchanged for a Duma; a Kaiser for a President. When such a transformation has taken place, the question arises for foreign Governments whether the new Government has the right and the power to act on behalf of the nation it professes to represent. While the matter is in doubt—in other words, until the new Government has shown signs of being able in fact to speak and act for its nation—the recognition by foreign nations of its members is delayed. But when no doubt exists that the new Government is representative, recognition is then accorded. Similarly in Trade Union affairs, a Trade Union wins recognition—the recognition, that is, of its sovereign right over its labour—when it can prove its power to control its labour. But until a Trade Union can give or withhold its own labour, its right to recognition is illusory.
Views and Reviews.

THE MORAL TEST.

The debate on the autumn adjournment of the House of Commons had many points of interest, but I shall deal with only the idea and spirit of the Test Acts. It came strangely from a Liberal, for the Liberal doctrine used to be that religious tests should be abolished, because fitness for a particular office could not be determined by agreement with certain ideas or conformity with certain practices. Certainly, in the strict sense of the word, it was not religious but a moral test that Mr. Ellis Griffith proposed; fitness to participate in the Stockholm Conference should be determined by the delegate's ability to declare that we were right in this war. "If a man did not know or would not say whether we were right or wrong in the war, he would not trust him to go to Stockholm." The test is quite simple, as simple as "Shibboleth"; once again, "the Gileadites have taken judgment." But in the words of the Goes, it was a language test that proved nationality with considerable precision; the test proposed by Mr. Ellis Griffith is a test of moral judgment that proves nothing but the inquisitor's determination to act tyrannically.

The test is a demand for moral judgment; but moral judgment is absolute, it is only a moral activity, the practice of morality, that is relative. The appeals to God that are made by both sets of belligerents, although superficially absurd, have no other purpose than obtaining the moral judgment of the Absolute; God, in the old phrase, will defend the right, and the issue of the battle will decide between the combatants. That the Absolute may deliver judgment without considering what we call evidence, is probably true; but the judgment can only be manifested to which we call evidence, and the necessary condition of the relative moral judgment of man is acquaintance with all the evidence. If the moral judgment of the Absolute is only clear to us at the end of our activities, the moral judgment of man can only be delivered at the end of his researches; any other course would be assuming the very point at issue.

The difficulty of reaching even a provisional moral judgment is insuperable to all except those who partake of the Divine nature, and who without considering the evidence. It is safe to say that the people of no one of the belligerent countries is acquainted with all the evidence, that, on the contrary, each people, by means of the censorship, is acquainted only with a selection of the evidence, which is chosen on the assumption and for the purpose of proving that the particular country is in the right. From this point of view, the Stockholm Conference may be regarded as a Court of Moral Inquiry; the conflicting claims to the moral approval of mankind will be stated, the evidence on which those claims are based will be submitted, and by the simple process of putting two and two together, a relatively more perfect judgment of the claims will be obtained than is possible so long as each belligerent people does not hear its opponent's case. It is a judgment as old as the Book of Proverbs that "every way of a man is right in his own eyes, but the Lord pondereth the heart." Without a word or two of qualification, this approval has misgivings concerning our claims to moral excellence in this connection. Mr. MacDonald is a reasonable man, and those misgivings are probably based upon evidence, and evidence, as I have said, is necessarily partial under a censorship. At Stockholm, he would meet German Socialists, who also have misgivings concerning the moral excellence of the German Government, and those misgivings are also based on evidence, necessarily partial. Which is the more probable result of their meeting; that Mr. MacDonald's misgivings will be strengthened or weakened by acquaintance with the German Socialists' misgivings of their own Government? To suppose that his doubts of our probity will become certainty, that he will come back from a conference of men practically all of whom entertain precisely similar doubts of the probity of their own Governments with the doubts confirmed, is to admit the very thing that is denied. If we are right in this war, then the evidence will prove it; if we are wrong in this war, the evidence will prove it; but the judgment cannot be delivered until the evidence is heard, and the partial statements combined in a general statement.

There is, of course, no reason to suppose that Mr. Ellis Griffith, by proposing this test, really wished to elicit a moral judgment from Mr. MacDonald. If Mr. MacDonald had risen, and had solemnly declared that we were in the right in this war, the retort would probably have been to the effect that Mr. Lloyd George says the same thing, and he does not want to go to Stockholm. If, on the other hand, Mr. MacDonald were to give judgment against us, the probability of prosecution would be imminent. We are not gagged, but the things that must not be said increase in number. There is, of course, no evidence that Mr. MacDonald thinks that we are wrong in this war; his hesitation to pronounce a judgment has nothing to do with the right of any of the combatants, it derives from a prepossession against war in general. A man who thinks that war should never occur obviously cannot express the opinion that a particular belligerent in a particular war is right, without renouncing his main principle. The advocacy of his principle certainly entails the argument that the other side may be as right as we are, or, rather, that there is another side of the case to be heard; but his main principle compels the judgment that all the belligerents are wrong because they are belligerents, and his efforts, although perhaps misdirected, have for their object the creation of an organ of international understanding which will prevent misunderstanding from issuing in belligerency. The "right or wrong in this war" test cannot be successfully applied to those people who put all war in the wrong; and the real purpose of the test is to make Mr. Ellis Griffith seem to be in the right by refusing the right of conference to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald.

A. E. R.

Reviews.

Who Can Be Happy and Free in Russia? By Nikolai Nekrasov. Translated by Juliet M. Soskice. With an Introduction by Dr. David Soskice. (Humphrey Milford: The World's Classics, No. 213. 15. 6d. net.)

Admiration is due to the translator for industry and praise to the publisher for enterprise, in having produced this English edition of Nekrasov's epic. But without a word or two of explanation, the appearance would be incomplete. Speaking of Russian literature, the introduction says: "Treasures of untold beauty and priceless value, which for many decades have been enriching and elevating the Russian mind, still await discovery here." Here, the critical temperature might be lowered several degrees without casting beneath the mark of justice. And again, of this poet in particular: "There are few literate persons in Russia who
do not know whole pages by heart . . . its artistic value as an instrument for the depiction of Russian


The energy thus spared (for the task is a severe one)

that she did not form . . . their invasion of the Balkans

Captain Temperley's work is a valuable acquisition

Captain Giles; and after that, the

Captain Temperley devotes his book chiefly to the

The Serb legends of national unity and the longing of

the Serbians and the Cyrillic letters. This difference has
difficulties offered by a mad mate. There is nothing very

began to move by natural pressure in that direction.

the Serbians have known the glory of Empire under

stephaniek considered the curse of the Russians, is characteristic of the whole Slav race. Until the creation

Stepniak wrote the history even of that race; for the problems of the Balkans were created centuries ago.

in the Near East," and of much delving in the

in all some sixty or seventy persons

shapeless buildings, consisting of a number of

Montenegro and Her Share in Serbian National Development

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History of Serbia. By Captain H. W. Temperley. (Bell. 20s. 6d. net.)

Captain Temperley's work is a valuable acquisition to history. It is "the fruit of some years of study and

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Pastiche.
MODERN LYRICS.

I.—THE VAGUELY INTERROGATIVE.
Did you see in Cumberland,
Riding to hounds upon a grey,
A lovely girl with thin brown hands,
And eyes that were very*?

Straight and narrow was her back,
Scarlet as heather was her hair,
Like heather-hokey was her hair,
And slender her hips.

Did you catch a sight of her
When hounds held on a burning scent,
Her face aflame to lead the field,
Her lips a red vent?

Saw you her returning home
Walking her horse? Did you surprise,
There in the quiet country lanes,
The lock in her eyes?

E. L.

* The answers to this and the following questions are in the negative.

II.—THE DEFINITELY DECORATIVE.

Six white cockerels a-roosting in the apple-blossom;
Red combs and white wings amid the pink and white—
Dead weight spondees and effervescent anapests—
Scarlet combs and white breasts against the pink and white—

All in apposition to an aposiopesis

GOD, a Chintz Designer—! And the sun sinks out of sight.

I reach to them across the waste of years,
The abyss, and links my far-off mind with theirs,

And feel that for each wordy strand that clears

Alas that man, by worldly cares beguiled,
Seeking with slender talk its space to span
Still strain to where my earthly course began,
A thousand fall too short. Still must I plan,
And glimpse the light that every infant sees.
Of childish action; solve such mysteries

Thy poets droop like sickly, harnessed slaves
To soft desires, while still the thunder raves;

Oh, England, how thy minstrelsy decays!

The widening gulf that yawns 'twixt child and man,
While the old institution of serfdom is abolished—at least, so I am told by those who know Russia. They submitted in this matter to an arbitrary power in which they had no part—i.e., they did not resume their old land because, if they had tried to do so, political officers would have killed them or put them in prison. They were unfree. When this type of control was removed, when there was a "solutio," the peasant immediately translated his political freedom not into the right of combining for corporate action, representation, discussion, and ultimately, perhaps, agreed laws giving him back his land, but into the direct action of walking in and taking it.

H. Bulloch.

CHILDREN.
I reach to them across the waste of years,
The widening gull that yawns twixt child and man,
Seeking with slender talk its space to span;
And feel that for each woody strand that clears

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OTTAWA S. W. LAWRENCE.

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Sir,—The discussion between the National Guildsman and the Single Taxer proceeded as follows. The latter continued: "I certainly follow you more clearly since the Single Taxer proceeded as follows. The latter knew. OTTAWA S. W. LAWRENCE.

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PRESS CUTTINGS.

Sir F. Banbury (City of London, U.) said the manner in which securities taken on loan were requisitioned by the Treasury did not tend to inspire confidence in investors.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said the hon. baronet spoke as if there was some hardship in connection with this measure. Did he really think it was a smaller thing to requisition human beings to risk their lives than to risk the resources which people possessed, if the national need required it? If that was the right hon. baronet's view it was not his. The reason why Government took American securities was because this country needed them as vital to the conduct of the war. It was said that it was necessary not to destroy the confidence of the people who possessed money. He quite agreed, and he was thankful to say that in all the experience he had had in connection with the Exchequer he had scarcely found an individual who grudged to the State the funds necessary to help it in time of need.

But in this matter there was no hardship at all. Just as in seeking men for the Armies the State took those who could help it, so in the same way it was entitled to take, whatever securities were necessary to assure that we should come out successfully in the struggle. They had had enough of that kind. He knew the House of Commons did not share the views of the right hon. baronet, and he was quite sure the City of London, which he represented, did not share them either.—"Times." Report.

When the report was over Dr. Oldenburg asked him if he knew an address I wanted in connection with the Stockholm Conference. M. Kerensky fired up at once, and said:

"There has been a serious misunderstanding. They are drawing a wrong deduction from our Note. We meant simply to state our position. We are a Coalition Government, and therefore, since the Conference is a party matter, we cannot, as a Coalition, be bound by its decisions. Our Conference, the Conference of Governments, is the London Conference. The Swedish Conference is a Conference of Labour parties. That is all we wished to say. That does not mean we are opposed to it. It is not our business to be opposed to it or in favour of it."

I said: "But it has been said that M. Albert Thomas declared you said that you personally are opposed to the Stockholm Conference and that you are not willing to have it done."

"Nothing of the sort," said M. Kerensky. "I think it of great importance, although personally I think it would have been of greater importance if it had taken place while we were advancing instead of in the present conditions. But I am not opposed to it. No. I have insisted again and again that any opposition offered to it by the Allied Governments, any difficulties put in the way of the delegates, is simply playing into the Germans' hands."

I asked, "May I telegraph this?"

M. Kerensky replied, "Certainly. You can telegraph what I said to you in the presence of M. Oldenburg as a witness."

He laughed, and then continued seriously: "Say that the Russian Government regards the Swedish Conference exactly as you regard it—that is as a Conference not of Governments but of parties. As a Coalition Government we can be neither for nor against the Conference, but only for or against one of the parties which are in coalition. For that reason, personally as President of the Coalition, I have made no speeches about it. But we consider that no obstacles should be put in the way of the Conference, and shall vote for its success. It is not so much now a question of organisation; it is a question of labour. You want both an adequate supply of labour and a willing application of that labour by those who are responsible for its use for the sake of those supreme national interests. The appeal which has been made on behalf of the Government, on behalf of the country, and on behalf of the Allied cause, to our fellow-countrymen was never more imperious or more urgent than it is to-day. It is an appeal to all who are in any way able to influence the great mass of labouring people in this country to do their best for the success of this appeal unstintedly, patriotically, assiduously, and, if possible, with even increased zeal in the performance of those two great national functions. I am certain that appeal will not fall on deaf ears. Those of us who have watched, as some of us have at very close quarters and from the very earliest moment, the progress of the war know that the success which we have achieved, the power which we have displayed, the unexampled and unexampled development of our resources which we have accomplished, are due more to any other cause than the willing and devoted co-operation of the labour classes of this country. They have gone into the Army in vast numbers. They have turned away from their old accustomed industries into new fields of labour. They have suspended and put in abeyance traditions, customs, rules, and usages which were very dear to them. They have done so willingly; they have done so patriotically. And the result has been one which I believe has never been achieved in the experience of any free, and still less of any unfree, country in the history of the world—the united co-operation of the whole population in the supreme national task. That spirit, I am certain, will continue to animate them, and will produce even greater results in the future than it has in the past three years."


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