

laborers and technicians, invaders trust to the inhabitants for the bulk of their skilled and unskilled labor and since passive resistance by civilians has never constituted a feature of war, this has usually been practicable. In the World War the Germans secured labor from the French, the Poles and with some exceptions, from the Belgians. Japan has been able to replace Chinese officials of all grades by other Chinese bound to the enemy by fear or self-interest.

While the Czechs have employed sabotage and inflicted many petty annoyances against their German conquerors, there have been few if any reports of open or organized passive resistance. Public officials have collaborated to a certain extent with the German administration, and are even said to have assisted in carrying out sentences against rebellious fellow-countrymen.

As far as we know, the people of France, Holland and Belgium have been driven by threats and starvation to work for their German conquerors. Sabotage has doubtless been present, and individuals may have paid the penalty for refusal to work, but a nation defeated and surrendered is in no condition for organized passive resistance, and no word of such an attempt has come through to us.

As unarmed defense, on the other hand, transfers resistance from the military to the civil population, the invaders of our hypothesis will have at their command no assistance of this type. Soldiers must not only attend personally to all their needs, but also man without native help all the railroads, telegraphs, and airports upon which the advance depends. At each stage, moreover, they must leave behind them a complete local government with garrison, technicians and workers, as the legitimate authorities will have new groups of defenders

always ready to take the risks of restoring civil life at the rear of the invading forces.

It is, of course, unthinkable that the enemy would undertake the maintenance of public utilities and government upon any peace time scale. In 1935 the railroad employees of the United States numbered 1,013,000 and the federal civil service 824,259, amounting together to more than half the German or the Japanese army of that time, including reserves. Even the skeleton service required for military purposes would call for thousands of men, and we have taken in this estimate no account of garrisons, food, service and utilities other than the railroads. We cannot picture the advance of the invaders as anything but costly from a financial point of view, precarious as far as permanent results are concerned, and distasteful to the large proportion of the army who are compelled to exchange uniforms for overalls for an indefinite period.

At this point it should be noted that the present hypothesis has to do strictly with a country such as the United States, industrially developed, democratically organized, of vast extent, and generally self-sufficient from an economic point of view. Only a country of this rank can hope to withstand invasion by either military or non-violent methods. The smaller nations—Belgium, Greece, Thailand—can maintain their independence only as long as this is to the advantage of their powerful neighbors, be these allies or enemies.

Let us assume this advance of an invading force through a first class country to continue for, say a month. The enemy has cut a swath of nominal occupation on the one hand, or of devastation on the other, through the country. They may have reached the goal of our national capitol and burned it, as happened in 1813 (a war which was followed by a most successful peace). By landing several expeditions