The Great Geneva Fraud

By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

History proves that "summit" conferences inevitably end in disaster. USSR maneuverings behind a mask of smiles betoken a similar sequel to Geneva.

It has been well said that the main lesson of history is the inability of people to learn from the lessons of history. The "summit" conference of heads of governments at Geneva last July was the third event of its kind in the last seventeen years. Its predecessors were Munich and Yalta. Each of these meetings was based on the theory that if it were only possible to get the rulers of the world around a conference table and create an atmosphere of good fellowship and mutual understanding the predatory wolf would lie down peacefully with the pacific lamb and all the problems created by aggression would be miraculously charmed out of existence.

All three conferences were widely hailed as great achievements in the cause of peace. But the sequel to Munich, within less than a year, was the Second World War. The sequel to Yalta was enormous aggrandizement of the power of the Soviet Union and the cold war, with such accompaniments as the incitation of civil war in Greece and of subversion in many other countries, the blockade of West Berlin and the shooting war in Korea. The sequel to Geneva, unless a rallying stand is made somewhere somehow, may well be the irretrievable loss of a cold war. This is likely to come about not through any improbable Soviet military adventure, but through a loss of mutual confidence and solidarity among the nations outside the Iron Curtain and through a growing sense of hopelessness among the captive peoples inside the Iron Curtain.

Victory for Russia Seen

Geneva, like Munich and Yalta before, was greeted with a deafening chorus of praise. But, just as there were perceptive Cassandras who saw the hollowness of Munich and Yalta, so there were voices of clear insight into the balance sheet of the love feast at Geneva. One such voice was that of the distinguished Spanish scholar and publicist, Salvador de Madariaga, a staunch champion of human liberty both in his native Spain (he is living in self-imposed exile in England) and in the countries now subjugated and enslaved by the Soviet Union.

Madariaga pronounced this judgment on Geneva immediately after its results were published in two great newspapers, the Swiss *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* and the British *Manchester Guardian*. It is likely to be the judgment of history:

"The Soviet leaders have every reason to be satisfied with the outcome of the Geneva conference. They have been able to demonstrate to their own peoples that even their opponents are convinced of the peaceful desires of the Soviet Union, so that, if no peace prevails, the reasons must lie elsewhere. They have been able to show to the peoples of eastern Europe that they have practically nothing to expect from the West for their liberation, that the West is practically ready to recognize the status quo of the Russian conquests by the indirect method of a security pact, insofar as an acceptable solution for the German question can be found. To the Communists in France and Italy they have proved that Moscow will henceforward support those communist parties with the help of which they have already engulfed half of Europe.

"It is difficult to see what the leaders of the West can show to *their* peoples as a success of the Geneva conference."

Some Facts to Consider

In order to understand why the "spirit of Geneva," with the profuse exchanges of professions of friendship and esteem and desire for peace and the failure to agree on any issue of substantial importance, was a victory for the new look in Soviet diplomacy and a defeat for the West, one should recall and re-emphasize a few basic facts about the nature and origin of the cold war. Perpetual struggle with the noncommunist world was inherent in the philosophy of Leninism, faith in which has been vigorously reasserted by Nikita Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders since the Geneva conference.

Lenin thought in terms of implacable hostility between the communist and noncommunist worlds, which could only be resolved by the world-wide triumph of communism and the organization of a "one world" union of communist states. This did not mean that the Soviet government was committed to perpetual warfare. Although they were fanatics in devotion to their creed of world conquest through world revolution, Lenin and his successor, Stalin, were shrewd, calculating statesmen, able to wait for the most favorable conditions before acting.

Their grand design, restated with remarkable frankness by Stalin shortly before his death, was not to conquer noncommunist countries by Soviet military power (at least not until these countries were hopelessly weak and ripe for the plucking), but rather to subvert these countries by two methods. One of these methods was the promotion of class war from within, the avowed function of communist parties throughout the world. The other was the fanning and exploitation of national rivalries and antagonisms, the driving of as many wedges as possible into the unity of the noncommunist powers.

So long as the Soviet Union remained within its proper frontiers there were limitations on its capacity for conquest and expansion. But this situation was radically changed by World War Two. The Soviet Union emerged as incomparably the strongest power in the Eurasian continent.

And Stalin, who had previously declared that the Soviet Union did not want "a square foot" of foreign soil, exploited a military victory which he could not have won without lavish American lend-lease aid to create a tremendous unbalance of power in Europe. He directly annexed territories (Galicia, Bukovina, the sub-Carpathian area) which had never belonged to Russia in the course of history. By the device of using local communist parties as agents of domination he annexed, for all practical purposes, nations with a combined population of eighty or ninety million and considerable natural resources: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Albania.

Stalin mutilated and divided Germany. He gave large areas of ethnic German territory to his Polish puppet state, seized the old German city of Koenigsberg and its hinterland for the Soviet Union and set up a Soviet-sponsored Red Quisling regime in the Soviet zone of military occupation. Apart from individual acts of aggression like the blockade of Berlin and the invasion of South Korea, apart from a continuous Soviet record of incitement to treason and espionage, it was the very fact of this enormous expansion of Soviet power and influence beyond any precedent in European history that automatically created the state of tension which Stalin's political heirs profess a desire to reduce.

Stalling for Time

There were several reasons why Khrushchev and Bulganin went to Geneva eager for a temporary detente, for some tangible sign of improved international relations. The new Soviet rulers need time to consolidate their own political power and to organize the vast empire they have inherited. The economic pressures of the arms race and the withholding of strategic goods tend to keep the living standards of the peoples in the Soviet Union and the satellite states below the political safety limit.

Moreover, the Soviet government at the present time is in the position of a poker player with a huge pile of blue chips stacked up before him. He is not sorry for an excuse to break off the game. Settlement for the status quo—for a divided Germany and enslaved satellites—would be not a draw but a tremendous victory for the Soviets.

Had the Western statesmen been clear as to their purposes and objectives they would have gone to Geneva determined to exact a price for the detente which the Soviet leaders clearly needed and wanted. Essential elements in this price would have been agreement on free all-German elections, with the new German government permitted to choose its own foreign policy and to make whatever alliance it might desire, and liberation of the satellite states. This would not necessarily mean the restoration of their prewar regimes. It would mean that the free institutions which were promised over and over again during the war would be established, that Soviet troops, police agents and political controllers would withdraw and that Warsaw, Prague, Bucharest and Budapest would be as free in relation to Moscow as London, Paris, Brussels and Oslo are in relation to Washington.

Peace at No Price

But the Soviets got what might be called peace at no price at Geneva. The pictures of the "Big Four" chatting wreathed in smiles, of Eisenhower shaking hands with Bulganin, were of inestimable propaganda value for Soviet policy on both sides of the Iron Curtain. In Poland and other satellite countries these pictures were widely circulated to point a moral. If the President of the United States is on such good terms with the Soviet rulers, what is the use of hoping for liberation, of keeping up any kind of resistance? These Geneva photographs represented the biggest imaginable handicap for the political and psychological warfare efforts of the Free Europe Committee and the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism.

Defenders of Geneva and the "Geneva spirit" are inclined to employ two arguments. First, they say, President Eisenhower's hail-fellow-well-met manner with the Soviet leaders proved America's peaceful intentions to the whole world. Second, an "atmosphere," a "climate" or something of the sort, in which disputed issues may be satisfactorily solved, was created.

As to the first argument, America's whole record under provocation during the cold war has proved its desire to avoid or to limit hostilities. To the challenge of the Berlin blockade the response was not moving convoys across the Soviet zone, but the expensive air lift supply system. There were no reprisals for repeated shooting down of Amer-