

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Info P R 222230Z

FM AMEMBASSY RIODEJANEIRO

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY (627)

INFO RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK 18

RUESSD/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO 48

RUESSD/USCOMDOMREP

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STATE GRNC

BT

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ SEPTEMBER 22.

Authority *State Sec 3/18/77*

LIMDIS

By *mg*, NARS, Date *5/2/77*

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL BRAZILIAN CONTINGENT FOR DOMREP

1. PRESIDENT CASTELLO BRANCO RECEIVED ME LATE WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON TO GIVE ME HIS REACTIONS TO OUR SOUNDINGS ON ABOVE SUBJECT MADE THROUGH FOREIGN MINISTER AND WAR MINISTER.

2. PRESIDENT STATED THAT HE HAD TO BEAR IN MIND THREE FACTORS: HEMISPHERIC SECURITY, ECONOMY, AND DOMESTIC PRESSURES FOR WITHDRAWAL BRAZILIAN FORCES FROM DOMREP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THESE MAY OBVIOUSLY CONFLICT, AND TO EXTENT THEY DO THE FIRST IS PARAMOUNT IN HIS MIND.

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TO EXTENT THAT HE CAN RECONCILE THEM, HOWEVER, GOB WANTS TO DO SO.
HE ALSO INDICATED DESIRE TO ASSIST IN FREEING US PERSONNEL VIEW VIETNAM AND OTHER WESTERN CAUSES WHICH GOB SUPPORTS.

3. PRESIDENT SAID HE UNDERSTOOD OUR THINKING HAD BEEN IN TERMS OF NEED

FOR TWO BRIGADES TO STAY FOR A SUBSTANTIAL PERIOD, PERHAPS THROUGH ELECTION AND INSTALLATION SUCCESSOR TO GARCIA GODOY. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT GENERAL PALMER HAS JUST RETURNED TO DOMREP FROM WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS, AND HE WOULD LIKE TO BE BROUGHT UP TO DATE ON BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL THINKING IN US CONCERNING SIZE AND DURATION OF FORCE. HE HAS ALSO NOTED AMBIGUOUS STATEMENTS OF GARCIA GODOY CONCERNING REQUEST FOR EARLY WITHDRAWAL. PRESIDENT THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE MOST USEFUL FOR SECRETARY RUSK AND FONMIN LEITAO DA CUNHA TO DISCUSS THIS ASPECT DURING THEIR TUESDAY MORNING NEW YORK MEETING NEXT WEEK.

4. FOR REASONS OF ECONOMY, PRESIDENT'S PREFERENCE WOULD BE TO MAINTAIN ONLY ONE BATTALION IN DOMREP, BUT IF CONTINENTAL SECURITY NEEDS REQUIRE

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-2- 627, SEPTEMBER 22, FROM RIO DE JANEIRO.

HE PREPARED TO INCREASE THIS TO A MAXIMUM EQUIVALENT TO TWO BATTALIONS, THE SECOND ONE PROBABLY BEING MARINES RATHER THAN ARMY. HE NOTED OUR WILLINGNESS COVER LOGISTICAL COST, BUT THIS IS A SMALL PORTION OF TOTAL, AND HE ASKED WHETHER THERE MIGHT BE SOME POSSIBILITY OF OAS SHARING IAPF EXPENSES IN WHOLE OR IN PART. (I REPLIED THAT I COULD SEE SOME

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OBVIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN THIS, ESPECIALLY IN SECURING THE VOTE OF COUNTRIES WHICH HAD REFUSED TO SEND CONTINGENTS.) PRESIDENT SAID HE ALSO GIVING THOUGHT TO REDUCING HIGH ALLOWANCES FOR TROOPS SERVING OUTSIDE COUNTRY, ALTHOUGH THIS MIGHT REQUIRE LEGISLATION.

5. FINALLY, PRESIDENT SAID HE UNDERSTOOD US WAS PLANNING REDUCE RANK OF CONTINGENT COMMANDER, AND HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE MAKE CORRESPONDING REDUCTION IN RANK FORCE COMMANDER BY REPLACING ALVIM BY A MAJOR GENERAL.

6. COMMENT. IT SEEMS CLEAR TO ME THAT BRAZIL WILL DOUBLE ITS CONTINGENT IF PRESSED, BUT ALSO HOPES THAT SOME MEANS OF REDUCING ECONOMIC BURDEN INVOLVED MIGHT BE FOUND. I WILL BE WITH PRESIDENT IN RECIFE SUNDAY FOR INAUGURATION COPERBO SYNTHETIC RUBBER PLANT, AND WOULD WELCOME ANY GUIDANCE BY SATURDAY MORNING ON ABOVE POINTS. IN ANY CASE, WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE FOR SECRETARY BE PREPARED DISCUSS THEM WITH LEITAO TUESDAY.

GP-2 GORDON
BT

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