

achieve that wish by the course we are now following. With the Russians providing the sophisticated equipment and the Chinese providing the manpower—if it becomes necessary—there is very little left to provide in terms of military opposition to the American troops over there.

So, my contention is that those who argue that my course would be "deserting our boys in Vietnam" do not realize the full danger of the situation. Their course is the one which is deserting those boys. Their course is piling up casualties by the thousands week after week. If that course continues, it will result in casualties by the hundreds of thousands.

This is the course which, it is said, we have no opportunity to do anything about—we cannot do it on an authorization bill, we cannot do it on an appropriation bill, and we cannot do it on a foreign aid bill.

When can we do it? What is the power of Congress, if it is not to indicate its feelings by use of the legislative power and the control of the purse-strings? If not that, there is no power in Congress.

Many on both sides of the aisle have complained about the great and growing power of the Executive. There is no greater example of that power today than that being exercised by the President in Vietnam, with no congressional control whatsoever, in this most critical course that has ever faced the United States, and we sit here and say Congress cannot do anything about it.

Congress can do something about it. Congress should do something about it. This is the way to do it—by action on this bill we have before us today.

The Fair Packaging and Labeling Act of 1966

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN D. DINGELL

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 6, 1967

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act of 1966 was described by President Johnson, when he signed the bill, as "a strong and simple law." The act goes into effect July 1, 1967. In order to assure the maximum amount of cooperation between those who will administer the law and those who will be subject to the law, Acting Secretary of Commerce Alexander B. Trowbridge called a meeting in Washington on February 28, to bring together Government officials and business leaders of affected industries. I should like to point out that this meeting was set 4 months before the law is scheduled to go into effect. A thorough report on this meeting appeared in the March 1, 1967, issue of the New York Times, in an article by Nan Robertson. The spirit of cooperation is evident from a reading of the story. I urge Members to read this

account of the meeting, which I offer for the RECORD at this point:

[From the New York Times, Mar. 1, 1967]

UNITED STATES WILL PUBLISH GUIDELINES ON PACKAGE SIZES BY JULY 1—TROWBRIDGE TELLS BUSINESS THAT PLAN IS VOLUNTARY, BUT IN PUBLIC INTEREST

(By Nan Robertson)

WASHINGTON, Feb. 28—Top officials of the Commerce Department told businessmen today that the department would publish guidelines on "undue proliferation" of package sizes before July 1.

The Fair Packaging Act of 1966 goes into effect on that date. The first guidelines to be made public will be the Commerce Department's proposed procedures for determining when a packaged product is sold in to many weights, measures or quantities. When this happens, the law says, the customer is often confused, and it is difficult or impossible for him to judge which package to choose.

The acting Secretary of Commerce, Alexander B. Trowbridge, told the 300 invited businessmen that his department had no authority to regulate the packaging or labeling practices of private industry.

But, he said, "We do have a responsibility and authority to determine whether there are problems and to encourage the development, on a voluntary basis, of standards which will be in the total public interest."

AIM IS TO REDUCE CONFUSION

The acting Under Secretary, J. Herbert Holloman, carried on the "voluntary" theme by saying:

"It is our intent to reduce confusion and allow shoppers to judge. We will not demand that everything be sold in 10-pound sacks. The department does not want to define 'undue proliferation' for everybody."

To define strictly what that term is would be a "horrible mistake" and "put us in a straitjacket," the Under Secretary said. Mr. Holloman will oversee the program.

And Robert E. Giles, general counsel for the department, said that unlike the word "regulation," the word "voluntary" is a nice word; it is a happy word, and it is a constitutional word.

"It has a connotation of happy things, being done by happy people—not unhappy things being done to unhappy people," Mr. Giles said to muted laughter.

PROCEDURE IS OUTLINED

Under the law, if the commerce Department decided that "undue proliferation" existed, it would ask the industry concerned to work out voluntary package standards. If the industry failed to set up standards within one year, or if the voluntary standards were not observed, the Secretary of Commerce could ask Congress for the authority to impose standards.

Mr. Giles indicated that the department could set up procedural guidelines soon, presumably before July 1.

In general, the procedure would provide, first, a notice of a tentative finding of undue proliferation from the Commerce Department. Second, it would give the affected industry time to examine the finding. Third, the industry would present information and argument on its behalf. Fourth, the Commerce Department would then publish its final procedural guidelines—also probably before July 1.

Practically every man on platform today admitted he could not define beyond the broad terms expressed in the law what undue proliferation was.

"How does one go about determining whether the ability of the consumer to make value comparisons between comparable consumer commodities is impaired?" asked Mr. Giles.

ANSWER IS GIVEN

The answer, according to Mr. Giles and others, boils down to making decisions based on common sense and "experience growing out of case-by-case determinations" after the law goes into effect.

"I think the statute authorizes a broad grant of discretionary authority on this point" Mr. Giles said.

"It seems to me that what may be reasonable for one commodity may very well be unreasonable as applied to an entirely different commodity."

The chief lawyer for the Commerce Department had three suggestions to make to private industry:

One, that it develop and publicize a voluntary packaging standard in such a way that producers, distributors and consumers would be represented.

"Some years ago, the byword for the conduct of international relations was, 'open covenants openly arrived at.' The byword for developing voluntary product standards by private industry might very well be, 'open standards openly arrived at,'" Mr. Giles said.

Two, the standard should not have the effect of imposing an unreasonable restraint on trade by being accompanied by efforts to fix prices, divide markets or boycott competitors.

And finally, he said, it is desirable before any standard is made public "that there be a competent legal review of the standard itself" as well as the procedures for developing it and getting industry approval.

Ave Maria Magazine Criticizes Latin American Arms Race When Economic Needs Are Critical

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. HENRY S. REUSS

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 6, 1967

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Speaker, an article appearing in the December 17, 1966, issue of Ave Maria magazine strikes at the heart of one of Latin America's great problems—continued military expenditures in the face of desperate economic needs. The article not only is critical of Latin American nations that follow this policy, but is equally critical of those, the United States included, who too often encourage it.

As chairman of the Subcommittee on International Finance of the Banking and Currency Committee, I had occasion to study agricultural development in Latin America last December. The findings of the subcommittee confirm the article's conclusions that what Latin America really needs is butter, not guns. This article should be of interest to all Members of Congress:

ARMS AND LATIN AMERICA: THEIR GUNS, OUR BUTTER

Reporting that Chile recently bought 21 British jet fighters at a cost of \$20,000,000, *Newsweek* magazine called the purchase "a disheartening reminder that even in one of the most progressive of Latin American countries the worst traditions of Latin politics are not yet dead."

The magazine also reprinted part of the scolding the New York Times gave Chile, an

editorial pointing out that the country "simply cannot afford millions spent on toys for the Chilean Air Force."

Both the *Times* and *Newsweek* saw a connection between Chile's purchase and the fact that Argentina's military government had recently bought 25 Skyhawks in the United States. So do we.

Neither publication liked to see this money go into war equipment while Latin America's social conditions are so urgently in need of drastic reform. No more do we.

But both the *Times* and *Newsweek* adopted a lofty, superior tone, reproving Chile's President Eduardo Frei for giving in to the military. *Newsweek* mentioned that a *Times* editorial "implied [that] it was downright hypocritical of Chile to spend \$20 million on warplanes and then ask U.S. aid in financing its social and economic reforms."

We feel that someone ought to point out that both Latin governments involved—Chile's progressive and democratic one no less than Argentina's repressive and autocratic one—are "more to be pitied than censured." They're not spendthrifts squandering the food money on shiny baubles: far from it. They are, rather, victims of a set of circumstances neither they nor their predecessors created, a set of circumstances from which they do not profit and over which, as matters now stand, they have little or no control.

Either despite our wars in this century or because of them, depending on how you read history and psychology, we have no great revulsion in this nation against those who profit from war. That may be just as well, for with the widespread ownership of our industry and given the complex web of interaction in our economy, probably none of us can claim, nowadays, not to profit from war. At any rate, the days when we as a nation were stirred by Upton Sinclair's "Lanny Budd" books attacking the munitions-makers are long gone. And so it may be that many of us have forgotten President Eisenhower's warning, given as he left the presidency, against the growth of a "military-industrial complex" of power.

Few could have failed to get his point in Brazil, where a military government installed itself in 1964 with the aid and complicity of our government's military and civilian representatives—and the blessings of our business interests.

His warning could not have escaped notice in Uruguay—which, between 1945 and 1962, received more than half as much in military aid as in economic assistance.

Certainly, this history and President Eisenhower's warning are not lost on Frei, Argentina's generals or other Latin American leaders.

No one knows better than those who live there how little need there is for a military class in Latin America—or how urgently the money now spent on military equipment and activities is needed for social and economic reforms. President Frei needs no lectures on this from the *New York Times* or from anyone. And we—our government leaders and our military men—recognize the truth of the *Times'* remarks, too.

Yet we continue to furnish military aid to these countries—more than \$70,000,000 in 1962 alone; and the question remains: Why?

Well, they ask for it. That's no reason—our wives ask for fur coats, but they don't always get them.

And it's easier to get money from Congress for military aid than for economic assistance. True; but that's a symptom, not a cause.

Why?

Certainly not for defense against communism—guns are no defense against ideas; and a government that invests in jets and tanks instead of in schools and hospitals and roads and industry is simply asking to be overthrown . . . probably with the help of

those very jets and tanks. Latin American politicians are not stupid: They realize this.

The cynical answer, heard fairly commonly in Latin America, is that we give military aid so that countries will buy arms from us, since we produce them faster than our own government can use them. This helps keep our arms industry going, so that when our own government needs to call on it, it can respond. A variation on this answer holds that we give military aid because our munitions and aircraft industries have a hold over our lawmakers; thus, Congress seldom votes against even the most outrageous proposals for military aid. President Eisenhower's warning is quoted to support this viewpoint, as are statistics.

Militarismo is, as *Newsweek* said, one of "the worst traditions of Latin politics"—and Eduardo Frei certainly recognizes this, if Argentina's generals do not. He realizes how little his country can afford to spend millions of dollars on "toys for the Chilean Air Force."

When will we realize that we cannot afford this sort of expenditure, either—or the circumstances that compel it? And that by permitting these circumstances to continue, we become even more responsible for *militarismo's* continued existence than Latin American politicians and militares?

Why do we do it?

Hanoi's Offers To "Talk"

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 6, 1967

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, as pointed out in the following article from the February 10, 1967, edition of the *New York World Journal Tribune*, Hanoi's offers to negotiate have always been false. The only reason they even throw out their whispers and rumors is to try to get us to the point where we will unilaterally stop bombing the north and thus permit them to rebuild their forces in the south and replenish their supplies there. It would be folly to permit them to do this and President Johnson is to be commended for continuing to protect the lives of our troops by refusing to stop the bombing without an assurance from Hanoi that they will not use the time for increasing their infiltration and aggression.

The article follows:

A BEHIND-THE-SCENES LOOK AT HANOI'S OFFER TO TALK

(By Joseph Alsop)

WASHINGTON.—What has really been happening behind the scenes in these last months? This question has been insanely confused by self-serving statements by all parties interested in the Vietnamese war, including the U.S. government. But a fairly confident answer is now possible.

Briefly, the North Vietnamese leaders have crossed the great divide between making propaganda and making solid-seeming though highly conditional offers to negotiate.

At one moment, in Warsaw in December, a face-to-face meeting between American and North Vietnamese representatives even seemed possible. The Polish government, having promised to produce the North Viet-

namese, then failed to do so. Bombing of targets in the Hanoi area was blamed for the no-show, but in fact there is every indication that this episode was only a more dramatic version of the general pattern.

The general pattern, which has been repeated again and again, is very simple indeed. A diplomatic or other third party turns up with the news that he has been having frank talks with the North Vietnamese leaders or their qualified representatives. He does not say he brings a "message," but he states that he has the "strong impression" that the North Vietnamese will hasten to the conference table, if only the bombing of North Viet Nam can be "permanently" halted.

Thus far, the U.S. answer has always been the same: that the U.S. is eager for "unconditional negotiations," as proposed by the President at Baltimore; that the U.S. will not halt the bombing merely to secure negotiations; but that the U.S. is also eager to begin talks and halt the bombing, if Hanoi reciprocates with an adequate quid pro quo.

Thus far, when this answer has been returned to one of Hanoi's third party-probers, the sequel has always been dead silence. This confirms the surmise in the last report in this space, that the whole thrust of Hanoi's recent diplomatic effort has been to get a respite in the war, in the form of a bombing halt, rather than to get negotiations. The indications of willingness to talk are in fact mere bait to secure a unilateral military advantage of the utmost importance.

The pattern is simple if you understand it, but it has been vastly muddled up, in the first place, by the self-deluding eagerness marking the efforts of too many of the third parties, including some third parties who have spoken with no authorization.

Etienne Manac'h, of the French foreign office, spoke without serious authorization, for example, when he presented to Senator Robert Kennedy and a member of the U.S. Embassy staff in Paris his ideas about the possible phases of negotiations. Only after receiving Kennedy did Manac'h check with the North Vietnamese in Paris, Mai Van Bo, who apparently said that he personally thought Manac'h's ideas were quite O.K.

This explains the mystery of the French foreign office denial, issued only a day or so after the foreign office had approved the Paris Embassy's telegram given an exact account of Manac'h's conversation.

The Manac'h-Kennedy conversation was as represented in the telegram, but the ideas put forward by Manac'h belonged only to Manac'h. Even the alleged after-the-event approval of Mai Van Bo was also unauthorized by Hanoi, as was indicated by Mai Van Bo's throw-down of the whole story, issued simultaneously with that of the foreign office.

When so many persons are eager to get into the act, such flurries are unavoidable. But there is a deeper reason for the prevailing confusion, going far beyond the pretensions of a Manac'h or the groundless whispers of the Polish foreign office.

The root of all the confusion, in fact, is the President's hankering to defer, or even to prevent altogether, the kind of national argument that is bound to arise if the issue is starkly posed. There are a great many people who know little or nothing of the war, who would like the President "to stop the bombing to get talks." They will make an ear-splitting row, when and if it is learned beyond question that he has been refusing to do so. Consequently, smoke-screens have been pouring out of the White House in the customary way.

Meanwhile, no one at all pays any attention to the real meaning of these probes by Hanoi. Only a little while ago, the Hanoi leaders were swearing they would never, never negotiate until the last American soldier had left South Viet Nam. Now they