

to curb his tongue, he found himself embroiled with practically everybody else in politics in the Jeffersonian and earliest Jacksonian periods. For a while he made common cause with the New Englanders who opposed Jefferson's Embargo and the War of 1812. The embargo and the war accomplished the ruin of both the Virginia Tidewater planters and the New England shipping interest—and after the war was over Massachusetts' Daniel Webster, a great opportunist, went over to the High Tariff enemy when it became apparent that the shipping interest would never come back. This left John Randolph with no important congressional allies.

But he did pass on the substance of his thought to John Calhoun of South Carolina. Originally a War Hawk and a nationalist, Calhoun embraced a Burkean defense of the tradition of states' rights when he realized that a nationalist North and West would menace the slave economy of the Deep South.

The Problems Remain the Same

Reading about Randolph's career in the Congress of a hundred and fifty years ago is a melancholy business. If the quixotic Old Republican were alive in 1965, he would recognize at least a hundred

contemporary ironies as being very similar to the irony that forced southern enemies of slavery such as himself into the position of defending the rights of states to deal with their "peculiar institution" in their own way. What would Randolph, the enemy of Jefferson's Embargo and "Mr. Madison's War," do about trading with Soviet Russia or about war in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic? He would be forced, would he not, to the Burkean expediency of supporting little expeditions and an embargo on trade in strategic goods in order to forestall the coming of a big atomic blow-off.

As for Selma, Alabama, and all that it connotes, would Randolph, as a strict constructionist, invoke his principles to welcome a strict construction of the constitutional clause that says the privileges and immunities of the citizen shall be equal? I fancy that Randolph would acknowledge the Federal right under the Fifteenth Amendment to guarantee even-handed registration and to police the polls, but would fight to the end for the right of a state to impose educational qualifications on voters in a nondiscriminatory way and to retain the poll tax in local elections. This would leave a modern Randolph standing in uncomfortable isolation between the two fires of

the Ku Klux Klan and the "liberals," a quite familiar spot for a battler for Old Republican principles.

Randolph would find himself right at home in the controversies over reapportionment and in the fight to cut foreign aid. The virtue of the Kirk study is that it shows that, while times do change, principles do not evaporate. This is a fine work even though it does argue in a circle on the subject of natural law. ♦

► IF YOU DON'T MIND MY SAYING SO, *Essays on Man and Nature* by Joseph Wood Krutch, New York: William Sloane Associates, 1964, 402 pp., \$5.95.

Reviewed by: R. M. Thornton and E. A. Opitz

WE MAY NOT be able to frame a definition of philosophy, but we can, nevertheless, recognize a philosopher when we see one. He would be a man who had served a long and varied apprenticeship: professor of literature at Columbia University, dean of American drama critics, biographer of Samuel Johnson and Thoreau, naturalist, student of contemporary science, observer of the human scene on several fronts. He would, in short, be Joseph Wood Krutch.

Krutch wrote a little bombshell of a book in 1929, *The Modern*

Temper, all the more shattering in its conclusion because of its urbane style. The book examines the universe supposedly revealed by modern science, draws some logical conclusions, and calmly demonstrates that the human spirit can no longer be or feel at home in such a universe. Exactly 25 years and many books later, Krutch returned to the general subject in a book called *The Measure of Man*. He does not here attack the argument of his earlier work, but rather outflanks it. The diagnosis of *The Modern Temper* still stands, but the prognosis is revised upward. Mr. Krutch sets forth his "reasons for no longer believing that the mechanistic, materialistic, and deterministic conclusions of science do have to be accepted as fact and hence as the premises upon which any philosophy of life or any estimate of (man's) future must be based." The new perspectives are further elaborated in several recent books and essays. Mr. Krutch calls himself an "essayist by habit," and in the present collection, culled from various journals and spanning many years, he has given us a delightful book, a book to enjoy, and then to ponder.

Krutch views his fellow creatures — and himself — with detachment and amused tolerance, so that his strongest criticisms per-