

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 93-309

By , NARA, Date 4-11-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ JUNE 7.

CINCSO FOR POLAD. DOD FOR DIA, ACSI AND CONTIG

1. ARMA LUNCHED ALONE WITH PRESIDENT CATELLO BRANCO IN RIO ON JUNE 6.

2. PRESIDENT EVINCED PLEASURE OVER REPORTS RECEIVED FROM BOTH GENERAL PANASCO ALVIN AND COLONEL MEIRA MATTOS CONCERNING RECEPTION AND TREATMENT THEY ACCORDED BY GENERAL PALMER AND US MILITARY IN SANTO DOMINGO. HE SAID THEY HAD TOLD HIM EVERYTHING HAD BEEN DONE TO FACILITATE ARRIVAL AND INSTALLATION OF BRAZILIAN IAF CONTINGENT. PRESIDENT EXPRESSED WARM APPRECIATION OF ASSISTANCE RENDERED HERE BY USMILGP AND USAF IN SHIPMENT OF BRAZILIAN TROOPS WHICH WENT OFF SO WELL.

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3. PRESIDENT QUERIED ARMA AS TO REASON LATTER HAD NOT ACCOMPANIED COLONEL MEIRA MATTOS TO DR, AND ARMA REPLIED THAT COMPETENT US AUTHORITIES FELT IT WOULD BE BETTER IF BRAZILIAN CONTINGENT COMMANDER ARRIVED ALONE. PRESIDENT DID NOT PURSUE POINT FURTHER.

4. PRESIDENT NOTED THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID INTER-SERVICE SQUABBLES HE HAD TURNED PLANNING CONNECTED WITH DR CONTINGENT OVER TO ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF AND IS PLEASED WITH RESULTS. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE SAID HE HAD CREATED NEW BODY, I.E., AN ARMED FORCES HIGH COMMAND COMPOSED OF THE THREE SERVICE MINISTERS: THE THREE CHIEFS OF STAFF; THE ARMED FORCES CHIEF

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-2- 2658, JUNE 7, FROM: RIO DE JANEIRO

OF STAFF AND THE CHIEF OF PRESIDENT'S MILITARY HOUSEHOLD. PRESIDENT SAID HE HAD FOUND THIS BODY EXTREMELY USEFUL AND INTENDS TO HAVE IT GIVEN LEGAL STATUS AND MADE PERMANENT.

5. PRESIDENT INQUIRED AS TO U.S. REACTIONS TO BRAZIL'S SUPPORT OF U.S. IN OAS OPERATION IN DR AND DECISION TO MAKE BRAZILIAN MILITARY FORCES AVAILABLE. ARMA ASSURED PRESIDENT BRAZIL'S ACTION HAD MADE MOST FAVORABLE IMPRESSION IN U.S., NOTING THAT THIS WOULD HELP ENSURE GREATER RECOGNITION OF BRAZIL'S ROLE IN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS.

6. PRESIDENT OBSERVED THAT OAS SHOULD PRESS FOR EARLY

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SOLUTION OF DR SITUATION, OTHERWISE IT WILL BECOME CHRONIC CRISIS LIKE THAT OF CUBA. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTED BRAZILIAN OAS AMBASSADOR PENNA MARINHO IN THIS SENSE. PRESIDENT WENT ON TO SAY THAT WHEN U.S. ACCEPTED OPPROBRIUM INEVITABLY CONCOMITANT WITH MILITARY INTERVENTION IN DR IT SHOULD HAVE CARRIED ACTION THROUGH TO LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES, ADD KG THAT HE OF COURSE DOES NOT HAVE ALL INFORMATION WHICH U.S. UNDOUBTEDLY HAS IN MATTER. PRESIDENT CLEARLY TAKES A DIM VIEW OF CAAMANO.

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