then persuade it to accept his terms.

I would like to go back and reflect upon Netanyahu's regional world view. In terms of the larger Arab world, Netanyahu writes a lot about this concept of two kinds of entities, two kinds of peace. This idea essentially boils down to a synthesis of two disparate elements. The first is the familiar liberal notion of a democratic peace, which originates from the eighteenth century political philosopher Immanuel Kant. The second element is the "peace through strength" concept of former President Ronald Reagan. These two elements are fused in Netanyahu's policy and grafted wholesale onto the present-day Middle East.

Netanyahu's political world consists of two political entities: democratic and undemocratic. There are two kinds of peace that follow these two different entities: the peace of democracies and the peace of deterrence. Netanyahu uses the two great ideological clashes of the twenthieth century to demonstrate the validity of this idea. He questions why a democracy cannot resolve its disputes with an authoritarian state through concessions. He cites the example of the German Nazis in the 1930s, arguing that when the West tried concession and compromise, the result was an immediate war. Now, with the totalitarian state – the Soviet Union – on the opposite end of the political spectrum, the West adopted the contrary posture of strength and was rewarded with forty years of peace. Netanyahu's question is, "why is that?" The answer is that undemocratic states tend to interpret concessions as a sign of weakness, not as a method of resolving disputes.

Applying that idea to the Middle East of the 1990s, Netanyahu implies that the Arab states are either the Nazis of the 1930s or the Soviets of the 1950s. He continues to infer that what the Arab states are and what the Arabs will become depends on what Israel chooses to do. If Israel makes concessions to what he considers to be undemocratic neighboring states, which are in his mind akin to the great totalitarian movements of Europe in the twentieth century, then it will look weak and invite war. But if he adopts the opposite stance, he will have peace. So he does not say that peace is impossible, rather, that peace is possible with the Arabs at the present time only through deterrence or through strength, as exemplified in his campaign terminology, "peace through security."

Netanyahu's peace is a peace without concession, a peace without compromise. It is a peace based on deterrence, not a peace of give and take. It is peace of staying on high alert and managing a very unstable and dangerous relationship through the construction of some formal treaty relationship, or barring that, at least some smaller, lower-level attempts to prevent the outbreak of war, such as establishing hot lines with Syria. All of this is, basically, an adaptation of the U.S.-Soviet strategy.

The most significant factor shaping our expectations of what Netanyahu is going to do must be to understand all of these perceptions he has and to understand the way in which he views the world. Only then can we begin to gain insights into those broad structures or directions that Netanyahu is intending to establish in the coming few years. Thank you.

Laura Drake

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