

day's shameful performance. At first blush, this may seem like an impressive number. But it isn't, really, for what it means is that for every American who joined the demonstrations, something like 999 stayed away. Thus, the voice of the lunatic fringe, while shrill, does not begin to speak for the people of this country. If 185,000 Americans took part in the protest, something like more than 185,000,000 did not. And those who were revolted by the Saturday spectacle will simply have to hold their noses and learn to live with this sort of thing.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

THE MARCH FOR PEACE

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I speak from this side of the aisle in defense of those who march for peace.

I speak in defense of the three veterans who appeared in a rally at Independence Hall in Philadelphia, Pa. These veterans were Medal of Honor winners from World War II, the Korean war, and the present war.

Those three Medal of Honor winners know what it is to march for peace.

I speak also to defend those who march for peace, the members of the armed services who are compelled to march courageously every day in the direction of the enemy. And it takes a lot more guts to march for peace against a willful, deliberate, murderous aggressor than it does to march down the streets of America's towns and cities.

As a lawyer, I fervently uphold the statement of the late Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes that freedom of speech is freedom not for the thought we love, but for the thought we hate.

If any marcher were arrested in my Commonwealth for the simple act of marching, protesting, disagreeing with our Government, or carrying placards and wished me to be his counsel, I would serve gladly and would seek to free him from any detention.

I value the right of dissent. Moreover, I think that dissent serves a useful purpose in this country. It serves to awaken the otherwise blatantly apathetic Americans to a resentment—a justifiable resentment—against the kind of marching where not a single voice was raised among the marchers anywhere in America, so far as I am aware, that addressed itself, in the cause of peace, to the only people who can bring an end to the war—that is, the enemy.

Not a word was said to Ho Chi Minh. Not a word was said to the enemy. Not a word was said to any of our enemies. The only thing that was said was, in effect: "Our country is always wrong."

The corollary of that is to say that the enemy is always right. They did not mean that, but in acting as they did they give aid and comfort to the enemy.

I think they have a right to dissent as they did and to keep on dissenting. However, every time they do, let those Americans who dissent from them stand up and say that what we are doing is just and right and in keeping with our tradition.

Let us all march for peace with the Medal of Honor winners and with those

soldiers, sailors, and marines, all of whom are serving the cause of peace in the only way a free nation knows how in an effort to keep the rest of the world free so far as we have a commitment to do so.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "One Thousand at Rally in Philadelphia—Salute Three War Heroes," written by William J. Storm, and published in the Sunday Bulletin of Philadelphia on April 16, 1967, and an editorial entitled "Marching for Peace," published in the Philadelphia Inquirer of April 17, 1967.

There being no objection, the article and editorial were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Philadelphia Sunday Bulletin, Apr. 16, 1967]

ONE THOUSAND AT RALLY IN PHILADELPHIA SALUTE THREE WAR HEROES

(By William J. Storm)

Three Medal of Honor winners were among more than 1,000 persons who took part in a rally here yesterday in support of American involvement in the Vietnam war.

The rally, sponsored by the Philadelphia County Council, American Legion, was held in the rear of Independence Hall. It was preceded by a parade which began at City Hall and moved down Market st. and over 6th st. to Chestnut.

The rally was picketed by several young men carrying antiwar placards. They, in turn, were picketed by other young people, with pro-war placards. At times words were exchanged between the two groups but police kept them apart.

WORLD WAR II HEROES

The Medal of Honor winners were Lawrence Joel, an Army specialist 6th class; Marine Corps Major Douglas P. Jacobson, of Willingboro, N.C., and Carlton R. Rouh, a retired marine captain, of Lindenwold, N.J.

Joel was decorated by President Johnson last month for saving the lives of 13 wounded comrades while under continuous rifle and machinegun fire of the Viet Cong.

Jacobson was decorated for heroism on Iwo Jima in 1945. Rouh also received his medal in World War II.

REENLISTS FOR 6 YEARS

Joel, who has been in the Army 17 years, ended his latest hitch yesterday and was sworn in for another six-year term by Major Jacobson.

Joel, a medical corpsman, is the first Negro to receive the nation's highest decoration in the Vietnamese conflict. He and Major Jacobson addressed the rally.

Another speaker was Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe, director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania.

The anti-war pickets carried placards with inscriptions "Why Are We Murdering the Vietnamese?"

The pro-war pickets' placards read: "We Must Win the War."

[From the Philadelphia Inquirer, Apr. 17, 1967]

MARCHING FOR PEACE

Self-styled peace marchers had a big week-end from coast to coast—with rallies in New York and San Francisco holding the spotlight.

Young men, enjoying their safety and security thousands of miles from the fighting front in Vietnam, seemed to have a wonderful time burning their draft cards.

So-called civil rights leaders were in fine form, oratorically speaking—apparently convinced that their strongest civil right is to

attack the good name of their country and to distort its motives.

Peace-at-any-price professors from university campuses were out in force—setting an example for a young generation that will inherit leadership tomorrow.

Hard-core advocates of surrender to the Communists did their usual efficient job of bewildering and deluding the sincere and frustrated pacifists—many of them mature women of integrity and intelligence—who conscientiously object to war and have been misled to believe that the most effective way to end the war in Vietnam is to demonstrate repeatedly in public protest against U. S. policy.

So much for the peace marchers who retire to comforts of home and hearth as dusk descends.

There are other Americans also marching for peace in Vietnam. They are servicemen who are there.

Crawling through a rice paddy isn't quite like marching down Madison avenue. It takes a little more courage, for one thing.

Our countrymen over there are marching for peace where it counts.

It must be great—really great—for Americans fighting the Communists in Vietnam to hear and read about countrymen back home burning draft cards and lavishing aid and comfort upon the enemy.

If anti-war demonstrations on the home front could advance the cause of an honorable peace in Vietnam, we would urge that they be held around the clock. But peace is not won by turning the face of disunity and dissension to a ruthless enemy. This kind of display invites him to prolong the war instead of ending it.

If marchers on the home front want honestly to advance peace, they should support patriotic demonstrations such as were held in Philadelphia and environs Saturday—demonstrations that underscore American resolution and fortitude.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND THE LATIN AMERICA SUMMIT MEETING

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of these brief remarks three editorials: "Senate and Summit" from the News of Mexico City, April 6; "President Johnson's Trip" from the Boston Globe, April 10; and "The Presidency: L.B.J.'s Diplomatic Foray Into South America" from Life magazine, April 14.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, in different ways and for somewhat different reasons, all of these make the point that the action of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with respect to the so-called Punta del Este resolution should have a salutary effect. Even Life magazine, which as usual is led astray by arguing personalities instead of issues, concludes that the President "may even make a virtue of what happened by pointing out to his fellow heads of state—who know what political troubles are—that he does not have it all his way all the time, either."

The Boston Globe sees the matter more clearly as not involving policy toward Latin America but only the procedures of the U.S. Government, and the Globe is encouraged by the "new spirit of congressional independence."

Perhaps the most interesting of all is

the comment of the News, the English-language newspaper published by Novedades of Mexico City.

It may prove fortuitous—

Says the News—

If President Johnson arrives at the hemisphere conference with empty hands, so that the carrot of U.S. economic assistance will not distract the participants from far more important questions for discussion, including economic integration and more equitable treatment for Latin America's raw materials in the U.S. market. There are those who are saying quite bluntly that the best contribution President Johnson and the U.S. delegation can make to the conference is to sit quietly and listen, and the Senate Committee decision to force Mr. Johnson to leave his checkbook at home may achieve precisely that purpose.

It is especially significant, Mr. President, that this perceptive analysis comes from a Latin American newspaper.

Finally, I ask unanimous consent that there also be included in the RECORD at the end of these remarks, as an example of enlightened and liberal criticism, an article from the Los Angeles Times entitled "Senator 'Fulblock' Stalls Latin Bid."

This article might be compared to the glowing report of the success of the Conference by the various commentators who were present at the Conference. In my opinion the Conference was a success and the action of the Senate certainly did not adversely affect the President's role at Punta del Este.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

EXHIBIT 1

[From the News (Mexico, D.F.) Apr. 6, 1967]

SENATE AND SUMMIT

Even the most acquiescent Congress has to thwart its chief executive every so often to prove who is really boss. This is essentially what the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee did Monday in watering down the resolution President Johnson had asked for in preparation for the Latin American summit conference at Punta del Este. The issue was over whether the Committee was willing to pledge advance commitment to economic aid programs for Latin America, and the refusal was based on scruples over "constitutional procedures." The best President Johnson could obtain from Fulbright and Company was a resolution saying Congress would "consider" any plan of economic cooperation worked out at Punta del Este.

Apart from the implicit rebuff to the President, whose intended liberality at the summit conference has been effectively circumscribed, the Senate Committee action does not endanger any vital points of the Punta del Este agenda. In fact, it may prove fortuitous if President Johnson arrives at the hemisphere conference with empty hands, so that the carrot of U.S. economic assistance will not distract the participants from far more important questions for discussion, including economic integration and more equitable treatment for Latin America's raw materials in the U.S. market. There are those who are saying quite bluntly that the best contribution President Johnson and the U.S. delegation can make to the conference is to sit quietly and listen, and the Senate Committee decision to force Mr. Johnson to leave his checkbook at home may achieve precisely that purpose. An intent spectator at Punta del Este will not fail to grasp the pervading sentiment among Latin American nations that what is needed is not outpouring of U.S. funds but basic changes in the feudalistic systems that limit progress in so many Latin

nations and better conditions for trade in the U.S. market. No amount of aid can bring about any significant development as long as so many of the area's principal products have such a precarious status in world markets sensitive to fluctuations in U.S. economic policy.

Unwittingly surely, the reticence of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee may have done Latin America a favor by helping to keep the discussions at Punta del Este in proper perspective. Real understanding of Latin America's problems, and true intent to help alleviate them, will be seen in the trade recommendations President Johnson submits to Congress after the summit meeting—and in the disposition of Congress to act on them.

[From the Boston Globe, Apr. 10, 1967]

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S TRIP

When President Lyndon B. Johnson takes off this evening for Punta del Este, he will be leaving behind him a most embarrassing rebuff in the U.S. Senate, while ahead of him he will face his most baffling problem, except for Vietnam, in foreign policy.

The problem, for whose solution the chiefs of state of 19 Western hemisphere nations are convening on Wednesday, is how to rehabilitate the deteriorating economy of Latin America, with special reference to creation of a common market for that area.

While they possess more land, natural resources and potential wealth than the United States, the 20 states between the Rio Grande and Cape Horn are divided by national and natural boundaries. If they have one thing in common, it is exploitation of the multiplying poor.

The Charter of Punta del Este was supposed to point the way for the Alliance for Progress. But President Eduardo Frei Montalva of Chile, writing in the current Foreign Affairs, aptly describes it in his title as "The Alliance That Lost Its Way."

He tells how the extreme right and left tried to prevent the needed basic changes. As a result, "less than half of the Latin American countries have started serious programs of agrarian reform. Drastic changes in the tax system are even scarcer, while the number of genuinely democratic regimes . . . has actually declined. In other words, there has been no strengthening of the political and social foundations for economic progress in Latin America."

To strengthen his hand for this week's summit meeting, Mr. Johnson had asked Congress for a resolution giving him an advance pledge of aid for the proposed common market. It would have committed Congress, in effect, to an increase over five years of \$1.5 billion in Latin aid, now running at \$1 billion annually.

The House quickly approved this, 210 to 147. But it was different in the Senate, where the Foreign Relations Committee turned it down 9 to 0. The Administration then dropped the matter.

Yet it would not be correct to say the Senate opposes the proposal. It does not. Senator Fulbright and many other lawmakers objected purely on procedural grounds. They saw the resolution as a "blank check" reminiscent of Tonkin Bay; they wanted public hearings before more funds were committed, and they resented being told the resolution must be passed word for word.

All this is encouraging for the new spirit of Congressional independence it represents. But there should be no doubt that if President Johnson returns from Punta del Este with agreement on a common market and other reforms, the Senate will support him.

[From Life magazine]

L.B.J.'S DIPLOMATIC FORAY INTO SOUTH AMERICA

(By Hugh Sidey)

On the eve of the Latin American summit, described by one White House enthusiast as "the conference of the decade," Lyndon

Johnson got mad. His unflagging nemesis, Senator William Fulbright, stood between him and a resounding vote of congressional approval backing his mission to Punta del Este this week. For a few hours—until his temper subsided—the President saw a year's painstaking preparation about to go down the drain. But when calm returned he decided that, with or without the backing of Congress, the meeting would be important. He was right.

Not only is this a major and new stimulation for the becalmed Alliance for Progress but also it is kind of a coming-out party for Lyndon B. Johnson. He still is an unknown quantity to the Latin Americans, who are more inclined to put the portrait of John F. Kennedy on their walls. Mostly they know Lyndon Johnson for his actions in Panama and the Dominican Republic, neither of which was wildly popular down there. They want a chance to size him up. For L.B.J., Punta del Este is a main bout in international diplomacy. He has saturated himself in Asian troubles for fully three years now, and for the first time he seriously swings his eyes south. The view is encouraging.

That is his type of land, with "sunshine and flowers and pretty girls," to list three things in his own language that L.B.J. finds appealing. He has often vacationed in Mexico and he has a palate that is finely attuned to tacos and enchiladas. There is even a report that he has been polishing his "Tex-Mex" into something resembling classical Spanish so that he can say a couple of lines like a native.

Some of the talk will be about improving the soil so that more food can be raised. Lyndon Johnson even now reminds his listeners that one of his first glimpses of poverty was when as a boy he saw Mexican-American children rummaging in garbage cans for grapefruit rinds. The discussions will deal also with spreading education to the vast hordes of the illiterate. Again, Johnson's past rises to influence him. He can call the names of the Mexican-American students he taught more than 35 years ago in Cotulla, Texas. Fully aware of Latin America's new era of awakening (page 42), Johnson believes those countries are now capable of assuming a large part of the responsibility for their own development. He sees his role in this "family affair," as he likes to call the conference, as helping to make them come more fully to life.

The party that L.B.J. gave at his ranch for the Latin American ambassadors was a warm-up for this week's events. Not only was there plenty of hot barbecue out along Johnson's own beloved Pedernales, but also there was the opportunity for man-to-man talk with the diplomats. He gave them to understand that he wanted to hear the most private worries and greatest dreams of the chiefs of state at Punta del Este.

It was a just a few days later that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 9-0 to change the resolution of support. Johnson had sought a virtual commitment from Congress that it would back up his pledges to increase the Alliance for Progress support by \$1.5 billion over the next 5 years. At the instigation of Chairman Fulbright, the committee watered it down to a pledge "to give due consideration to cooperation in such agreements."

Behind it all was the smoldering bitterness between Fulbright and the President. To the senator, Johnson's request was a reminder of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution which was guided through the Senate by Fulbright. As he came to disagree with the conduct of the war more and more, the senator also became resentful of Johnson's constant reference to it as backing for expanding the fighting. Though the proposed Latin American resolution was not unlike one voted for the Bogotá meeting in 1960, and it was for peace instead of war and required further congressional action for spending money, Fulbright's dislike of Johnson and

his tactics became the overriding consideration. When Johnson learned of the committee's action, in a white heat he sent his special assistant Walt W. Rostow to tell the White House press corps that the Fulbright resolution was "worse than useless."

For a few hours the two antagonists simply stared defiantly from their opposite ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. Lyndon Johnson, who carries the responsibility for success or failure at Punta del Este, was the one who capitulated. Not wanting to have a fuss stirred all over South America, he decided after his anger subsided that he would take whatever backing the Congress would give him. The House of Representatives has granted the endorsement he asked for, and even if the whole Senate does not act before he sits down at the conference table the President plans to keep his disappointment in check. In fact he may even make a virtue of what happened, by pointing out to his fellow heads of state—who know what political troubles are—that he doesn't have it all his way all the time, either.

EXHIBIT 2

[From the Los Angeles Times]

SENATOR "FULBRIGHT" STALLS LATIN BID
(By Ernest Conine)

Thanks to what might be called Sen. William Fulbright's arrogance of hurt pride, President Johnson is going to the Latin American summit meeting this week with one hand tied behind him.

Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has worked himself into a massive pique over Mr. Johnson's determination to pursue the war in Vietnam in the teeth of his advice to the contrary.

The Arkansas Democrat seems determined to show the President that if he can't make foreign policy, he can at least frustrate it.

He has sought to do just that by influencing the Senate to withhold a resolution of support which Mr. Johnson badly wanted to have in his hip pocket at Punta del Este. Or so it appears.

The President's main summit aim is to nudge the presidents of this hemisphere into finally making the commitment to create a Latin American common market.

If our Latin neighbors are ever to outgrow the need for large-scale U.S. aid, they must lower the trade barriers which divide the hemisphere into a collection of small and inefficient economies.

It takes considerable courage, however, for the leader of a poor, revolution-prone country to throw open the borders to cheaper goods from other lands—thereby alienating not only the affected growers and factory-owners, but the workers who are temporarily displaced.

President Johnson wanted to sweeten the pill by pledging U.S. funds to help them through the painful adjustment process. To strengthen his hand, he asked Congress for a joint resolution of support.

The House went along. But Fulbright, purporting to see a parallel with the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution which has been used to justify the U.S. role in Vietnam, accused the President of seeking a "blank check."

(The logic is peculiar, since Fulbright has complained previously that Mr. Johnson was committing the country without advance consultation with Congress.)

As a result, the President did not get his resolution from the Senate.

The summit may succeed anyway, of course. But the fact remains that Mr. Johnson's bargaining power has been drastically and needlessly impaired.

The incident is just one more example of Fulbright's recent campaign to usurp the executive branch's pre-eminent role in the making of foreign policy.

Such senatorial attempts have, in the past,

proved unfortunate for the country—the best example being the "band of willful men" who obstructed U.S. membership in the League of Nations after World War I.

It is noteworthy that, until lately, Fulbright has always advocated more, rather than less, Presidential power in foreign policymaking.

In the 1950's, he helped fight off the so-called "Bricker amendment" to restrict the President's treaty-making powers. And as late as 1963, he called for "further enhancement of Presidential authority in foreign affairs" to prevent "immobility and the paralysis of national policy in a revolutionary world."

What changed his mind? Obviously, Vietnam.

Fulbright is absolutely convinced that the U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia is not just wrong, but dead wrong.

He professes deep remorse that he and other senators didn't seriously challenge administration policy earlier. Now he does his best to force a reversal of that policy.

These efforts have escalated from private persuasion to televised hearings—aimed at mobilizing public opinion against the President—and finally to petty sniping and obstructionism on matters having nothing to do with Vietnam.

Through it all, the soft-spoken Arkansan has seemed to look upon the President's failure to recognize his superior wisdom as a personal affront.

There is nothing in the Constitution which says that a senator must always agree with the President, on foreign any more than other subjects.

But as the Fulbright of yesteryear would have been the first to agree, the conduct of U.S. foreign policy suffers when the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tries to run the show from Capitol Hill.

It approaches tragedy that a man with so much capacity should put his talents to such negative use.

OUR RELATIONS WITH EUROPE

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, once again Mr. Walter Lippmann has written with great insight and perception of our relations with Europe. In a column which appeared in the April 4 issue of the Washington Post, Mr. Lippmann comments on "the great differences between modern Europeans and contemporary Americans who are drifting apart in their policies in the world."

He observes that—

Europe, which in his respect includes the Soviet Union, is moving to a direction of its own, not to be sure against the United States but apart from it and in spite of it.

Mr. Lippmann writes that "our official spokesmen no longer speak in the language of contemporary Europeans" and he concludes that "the place where the renovation and the revivification of our relations with Europe must begin is in the minds of our own officials."

I commend Mr. Lippmann's article to the attention of my colleagues and suggest that the points it makes are highly relevant to Senate Resolution 49, proposed by the distinguished majority leader, which expresses the sense of the Senate that because of changed circumstances in Europe "a substantial reduction of U.S. forces permanently stationed in Europe can be made."

I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the article entitled "Humphrey in Europe," written by Mr. Lippmann and published in the Washington Post

of April 4, 1967, be inserted in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, April 4, 1967]

HUMPHREY IN EUROPE

(By Walter Lippmann)

The Vice President's reception in Europe has been most correct but not enthusiastic. Yet if his chief practical purpose is to persuade the Germans and Italians to accept the non-proliferation treaty, it is reasonable to suppose that in the end they will accept it. But that assent, which will be given very reluctantly, will certainly not alter the great differences between modern Europeans and contemporary Americans who are drifting apart in their policies in the world. The Europeans do not doubt or underestimate the power of the United States in military affairs and economic affairs. This power is fully recognized in Europe. But the political and moral influence of the United States, the willingness of Europeans to follow the leadership of Washington, has decreased dramatically in the past several years. Europe, which in this respect includes the Soviet Union, is moving to a direction of its own, not to be sure against the United States, but apart from it and in spite of it.

There are two main causes of the separateness of Europeans from Americans. The outstanding one is, obviously enough, the war in Vietnam which is so deeply and vividly disliked all over Europe that anything like confident diplomatic relations are impossible as long as it lasts. If the Vice President has not learned this, then those who have entertained him have not talked frankly. There are, to be sure, small numbers of highly placed officials and personages who speak out openly for the American position in Vietnam. But they are not a majority or anything like it, and they are reluctant and even apologetic and embarrassed defenders of our course. The British, for example, who have a special national interest in pleasing the Administration, do not applaud and defend only with great difficulty the extended bombing offensive against North Vietnam.

The other great cause of the separateness between Europe and America is that the thaw in the cold war is much more advanced than it is in the United States. As a result, our official spokesmen no longer speak in the language of contemporary Europeans. Vice President Humphrey's speeches sound curiously out of date. The Vice President, for example, announced in Europe, no doubt with the best intentions, that we are in favor of the Atlantic community and also of a detente with eastern Europe. To a contemporary European these two objectives, however sincerely held and well meant, are incompatible. If you are going to consolidate the Atlantic Alliance, you will consolidate along with it the Warsaw Pact, so say the contemporary Europeans. Two opposing military alliances cannot make a detente. They need, as the recent history of both NATO and of the Warsaw Pact shows, fear and antagonism to keep them together. As a consequence the detente, which most Europeans want and seek persistently, assumes the erosion and dissolution of the pacts.

Whether some greater European community may emerge from all this no one today is able to say.

The most important question about the Vice President's trip is whether he has listened and what he has learned. For the place where the renovation and the revivification of our relations with Europe must begin is in the minds of our own officials. The critical question is how much they have learned and been able to adjust their policies

from what was proper in the 1950s to what suits the contemporary condition of the late Sixties.

THE REAL COST OF WAR

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the phrase "the cost of war" is heard with increasing frequency across the land. I am speaking now, not of the tragic cost of war in terms of the tears, of the lost limbs or the lives that will never be lived. I refer only to the raw cost in dollars, the cost to our country and its economy.

In a larger sense it is impossible to assess the cost of a war. War is not a simple commodity that can be selected from the shelf and purchased. Its price can be neither fixed nor negotiated. The unseen forces which merchandise war are, like all sharp dealers, guilty of shockingly deceptive trade practices. They not only conceal from the public the true price that is being paid when it contracts to purchase the evil luxury of war, but it also hides the full extent of the sacrifices which must be made in terms of the necessities which must be relinquished from the usual national budget. Moreover, the merchants of war never have the candor to inform the taxpayer that he will be paying interest on his macabre purchase in virtual perpetuity, for, as our experience with our last three wars has demonstrated, almost no progress is ever made at amortizing the cost of a war or retiring the indebtedness thereon.

There unfortunately has been no truth-in-packaging legislation to protect the consumer who must pay the bills for war. There is no regulatory agency establishing fair trade practices for disclosure of the true cost of war to each American. Most unfair of all, those who contract by proxy to incur these terrible obligations without full disclosure of the terms of the agreement, have no subsequent remedy at law. They cannot sue for fraudulent misrepresentation; they cannot obtain restitution; they cannot be made whole again. There can be no recovery, no redress.

On the front page of the Washington Post of Thursday, April 13, is an article by Hobart Rowen stating that the growth of the Nation's economy has come to a standstill. Our "real" or adjusted gross national product remains ominously unchanged for the first quarter of this year. This is the first time that there was not even a small increase in real terms in the 6-year boom cycle that started with the Kennedy administration.

The gold reserves of the United States have now, for the first time, dwindled to less than half the amount of the more than \$25 billion in foreign claims against us, with the claims steadily increasing. The situation is actually far more serious than these figures would indicate, for of our approximately \$13 billion in gold, nearly \$10 billion is now legally pledged as backing for our currency.

Many experts agree that our balance-of-payments situation will be much more seriously aggravated by the staggering fiscal demands of the Vietnam war, that the trade deficit figure for this year alone will reach \$3 billion.

There are those of us who have a growing fear that we cannot continue indefinitely with ingenious but illusory expedients for maintaining world confidence in our monetary soundness. We cannot continue forever juggling entries in deceptive books. There is a limit to how long we can "cool the thermometer," deluding only ourselves as to what the outside economic temperature is.

If the tremendous stresses on our economy are permitted to go on unchecked, it is by no means impossible that the perennial argument of guns versus butter could become largely academic, our available funds having become inadequate for a sufficiency of either.

What I would suggest is that it would not necessarily be presumptuous for the Congress to consider from time to time the nature and extent of the obligations we are incurring. I am referring to the true costs, and not merely the apparent costs, of the vast, malignant, metastasizing bureaucracy of war. Our present adventures in southeast Asia and the expansion of our undertakings there suggest the words of John Ruskin:

Borrowers are nearly always ill-spenders, and it is with lent money that all evil is mainly done, and all unjust war protracted.

One of the most revealing articles I have seen recently on this subject is one by our distinguished colleague, Senator VANCE HARTKE, in the "Speaking Out" section of the current issue of the Saturday Evening Post. I regard some of the figures cited as most conservative, but whether the cost of killing an Asian peasant is half a million dollars, as stated in the article, or a million dollars, as some reputable analysts have calculated, the amount is equally senseless and shocking. I thank the senior Senator from Indiana for having the courage to make the statements in the article.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD an article entitled, "Why HUMPHREY Got That Abuse in Europe," written by Anthony Lewis, and published in the Sunday New York Times, and the magazine article entitled, "Vietnam Costs More Than You Think," written by the senior Senator from Indiana [Mr. HARTKE], and published in the Saturday Evening Post.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times]

WHY HUMPHREY GOT THAT ABUSE IN EUROPE
(By Anthony Lewis)

LONDON.—In Paris it would not have been so surprising. But this was Brussels, that picture of bourgeois respectability, and in an upper-middle-class residential area. An American family was giving a cocktail party last week. As the guests arrived, banners were hung from the windows of a flat across the street: "U. S. A. go home. Paix au Vietnam."

Such displays are commonplace in Europe these days—as Vice President Humphrey unhappily learned in country after country during his recent tour. They are the surface signs of a disaffection from the United States that has cut surprisingly deeply into political life in Britain and on the continent.

Anti-Americanism is the phrase commonly used in American newspapers when rotten eggs are thrown at Mr. Humphrey or slogans

are painted on walls. But it is a notably inaccurate way to describe the phenomenon that exists.

Ask Americans who live in Europe, and few will say that they have run into any personal anti-Laotian neutrality which the Thais feared meant a U.S. pullout and the communization of Laos. Thai bases helped U.S. air power offset North Vietnamese infiltration in Laos starting in 1964, but until the massive commitment of U.S. troops in South Vietnam, Bangkok like other Southeast Asian capitals, was not sure whether President Johnson would match words with deeds.

His visit here last October is said to have helped the Thais make up their minds. It was a case of mutual seduction and mutual involvement.

It is not a hatred of persons or of a nation as such. It is, rather, a disaffection from what the United States stands for—or what these critical Europeans think it has come to stand for.

"The feeling is not hatred but disappointment," a correspondent in Rome says.

A survey of New York Times correspondents in Europe shows a surprising similarity of attitudes in the various capitals. Again and again, the same psychological elements are found in the tendency to turn away from the United States.

First, there is an underlying feeling that the United States is simply, as a Paris correspondent put it, "too large, too powerful militarily and industrially—a giant with an enormous weight against which you have to defend yourself if you do not want to be crushed."

For a Western Europe that has grown from the American-aided phase to economic ebullience, there is perhaps a natural resentment of the friend who helped in hard times. But something more than that, much more, is involved. It might be called a concern for identity.

Not only Charles de Gaulle is worried about the spectre of an American industrial juggernaut gulping the major business of Europe into its maw. A Belgian businessman who has enjoyed the profits brought by American industrial activity nevertheless worries about the Americanization of his country and its economy.

The Paris correspondent puts it colorfully: "If Ford wins the auto race at Le Mans, it will be a catastrophe for French-American relations. A Frenchman can accept a victory for Ferrari because he sees Ferrari as something small and delicate, the brainchild of a brilliant man who succeeded on a shoestring. He sees Ford as a bulldozer crushing its competitors by the sheer superiority of its capital and its bigness. The humiliation of having to import the more sophisticated electronic gadgets—the technological gap's result—does not help, nor does the brain drain."

The size and power of the United States are relevant in another way. Among the young people all over Europe there are signs of a revulsion from power, of a kind of nihilism. The Provos in Amsterdam and the young idealists in Hamburg proclaim their rebellion against all aggregations of power—and the United States is the biggest.

The use of American power is the second major element. And of course that largely means Vietnam.

To go into the reasons for West European attitudes toward Vietnam would require rehearsing all the arguments about America's role there. Suffice it to say that only the British Government has had much favorable to say about American policy in Vietnam. No European country has a single soldier there. Much of the public on the Continent, rightly or not, sees the situation as that of a huge power over-reacting.

The Vietnam war is a symbol of something else among the politically sophisticated—a strong feeling that the concerns of