Greenwood's Committee has now adjourned for a "maintenance without work" -- in other words, to the convene last week to consider the proposals of Mr. The Labour Conference on Unemployment which was conclusions. Both alike, for instance, assume that month on the plea that something besides starving can the Committee is compelled either to do nothing or commodities (that is, of commodities delivered to the extension of the dividend-system from the "idle rich" friends share the premises of the so-called Capitalists attain; but "direct action" with no clear and attainable England is now a poor country whose first necessity be done by the rank and file in the interim. Little else objectively? Direct action, whatever that may mean, might conceivably be proper and necessary if an objec- masses of America is whittled away at both ends, leaving the only source of wealth is "output," instead of output the principle the Pauline doctrine which both Christianity and Science are doing their best to destroy, that "work," whether really necessary or unnecessary, is the only objective. No fundamental difference exists between Capital and Labour as regards the industrial masses of America is whittled away at both ends, leaving the only title to sharing in the common inheritance. It is true for the present "abnormal" circumstances, the Labour Party is prepared to waive its objection to "maintenance without work"—in other words, to the extension of the dividend-system from the "idle rich" to the "idle poor"; but it is a temporary expedient only. In general, no fundamental difference exists be- tween Capital and Labour as regards the industrial mechanism as a whole; and in consequence Mr. Greenwood's Committee is compelled either to do nothing or vaguely to threaten the adoption of "direct action." What is the value, however, of direct action without an objective? Direct action, whatever that may mean, might conceivably be proper and necessary if an objec- were reduced. He has quoted an ex-Cabinet Minister (the late Food-Controller, we believe) who recently declared that "80 per cent. of the principal businesses of the country were controlled by trusts and syndi- cates." Since the object of these combinations is un- doubtedly the reduction of costs concurrently with the maintenance or increase of prices, it follows that a re- duction of wages in any trustified industry would not necessarily or even probably effect a reduction of prices. But that is not the only method by which prices might be maintained though wages should fall. In America at this moment, for instance, simultaneously with wholesale wage-reductions, a Senate Committee is at work "framing the highest tariff of a generation." It will not be denied, we presume, that both the intention and effect of a high tariff are to keep up and to raise prices; so that we have, in America, this paradoxical policy of reducing wages in order to reduce prices, and framing a tariff in order to raise prices again. The further consequence of such a policy is perfectly clear. Wages being reduced and prices being simultane- ously raised, the effective purchasing power of the masses of America is whittled away at both ends, leaving such a congestion of American goods for export that foreign competition is bound to be enormously in- tensified. With the contraction of the world-market and the expansion of the exportable surpluses of the leading industrial nations (America and England) the certainty of a clash comes nearer and nearer. Nothing on earth can prevent war while this state of affairs prevails.

One of the difficulties of meeting the Capitalist case is the protean character it assumes. Agreement as to the facts is at least as rare among the advocates of the existing system as among its critics. Consider, for instance, the bewildering contradiction between the fol- lowing equally confident statements, the one made by Lord Weir in the "Times" on Wednesday, and the other made by the "Times" itself on Thursday. "To- day's situation with its increasing unemployment," says Lord Weir, "is, to a large extent, the direct out- come of Labour and Socialist policy . . . particularly during the last two years." And the "Times" of the following day observed that "six years of inflationary finance has been a principal cause of the present world- wide distress and depression." There cannot be much hesitation, we imagine, in making a choice between these two diagnoses. The "Times" is undoubtedly as right as Lord Weir is, as usual, wrong; but the point

NOTES OF THE WEEK.

The Labour Conference on Unemployment which was convened last week to consider the proposals of Mr. Greenwood’s Committee has now adjourned for a month on the plea that something besides starving can be done by the rank and file in the interim. Little else was to be expected from the counsels of such a Committee, for the truth is that Mr. Greenwood and his friends share the premises of the so-called Capitalists and are in consequence driven to arrive at similar conclusions. Both alike, for instance, assume that England is now a poor country whose first necessity is economy; both believe that foreign trade is indispens- able to the distribution of goods at home; both accept without question the absurd proposition that instrument exists, not to deliver goods, but to make work and to provide employment; both take it for granted that the only source of wealth is "output," instead of output plus development; both agree that the price of ultimate commodities (that is, of commodities delivered to the individual consumer) cannot be less than "Cost"; and, finally, both endorse as a first and unchangeable prin- ciple the Pauline doctrine which both Christianity and Science are doing their best to destroy, that "work," whether really necessary or unnecessary, is the only title to sharing in the common inheritance. It is true that for the present "abnormal" circumstances, the Labour Party is prepared to waive its objection to "maintenance without work"—in other words, to the extension of the dividend-system from the "idle rich" to the "idle poor"; but it is a temporary expedient only. In general, no fundamental difference exists be- tween Capital and Labour as regards the industrial mechanism as a whole; and in consequence Mr. Greenwood’s Committee is compelled either to do nothing or vaguely to threaten the adoption of "direct action." What is the value, however, of direct action without an objective? Direct action, whatever that may mean, might conceivably be proper and necessary if an objec- were reduced. He has quoted an ex-Cabinet Minister (the late Food-Controller, we believe) who recently declared that "80 per cent. of the principal businesses of the country were controlled by trusts and syndi- cates." Since the object of these combinations is un- doubtedly the reduction of costs concurrently with the maintenance or increase of prices, it follows that a re- duction of wages in any trustified industry would not necessarily or even probably effect a reduction of prices. But that is not the only method by which prices might be maintained though wages should fall. In America at this moment, for instance, simultaneously with wholesale wage-reductions, a Senate Committee is at work "framing the highest tariff of a generation." It will not be denied, we presume, that both the intention and effect of a high tariff are to keep up and to raise prices; so that we have, in America, this paradoxical policy of reducing wages in order to reduce prices, and framing a tariff in order to raise prices again. The further consequence of such a policy is perfectly clear. Wages being reduced and prices being simultane- ously raised, the effective purchasing power of the masses of America is whittled away at both ends, leaving such a congestion of American goods for export that foreign competition is bound to be enormously in- tensified. With the contraction of the world-market and the expansion of the exportable surpluses of the leading industrial nations (America and England) the certainty of a clash comes nearer and nearer. Nothing on earth can prevent war while this state of affairs prevails.

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to remark is that after all these months of discussion a man of Lord Weir's standing can utter and publish a diagnosis which everybody must and does raise prices, while the latter, in the long run, need not. Thoroughly examined and understood, the foregoing explanation will be found to contain the complete answer to the riddle of the difference between the Inflation and the Expansion of Credit.

It must not be supposed, however, that we are against the issue of Credit, either for Output or for Development. The issue of Credit is an absolute necessity for production of both kinds; and any modern production, or production by means of the division of labour, is possible without it. On the other hand, it is no less essential that the direction of the credit-issue should be under public control, so that we should not have, as now, an enormous concentration of credit on development when, plainly, our real need is for output; and equally it is essential that the credit issued should actually effect what it sets out to attain and what it taxes the consumer to attain, namely, a reduction of prices. Let us state the matter as simply as we can. An issue of credit or spending-power is made by the banks professedly for the purpose of increasing either output or the means to output. In other words, Money is issued for the purpose of increasing the quantity of Goods soon or ultimately available for consumption. The first effect, however, of that issue, in the necessary absence of the immediate appearance of the goods, is "inflation"; in other words, the raising of the price of goods already in existence; which means, if it be considered, the taxation of the present consumer by the exact amount of the credit issued and poured into the spending currency. And the question to be asked and answered is how the present consumer, who is immediately taxed by an issue of credit which immediately raises prices, is to be recouped for his loss out of the increased production which the issue of credit at his expense has brought about. Unless, in fact, prices can be reduced simultaneously with the issue of Credit or, at any rate, so soon after the issue of Credit that the present consumer reaps the reward of his enforced abstinence, there can be no reasonable reply to our question. If Credit is issued to increase production and to reduce prices, and is issued at the expense of the community, and yet does not result in greater production and reduced prices, then, clearly, its avowed object has been frustrated and its justification disappears. The object of Credit-issue being more and cheaper production, the means being the taxation of the immediate purchasing-power of the community—unless its own effect is the mere amount to simple robbery. We affirm, in fact, that under the existing system which denies to the consumer the increased production which his credit has been employed to bring about, all Credit and the Capital resulting from it are appropriations of public wealth to private account. The only conceivable justification for the levy of Credit on the purchasing-power of the community is that it should enable the whole community to obtain more and cheaper goods.

Though no English journal appears to be aware of the fact, the Italian Parliament is now engaged in nothing less than the attempt to organize a National Guild idea in this country, where the movement originated; and, in consequence, the application of the idea in Italy is likely to result in considerable disappointment, as the same crude application of the idea is bound to result in disappointment at home. National Guilds as first adumbrated in these pages described a potential order of society differing only from other Utopias in being practically realisable and, in fact, in being indicated as within the current of events. But
World Affairs.

The flower and the fruit of the evolutionary tree of the Race is the great Deed itself of humanity, human self-creation or History. It is humanity itself. It is history proper of Man, therefore, which is the end and the meaning of the evolutionary process of the Human planet. The globe itself and the anthropogenetic process unfolds upon it, and only the material and divine foundation for the building of the civilisation and culture of the human Kingdom; which building, however, is again a process, a dynamic reality, not a static one. The civilisation and culture of the race of Man as a planetary kingdom, that one and universal organisation and order of the world, which the Scottish Brahmanism calls Loka Samgraha—the organism of Humanity, civilisation and culture of the Race, the one Imperium and the One Life of the Race, is the goal and the sanction of History. It is History and not Evolution which is the proper and utter greatness of the Kingdom; for the creation of the human body and of the races of mankind is the inscrutable and providential work of Nature and of what lies within if not behind Nature. We emphasise the obvious, well aware of the danger we are incurring. The identification of generation; however, by History and the conscious presence and prevalence of Destiny in the crisis we live in, compels us to defend obvious truth from the deliberate phantasmasgeries of malevolence and sloth. The British Empire is at the crisis of its existence to-day, and the British race is actually shattered and demented by its own tragic and decisive catharsis of having to choose between Evolution and History, between Destiny-Providence on the one side and the Will of Man on the other, between the British commonwealth and the Loka Samgraha of the species. Let it be said, therefore, that history and humanity proper are the end of Evolution and anthropogenesis. History is rooted in Evolution, and nourished by it, while Evolution ends in the flowering of History.

Evolution, in the sense of our definition, is the unfolding of the cosmic evolution upon the Human Planet, upon the Planet of the Ego, which means upon the planet of Matter most material, of the Logos most logical and dead. Evolution is, thus, anthropogenesis. For it is Man who is the purpose and the realisation of the cosmic work upon the Earth, and the definition sense, then, Evolution may be taken to mean Anthropogenesis, as generally understood, but only that creation of our species, that anthropogenesis which is the perfection and the work of God and of Destiny. History is another and higher creative process, and the work of Nature and of what lies within if not behind the Race. It is History and not our own human omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence. The self-creation of Man, of himself by himself, is another and higher anthropogenesis, being both the fulfilment and the transcendence of the cosmic and evolutionary guidance of Man; the fulfillment and transcendence of both Man and his cosmic abode. For the majesty of the all-might of mankind and human self-creation, the real and final destiny of the Son, of the Kingdom of Humanity, will be, because it ought to be, nothing else than the attainment by the race of the evolutionary and cosmic consciousness itself and of supra-human responsibilities. History tends to become evolution itself on the higher spiral, in the higher ascension of its own pleroma; just as Evolution tends to become self-conscious on the higher spirals of history. The moment in which we live is a moment by which the British commonwealth and the Russian world-responsibility and catharsis, is the crucial moment in the Sophian evolution of humanity. Greater and more fatal tension between the evolutionary and conservative tendency of the world-unconscious from the one side and the transcendental and revolutionary, catastrophic, resurrectional tendency from the other side, greater tension and more ceaseon in its consequences there has never been in
Man. For our age is the Coming of Age of the Race. Our age is the entrance of the Universal Socialism of Humanity into both the History of mankind and into its evolution. Nothing less, not anything less. The Coming of Age of the Race, the dawn of the responsibility and awakening of Mankind as a whole.

The crises of the British Empire and of the Slav world are only the most visible and the greatest signs and results of the cosmic pressure of the arriving aeon of Seraphic Socialism and of the divine order of the organic organisation of the Loka Samgraha. The danger of the Seraphic Socialism and of violence is the organic function of the Aryan destiny and destiny threatening Aryanand, Christendom, and even humanity from the earthquake of the Soviet dispensation lies in the Satanism of the historic consciousness, in the Luciferian belief in intellect and violence, as the bases of the transformation of the world. The revelation and message of the Russian catastrophe is that a Promethean act, a mighty historic deed of geometry and of violence should be the foundation of the new human order, new and all-embracing, new and imposed upon the world. The Russian Man, the most historically mankind finds what he needs himself and what in his own being he himself demands, intellect, Logos, in the world. The Russian revelation concerns the Loka Samgraha as the organisation, the machinery, the mechanics of the One Kingdom. Albion, on the contrary, recommends the protean shapelessness, the liquidity and nebulosity of the British Empire harmonised with the rest of the Kingdom; recommends the League of Nations and internationalism and metaphorical Semantic Christianity. The danger to the world of the panacea of Albion is truly great and mortal. For it recommends to Man insipidity and pseudo-religion, indifference and a pseudo-love of Providence, the pseudo-fear of Destiny; and not from positive belief in God or from love for the Kingdom does the Giant recommend this, but from her own habit of trusting Destiny and Providence, from her fear, fear, fear, lest anything should happen in the world which might bring Promethean form, the Term of Reason, organisation, into the Race. Albion avoids and strives to prevent crystallisation of humanities into Sophia, into the Universal Chantry, Society, Humanity, from the shapelessness and of reason, of death. But Sophia or Pan-Humanity is not that freezing Logos which brings materialisation and death into existence. Pan-Humanity or World-Synthesis is the Body of the Holy Ghost, the incarnation of the Third Hypostasis of God on the earth. To the Holy Spirit, therefore, to Humanity Universal, all the racial organs of Man, all humanities, all empires, all races, all classes, must be subordinated—or, rather, co-ordinated—all sexes of humanity, all ages, every spirit! Even the empire of Albion must be thus co-ordinated. This would involve, we know, the subordination of the Central Evolutionary Vehicle of the living world to Humanity itself and to Universal Freedom, not to Destiny. Not even to Providence, to the Father. For our glory is to live in the era of the expanding and incarnating Aeon of the Organisation of the Aryan. It is the dawn of the Organism of the Race. To this divine and pan-human law every Imperium should be obedient and attuned; every spirit and every group-spirit, even the Commonwealth of the British stock race.

We beg the indulgence of the reader for introducing the term "Germania" into these contemplations, being, as we are, in need of distinguishing between two spiritual and physical, between the positive and negative aspects of Hegel's and Eckhardt's August race. It is neither the Columbia, nor the Germany that gave the gnosis of Hegel and Eckhard to the Kingdom, but the noble and elevated People England, that is responsible to the world and to God for the pan-human function of the indivisible block of the Western and Northern mankind of Teutons and Anglo-Saxons. Of the block of Germany-Britain-America, Germania-England-Columbia, we have written. This is the Western basis of the Aryan function in Man. Russia and the rest of Slavonic humanity is the correlative and Eastern function of the One Aryanand. It is Russia and England that are centrally responsible for the blocks of the races they are morally and mysteriously in charge of; more Russia than Great Serbia and the rest of Slavism, more England than both Germany and Columbia together; and this is the point we wished to come to. The initiation of the work and the Millenium is the spirit of violence, and for Pan-Humanity, rests, in the Western hemisphere, with England. Whether or not it is credible or intelligible, to the evil and slothful generation to whom this appeal is addressed, we say that Albion should be only the physical body of England, the appropriate target for revolver practice, a lifelike portrait of a Sinn Feiner in a firing attitude, and to this little tableau it gave the facetious title of "An Irish Bull." Here, it is needless to say, the bull is not Irish; we are not contemplating a mere verbal error but a spiritual crime, a crime which is unconscious of itself, as so many of our crimes are. The offence is not the publication of the photograph; that may be salutary, for it will show all those who are not blind—a small percentage, but still a percentage—what psychologically the state of the warring parties in Ireland is and how abysmally evil are the powers which the present anarchy has let loose there. No, the offence—and it is against England primarily, and only by reflection against Ireland—is the lighthearted approval which the "Daily Graphic" accords to an attitude which is sardonically evil, which has been produced by the frightful environment in which the men of the R.I.C. have to move, which is therefore comprehensible and even partly excusable in them, but which the "Daily Graphic" by the fact that it is still existing in a civilisation has no excuse either for adopting or for approving. The fact that the "Daily Graphic" regards the "lifelike portrait of a Sinn Feiner" as an "appropriate" target for an R.I.C. auxiliary's revolver practice, is a matter of little concern to the shooting of Sinn Feiners not with the revolver, which spectators at any rate should feel, but with a certain satisfaction. This, however, is the spirit of the vendetta; and if the central conception of civilisation, the conception of justice, is good, this is evil in itself, for if it were acted upon it would reduce civilisation to such a state of decrepitude that only the Press could flourish in it. Let us admit that the present error of the "Daily Graphic" is not a manifestation of deliberate but of unconscious evil; granting that, the most dangerous thing of all is that so much of the evil committed by the Press is unconscious. But I shall have to return to the subject again.

A point worth reflection by us all arose the other day in a divorce trial. A part of the evidence was considered to be unsuitable for the judgment of the women-
jurers, and the defending counsel urged that the women should be excused. "The men might be able to tell the women something about it," he said. This is surely a theory of justice by hearsay! The judge very properly insisted that the women should be allowed to consider the whole evidence; but the newspaper report does not indicate that they did so. The evidence in question was a sketch, and we are told that "several male jurors then looked at it." This incident will no doubt be repeated unless it should be considered an important matter to think more of the fate of the accused than of the feelings of the jury. But the truth is that as a people we are more inclined to think of the feelings of blameless people than of the deserts of offenders. It is the fault of a community strong in moral sentiment rather than in moral sense. Justice is to us an emotion and not a serious passion; we blame the offender, therefore, instead of first understanding and then judging him. And, carried away by our moral sentiments, we are tempted to give more weight even to a matter of delicacy, especially if it is a matter of false delicacy, in the innocent than we are to understand the guilty. Unconsciously, indeed, we regard it as an offence for anyone to question the conduct of all, either as a defendant or prosecutor. The necessity to insist upon the rights of accused people is therefore all the more pressing when a few more possible points of delicacy, in the presence of women in juries, have been introduced into the system. Yet verdicts have been passed, as we like; until a psychological transformation has taken place in the national attitude to morality it will not do much good. For, bad as our law is, the public conception of law is still worse; and in our immediate insensibility really arises from a naïve egoism, an egoism which is satisfied so long as we have closed it from our sight. And this explains also our reluctance to the ex-convict; we do not want to be reminded of what we have done. The bank had some use for it bankers would not be willing to "lend" it; in other words, they enable it to  go to market to buy. Here at once we have a vital difference between money saved up at home and money put into a bank; and the use in question is plainly to employ it by "lending" the bank had some use for it bankers would not be willing to "lend" it; in other words, they enable it to  go to market to buy. Here at once we have a vital difference between money saved up at home and money put into a bank; and the use in question is plainly to employ it by "lending" it to somebody who will take it to market. There is no doubt, in short, that the banks do with money: they send it to market. But now consider what the bank's "lending" of money really means. You put, let us say, £100 in the bank, and the bank is now assumed to be able to "lend" £100. But the depositor would be very much alarmed if the bank had some use for it bankers would not be willing to "lend" it; in other words, they enable it to  go to market to buy. Here at once we have a vital difference between money saved up at home and money put into a bank; and the use in question is plainly to employ it by "lending" it to somebody who will take it to market. There is no doubt, in short, that the banks do with money: they send it to market. But now consider what the bank's "lending" of money really means. You put, let us say, £100 in the bank, and the bank is now assumed to be able to "lend" £100. But the depositor would be very much alarmed if he thought his money had really gone. He believes, at any rate, that though "lent" by the bank it is still in the bank; and in proof of his belief he can, on demand, either "draw out" his money in cash or, if he has a cheque-book, make payments out of it on his own account. The two operations are different, but the central power that they are parts of, and they deserve to be considered; for the one requires that the bank shall always keep its deposits in cash, while the other allows the bank to dispose of its cash and to substitute cheques. Which of these courses is adopted? There is no doubt, of course. No bank keeps enough cash to repay its depositors on demand, nor anything like it. Most banks have only a small amount of cash in their possession: from one-tenth to one-sixteenth of

Towards National Guilds.

We were inquiring last week what is the difference in effect between money saved up in a stocking and money put into a bank; and our provisional answer involved us in some simple definitions of money and price. Price, it was concluded, being the result of the division of goods among the people, is often offered to them, is affected by money that goes to market; it is not affected by money that stays at home, but only by money looking for goods to carry; and thus our first answer to our original question is that the money saved up in a stocking, since it does not go to market, does not affect prices. What, however, of the money that is put into a bank? What does it do?

It would be nonsense to suppose that the bank does nothing with the money but hoard it up. In short, the bank is not a stocking. We may be sure that unless the bank had some use for it bankers would not be always touting for what they call Deposits. They do not build branch banks in every village just to keep people's money safe. Besides, we know that they are willing to pay people to deposit money with them; they call the payment interest; and unless they themselves made money out of the deposits they surely would not do that. Now, then, do banks make their money? What do they do with the deposits that a stocking does not do? The obvious answer is that they "lend" it; in other words, they enable it to go to market to buy. Here at once we have a vital difference between money saved up at home and money put into a bank; for whereas money at home does not come into competition for goods and put up prices, the same money, when put into a bank, does go to market, does compete for goods, and does, in consequence, put up prices. Of course, this is admitted by the banks, but in such terms as would make few people know what they are talking about. For instance, people are urged not to let their money "lie idle" at home, but to put it into a bank where it can be "used"; and the use in question is plainly to employ it by "lending" it to somebody who will take it to market. There is no doubt, in short, that the banks do with money: they send it to market. But now consider what the bank's "lending" of money really means. You put, let us say, £100 in the bank, and the bank is now assumed to be able to "lend" £100. But the depositor would be very much alarmed if he thought his money had really gone. He believes, at any rate, that though "lent" by the bank it is still in the bank; and in proof of his belief he can, on demand, either "draw out" his money in cash or, if he has a cheque-book, make payments out of it on his own account. The two operations are different, but the central power that they are parts of, and they deserve to be considered; for the one requires that the bank shall always keep its deposits in cash, while the other allows the bank to dispose of its cash and to substitute cheques. Which of these courses is adopted? There is no doubt, of course. No bank keeps enough cash to repay its depositors on demand, nor anything like it. Most banks have only a small amount of cash in their possession: from one-tenth to one-sixteenth of

minds one more unwillingly than ever that England, in spite of her splendid literature, has no concept of Burns as a national poet, or a figure in her culture, no man of genius whose writings are as familiar to her as popular sayings. It is less her misfortune than her fault, for she has writers in abundance who can be understood by everyone, and who are English as characteristically as Burns is Scotch.

The divorce between the English nation and its written documents is perhaps the most striking example of this phenomenon; we have forgotten even the minimum of popular culture which half-suavage peoples possess—we have forgotten our very ballads. It is strange how little this loss inconveniences us. —EDWARD MOORE.
the deposits they have received. It follows that if all the depositors or even a large number of them were suddenly to demand their money back in the form of cash the bank could not pay them. It would have to shut its doors and declare itself bankrupt. In the other case, that of payment by cheque, the bank is perfectly safe; it does not need a penny of cash in order to cover a business by cheque. All it does is to subtract from the depositors' figures in one book and add to them in another. It is just book-keeping.

Several conclusions emerge from these facts, and the first is that, though the banks send their depositors' money to market, the depositos's continue in possession of their rights to the same. Suppose, for instance, that A and B have each deposited £100 in the same bank. The bank has £200 to lend, which it sends to market by means of a borrower of that amount. Very good. But A and B, having each a cheque-book, let us say, begin making out cheques to each other; in short, sending their money to market. So long as the £200 is in the bank, no matter whether it belongs to A or B, so long as neither A nor B demands repayment in cash, not only can the bank "lend" £200 to C or D, but A and B both continually be able to "spend" their deposits. The surprising conclusion arises that bank deposits, so long as they do not involve cash, can be sent to market simultaneously by both the depositor and the bank. The bank "lends" the money, enabling somebody to go to market with it; and, at the same time, the depositor continues to have the "use" of it; with the result that an original deposit of, let us say, £100 is not only set to work and sent to market as £200. For the depositor not only "lends" his cake to the banker who "lends" it to somebody else, but the depositor has to eat himself.

We have seen that Prices are fixed by the relation of their constituents to their loans of spending power; and the banks let us return to our stocking. It contains, we have supposed, £100 in gold, silver, nickel, copper or paper notes. What is it? As metal or paper it is worth much, little, or nothing. A gold sovereign beaten up would still be worth twenty shillings as gold; a silver or nickel shilling beaten up would be worth less than twelve pence or two-dime pieces of the same sovereign; a penny beaten up would not be worth a great; and the mere paper of a note is worthless. What, then, gives value to the whole collection? What makes it "worth" £100, though the sum of its constituents is much less? The first answer is that it is "legal tender"; in other words, the law compels people to take it in payment of debts at its face value. And the second answer is that it represents its owner's title to £100 worth of goods and services current in the community. We shall see next week what this means.

Drama.

By John Francis Hope.

"Daniel" was a poet—he should have been called Derondeaux; he was a minor poet, and a French poet. Therefore he had a secret sorrow and a public vice. The cause, connection, and consequence of these facts are demonstrated in the play now being performed at the St. James' Theatre; it is adapted from the French and not quite acclimatized to the English—for it comes from Paris where, as Nietzsche said, "people are almost nothing else but psychologists," and it suffers, says the most Gallic of our critics, "A. B. W.," from over-enginuity, "the 'motivation' is a little exorbitant." There is a reason for everything in the play, except the play itself; and the "natural history" method applied to French literature would indicate that a Frenchwoman needs no reason for an intrigue or a French minor poet for a vice. The play would not work without technical equipment; a woman without an intrigue, or a poet without a vice, would simply not be French.

But in "Daniel" they have reasons—French ones. Love—the loneliness of unrequited love. Daniel loved Marguerite as only a French minor poet can love—although he exceeded the usual time allowance and imitated Shakespeare's Viola too faithfully. I gathered that he sent his big brother Albert to plead his cause ("Courtship of Miles Standish") but resigned his pretensions to Marguerite when he discovered that his brother loved her. Minor poetry excels in the discovery of novel motives for failure, resignation, the symptoms of declining life; and brotherly love inspiring the sacrifice of sexual love has Christian sanction. But every Frenchman would know that a Frenchwoman has only calculation in the purpose of drama; but opium provides a nice, easy, lingering death, with just the right touch of sentimental melancholy. It is almost as affecting as consumption used to be on the stage.

Marguerite married Albert, not because she loved him, but because in his perpetual presence; for Albert, although preoccupied with motor-cars, was of a jealous temperament, and not yet trained in the art of self-sacrifice as Daniel was, and, moreover, Marguerite wanted no scandal. She only wanted to do scandalous things, not to accept the consequences of them.

The younger sister, Suzanne, was secretly engaged to Albert's secretary, who was not very rich enough to ask for her. She suggested that Maurice Granger should pretend to be making love to her, and thus tell

National Guildsmen.

By John Francis Hope.
two lies with one action. But Marguerite, if she had not the passion for truth, had, at least, the truthfulness of passion; she could not make love to a man she did not love when she was in love with another, and her everlasting repulsion of her husband at last forced him to jump to the conclusion that she had a lover. He forced her to confess, but he was ignorant of man's name. Suzanne innocently revealed the fact that her pretended engagement was a temporary device of concealment no longer necessary; and, thinking logically, he suspected Daniel; Daniel confesses, and produces letters in proof. Albert nearly strikes him; confirmed his suspicion; and although Maurice admitted practically certain of the lover's identity. The man's name. Suzanne innocently revealed the fact that her pretended engagement was a temporary device of poisoning has its advantages, and Daniel conveniently faints under Albert's searching cross-examination pathetically reproaches her for having betrayed his love, checks him. Before he can decide what to do Albert returns; Marguerite rushes into the bedroom. but leaves her bag behind. Being in the mood to suspect everybody, he suspects Daniel; Daniel confesses, and produces the letters in proof. Albert nearly strikes him; but Daniel falls into another swoon as he rushes out. In the next act he dies "off," but not before he has told his brother the truth and taught him the lesson of sacrifice. Albert tells the lovers that he will release Marguerite so that she may marry Maurice—and thus Love triumphs without damaging morality more than is necessary. "Let those love who love," is Daniel's contribution to sociology—love being, in Nietzsche's biting phrase, "only a more refined parasitism, a nestling in a strange soul, sometimes even in a strange body—ah! at what expense always to the 'host'—1!"

It is an obvious stage-play, and it ought to be staggily played. The confession scene in the second act, for example, ought to be the actress's "great" scene—but it was merely lifelike. The whole cast plays too quietly in crises, too like ladies and gentlemen, and not enough like actors, and the pitch the playing is perfect; but French actors do not play at that low pitch. Mr. Claude Rains, who not only played Casca, as all the critics remember, but gave a remarkably fine performance of Klestakoff in "The Government Inspector," added another fine performance as Daniel to his record. His "bronchi," was a marvel of accuracy; but the restless play of the fingers contrasted with the weak immobility of the body, the eyes alternately dull and blazing, the feeble smile, the voice tremulous and slightly hoarse—every detail of the acting conclusions realised his problem. The psychology did not agree with the physiology of opium-smoking. I pay Miss Edith Evans the compliment of saying that I did not recognise her, and was surprised to see her name on the programme.

**Readers and Writers.**

Though it is stolen into my province, I must call attention to the extraordinary "Hymn of Hate" recently composed and sung by Mr. Israel Zangwill in the "Venturer" (monthly, 1s., Swarthmore Press, Ltd.). As far as I know, Mr. Zangwill has little ill-usage to complain of in this country; and, even at the most, far less, I imagine, than many of its own sons, including some of the noblest. With only a moderate talent, too often employed to tickle the ears of the groundlings, Mr. Zangwill has been permitted to acquire, if he has not been permitted to adopt, a considerate public estimation, not only as a versatile journalist, but as novelist, playwright, politician, thinker, and I know not what. Generosity has been strained in this country to make much more than the best of him. Any native talent of the size of Mr. Zangwill's would be satisfied to have had half or even a quarter of Mr. Zangwill's opportunity for delivering himself in the full limelight of the Press and the Platform. Whatever he has had to say, and in whatever manner he has chosen to say it, has been accepted and listened to with the exaggerated attention and deference paid to almost anything. Whether destined and his final triumph—or what was assumed to be his triumph—was the creation at the instance of the British Government of a new Zion for his people in Palestine. In spite of all this glorification, testifying to the abundance of good-natured souls, it is a little curious that, on the one hand, Mr. Zangwill has chosen to exhibit one of the characteristic vices of his race in the form of black resentment; and in a spirit of revulsion to type he has chosen as his particular object the "creatures called Christians." It can be easily understood how the unquestionably coloured races, meditating on their wrongs in the light of the recent European war, should arrive at the conclusion, expressed by Mr. Du Bois, that Europe is wholly evil and the coloured peoples the only civilised among mankind. But hitherto, outside the speculations of a few unknown thinkers (on whom, Mr. Zangwill may observe, no limelight is thrown, though, in a sense, they may be said to flatter Christendom as Christendom has never been flattered before, raising it to the level of a plane of cosmic thought), apart from my colleagues, "M. M. Cosmoj," I repeat, nobody has hitherto classified the Jewish race with the coloured races of the world or attributed to them a similar psychology. By an extraordinary coincidence, however, the affirmation has no sooner been made than Mr. Zangwill has been impelled to connect back for the benefit of the "creatures called Christians" is indistinguishable, both in form and in substance, from the dithyrambs of Mr. Du Bois. I would call the attention of anthropological students to the unmistakable psychological con- sanguinity, as exhibited in "Blackwater" and the present "Hymn of Hate," of the Jew—Mr. Zangwill, and the negro—Mr. Du Bois.

Those who have read the series of articles on the Jews recently published in these pages will allow me to remark on the generosity, the Aryan nobility of conception, the plain manifesting. Whether destined to become current and popular, as may be hoped, or to be forgotten, the judgment there passed on the Jewish race cannot be said to err on the side of severity. As never before by any European thinker, the Jewish race was accorded the position of the highest possible human distinction, and, that of being the people chosen by "God" for the manifestation of the "first-born" of the human race; and even if reason was discovered in its subsequent history for affirming that the choice had now passed from the Jewish people elsewhere, the prac- tical conclusion, as my readers will remember, was friendly assimilation and not a barbarous extinction. Is it in reply to those articles that Mr. Zangwill has been moved to dip his pen in spleen and write from the depths of racial resentment? It may be so, though
we have no other evidence than coincidence. The fact remains that a more startling and illuminating contrast of spiritual approach to racial and human problems could scarcely be conceived than the articles referred to above and Mr. Zangwill's attack upon 'the creatures called Christians.'

"Goyim," "Beware of the 'Goyim,'" Jacob is told, and remains that a more startling and illuminating contrast of spiritual approach to racial and human problems could scarcely be conceived than the articles referred to above and Mr. Zangwill's attack upon 'the creatures called Christians.'

The dithyrambic verse opens with the warning addressed by the elders to young Jacob against the 'Goyim.' Jacob is told, "they drink Jewish blood . . . . They are "foes of the faith, drunks and bullies, engendered of God for our sins . . . . but the worst of the Goyim are the creatures called Christians." He recognises them by "the oaths of their reeling adults" and "the black eyes they give to their females." Later, however, Jacob grows bigger. He begins to read the works of the Goyim: Plato, Virgil, Shakespeare, and for a while "Back, back, he cries . . . . back to the Ghetto, to our God of Compassion, to our dream of Messiah, to our God of Compassion, to our dream of Messiah," for the Goyim, despite their Platos and Shakespeares, "drink human blood," and "the worst of the Goyim are the creatures called Christians."

If Mr. Zangwill's resentment is black as Ethiopia—and it is more deeply darkened by his intensifying references to "our God of Compassion"—his intelligence compensates for it (speaking psycho-analytically) by the other extreme of superficiality. Again, it is not within my province nor are these Notes the proper medium in which to demonstrate, as I believe it could be and has been demonstrated, that the Jewish race to which Mr. Zangwill belongs is, above all others, the very instrument of the degradation of "the creatures called Christians" with the essential truth that everywhere throughout European history it is the Jewish genius that has initiated and perfected, to the successive ruin of every great European civilisation, the system of financial credit which, as certainly as we are alive to-day, not only brought about the recent European war, but is plunged "the creatures called Christians" into others even worse. It is strange that Mr. Zangwill should describe Christians as "drinkers of blood"; for what is Credit and Money but an exact analogue of blood in human society and who has taught European the black art if not the Jew? The Jewish economist and historian, Sombart, is an impartial witness to it. Read his account of how the Jews, by monopolising the control of Credit, sucked dry to death first Rome, then Spain, then Holland, and afterwards, under the Dutch Monarchy, founded the Bank of England for the same deadly result as here. Is there now a strain between "the creatures called Christians" in America and England? To what is it due but to the threat of the transfer of the control of credit from London to New York; and who are the chief agents of it? New York and the Venticour, Mr. Zangwill's attack upon "the creatures called Christians"? I do not know it.

The London Press has obviously not realised the importance of a section of this exhibition, although the East End has now got something to look at that the West End has not seen for a long time. In my opinion the Small Gallery contains the best collection of modern art shown in London during the last five years. At last signs are to be seen that Expressionism is beginning to settle down on firm ground and to use the former experiments and experiences to better purpose than before. Some will say that there is a strong touch of Céanne in these pictures, but the more penetrating will see that these Dutchmen are descended artistically from the old Dutch painters and sculptors, and that Expressionism is only a distant relation, and that they are more influenced by the feeling of the modern Dutchman, Van Gogh, and indeed by the whole Expressionist movement. There are of course in Holland as elsewhere only one or two important figures in modern painting, who have a number of more or less successful followers. Jan Sluyters in particular has a strong influence on many of his contemporaries, and when face to face with some of his best works it is not difficult to see why. His conception is of the twentieth century; and he is as simple and passionate as any human that has lived. His craftsmanship is superb; one looks at his "Nude" (171) (which was so powerful that the Dutch Committee decided not to hang it—it can be seen in the Secretary's room on request!) is enough to convince anyone that all modern tendencies are realised in this man's art. It shows a mulatto prostitute lying on a couch facing the spectator; the lines and forms are so masterfully arranged that for that alone the picture could be thought an almost perfect work of art. But it is also a profound expression of bestial passion which it is difficult to compare with anything in modern painting. No one visiting the show should forget to ask for this picture, as it is positively the best now shown in London. Kees van Dongen has a good example of his portrait painting here, which is worth while noticing, if only for the sake of knowing what will be "modern" and "good stuff" in London in a year or two (Dongenism has now reached high-tide in Paris). "Le Doigt sur la joue" (161) is splendidly arranged in colour and design, and would be Cretan if it were not Parisian; but, being the latter, it is stronger in poster effects than in composition. The two compositions by P. Modrian, who stands somewhere in between Marinetti, Picasso and Kandinsky, are purely experimental, and as such quite satisfactory; anyhow, quite as satisfactory as any of the Picassos at the Leicester Gallery. Picasso has worked out a formula and now does nothing but arrange his planes by this fixed rule, while Modrian is sincerely experimenting and shows variety in his attempts. In the same room is a piece of sculpture in stone (188) by H. L. Krop; it is very well constructed and the character of the material has been wonderfully preserved. The Large Gallery is filled with paintings of a kind which is only too familiar to the frequenter of the R.A. and similar shows. There is particularly fatuous "Salome" (43), an attempt at "Hokusai" (75), two very sentimental "Unbelievers," some dull and carefully painted portraits, etc. As for sculpture, there is a shocking bust of Prince Hendric and a few very
Principia Metaphysica: A Commentary.
By Denis Saurat.

I.—ONTOLOGY: THE ACTUAL AND THE POTENTIAL.

1. Every existence is infinite; every expression is limited. The expression of any thought or being is necessarily incomplete.

I say: "A man is going by in the street." It is impossible for me to express all I can and feel about that man; it is impossible for me even to see or feel it; it does not even interest me. For instance, I do not take any notice of the colour of his hair, the length of his coat, the expression on his face; the analysis of any feature would spread into the infinite. I choose to select the very general fact that he belongs to the human species, and I go into no details. To get all the details, I should have to fix him at one particular point of time; it is conceivable that then the total of the details would be finite. But the next instant most of the elements of the picture: his position, his expression, etc., would have changed; and no unit of time is short enough for me to catch him in a static position. He is in a perpetual transformation, and therefore infinite. To say anything about him, I must choose what interests me in him, and leave out the rest; otherwise, I could say nothing. And even if I could say everything about him, it would come to the same result as the following: He is in a perpetual transformation, and therefore infinite.

I should have insisted on nothing, and a listener would not know the aim or point of my speech: I could proceed to no deduction. My thought about the man would not have progressed. Thus all expression, all thinking, is a choice, and is by nature, even by aim, incomplete.

2. There are two parts in every being: the Actual which is the expressed, and the Potential, which is the unexpressed, and they grow together infinitely, the one out of the other.

The distinction is not between the Conscious and the Unconscious. The word "Unconscious" is a mere negative, and may cover widely different categories of being. Thus, many things for us become unconscious because they are expressed, absolutely in the actual, and so trouble us no more: for instance, in part, our past. Also, many things are unconscious because the conscious self is quite potential still for us and far from being expressed: for instance, our future. The Potential is the infinite mass of our possibilities which we have not expressed yet; our future belongs to it; some of our past also, because it may recur. The Potential grows with the growth of the Actual, because to actualise anything, we reject parts of it, which creates problems. When I say "A man is going by"—having chosen to concentrate on the motion of the man, I create new problems, as: Where is he going to?

What is he going there for? etc., problems which were not in my consciousness while I was merely looking at the man without expressing anything about him.

A new Potential is thus created with every new Actual; and inversely, from that new Potential a new Actual will come: the answers to the above questions: Where? What for? etc., and this new Actual in turn will create a new Potential; and so on ad infinitum.

3. The aim of every being is to express itself: to render as intense (as conscious) as possible the desires which are its essence.

When we abstract ourselves from the outside world; at a quiet moment, we close our eyes, listen to nothing outside, and just feel our existence, if we are in good health, we perceive and enjoy in ourselves a sort of warm vibration or rippling current of life, which is pure pleasure, which is pure desire. That is the very essence of our being. In certain acts of ours, it becomes more intense, and bursts out into our ordinary crowded and busy life: in eating when we are hungry, in physical or mental exercise, in love. The aim of all our acts is to intensify that desire, to increase that pleasure of life; generally, our work is designed to get the means to that increase: food, exercise, love, etc.

But whatever the means, the aim is the same, whether it be in the lowest sensualism, or in the purest joys of asceticism or intellectualism. We can even perceive, when we get to that fundamental desire in us, that it has a sort of impersonal quality: it is not so much particularly "us" as running through us. It is not only our being, but the general being, there is in it communion with the whole of being, of nature, animals, trees and waters and air. Indeed many people are only conscious of it in the presence of nature, not being able to get to it sufficiently in themselves, owing to ill health or other causes.

4. To express itself Being has to concentrate on some chosen part of itself, and to reject other parts; thus, in its expression, Being divides and subdivides itself into individuals.

The only grounds we have to judge the General Being by are the facts of our experience. There we touch reality, however limited, and we must use our intelligence in trying to see how the limitation works, and how much of our experience is the General Being's. As we are parts of the General Being, its ways are to be seen in us. Thus, psychological experience is the basis of metaphysics. Metaphysics is the psychology of the Universe.

Besides which, we cannot help ourselves. As we cannot know anything else, we have to judge by our own experience. Only we must be careful not to mix the abstract workings of our intelligence with the facts of our psychological experience. Our intelligence is a tool; we must apply it to facts, and not allow it to produce conceptions mechanically by working upon itself and its processes and not upon facts. When it works upon itself, intelligence produces logic, which is a fine, interesting and instructive fabric, but has only the slenderest connections with reality. We must beware of admitting pure logic into metaphysics, and base metaphysics on experience and reason which is the perception and organisation of experience by intelligence.

We have then to assume that things happen in the General Being as they do in us. Trying to express itself, the General Being separates one Actual from its Potential. Then, in that rejected Potential, another Actual concentrates; and so on, as conceptions are produced in us. Each Actual thus formed in the General Being is an individual.

5. Pain and Pleasure are the twin concomitants of creation, which is expression, which is division.

When the Potential concentrates itself, on one hand it increases the intensity of some of its desires, and that is
the production of pleasure. But at the same time, a new Potential is created, and for the moment, anyhow, refused expression. Desire is torn into two parts: one is satisfied, and gives pleasure; the other is rejected and becomes... unsatisfied desire.

Thus in work, there is first a pleasure, the intensification of desire by expression; but there is an effort, which is a pain, which soon culminates in fatigue and actual suffering. Therefore, in human beings, at the same time as desire for work, there is laziness, a repulsion in front of work: a fear of the suffering in it.

Thus:

6. Pleasure is the self-consciousness of desire, the aim of every being; as has been explained under (3); and

7. Pain is the consciousness of loss which accompanies the rejection by desire of part of itself in the course of its expression.

8. There is in every being the instinct of concentration; of the necessity to choose and reject.

Since Being progresses on the lines of division and concentration, every individual has in himself that same need.

Intellectual consciousness is produced, as we have seen under (1) by concentration; by choosing one line of thought and rejecting all the others.

Moral conscience is the same process applied to action: man has realised since he began to be man that out of all the actions possible to him, he must choose some coherent course. He has deliberately forbidden himself to do a great number of things, which he has marked as evil; he has chosen some channels of action which he has called good. Thus he has developed out of animality, savagery, barbarism, into civilisation. That instinct of concentration must be very deep-rooted in man, since, after all the orgies and ecstasies of lust, bloodshed and brutality of history, and in the middle of the welter of passions and ignominies of present mankind, moral conscience still exists, and, in the best individuals, is probably stronger than ever; and, ultimately, makes a bid for the political government of mankind. And there remains always, in the moral conscience, in intellectual processes, in chastity, in jealousy, the same deep sense that some things must not be done, that a being has to concentrate in one direction, whatever be the suffering to be borne.

9. Concentration in a Universe produces men; in a man, ideas.

The matter of the Universe, elaborated by a special process which concentrates infinite powers into very small particles, ultimately produce: men.

Thus the desires of man ultimately produce ideas. Take the idea expressed by the word "patriotism." Man has originally a feeling of comfort and security in the existence of a group of men who have interests in common with him, who help him and protect him. That is a pure feeling, or desire. Then, in the course of its expression, that feeling becomes subdivided into several others: a feeling for the family; one for friends; one for superiors in the social order; one for servants; one for the group as a whole. Each of these feelings develops on its own lines. In the feeling for the group as a whole, again several elements concentrate; until at last there emerges one very precise, complicated, "sub-divided" feeling, extremely self-conscious of its aims, which we call "patriotism." As it has become conscious of many complications which were not in the primitive feeling, we call it an "idea." But patriotism varies in each man; there is A's patriotism, B's, and so on. And even in each man it varies: it generally is quite dormant, and comes to the foreground of consciousness for quite a short time occasionally. So in each of us there are many patriotism which are born

and die; each being a feeling of some duration and intense self-consciousness. Such summits of waves of desire I shall call "ideas." An idea is an individual being, a desire which lives in us for a certain short period in a very intense state, much more intense than our ordinary life; just as a man lives in a universe.

Just as we say "man," or "American" to cover, to name, a great number of beings, thus we give the name "patriotism" to a whole nation of "ideas," each individual and different and transitory. But for the purpose of these metaphysics, "an idea" shall mean such a being. Thus ideas come from desires, as men come from Universes.

10. The Potential is common to all; individuals are concentrations of the One Potential Being in different directions.

In the General Being one Actual being crystallises; all that is left out still belongs to the General Being, not to the Actual. Thus what a man has not expressed does not belong to him: there is even a precise feeling of being robbed, of suffering personal injury, when somebody else expresses something which we might have, but have not, expressed. And verily we left it in the Potential and someone else did take it. The possibilities of our being and extend, going up the course of concentration, to the whole General Being, where they naturally interpenetrate and are one with the possibilities of all other beings.

But also, naturally, there are several degrees of concentration of the Potential, and in that sense, the Potential from which we have derived our actuality is nearer to us than the General Being, is more particularly our Potential. Much as men have a country which they belong to, more precisely than they belong to the whole of mankind. But that country is not theirs, as individuals, exclusively; each shares it with a number of others. It is thus with the different degrees of concentration of the Potential, and with what we may call "our" Potential.

Thus, there are three stages of being which we are clearly conscious of: the General Being subdivides and concentrates into Universes; a universe subdivides and concentrates into men; a man subdivides and concentrates into ideas.

Views and Reviews.

THE MINUTE STRUCTURE OF THE BRAIN.

The application of the microscope to the study of the brain not only gave birth to a new science—brain histology—but struck the final blow at the old theory (maintained so late as the "History of Philosophy," by George Henry Lewes) of the uniform structure of the brain. The list of discoveries and discoverers since Ehrenberg is too long for me to quote; but I may give the result in Dr. Hollander's words: "The neurone—with its differentiated processes, its definitely organised reticulum and definitely arranged granules of various nature, its nucleus and nuclear network and chromatic filaments—is the most complex unit of the human body, and each neurone is more intricate in structure than the whole cerebral cortex supposed to be Gall's time. There are millions of these neurones in the cerebral grey matter, and these are not planted fortuitously, but they are definitely arranged, and according to the current hypothesis, each neurone is a separate organisation. Altogether the histological study of the brain is now absorbing more attention than the naked eye anatomy. Microscopy has replaced macroscopy."*  

* "In Search of the Soul, and the Mechanism of Thought, Emotion, and Conduct." By Bernard Hollander, M.D. (Kegan Paul. 2 vols. £2 2s. net.)
But although it is easy to ignore Gall, it is not so easy to escape from him. Certainly Gall did not use the microscope; but the perfected methods of histology only elaborate and complete his anatomical demonstrations, while his principle is admitted at the same time that his authority is denied. Dr. Hollander says: "But just as thought cannot be lifted from the brain with a dissecting-knife, so the mysteries of psychological phenomena cannot be perceived slumbering in its meshes, no half-formed ideas starting from its processes."

"Histologists have tried to discover the uses of the different parts of the brain; but unaided examination of structure has never yet been sufficient to reveal the functions of an organ. We might dissect the optic nerve till the crack of doom without being enabled, by that means alone, to demonstrate that its use is to convey visual impressions from the eye to the mind. It is by observing the concomitance of the faculty of vision with the existence and development of the nerve, and the effect of its diseases in destroying sight, that we arrive at the discovery of its function. Having once made the discovery, anatomy steps in to confirm its truth, by showing its consistency with the relations of the nerve to the eye on the one side and the brain on the other. It is the same with the nerve of hearing, with the nerves of sensation and motion, and, indeed, with every part of our bodily structure. We might dissect them all for centuries, apart from observation of living phenomena, without being thereby enabled to discover their uses. Even the structure of a muscle, plainly as it speaks after we perceive its function, does not, of itself, suffice to teach us that its office is to contract. It is by observation of the actual concomitance of contraction and structure that we first ascertain the fact. Dissection may prove the compatibility of function and structure; but, after the function is revealed by observation, or disproved an alleged function by showing its incompatibility with well ascertained structure."

Dr. Hollander here reveals the weakness of all specialism. In the passion to know "everything of something," the specialist forgets that the only check to intemperate zeal, the only real possibility of making fruitful discoveries, is also to know "something of everything," in Huxley's phrase. It is a common complaint of the medical profession that laboratory work is out of touch with medical practice, that the specialists do not answer the questions that the clinical observer asks. A man is a very complicated organism, and his various parts do not work in isolation or independence; and not only the need, but the value, of a synthetic point of view is well demonstrated by Mr. Morley Roberts in his recent book, "Watershed in the Human Body," published by Eveleigh Nash. Gall, like all original men, had the synthetic mind; he brought together facts from natural history, embryology, clinical observation, and anatomy; and he made two and two equal four.

It has been stated by Bevan-Lewis that "the localisation of cerebral function was the outcome of the great principle of evolution carried to its logical issue"; and the histologists invented the "new phrenology." It is a curious fact that, apart from astronomy, where every observer has his "personal galaxy," that addition of our nomenclature concerning fundamental questions. The number of layers of cells described by histologists varies from five to nine; according to Brodmann, six is the correct number of cell-strata in the cortex of men and mammals. But every observer has his own nomenclature and interpretation—and it is obvious that the "personal equation" bulks too largely in the results to justify us in calling histology an exact science. Having demonstrated the existence of cell-strata, histologists proceeded to localise the brain-functions also in layers; but even here they could not agree. But out of assuming the impossibility, to emerge two names, G. Elliott Smith and K. Brodmann; and although Brodmann adopts the untenable position that mental functions cannot be localised, Dr. Hollander concludes: "It is sufficient for our purpose that Elliott Smith and Brodmann have made out just such structurally differentiated areas in the brain as must exist if localisation of mental function is to be possible, that they admit that cells and cell groups are localised, and that certain symptoms are produced by definite lesions. This is something definite and unambiguous."

Theodor Meynert is usually credited with the discovery of the projection systems of the brain—although Gall was the discoverer. Flechsig contended that he ought to be grateful to Gall, but Meynert had already expressed his "gratitude" in these terms: "Much more hopeful can we be some day to understand the functions of the brain, which must of necessity lead to the creation of an organology of the brain surface. We need not be afraid of it, because of Gall's swindle, for if two engage upon the same thing, it need not turn out the same, especially when we recognise the frivolous ambition of the man, who, according to Burdach's striking characterisation, 'did not want to be within the bond of science, or a link in its chain, but wanted solely to float on the surface,' as compared with our own exact, careful, scientific, psychological method." Burdach's mixed metaphors betray as much ignorance of Gall and his work as Meynert's excessive "personal equation"; and when we discover that "Meynert was also opposed to Gall's localisation theory because memory is the common property of all cortical cells and fibres; which is exactly what Gall said," we can only be thankful that Meynert's own discoveries do not depend on his uncorroborated testimony. Flechsig practically adopts Gall's doctrine, but falls foul of the nomenclature, "friendship," "benevolence," "wit," "firmness," and so on. But as he himself speaks of "the man who, according to Burdach's feeling of hunger and thirst," the "emotion of fear," his difference from Gall could be detected, if at all, only under the microscope. The fact remains that Gall's anatomy of the brain has not been superseded, but elaborated by later research; that his doctrine of the plurality and localisation of the mental functions of the brain is necessary to every investigator, however scientific and specialised; and that the most fruitful means of research both into the nature of the mental functions and of their localisation, that of clinical observation of circumscribed lesions with such disease, has been neglected to the detriment of our knowledge of the subject. It is difficult to discover, at the present moment, any argument in support of the undoubted fact that the brain is the organ of the mind.

A. E. R.
LETTER TO THE EDITOR.

Sir,—Perhaps you will allow me to protest to you against the reply to the letter of C. H. Douglas, in which the "mystica" poems criticised in your recent review of my verses. Such "impressionist" remarks make one despair of English criticism. Surely the first duty of a critic is to understand his subject and to send the volume back. Your critic's power to understand philosophical verse evidently does not go beyond Tupper. That these particular verses are something better is I think proved by the letter of warm commendation I have received from such leading philosophers of the day, from Balfour, Boutroux, Bergson, Haldane, and others. The "Times," and many other papers have praised them highly for their philosophical and poetical qualities. Only this week I received from abroad a copy of the "Revue Germanique," the principal review in France as you doubtless know of English and German literature in which there is an article on a dozen English poets entitled "Annual Review" with some two pages devoted to "Mystica et Lyrica," in which their particular poetical and philosophical qualities are praised. Initially, I do hope if I publish another volume at a subsequent date you will send the volume to someone who understands the ABC of philosophical poetry.

CLOUDESLEY BRERETON.

"E. M." replies: Mr. Brereton's letter is even more philosophical than his poetry. Still, allowing that his book has been praised by four philosophers and the "Times," it may be that the passages which I quoted from it are as platitudinous as they read. My readers will have to decide that for themselves. Meanwhile, believing my eyes, which have seen Mr. Brereton's verse, I venture to offer an explanation of the praise which was accorded it. The philosophers thought it was poetry, and the poetry critics thought it was philosophy. I will not pretend that I do not understand Mr. Brereton's verse; all that I do not understand is why it should be mistaken for 'philosophical poetry.'

PRESS CUTTINGS.


With a Commentary by A. R. Orage. (Cecil Palmer. 7s. 6d. net.)

It is an unfortunate English characteristic that few public ideas become generally known until they are adopted or denounced by Man for himself, a paradox of distrust of any untried proposal; but, on the other hand, efforts are rarely made to consider in advance the possibilities of a new scheme. The result is that, as a nation, we do no more than "muddle through"; politicians, probably only a few people, and these technically interested in economic theory, are aware that Major Douglas's ideas outlined and explained in this volume, have for some months occupied an important place among the various plans put forward to counter the economic crisis through which the country is passing. It is indeed possible that before many months have passed we may see them proposed. It would surely be a good thing, therefore, in a country that prides itself upon being a democracy, that such ideas as these should be canvassed publicly and some definite opinion formed about them. It is obvious that the first sum must always be smaller than both together; but the first is all that is distributed among the community in the form of purchasing power; consequently, the community is in a position to purchase all the goods it produces. This ratio is not altered if the complication of international exchange is introduced, as, of course, it must be; if the community cannot purchase the goods it produces, neither can it purchase their equivalent. Credits are issued to manufacturers by a banker on the assumption that their enterprises will yield a profit—in other words, that the goods produced will be sold at not less than an inclusive price. But since therefore the community itself cannot buy them, the individual manufacturer is bound either to seek markets abroad for his surplus stocks or to produce such intermediate products (factory buildings, machinery, etc.) as can be handed on profitably to other producers, who are in turn faced with the problem of getting rid of their products. The difficulties of obtaining foreign markets and the falling-off in purchasing at home are the causes of the present crisis. The world is not suffering from under-production; the most pressing problem, as every manufacturer knows, is to keep customers to take the glut of goods. Nor is the world suffering from over-production, since most people, even in this country, are suffering from the want of things they need. In other words, it is not production but distribution that has broken down.

Major Douglas's solution, if we may venture to express it in a simple phrase, is to buy all goods with an equivalent issue of purchasing power. The manufacturer will sell "below cost," the difference being made up to him by grants of credit. The natural objection that this would be like giving away the wife without a dowry—"not a bad thing, if only goods are to be obtained with this money—is met with the argument that these credits would not be in respect of goods to be produced in the future (which has been the damning criticism of every currency scheme since Goethe's Mephistopheles) but in respect of goods already existing. The credits issued would balance the expense of the "intermediate products," which are themselves the basis of future industry, without which no industry could be carried on, but which are to-day reckoned in the price of the articles put out for sale, thus multiplying the purchasing power of the community. Let this solution seem merely Utopian, Major Douglas and his collaborator, the Editor of THE NEW AGE, have developed a practical scheme for applying to the mining industry of this country, which is printed in these pages and explained in detail. It was this scheme that we had particularly in mind when we referred to the possibility of Major Douglas's thesis coming to the forefront of political ideas. He envisages the formation of a Miners' Bank, which would seek not to dispose of its own products but to build up by them a reserve which would be enabled to join them in the task of price-fixing according to the general nature of the plan.

Major Douglas is not a Socialist; indeed his proposals have been hostile to many Radical and advanced Socialist camps. But he carries the war into their own country by attacking and demolishing some of their favourite tenets. For example, he attacks their insistence upon the "right to work," which he rightly sees to be a misstatement of the "right to be fed" adhering to every member of the community whose credit is the ultimate basis of all financial credit. The advocates of the class-war have met Peterloo in this little book of some 200 pages, which is infinitely better written and argued than the same writer's previous volume, "Economic Democracy."—"Times" Literary Supplement (January 27).

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