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FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

027

NO: 1072, December 3, 6 P. M. (SECTION FOUR OF FOUR)

PRIORITY.

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On other hand Justice Minister Joao Mangabeira recently stated that return to Presidentialism is automatic immediately after favorable plebiscite vote, and hence implied Congressional approval of new Government unnecessary. If this statement was authorized by Goulart, which it presumably was, it does not raise one's confidence as to nature of Government with which Goulart is planning to confront us, since it should be relatively easy to get Congressional approval for kind of regime we would like to see.

As to longer-range political plans of regime we do not have much to go on. Danilo Nunes, important UDN Guarabara State Deputy, tells me that PTB thinking of 1965 in terms of following possibilities:

- A) Amendment to Constitution so Goulart could succeed himself,
- B) San Tiago Dantas as candidate to keep Presidency in Party,
- C) Amendment so Brizola, now ineligible as Goulart brother-in-law, could run, and
- D) Arracs as candidate.

While this is very unwholesome crew, it would be nice to be

/ sure (and I am not)

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E. O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 5(D), 5(E) AND 11

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State NLK-76-88
BY SKF NARS, DATE 7-6-77

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-2- 1072, December 3, 6 P. M. from Rio de Janeiro (Section 4 of 4)

sure (and I am not) PTB thinking in terms as much constitutionality as this.

Whatever bits and pieces of evidence we have relevant to question of what happens if we insist on our own terms for continued collaboration with GOB are scattered throughout preceding sections this message. Conclusion we draw from them is that chance for success in influencing regime for better are considerable. Although dramatic changes in this direction, especially on political side, are unlikely, we can hope for enough changes to commit regime to substantially altered course. As we have indicated under two above, we think negative GOB line would be unlikely itself be dramatic in early stages. I thus think that even when we knew Goulart's reaction to our approach and had had chance to look at personnel of new Government, we might well find ourselves with very difficult decision as to whether changes we had brought about were essentially in nature of "cover" for negative GOB attitude or whether we had really accomplished enough to make lasting change.

This message is from Ambassador drafted prior departure.

BOND

MBK-16

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