The "Times" and its choristers are still harping an old tune. "The condition precedent of all recovery in Russia is the establishment of a stable and constitutional government." But if this were the case our outlook would be black indeed; for what power have we (apart from the question of whether the so-called "Times" specifically denies) to determine the character or the stability of any present Russian government? The nettle which very few people have yet grasped is that Russia is at this moment not only a conquered country but a country in enemy occupation. Its present form of government is not, therefore, properly speaking, a form of government at all, any more than the regulating authorities of the occupied territories of Roumania, Serbia, or Belgium can be called governments. Nor have the Allies very much more power to shape permanently the public authority of Russia than they have to shape the ruling authorities in other areas occupied by the Germans. What alone they can do for Russia politically at the present moment is precisely what they can do for Belgium. It is to preserve its idea of freedom and to labour to make it real by continuing the struggle against the common enemy occupation, or to love the form of government imposed by these conditions. And she will assuredly get rid of them as soon as she safely can.

The case is not, therefore, properly speaking, a form of government at all, any more than the regulating authorities of the occupied territories of Roumania, Serbia, or Belgium can be called governments. Nor have the Allies very much more power to shape permanently the public authority of Russia than they have to shape the ruling authorities in other areas occupied by the Germans. What alone they can do for Russia politically at the present moment is precisely what they can do for Belgium. It is to preserve its idea of freedom and to labour to make it real by continuing the struggle against the common enemy occupation, or to love the form of government imposed by these conditions. And she will assuredly get rid of them as soon as she safely can.

There are pessimists among us who despair of ever recovering Russia from the hands of Germany. Because the present occupation of Russia by Germany is a fact, and a fact, moreover, which the Germans are doing their utmost to make permanent by every form of exploitation, we must bow, they say, to the inevitable and accommodate our policy to the new orientation. We are, in other words, to accept as irremediable the present Prussian conquest of Russia. But we cannot see, for ourselves, upon what better ground this deduction is made than the ground from which the opposite conclusion is drawn in the case of the other territories now similarly occupied by Germany. If we need not and do not despair of recovering Belgium, France, Serbia, and Roumania from the enemy, why need there be despair in the continued attempt to recover Russia? The same circumstance that will enable the Allies to dictate the withdrawal of Germany from Belgium will enable them to dictate her withdrawal from Russia, and if it be replied that the one may be of negotiation while the other must necessarily imply superior force, we can answer that the difference is verbal, for Germany is about to be defeated and these movements will at once begin to decline. The case of Russia, as we say, is no different. There are pessimists among us who despair of ever recovering Russia from the hands of Germany.
Germans are willing to discuss peace on terms dictated by the Allies," we shall not abandon the war.

Mr. Henderson has now confessed that he has failed to change the opinion of the American delegates on the subject of a Socialist and Labour Conference with the German Socialists. But this was only to be expected, for, in truth, the arguments he had to offer were insufficient. Inasmuch as he had not been, nor is he, aware that the European Allied Socialists are not themselves in any sense united upon the purpose or the procedure of such a Conference. Some of them, for example, hope that at such a conference it may be possible to draw up the terms of peace on the lines of the recent Labour War-Aims Memorandum. Others entertain the hope that the Conference may provide the conditions for a slanging match between the representatives of the German democracy and the representatives of the Allied seamen. Still others fancy themselves as hob-nobbing with the German pacifists and bringing home an international Utopia. What, on the contrary, should be the sole purpose and object of the conference the majority of our European Socialists have utterly failed to realise. Yet it happens to be the one object upon which they would have been prepared to consent of the American delegation. Need we say that it is no less true of the professed democrats of the Labour War-Aims Memorandum. Others entertain the hope that the European Allied Socialists are not themselves favourable to a conference at the earliest possible moment. A definite objective would have been given to the mission which, in fact, would have taken on the nature of a crusade, A conference for the sole purpose of democratising Germany; and since each of them leaves us, as a nation, freer than we were before, we ask for nothing else; and in failing to represent it in that light our Socialists have themselves to thank for the fruitlessness of their appeals. Yet not themselves entirely, for unfortunately it is no less true of the professed democrats of this country than of our International Socialists that the last thing of which they think is the democratisation of Germany? Had our Socialists confined themselves to this and urged upon American Labour the common duty of doing all in their power to persuade the German Socialists to raise their State—the response, we believe, would have been favourable to a conference at the earliest possible moment. A definite objective would have been given to the mission which, in fact, would have taken on the nature of a crusade. A conference for the sole purpose of democratising Germany through its Socialists would have appealed to America as nothing else has; and in failing to represent it in that light our Socialists have themselves to thank for the fruitlessness of their appeals. Yet not themselves entirely, for unfortunately it is no less true of the professed democrats of this country than of our International Socialists that the last thing of which they think is the democratisation of Germany. In vain have we endeavoured to show that the democratisation of Germany is the only condition upon which a democratic peace is possible; in vain have we urged upon pacifists and democrats the duty and the necessity of democratising Germany as a condition precedent of every one of their other demands. They have not heard it. They prefer to wrangle with the so-called militarists and Imperialists among the Allies and to intrigue for a change of government; not in Germany, but in our own country. The result is likely to prove tragic; for left thus to themselves and with no support from the Allied democracies, the German Social Democrats will inevitably be driven to depending upon the Prussian sword, and will fight to the last.

The proposal to form a League of Nations has now to encounter the much more practicable proposal to perpetuate the existing League of the Allies. But against the latter not less than against the former we are opposed. What but a military and capitalist alliance could the existing League become in the circumstances; and what else could be expected of it but the perpetuation of its present military and capitalist functions? The more idealistic proposal of a Universal League suffers, on the other hand, from the additional defect of impracticability; it is simply not possible; and not to the talented and garrulous Mr. H. G. Wells will make it appear so to anybody who enquires into it. Upon the threshold of the scheme we are met by the condition that the supernational organ of the League must be both a legislative and an executive body; it must have, that is to say, both the right to legislate and the power to execute its findings. But, in the words of Mr. Brailsford, who is, we note, cooling rapidly on the subject as Mr. Wells and the rest grow warmer: "Neither our own Labour party nor any other democratic organisation has faced the problem involved for democracy in the concentration of such tremendous powers in the hands of the League of Nations." "We have learned" (we are still quoting Mr. Brailsford's article in the current "Herald") "that a mere Alliance is insufficiently enough. A definite alternative, we are sometimes asked? If the perpetuation of the existing Alliance is continually undesirable and a Universal League of Nations is impracticable, what hope is there that world-conditions will ever improve? There is one hope in the fact that after the war Germany will either cease to be a predatory Empire or become a peaceful democracy; and since it was from no other cause than the defeat of Prussia that the war arose, we may confidently assume that, with the disappearance of the cause, will disappear the effects. In other words if there should be no other consequence of the war than the defeat of Prussia, the chances of peace in the future will be greater than they have been since 1815. But even this is by no means the only consequence making for peace, without the aid of a League of Nations. There is the fact of the British-American entente which has now been cemented by alliance in a life and death struggle. If the world might have had peace in perpetuity before the war but for the militarist ambition of Prussia; if the chances of peace in perpetuity will therefore have been enhanced by the defeat of Prussia—what may not peace in perpetuity hope for from the double fact of the defeat of Prussia and the confirmation of the British-American entente? We need nothing else for our reasonable assurance of future peace than these two things; and since each of them leaves us, as a nation, freer than we were before, we ask for nothing better.

The view that Marx wrote the Bible of Socialism is supported by the variety of doctrines claiming to derive from him. The Bolcheviki claim the authority of Marx for a revolution in favour of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Some of our own Socialists claim him as a defence for conscientious objection to capitalist wars. He could be as easily cited as an authority for a League of Nations that should be a League of the ruling capitalist classes of the world. And, finally, a number of super-logical German Socialists, headed by Dr. Renner, have claimed him as the first apostle of Pan-Germanism. Their reasoning is, indeed, super-logical. Did not Marx, they ask, announce that capitalism would collapse of itself only when it had reached its final development? And is not its final development indicated in the establishment of a pax germanica or world-dominion of one monoplist Power? From this it clearly follows that the duty, nay, the sacred duty, of German Socialists, nay, of Marxian Socialists all over the world, is to facilitate the triumph of Prussia as a means to the triumph and downfall of capitalism. There is a little uncertainty in the mind of Dr. Renner, however, as there is, we hope, in the rest of the Marxian sects. The pax germanica is not, after all, the only means to a world-peace; nor is it on theoretical grounds the most desirable. Better than a world-empire, even than a German world-empire, would be, says Dr. Renner, a world-commonwealth created by the consent of free peoples. But this, it appears, is impos-
sible; and, in the alternative, there is nothing for a good Marxian to do but to support Prussia. We commend the reasoning to the Bolsheviks and to the pacifist, who write in the "Call" and declare themselves to be Marxians dyed in the wool. Either these or Dr. Renner must be wrong in their deduction from the works of the master; for it would be contrary to reason that both should be right, 'the one in fighting for Imperialism and the other in fighting against it.' There remains, however, the hypothesis that both may be wrong; and there is something to be said for it!

Several of the Irish journals continue to write as though the conscription of Ireland were still an issue; but this is to cling to a grievance after it should be dead. The proclamation of Lord French to the people of Ireland means, if it means anything at all, that discretion if not reason has won, and that the conscription of Ireland is no longer seriously thought of. All the more does it become the duty of the Irish people to themselves to perform voluntarily any that they have rightly refused to perform under compulsion. Their release from the prospect of conscription by no means releases them from the problem involved in it, namely, the defence of the common liberties of the world; and now that the authorities would give it. It is certain, moreover, that nine times out of ten the explanation would be given without endangering anything more important than the concit of one or another personage. Why, then, is it not given? Why are these carcases left to contaminate the air? The answer is to be found in the appeal addressed by Sir Valentine Chirol to the Government of India, in which he urges that to regard themselves as political educators and not merely as administrators. It is, in short, the bureaucratic habit of mind as distinct from the democratic. The bureaucrat, secure in his position, tends to become uncouth with his own rectitude. Questions addressed to him are imperinences, and suspicions arising from his evasive answers are unworthy of his regard. The democratic governor, on the other hand, would welcome questions and delight in giving explanations. By so doing he would do more than "educate" the nation, he would preserve the atmosphere in which alone good government can be permanently carried on. Is an example necessary? Of the "democratic" type there is the case of Mr. Clynes, our most successful Minister, without distinction of party. How has he come to find himself regarded not only in the House of Commons but in the country at large as a man to be trusted? It is, we affirm, from his practice of explanation and from no other cause. The most difficult problems are dispersed before him without leaving behind them a trace of suspicion. Or, if they cannot be solved—and there are such problems—his habit of frankly admitting the fact is no less disarming. His example, we venture to say, is to be commended as the only known cure for the state of mind revealed in the course of the Billing trial. Disraeli’s maxim that a public man should never "explain" is out of date.

Two or three examples of the opposite policy may be mentioned. There is the case of the Black Book of Germany to which sinister reference was made by various incredible witnesses. Would it be beneath the dignity of the Government to explain that such a black book is part of the indispensable stock-in-trade of not only every Government but of almost every department? No great danger that we can conceive would be done by the avowal. Another case is that of Mr. Henry Murray, convicted of having libelled one of the chief officials of the Board of Trade. He was intelligibly provoked to it by the stone-walling of the department; and just as certainly the department was within its official rights in not explaining the case of the Billing trial. Mr. Murray’s explanation before instead of after his campaign? What possible harm could have been done if a reasonable man had been given a reason? Our third example is still current. It refers to Lord Rothermere; a few weeks ago the public was informed that Lord Rothermere was resigning his appointment as Air-Minister for reasons of health. Last week, however, his appoint-
Establishing a kind of morally obligatory arbitration; responsibility for their profession and thus to approximate explanation, his present appointment, so soon after it, is entitled to nothing less. Mr. Fisher's "concession" to the Lancashire cotton interests turns out on examination to be more apparent than real; and it would in any case have been necessary in view of the shortage of teachers and the difficulties of building. To add to the elementary school population a million children, between the ages of fourteen and sixteen or eighteen, was impracticable in the period of two years allowed in the Bill; and the period has now been extended to seven years. That is the amount of the "concession." On the other hand, it may safely be said that even seven years will not prove to be enough if the present decline in status of the teaching profession is allowed to continue; for it is the simple truth that as matters are arranged at present it will be more easy to find recruits for any mechanical trade than for the profession of teaching. And the explanation is not by any means altogether the question of salary. It is certainly true that the salaries of elementary school teachers are very low; and that its opportunities of improvement are few. But far more onerous than the low salaries is the low status of the profession; and this can never be remedied by raising salaries alone. However, it is another simple truth that the teachers themselves are as ignorant of the means of raising their profession as they are acutely aware of its present degradation. They imagine that the remedy is better salaries. The remedy, on the contrary, is collective responsibility to which we are certain that higher salaries of elementary teachers arc below those of any skilled trade; and that its opportunities of improvement are few. But far more onerous than the low salaries is the low status of the profession; and this can never be remedied by raising salaries alone. However, it is another simple truth that the teachers themselves are as ignorant of the means of raising their profession as they are acutely aware of its present degradation. They imagine that the remedy is better salaries. The remedy, on the contrary, is collective responsibility to which we are certain that higher salaries would in the end be added. When the National Union of Teachers is prepared to demand complete responsibility for their profession and thus to approximate to the claims established by the medical and legal professions, they will find, we think, that their status will be automatically raised.

We have warned our readers before of the danger involved in taking the efficacy of the Whitley scheme for granted. But not a few of our Labour Ministers are allowing their speeches to be made in a spirit last week, for example, Mr. Barnes committed himself to the optimistic statement that the Whitley organisation of industry would abolish both the lock-out and the strike. There is not the least reason for supposing that it will do one or the other. No doubt, it is the intention of the capitalist parties behind the Whitley Report to put an end to "labour unrest" by establishing a kind of morally obligatory arbitration; but we cannot discover in the creation of two organised and opposing camps any guarantee of real peace. It might as well be supposed that the division of the nations into two military parties would automatically ensure peace. Sooner or later, as everybody now knows, the guns would go off of themselves. In the case of the perennial dispute between Capital and Labour, warily hoping to be spared by being compromised under the Whitley schemes, the likelihood of hostilities is increased rather than diminished. In the process of collective bargaining on the scale now contemplated, the problem of control is certain to be isolated; and with the problem of the control of industry is raised the perennial question of justice. As Mr. G. D. H. Cole has observed in an admirable and final article in the current "Gudsman," the Whitley Report is designed to make collective bargaining easier; but it is not designed to satisfy the ethical claims of Labour.

Foreign Affairs.

By S. Verdad.

Last Thursday's papers contained the official announcement, issued on behalf of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, that the Allies regarded the creation of a "united and independent Polish State, with free access to the sea," as one of the essential conditions of a just peace. The Council further allied themselves with the American expressions of sympathy with the aspirations of the Yugoslavs and the Czecho-Slovak peoples. These are highly important principles; and let it be emphasised that their carrying into effect depends upon sea-power. It is true that no part of the proposed Czecho-Slovak State touches upon the sea; but it does touch upon Poland, and Poland is to have "free access to the sea." This phrase, it must be acknowledged, is a little ambiguous, and may conceivably amount to little more than a guarantee of unrestricted access to the coast over the Prussian railways. A united Polish State presumably means Russian, Austrian, and German Poland; but if the Allies carried their plans out logically—the exigencies of the situation may compel them to do—Prussia proper would be cut in twain by the surrender of the port of Danzig to a Warsaw Government.

These recommendations were criticised in anticipation by articles already published in these columns in which the importance of sea-power was emphasised. The demands of war have made enormous coal and iron resources indispensable, as well as chemical resources. The resources of Germany in the essential matter of chemicals are larger than those of any other European country; and her gigantic coalfields in the Rheinland and in Silesia will last her for many centuries. It is her iron-ore supplies which need safeguarding; and that is why German industrialists of all classes have been steadily demanding the Longwy and Briey basins which were occupied by German troops at the beginning of the war. If Alsace-Lorraine were restored to France, Germany's mineral resources would be considerably curtailed. In view of the importance attached by the enemy to the future economic organisation necessary for the waging of war (Freytag-Loringhoven's "Deductions," which I reviewed here a few weeks ago, may be cited in this connection) the Allied Governments had naturally to agree upon some form of compulsion. As Germany has all along been openly threatening another war after this one, and as her peculiar form of autocratic constitution would render her attempted expansion necessary in any case, how can the Allies be reproached for trying to keep a bellicose and militarist Germany under control by depriving her of a certain amount of economic power? There is some point in this question when the activities of the pacifists and of their supporters are considered. The Union of Democratic Control has issued in volume form the text of the Secret Treaties published in part by the "Manchester Guardian," the "New Europe," and the "Herald." The pacifist argument is quite clear: there must be no more secret treaties because the League of Nations, the formation of which is urged as an immediate measure, will do away with the need of political safety secured by annexations. But supposing this League of Nations is a mere chimera; supposing that its own supporters violently repudiate its actions in practice, as we have already seen Mr. Asquith, the "Daily News," and the "Nation" repudiate the supreme authority of the Versailles Council, what then? If the League of Nations breaks down, what remedy is there if not this very remedy of political and economic security which the pacifists so vigorously resist? Nor need we say "if."
No one who has served on any public body—a board of guardians, a parliamentary chamber, or even a meeting of directors—has the slightest faith in a body constituted like the League of Nations. When the questions at issue are all such matters, and in a scuffle sooner or later. "Regrettible incidents" in connection with Irish and Labour members have been known in our own House of Commons; even before the war inkpots have been known to fly about the Reichsrath. No representative chamber in Europe has been free from these things. Wasn't it Mr. R. McNeill who once flung a book at Mr. Churchill? And this in our own staid, respectable assembly! Mr. Wells's efforts on behalf of a League of Free Nations are so indefatigable as to have become tiresome. Has he forgotten the Fabian Society meetings and Mr. Shaw's unkind references? * * *

Two facts stand out. If Germany can become, or (if necessary) is forced to become democratic after the war, then Czecho-Slovachia and Poland, not to mention the Jugoslav States, must have their independence recognised as a matter of principle; and they must be exploited, as Ukraine and Roumania are now being exploited, for the benefit of German capitalists. But if (and we on this journal do not care to consider even the possibility) it should unfortunately happen that no hope of a German democracy is seen to exist after the war, then it will become all the more essential that the Allied victors to draw a political and economic barrier round the most aggressive peoples in all history; to render completely independent not only Czecho-Slovachia and Poland, but also the Jugoslav States and Roumania, to the end that the German militarist parties may be deprived of the ones necessary for waging war. As much raw material as you may want for peaceful manufacturing industries, but not one ounce for war: that will be the principle. In the circumstances, who could deny its justice—or its efficacy? * * *

Mr. Edward Hutton's new monthly, the "Anglo-Italian Review" (Constable, 1s. 3d. net) will, I hope, become not only interesting but necessary. There is not so much to bite upon in the first issue as might have been expected; but first numbers are proverbially difficult things to bring out. Mr. G. P. Harben's article on the possibilities of trade between England and Italy is the most important article in this number, and it is more remarkable for what it suggests than for what it says. It is to be hoped that economics, art, and literature will have due recognition in the pages of this new monthly; there is no reason why they should not. It is hardly necessary to include in the contents of such a magazine telegrams and reports already well covered by the daily papers. On the other hand, the extracts from the Italian Press could be made a very advantageous feature. In respect of special articles dealing with present-day events the Italian papers are as well served in their way as the French, and men like Guglielmo Emmanuele and Bevione are always worth listening to. Our daily papers are obviously not now in a position to furnish us with adequate selections from the Italian Press, and the "Anglo-Italian Review" would be acting well by both countries in doing so. Further, if I may say so in a spirit of friendly criticism, it is almost hopeless for a writer in a monthly magazine to predict likely offensives. On the other hand, such a writer can most effectively interpret the military operations of the previous four weeks and tell us something which the day-to-day critics in the Press may overlook. However, this new Review promises well; but it need not neglect Italian politics simply because this subject is dealt with in the weekly "New Europe," published by the same firm.

Gilds and their Critics.

VIII.—NATION, STATE AND GOVERNMENT.

Mr. Cole will be observed that my criticism of Mr. Cole's doctrine is in part theoretical and in part practical. On the three main issues it will perhaps clarify the controversy if I conclude by comparing them.

In substance, the sovereign citizenship advocated in those chapters is probably akin to the "community sovereignty" envisaged by Mr. Cole. But, whereas this indicates no practical way of asserting that sovereignty, I have indicated the State as both the historical and practical embodiment of citizen sovereignty. Mr. Cole leaves it as something inherent somewhere in the body politic and with no ultimate or effective means of expressing itself. Further, I see power sought in the succession of the thought and activities of these manifold associations, with an instrument ready to its hand to crystallise its will. Mr. Cole does not apparently travel beyond balance of power, with divisions which, whether arbitrary or natural, are more exhausting than fruitful.

Mr. Cole's conception of the State is, I think, coloured by his failure to distinguish between the expressed will of sovereign citizenship and the vast administrative machinery, functional throughout, that gives effect to the sovereign will. In the "industrial sovereignty," Mr. Cole would disperse this between State, municipality, and the Gilds, leaving to the Gilds only a moiety of industrial power. On the other hand, whilst recognising the final rights of sovereign citizenship, I would not divide, but rather concentrate, the economic function in the Gilds. In this way, I believe we should evolve a finer type of industrial statesmanship. Nor will it escape notice that the main effect of concentrating industrial power in the Gilds is to release the State for the spiritual leadership of the nation, which I believe to be its true role.

Finally, the balance of power sought by Mr. Cole cannot be other than a balance of functions. Power springs from rights, rights are finally justified in function. But whether it be a balance of power or function, or whether they mean the same thing, it assuredly cannot be mechanically contrived. That balance is either in the nature of things, or is impossible, or is attainable only by chance. Mr. Cole looks for it between the State and the Guild Congress. He will look in vain, because he looks for an artificial arrangement of society. I see it in the natural reaction between the Administration, the economic function of the Department, and the Gilds, the great producing Department. I have not to create it; it is there already.

XI.

It remains only to consider briefly the principles of liaison between the State and the Gilds. There is the problem of Gild representation in Parliament; the vastly important problem of taxation; and the subsidiary problem of the right relationship between the Industrial and Civil Gilds. In regard to Parliamentary representation, we shall, I think, find the true analogy in the present method of administrative representation. In the preceding diagram, the Government or Administration is placed in precisely the same relation to the State as the Gilds. Each administrative office has its official head in Parliament, acting as liaison officer between the State and the function of administration. This officer is the channel through which come the authority of the citizen body to the executive, and the executive, through which come the explanation and apologies of the several departments. Deriving their power from sovereign citizenship, they are liable at any moment to give an account of their stewardship. But we know that the bureaucracy thus created occupies an anomalous position; it exercises power beyond its
warrant, and plays a part in policy to which it is not entitled—the heritage of existing and former autocratic systems. The Guild principle, as we have seen, limits it in policy to its defined functions, but confers upon it the liberty of professional association developed into Civil Guilds. The adoption of the functional principle of Guild organisation, obviously involves a change in attitude towards the State. It secures to the State, as the organ of sovereign citizenship, the unchallenged direction of policy; it secures to the Administration that economic freedom which is fundamental to Guild principles—economic freedom that can only be withdrawn in the event of unfaithfulness to assigned freedom that can only be withdrawn in the event of obvious unfaithfulness to assigned

inducing themselves: they must carry the burden of the State. It secures to the State, as the organ of the Guilds—either separately or in groups, or through the Guild Congress. But the Industrial Guilds have a function peculiar to themselves: they must carry the burden of the State Budget. However important may be the function of spending the principal of taxation,—the evident fact that the provision of the public funds carries with it unique responsibilities and indicates the necessity of common action and joint organisation between the State and the Guild Congress. In addition, therefore, to Guild departmental representation in Parliament, a peculiar bond must exist between the Exchequer and the Guild Congress. It is common knowledge that the Chancellor of the Exchequer always consults the bankers before presenting his Budget. In a Guild society, the bankers disappear and the Congress supplies them. The informal discussions with the banking and allied interests may give way to some formal and constitutionally recognised joint session between the Exchequer and the Guild Congress or even between Parliament and the Guild Congress.

At the first blush, this joint session would seem superfluous, since the principle of taxation is subordinated in Guild doctrine to a per capita levy on the Guilds. It is not so easy as that. One Guild may, during the year, have suffered severely from one cause or another—a scarcity of raw material over the sources of which it had no control, heavy liabilities incurred involving a depression in the rates of pay, a bad season in the Agricultural Guild, a large transfer of labour-power for State or economic reasons. It would be for such a joint session to arrange an equitable levy upon the Guilds, after weighing and considering the transactions of the year. Nor would I close the door against referring to this joint body other difficulties and problems calling for treatment or solution as between the State and the Guilds.

My objection to this joint body possessing legislative powers, apart from the principle of sovereign citizenship, is because it is composed of disparate elements. We send the banner bearer to speak for our purposes as they have in common to the Exchequer and each other. He will be quick to distinguish between his Guild and political affairs. Clear and spirited thinking spells decisive action and not the impossibilism of the dreamer or the sentimentalist. Statesmen must always be confronted with practical problems. We shall finally judge them by the permanence of their solutions; the stability or instability of their policy and tendency than upon the laws adopted by Parliament. In their hearts and consciences, the citizens look to their State to seize the abiding truths of every national and international situation; they realise that spiritual life in the body politic is our ultimate defence against selfish interests, vacillating ambition or arrogant pretension.

I have failed to convey my concept of the spiritual State—the feit-motif of this chapter—if my readers should infer that it is incapable of dealing with practical affairs. Clear and spirited thinking spells decisive action and not the impossibilism of the dreamer or the sentimentalist. Statesmen must always be confronted with practical problems. We shall finally judge them by the permanence of their solutions; the stability or instability of their policy and decisions is the measure of their spiritual insight. But Democracy does not build upon single individuals however brilliant: the democratic State is a spiritual State to the extent that its citizens realise the vital principles of social existence and insist upon their application to all alike, without fear or favour.

The third problem of the relations between the Industrial and Civil Guilds is perhaps hardly germane to this chapter. In general, my solution would be the interchange of representatives upon the governing bodies of all the Guilds concerned, exactly as we have already proposed that the Industrial Guilds, following the example of interlocking directors under the joint-stock system, should each be represented upon each other's executive authorities.

Perhaps, in the future, men will walk with increasing confidence without the tuteledge of the written law, finding a correspondence between their actions and the law, with the new concepts of property rights that flow from it, is essentially other than the mechanism by which the way of the citizen, straightening out the twists and bends of the road he would travel. Nowhere does the law so intimately touch and irritate the average man as in his industrial pursuits. He may, and generally does, go through life unconscious at first hand of the civic缔作. The vast majority of Englishmen know nothing and care less about chancery law. The common law they know more by custom and instinct than by acquired knowledge. Thus, the removal of commercial and industrial law from the ordinary practice of the State administration renders the average citizen almost free from statute law, except so far as it embodies and protects his constitutional rights and liberties. Of these he is rightly tenacious, his main purpose in politics being to strengthen and extend them. His contact with the State, otherwise, is through taxation. It would be wrong to infer from this that, in consequence, the State becomes remote from his life and thoughts. Quite the contrary: the simplification both of law and regulation involved in industrial autonomy clears his mind of misconceptions and puts the supreme responsibility of citizenship into bold relief. He will be quick to distinguish between his Guild regulations (which would have the sanction of law) and his higher rights as a citizen.

It is a profound mistake to assume that the State retains its power and influence by its statute book. The promulgation and application of law probably weakens rather than strengthens its authority. It will be found, I think, that men set far greater store upon State policy and tendency than upon the laws adopted by Parliament. In their hearts and consciences, the citizens look to their State to seize the abiding truths of every national and international situation; they realise that spiritual life in the body politic is our ultimate defence against selfish interests, vacillating ambition or arrogant pretension.

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[End of Part 1.]
War and Peace.
By Bernard Gilbert.

1. Hidden away in a dangerous book is a saying more explosive than dynamite, which will one day inspire a great rebellion. "If any man come to me and hate not his father and mother and wife and children and brethren, yea and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple."

If any Christian read this without shutting eyes and ears, he would scream with horror, for it foreshadows the abolition of family, and property, and all rights; ties, duties, and possessions as at present understood. True, it imposes heavier duties, wider responsibilities; but not such as would appeal to the Christian.

2. By mixing more in the daily world, women will absorb that atmosphere which men breathe as they do the common air. Men do not question the accepted ideas which compose this universal fluid, nor are they hardly ever able to discuss them if challenged, for what no one questions no one consciously supports; but there is a base upon which men trade, fight, work, and play together, which women regard with envy, and an entire lack of comprehension. Men make allowances, they compromise vastly, and have a sense of fairness to which an irresistible appeal can be made. When in business I came to settle differences that arose between myself and farmers, I neither argued nor explained, but merely said—mentioning the sum in dispute—"Between man and man, I leave it in your hands to do what's fair"; and without hesitation the farmer would say "Halves." I was satisfied, I hadn't offended a customer, and I secured half the disputed sum. He also was satisfied; the matter had been left to his sense of fairness; and whereas force would never have extracted one penny, he was willing to pay half; and we parted the best of friends. When I had disputes to settle with the widows of customers, I tried the same formula, and to my dismay (not having carried my research in the application of psychology to business far enough) I found that they took the whole! It was their due, and they claimed it! After learning the lesson, I insisted on my own claim in full, and all was well.

3. Heads of large organisations fall into two classes: those who think of output and those who think of machinery. The former are concerned that each unit shall produce the utmost work whilst the latter insist that inefficient units be removed and that the remainder work smoothly, looking for satisfaction to efficiency. In the light of the war's experience the latter seems the better man. He is the trained civil servant.

4. All organisations are the same in essence, and the same principles underlie them; yet nowhere do these appear to be enunciated. I have searched in vain, expecting a copious literature. Yet important questions, such as to what extent the individual shall subordinate his personality to the efficiency of the machine, are not even discussed. I hesitate to make deductions from a limited experience, but it appears that a very considerable subordination is necessary. It is this that caused the trouble with business men in Government service. Departments are greater than any business; they must be run with a view to their indefinite continuance, and take it for granted that they will only get a fair average of material to do their work. They have therefore to arrange for substitution without dislocation, that no post demands more than average ability, and that every cog runs smoothly under all conditions.

How is it that these things have not been many times explored? I understand that there are good American books on business organisation, and no doubt Germans have covered the ground thoroughly. But where are ours?

5. The combination of ability with rectitude is so rare that those who possess it may rise as fast and far as they reasonably desire. We all want, in our dealings, the man whom we can trust implicitly and who will not act weakly or foolishly when he has our trust. The majority of business men of any length of experience have a fair reputation for honesty, but with one high and the other low, men are either knaves or fools. The most wretched are they who have great conscientiousness and little ability; they are pack-mules upon whom everyone heaps a burden, on a journey that has no end. Believing that honesty is the best policy and inspired by it, they are for ever aware of their real position as life advances, and sometimes turn rogue in despair. But to be a rogue needs ability, and they sink incontinently. In the last century, our Quakers shone as examples of the desirable combination, and with their Nonconformist compatriots made England wealthy and powerful. Now a large class of the same character (though not distinctively religious), and she will presently, by their hands, take hold of the earth.

6. There are no Nepoleons to-day, although the Press idolises Kitchener, Hindenburg, Joffre, Lloyd George, Ludendorf, Carson, or Cadorna by turns. But there is no room for the old-fashioned leader, and we have been compelled to discard several attempts as hindrances to organisation. Modern armies are whole nations run by General Staffs, and need order and method instead of brilliancy and dash. The great leader was an illusion; his power that of the shaft to which he was the spearhead; and when he died he left an over-centralised chaos. The essence of organisation is that units—however important—should be instantly replaceable.

7. I asked one of my farm labourers how he was brought up. 'He said he was one of eleven children. They lived on sor (bread and water), and sometimes on Sunday tasted meat and sugar. His first suit was a sack, and he went to work at six years old to eke out his father's nine-and-shilling a week. It was cold on the winter mornings, he said, and he often ate the frozen turnips meant for the sheep! This was whilst wheat was making record prices, farmers growing wealthy and landlords powerful: the Golden Victorian Era. Why on earth there was not an English Jacquerie one cannot guess, except on the hypothesis that we are the most servile race on earth.

8. After another couple of years' war all the necessities of life will be rationed: clothing, coal, light, and so forth; and we shall have settled down to the kip. Then why not continue it indefinitely? It is accepted that a labourer must have a minimum of subsistence, only we have left it to him to strike for more money when prices rose; and our whole system of poor relief is built on that base. It would be better to give every citizen, free of charge, a subsistence ration of the necessities of life, and leave the luxuries to the margin of money he earned, inherited, or stole. You would have to consider unauthorised dealing in rationed articles a criminal offence, but the thing could be done without coupons and almost without machinery.
The Communion of Plain Men.

We know that the early stages of a study are largely a record of the process whereby it frees itself from the domination of other sciences. The most obvious feature of Mr. MacIver's book* is his desire to establish the claim of sociology to such independence, as regards not its material but its methods and formula. All the familiar attempts to argue about community by saying it is organic, or a supermechanism, or a mind, or anything else of that sort, are, according to Mr. MacIver, mere simplifications. The business of sociology is to take cognisance of the common life as it finds it, and quite impartially to formulate the laws of its development, or enumerate the elements which analysis discovers in it. You may talk of its evolution, or decay or death. But that does not mean it is an organism. You might as well say that because a man is at one time in the bloom of youth he must be a plant.

Most writers on sociology have tried to treat their subject strictly as science and not as philosophy. They produce a formidable array of authorities on the life of savage tribes, and though they may generalise, it is on a basis of induction. Mr. MacIver's interests have patently been mainly in philosophy, and in the most philosophical part of philosophy, and this reacts constantly on his argument. It would not be fair to call this abstractly either a loss or a gain, because it simply leads to a difference of emphasis and treatment, which is sometimes advantageous and sometimes not. Frequently the ordinary sociologist would tend to dismiss Mr MacIver's discussion as "generalised" where he did not despise it as "thin," while the philosopher will open his eyes at the comprehensiveness of some of his assumptions. This is particularly obvious in the first two books.

Mr. MacIver writes with the ideas of the great philosophers who have written on the State constantly in mind, and discusses, therefore, very carefully the relation of community to associations and institutions. Within recent years, as readers of The New Age know, there has been a great deal of criticism of the traditional juristic and the dominant modern view of co-sovereignty, and that he is most interested in the grip of the possessive impulses that make for social life. As a matter of fact, the latter exploits in the idealist pastime of taking away the landmarks were not so misleading as might have been expected, because both terms constantly underwent a good deal of interpretation. But it was certainly inconvenient. Mr. MacIver regards an institution as a form of order established within social life by some common will. It is the expression or creation of an association, an instrument of suggestion and control. Similarly, his explanation of the various forms of association and their differences in relation to the interests or motive forces which underlie the common life is a useful corrective of the loose argument from one of the two sides of the question just mentioned. On the other hand, the discussion of social fact and social law and of the relation of sociology to other sciences is an example of the less satisfying results of Mr. MacIver's interest in philosophy. It represents, I admit, a fairly consistent point of view. But it certainly passes over without comment very considerable difficulties, and is, in fact, hardly intelligible apart from a metaphysical position which is not stated.

Though Mr. MacIver does not concern himself with the historical origins of his matter, his problem, his intense importance deserved some notice. An inquiry into the conditions under which the collective social life of humanity emerges and matures, with the object of discovering what laws this development follows (if, indeed, there are any), and what end it may be supposed to be desired to attain, are not a side of its significance from the way in which it arises out of ethics. The prevailing difficulty in all utilitarian ethical theory has been the impossibility in particular cases, if not generally of making the calculation of consequences which it seems to demand. We may, or may not, regard this as a final objection to the doctrine as an ethical theory. I do not. But it certainly requires to be supplemented on the side of its applicability by a study of past and present moral standards, and this is best done by a conception of the corporate life of society, the laws of which may be expected to show in outline, at least, the broad effects of conduct. Substantially, this is what Mr. MacIver's problem in the second part of the volume comes to, and it is in it that he is most successful. He maintains that by far the most important law of communal development is that socialisation and individualisation are two sides of one process, and develop pari passu. The two factors are united in personality, which cannot grow in the members of a community without a corresponding development in their relations to one another. Mr. MacIver works closely out in detail, and formulates in relation to it certain subordinate laws; and he discusses in an interesting fashion numerous special problems, notably that of the application of ideas like "natural selection" to social life.

An argument so closely dependent on metaphysical presupposition is open to two special dangers, and from neither does Mr. MacIver altogether escape. The first is an excessive rationalism. Against this, Mr. MacIver has introduced numerous paper safeguards. But of the strength of the most ordinary anti-social tendencies, of the frequent helplessness of a soul in the grip of the possessive impulses, that nearer to death, to say nothing of lust or perversions, he seems to have no adequate conception at all. There may be a philosophy of society; but Hobbes was not wrong in basing sociology on psychology. The other danger is quite as insidious. It is that of solving particular problems by general arguments. Mr. MacIver comes very near deducing from his general law of communal development (1) monogamy and women's suffrage; (2) either compulsory arbitration or cooperation. Any, or all of these, may be defensible, but they require reasons. Nothing is proved by being sentimental about them. M. W. ROBIESEN.
A Modern Prose Anthology.

Edited by R. Harrison.

XXI.—MR. G. S. STR—T.

A Digression on Sound. By G. S. Str—t.

This is no profound and weighty article on the theory of sound, its volume, intensity, and vibratory powers in whatever element it is that it vibrates in—though (with your permission) it will touch on all these in a strictly non-academic manner. It will be a light, witty trifle (it is as well not to be over-modest about it), pleasantly provocative, perhaps mildly discursive, achieving such purpose as it has mainly by avoiding it. Nothing more.—no profundity, of which at the moment achieving such purpose as it has mainly by avoiding it. Strictly Ikon-academical manner. It will be a light, witty trifle (it is as well not to be over-modest about it), pleasantly provocative, perhaps mildly discursive, achieving such purpose as it has mainly by avoiding it. Nothing more.—no profundity, of which at the moment achieving such purpose as it has mainly by avoiding it.

This reader, as I have had; I am coining to the point. I am in no mood to insist if you disagree, but I know she is feminine—no man would play such a part. If it was not out of tune, it would still be. . . .

Well! it is out of-tune, but what does that matter? If it was not out-of-date, it would be out of tune; and if it was not out of tune, it would still be. . . .

Ugh! another lost note. . . . How can I write? Can you not hear my style bobbing and jumping to the accursed thing (it is Dixie?) . . .? I shall grow really angry.

Why not go out? you say. Of course, you would say that. It must suffice that I am a journalist; it is my working time; I cannot afford to go out. But, you suggest, she would stop if I asked her. I might play, in fact, on her feelings in my turn, but only on her better feelings (a truly artistic revenge): describe to her my sufferings, say that I am a novelist, an invalid, a musician, anything: throw myself on her mercy. Enough! It is obvious we have no true knowledge of women; she is probably rather proud of her playing, imagines herself a female Paderewski. My tact, in short, is not to be improved.

My revenge can shatter her. Oh! quite painlessly, if you suggest, she would stop if I asked her. I might play, in fact, on her feelings in my turn, but only on her better feelings (a truly artistic revenge): describe to her my sufferings, say that I am a novelist, an invalid, a musician, anything: throw myself on her mercy. Enough! It is obvious we have no true knowledge of women; she is probably rather proud of her playing, imagines herself a female Paderewski. My tact, in short, is not to be improved. If it was not out of tune, it would still be. . . .

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If it was not out of tune, it would still be. . . .

There! it is out.

Sweet silence reigns. (That, too, is an echo. It is hard to be original.) But you understand why I began the morning in an irritable mood, do you not? Have you noticed, patient reader, who have followed me thus far, how one's mind, forced for a long time to revolve round an irritation, when the irritation is suddenly removed, strives to belittle the cause of it, to magnify its own sensibility, and create a phantom out of nothing wherewith to menace its hardly recovered liberty? It is so, is it not? You waste precious hours planning impossible assaults on the disturbers of your peace, and end by doing nothing. Well, so would not I. My revenge can wait; it will not lose by keeping. Meanwhile, I would compensate you; I am irritable no longer, but magnanimous; I would have you soothe me as I have soothed you, in which to make amends for all you have suffered on my account. The style of this essay, which began in a five-finger exercise, shall end in a serenade.

I am in a mood for trifling, reader. It shall be said of me, as Macaulay said of Horace Walpole (it was the sort of thing he would say), that "serious business was a trifle to him, and trifles were his serious business." That I believe to be the right spirit; for, mark you, we take our business (we English) just a trifle too seriously; a gentleman would do well and easily in a morning what your business man toils all day in the city to do very badly. (Do not mistake me. I am not blaming him. It is his business that keeps him in the city; just as it is my business to keep as far as possible away from it.) But to resume. (This essay is all digressions.) I sometimes think that civilization may be understood, not in terms of money (as some would have it), nor in terms of servility (as Mr. Belloc would have it), but in terms of sound.

Think of it, I beg of you. Do not dismiss the idea. We come from silence and we return to silence, and it is all in between it is all noise. The circumstance will bear reflection. And, if we are correct in our theory, is our civilization the most wonderful the world has seen? If civilization is a refinement on noise, we have relapsed into barbarism, for we appreciate music in terms of the purposeless clatter of machinery, ragtime and milk-cans. The savages, in fact, are rather more refined, for (I am told) they only beat tom-toms. Alas, my country!

Mr. Chesterton says somewhere that the sound of a pig grunting is one that does a man good. I am a Londoner, and must seek other distractions—not always in perfect soundlessness. It is impossible anyhow, of course, but we Londoners have nerves, and in silence, however perfect, memory has a way of retailing old tortures. This essay is not at all, complaint, and I here admit that there are occasions when noise can be actually restful. There are noisy streets, and literature, emphatically, is one of them. I say "one of them" but I mean the other.

Are there any others? There is the drama, of course, but that is merely literature expressed in sound; and,
of course, the opera. There are some very noisy operas; and it is curious one should go to them to have one’s nerves soothed by concourse of sweet sounds, is it not? Why do we do it? Not, of course, that it matters very much. Still, one would like to know.

Yet why should we suffer it? But no, cockneys, not for you would I cherish my anger: you who are poor like myself and, like myself, wander at the mercy of men, you cannot sympathise with my feelings, but you would help me if you could, would you not? Ah, beloved cockneys, indeed it is I who would not interrupt for any ends of mine your “nonsense well tuned and sweet stupidity.” How could I be angry “when thou, my music, music play’st?” Dear people! it was a timely interruption.

Oriental Encounters.

By Marmaduke Pickthall.

XV.—PRIDE AND A FALL.

There was to be a grand fantasia at the castle of the greatest of Druze sheikhs in honour of a visit from the English Consul-General in Syria; and as an Englishman I was invited to be there. It was a journey of a day and a half. Upon the second morning Rashid and I had not gone far ere we fell in with other horsemen wending in the same direction as ourselves, well-mounted and in holiday attire. All greeted us politely, but we kept apart, because they nearly all rode mares while we rode stallions—a fruitful source of trouble and a cause of war. At length a young man mounted on a stallion took us over with most cordial greetings. I had met him often. He was the son of a rich landowner in a neighbouring valley and, I think, the most beautiful human creature I ever saw. That day he was particularly good to look at, his complexion of clear olive slightly flushed, his violet eyes beneath their long dark lashes dancing, his perfect white teeth gleaming with excitement and delight. He wore a cloak broad-striped of white and crimson, a white-frilled shirt of lawn showing above a vest of crimson velvet, a fawn-coloured baggy trousers and soft sheepskin boots. A snow-white turban crowned his whole appearance. His horse was thoroughbred and young, and he controlled its ceaseless dance to admiration. He told me that the stallion was his own, an uncle’s gift to him in all the mountains; although mine, he added out of mere politeness, was with thee in to-day’s event. “Does not your Honour also think my horse the best?”

I assured him that I did indeed, and all my wishes were for his success, “because,” said I, “I know and like you, and I do not know the others.”

He proceeded to discuss the horses which we saw before us on the road, pointing out in each of them something in his master’s ear. His master looked at me explaining to the servant of the house that no one else had a gift of price. “I shall exceed them all, in ah ‘Allah! Does not your Honour also think my horse the best?’”

I assured him that I did indeed, and all my wishes were for his success, “because,” said I, “I know and like you, and I do not know the others.”

“Might I present you to our host? He is a representative of England. And you are, I see, a very skilful cavalier. The way you quieted that horse was wonderful. We have all been talking of it. Ride with them!”

I begged to be excused. The essence of the fantasia is to show off one’s own prowess and one’s horse’s paces while carriage madly in a wide circle round...
some given object—an open carriage with some great man in it, or a bridal pair—no note of obstacles, dashing over rocks and gulleys and down break-neck slopes, loading and firing off a gun at intervals in full career. I had tried the feeling of it once at a friend's wedding, and had been far from happy, though my horse enjoyed the romp and often tried to start it afterwards when there was no occasion. Remembering Abdul Hamid and his desire for praise that day, I said: "There is only one good horseman here—Abdul Hamid, the son of Sheykh Mustafa. All the rest of us, compared with him, are mere pedestrians."

I pointed out the youth in question to my neighbour, who was a man of power in the mountains, and he praised the beauty of his form on horseback.

"By Allah, right is with thee," he assented. "There is none but he."

Away they went—Jinblats, Talhiks and Abdul Meliks—all in clean white turbans with coloured cloaks dashing over rocks and gulleys and down break-neck horse enjoyed the romp and often tried to start it afterwards when there was no occasion. Remembering Abdul Hamid and his desire for praise that day, I said: "There is only one good horseman here—Abdul Hamid, the son of Sheykh Mustafa. All the rest of us, compared with him, are mere pedestrians."

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most charming where the slow viola gave most attention to individual sounds, i.e., where the *writing* of the music was not the sole resource of the listener. The third movement opens with cliche, scrabbly, goes on in potted Beethoven, and yet more cliches from varied, familiar canneries somewhat later than Ludovico Mistral. The Sammons "Air with Variations" is not bad; Wolstenholmes remembers the "Old Oak Bucket." McEwen's "Chaleur d'Ete" opens with sham Debussy, and continues in derivations from earlier sources mixed with pseudo Debussy. Tertis gave it with great delicacy of sound. York Bowen accompanied with the Sonata No. 1 C minor; there is no particular limit to the number of people who might have written this Sonata. A personal and distinguishable style is perhaps more than we should demand of composers, but it is extremely difficult to give any explicit praise to the works until they have attained it. The thing is well placed for the viola; one sits on as through the inter-acet music at a theatre; the second movement is not without rubber-stamps. Miss Ellen Tuckfield accompanied the short pieces rather better than either of the composers.

**Felix Salmond** (Wigmore) was firm and clear in the firmness and clarity of C. Franck, and showed surety in the approach and recede of sound. Murdock was also up to it; I have never heard him play better, and hope he will keep to good company. Salmon has a little the quality of the controlled maestro who simply cannot go wrong. The music moves the cello. It is there first, it pre-exists; does not wait for the bow to drag out an approximation (which waiting is exactly what makes many concerts unendurable). This kind of playing is the nearest thing we have to evidence for Plato's concept of "ideas.""Contact with this reality" is genius; or, at least, the highest pleasure we can get from instruments is in some sort of sense of such contact. I forgot to analyse the Franck. There is great beauty in the second movement after the scramble of the opening.

Ultimate conclusion on the A major sonata: *cello* excellent Burgundy, and C. Franck not a great genius. Frank Bridge, mediocre in opening piano part of Sonata in D minor, Salmond can make any simple phrase beautiful, but this does not reflect any credit on the composers he chooses to present. Almost any sequence of notes would serve him. There is no particular reason for this sonata. Nor do I think there is among performers any widespread desire to discriminate between excellent music and mediocritie.

**Edwin Evans** (series of illustrated lectures at Elion) is to be thanked for trying to weed out contemporary English composers. Their works should certainly be tried on the public, but English music is suffering, and will continue to suffer from a long attempt to boot Elgars and Parrys as men of commanding genius and of international significance. The only way to improve an art anywhere is by maintaining the strictest standards of judgment.

Silvia Perisotti's voice is pleasant enough, but throaty, phlegmy, indistinct, good deal of nonsense. No beauty added by singing "querele" as "querwahahah," or "Penare" as "penahwah," "penahwah," or even "penahwah." Single beautiful sounds may invite the critic's amiability, but they "are not enough." Albanesi's "Mer" shows that Debussy invented some new sonorities for the piano which other writers may turn on ad lib.

Fresh, we presume, from operatic triumphs in Citta del Castello, Perugia, Saragossa, or, perhaps, it is East Orange, N. J., La Donzella floribundissima Felice del Castello, Perugia, Saragossa, or, perhaps, it is East Orange, N. J., La Donzella floribundissima Felice Lyne bursts upon us with trills, twirls, toooldoles, Rossini, balls-eye (Ping-Wok !) on the last note, not necessarily the note indicated by the composer, but why stop for details?

Keeping to the "ah-ab-ah" method she does rather content herself with "Ut-re-mi," as Waller advised bad composers; but this thing has to be extremely well done to be interesting. Old Twinkle's "La Danza" served to show that the lady had no real technique, though "Una voce poco fa" may require some educational prelude. A lot of camouflage over nothing. The great intrinsic beauty of "Deh vieni, non odi" is neither well heard nor well made, the woe is not wholly concealed. Purcell was murdered, and singing "forget my feet" for "forget my fate" is no embellishment of the verbal text.

**Views and Reviews.**

**NOT GUILTY.**

The recent trial of Mr. Pemberton Billing, M. P., with its almost inevitable verdict of acquittal,revives in an acute form all the modern misgivings of trial by jury. It has been the habit for centuries to regard trial by jury as the principal safeguard of personal liberty, although Sir Henry Maine showed that it was only a survival of popular justice, a form of lynching law; but the thing that betrays it is the "trial by jury" in the case of William Penn, the Quaker, which ended in the clear declaration of the doctrine that the jury is the judge of fact, introduced a new conception of the functions of the jury. Any fool can return a verdict, but to be a judge of fact requires something quite different from folly, demands qualities that I think are superior to those required by a judge of law—and there is no guarantee that any one of those qualities is possessed by any member of any jury. The presence of a juror may be challenged on many grounds, but not, I think, on the ground that he is incompetent to judge facts or to follow an argument to a correct inference. Most of us like to leave as much as we can to what we call "common sense," by which we usually mean the non-technical judgment of a trained and intelligent mind; but the trend of modern litigation suffices to show that we have no right to assume that "common sense" is a common possession. Without diving into the depths of the psychology of the crowd, it is manifest that twelve men in a jury-box are less capable of exercising common sense than any one of them is by himself.

The chief reason for this peculiarity is not, I think, stupidity (although there is stupidity even among jurymen), but what is really a superstitious awe. Like some other people, jurymen believe in things and not in men, and the law is more than a thing, medicine is another, awe is another, politics is another, and so forth. It never apparently occurs to them that, although the facts may be different, the methods of handling them and formulating arguments concerning them are the same. If Father Bernard Vaughan had read the rules of evidence, Mr. Justice Darling said, he would not have made any slip in the witness-box; if he had remembered the structure of any of the theological arguments with which, I presume, he is familiar, he would have been equally competent to tender evidence. The methods of reasoning do not differ when we pass from theology to science, or from science to law; poetry itself is only a sublime logic, and beauty is a result of the perfect application of ad hoc principles, the synthesis of the a priori.

But the untrained jurymen, like the untrained witness, confesses himself incompetent to form an intelligent opinion. He is "bobby-dazzled" by the experts into believing that "the law" is something different from the determination of facts and the application of legal rules. He is insensitive to the opinion that the whole business is a mystery because he does not understand the ritual; and on the plea that he knows nothing about the law, he resigns himself to the statement of the last opinion.
of which he thinks. If he could only be made to understand that even in this case ignorance of the law is no excuse, the scandalous verdicts of some recent cases would not be repeated; for it is precisely not the law with which he is concerned, but the facts. All that he has to do is to determine whether such and such an act has been committed; if so, whether it was committed by the accused, and, if so, what degree of culpability has been incurred by the accused.

The process is simplicity itself; how it is understood by jurymen the result of the Billing trial shows. Mr. Billing was charged with publishing a false and defamatory libel concerning Miss Maud Allan; he pleaded Not Guilty to the charge, and justification.

The actual proof of publication would not take ten minutes; the next question would be whether the statement meant what the prosecution alleged it to mean, and, if so, was it libellous. That it meant something defamatory, the plea of justification proved; no one pleads " JUSTIFICATION " of a compliment, unless it is a left-handed compliment, or the person who makes it is a dul dog. The defendant, by his plea of justification, admitted that he meant to say something defamatory; what was that thing? The prosecution alleged that the paragraph complained of meant that the prosecutor " was, a lewd, unchaste, and immoral woman, and was about to give private performances of an obscene and indecent character." He had failed to prove that he intended to prove that the allegations were true.

To prove that they were true, he would have to produce evidence which, if not conclusive, would justify the inference to any reasonable mind. Whether he did or not, I do not know; but certainly there was nothing in the " Times " report to show that he offered any evidence at all to prove that the prosecutor was " a lewd, unchaste, and immoral woman." On that point he only proved that her brother was executed for murder, and stated that he intended to prove that the vice or disease from which the brother suffered was not pandering. I could prove that the fact that her brother was a murderer would be fair, presumptive evidence that the prosecutor was such a person as the paragraph implied: That evidence, so far as I know, was never tendered; that argument, I am sure, the prosecutor's closing speech, and the summing-up, was never articulated. Indeed, the defendant specifically denied, in the closing stages of the trial, what he had pleaded justification for in the opening stages; he declared specifically that " the accusation I made was not that the prosecutor was a pervert, but that she was pandering to others."

But the jury might, and ought to, have remembered that he declared that the brother was a pervert, and intended to prove that the vice was hereditary, and that the vice was not pandering. He had accepted the meaning of the paragraph, the staging of the paragraph, and was prepared to justify it; but he did not prove that she was " a lewd, unchaste, and immoral woman;" he specifically withdrew that imputation at the end; he did not prove that, whatever the character of her performances may have been (and the dramatic critic who saw them did not think them either obscene or indecent), they were " so designed as to foster and encourage unnatural practices among women." On the contrary, most of the evidence reported related to unnatural practices among men. Nor did he prove her association with " persons addicted to unnatural practices;" indeed, he could not prove this without first proving that those persons were guilty of those practices.

We have to admit, then, that he had failed to sub-

stantiate his plea of justification; therefore, as he had already admitted that the meaning attributed by the prosecution was correct, the statement complained of was libellous. But the jury returned a verdict of " Not Guilty," " Not Guilty " of what? He was charged with publishing a false and defamatory libel concerning the prosecutor; the publication had been proved; he had agreed that it meant what it was alleged to mean; he had tried to justify the admitted implications of the paragraph, and had failed. In addition to that, he had specifically withdrawn the imputations that he had failed to prove; and, by every canon of reasoning, the prosecution was entitled to the verdict. The paragraph was not only libellous, it was admittedly libellous; and the jury's verdict of " Not Guilty " makes us wonder whether jurymen intend to reserve the verdict of " Guilty " for the demonstrably innocent. " I am a libeller," said the defendant. " I have libelled public men for the last two and a half years in the public press, on public platforms, and in the House of Commons." In the House of Commons, of course, it is impossible to libel a man; it is impossible even to slander him in the legal sense, because the occasion is privileged. But the assertion was valuable, at least, as a statement of intention; and the only conclusion that we can draw from the verdict is that a self-confessed listeller who has already admitted that the allegations that he has pleaded are untrue is not guilty of libel. The judge of facts is developing the habit of judging contrary to facts; and if justice is to be done, we shall have to devise some means of dispensing with the services of the twelve good men and true. There are limits to our admiration of " popular justice," and the verdict in the Billing case is beyond those limits.

A. F. R.
not likely to enhance his conjugal happiness by observing that the tide ebbs, or is on the turn, or is flowing, as the case may be. Let us be quite scientific, and insist that every woman should present her chart of the tides to her husband after she has signed the register, and thereby enable him to know when to be happy, work, or otherwise. The fascinating peculiarity of people already know these things, and the probability is that the abnormal are incapable of taking advantage of the information.

Over the Hills and Far Away. By Guy Fleming.

This is a story of Scotch life about the time of Paul Jones that has almost reconciled us to porridge as a breakfast dish. He is a great man whom the smugglers will trust at the age of ten, and nothing but porridge will explain it. Although no swashbuckler, and, indeed, one who aspired to be a lawyer even in the unregenerate days of his teens, he found enough adventure in a quiet country life to satisfy Hotspur. He was not merely a bearer of a challenge to a duel, but a hidden witness of it, with a dirk ready for emergencies. He was a girl, too, even for his age, "gleg at the uptake" with his arm and his lips even if his tongue did falter. He had one marked peculiarity, a habit of being injured in the head; but as every blow or fall seems only to have quickened his wits, we rejoice that his head was not quite shattered. He discovered what the family solicitor had failed to discover, that by the Scotch law he was legitimately born and a member of the peerage; so that he could do but marry and beget children, and cease adventuring in London or on the North Sea? He had really sown Quaker Oats.


To the writer of patriotic novels, the Elizabethan age is indispensable. It supplies plots, stage properties, persons, and the spirit, and the tale practically tells itself. The ideal Englishman exists there complete in all but one detail; but Mr. Capes satisfies the modern addition of personal cleanliness by putting "a ha'pennyworth of mottled soap" in the bed at the Cock Tavern. But, for the rest, patriotism was then what it is now, the living faith of foreigners; the pure peculiarity, as that of personal cleanliness by putting "a

Letters to the Editor.

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Sir,—In your issue of June 6, the Rt. Hon. W. H. Dickinson, M.P., takes exception to certain points I set forth in my recent article on M. Jean Grève's pamphlet. Mr. Dickinson argues that the sovereignty of the League is a matter of degree, that the alternative to the League is international anarchy, and that in any case those who object to the proposal for a League never prescribe an alternative policy. Your correspondent suggests, among minor points, that I appear to have an objection to all forms of government because they are all necessarily corrupt and oppressive in some degree. I think your readers know my work well enough to realise that this statement is not really warranted. I simply appeal to practical politics (as Mr. Dickinson does), and I cannot find any justification for assuming that the League will be able to enforce its decrees. In the struggle for raw materials some nation is bound to think itself unfairly treated if it does not get what it believes to be its adequate share of ores, coal, oil, rubber, and the like; and my frank belief is that once again it will be found impossible to restrain the Teutonic tribes by moral suasion if they choose to think they are not getting their full share of what is going.

Further, it is, I submit, hardly correct to say that the present war is the "result of international anarchy," as Mr. Dickinson does. The German industrialists who demand the Longwy and Briey coal and ore basins are under no such illusion nor are the German expansionists who demand the return of their African colonies on account of their economic value. Far from being the result of anarchy, the war is the outcome of a very carefully thought-out scheme planned by the very anti-anarchical Governments of the Central Powers in consequence of suitable economic and political inspiration. Let me suggest, also, that the advocates of a League of Nations overlook too often the fact that the international authority already existing at The Hague. In that summer of 1914 there was actually in being an international authority competent to judge all the questions raised. The German Government, as we know, refused to consider any form of conference. Is it more likely to agree to conferences in future? I hardly think so; and even if it yields in principle a part of its sovereignty, how is it to be made to yield that part in fact? I mention the German Government particularly, not only because it is responsible for the present war, but because its propaganda of expansion through the Pan-German League will long cause all classes of the German people to remain the most dissatisfied in Europe, the most insistent upon their racial superiority, and the most ready to appeal to the League.

The alternative policy, surely, is already being fore-shadowed. It is, I admit, contingent upon the result of the war; but it looks at present as if we shall have a League of Nations formed of the present Allied Powers and perhaps, also, of those European neutrals bordering on the sea (Spain, Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden), together with a restored Poland and the new States of Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. The democratisation of the German people might conceivably do away with the need of such a League after a generation or two; but that form of League now appears to be inevitable. If the German people dislike this, and if they think such a body a menace to themselves, I fear they will have only themselves to thank. The world must be protected, not from international anarchy, but from German militarism. There is no other obstacle to peace; and there has been no other obstacle to peace for the last forty years.

J. WaRNOCK.

MARX.

Sir,—In your issue of April 4, "H. C." expresses a hope that the influence of Marx will be diminished after the war. In one respect this wish will be fulfilled, for it will be seen that the political policy of Marx was one of the chief causes of the present war. Marx and Lassalle between them destroyed the Liberal Party in Central and Eastern Europe, and thus strengthened the monarchy and the military party. In 1860 the political situation in Germany was much
admite, of course, that the admission of a right to control people in matters of faith and morals by toleration could include what I have stated, is, beyond these limits, indefinite, and an obvious source of friction. But I know of no reason why these boundaries should not be marked out by discussion.

When I argued for the control of education by the teaching profession, I did not wish to suggest that it must simply cry "Hands off!" to the community. That would be a mere extension of the Syndicalist principle. What the relations between the two must be is a considerable question, and I admit it requires more discussion than I gave it or than it has received. But it is quite capable of solution. (2) There is a certain limitation on the scope of education, or, as I should say, "S. G. H." in his admirable current series. Since this letter is, however, meant by way of acknowledgment of F. H. D.'s "query rather than of reply to it, I shall content myself here with two remarks: (1) What, I take it, the Church mainly contends is that in certain schools the teachers should be Catholics, giving instruction which, while it may conform to a general syllabus, is Catholic in atmosphere. For many purposes such teachers would be responsible to their clergy, who might even have a veto on their appointment. But no child is compelled to attend a school of this type. To do so, in fact, is not a compulsory or voluntary obligation. No such arrangement, it is plain, makes teachers any the less members of their profession. (2) There is a certain limitation on the scope of education, or, as I should say, "S. G. H." in his admirable current series. Since this letter is, however, meant by way of acknowledgment of F. H. D.'s "query rather than of reply to it, I shall content myself here with two remarks: (1) What, I take it, the Church mainly contends is that in certain schools the teachers should be Catholics, giving instruction which, while it may conform to a general syllabus, is Catholic in atmosphere. For many purposes such teachers would be responsible to their clergy, who might even have a veto on their appointment. But no child is compelled to attend a school of this type. To do so, in fact, is not a compulsory or voluntary obligation. No such arrangement, it is plain, makes teachers any the less members of their profession.

The Socialists of that time were unable to see that the teaching office is essentially a delegation of the parent's office. It emphatically does not believe that "the teaching office is essentially a delegation of the parent's office." A. LATHLAM.

**WOMAN.**

Sir,—Your correspondent, Miss Elizabeth Gerard Smith, asks: "Has your reviewer ever heard of what has been aptly termed 'The 'Englishman fallacy'?" Your reviewer can assure Miss Elizabeth Gerard Smith that he has heard of it. Miss Elizabeth Gerard Smith also asks: "Is it permitted to express a hope that THE NEW AGE may find its way to the realisation of the fact that its doctrine of 'The Woman is as much a fallacy in the history of the world as the doctrine of 'The 'Englishman is a fallacy in the history of races?" As you have published the letter, it is obvious that Miss Elizabeth Gerard Smith is permitted to express this hope, and your reviewer has no objection to it, but the expression of the hope will not, in his opinion, lead to the renunciation of a doctrine that, so far as your reviewer knows, THE NEW AGE does not, and never did, hold.

Your letter is a showing of the progress of thought that Miss Elizabeth Gerard Smith that women are diverse; but your reviewer cannot accept the inference that, therefore, it is impossible to point to a "class" of women that will be generally true. The statement that "women are diverse" is itself a general statement.

**WHERE MYTHS MEET.**

Sir,—In the interest of the perpetuation of myths, what price the polyandrous mating in the shade of Billings' 47,000 with the 11,000 virgins of Cologne? P. T. K.
Pastiche.

SONG.
The end of true love is to sit and mourn—
    Heigh ho, the end of love!
Under the shadow of the naked thorn,
    With his thin boughs above.
The end of true love is to lie and weep—
    Heigh ho, to weep alone!
On the cold bosom of the mountain steep,
    By a grey boulder stone.
The end of true love is to fare forth far—
    Heigh ho, the empty ways!
To the bare places where the great winds are,
    And there to spend his days.
The end of true love is a sorry end,
    Heigh ho, the weary death!
Marvel it is that everyman should tend
    Poor love, that vanisheth.
Love's a life not any leech may save;
So, since he's fair,
And thou must full soon lay him in his grave,
Be love thy care.

RUTH PITTER.

MELANCHOLY.
Melancholy, heavy melancholy,
Its prey has found,
Builds a prison, impenetrable prison,
My soul around.

I first speaking, stops my tongue from speaking
What's in my mind.
Sets me distant, very far distant,
From my kind.

If I must wander, reluctantly wander,
To a strange land,
May I see a trace, just the faintest trace,
Left by a friend.

Had you been there, if I knew you'd been there,
I might stay;
If I feel alone, if I must be quite alone,
I'll flee away.

M. HONEYBURN.

TREES.
The bark is best when silver with the Spring,
    Before the mists have taken wing;
Comes Summer—she's a maid who loves to sing
    Of one, more fair than she, who loved a king.
The pin is as a spear thrust to the sky,
    From out the snowtracks that the horsemen made
But yester-night, when down the moonlight glade
    Full twenty white-clad knights went riding by.
The fir high over all our folly stands,
Sombre and black against the fading light;
Like one with gaunt and fleshless hands
    Stretched up in supplication to the light.

FRED KAY.

PRESS CUTTINGS.
The issues now being decided on the battlefields of France are of the most vital consequence to ourselves and our readers, not only in common with our fellow-countrymen generally as citizens, but as Socialists, and particularly as Guild Socialists. As Guild Socialists because Guild Socialism demands for its fulfilment a normality, a stability and security in the elemental conditions of national life which will be unattainable for a longer period than we care to prophesy if the Central Powers should be victorious in the struggle.

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The direct consequence of the defeat of the Allies would be that Western Europe would be unsettled in a sense in which, although the present tumult and strife are universal, up to now only the East has been unsettled. And it is a capital mistake to imagine that under those conditions—the conditions under which Russia suffers to-day—any systematic reorganisation of Society would be possible. Proletarian upheavals, and even triumphs, resulting in a proletarian military autocracy constantly menaced by reactions; all this we might have, but not the enduring revolution Guildsmen contemplate. European civilisation would continue, practically speaking, permanently on a military basis, and the only certain prospect before us would be an early renewal of world-wide war for liberation from the Prussian yoke. The only hope of National Guilds lies in a stable and conclusive peace, and this can only be obtained by subduing the Central Powers to that point at which they can be negotiated with on equal terms. We would add that an essential condition of any settlement must be that Russia be reinvoked with her proper possessions, and have her independence fully restored.

—The Guildsman.

After conferences in which representatives of many organisations took part a Federation of Professional, Clerical, and Technical Workers has been formed "to assist in maintaining and improving the economic conditions of members; to discuss policy on subjects of common interest, and, where necessary, to take joint action; to arouse general interest on important professional matters affecting particular organisations, and generally to secure the unity of members in all social activities." The hon. secretary is Mr. F. II. Norman, Westfia, Princes Park Avenue, N.W.4.

Don Ramiro de Maeztu delivered an address, in Spanish, on "Don Quijote y su influencia en España," at a meeting of the Anglo-Spanish Society held on Thursday at King's College, London, Professor Fitzmaurice-Kelly in the chair. In welcoming Señor de Maeztu, who had come specially from the front for the meeting, the chairman referred, in Spanish, to the lecturer as "a formidable gladiator of the Press, a masterly journalist with a more philosophical endowment than is vouchsafed to most knights of the quill." Señor de Maeztu explained that his object was to consider "Don Quijote" and its influence on Spain from the moral and political points of view.

The work, read in historical perspective, belonged to the period when Spain was tired out. At the time of the appearance of "Don Quijote" Spain had just finished the greatest effort a nation has ever made. The Moors, after a struggle of nearly eight centuries, had been expelled from the Peninsula; national and religious unity had been accomplished; Spanish banners were planted all over Europe; America had been discovered, conquered, and colonized; the world had been circumnavigated by Spaniards; the Turks had been finally defeated at Lepanto. The practical result of the great effort was the impoverishment, exhaustion and disappointment of the Spanish people.

The moment was ripe for the warm reception of his gentle jokes at the expense of idealism run mad. The Spanish people saw in the misfortunes of their idealism in the centuries gone by.—"Times," June 13, 1918.