

secure than most nations, or in any case not less.

The responsibility to disarm unilaterally rests equally upon other big powers, including the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic. The Committee for Nonviolent Action, a few years ago, sponsored a San Francisco to Moscow Peace March which actually carried the appeal to disarm unilaterally to England, Belgium, West and East Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union. The only country the team did not get into at all, except for a dramatic demonstration at the Le Havre harbor, was Gaullist France. However, in each nation its own citizens must do the job.

I am aware that there is the grave problem of a transition during which the American people must prepare themselves for such a step. I am aware that, even if they were prepared, such undertakings as disarmament take time and involve complicated planning. We seem quite competent to do the most intricate planning and to carry out the most stupendous operations when it comes to war. Why should one assume in advance that these things cannot be done in order to carry out a decision to cease from war-making? As it is, we are deciding daily to remain in the nuclear arms race, to keep ahead if we can, to escalate our forces where they are engaged, and so on. What is needed is a decision to reverse the course. To use again a somewhat crude figure, we are on the edge of a precipice. We call for a decision to stop and turn around, recognizing that then we still would have a long way to go.

In making a proposal for unilateral disarmament as a follow-up to withdrawal from Vietnam we have opened up a highly complicated subject. Only a few of the questions raised can be touched upon here, and these only in a sketchy fashion. I am, of course, aware of the fact that to many, perhaps nearly all, the proposal seems unrealistic, utterly

fantastic, even perhaps mad, unthinkable. I trust that the reader who may feel this reaction will read on for a few more sentences.

A few years ago, Herman Kahn, formerly of the Rand Corporation and now head of the Hudson Institute, a research agency which does a lot of work for the Defense Department, insisted that Americans had to face up to thinking about the unthinkable. He was referring to the fact that many considered it inappropriate or scandalous to discuss the strategy of modern, nuclear war which might terminate in a nuclear catastrophe. He characterized this attitude as that of the ostrich sticking his head in the sand. As realists and people living in a scientific age we, or at any rate our leaders in the Pentagon and the White House, should calmly examine the many possible developments, the alternative strategies which we and the enemy might follow and so on. Dr. Kahn looked into such questions as how many deaths a United States government might consider permissible in a nuclear war before surrendering. He found that, as a group, the various people he interviewed who might be competent to judge or at least typical of official opinion, ruled out a hundred million American deaths as too many—sixty million might be tolerable. Dr. Kahn is only in a minor degree responsible for it, in my opinion, but the fact is that the White House and the Pentagon are now thinking in such terms, with the help of computers, no doubt, and in the main the American people accept this. We are thinking, if it can be called thinking, about what is or should be "unthinkable" in another sense from what Dr. Kahn perhaps had in mind. Now I raise the question of whether our present behavior in this whole field of war and foreign policy and the various phases of it, is not precisely the behavior of an ostrich with his head in the sand; whether we are not in fact living in a world of fantasy. As is the case with people afflicted with certain