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ITEM: 9

DATE: 8/27/63

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

MEMO FOR U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

PAGES: 6

CLASS: S

LOCATION:

NATIONAL SECURITY FILES

**RALPH A. DUNGAN: BRAZIL, GENERAL, 7/63-10/63
AND UNDATED**

BOX #: 390

Sanitized, NLK-03-SSB and NLK-01390-S-3-2, 10/04

~~SECRET~~CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: SEP 2004

27 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
Deputy Under Secretary
for Political AffairsSUBJECT : Appraisal of Current Political
Situation in Brazil

[REDACTED]


"1. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] It is not an official judgment of this Agency or any component.

"2. As of 24 August 1963, political and economic instability in Brazil had reached the point where Brazil's democratic traditions and institutions were in greater danger than at any time since President Goulart came to power.

"3. Turning more and more to demagoguery and agitation of the masses in an effort to bring pressure to bear on the Congress and his political opponents, President Goulart seemed to be adopting the tactics of a would-be authoritarian dictator.

"4. At best the Goulart government is [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] incapable of solving the complex problems of a country as big as Brazil.

"5. At worst President Goulart is deliberately paving the way for an authoritarian type government heavily influenced by Communists and/or extreme nationalists whose anti-Americanism is an obsession. The question of a 'Communist' take-over is merely one of semantics. The consequences will be the same whether it is a Prestes, an Arraes, or a Leonel Brizola who emerges as a behind-the-scenes strongman.

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- 2 -

"6. President Goulart's efforts to neutralize restraining forces (Congress, Armed Forces, media outlets, state governors, political moderates, and the U.S. Government) are real and are being intensified. But if indeed it is President Goulart's intention to establish a far leftist authoritarian regime in Brazil, it is imperative that he establish effective control over the Armed Forces, and this he is trying to do.

"7. Virtually all of the key Army command positions are now filled by general officers who are acceptable and/or loyal to (one or all) War Minister Jair Dantas Ribeiro, former First Army Commander General Osvaldo Alves, and President Goulart. There are a few exceptions of officers whose weak, opportunistic character assure General Ribeiro and President Goulart there will be no control problem. A breakdown of newly promoted general officers bears out the fact that President Goulart wants assurance the military will offer no resistance to his actions. To achieve military support, President Goulart has followed the familiar and successful pattern he has used in the labor field. He has installed leaders he considers personally loyal to him even though he knows a large percentage are far leftists.

"8. At this date the generals in key commands probably would not support an open unconstitutional action sponsored by President Goulart, but as more officers are named by him, giving him greater depth of support, it is possible there would be no Army opposition to President Goulart taking illegal action if strongly backed by 'popular' demand. This would be particularly true if such action were to follow an abortive coup by anti-Goulart forces.

"9. As the fortunes of officers openly favoring President Goulart are improving with rapid promotions and assignments of importance, the situation of the anti-Goulart officers is reversed. (See [] report of 6 August promotions and command changes to strengthen Goulart dispositive.) This interaction sharply decreases the possibilities of a successful Armed Forces coup against President Goulart. The large group of uncommitted middle grade officers who have waited for the usual Brazilian compromise to save them from making a crucial political decision are ceasing their outspoken criticism of President Goulart, as they see with increasing frequency the favors handed out to pro-Goulart officers and the assignments to oblivion given to anti-Goulart officers. Also important is the ever increasing economic

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- 3 -

pressure which the average officer is subjected to due to Brazil's inflation. Few officers have the economic resources or the moral courage to knowingly jeopardize their chances for promotion or choice assignments, which involve financial fringe benefits. In this increasingly troubled and confused atmosphere, and lacking a strong active duty spokesman, the anti-Goulart military forces appear to have time working against them in organizing a coup against the Goulart government.

"10. Of the sixteen newly-promoted generals, five are considered leftists, three are possible Communists and eight are non-political officers whose [redacted] backgrounds reflect no previous record of anti-Goulart sentiment or open pro-U.S. friendship. Particularly significant were the out-of-turn promotions of men named far down the promotion list. In addition to grade promotions, virtually all sixteen were also promoted in terms of more important assignments. The contrary is true for known pro-U.S. officers, who with few exceptions, were given no promotions or key assignments. Most pro-U.S. officers were in fact shunted to insignificant field commands or desk jobs without real authority.

"11. A breakdown of the sixteen newly-promoted generals follows:

- A. Alfredo Pinheiro Soares Filho; far leftist, primary loyalty Goulart, 35th on promotion list.
- B. Omar Emir Chaves; political non-entity, primary loyalty General Ribeiro, 20th on promotion list.
- C. Joao de Deus Nunes Saraiva, political nonentity, primary loyalty General Ribeiro, 33th on promotion list.
- D. Nario Villanova Madeira; far leftist, possible Communist, primary loyalty Goulart, 26th on promotion list.
- E. Joaquim de Mello Camarinha; political nonentity, opportunist now tied to General Ribeiro, 27th on promotion list.

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- 4 -

- F. Chrysantho de Miranda Figueiredo; far leftist, possible Communist, primary loyalty General Osvino, 25th on promotion list.
- G. Napoleao Nobre; far leftist, primary loyalty General Osvino, 28th on promotion list.
- H. Antonio Negreiros de Andrade Pinto; leftist, opportunist with loyalty Goulart and General Osvino, 18th on promotion list.
- I. Argemiro de Assis Brasil; far leftist, possible Communist, primary loyalty Goulart, General Osvino, and respects General Ribeiro, 44th on promotion list.
- J. Newton Barra; political nonentity, opportunist primary loyalty General Ribeiro, 47th on promotion list.
- K. Luis Lopes de Miranda; political nonentity from Medical Corps, first on Medical Corp list.
- L. Benjamin Rodrigues Galhardo; political nonentity, opportunist with primary loyalty General Ribeiro, first on Major General list.
- M. Armando Bandeira de Moraes; leftist, opportunist now primary loyalty General Ribeiro, formerly General Osvino, 5th on Major General list.
- N. Aluizio de Miranda Mendes; political nonentity, opportunist primary loyalty General Ribeiro, 4th on Major General list.
- O. Mario Poppe de Figueiredo; political nonentity, opportunist primary loyalty General Ribeiro, second on Major General list.

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- 5 -

P. Silvino Castor da Nobrega; far leftist, opportunist primary loyalty General Osmino and Goulart, third on Major General list.

"12. A very key figure in the current situation is War Minister Ribeiro. He is basically apolitical, [redacted] strictly military, a strong legalist who is violently opposed to illegal activities of both left and right extremes. He is very loyal to President Goulart but asserts himself when his principles are involved. Personally violently anti-Lacerda, he claims backing of Kubitschek. He is running the Ministry of War; however, he is at the same time a figurehead for President Goulart in the sense that he obeys the orders of the President of the Republic. General Ribeiro does not have significant strength throughout the Army; rather he appears to be acceptable to both left and right elements, and draws some support from both. General Ribeiro, under the influence of President Goulart and at the same time determined to protect and maintain President Goulart is now leaning toward leftist military elements since they feign support of President Goulart, while rightist elements openly plot and talk of wanting to oust President Goulart. General Ribeiro is faced with something of a dilemma. He is determined to maintain President Goulart, and therefore must seek support from the left, even though he would prefer to avoid leftist support. Concerning promotions, he had little choice but to go along with President Goulart's recommendations and although he is aware that three Goulart choices (Assis Brasil, Napoleao Nobre, and Figueiredo) were considered 'Osmino men,' General Ribeiro is impressed with their high ability and perhaps believes they will be loyal officers. In general, however, General Ribeiro seems to be in control of assignments.

"13. Regarding General Osmino's position and influence, General Osmino has been politically active in the military for a long time. He has left his mark primarily by selecting, promoting and indoctrinating a group of highly capable, relatively young officers who as ultra-nationalists believe the military must play an active political role in achievement of a strong, financially independent Brazil. General Ribeiro appears to consider General Osmino a 'politico,' not a soldier, and for this reason insisted that President Goulart agree to the retirement of General Osmino.

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However, Generals Ribeiro and Osmino have not 'broken' with each other. On the contrary, General Ribeiro is a friend of General Osmino as General Ribeiro is of Lt. General Amaury Kruehl, former Minister of War, and Lt. General Castello Branco, former Commander of the Fourth Army in Northeast Brazil. General Ribeiro listens to General Osmino since General Osmino has the full confidence of President Goulart.

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

cc: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. McCone

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